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"U.S. chopper shot down over Afghanistan"

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Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Inside Bin Laden
Jihad vs. McWorld
Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Taliban
The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Terrorists
Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War

Opposed to the PDPA
regime are a number of mujahidin.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

American response was initially lukewarm. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Neumann prepared a policy review for the State Department in June 1971. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In this review he said, For the United States, Afghanistan has at the present limited direct interesr, it is not an important trading partner, it is not an access route for US trade with History and Political Traditions: The Monarch/ 15 16 Afghanistan others; it is not presently. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He told an American author that Daoud’s foreign policy did not cause any anxiety in Moscow and was not a factor in the latter’s downfalL This was also the view of Eliot’s political counsellor, Bruce Flatin. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The confrontational strategy began with the election ofJimmy Carter as American President, its principal architect was his national security adviser, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Developments in the area around Afghanistan particularly were taken into account by the Soviet leaders as they arrived at the decision to intervene. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Cyrus Vance wrote in his memoirs: ‘There were background news stories coming out of Washington to the effect that there was a possibility of some form of US military action against Iran.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Vance realized that ‘US military presence in the area would make a collapse of the Kabul regime more dangerous for the Soviets and thus enhance the possibility of Soviet intervention.’7 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Coming back to the specific point of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, it is significant that in the last week of December 1979, the Soviets were as apprehensive of an imminent American move into Iran as were the Americans of a probable Soviet push into Pakistan or iran from the vantage point of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The burden of Moscow’s carefully orchestrated articulations was that the United States was turning Nelson’s blind eye on the changes that had occurred to the global balance, that it was determined to take the world back to the wasted epoch of cold war, and that this exercise in muscle- flexing would fail because the Soviet Union had emerged as an equal of America and could not be cowed by threats of military superiority. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
More relevant to the situation immediately created by the Soviet military push into Afghanistan were the firmness and precision with which the Soviets reiterated their determination to defend the legiti- mate interests of national security and a fraternal revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘Nobody will intimidate the Soviet Union’, he declared. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This requires us, on the one hand, to remain firm in our resolve not to accept unprincipled compromises under pressure of military threats and violations, and, on the other hand, not to allow ourselves to be provoked into retaliatory measures which could harm the prospects of a peaceful solution.24 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘In the past two years’, stated the annual plan document, sixteen big projects ‘which have a major role in the growth of the national economy of the DRA~, were built with Soviet assistance and were now in operation. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Brezhnev declared in his first major statement after the military intervention that ‘the USSR will withdraw its military contingents from Afghanistan as soon as the reasons that caused their presence there disappear and the Afghan government decides that their presence is no longer necessary.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As Andropov told a Western interviewer on 1 April 1984, ‘We have a long common border, and it does make a difference to us what kind of Afghanistan it will be. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He received a cool reception. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On May 25, the Pakistan Foreign Minister was in Washington to obtain from the United States its concurrence with the principal outlines of the settlement. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It is known that there is an element within the Reagan administration that advocates US backing for a negotiated settlement. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
During the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives inJuly 1983, Selig Harrison declared that the USA appears to share some of the responsibility for the present slowdown in the negotiations. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
While the Government of Pakistan seemed to be bereft of new ideas and initiatives for settling the Afghan issue, its former foreign minister, Agha Shahi, suggested a quid pro quo between the two superpowers as a means of getting Soviet troops out of Afghanist2.n. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Begum Bhutto said that what was happening in Afghanistan was an internal affair of that country, Pakistan had no right to interfere. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Once we have accepted the British in principle as solicitors with the Amir till our political interests in Middle Asia do not clash with those of the British, the stronger is the authority of the Government of India in Kabul the easier it would be for us to achieve the safety of our interests and ful- filment of our demands. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
291.] Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
New York Times, loJune 1978.11. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
3. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
5)is mostly about the Panjsher Valley fighting. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Kabul New Times, 2-8 February 1983. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
93—36111 CIP To Sayd Bahauddin Ma/rub, Ghulam Ghaus Shujaee, Abdur Rahim Chinzay, Naheed Azadab, Aziz ur Rahman Ulfat, Ghulam Shah Sarshar Shamali, Sa’adat Shigaywal, Mohammad Wali Karokhel, and other Afghans who died for us in defending freedom and independence. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I acknowledge my special indebtedness to Kent Obee, director of the United States Information Service in the American embassy in Islamabad; Richard Hoagland, head of the American Center in Pes- hawar; and John Dixon, director of Afghan Section at the U.S. Informa- tion Agency in Washington, D.C. These three men made the Fuibright grant possible. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Pre- L mier Daoud had set as one of his principal tasks the settlement of the Pashtunistan issue. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He intended to ask the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev “whether Soviet subversive actions in Afghani- stan had received his sanction or were carried out without his knowl- edge.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
While addressing a group of university professors whom he had invited to dine with him, he assured them, “You professors may or may not be with us, but as long as I am alive I will never allow any foreign power to dominate our fatherland.”29 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The military regime in Pakistan, led by General Zia al-Haq, who came to power in 1977, and the religious regime in Iran, led by the Ayatullah Khomeini, who came to power in 1979, were grappling with serious problems. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Another “reason” was given more prominence in the Soviet official declarations. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On 14 February 1979 four followers of Baw’ess kidnapped U.S. Am- bassador Adolph Dubs and took him hostage in a hotel to pressure the government to release their leader. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Following the death of his mother, he left home and lived with his widowed mater- nal aunt. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Similarly, Rabbani states, “For us Islam is a driving force, which concerns every aspect of our life.”3’ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
While Afghanistan harbored the Pashtun and Baluch dissidents of Pakistan, the latter incited Afghan Islamists. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Olivier Roy states that Afghan Islamists decided to wage an armed struggle against the government of Daoud, but on this they were divided, and while the younger members stood for it with the support of Pakistan, Rabbani was against it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The patronized coalition did not prove effective in coordinating mili- tary activities. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Khalili says of himself, “I do not know what part of Afghanistan I am from; my father and grandfather would tell us we are from Ghazni. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Their attitude was changed not only toward the regime but also toward modern education and local leaders. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To forestall disturbances and to collect intelligence, KhAD directed a network of spies. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For Kabul, Logar and Shamali (districts south and north of Kabul, respectively) are important strategic regions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But,” added the minister, “if you really want to live in peace, cooperate with us, expel the rebels from your region, and pay your taxes, for which you will be granted local autonomy.”4 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
One further village we saw destroyed virtually before our eyes. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
When not allowed to do so, they would attack the village or residential forts. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet officer warned him that if he did not carry out the order, then he would be killed instead. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Hurriedly we left the village, but left one man behind us; he was wounded and we could not carry him out. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I have already commented on the fact that areas surrounding military garrisons and military posts had been mined. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and the Soviet Union’s Foreign Minister Edward Shevard- nadze were present as the coguarantors of the accords. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
President Najibullah was, however, unable to enjoy the fruits of vic- tory for long. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Let us turn now to the internal aspect of the coalition. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The economic deterioration is still more phenomenal. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Robert Oakley, the former U.S. ambassa- dor to Pakistan who was also concerned with Afghan affairs, holds that “the political future of Afghanistan is no longer of interest to the U.S.”133 This may or may not be the official line, but since the dissolution of the Soviet Union the U.S. administrations have shown no evidence to the contrar~ The United States and other powers have even forgotten about the part that Afghanistan played in the dissolution of the “evil empire” and the end of the cold war, events that made it possible for world gov- ernments to improve their economies for the first time in four decades.134 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
It is doubtful whether the United States and other major powers will effectively back the UN plan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Thus, the legacy of the Soviet war and the Western response to it is not only a ravaged Afghanistan without a functioning national govern- 300 ment but also a culture of guns, drugs, and terrorism that is as poison- ous to others as it is to Afghans. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
With the help of his followers he occupied the district of Darwaz for a while in 1975. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
K0sYGIN. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Iran and Pakistan have a common plan against us. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I ask you to help us. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
What political actions or statements would you like us to make? Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
KOSYGIN. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
TAiwu. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
34. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
29. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
arm and kill followers of the rival group. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Russians are in great difficulty; don’t shun resisting them” (Zadran, History of Afghanistan, 709—I z). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
103. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
135. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A Nation Is Dying, 1979—87. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
B. The Political Language of Islam. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Chicago: University of Chicago ~5S, 1988. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
U.S. Depart- ment of State Special Report no. 104, 1982. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
323, 324, 315 USSR. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to numerous friends, fellow journalists and observers for their views, suggestions and help. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Only a few weeks before, on 14 September, Hafizullah Amin, then prime minister, had deposed President Nur Mohammad Taraki following a bloody shoot-out at the Presidential Palace. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Too many people Introduction ‘7 Introduction are in jail for us to forget now’, a respected Afghan university lecturer told me. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Then he smiled and waved us on. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Searching for weapons, they frisked the passengers in a cursory manner but did not bother with us. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Astonished at the lack of a Soviet presence, we asked about their whereabouts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
We found a relatively modern but empty hotel that had obviously seen better days during the pre-1978 tourist boom which had provided Afghanistan with one of its main sources of hard currency. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Build-UP US satellite surveillance indicated abnormal Soviet military activity in the Central Asian republics bordering Afghanistan towards the end of November. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As suggested by the four to six Soviet divisions reportedly positioned in Western Afghanistan, as well as the 20-24 divisions along the southern Soviet border with Iran, it is against this country that the Soviet focus appears to be directed rather than against Pakistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It has also begun to assert greater influence among resistance organisations and may play a leading role in the years to come. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As compared with the US experience in Vietnam, the Kremlin has been much more restrained militarily and has only permitted a limited escalation of the war by raising its troop commitment from 85,000 men during the early stages to the present estimates. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But at dawn, some 300 armoured vehicles rumbled into the valley and surrounded the settlement of Dehe Sallah. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In one minor but revealing incident, Dupaigne’s bus overtook a Russian truck along the Salang Highway. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘They treat us like dogs rather than comrades’, remarked a disenchanted Khalqi army officer who fled in late 1983. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Now and again, one of his lieutenants would venture up to him. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The chief, his hands planted firmly on his knees, would listen gravely before bellowing forth yet another command. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In typical Afghan fashion, they immediately offered us cushions and the best positions on the worn but beautifully woven rugs before serving us with tea, sweets and cakes. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Observers who have travelled to the interior question claims by US officials that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is running a highly effective and ‘daring’ military assistance programme to the resistance, estimated at $325 million in early 1984. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
They have caused us some serious problems, but we have learned to cope with them. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Failing to crush us by force, as they have said they would with each offensive, they have turned their wrath on defenceless people, killing old men, women and children, destroying houses, and burning crops. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Once there, he and his fellow guerrillas sought to persuade the local inhabitants to take up arms against the Kabul regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
rocket launchers, each capable of firing 122mm projectiles in devastating salvos or ‘ripples’ totalling four and a half tonnes of explosives, had been positioned on the edge of the camp. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
hazard relationship that had existed in the region between the British and the Russians came to an end. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to John Evarts Homer, the US deputy chief of mission in Kabul from 1951 to 1953, the State Department showed ‘absolutely no interest in East- West relations’ in Afghanistan during this period. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
US-Soviet Competition Overall, the Russians had adopted a far more effective, and subtle, long- term approach than their American counterparts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Apart from major road construction in the south, many US develop- ment projects were less evident to the public eye: health programmes, education, Peace Corps volunteer work and agricultural reclamation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Some of these projects were also in conjunction with international aid programmes, thus displaying UN rather than US insignia. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Former US ambassador Robert Neuman noted that, although this co-operation was completely unofficial, it was good and effective. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Moscow was absorbing roughly 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s exports. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At any rate, in 1956, he was hired by the US embassy and AID mission in Kabul as a translator, but then established his own agency, the Nur Translations Bureau, while still pursuing a literary career. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Abdul Hadi, another teacher, recalled: ‘They were particularly angry because the governor of Kunar had previously called on us all to take up arms against the rebels, but we flatly refused.’ Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nabi turned away anyway and started to hurry toward the mosque. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
When, at the end of land distribution ceremonies, government officials invited farmers to spit on their expropriated landlords, many refused. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Those who plot against us in the dark will vanish in the dark’, maintained Taraki. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘We used to be questioned (by Afghans) but then they would take their papers with our answers into the next room where there were Russian advisers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
God is Great. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Join us. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
An inhuman The Communist Overlay regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
ents on th e e from the army. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Seventeen and eighteen year old pupils often complain to their teachers that there is little point in learning if they can be called up at any moment or can enter university without examinations if they join the announced that all 10th grade high school drop-outs who for grade certificates, while se from t ith rade could ent uni. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Only by doing this, they told us, could we evolve like the Soviets and emerge from our misery’, said a former high school student from Ghazni. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At one point, the Kremlin tried with UNESCO acquiescence to swamp one of its adult education programmes by sending 18 Soviet instructors to fill the salaried posts of six teachers designated by the Paris agency. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At one gathering in December 1983 outside the US embassy which was elaborately ‘guarded’ by visored riot police, shouting party mili- tants carried uniformly painted signs (all carefully collected at the end of the demonstration) with anti-American slogans condemning Washin- ton’s ‘imperialist occupation’ of Grenada. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘They only told us what they thought we needed to know’, said one senior engineer, who joined the resistance at the end of 1981. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
We thanked the women and bent down to pick up their offerings. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Even in war people must continue living’, noted one resistance commander from Kabul, ‘If the mujahideen 165 166 The Afghan Struggle can offer nothing, there is no doubt that the communists will do every- thing to fill the gap if they know it will break us. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Hekmatyar disclaims all responsibility for such attacks, either dis- owning them completely or maintaining that his supporters are not involved. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But this time armed Parchami militants, many of them students, blocked their path. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghan police accom- panied them but did not intervene. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, despite the gunning down of demonstrators, the Parchami authorities seemed to be making an effort not to act in the same manner as the Khalqis. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For over three hours, the chief and his lieutenants patiently explained their position. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Then the Afghan commander turned to us and said: ‘Now, you have asked your questions, let me ask mine.’ Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Meeting, sometimes secretly, with numerous commanders from the interior and refugee leaders, they claimed that local reaction was far beyond what they had expected. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
groups who regard the move as an effort to reassert Pushtun dominance, there appears to be increasingly widespread support for his The Afghan Struggle return. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In the summer of 1984 a group of Afghan resistance represent- atives arrived in Peshawar to test out the idea. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As de Bretagne recounted: As the Soviets advanced, we moved from one village to another, people carrying the medication and patients behind us. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
isation’ of the situation through complete suppression of the ‘counter- revolution’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Soviet refusal to consider a withdrawal so long as the present regime in Kabul cannot survive on its own also spells doom, at least for the time being, for the peace talks. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
239 240 Perspectives During the early 1980s, the search for a peaceful solution in the Middle East, US involvement in Central America, the Libyan interven- tion in Chad and even the invasion of Grenada tended to dominate America’s outlook in the world. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As a nation of immigrants, it also has the habit of responding to foreign policy along the lines of ethnic identities, be they Irish, Jewish or Pol~ _M..w” Afghanistan: The Soviet War
He has written mainly on refugees, politics, development and guerrilla movements, but has also collaborated on documentary films/news shows for European and American television on Angola, Ethiopia, the Iran-Iraq war, Afghani- stan and other issues. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
47,74, 75,101,104,108-10, ll5-l8passim, 122,123,125, 130, 136,138, 139, 149,226, 227,236 Afghan Information Centre, Peshawar 141 Afghan Millat 50 agreements, A.-Soviet 26, 104, 132-3, 152, 154-5, 157; Red Cross- Soviet 230 agriculture 34, 36, 49, 86, 87, 112, 154,160-1,165,185,242 AGSA 117, 118,121,122 Ahrnad, Col Sayed Gui 118 Ahmadzai, Gen. Shahpur Khan 106 AICF 224 aid 7,10,66-7,101,184,203~12, 2404; Soviet 22-3, 88-90,93-5, 104, 153-6, 158-60,242; US 8, 66-7,94-5,101,114,190,240-1, 244 airbases 25,40,44,61,73,93,94; see also Individual headings air bombardments 5, 6, 30,33-5 passlm, 37,42,44,45,60,81, 83-5,114,116,118,126.7164 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
6,16-17,25,28,32-5,40,42, 236 Sovietisation 135-61, 236-8 SSD 120, 122, 123 Stalin, Josef 89 strikes 176-8 passlm students 89, 91,92, 141-5, 147,151, 166, 177-80,218 subversion, Soviet 5,25,28, 35-6, 41-2, 187, 233, 243 Sultani Valley 9 Sunnis 10, 27,54, 196 supply routes 37-8, 634; see also caravans Sweden 211,216,242 Switzerland 229-32 passlm Tadjikistan, Soviet 116,156 Tadjiks 10, 54, 57,58, 66, 68, 133, 199,203; Soviet 145 Takhax province 2,42,66 talks, Geneva 82, 139,193,234,235; Soviet-mujahldeen 86 Tanaki, President Nun Mohammad 8,22,23,24,31,52,96-8,102, 103,105,106,110,116,117, 119,121,143,153,203 TASS 245 taxation 62,185-6, 198 Technoexport 154 Termez 15, 158, 159 Thiebolt, Mlchel 160 Third World 236,239 Tigré Relief CommIttee 212 torture 7, 117, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 170, 179,223 trade 159,207 traditionalist elements 55, 129, 1834 trail, Jihad 634 trainIng 66,68,76,78,79,93, 138, 225; in Soviet Union 63, 76, 93, 124, 130, 138, 141, 142, 147-8, 154,236,237 treaty, Afghan-SovIet (1921) 88, (1978) 26, 104,244; Afghan-US 90 trials, show 125 tribal elements 5, 10, 36, 54, 58, 69-70,78,97,131-3, 141,183, 184; MInistry of 124, 131-3 truces 132-3; Soviet-mujahIdeen 85-7 Tudeh party 29, 129, 20~ Turkestan 30 Turkey 92,93,208 209 Turkmens 46, 54, 133, 203, 208 TV 148,149,151,239 UNDP 120,147 UNESCO 7,146 UNHCR 7,203-5,208-10 passlm UNITA 68, 183,212,225 United Front for the Liberation of A. United Nations 8, 82, 94, 116, 139, 146-7, 153, 192, 193, 210, 238, 239, 243,244 United States 6,21, 22,25, 28, 29, 32, 34,42,66-7, 68,90,92,93, 94, 114, 120, 151, 184, 189, 190, 208,211,223,235,23940, 242-4 passlm , 248; and aid 8, 66-7, 94-5, 101, 114, 190,240-1; and Soviet Union 8,26,28,94, 235; American Centre 145; American Aid for A. 190 uranium 29, 154 urban warfare 59-60, 72-6, 125, 180,234 University, Free Afghan 242 Uzbeks 54,57, 66, 133, 203, 208; Soviet 145,156 Vachentko, Yourl 230 Venice summIt (1980) 40 Verstakov, Victor 247 Viet Cong 53 Vietnam 6,9,25, 34, 38,42, 53, 104, 110,208,223,225, 244 visits, to Soviet Union 138-9 194 Index Voice of America (VOA) 81, 148, 188, 189, 246 volunteer agencies 7, 10, 205-6, 242 Wakhan corridor 208-9 ‘Waltan Palanzaj’ 148 war: Indochina 225; Indo-Pakistan 100; Iraq-Iran 29, 201; World II 90 Wardak province 55, 172, 184 Wardak, Col Abdul Rahim 65 Wardak, Mohammed Amin 55, 172, 196 water, irrigation 152, 154-5 Wazinstan, Northern 39 Western interest 23841 wheat 160 Wikh-e-Zalmaiyan (Enlightened Youth) 91, 92, 98 withdrawal, Soviet 6, 40, 235, 240 women 164, 218-19; Democratic — Organisation of A. 140; education of 115; rights of 106 World Bank I53-Spassim, 158 World Food Programme 205 World Health Organization 146, 210, 217 Writers and Poets, Union of 140 Yemen, South 27, 120 Yepishev, Gen. Alexei 22 ‘Young Afghans’ 90, 91, 99 Young Muslims 166 youth 147-8, 237; see also students; Democratic Organisation of A. Youth 140 Yugoslavia 192 Zabiullab (mujahed commander) 54, 55, 156, 233 Zabul province 171, 229 Zahir Shah, King 90-1, 95, 100, 158, 166, 172, 194-5, 244 zakat 185-6 Zalmai (nephew of Amin) 14 Zariffar, Ahmed Kasim 147 Zia, Ahmad (Massoud’s brother) 78 Zia uI-Haq, President, 36, 206 259 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
VIII . Jihad vs. McWorld
Neither race nor soul offers us a future that is other than bleak, neither promises a polity that is remotely democratic. Jihad vs. McWorld
When the Hilton came to the Hills of Buda, a local architect grafted the new structure onto a thirteenth-century monastery. Jihad vs. McWorld
Yet however American cars are in concept, they are hardly Amer- ican in their manufacture whether measured by parts, design, or even labor. Jihad vs. McWorld
Leave us alone! Jihad vs. McWorld
Let us do what producers and consumers do: sell, buy, produce, consume. Jihad vs. McWorld
The Resource Imperative As recently as 1960, the United States imported only a handful of minerals such as aluminum, manganese, nickel, and tin. Jihad vs. McWorld
The sharp and sudden deterioration in America’s resource inde- pendence produced by this juxtaposition is evident from U.S. baux- ite figures. Jihad vs. McWorld
Bauxite is the source of aluminum and a crucial element in industrialization, not least of all in its war-making moment. Jihad vs. McWorld
That is the irony of mod- ernization, described by modernity’s first incisive critic, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Jihad vs. McWorld
Rousseau had seen that the power given us by science and technology to gratify our needs actually compounds and multiplies them so that as our power increases our satisfaction diminishes. Jihad vs. McWorld
The only non-European, non—Pacific Rim countries among the top twenty-five U.S. export markets are its Latin American neighbors (with whom America also runs trade deficits): Brazil at number 17 and Venezuela at number 20. Jihad vs. McWorld
There may be radical The Industrial Sector and the Rise of the East • Ranking as Supplier (US. Jihad vs. McWorld
importsftom,) 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 I0 Ranking as Export Market (US. Jihad vs. McWorld
Among the top twenty-five U.S. companies (for 1992) with the largest non-U.S. Jihad vs. McWorld
Merchandising is as much about symbols as about goods and sells not life’s necessities but life’s styles—which is the modern pathway that takes us from the body to the soul. Jihad vs. McWorld
Brand names are tiphers for associations and images carefully cul- tivated by advertising and marketing because they are what generate market demand. Jihad vs. McWorld
Nike is not trying to export sneakers (a limited market, the corporation acknowledges), it is trying to export Michael Jordan who, Chairman Knight assures us, is tied for first place in 66 THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD China as the world’s greatest man with Chou En-lai (an astonishing comparison that, from the viewpoint of sales, is apparently nonethe- less worth flaunting!). Jihad vs. McWorld
By 1980, the U.S. share had fallen to ~6 percent while Japan’s share had risen to 40 percent. Jihad vs. McWorld
They say they don’t have any artistic or cultural inputs. Jihad vs. McWorld
The table for McWorld has been set by Hollywood. Jihad vs. McWorld
There are apparent exceptions to the growing American hege- mony. Jihad vs. McWorld
Yet only these latter envi- ronments elicit active and engaged public behavior and ask us to define ourselves as autonomous members of civic communities Hollyworid: Mc World’s Videology 97 marked by culture or religion or other public values. Jihad vs. McWorld
McWorld calls on us to see ourselves as private and solitary, inter- acting primarily via commercial transactions where “me” displaces “we”; and it permits private corporations whose only interest is their revenue stream to define by default the public goods of the individu- als and communities they serve. Jihad vs. McWorld
Hollyworld: McWorld~s Videology . Jihad vs. McWorld
To create the cultural values necessary to material consumption is McWorld’s first operating imperative. Jihad vs. McWorld
The supposed explosion of media outlets via cable and fiber optics has created an incentive for government to excuse itself from the messy business of regulation. Jihad vs. McWorld
Consumption takes us as it fmds us, the more impulsive and greedy, the better. Jihad vs. McWorld
Government, federal and local, with responsibility for public education once took it upon itself (back when “itself” was “us”) to even up the market and lend a hand to our better selves. Jihad vs. McWorld
ground, a community center, a museum of living facts, and a showplace of beauty and magic. Jihad vs. McWorld
McWorld as Marketland is, however, not a natural entity imagi- neered by some benevolent deity It is fabricated and it is owned, and how it is owned tells us a great deal about its nature. Jihad vs. McWorld
Margo L. Vignola, a media ai4alyst at Salomon Brothers, smartly noticed that it was a “paucity of creative talent and product available and an enormous amount of technology chasing it” that ultimately 140 THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD Date 1966 1982 1985 1985 1986 1988 1989 1989 1990 Who Owns Mc World? The Media Merger Frenzy ‘4’ Paramount (first round) Columbia Pictures Fox Broadcasting MGM/United Artists NBC Network (RCA) CBS Records Columbia Pictures Warner Communications (Warner Bros. Jihad vs. McWorld
Everyone wants it.”6 Jihad vs. McWorld
This lugubrious conclusion brings us back to the same questions raised in the previous section by the impact of economic markets generally in McWorld. Jihad vs. McWorld
I0 H UMAN BEINGS are so psychologically needy, so dependent on community, so full of yearning for a blood brotherhood com- brings us to the crucial question of nationalism, and its role in the struggle of Jihad versus McWorld. Jihad vs. McWorld
Market liberals of Milton Friedman’s or Jeffrey Sachs’s persuasion have assured us that the two cannot be uncoupled in the long run, but the long run here may be several lifetimes—far too long to sustain the credibility of their argument.’ Jihad vs. McWorld
Pat Buchanan tells the Republican National Convention in 1992 that the country faces a cultural war for its very survival and victori,çus Republicans following the 1994 elec- tions accuse Preskdent Clinton of countercultural and un-American attitudes. Jihad vs. McWorld
But as McWorld is “other” to Jihad, so jihad is “other” to McWorld. Jihad vs. McWorld
It is the job of civil society and democratic government and not of the market to look after common interests and make sure that those who profit from the common planet pay its common proprietors their fair share. Jihad vs. McWorld
Multinationals cannot be blamed for promoting high profits at the price of high unemployment or sacrificing the local environment to the economic benefits of free trade. Jihad vs. McWorld
When I choose to buy a car, I choose to get from here to there efficiently and perhaps pleasantly; however, among the consequences of my choice may be air pollution, resource depletion, the disadvantaging of public trans- portation, pressure on hospital facilities, and the despoilation of the natural environment by a highway system. Jihad vs. McWorld
Even within nation-states, we are eschewing the tools we have. Jihad vs. McWorld
The dogmas of laissez-faire capitalism that have suffused the politics of America and Europe in the last few decades have been reinforced by the resentments of an alienated electorate that has lost confidence in its own democratic institutions; together, they have persuaded us that our democratic governments neither belong to us nor function usefully either to limit markets or to help them work. Jihad vs. McWorld
If laissez-faire ideology has made it this difficult to conjure up a noncollectivist democracy, how can a transnational democratic polity ever be imagined? Even if we could overcome our political dif- fidence, which mechanisms might afford us the chance as citizens to undo the inadvertent evils of global markets? The eclipse of the national “we” in the shadows of both Jihad and McWorld is trouble enough. Jihad vs. McWorld
256 JIHAD VS. Jihad vs. McWorld
The old Baconian dictum that knowledge is power and that through science we can command the world, the belief that the improvement of men’s minds and the improvement of his lot are finally the very same thing, was at the heart of the Enlightenment’s conviction that reason embodied in science and technology could liberate the human race from prejudice, ignorance, and injustice-- could eventually liberate all women and men and democratize their social institutions. Jihad vs. McWorld
The history of science and technology is at best a history of ambiva- lence. Jihad vs. McWorld
Their aim is to stay competitive with infotainment companies like Time Warner. Jihad vs. McWorld
Not so long ago, the prescient historian J. G. A. Pocock suggested that [today we find] ourselves in a post-industrial and post-modern world in which more and more of us were consumers of informa- tion and fewer and fewer of us producers or possessors of any- thing, including our own identities.’When Jihad vs. McWorld
These include traditionalist advocates of the moral Jihad against the West’s consumer culture, like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn or his more militant Islamic brethren as well as some of Jihad’s harshest critics like Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has blamed the temptations of tribalism on the West’s “permissive cornucopia” that breeds materialist self-gratification and a “dominant cultural reality” defmed by the “dyn~mic escal~ttion of desire for sensual and material pleasure.”9 Jihad vs. McWorld
Civil society, or civic space, occupies the middle ground between government and the private sector. Jihad vs. McWorld
Their first priority surely must be the reconstruction of civil society as a framework for the reinven- tion of democratic citizenship, a mediating third domain between the overgrown but increasingly ineffective state governmental and the metastasizing private market sectors. Jihad vs. McWorld
Civil society offers us a single civic identity that, belonging neither to state bureaucrats nor private consumers but to citizens alone, recouples rights and responsibilities and allows us to take control of our gov- ernments and our markets. Jihad vs. McWorld
Technology may permit us to reconstruct electronic wards and teleassemblies linking together distant neighbors. Jihad vs. McWorld
Admirers of Milton Friedman’s version of unrestrained capitalism would like us to think that markets are surrogates for democratic sovereignty because they permit us to “vote” with our dollars or D-Marks or yen.9 Jihad vs. McWorld
McWorld has virtues then, but they scarcely warrant permitting the market to become sovereign over politics, culture, and civil soci- ety Jihad too has virtues which, I acknowledge, may be less than easily discernible in light of my harsh criticism of parochialism’s abuses. Jihad vs. McWorld
Nonetheless, as Robert Bellah and his colleagues demon- strate in their study of America’s yearning for community (Habits of the Heart), and as Michael Sandel shows with acute historical insight in his recent tribute to Democracy’s Discontents, the alienating material forces of McWorld leave us seeking forms of conm!union Jihad vs. McWorld
I have much less sympathy for those who read only one or another section of the book and concluded, lazily, that I must be writing either about McWorld alone or Jihad alone. Jihad vs. McWorld
5. Jihad vs. McWorld
For 1985—88, Argentina’s spending averaged $27.5 Jihad vs. McWorld
tics, ~D. Jihad vs. McWorld
West Germany with 102 deals was the chief culprit, but the US., Jihad vs. McWorld
American farms employ less than 2.5 Jihad vs. McWorld
Recycling can make a difference. Jihad vs. McWorld
Chapter3. Jihad vs. McWorld
27. Jihad vs. McWorld
Figures from Anthony de Palma, “Mexico’s Hunger for US. Jihad vs. McWorld
Roger Cohen, “Europeans Back French Curbs on U.S. Movies,” The Yew2. Jihad vs. McWorld
I will not try here to rehearse the thoughtful critique of television that has been offered by social critics such as Marshall McLuhan, Neil Postman, or Todd Gitlin. Jihad vs. McWorld
McDonald’s 1992 U.S. sales were $13.2 Jihad vs. McWorld
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Yationalism (London: Verso, 1991). Jihad vs. McWorld
We are not facing the global, social, ecological and cultural challenges that confront us. Jihad vs. McWorld
Cited by Nicholas D. Kristof, “China Sees ‘Market-Leninism’ a Way to2. Jihad vs. McWorld
There are, Greenfeld reminds us, 25 mil- lion Japanese between the ages of fifteen and thirty They are “the chil- dren of the industrialists, executives and laborers who built Japan Inc.” and they are “as accustomed to hamburgers as to rice balls and are often more adept at folding a bundle of cocaine or heroin than creasing an origami crane.” Jihad vs. McWorld
Chapter 15. Jihad vs. McWorld
Kuttner notices, of course, that “oddly enough, for a decade the US. Jihad vs. McWorld
Supporters played on Kohl’s name, which means both cabbage and cash in German, by shouting “Keine Kohl ohne Kohl”—no cash without Kohl. Jihad vs. McWorld
Municipalities are left with only those programs that run at a loss. Jihad vs. McWorld
Geographia Ltd., Jihad vs. McWorld
I05~ Jihad in, ig6, 197, 198, 202 Huntington, Samuel P, 299 hydroelectric power, 39 IBM, 27, 74, 126 Ignatiefl Michael, 165, 167, 171 IKEA, 57—58 Iliescu, Ion, 202 images: and advertising, 61—63, 67, 69 imperialism, 167 India, i8, 184, 191; advertising in, 62; and confederalism, 289; and economic issues, 35, 55; infotain- ment in, 90, 94, 103, 405, io8; and resources, 43, 44, 47, 48 Indonesia, 70, 90, 91, i8~, 187, 191 industrialism, 50—58 infantilism, 93 infomercials, 64—65, 8~—86, 146 information superhighway: access to, 448; aims of, ioo—Ioi; and con- glomerates, 273; and democracy, iso; and hard goods-service sector interaction, 74; and mergers, 149, iso; power on, 74; public voice in development of, 272; and televi- sion, ioi; “universal service” on, 449; uses of, 269—70 infotainment: American domination of, 76, 82—83; and consumption, i~ and defeat of Jihad, 82—83; and democracy, 268, 273, 291—92; and hard goods, 72; impact of, 32, 82—83; and mergers, 85—87, 137—51; and narrowing ownership Index • of telesector, 297; as part of ser- vice sector; 79—87; and postmod- em capitalism, 59—60; power of, 8~8i; and religion, 83; and soul, 79. Jihad vs. McWorld
See also QVC Hong Kong, ~, io8 Horkheimer, 297 Houston Industries, 273 Howe, Irving, 296 Huizenga, H. Wayne, 132—33, 145, 146 Hungary, 162, 266; economic issues in, 240, 248; infotainment in, 90—9!, Jihad vs. McWorld
See also Soviet Union Rutgers University; 6i, 6g Rwanda, 8, 17—18 Saatchi & Saatchi, 6, Sachs, Jeffrey, 239—40, 248 Said, Edward W, 209 Samuelson, Robert J., 28 Saroyan, William, 162—63 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 123 satellite transmissions: and Ameri- canization of global television, 102—4; banning of, 82—83, i88—8g, 207, 227, 270; in China, i88—8g, 207; and defeat of Jihad, 82—83; and infotainment, 9!, Jihad vs. McWorld
See also spec~fic topic Universal City Studios, 142 Universal Pictures, 141 University of Chicago, 234 US West, 142, 273 USA network, 144 USA Today, 89 Uzbekistan, 44, 46, 48 values. Jihad vs. McWorld
M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 12 No. 6 had any originality. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
I say, because history and daily events show us very clearly that those Muslim countries and nations who are brought under the sway of the rule of unbeievers and have lost their national and territorial independence to the oppressive colonialists have no free- dom of religion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It has brought us together. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Afghan people fear both communism and the Soviets. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
First, the mujahidin leadership has been accused of con- nections with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and there- fore of representing Western imperialist interests.t Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
the importance of the “revolution” and rebellions will become more evident to the West. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Daoud had been prime minister from 1953 to 1963 (pp. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
MARXIST REGIMES AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE REVOLUTION 61 major changes in his government), when Mir Akbar Khaybar, a well- known Parcham ideologue (and former high-ranking police officer), was murdered by persons unknown.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
A joke in Moscow among intellectuals in 1981: Probably the Soviets planned a Dominican Republic-type opera- The Soviets have never been completely successful in the “Rus- Question: “Why are we still in Afghanistan?” Answer: “We’re still looking for the people who invited us in.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Although a number of men in Darra-i Nur were potential leaders Second, highland leaders were skillful at negotiating village Finally, during the Muhammadzai period highland leaders had a In contrast, politics in the lower valley had been confrontational THE REBELLION IN DARRA-I NUR 133 not more important questions stand out: (1) What can an understand- ing of the rebellion in Darra-i Nur tell us about rebellions in other areas of Afghanistan? (2) What relevancy does such an understanding have for theoretical issues in political anthropology? and (3) What are the implications of the rebellion in Darra-i Nur for the current theoret- ical debate among social scientists concerning the nature and causes of peasant insurrections in agrarian societies? Answering such questions in detail would take us beyond the limits of this essay, but I feel that the analysis developed here makes a start. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
a village in Jurm district. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Confusion was clearly felt especially among peasants who owned land; for many of them the weakening of ethnic loyalties paralleled a breakup of family ties and a general decline in religiosity and seemed to forecast the end of the world. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghan identifications with Islam have obscurities for observers who frequently, sometimes explicitly, attribute the obscurity to Afghans themselves as insincere or fana- tical or both by highlighting the more accessible fact that Afghans make such charges against each other. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The honor of the nation would be lost. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Conservative aversion in- creased as Habibullah’s son, King Amanullah (1919-29), attempted to institutionalize reforms for women. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
MOBILIZING AFGHAN WOMEN AFTER THE SAUR REVOLUTION: the new government. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
“No one shall engage a girl or give her in marriage in NANCY HATCH DUPREE 322 change, the issue of prestige cannot be discounted when considering the well-being of brides. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Babrak, but Dr. Anahita was the main speaker. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Stork, Joe. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Price and C. G. Rosberg. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustra- tions, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Taliban
10 9 U.S. office sales.press@yale.edu Taliban
Since late 1995, Washington had strongly backed the US company Unocal to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan across Tali- ban-controlled Afghanistan. Taliban
For a year I had been trying to discover what Interests an Argentinean company, unknown in this part of the world, had in investing in such a high-risk place as Afghanistan. Taliban
From 1956 to 78 the Soviet Union gave a total of US$1.26 Taliban
The Afghan Mujaheddin were to become the US-backed, anti-Soviet shock troops. Taliban
million people and devastated the country. Taliban
‘We would sit for a long time to discuss how to change the terrible situation. Taliban
He was the first amongst equals and we gave him the power to lead us and he has given us the power and authority to deal with people’s problems,’ said Mullah Hassan. Taliban
‘We took up arms to achieve the aims of the Afghan jihad and save our people from further suffering at the hands of the so-called Mujaheddin. Taliban
As success came, another tin trunk was added — this one containing US dollars. Taliban
to funnel US arms to the Mujaheddin, left Quetta with 80 Pakistani ex-army drivers. Taliban
Iran developed an air bridge from Meshad in eastern Iran to Bagram, where it flew in arms supplies. Taliban
The US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel arrived in Islaniabad to review US policy towards Afghanistan. Taliban
Starting on 19 April 1996, Raphel visited the three power centres of Kabul, Kand- ahar and Mazar-e-Sharif and later three Central Asian capitals. Taliban
The US moved on other fronts. Taliban
The US Congress had authorised a covert US$20 million budget for the CIA to destabilize Iran, and Tehran had accused Wash- ington of funnelling some of these funds to the Taliban - a charge that was always denied by Washington. Taliban
Moreover the US remained sceptical that the Taliban would conquer Kabul in the near future. Taliban
Washington also courted the other warlords. Taliban
US reluctance to support the Taliban was also influenced by Pakistan’s failure in creating an anti-Rabbani alliance. Taliban
He became one of the young Islamic opponents of the regime of President Daud and fled to Pakistan in 1975, after he led a failed uprising in the Panjshir. Taliban
‘The Taliban took five months to capture one province but then six provinces fell to us in only ten days. Taliban
On the way to Termez on the Uzbekistan-.Afghanistan Taliban
Powerful US feminist groups lobbied Washington on behalf of Afghan women. Taliban
It was now becoming difficult for the Clinton administration to main- tain its initial sympathy for the Taliban. Taliban
They had been instrumental in defeating the Taliban in Mazar in May and again in October 1997. Taliban
A hearing in the US Senate on the Afghan gender issue attracted widespread publicity, as did condem- nation of the Taliban’s policies by such luminaries as Hillary Clinton. Taliban
For several months they squabbled with each other as to who qualified to be an ulema. Taliban
The UN mustered the help of the US. Taliban
Both sides were trying to woo the US and the flamboyant Richardson received a rapturous reception. Taliban
In Kabul the Taliban allowed the accompanying US TV crews to film their leaders for the first time and, as a courtesy to Richardson, they postponed their regular Friday public spectacle of lash- ings and amputations in the city’s football stadium. Taliban
‘This is an organization that hands out edicts to us that prevents us from doing our job,’ he said. Taliban
The Taliban must know that not only is there a limit to what you can stand but that there are growing pressures on us — in particular from the donor community to say that there’s a limit.” Taliban
Mullah Niazi, the commander who had ordered Najibullah’s murder was appointed Gov- ernor of Mazar and within hours of taking the city, Taliban mullahs were proclaiming from the city’s mosques that the city’s Shia had three cho- ices — convert to Sunni Islam, leave for Shia Iran or die. Taliban
All prayer ser- vices conducted by the Shia in mosques were banned. Taliban
It was the Taliban victory, their control over most of Afghanistan and their expectation, fuelled by Pakistani officials that they would now receive international recognition, which partly prompted their guest, the Saudi dissident Osama Bin Laden, to become bolder in his declared jihad against the US and the Saudi Royal family. Taliban
On 7 August 1998, Bin Laden’s sympathizers blew up the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people and wounding 4,500. Taliban
This prompted the US to launch missile strikes on Bin Laden’s training camps in north-eastern Afghanis- tan on 20 August 1998. Taliban
The US claimed that Bin Laden had been present but escaped the attack. Taliban
The Taliban were outraged and organized demonstrations in Afghan cities to protest against the attacks. Taliban
The Taliban offensive, the massacre of Hazaras and the confrontation with Iran, along with the US cruise-missile attack dramatically under- mined the fragile balance of power in the region. Taliban
The consequences of the regional escalation were enormous: there was the danger of a war between Iran and the Taliban, which could also suck in Pakistan on the side of the Taliban; Western investors and oil compan- ies became wary of further investments in the oil-rich Caspian nations; the danger of Islamic fundamentalism spreading to the already economic- ally impoverished Central Asian states increased and anti-US feeling across the region escalated; Pakistan became more deeply polarized as Islamic parties demanded Islamicization. Taliban
The Resolution threatened unspecified sanctions against the Taliban for har- bouring international terrorists, violating human rights, promoting drugs trafficking and refusing to accept a cease-fire. Taliban
Increasing pressure by the UN, the US and other states forced both sides back to the negotiating table in early 1999. Taliban
The money market shut down in protest for several days as the ‘Afghani’ plummeted against the US dollar. Taliban
International efforts by the US, Russia and the regional states to coor- dinate anti-terrorism measures were stepped up. Taliban
When the government launched a crackdown against the SSP in 1998 after hundreds of Shia had been massacred by the SSP, their leaders fled to Kabul where they were offered sanctuary. Taliban
For the first time, the JUl developed international prestige and influence as a major patron of Islamic radicalism. Taliban
For us consultation is not necessary. Taliban
The Kabul Supreme Court handles about 40 cases a week and comprises eight departments which deal with laws related to commerce, business, criminal and public law, but it clearly does not have the same powers as the Kanda- bar Supreme Court. Taliban
‘The Taliban had promised peace, instead they have given us nothing but war,’ said one village elder.8 Taliban
Meanwhile the simmering differences between the Shuras in Kandahar and Kabul escalated dramatically in April 1998 after the visit of the US envoy Bill Richardson to Kabul. Taliban
Like so many mullahs and despite his size, he is surprisingly soft-spoken and I strained to catch his words. Taliban
Children were caught up in the war on a greater scale than in any other civil conflict in the world. Taliban
They insisted that it was up to the West to moderate their position and accommodate the Taliban, rather than that the Taliban recognize univer- sal human rights. Taliban
In May 1997 the religious police beat up five female staff of the US NGO Care International and then demanded that all aid projects receive clearance from not just the relevant ministry, but also from the Ministeries of Interior, Public Health, Police and the Department of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Taliban
‘The Taliban have brought us secur- ity so we can grow our poppy in peace. Taliban
‘Drugs are evil and we would like to substitute poppies with another cash crop, but it’s not possible at the moment, because we do not have international recognition.’ Taliban
When they first captured Kandahar they had declared they would eliminate all drugs and US diplomats were encouraged enough by the announcement to make immediate contact with the Taliban. Taliban
per cent remained in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the hands of dealers, while 5 per cent was spent in the countries through which the heroin passed while en route to the West. Taliban
By 1997, UNDCP and the US HIGH ON HEROIN: DRUGS AND THE TALIBAN ECONOMY 119 120 estimated that 96 per cent of Afghan heroin came from areas under Tali- ban co~itrol. Taliban
The explosion in heroin production began ironically not in Afghanis- tan but in Pakistan. Taliban
The US street value of just these two caches was US$600 million dollars, equivalent to the total amount of US aid to Pakistan that year. Taliban
The US Drugs Enforcement Administration (DEA) had 17 full-time officers in Pakistan during the 1980s, who identified 40 major heroin syn- dicates, including some headed by top government officials. Taliban
It was only after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that US and Western pressure began to mount on Islamabad to curtail the production of opium in Pakistan. Taliban
In February 1998 the Clin- ton administration accused Islamabad of doing little to curb production and exports of heroin. Taliban
Pakistan was slipping back into bad habits. Taliban
The Taliban’s appetite for foreign investment had been first wetted by the competition between two oil companies, Bridas of Argentina and the US company Unocal, who were competing for influence with the Taliban in order to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan across southern Afghanistan (see Chapters 12 and 13). Taliban
In 1998 the economic situation visibly worsened. Taliban
million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and 1.4 Taliban
This reflected the improved law and order in rural areas under Taliban control, the lack of fighting and the return of refugees to farm their lands. Taliban
Although there are still 1.2 Taliban
In camps near Peshawar and in Afghanistan, these radicals met each other for the first time and studied, trained and fought together. Taliban
A decade later the Makhtab would emerge at the centre of a web of radical organizations that helped carry out the World Trade Centre bombing and the bombings of US Embassies in Africa in 1998. Taliban
Ahmed Shah Masud later criticized the Arab-Afghans. Taliban
When my faction entered Kabul in 1992, the Arab-Afghans fought in the ranks of Hikmetyar’s TALIBAN forces against us. Taliban
‘My jihad fac- tion did not have good relations with the Arab-Afghans during the years of jihad. Taliban
In contrast they had very good relations with the factions of Abdul Rasul Say’yef and Gulbuddin Hikmetyar. Taliban
The US activity in Peshawar helped persuade Bin Laden to move to the safer confines of Kandahar. Taliban
The Americans enlisted Afghans and Pakistanis to help them but aborted the operation. Taliban
However, it was the bombings in August 1998 of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 220 people which made Bin Laden a household name in the Muslim world and the West. Taliban
TALIBAN Laden’s capture. Taliban
The Americans were further galvanized when Bin Laden claimed that it was his Islamic duty to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons to use against the USA. Taliban
Bin Laden’s former associates describe him as deeply impressionable, always in the need for mentors — men who knew more about both Islam and the modem world than he did. Taliban
After the Africa bombings the US launched a truely global operation. Taliban
More than 80 Islamic militants were arrested in a dozen different coun- tries. Taliban
The US was Pakistan’s closest ally with deep links to the military and the IS!. Taliban
The Saudi conundrum was even worse. Taliban
After the August 1998 Africa bombings, US pressure on the Saudis increased. Taliban
In their meeting, Mullah Omar refuse to d~ so and then insulted Prince Turki by abusing the Saudi Rova Family. Taliban
Prince Turki visited Kandabar again, this time to persuade the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden. Taliban
The US State Department opened a satellite telephone connection to speak to Mullah Omar directly. Taliban
The Afghanistan desk officers, helped by a Pushto translator, held lengthy conversations with Omar in which both sides explored various options, but to no avail.25 Taliban
They began to hold talks with Western oil companies, on the back of ongoing negotiations between Kazakhstan and the US company Chevron. Taliban
billion. Taliban
That pipeline never got built and subsequently saw several variations as the US tried to block any route through Iran. Taliban
On the drawing boards in 1994 were plans for a 5,000-mile-long oil and gas pipeline eastwards to China that would cost over US$20 bil- lion, but the project is still only in the feasibility stage.’3 Taliban
By 1998 it was clear that US plans to develop the Afghanistan route would be delayed and so the Baku-Ceyhan corridor became the main plank of Washington’s policy towards the Caspian region. Taliban
The controversy over Baku-Ceyhan raged on for two years until late 153DICTATORS AND OIL BARONS 154 TALIBAN 1998 when international oil prices crashed because of the slump in demand due to the Asian economic crisis. Taliban
Turkey and Israel had developed close military and strategic ties after the 1993 Oslo Accords. Taliban
But as US policy towards the Taliban shifted so did Israel’s, as the Taliban gave refuge to Bin Laden and encouraged the drugs trade. Taliban
In exchange Iran allowed companies to lift oil from Iranian ports on the Gulf. Taliban
Since 1998 crude from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan has been transported across the Caspian Sea to Iran’s Casp- ian port of Neka, where it is refined and consumed in Iran. Taliban
In the first phase of its programme, Iran proposed swapping its crude oil with Central Asian crude. Taliban
The USA now wants stability, for it is concerned about the repercus- sions of the continuing Afghan war on its own policies in Central Asia. Taliban
By February 1996 Bulghreoni reported to Bhutto and Niyazov that ‘agreements have been reached and signed with the warlords which assure us a right of way’.5 Taliban
Niyazov was a communist-style dictator who had little understanding or interest in international law and contracts. Taliban
But there were other reasons for Niyazov to turn the screws on Bridas at that precise moment. Taliban
Looking on at the signing ceremony was Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State and then a consultant for Unocal. Taliban
It was preceded by a significant change in US policy towards Central Asia. Taliban
The Clinton administration and Unocal’s sudden interest in Turkmeni- stan and Afghanistan was not accidental. Taliban
During this period (1991—95) the USA ignored Tajikistan which was Involved in a civil war, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, ruled by two dictators, were considered beyond the pale by the US State Department. Taliban
Moreover, with the Russo-centric Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Tat- bott in the driving seat of US policy towards the FSU, Washington was not keen to antagonize Moscow and challenge its abiding interests in Central Asia. Taliban
However, as Russia slipped into chaos, Talbott’s pro-Russian policy 161ROMANCiNG THE TALIBAN 1 162 TALIBAN came under bitter attack from within the US foreign policy establishment, the Jewish and Israeli lobbies in Washington and US oil companies, who all wanted the US to embrace a more multi-dimensional foreign policy towards the FSU. Taliban
One that would allow them to exploit the Caspian’s resources, help the Caspian states assert their independence from Russia and enlist them in the Western camp. Taliban
In early 1995, major US oil companies formed a private Foreign Oil Companies group in Washington to further their interests in the Caspian. Taliban
The strategic interest of Washington and the US oil companies in the Caspian was growing and Washington began to snub Russia. Taliban
Washington had scotched one attempt by US lobbyists to promote Niyazov. Taliban
The immedi- ate beneficiaries were Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Taliban
The US must recognize that Central Asia will remain within the “near abroad” — Russia’s sphere of influence,’ an angr’~ Russian diplomat told me in Asbkhabad in 1997.’~ Taliban
US companies tooL an interest in Uzbekistan’s mineral deposits, and trade between Uzbekis- tan and the USA suddenly blossomed, increasing by eight times betweer 1995 and 1997. Taliban
Both cautiously wooed each other. Taliban
The US lining up alongside Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan and encouraging its allies — Israel, Turkey and Pakistan — to invest there, while Russia retained its grip on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.. Taliban
Thus there were the makings of two coalitions emerging in the region. Taliban
Unocal was a huge corporation which hired executives to run its global oil business. Taliban
Unocal tended to depend more on the US Embassy in Islamabad, and Pakistani and Turkmen intelligence for information on what was happen- ing or about to happen, rather than gathering their own information. Taliban
As my stones were published on the Bndas—Unocal nvalry and the twists and turns of the new Great Game, both companies at first thought I was a spy, secretly working for the other company. Taliban
‘Unocal came to this region because we invited them. Taliban
In March 1996 the US Ambassador to Pakistan Tom Simmons had a major row with Bhutto when be asked her to switch Pakistan’s support from Bridas to Unocal. Taliban
During two trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan in April and August 1996, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 1 ~- 165 166 TALIBAN also spoke in favour of the Unocal project. Taliban
Open US support for the Unocal project aroused an already suspicious Russia and Iran, which became even more convinced that the CIA was backing the Taliban. Taliban
Then, within hours of Kabul’s capture by the Taliban, the US State Department announced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sending an official to Kabul — an announcement it also quickly retracted. Taliban
State Department spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found ‘nothing objectionable’ in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law. Taliban
US Congressmen weighed in on the side of the Taliban. Taliban
Embarrassed US diplomats later explained to me that the over-hasty US statement was made without consulting the US Embassy in Islamabad. Taliban
But the damage done was enormous. Taliban
Even the ever- neutral wire agencies weighed in with their suspicions. Taliban
Its gas and oil fields in Turkmenistan were blocked. Taliban
On the other hand, Unocal’s position was closely linked to US policy on Afghanistan — that it would not construct the pipeline or discuss com- mercial terms with the Taliban, until there was a recognized government in Kabul so that the World Bank and others could lend money for the project. Taliban
We made it clear to all parties from the beginning that the ability to obtain financing for the project was critical, that the Afghan factions would have to get together and develop a functioning government that was recognized by lending institutions before the project could succeed,’ said John Imle.25 Taliban
After the dismissal of the Bhutto government in 1996, the newly elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, his Oil Minister Chaudry Nisar Au Khan, the army and the IS! fully backed Unocal. Taliban
The USA and Unocal had also won over Pakistan. Taliban
Apart from wanting US recognition for the Taliban, Pakistan also des- perately needed new sources of gas supply. Taliban
Niyazov’s wooing of the US began to pay dividends. Taliban
In January 1997, Turkmenistan signed an agreement with the US oil giant Mobil and Monument Oil of Britain to explore for oil over a large tract of western Turkmenistan. Taliban
Privately several Taliban leaders said that they preferred Briclas, because Bridas made no demands upon them while Unocal was urging them to improve their human rights image and to open talks with the anti-Taliban alliance — the main plank of US policy. Taliban
Moreover, Unocal was facing the growing feminist movement in the US which demanded that the USA and Unocal suspend negotiations with the Taliban. Taliban
At the same time, another Taliban delegation was experiencing a dif ferent kind of culture shock They were in Washmgton where they met with State Department officials and Unocal and lobbied for US recogni- tion for their government. Taliban
Bridas actually began to negotiate a contract with the Taliban. Taliban
Delta’s role also increased external suspicions. Taliban
It hired Robert Oakley, the former ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 2: 1997-99 -~ 171 T he attractive mini-skirted Argentinian secretaries at Bridas head- quarters in Buenos Aires had been told to cover up — long dresses and long-sleeved blouses to show as little of their limbs as possible. Taliban
172 -~ TAUBAN US Ambassador to Pakistan and later the US Special Envoy to Somalia. Taliban
For a US corporation to hire ex-US government officials or academics was not unusual. Taliban
All the US oil companies playing the Great Game were doing the same in order to lobby Washington and they were hiring even bigger names from the Reagan and Bush administrations than Unocal was. Taliban
Despite these problems Unocal pushed ahead. Taliban
In a dramatic reversal of policy the USA announced in July 1997 that it would not object to a Turkmenistan—Turkey gas pipeline which would cross Iran. Taliban
By now, there was growing scepticism in Washington that Pakistan and the Taliban could deliver a unified Afghanistan. Taliban
Washington’s decision came as a blow to Unocal and a sharp reminder to Islamabad that US support was fickle at the best of times and that time was running out for the Taliban to unify the country through conquest. Taliban
Although 10 per cent shares in CentGas were reserved for Gazprom, the Russian gas giant refused to sign as Moscow criticized US sponsorship of the Taliban and the undermining of Russian influence in Central Asia.8 Taliban
US officials had already made their anti-Russia policy clear. Taliban
‘US policy was to promote the rapid development of Caspian energy... Taliban
In September 1997 Brida sold 60 per cent of its company’s stake in Latin America to the US 01 giant Amoco, raising the possibility that Amoco could influence Niyazo~ to ease off on Bridas’s frozen assets in Turkmenistan. Taliban
Bridas invited Taliban delegation headed by Mullah Abmad Jan, the former carpe dealer and now Minister for Industries, to Buenos Aires for a second visit in September. Taliban
Throughout 1998 the feminist pressure on Unocal intensified. Taliban
The US bombing of Bin Laden’s camps in August 1998 forced Unocal to pull out its staff from Pakistan and Kandahar and finally, in December 1998, it formally withdrew from the CentOas consortium, which it bad struggled so hard to set up. Taliban
It was clear that no US company could build an Afghan pipeline with issues such as the Taliban’s gender policy, Bin Laden and the continuing fighting. Taliban
US strategy in Central Asia was ‘a cluster of confusions’ according to Paul Starobin and ‘arrogant, muddled, naive and dangerous’ according to Martha Brill Olcott. Taliban
For ordinary Afghans the US withdrawal from the scene ROMANCING ThE TALIBAN 2:1997-99 175 176 constituted a major betrayal, while Washington’s refusal to harness inter- national pressure to help broker a settlement between the warlords was considered a double betrayal. Taliban
Washington allowed its allies in the region, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, free rein to sort out the ensuing Afghan civil war. Taliban
That walk became a run in 1992 after the fall of Kabul. Taliban
There are several distinct phases of US policy towards the Taliban, which were driven by domestic American politics or attempted quick-fix solutions rather than a strategic policy. Taliban
The USA conveniently ignored the Taliban’s own Islamic fundamentalist agenda, its supression of women and the consternation they created in Central Asia largely because Washington was not interested in the larger picture. Taliban
The US policy turnaround from late 1997 to today was first driven exclusively by the effective campaign of American feminists against the Taliban. Taliban
US policy has been too preoccupied with wrong assumptions. Taliban
When I first spoke to diplomats at the US Embassy in Islamabad after the Taliban emerged in 1994, they were enthusiastic. Taliban
There was not a word of US criticism after the Taliban captured Herat in 1995 and threw out thousands of girls from schools. Taliban
In fact the USA, along with Pakistan’s IS!, Taliban
Some US diplomats, concerned with the lack of direction in Wash- ington on Afghanistan, have admitted that there was no coherent US policy, except to go along with what Pakistan and Saudi Arabia wanted. Taliban
In such a situation, the State Department surmised, the USA could not ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 2:1997-99 -~ 177 178 TALIBAN hope to have a coherent policy towards Afghanistan. Taliban
Few in Washington were interested in Afghanistan. Taliban
There was another problem. Taliban
In May 1996 she told the US Senate, ‘Afghanistan has become a conduit for drugs, crime and terrorism that can undermine Pakistan, the neighbouring Central Asian states and have an impact beyond Europe and Russia.’ Taliban
Raphel recognized the dangers emanating from Afghanistan. Taliban
The USA was silent on the Taliban’s repression of Kabul’s women and the dramatic escalation in fighting and in November Raphael urged all states to engage the Taliban and not isolate them. Taliban
Several concerned American commentators noted the inconsistency of US policy at the time. Taliban
‘The US, although vocal against the ongoin~ human rights violations, has not spelled out a clear policy towards thc country and has not taken a strong and forthright public stand againsi the interference in Afghanistan by its friends and erstwhile allies — Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, whose aid — financial and otherwise — enabled ~“ Taliba~i to capture Kabul.”9 Taliban
The US and Unocal wanted to believe that the Taliban would win and went along with Pakistan’s analysis that they would. Taliban
The most naive US policy-makers hoped that the Taliban would emulate US—Saudi Arabia relations in the 1920s. Taliban
We can live with that,’ said one US diplomat.20 Taliban
The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis did. Taliban
Unocal neither admitted nor denied receiving State Department sup- port, as any US company would have in a foreign country, but it denied links with the CIA. Taliban
‘Since Unocal was the only US company involved in the CentGas consortium, State Department support for that route became, de facto, support for CentGas and Unocal. Taliban
At the same time, Unocal’s policy of political neutrality was well known to the US Govern- ment,’ Unocal President John Imle told me.22 Taliban
Until July 1997 when Strobe Talbott made his speech in Washington, the USA had no strategic plan for accessing Central Asia’s energy. Taliban
It was in the interests of Iran and Russia to keep the region unstable by arming the anti-Taliban alliance, so that US pipeline plans could never succeed. Taliban
‘The US acquiesced in supporting the Taliban because of our links to the Pakistan and Saudi governments who backed them. Taliban
But we no longer do so and we have told them categorically that we need a settlement,’ the highest ranking US diplomat dealing with Afghanistan said in 1998.l~ Taliban
US officials began to voice fears that the drugs, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalist threat which the Taliban posed could overwhelm its old and now decidedly fragile ally Pakistan. Taliban
The first public expression of the US change was made by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright when she visited Islamabad in November 1997. Taliban
Inside, she warned Pakistani officials that Pakistan was becoming isolated in Central Asia - which weakened US leverage in the region. Taliban
The shift in US policy was also because of major changes in Wash- ington. Taliban
The dour, hapless Warren Christopher was replaced by Albright as Secretary of State in early 1997. Taliban
Aibright’s private criticism of Pakistan’s policies and public criticism of the Taliban was followed up by the visit of the US Ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, to Islarnabad and Kabul in April 1998. Taliban
The Pakistanis realized this weakness and tried to negate US pressure. Taliban
US tensions with Pakistan increased substantially after Bin Laden’s attacks against US Embassies in Africa in August 1998. Taliban
The fact that the IS! Taliban
Even US Con- gressmen were now raising the self-defeating contradictions in US policy. Taliban
US policy was again a one-track agenda, solely focused on getting Bin Laden, rather than tackling the wider problems of Afghanistan-based terrorism and peace-making. Taliban
The US rejection of the Taliban was largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement at home. Taliban
Afghan women activists such as Zieba Shorish-Shamley had persuaded the Feminist Majority to spear- head a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghan women and force Clinton to take a tougher stance against the Taliban. Taliban
Tibet is out. Taliban
In September 1997 Bridas sold 60 per cent of its company’s stake in Latin America to the US oil giant Amoco, raising the possibility that Amoco could influence Niyazov to ease off on Bridas’s frozen assets in Turkmenistan. Taliban
Bridas invited a Taliban delegation headed by Mullah Abmad Jan, the former carpet dealer and now Minister for Industries, to Buenos Aires for a second visit in September. Taliban
In Sep. Taliban
The US bombing of Bin Laden’s camps in August 1998 forced Unocal to pull out its staff from Pakistan and Kandahar and finally, in December 1998, it formally withdrew from the CentGas consortium, which it had struggled so hard to set up. Taliban
In such a situation, the State Department surmised, the USA could not ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 2: 1997-99 -~ 177 178 TALIBAN hope to have a coherent policy towards Afghanistan. Taliban
‘The US, although vocal against the ongoing human rights violations, has not spelled out a clear policy towards the country and has not taken a strong and forthright public stand against the interference in Afghanistan by its friends and erstwhile allies — Saudi Arabia and Pakigtan, whose aid — financial and otherwise — enabled the Taliba~i to capture Kabul.”9 Taliban
had handled the billions of US dollars which had poured in from the West and Arab states to help the Mujaheddin. Taliban
During his visit to Kabul in April 1998, US Ambassador Bill Richardson had already signalled that the USA saw Iran as a dialogue partner to help resolve the Afghan crisis. Taliban
In the twentieth century the long war between revolutionary Iran and Iraq (1981—88), which led to some 1.5 Taliban
They strongly opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanis- tan, supported the Mujaheddin and backed international measures to isol- ate the Afghan regime and the Soviet Union. Taliban
Dollar for dollar, Saudi aid matched the funds given to the Mujaheddin by the US. Taliban
Iran moved swiftly into Central Asia with a path-breaking trip by Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayti in November 1991, who signed an agreement to build a railway line between Turkmenistan and Iran. Taliban
The ulema play a leading advisory role to the Saudi monarch in the Council of the Assembly of Senior Ulema and four other state organizations. Taliban
King Fahd expressed happi- ness at the good measures taken by the Taliban and over the imposition of Sharia in our country,’ Rabbani said.’3 Taliban
SHIA VERSUS SUNNI: IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA 201 202 TALIBAN Taliban leader MuIIah Rabbani met with King Fahd in Riyadh and praised the Saudis effusively. Taliban
US Secretary of State Madeleine Aibright had said in June 1998, the critical role that Iran plays in the region, ‘makes the question of USA—Iran relations a topic of great interest and importance to this Secretary of State.24’ Taliban
The Iranians had been encouraged that the USA was taking them seriously for the first time. Taliban
‘We brought Afghanistan with us — in our souls, in our hearts, in our memory, in our customs, in everything and at every level,’ said Alexander Lebed, who served as a major in the Soviet army in Afghanistan and is now a presidential candid- ate. Taliban
Regional powers took advantage of the political vacuum the US retreat created, saw an opportunity to wield influence and jumped into the fray. Taliban
The abortive Unocal project should have taught many lessons to US policy-makers, but there appear to be no signs of it as US diplomats scurry across Central Asia trying to persuade oil companies and governments to commit to building a main export pipeline from Baku to~y~. Taliban
The lessons from the Unocal project are several. Taliban
It seems that the only effective Afghan NGO is based on organized smuggling and the drugs trade. Taliban
7 March. Taliban
26 May. Taliban
20 July. Taliban
NOOs pull out of Kabul. Taliban
US FBI places Bin Laden on top of ten most wanted fugitives. Taliban
Fears of US attack on Bin Laden increase. Taliban
billion STATUS OF PIPELINES IN 1999 I. Contract for a Turkmenistan-Turkey pipeline under the Caspian Sea signed in 1999 by consortium made up of Bechtel Group and US General Electric. Taliban
Former US National Security Adviser Alexander Haig hired by President Niyazov to head campaign to encourage US invest- ment in Turkmenistan and soften US position on pipelines via Iran. Taliban
President Niyazov visits USA. Taliban
USA sets up working group including National Security Council, State Department and CIA to study US oil and gas interests in Caspian region. Taliban
US tells Turkmenistan it will oppose financing for pipe- lines through Iran and urges it look to the west. Taliban
US Ambassador Tom Simmons urges PM Bhutto to give exclusive rights to Unocal. Taliban
US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel visits Kabul and Kandahar. Taliban
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Paid- stan and Afghanistan sign agreeement giving Turk- menistan the right to nominate the consortium to build the pipeline. Taliban
APPENDIX 4 239 240 -~ TALIBAN May 14 May 24 4 June 8 June 9 June 22 July 23 July 27 July 14 August 28 August 1 September 5 September 12 September 15 September~Pakistan concludes a 30-year gas pricing agreement Unocal to setup new headquarters for Asia in Kuala Lumpur. Taliban
APPENDIX 4 -~ 241 242 -~ TALIBAN 1999 24 January June 21 August 10 September 5 October 23 November 4 December 22 December Unocal announces a 40-per-cent drop in capital February 3 March March 29 April 12 May At Unocal’s annual meeting, some shareholders object to company’s plans for an Afghan pipeline because of human rights abuses by the Taliban. Taliban
Bennigsen, Alexandre and Wimbush, Enders, Mystics arid Corn- missars, SufIsm in the Soviet Union, University of California Press, Berkeley 1985. Taliban
Hurst, London 1998. Taliban
US aid began with US$30 million in 1980, nsing to US$80 million in 1983, to US$250 million in 1985, to US$470 million in 1986, to US$630 million in 1987 until 1989. Taliban
6. Taliban
7. Taliban
8. Taliban
10. Taliban
Chapter 8 1. Taliban
Chapter 9 1. Taliban
Chapter 10 1. Taliban
2. Taliban
Chapter 11 1. Taliban
Chapter 12 1. Taliban
Both times we spoke extens- ively on and off the record. Taliban
Both companies had built up lobbies within the Taliban. Taliban
Chapter 13 1. Taliban
We have still not decided which company we will accept, but we prefer Bridas. Taliban
Chapter 14 1. Taliban
18. Taliban
NOTES -~ 263 264 NOTES For a discussion of Wahabbism in Central Asia between 1991—94 see, Rashid, Ahmed: The Resurgence of Central Asia, Islam or Nationalism? 9. Taliban
NOTES ~- 265 Abbas, Mulla Mohammed 22, 61, 100 Abdali, Ahmad Shah 10-11 Abdullah, Crown Prince 168 Abu, Dhabi 120 Achakzai, Mansur 28 Afghan, Abdullah 3—4 Afganistan 1—7, 9, 11, 147, 207—8 conflict 21,31, 175, 196—7, 209, 211 ethnic groups 61, 180, 203, 207—8, future of 207—16 history 93, 185, 211—12 international terrorism 209 Islamicists 86—7 jihad 130, 185—7 Marxists 86 Mujaheddin 7, 13,89, 120, 195, 198, Pashtuns 32, 54,200,211 Persians and Arabs conflict 197 pro-Pakistan Pashtuns Mujaheddin radical Islam 188 reconstruction 210 refugees 60 Shins 35,44, 198, 200, 214 Soviet invasion (1979) 11,84—5, 197, 208 with4rawal of troops 175,208 212,215 201,208 government 186 Index Trade Development Cell 184—5 Transit Trade (ATT) 189—94 Turkic peoples 215 Turkmen 61 women 105—16, 174, 182 Afghans 208 Afridi, Major Zahooruddin 120 Agha, Mohammed 34 Agha, Mullah Syed Ghayasuddin 51 Ahmad, Eqbal 187 Ahmad, MulIah Wakil25, 39 Ahmadzai, Shahpur 4. Taliban
Peters, Gretchen 2 pipelines 6, 157—69, 173, 175, 179, 201,209,215 Polo, Marco 7 Primakov, Yevgeny 60—1 Prophet Mohammed 6, 10,23,32, 42—3, 57,86-7, 107 Cloak of 19—20,42 Qadeer, Haji Abdul 48 Qaderiyah (Suffi order) 84—5 Qais 10 Qalamuddin, Maulvi 105-7 Qazil Abad 63 Qila-e-Jhangi 55 Quetta, Pakistan 18,21—2, 27—9,50, 120 mafia 190—3 Rabbani, Mullah Mohammed 22,26, 34,50—2, 93, 103, 159 meeting with King Fahd 202 Rabbani, Burhanuddin 13,26,29,33, 36,43—4, 52,61,64,97, 159, 169 Iran 200,204 Masud troops 21,34—5,40 Pakistan’s rivals 188 Radio Afghanistan 185 Kabul 50 Pakistan 185 Shariat 50—1, 107, 185 Rafsanjani, President AkbarAli 202 Rahi, Dr Humera 69 opment 171 INDEX — 275 INDEX — 276 Rakhmanov, Imomall (President of Tajikistan) 123 Baphel, Robin 46-6, 165—6, 178, 181 Rashid, Abdul 118—19 Rashid, Mullah Abdul 125—6 Razaq, Mullah Abdul49, 51,59 Razzak, Mullah Abdul 100 Reagan, President 172 Red Cross, International Committe (ICRC) 18, 50, 59, 74, 126, 207 Rehami, Mullah Mohammed 17 Rebman, Amir Abdul ‘Iron Amir’ (1880—1901)12 Rehman, Dr Abdur 43 Rebman, Faslur 44 Rehman, Flight-Lieutenant Khalilur Rehman, King Abdul68 Rehman, Maulana Fazlur 26,90,201 Rehmen, General Akhtar Abdur 120 Reuters 167 Richardson, Bill (US Ambassador to Rishkor army garrison 139 Rohrabacher, Dana 181-2 Roman Empire 68 Rostam, Sobrab 63 Rouzi, Majid 58 Roy, Olivier 87, 130, 187 Rubin, Barnett 108,177 Rukh, Shah (son of Taimur)37-8 Rumi (Persian poet) 57 Russia 1—5,44, 53, 56, 60—1,66, 72, 77 arms supplies 76 and Britain treaties 209 Central Asian 44,209 Revolution (1917) 147 Tashkent meeting 77 troops 60 Unocal 171 Safavid dynasty 9—10,197 Sabar, General Saleem 63 Salang Highway/tunnel 47, 52—3, 59 Salim 75 Samangan province 59 Samarkand9,38, 147 Saneos, q~arles 171 121 UN) 71, 181, 196 Sarbanar (son of Qais) 10 Sari Pu! Taliban
UNESCO 9, 113 UNICEF 108, 113 United Arab Emirates 58 United Islamic and National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan 61 United Nations (UN) 50,54,61,67, 74, 111, 114, 126—7, 139, 169 Afghanistan 189 agencies 59, 64, 71, 103, 113, 123—4, aid agencies 2, 62, 70, 72, 77, 101, Aid programmes 69 Charter 64,76 Drugs Control Programme (UNDCP) Group of Concerned Countries 66 High Commissioner for Refugees humanitarian aid agencies 65, 71, 93, investigations 63 Islamabad 49 mediation 177 officials, Kabul 75 peace-making 49, 214 Security Council 45—6,64,66,76—9, Special Representative for staff 70-1 United States (US) 66 Afghan policy 178 Agency for International Develop- Assistant Secretary of State for South h Taliban
Chapter outlines the nature of the creed, largely as defined by the Taliban in their public statements. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
This brings us, in Chapter to the dialogue with the human- itarian agencies. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The war between the Soviet forces and the Mujahidin went through several phases. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In Herat, the Jamiat resistance leader, Ismail Khan, took control’ as soon as the Najibullah govern- ment fell in April 1992. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In the meantime, Masoud’s forces had succeeded in taking Jabal-us-Seraj, at the southern entrance of the Salang Pass, from the Taliban on 29 May. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
We are therefore given a diet of, for example, Iran-backed terrorist groups killing civilians in Israel, of Islamic terrorists bombing the World Trade Center in New York and of the Islamic opposition committing daily atrocities in Algeria. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Taliban spokes- man Mullah Wakil Ahmed, speaking to the Arabic magazine Al- Majallah on 23 October and responding to a question as to how decisions were taken within the Taliban movement, said: They are based on the advice of the Amir Al-Mu’minin. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
This coincided with a dramatic increase in US military support to the Mujahidin. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It argued that a single government there would bring stability and improve the prospects of proceeding with plans to build oil and gas pipelines through Afghan- istan from Central Asia. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Earlier in the Afghan conflict, Iran took a strong position against the USA following the assumption of power by the Ayatollah Khom- eini in 1979, and was alarmed by the growing US and Saudi involve- ment in Afghanistan as the war progressed. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
This ambivalence is also evident with regard to terrorism. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The USA’s possible interest in promoting the Taliban has also been linked with its opposition to Iran. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Certainly, the opposition leaders have been frequent visitors to Tehran and the Iranian government’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Alauddin Borujerdi, has visited the northern leaders on many occasions, as well as holding some discussions with the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
We therefore have a situation where Pakistan and Iran appear to be backing opposing ‘43 To what extent does the USA bear responsibility for the present The Taliban sides in a civil war, with the CIS states, with the exception of Turkmenistan, periodically lending support. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Iran’s paranoia at the presence of a radical Sunni movement on its borders may well have led it to lend support to the northern opposition. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
146 Where, then, does all this take us? We have identified the primary purposes of the Taliban, and have been made aware of the extreme puritanism of the movement and of their willingness to enforce compliance with detailed regulations governing dress and behaviour. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Bibliography ‘54 Abdur-Rahman Khan, Amir, i8, 19, 31, 143 Abdur-Rahman, King, 8o adultery under Shari’a law, 85 Afghan Interim Government, 36, 42, 105 Afghan National Liberation Front, 32 afghani currency, collapse of, 51 Afghanistan: as conduit for gas and oil, 2 nature of, 8—26; relations with Pakistan, 22 Mshar, massacre of, 39 agriculture in Afghanistan, 8—9, 103 Ahmed Shah Durrani, 15, 16 Ahmed, Mullah Wakil, 6o, 65 aid, 8; provision of, 103, 104, 108, 151 (women’s access to, 105) aid agencies, 37, 40, 47, 49, 70, 96, 98, 99, 147, 149, 150, 151; and employment of women, 108, 110; attacks on, 96; dialogue with Taliban, 102—13; possible closure of programmes, 111 Akhund, Haji Mawlawi Mohammed Ghaus, 110 Alexander the Great, military campaigns of, 12—13 Algeria, 97, 100 Amanullah, 24, 8z Amanullah, grandson of Abdur- Rahman Khan, 20, 24, 81, 98; overthrow of, 21 Amanullah, King, 8o, 85, 93; Amin, Hafizullah, 26 Amnesty International, 52 Andropov, Yuri, 35 Index ‘55 Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1921), 20 Anglo-Russian Agreement (1872), 17 arms supplies, 43, 46; negotiated end to, 36; US provision of Stinger missiles, 35, 141 Ashraf, cousin of Mir Mahmoud, Auckland, Lord, i6, 17 Ayala-Lasso, José, 115 Babar, Moghul ruler, i4 Babar, Naseerullah, 128, 132 Babar, Qari, 41 Bacha-e-Saqqao, 21, 39, 8o, 8i, 86, 94 Bagram, 13; airbase, taking of, 55 Balkh, 12, 13, 16 Baluch population, 10 Bamyan, 13 Barelvi, Sayyad Ahmed, 79 Barkley-Brown, Elsa, 152 beards, requirement to wear, 46, 51, 63, 89, 92, 93, 99 Bellamy, Carol, 115 Bhutto, Benazir, 129 Bhutto, Zulfihar, 28; hanging of, 29 blood vengeance, 85 Bonino, Emma, 115 Borujerdi, Alauddin, 135, 143 Bosnia, fighting in, 84 Brezhnev, Leonid, 35 Bridas oil company, 139, 140 brideprice, limiting of, 24 Buddhism, 78 Bukhara, Amir of, i6, 17 burqa, requirement to wear, 51, 6o, 63, 89, 91, 93, g6, 97 15 The Taliban Catholic church, 58, 70 Central Asia, 126, 129, 130, 134, 147 Central Asian Republics, 127, 128, 133, 135, 136, 137, 148 chador, wearing of, 63 Charasyab, 46, 47 Charikar, taking of, 55 Chernenko, Konstantin, 35 Chernomyrdin, Victor, 131 children, working in the streets, 89 China, i8, 135 Christianity, 58, 59; conversion to, 37, 96; evangelism of, 137 see also Islam, and Christianity complex emergencies, 59 corruption, 45, 46, 6i, 71, 73, 92, 139 Cyrus the Great, 12 dance, restrictions on, 72, 73 Daoud Khan, Muhammad, 22, 23, 24, 28, 30, 31, 32, 94, 98; overthrow of, 24 Dan dialect, 9 Darius the Great, 12 debt, rural, 24 Delta Oil company, ‘40 democracy, ii6 Deoband school of Islamic Studies, 79, 8, Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, 45, 63, 73, 77, 8g, 110, 122 Dost Muhammad, i6, 17 Dostam, Rashid, 36, 38, 40, 4!, The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
That leads us to the chief use and justification of terrorism: it is the means taken by militant minorities who feel themselves driven at last to have recourse to violence in the service of their cause, where the inequality of forces as between themselves and the government they seek to or constrain o Uifferent policies is such ory for themselves in open warfare is• The militant minority using terrorism always has one im- mediate object: to weaken both the hold and the will of the tenants of political power. The Terrorists
Let us take the common-sense arguments first: that denial of the right to use violence against the State would lead to the conclusion that whereas Adolf Hitler had a right to use violence against millions of German citizens and against other states, by virtue of his office as Chancellor of the Third Reich, no group of German dissidents could possibly have the right to use terrorism —literally the only means of changing the government of their 14 has a right to defend himself against the aggressor: at the time of writing the following governments are using force without country which was open to Germans between 1933 and 1944— to get rid of him and his Nazis. The Terrorists
St Thomas Aquinas held that an individual (and, a plus forte raison, a group of individuals) has a ‘natural law’right to resist tyranny, even by the use of assassination.’ The Terrorists
Samuel Johnson advises us to clear our minds of cant; it is even less likely that Stirner had read Boswell than that Nechayev ever read Stirner; but he certainly cleared his mind of all that seemed to him to be cant, with the result that he got down to the single remaining brass tack: Me. The Terrorists
Let us put our trust in the eternal spirit which destroys and annihilates only because it is the unsearchable and eternally creative source of all life. The Terrorists
And how, alas, waterfront and bidding Europe ‘Send us your poor...’ The Terrorists
Most’s influence in America began to show itself during the strikes and lockouts in Chicago in 1886, over the Central Labor Union’s attempt to win an eight-hour day for some sixty or seventy thousand workers. The Terrorists
As for Johann Most, he was not discouraged: he managed to keep Die Freiheit going until he himself died in 1906. The Terrorists
I suppose that there is no point in feeling retrospectively ashamed: Aristo- phanes would not have written The Knights had not democracies been apt to find the honour and decency of the ordinary citizen sacrificed by demagogues to the basest passions of political man, during the last couple of thousand years. The Terrorists
Segregated by us, the RIC became a spent force—our pressure made it so. The Terrorists
If you join us you must bring money to buy arms and ammuni- tion. The Terrorists
We have no organization behind us, no political party, no one to help us, no one to back us but ourselves. The Terrorists
Then comes: As was ordered us by our forefathers in our Holy Scriptures, we came to you with peace. The Terrorists
This leads us to a consideration of what, if anything, the terrorists achieved: to my mind there is not much doubt about the answer, though it is one which most people, Jews and Gentiles, will reject with all the honourable and decent disgust of respectable burgesses confronted with the proposition that nations are founded in robbery, arson, rape and slaughter, the objective truth of which can be denied only by carefully avoiding any knowledge of the facts of history. The Terrorists
Let us take two cases and compare results, still bearing in mind that we are considering not what is ‘right’ or ‘moral’ or ‘lawful’ or ‘decent’ or ‘honourable’, but what is expedient for the cause, whatever that happens to be. The Terrorists
Their campaign of property sabotage by massive bombings, of attacks on the army and police, both accompanied by heavy loss of life among unengaged bystanders, has shocked and horrified people all over the world. The Terrorists
Cánovas del Castillo, Antonio (Spanish Prime Minister), 112, 113 Carbonari society, 56—7, 58, 62 Carders Society, 82 Carey, James (Irish assassin), 90, 92—3 Carnot, M. F. Sadi(FrenchPresident), 113 Carson, Edward, 94 Casement, Roger, 95—6 Castioni (Swiss assassin), 17 Catherine the Great, 38 Catholic Emancipation, 83 Cavendish, Lord Frederick, 44,91—2, 93 Central Intelligence Agency, 9, 164, 168 Central Labor Union, 46 Chaikovsky, N. V. (Populist), 72, 76 Charles I, King of England, 184, 185 121 Index 191 Index Chemins de la Liberté, Les, 165 Chernoe Znamla (Russian Black Flag), 134 Chernov ,Victor (Russian revolution- ary), 125, 134 Chernyshevsky, Nikolai, 68, 69 Chesterton, G. K., 63, 122 Chia Ch’ing, Emperor, 53 Chicago, 46—7, 154, 156 Chicanos-Mexican-Americans, 177 Childers, Erskine, 95 Chile, 16, 177 fn. The Terrorists
Orsini (Italian terrorist), 16, 58 Osinsky, Valerian (Russian Anarch- ist), 73, 74 OSPAAAL: see Tricontinental Oufkir, Mohamed (Arab terrorist), 167 Owen, Robert, 69 Pacifism, 15 PAIG() (African anti-Portuguese movement), 168 Palestine, 12—13, 143—63, 174—6 — Arab-Israeli war, 174 —, Balfour Declaration on, 147 —, British in, 146—63, 175 —, 175British Mandate for, 13, 144, —, —, — White Paper, 147, 162 163, 175Jewish terrorism in, 12—13, 147— —, —, terrorism in, 144, 169refugees in, 175—6 Palestine Liberation Organization, 171 Palestine Police Force, 144, 171 Palestinian hijackers, 174, 177 Palestinian New Left Nationalists, 169 Pallas (Spanish terrorist), 112 Palmerston, Loid, 16 Parnell, Charles, 90—1 Parsons, Albert (U.S. The Terrorists
86 Pijemont (Serbian Black Hand jour- nal), quoted, 62—3 Pinkerton Agency, 46, 47, 48 Plekhanov, Georgi, 74, 122 Plunkett, Joseph (Irish militant), 96 Pogroms, 124, 129, 130 Poland, Anarchism in, 127 —, revolt against Russia, 33, 37, 68 Political refugees, 16—17 ——and the law, 16—17 — offences and the law, 165 Popular Front for Armed Struggle: see FPAS Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 176 Populists, 10, 12, 15, 17, 22—3, 68—78 passim, 122, 123, 165, 171 Portuguese Africa, 167-8 Powell, Enoch, 186 Price, General (U.S.) The Terrorists
CONTENTS List of Figures Figure ii. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
For me there has been an additional benefit to this quest. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In that same year, Matthew had become involved in investigating U.S. allegations that the Soviet Union aided Laotians in attacking Hmong tribes with dangerous trichothecene mycotoxins—known as Yellow Rain. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I immediately joined in that inquiry and interviewed Hmong refugees in Rhode Island and Minnesota, as well as officials from the United Nations and the U.S. and other governments who played a part in the controversy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A Joseph Conrad figure who had spent years in Southeast Asia, he claimed to have killed several men with his big, bare hands.) Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The inquiry eventually revealed that harmless bee feces, not mycotoxins, were misinterpreted by the U.S. government as evidence of Yellow Rain attacks. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It has been a privilege to work with them both, and a special bonus to be included on the team that went to Russia to investigate the 1979 anthrax outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Many people played a part in the ultimate success of our investiga- tion. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Faina Abramova, Irma Belaeva, Sergei Borisov, Lev Grinberg, Mar- garita Ilyenko, Larissa Mishustina, Ilona Popova, Vladimir Shepetkin, Paragoriy Suetin, Alexey Yablokov, and Olga Yampolskaya all helped keep the 1979 Sverdlovsk victims from being forgotten. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In 1969, after review- ing the extensive U.S. investment in offensive BW, President Richard Nixon categorically renounced biological weapons. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Nixon limited U.S. BW activities to strictly defined defensive purposes: “techniques of immunization, safety mea- sures, and the control and prevention of the spread of disease.”19 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
All U.S. programs were then dismantled or converted to protective or other peace- flu defensive uses. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the same time, President Nixon declared U.S. support for a British proposal for an international treaty banning biological weapons. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In March 1980, during the first review session of the BWC in Geneva, the U.S. State De- partment raised its initial concern that the Sverdlovsk outbreak signaled 7 8 ANTHRAX: ACCURSED FIRE, BIOLOGICAL WEAPON a Soviet violation of the convention. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Taken by surprise, the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow at first de- nied the outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. intelligence analyst~ believed otherwise. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the spring of 1980 the U.S. government formed a working group on the Sverdlovsk outbreak, consisting of rep- resentatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Coun- cil, the State Department, the CIA, and other agencies, to consider the incident. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
During the 198os, as Cold War tensions heightened, the U.S. invest- ment in weapons systems (including renewed production of chemical weapons) quadrupled, and American press reports about alleged Soviet treaty violations, in Sverdlovsk and elsewhere, filled the news.22 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Yet dur- ing this time no formal complaint about the 1979 epidemic was lodged against the Soviet Union at the United Nations Security Council by the United States or any other nation. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In 1990, he wrote, “On the Soviet side there needs to be a political decision to allow qualified US officials freely to examine what remains of the relevant evidence and to meet with sur- viving patients and local medical, public health, and veterinary person- nel in Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
There is a sixth member of our team, Dr. Olga Yampolskaya, a spe- cialist in infectious diseases at Moscow’s Botkin Hospital, who joins us for dinner. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This morning, June 3, the six of us go to the Institute of Mo- lecular Genetics, our Moscow host organization, where we have two sep- arate appointments, each with someone who has promised to bring us important evidence about the 1979 outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Before flying to Yekaterinburg, our group has business to take care of in Moscow. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Although he died in September 1986, the infected-meat explanation based on evidence he compiled lives on. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
An expanded version of this graph was included in a summary document by the three physicians, which was given to the U.S. State Department after Burgasov and Niki- forov’s 1988 visit (see Figure i). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Burgasov, the only survivor of the three key figures, is now retired from his post as Deputy Minister of Health and lives at his dacha on the Moscow River. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In late 1988, the Soviet Foreign Min- istry presented to the U.S. government the official version of the outbreak (with Bezdenezhnikh, Burgasov, and Nikiforov listed as authors, in that order). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It included a detailed description of gastrointestinal anthrax in- fection, apparently summarized from Nikiforov’s records, along with epi- demiological data from Dr. Bezdenezhnikh. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Olga Yampolskaya has warned us that the two men might come to blows if they meet. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Slightly built, in his forties, the young Nikiforov strongly resembles his father, except his manner is hardly hesitant. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In anthrax, the bacteria themselves are not the killers. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Shortly after, he told the U.S. National Academy of Sci- ences delegation that he had seen cases of inhalation anthrax in Albania, with hemorrhagic edema as their main, most telling characteristic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
MOSCOW: FRAGMENTS OF EVIDENCE MOSCOW: Knowing what Dr. Nikiforov perceived or believed is by now impos- sible, and in fairness, the diagnosis remains problematic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
From 1939 on, the framework for investigating the disease was weapons, which meant no research was done on gastrointestinal anthrax, just on the in- halatory form. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In it, Burgasov tells us, the elder Nikiforov wrote a descriptive section with two of the Sverdlovsk pathologists (Faina Abra- mova and Lev Grinberg) who perforn~’ed autopsies of victims in 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the presentation at the Na- tional Academy in Washington, it was Shelokov who stood up in the au- dience and corrected a serious mistake the interpreter, unfamiliar with biological terms, had made, a confusion of pneumonia with influenza. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The more fundamental source of the outbreak, as Burgasov argues (and MOSCOW: CONFLICTING VISIONS MOSCOW: as is described in the Soviet explanation given to the U.S. State De- partment in 1988), lies in the food industry. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Nothing is terribly amiss with Burgasov’s argument, but a few aspects of it are puzzling. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The combined feed was simply mixed there. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
First of all, from the point of view of evidence, the statement from the Aramil factory director tells us nothing about an- 25CONFLICTING VISIONS 26 thrax contamination. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
MOSCOW: CONFLICTING VISIONS MOSCOW: 90 5 FIGURE 1. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I have neither the home addresses to confirm that the victims were dispersed throughout the city nor the interview information for estimating what common circumstances the victims might have shared outside their homes. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the conclusion of the interview, Dr. Burgasov invites us to visit him at his dacha once we have finished our work in Yekaterinburg. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Young Dr. Nikiforov joins us for lunch at the Presidium of the Rus- sian Academy of Sciences. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The main restaurant, with a ceiling as high as an airplane hangar, is nearly empty. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In addition to the autopsy slides he is willing to share, Nikiforov says he also has at home copies of hospital records for some of the survivors of the 1979 epidemic, which he might allow us to peruse. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That evening, the team convenes for the first of the nightly discus- sions we plan to have throughout this research. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The next morning we go to Domodevedo Airport to fly to Yekate- rinburg. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Why then should the responsible civic or milita~ry personnel wax confessional for us? They would have to be willing to repudiate the Soviet Union’s public health sector or its army. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But the government is letting us in; we have been told that a good number of officials in Yekaterinburg are will- MOSCOW: CONFLICTING VISIONS MOSCOW: ing to speak to us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
And yet the invasion of infected meat into a populous ur- ban area might do that much damage. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The arrangement was made only a month before our arrival, and not without difficulty. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In a remnant of the exchange programs that had flourished during the Nixon administration, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Sci- ences supported Ellis, his wife, and two small children for two months in Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Instead of Director Semyonov, however, a young doctor named Vikton Romanenko greets us; he is the assistant chief sanitary inspectoi~ filling in for his boss. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“We have no records from the 1979 epidemic,” he begins, and then quickly assures us that all current records—on diphtheria, tuberculosis, influenza, as well as animal anthrax and other outbreaks—are comput- erized and in good order. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Romanenko was employed at SES as a junior physician at the time of the outbreak, so he is able to give us his perspective on what had hap- pened. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Were Burgasov’s documents about animal deaths valid or forgeries? Was Dr. Babich aware of Romanenko’s account of epizootics? Could he tell us about any late-occurring epizootic? Alexis Shelokov refuses to translate any confrontational questions, saying that they would be insulting and might get us in trouble. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On hearing two different stories, first that there was an epizootic be- fore the human anthrax cases and then that there was none, we begin exchanging worried glances. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At that mo- ment, Professor Borisov also appears, ready to drive us to lunch at the university. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At this juncture, Dr. Semyonov, the current chief of SES, comes briskly into the office and joins our little crowd. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Romanenko and he exchange glares. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Why did Babich suddenly blush when asked about animal deaths in March? Is he just an old man suffering memory loss? Why was Romanenko so definite about the timing of the epizootic? Is he just a young man suffering memory loss? Shelokov, who did most of the interpreting, has no explanation for the contradictions, nor does Yampolskaya. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Tall and hefty, with tinted glasses and a black beard, and wearing a white laboratory coat, Grinberg makes it clear from the beginning that he will dominate this meeting. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Instead, they were allowed no opportunity to speak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Grin- berg then announces he will give a presentation of the material that will illustrate inhalation anthrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They did, how- ever, take the precaution of closing off the floor drains, and they tried not to spill blood. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It is much more coherent than the one I saw in Moscow. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Grinberg’s review reminds us that, while weapons experts might think of anthrax spores as uniform little bullets, they are organic entities with a definite life cycle, just as Robert Koch demonstrated more than a cen- tury ago (see Chapter i). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I am struck by how far all this detail takes us from actual victims, from human beings. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Grinberg wants to hammer out the details of the intellectual property rights issue. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But this is no time to ask for more. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Grinberg has been so quick to answer our questions, at times interrupting Shelokov’s interpreting, that we are sure he understands English. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That evening our group mulls over the question of whether an ani- mal outbreak of anthrax did occur in 1979, before the human deaths. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our shy biologist from the university, Dr. Vladimir She- petkin, has for us five names of victims, with their addresses and snip- pets of information on hospital admission. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A little after ~ P.M., these meanderings are interrupted by a surprise telephone call. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the darkness, an old memory surfaces. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Walker, without any review of the autopsy data, was adamant that the mystery was solved. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It’s Saturday and the morning has been set aside for a visit to the cemetery while Walker and Yampolskaya work with the two pathologists at the Pulmonary Unit. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Awake at dawn, I am worried about exactly when and how I can get to the five addresses we now have. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
If the tainted-meat hypothesis is true, then the whereabouts of the victims might be widely scattered, with links back to where the meat was obtained, for example at the ceramics fac- tory. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
AUTOPSY VISIONS AUTOPSY VISIONS The person who has been most enthusiastic about these family inter- views is Dr. Alexander Langmuir, the epidemiologist who in 1949 founded and then ran the Epidemic Intelligence Division at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Unable to join us on this expedition, he nonetheless remains close to our efforts; we have been sending him e-mails of our daily ex- ploits, such as they have been. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Nikolay offers to guide us toward the special sector where the anthrax victims’ bodies were buried. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Around us, most of the graves, some with 60 THE COMMUNITY OF THE DEAD low iron fences, bear black-and-white photoengravings of the deceased, women and men, the old and the young, that are typical of Russian and other European cultures. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Thirteen years have passed since the epidemic, and he himself is a fairly recent employee. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They give us the age of each person and, in the aggregate, the age and sex distribution of the victims. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They reveal the generation of each victim, the phases of Soviet history each experienced. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As we move from one site to another, the photographs on the monu- ments take us past biographical facts to the individual personalities of the victims. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
These other sites and their portraits have an innocent air, simply by their place in the social topology of the cemetery. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As the rest of us are still reading tombstones, Shelokov strikes up a conversation with three people hovering at the edge of Sector i ~. He is innately gregarious, and being in a new Russian environment seems to make him more so. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Since our arrival, he has kept us up to date on hazardous radiation levels south of the city, about increased rates of theft and as- sault, about Russian mafia gangs, about a Chinese student with a knife who yesterday went berserk in the elevator of our dormitory building, about our concierge’s suspicions of foul play concerning our several ex- ploding light bulbs. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He talks easily with almost anyone, at restaurants, at the dormitory, in corridors at the university or city offices—and his brief translations of these conversations are like reports from a civic dis- aster center. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
All the Russians assisting us, Professor Borisov and Sasha Tiu- tiunnik, Rector Suetin and his fellow administrators, the public health officials at SES, Nikolay and the two young grave diggers, and even She- lokov, an American citizen for decades, always act as though they would like to help, but we shouldn’t expect much. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He believes the naushiki, the “earphones” or informers of the Soviet era, remain a decided influence in Yekaterinberg, making people afraid to talk to us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Standing in the middle of Vostochniy Cemetery I write in my notebook: I see propped against a grave two broken spades, the handles gone; they are rusted. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
After lunch, my next stop is the pathology laboratory. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Revived, I am trying to look on the bright side. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This work gained him a Nobel Prize in 1908. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They want their findings broadcast to the world of science and have been mak- ing efforts in that direction. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
By around four o’clock, after Walker has reviewed the first ten cases, Grinberg again suddenly calls a halt to the process. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As the former, he warns us that this autopsy information could “make difficulties” for his superiors, so Matthew should offer bona fides that this data is unique and valuable. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In an about-face, Grinberg then proposes tea. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The notebooks and ma- terials are put away, and, as we convene around a marble work bench, the mood lightens. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The necessary names and addresses of owners are listed in the documents Burgasov gave us in Moscow, which Shelokov and Matthew have spent this afternoon trans- lating and transcribing. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our goal is to interview the families who owned the anthrax-infected animals and to speak with local veterinarians. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The cemetery grave markers suggest that the first human deaths oc- curred April 9, the earliest date we found. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
To calculate back in time to when victims were exposed, we need the dates for the onset of the vic- tims’ symptoms. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Demographics, too, count; Dr. Ro- manenko at SES has promised to give us 1979 statistics for the city. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With no work scheduled at the Pulmonary Unit, Yampolskaya and I can start hunting for the five addresses passed on to us last night. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Shelokov cautions us not to be disruptive or we will be detained and ousted. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Unlike the natives of a neighborhood, whose understanding of their space is complex, visitors like us see only unfamiliar and unconnected locations.1 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He seems to know exactly what we are interested in and has no hesitation in speaking. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He wants to show us the ceramics factory, but we are looking for the home of Anna Komina, on Ulitsa Lyapustina, the street named for a lo- cal but now almost forgotten Soviet hero called Lyapustin, who in the 196os was killed defending citizens set upon by hooligans. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The worker points us in the general direction and we move on, searching in vain for street signs and trying to find order in the house numbers. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
After circling sev- eral blocks, we again encounter the man in overalls and take up his of- fer to see the ceramics factory, which is close by, due south of us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our guide leads us past the gate, explaining that this plant, which has a Sunday shift, is where industrial pipes, bathroom fixtures, tiles, dishes, and teapots have been made for decades. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our guide pushes open a side door and leads us to the enormous com- pany cafeteria, now empty. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
TO CHKALOVSKIY RAYON TO CHKALOVSKIY RAYON -J Our guide sees us beyond the factory gates and takes his leave. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He is trying to tell us that we are where we want to be, on Ulitsa Lyapustina. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the far end of the block, Sergei Borisov appears in his car and waves jubilantly. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He reckons back six days from when his mother died and gives us the date of April ~ for the onset. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our technologies have improved and prolonged our lives with efficient sanitation, farming, manufacture, and transportation. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Perhaps that sufficed. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But my thoughts are leaping forward. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On her tombstone, he tells us, the family put the Soviet star, not a cross, because Anna Komina was a patriot, not at all religious. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Without our asking, he tells us what happened to his father: crushed by his wife’s death, he died shortly after her, of a broken heart. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Both of us ar~ familiar with tragic deaths, she, as an active clinician, much r~ore than I. During the 1979 epidemic, she also cared for dozens of patients, nearly all of them fatalities. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“Khudyakov? Never heard of him. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Markov’s brother Nikolay and sister-in-law Prosovia still live there. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the time of the epidemic they shared the cottage with Mikhail, whom they call Misha, and his wife, and they are willing to talk to us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“They wanted a new sheet from us instead,” his sister-in-law complains. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We have com- pleted only two interviews, and our leads are exhausted. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It is nearly two o’clock when we leave the Markovs. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
None of us is par- ticularly a team player, and except for Matthew’s and my earlier efforts, the members of this group have not worked together before. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In July 1983, for example, after ongoing CONSTRAINTS, FEARS, FRUSTRATIONS Moscow, Matthew wrote Dr. Pyotr Burgasov to report that, as they had discussed, he had organized a small group to visit Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Matthew contacted Lown and convinced him of the importance of investigating the 1979 outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Among the present recruits, everyone (except Yampolskaya) wants to do it their way and is ready to tell the rest of us how the trip arrange- ments could be better. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
All this food came out of a closet-sized kitchen. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Why not! Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I have more questions for Abramova, but Lev Grinberg interrupts. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When we get back to our dormitory, Yam- polskaya gives me the bad news that she and Walker will fly back to Moscow early Friday morning. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The elation is short-lived. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Arrangements have been made for us as a respected group of experts, and we have to stay with our schedule. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That afternoon, D. N. Ponomaryev, a short, dapper man who was chief epidemiologist of the Oblast SES (Sanitary Epidemiological Station) in 1979, meets with us to present an hour-long account of the outbreak, which he tells us will be the first of two parts. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But he assures us he will resist fiction. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Abramova told us her first autopsy was April io and the samples sent to the laboratory then; laboratory results confirming the anthrax diagnosis were communicated on April i i. Dr. Ponomaryev has placed the confirmation of anthrax a week earlier, with an epizootic preceding the human cases. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
These dates sound off. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It affected ten settlements, he says, including the area’s largest town, Sy- serts, and resulted in sixty-eight animal cases, with sixty of these ani- mals belonging to private owners. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His overview is compli- cated: animals die of anthrax in March and then in a second wave in April anthrax strikes both humans and animals. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This idea may have merit, but that speculation doesn’t help us now. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
CONSTRAINTS, FEARS, FRUSTRATIONS Knocking on Doors As Sasha Tiutiunnik drives us toward Chkalovskiy, we are caught in a traffic jam south of the university. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Men and women pass by us with shopping bags and briefcases. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She was fifty when she died on April iz, 1979, at the peak of the epidemic, and her name was one of the first five our mysterious source provided. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Olga M., now in her fifties, shows us the death certificate; “infectious pneumonia” is given as the cause of death. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Sasha drives us back again to the worker’s hostel on Military Street in search of someone who knew Nikolay Khudyakov. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As we walk the streets of Chkalovskiy this afternoon, we have no qualms about asking passersby for directions, and they have little hesi- tancy asking us what we are doing in the district. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On Ulitsa Lyapustina, near Anna Komina’s house, two neighbors of the widow of Timofiev T. direct us down the street to her home. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Both Timofiev and his wife were vaccinated later in April. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She insists that a neighbor’s small pig alsc died during the outbreak, that dogs in the neighborhood died from an- thrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The chief vet- erinarian for the oblast called that afternoon to cancel his meeting with us the ‘next morning. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This is a disappointment. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Borisov also tells us that officials at Compound 19 have received no orders from Moscow about our study plan, although the university con- veyed our request to visit there three weeks ago. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Therefore, I wish to invite you or a member of your sci- entific staff to meet with us, to hear our findings at this state of our study and to exchange information and views regarding scientific aspects of this matter. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This general has been quoted in a Moscow paper, denying any Compound 19 involvement in the 1979 outbreak: “The rumors. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Afterward, the lethally contaminated air in the chamber would have to be expelled through a filtration system. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Although she now re- lays case names to us, Dr. Abramova has only two addresses to add to the ten we have received from the mysterious source, who we suspect may have other names. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It might have been that the military com- pound was the source of the epidemic, but through the sale of infected meat. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This same burden of risk was carried by the little communities near U.S. and British BW facilities during World War II and after, in places like Vigo, Indiana; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Fred- erick, Maryland; and the Scottish village across from Gruinard Island.4 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Tests “challenging” monkeys with deadly aerosols might have been going on at Compound 19 in 1979, just as they continue to go on wherever anthrax vaccines are being developed. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Very few, it seems. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the new Russia, the military is undergoing tremendous reorganization and quickly casting off the past. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN “She asked a Sverdlovsk relative to help with the skinning,” Arenskiy tells us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Both these cases are familiar—they are described in the documents Burgasov has given us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The rayon’s local veterinarian at the time is on our list of appointments for Thursday and, with happy nods all around, we are sure he will fill out the details of these events for us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our hope is that the KGB cleanup bypassed its records, but luck is not with us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the second two offices, we arrive without prior appointments, as people off the street investigating the outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Hugh-Jones and Matthew are waiting outside in a park for us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His mother, a large, imposing woman\ sits with us at their kitchen table and takes charge of answering our questions, while her husband and daugh- ter hover behind her. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But our two hours yield only one interview, with the parents and sister of Yuriy Sysikov, who lived on Predelnaya (Limit) Street. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The family’s cottage has the same somber aura as the Komins’ home. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The four of us return to the dormitory at 9 P.M. and, having skipped dinner, resort again to peanut butter on crackers. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At 7:45 the next morning, pandemonium breaks out in our dormi- tory suite. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As Walker and Yampolskaya leave for another day at the Pulmonary Unit, the rest of us have an ominous sense of doors closing. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN The Unnatural Steals the Natural Unable to travel outside the city, we have before us an open and poten- tially wasted day. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
No appointments are scheduled; reception to us has reportedly cooled because we are not official visitors, just a band of for- eigners. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Ponomaryev will not be giving us part two of his presenta- tion. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Professor Borisov gives us a lift to the old- est part of Yekaterinburg, literally to the high ground, to the Church of the Ascension, the city’s only remaining example of early classic nine- teenth-century architecture. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We revert to tourist mode. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She just knows about us from television. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“America should just take us over.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“What right had they to do that?” “To rob us of that beautiful piece of nature!” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They tell us where the old meat plant is located, in this same neigh- borhood of Vtorchmet. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I disagree. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This leads us to considering New York’s Brighton Beach, a community he knows all about, and he marvels that such a reproduction of Russian life is pos- sible in America. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In her book on innovations in military organization, Kimberly Zisk argues that the Soviet general staff maintained a consistent Cold War pat- tern of reacting to U.S. advances in military technology with upgrades of its own weapons.3 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He stayed at home the next day, but on the morning of May 6 he was taken by ambulance to Hospital 40, where he was diagnosed with bilateral pneumonia. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
THE UNNATURAL STEALS THE NATURAL THE UNNATURAL STEALS THE NATURAL Although they could not touch, the couple wrote messages back and forth to each other. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She shows us a newspaper article about pensions that may be coming to the families of victims of the 1979 outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We leave Dayanova to crisscross the district, returning to several of our dud addresses in the hope someone can give us an interview. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We return to an address given to us Monday, our first day in Chkalovskiy, by a couple whose door we knocked on by mistake. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We pause here, all four of us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We push on from here, still searching for good addresses. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
No matter. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Across the courtyard is Hos- pital 24, which remains just as it was in 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Before that, the early victims were not autopsied. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
By then, around April ,i—,z, when the diagnosis of anthrax was confirmed, he called a meeting of all involved physicians to tell them. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On top of all this response came the vaccination campaign. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She describes being stopped by police as she drove to a May ii celebration and told that there were ten new anthrax cases. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The easiest way is to ask and I do. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I tell her that for the sake of the families, I want to find out the cause of the epidemic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It’s time for our team to meet with Dr. Bolshakov, the veterinarian al the rayon SES. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
crats in any nation might be just as cautious with outsiders. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“We arrived at Bolshakov’s office and when we were all seated, he announced that he had orders not to speak to us and that we had to leave.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That evening, Shelokov tells us that there were men waiting outside Dr. Bolshakov’s office who were, according to Dr. Shepetkin, ready to get rough if our group did not leave quietly. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Bolshakov apparently also said that Dr. Romanenko at SES has refused to see us again. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His widow, whose own poor health keeps her homebound, told us that her husband used to help their niece, who lives near Compound 19, with her garden. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The pity of it, she told us, is that he had fought in the Great Patriotic War, and because he had survived that, they counted themselves lucky. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Abramova’s autopsy notes, which Yampolskaya copied and translated in their entirety before she left, also give us glim- merings of who the victims were. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The new Russian government has declared the day a holiday, in its own honor. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
There is no good time, she tells us, and begins. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But his family has moved, a neigh- bor tells us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We find them at the address, but they have nothing to tell us except that an old woman, maybe the victim’s mother, lived there alone until she died four years ago. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The death certificate Vershinin’s son shows us indicates “sepsis” as the cause of his father’s death. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The community may not be cohesive, but there were obviously friendships among residents. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
No one answers at the former home of Natalya Lyakhova on Pold- nevaya Street. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Aleksandra Volkova, age sixty-five, a pensioner, lived in a third floor apartment on the boulevard Selkorovskaya, where electric trol- leys run. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We then move north in the neighborhood to another story of grief and distress. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But she tells us that Korsayev’s sister lives somewhere over on Lyapustina. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When we knock at the door of the cottage where Tatyana Kosheleva once lived, a girl answers and tells us that her family has recently bought it. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The ever-ready neighbor, a woman passing by, fills us in. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The woman who opens the door greets our request with astonishment—and in turn astonishes us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our list from Dr. Ilyenko locates the former home of Valentina Mar- kova on Lyapustina Street. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As Korsayev’s sister talks, the victim whose family we expected to find, Valentina Markova, drifts away from us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Nearly every- one worked, even the pensioners, and they all apparently lived by the clock. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our salvation might be if Supreme Soviet deputy Larissa Mishustina, who we believe has access to the alleged official list of victims, returns to Yekaterinburg and shares that information with us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Meanwhile, this trip to Yekaterinburg is almost over, and we have learned that, unfortunately, no meeting at Compound 19 will be possi- ble. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The rock band is loud. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Without fanfare Larissa Mishustina presents us with an envelope con- taining a list of the victims of the 1979 anthrax epidemic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A reckoning was made and then wrapped in secrecy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Mishustina’s spirited optimism is encour- aging. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Matthew comes with us to scout the territory while Professor Bo- risov takes Shelokov and Hugh-Jones on a day trip to the Asian-Euro- pean border, where one can stand with a foot on each continent. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She was sixty- seven when she died in late April, 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Admission to Hospital 40 followed on April zz, and her mother’s death occurred on April 30. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The whole family, Spirina included, was ¶~accinated, she said, at the nearby rubber factory. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Leaving Spirina’s daughter, we take advantage of the proximity of other apartment buildings where victims once lived. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In his cemetery portrait he looked like a war-weary soldier, with kind eyes. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This last night, the sun refuses to set and let us rest. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I come back again to Giddens: it is the consciousness of jeopardy, not any numerical calcula- tion, that stays with us and shapes our reflections.6 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
These calculations of risk bring me no comfort. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Matthew, as usual, sleeps soundly, and at 6 A.M. he is ready for the airport while the rest of us are still stuffing clothes in our suitcases and searching for our plane tickets. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The family of the writer Alexey Tolstoy, among other celebrities, has a home on one of the rustic streets, where high fences separate the houses. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Matthew has us do this as a courtesy but also because it is an efficient way to communicate with government officials: Washington will soon receive a cablegram reporting about our trip. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That evening we dine at the Nikiforov home. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The elegant apartment, MOSCOW REDUX MOSCOW REDUX full of stuffed furniture and bric-a-brac, also looks like a comfortable scene from the 1930S. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Such strong light comes from the high windows that I can see almost nothing but the glare off the top of the councilor’s desk and off the table. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When Matthew asks him why he believes this, he tells us that the only thing Revina’s research unearthed was an empty KGB folder concerning Sverdlovsk, labeled, “Order to Confiscate All Documents Connected with Military Activity.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In December 1990, Yablokov tells us, the contents were destroyed by a top secret order of the Council of Ministers. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His final words to us are, “It is time to close the book on this event.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Either way, no one is taking responsibility for the victims’ deaths. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Wednesday afternoon, June 17, we depart for the United States via Finland. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Unknown to us, on May 2.7, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Alex’s concern about biological weapons goes back to the Korean War, when the U.S. army sought his advice on detection tactics and he publicly advocated civil de- fense measures against biological weapons. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He was also a member of the Chemical Corps Advisory Council, which oversaw the development of U.S. biological weapons (BW) programs. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the years following the end of World War II, as information about U.S. and British BW programs became public, the news media and members of the gov- ernment were caught up in a frenzy that led, for example, to members of a congressional committee telling the press that a “germ proposition” sprayed from airplanes could “wipe out all life in a large city.”1 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A large man with a great domed forehead, Alex acquired a reputation throughout his career at CDC, as well as at Harvard and Johns Hopkins, as a fierce and ready critic who brooks no fools, and as a distinguished researcher. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The three of us spend hours reviewing the photographic slides from Nikiforov and Abramova and Grinberg, which Matthew had copied. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The autopsy data, though, is not enough by itself to tell us the source of the 1979 outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
To begin, we turn to the criteria for a case definition: who shall be in- cluded as an anthrax victim? We start with the KGB list that we received from Larissa Mishustina, and immediately find independent verification of it in the lists of patients that Dr. Ilyenko gave us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Alex, Matthew, and I begin buildingstwo spot maps. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In late July, Ilona sends us a packet of material, brought to the United States by a relative of Professor Gubanov, the physicist who facilitated our invitation from the Ural State University. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Ilona also returned to the former home of Anna Komina and inter- viewed her daughter-in-law, which gives us more information on this early 169 170 victim. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
According to the daughter-in-law, Anna first fell sick on April ~ (as her son described to us). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We have sent Ilona the names and addresses of the five survivors from the Hospital 40 records that young Dr. Nikiforov let us copy just before we left Moscow. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The important role of friends who were also coworkers is frequently evident. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The eleven partial interviews leave us with only traces of those vic- 171 172 tims. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Ilona soon informs us by e-mail that MSD stands for the Motor- strelkoraya Diviziya (Motorized Rifle Division) located within Com- pound 32.. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The city’s topology has changed in thirteen years, as some areas disintegrate and others emerge. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Not all the missing streets can be found. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The offensive intent of the U.S. BW program against civilians was made explicit when its retired commander, GeneralJ. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Earlier, during the period from January to September 1953, the U.S. St. Jo Program tested versions of this attack scenario in and near three cities—Minneapolis, Minnesota; St. Louis, Missouri; and Winnipeg, Canada. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
177 178 Should the targeting of civilians as if they were “logs,” in the termi- nology of the Japanese during World War II, surprise us? Military tech- nology in the twentieth century seems at times like nothing more than the relentless development of ways to attack defenseless populations. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
NAMES GO TO PLACES Biological Weapons and Political Outbreaks On July 2—too soon after we are back, I feel—Matthew and I travel to the Brookings Institution, a think tank in Washington, D.C., for a pre- sentation on our work. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In his address to the U.S. Congress in June 1992, President Boris Yeltsin expressed a deep commitment to getting rid of both programs. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Later, he affirmed, these products will be used for peaceful purposes (e.g., Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“But were all suspicions about us groundless?” he asks. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In 1969 President Nixon renounced biological weapons, and by the time the Biological Weapons Convention entered into force in 1975, U.S. BW laboratories were shut down or converted to defensive research (for example, on vaccines), and stockpiles were destroyed by autoclaving and burning. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In 1992, another Russian defector, this one formerly a high official at Biopreparat, confirms General Yevstigneyev’s statement about Soviet competition with what they believed was an ongoing U.S. biological weapons program. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
187 Manifestation Back in Cambridge, Matthew and I continue building our spot map of the daytime locations of anthrax victims just before the outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We also continue to corroborate the public health response as de- scribed to us by officials. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We have garnered information from thirty-five death certificates and find that those for early cases (April 9—Il) were signed either at Hospital zo or at Hospital 24. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In early November, Alex Langmuir is with us when~we first see the outline of a discernible band of cases stretching southeast across Chkalov- skiy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Matthew, who has been meticulous about placing the red dots, fixes us drinks, and we sit in the living room, slightly stunned, somewhat satisfied, but not what anyone could call joyous. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The problem of the animal outbreaks, to which more than one offi- cial in Yekaterinburg bore witness, continues to trouble us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Spirina, after all, reportedly had infected meat in her refrigerator. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Behind the scenes, Russian defector Ken Alibek is telling U.S. intel- ligence that, even after the 1972. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They consider how best to MANIFESTATIONMANIFESTATION calculate the amount: whether it should be measured in kilograms, as U.S. intelligence still insists, or whether it was considerably less. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The U.S. government sn~pects that other hostile states, such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea, are also invested in CBW. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In this atmosphere of potential hostility, loose ends about the 1979 outbreak continue to frustrate us, especially concerning Compound 19. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Soon he sends us news that one of our out- liers, Klaudia Spirina, may not have died of anthrax and should not be plotted on our map. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Loose ends still abound. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
197 Mirage THE ANIMAL OUTBREAK The second trip to Yekaterinburg goes more smoothly than the first, al- though it begins with an exercise in calamity. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Yet life goes on. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We have a simple request, that he look at the five pages of veterinary documents Dr. Burgasov gave us and tell us if, to the best of his knowledge, they are authentic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He seems to chide us for the fourteen- year gap between the event and our present inquiry, to want it impress upon us the uselessness of our questions. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The person who could have helped us, he says, was another SES veterinarian, a man who died last November. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He reminds us that this past May, former SES Director Babich also passed away, taking with him to the grave the full account of his ex- periences in 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He tells us that he recognizes the names and signatures of the veterinarians in the doc- uments: the city’s chief veterinarian at that time, another man who was the meat factory’s veterinarian and another who worked for the city SES. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As we walk the road in search of the documented addresses, a drunken man, his jovial face aglow with sweat, introduces himself as Mikhail and bares his broad hairless chest to show us the tattoo of a crow, the artwork of a fellow soldier. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It should have been an eagle, he tells us cheerfully, but his army superiors interrupted the process, taking away the equipment, even the chair he’d been sitting on. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The village is quiet. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His wife answers and agrees to talk with us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We park the car on a pleasant rise overlooking the quiet village. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
To vaccinate villagers suggests there was a connec- tion between the vaccination program Dr. Nikiforov ordered in the city and the busloads of Moscovites that descended on Abramovo. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We could be back in April 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With no shepherd in sight, a ram with a bell around his neck confidently leads the rest across the road. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Map 1. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Though we have made some progress tracking the outliers, the loca- tions of at least six will probably always elude us for lack of detailed in- formation. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With the sixth of these outliers, a survivor, Aleksandr R., we have reached a complete impasse. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Another mysterious outlier is Vitaliy Fyodosov, who lived north, near the university, on the street named for astronaut Yuriy Gagarin. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Everything else Viktor tells us about the outbreak is according to form: the apartment was disinfected, Fyodosov’s body was never returned home, he was buried at Vostichniy Cemetery with a police escort. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We show them our list, pointing out the five names of victims who resided here at M5D34: Pave! Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I try to concentrate on the facts. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We carry with us a letter of introduction from Peoples Deputy Larissa Mishustina. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Waving our letter aside, he leads us downstairs to the factory clinic to meet Dr. Tamara Chernich, the clinic’s head, who was at her post during the 1979 outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She has some busi- ness to attend to before she can meet with us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Eighteen workers here died of anthrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Feisty and bright-eyed, Dr. Chernich greets us with impatience, as if we should have come sooner to ask about the epidemic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She begins her story by telling us that at first she and others thought the anthrax had come from burning infected animal carcasses in pits. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But Compound 19 was also suspected. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As Dr. Chernich goes over other names with us, she muses on the in- dividual victims: Dimitriy Vinogradov, Anna Komina, Vera Kozlova, Pytor Gayda, Mikhail Burmistrov, Valeriy Poletaev, the pensioner Lazar Kor- sayev. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She says she would like to give us more precise information about the antibiotics and about vaccinations, but in 1979 the KGB took away the workers’ records. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The director has arranged a tour of the factory for us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The two women stop to talk to us, but Anatoliy S. keeps on a straight path toward his home. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In her tidy yard, a small white dog, the kind one might see in a circus, greets us with tail-wagging. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Nina, now sixty-three, has deep-set eyes and high cheekbones and, though she sits down to talk with us, she gives the impression of being in perpetual motion. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His response, she tells us, was “What does it matter? You are going to die anyway.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
217THE FINAL PIECES 218 This evening, we have dinner with the Borisov and Belaev families. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
the last morning of our second trip to Yekaterin- burg, he drives us to Koltsovo airport for our flight to Moscow. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With no help from government, what would we have done without the assistance that the university provided us? Now our work in Yekaterinburg is done. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Bela is just back from a visit to a friend in Germany, and though she assures us all is well with her job at a Moscow patent office, we sense her life is not easy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He told us that Moscow has turned openly antisemitic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They have just made the decision to move to Australia and were too upset by the planned uprooting to dine with us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
What interests him most about our visit, he tells us, is any opportu- nity it might foster for professional exchange, the chance to visit and study at an American research institute. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The general tells us he himself has worked as a pathologist and feels that this exception should have been empha- sized. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
For example, the first victims might have expired from eating bad meat and the later cases from inhalati~n anthrax caused by the burning of in- fected carcasses. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
To substantiate the epizootic, Yevstigneyev shows us file photographs from Sysertskiy rayon in April 1979, pictures of dumps where dead live- stock are piled one on another, with legs and necks at awkward angles. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It can- not stand alone—and it doesn’t. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When we press for further details, the’general balks. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A typical experiment in this chamber would be done with a spray of five milliliters of an anthrax sus- pension containing a total of five billion spores. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He tells us that in 1979 the military sus- pected sabotage and investigated a “deviant individual” not in the mil- itary, but nothing came of it. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Despite a reputation for being overbearing in Russian-U.S. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He has left the Kremlin and his government post, and works instead as head of a consulting group that reports to President Yeltsin on the environment. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He reviews with us the communications that led to the presidential de- cree for pensions to the Sverdiovsk victims’ families. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Following Lanissa Mishustina’s letter to Yeltsin urging recompense, Yablokov and his staff investigated the files and found the empty KGB folder. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Military technology also imposes risks for the environment, in its manufacture, in its potential deployment, and above all in its technological develop- ment. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It is understandable that in 1990 the Sverdlovsk file was destroyed by the Soviet Council of Ministers. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Certainly he is not up to date. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Burgasov counters that the veterinary documents he gave us are incomplete, that animal deaths caused by anthrax happened earlier among private own- ers and were not well recorded. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Gorbachev’s glasnost, which allowed Burgasov to appear as its emis- sary to the U.S. in 1988, is as onerous to him as the free market econ- omy his country has adopted. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
According to the paper given by the Soviet government to the U.S. State Department in 1988, the total num- ber of anthrax cases was ninety-six: eleven pure cutaneous, six cutaneous that became systemic, and seventy-nine gastrointestinal cases. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Still left out of these reckonings is the problem of individual suscep- tibility to anthrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our trip to Russia is done. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The fireworks in Gorky Park are over. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Professor Borisov has also provided us with confirming data from two smaller airports reporting at the same time from Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Mer- cifully, no research has been done on this for humans. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Instead, we have to assume that the dose-response for a human population will resemble what has been determined experimentally with nonhuman primates. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Using the old army model gives the smallest estimate of the quantity of spores that might have been released as aerosol at Compound 19—an almost unbelievable two to four milligrams, hardly enough to see, but containing billions of spores. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Burgasov was right when, in reference to biolog- ical weapons proliferation, he said there were more countries in the world than Russia and the United States. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When a bomb exploded m47ebruary 1993 at New York’s World Trade Center, killing six and injuring a thousand, American citizens realized their vulnerability to the free-floating politi- cal violence that ignores national boundaries. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This time the fanatic hostility against the U.S. government was home-grown, from within. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Modern Western science, grounded in individual rationality, is sup- posed to protect us against the great plagues that afflicted our ancestors or that afflict the underprivileged in far-away countries. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
How can such random collective death assault us when we are so intelligent and our society is so advanced? But emerging diseases like AIDS and reemerg- ing ones like tuberculosis and plague have invaded our modern world. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The drum- beats began with a sequence of three reports that proclaimed biological weapons as the new, central threat to national security and laid the groundwork—reinforced by Congressional hearings and other public statements—for a whole new series of defensive programs against the threat of BW.9 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
million members of the military, including reservists. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. cities, virtually every large metropolis in the country. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
An improved U.S. public health system might be able to better cope with infectious disease outbreaks, but could it reasonably contain the ef- fects of a deployed biological weapon? A typical American city, large, impersonal, and culturally diverse, is a far cry from the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
One 1998 committee report, with John Deutch, former Direc- tor of U.S. Central Intelligence, as cochair~, recommends a federal consolidation of bioterrorism intelligence and the creation of decentral- ized Catastrophic Terrorism Response Offices (CTROS).17 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wil- davsky warn us, “Risk aversion is a preoccupation with anticipating dan- ger that leads to large-scale organization and centralization of power in order to mobilize massive resources against possible evils.”18 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The U.S. Department of Defense and the media have worked in syn- chrony to promote bioterrorism as a national security threat. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Defensive measures aside, we should be asking whether U.S. leader- ship in world arms control is all it should be. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The economic “shock therapy” begun in 1991 was applied to an already debilitated post-Soviet economy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The Russian population, with its high literacy and educational levels, was required to forego the security of full employ- ment and guaranteed pensions and throw itself into high-risk “byzniz” opportunities in a global world. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As the U.S. Depart- ment of Defense embarked on its biodefense campaign, the 1979 Sverd- lovsk outbreak unexpectedly reemerged in the headlines, via a scientific article. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The article reported the genetic modification of an anthrax strain RETURN TO YEKATERINBURG RETURN TO YEKATERINBURO that made it possible to infect hamsters which had been immunized with the standard Russian STI vaccine. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Great contingents of Russian army generals, scientists, and ad- ministrators have been circulating through official Washington and other U.S. cities. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Russia is in such a profound crisis that the West is predicting that any day Boris Yeltsin will fall from power. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
257 258 The Ural State University, where we go on our first day, has dropped the name “Gorky”—all over Russia, the author’s name has disappeared, even from Moscow’s famous park. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The Pulmonary Unit, where Yampolskaya and I meet with Grinberg and Abramova, looks unchanged. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Irma’s hair is fashionably cut, with blonde streaks; she is wearing a chic suit and scarf. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The two of us have an appointment with Dr. Romanenko at SES. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The once shaggy-haired physician now occupies the spacious deputy direc- tor’s office, which has a potted lime tree near the window. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
RETURN TOYEKATERINBURG El “The World Is Global” Irma has found a driver with a car, a young man named Kostya, who can take us down to Chkalovskiy rayon. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With no trouble, he drives us first to the ceramics factory. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Push- ing aside a brown-and-black puppy, he invites us into the house, which is exactly as I remember it, sparsely furnished, with the little bedroom off the living room. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He has a life to live. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Before we can blink, she has us sitting at her table with two steaming cups of tea before us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Atound the corner, we knock on Nina T.’s gate. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She watches us attentively and eats her food in small bites. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When she gave us a copy of the KGB list of victims in June 1992, she meant what she said, that it was no longer a secret. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Obviously, I have a personal stake in the KGB retraction of the list. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Instead, the risks of poverty and re- pression fall hardest on those already deprived, while wealthier nations try to barricade themselves against instabilities generated by the ebb and flow of world capital. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
14. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
23. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
24. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This is up to them to do, the ball is in their court” (Meselson 199 ia, 3). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
See also Meselson i99ib, ii. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Further corroboration of this scientific skepticism and ef~prts to effect an inquiry are found in U.S. State Department cables suipmarizing Meselson debriefings (Washing- ton, August z6, 1986, 267418; Moscow, August 29, 1986, 14971; Washington, September 17, 1986, 2674,8; Washington, January zi, 1988 i8i~i; Moscow, February i, 1988, 01894). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Chapter 5 i. V. V. Nikiforov, alludes to infection of the thoracic lymph nodes. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
12. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. Senate 1995, 4 1—44. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Meselson et al., Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
25. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
1959. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
295 296 Alibek, K., with S. Handelman. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Soviet Response to U.S. Regarding Information on Sverdlovsk, i9~9. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. Department of State translation. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
1982.. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
1997. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“Russia Fails to Detail Germ Arms: US and Britain Fear Program Continues in Violation of Treaty.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. Army. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. Senate. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. War Department. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
53, 54, 55, 196; author’s dream about, 56, 97; autopsy notes of, 109, 140; collaboration and, 69, 76—77, 140; controversy between Burgasov and, 96; gathering of autopsy material and, 127; identification of disease by, 132; life of, 96; professional findings of, 20, 73—74, 130, 22.2, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
6, 7, ,o8, 167, 252; bioterrorism and, 24 5—48; offensive intent of, 176—78, 287n4 biological weapons threat: American public and, 248—So; anti-bioweapons ,6,, 163, 192—95, 226, 242 programs and, 245—48; hoaxes and, 249—50; importance of, 243—50; Iraq and, 194; media exploitation of, 248; strategic problems and, 183; Sverdlovsk outbreak calculations and, 240—43; targeting of civilians and, 177—78; terrorism and, 24 5—48, 249 Biopreparat, 184, i86, 221 bioterrorism, 245—48, 249, 292fl23 “Black Maria” (U.S. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
179—82 Bubenshikov, Viktor (victim), z66 Buchelnikov, Vitaliy (victim), i88 Bulgakov, Mikhail, 223 Burgasov, Dimitriy (son of Pyotr), 21 Burgasov, Pyotr, 43, 6z, 93, 106; Abra- mova and Grinberg data and, 96, 158; as authority on epidemics, 29—30; hospitality and, 30, 157—58; infected- meat explanation and, 15, 22, 23—30, 64, 256; missing anthrax manuscript and, 15—16, 20; response to study results, 229—3 3, 238; role during out- break and, 13, 99, 234, 235; Soviet mission to the U.S. and, 20, 21, 3O~ So- viet system and, 182, 23 1—32; veter- inary documents and, 203—4; work at Compound 19, 29—30; Yeltsin and, 231 Burmistrov, Mikhail (victim), 143, 213, 214 BWC. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
See also Russian names naushiki (informers), 68 Nazarov, Vasiliy (victim), z66 Nazi Germany, 7 New York World Trade Center bombing, 244 Nikiforov, Vladimir (elder), 43, 46—47, 106; ability to distinguish forms of anthrax and, 18—19, 32; on anthrax strains in outbreak, ~ autopsy slides and, , 6—zo, 52, 260; course of out- break and, 133; missing manuscript by, 15—16, 20, 158; old Soviet order and, 21, 23 1—32; role during outbreak, 13, 14—15, 43, z6~ Soviet mission to U.S. and, 15, 20, 3I~ vaccine program and, 109 Nikiforov, Vladimir (younger), 16—20, 21, 31, 158—59 Nikolaev, Fyodor (victim), 65, 109, 153—54, Nikonova, Ilona, 139, 140, 145, 146, 151, 153, 155, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, i88, 199, 207, 259, z6o Nixon, Richard M., 7, ,86 official accounts of outbreak, 13—14, 45— 46, 97—99, 150—5 I, 222; alliance be- tween scientists and the state, 13, 231— 33; conflicts among experts and, II, 21, 47—48. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
See Nikonova, Ilona population dose-response relation, 24 1—42 portal of entry, 5, 19, 70—71. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
See also public health response to outbreak Russian scientists: infected-meat expla- nation and, i~~’; the military and, 31, 221; motivations of, 176; state au- thority and, 159, 231—33, 232—33; U.S. and Russian cooperation and, 187, 199. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Third International Workshop on Anthrax, 253—54 Thomas, Lewis, 93 timing, 168; of animal outbreaks, ~ 97—98, 231, 234; of anthrax emission, 217; of disease onset, 77—78, 86, 108—9 Tischenko, Valentina (victim), 173, z66 tissue samples, 70—76, 130, 196—97; U.S. analysis of, 252, 259. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
See also autopsy materials Tiutiunnik, Sasha, 42, 67, 101, 103, 122, 124, 125 transparency, 18 2—84, 194, 242, 250 Tretnikov, Vasiliy (victim), 65, 153 Tretnikova, Lydia, 89 Tretyakov, Y. E., 43, z6i Turner, Stansfield, 9 United Nations, 9, 184—8 5, 190, 194, 244 United States: anti-bioweapons programs ifl, 245—48; antigovernment cult groups in, ‘95; arms control policy in, 250; Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 253; Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 59, 179; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 15, ,94—95; civil defense and, 246, 247, 249; Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 9, 15, 242; Department of Defense, 245, 246, 248; emergency preparedness programs in, 246; mili- tary vaccination program, 246. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On September 25, in the midst of the second wave, the state sought help from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, based in Atlanta, and its Epidemic Intelligence Service, seventy mostly young doctors who learned epidemiology firsthand by investigating suspicious disease outbreaks throughout the country. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Why would anyone want to harm innocent people in a remote small town in Oregon? “Call us naïve,” Lutgens said years later, “but we never imagined people could have done such a thing. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
They also discovered a series of other plots in 1984 and 1985 to kill or sicken people on an eleven-person enemies list, among them Charles Turner, the U.S. attorney; several county officials; a former disciple who had won a lawsuit against the cult; and a journalist from the Oregonian newspaper. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
U.S. Army scientists in the 1 950s had turned F tularensis into a weapon, and it still remains on the nation’s list of germs a foe might use in a biological-warfare attack. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
ON Sunday, October 27, 1985, Dave Frohnmayer received a call at home from Charles Turner, the U.S. attorney in Portland whom Sheela and her gang had targeted and nearly killed that year. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
On the American side, a main problem solver was Bill Patrick. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
President Franklin D. Roosevelt publicly denounced the ex- otic arms of America’s foes as “terrible arTd inhumane,” even while preparing to retaliate in kind. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Gordon Gray, the president’s national security adviser, noted that under current U.S. policy, the use of either chemical and biological weapons required the president’s approval. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Under Kennedy, he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The military officials, he added, “were very good at keeping us in- formed,” while he and his colleagues, in turn, helped the officers judge “the potential for success.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Its in- cubation period varied from one to five days, followed by the sudden onset of the nausea and diarrhea often associated with serious infec- tion, as well as spiking fever up to 105 degrees. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“The U.S.,” he said, “shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It argued that classing the toxins produced by germs as chemical weapons was a technical distinction that undermined the administration’s policy goals, as well as the president’s credibility. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“Most of the people I worked with—the chief of the pilot plant division, the chief of munitions—all these people thought, ‘Jeez, it’s going to come around to bite us,’ “he recalled. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
His studies alternated with spells of duty at the U.S. Naval Hospital at Saint Albans, on Long Island. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A~ congressional investigators probed the American germ program, the U.S. intelligence community disagreed on whether the Soviet Union was secretly forging ahead on biological weapons. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
U.S. intelligence analysts had noticed nothing unusual that previous April. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Its annual assessment of the threat posed by Moscow, Soviet Mili- tary Power, said the Soviet Union was conducting gene engineering aimed at developing new weapons. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“That was good enough for us.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
CIA analysts quoted Saddam Hussein as telling a delegation of U.S. senators earlier in the year that he would use chemical weapons in re- taliation for a chemical or nuclear attack on Iraq. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Briefed in late November abdut the lack of biological detectors, General Carl Vuono, the army chief of staff, was stunned that American troops would be used as canaries in a po- tentially lethal coal mine. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“Course of Action #1” was to begin vaccinating U.S. troops as quickly as possible. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“We were really pushing the Soviet leadership very hard to deal with this problem’ Gates recalled. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The memo noted that “U.S. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
As early as 1993, a Connecticut company had notified the U.S. Cus- toms Service that a Japanese publishing company called Aum Shin- rikyo was trying to buy an interferometer, a device used to make very accurate measurements ofsmall objects. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The Americans were livid. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The calculations sounded impressive. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“The world is full of very crazy organizations that have designs against the U.S.,” he said. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Owens recruited an important ally in his campaign against the an- thrax vaccinations: his boss, General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
American soldiers, the auditors wrote, “face many of the same problems thel confronted during the Persian Gulf conflict in 1990 and ~1991 .“ Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
By the fall of 1996, the chiefs had turned around and endorsed the recommendation to vaccinate the entire force. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Breakthrough 201 THE proposal to vaccinate the entire U.S. military against anthrax came before John P. White, the deputy secretary of defense, in January 1997. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
He believed that the United States had to be bolder. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Yes, they were grateful for the money to study liver flukes, they told Weber and a small group of U.S. Army sci- entists. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
But while the projects launched under the auspices of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences had helped open once closed Biopreparat institutes, the Russians said, they wanted to work directly with their American military colleagues on more scientifi- cally challenging work. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Meanwhile, U.S. government scientists were having trouble secur- ing full access to Vector, Obolensk, and other key institutes where American intelligence officials claimed secret military research was still being conducted. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The 444-day-long hostage episode—the kidnapping an’d detention of American diplo- mats at the U.S. embassy in Teheran during the Carter administra- tion—had scarred America’s psyche, Weber said. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Miller, a longtime champion of the small threat-reduction program and a seasoned bureaucrat, liked Weber’s proposal for how to open up Russia’s closed military labs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
They shared his frustration, Weber and Harrington wrote, with the pace of U.S.-Russian exchanges and the scope of assistance to Vector. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“I know of no expert opinion,” he said, “that would say that those of us that are essentially in the civilian population of the United States should be vaccinated.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A~ the Pentagon prepared to vaccinate soldiers, new evidence of the biological threat—and even graver questions about the wisdom of the U.S. vaccination program—emerged in the I~ecember 1997 issue of Vaccine. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Andy Weber had been encountering resistahce from Kalinin since their first meeting in September 199~. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Again and again he would say, What if the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City had been a biological or chemical event?” Clinton was a hands-on editor of his own speeches, and Clarke said the germ references were his idea. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The U.S. effort to engage the Russians was working. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The so-called gentlemen’s agreement, negotiated by a towel—clad Vector scientist and U.S. officials in the institute’s banya, proscribed cooperation that had military uses with Teheran. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Compared with health care in other economically developed states, the U.S. public-health system was a disaster. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
To be sure, Clinton’s rhetoric changed measurably. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The results of the presidential audience were somewhat less than the experts had hoped. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A little more than 25 percent of the ftinds Young requested was initially approved for the first year. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“We don’t believe we have primary respon- sibility, but within minutes of an event, people are going to turn to us,” The President 245 246 GERMS Hamre said. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The proposal alarmed civil liberties experts. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
He had clearly studied the biological issue and, echoing the views of Venter and Lederberg, said he saw germ weapons as posing a unique threat to the nation’s security. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Once the secrets of the human genome were unlocked, Clinton predicted that one day scien- tists would be able to “take a blood sample, and there would be a com- puter program which would show us if we had—let’s say we had a variant of anthrax.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
While the bulk of the $10 billion request would be spent strength- ening security at U.S. embassies and at other American facilities, public-health officials were delighted. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
lation. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Public-health officials in New York later noted that she did not contact the public-health task force, some of whose members were also uneasy with the initial diagnosis. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Because no flavivirus had ever been known t~ cause disease in animals, neither the Ames lab nor any other veterinary lab in the country had the testing material needed to pin down a specific di- agnosis. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Aum’s 1995 sarin-gas attack in the Tokyo subway and the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa helped the administration push huge budget increases through Congress to prevent terrorism and deal with its consequences. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Even so, Smithson and some of the government’s auditors felt that some of the initiatives were notably wasteful. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Johnson was eager to analyze the properties of the Soviet bio- bomblet, and CIA headquarters directed American intelligence officers overseas to obtain one, perhaps in one of the former Soviet republics. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The project could produce tabloid headlines: U.S. Makes Killer Superbug. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
U.S. intelligence officials said that they un- derstood the significance of the step they were contemplating, and that this was the only genetic manipulation the Pentagon had even considered. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Lederberg faulted Bill Cohen’s performance with the bag of sugar. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Feb. 28, 1985,131, no. 23. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
to poison Judge Hulse: Ava Kay Avalos interrogation, p. 16. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
contingency plans to “snatch” the Bhagwan: Interviews, law-enforcement officials. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
324 Notes to pages 34—39 viewees included Herbert E York, Robert S. McNamara, Philip D. Zelikow, Leonard A. Cole, Susan Wright, Riley D. Housewright, and Matthew S. Meselson. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
All but three survived: Norman M. Covert, Cutting Edge:A History of Fort Detrick,35 Maryland (Fort Detrick: U.S. Army, 1997), p.41. 37 Germs and walare are old allies: Erhard Geissler andJohn Ellis van Cortland Moon, editors, Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, l999),pp. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Our thanks to the provider of this tape, who was not Bill Patrick and who shared it with us on the condition of anonymity 48 Georgi Zhukov, told: Sidell et al., Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
32—38,111—12. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
186, 198; William C. Patrick III, “A History of Biological and Toxin Warfare’ in Kathleen C. Bailey, editor, Director’s Series on Pro1 jferation, vol. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
54 President Kennedy ordered: Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: US. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
57 According to a once secret report of 1962: U.S. Department of Defense, “United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962,” undated. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
58 its own supply: U.S. Senate, “Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents:’ Hearings of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st sess.,vol. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
59 lyophilization, orfreeze-drying: Postgate, Microbes and Man, pp. 125—26. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
54—56. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
23—46. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
72 planned to kill Patrice Lumumba: Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The History of America’s Secret Germ Wa!fare Project (New York: Holt, 1999), pp. 182—85. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
1, Sept. 16, 17, and 18, l975,pp. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
74 The chosen toxin: U.S. Senate, “Examination of Serious Deficiencies:’ p. 246. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
For example, John Ellis van Courtland Moon, “US Biological Warfare Planning and Preparedness: The Dilemmas of Policy:’ in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research Development and Usefrom the MiddleAges to 1945, edited by Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon (New York: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), pp. 239—42, 244—47. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
77 closed ranks around this scenario: Leslie H. Gelb, “Keeping an Eye on Russia:’ New York Times Magazine, Nov. 29, 1981, p. 31; see also Guillemin, Anthrax, p.9. “a successful operation”: U.S. Senate, “Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents,” “to prevent his appearance”: U.S. Senate, “Examination of Serious Deficiencies,” 78 lack of corresponding evidence on intestinal anthrax “cast doubt”: Interview, Matthew S. Meselson. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
78 Alexander M. HaigJr. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Between fifteen thousand and seventeen thousand doses: U.S. Army Medical Ma-87 teriel Development Activity, Memorandum for: Commander, U.S. Army Med- ical Research, Subject: Minutes of Source Selection Board for Request for Proposal, (RFP) DAMD17-88-R-0149, Sept. 8, 1988, p. 1. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
87 the army signed its first-ever contract: U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity, Fort Detrick, Maryland, Contract with Michigan Department of Pub- lic Health, September 30, 1988, to September 29, 1993. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
87 “certainly not state-of-the-art”: U.S. Army, “Minutes of Source Selection Board:’ p.4. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
92 Yamamoto testified: U.S. Senate, “Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons,” pp. 204—5. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
90 “Nature isn’t benign”: Laurie Garrett, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Dis- eases in a World out of Balance (New York: Penguin, 1995), p. 6. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The document comes from the files of the U.S. Army Medical Research Ac- quisition Activity. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
General Carl Vuono: Vuono’s anger at the lack ofbiodefenses is described in U.S. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
They were quoted in: U.S. Air Force, “Oral History Interview of Lt. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
American officials continue to insist that it was a “backup” plant that could have been pressed into service. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Notes to pages 118—122 339 340 Notes to pages 123—127 123 filed onJanuary 23,1991. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“sensitive BW topic in the public eye”: U.S. Army, Biodefense Concept Briefing, Apr. 8,1991. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Notes to pages 128—134 341 342 Notes to pages 134—141 134 cials; Mangold and Goldberg, Plague Wars, p. 165. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
134 Anthrax on Germ Warfare Efforts,” Washington Post, June 16, 1992, p. Al. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
58,Jan. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Alibek, too, hadfeui doubts: Alibek, Biohazard, pp. 70—86. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It was called the Nuclear Emergency Search Team: U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the154 Permanent Subcommittee of Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
So we have been on top of this from the beginning.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Stephen Labaton, “Threat to Disneyland, Mentioned by Clinton, Is Termed a Hoax:’ New York Times, Apr. 23, 1995, p. A36. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Cult 164 This chapter is based on interviews conducted in Washington, D.C., and during more than half a dozen trips to the former Soviet Union—Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan—thatJudjth Miller made between 1998 and mid 2001. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
184 185 185 185 185 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 77—105. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Russ Zajtchuk. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
29, 1999, pp. 9—38. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
David R. Franz, William C. Patrick III, Ken Alibek, Stephen C.Joseph, Richard A. Clarke, RichardJ. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
David Danley, Lt. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
$322 million, ten-year contract: William J. Broad and Judith Miller, “Thwarting Terror: A Special Report; Germ Defense Plan in Peril as Its Flaws Are Re- vealed,” New York Times, Aug. 7, 1998, p. Al. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In an interview: Interview, Nikolai A. Staritsin, Obolensk, Russia. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
223 the Executive Chairman on the Activities of the Special Commission Estab- lished by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 9(b)(I) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1998/920, New York, Oct. 1998. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Judith Miller, “U.S. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
233 “You could make such a virus today”: Interviews, William A. Haseltine. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
233 The hybrid weapon: Miller and Broad, “Exercise Finds U.S. Unable.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
234 “We can return to the StoneAge”: Federal Document Clearing House, “Secretary of Defense Delivers Remarks at the National Press Club,” Mar. 17, 1998, p.9. 234 The story behind Cohen’s announcement: Former senior Pentagon officials de- scribed the origins of the National Guard program and the SAIC study of the issue. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Unable to Handle Germ War Threat,” New York Times, Apr. 26, 1998, p. Al. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
President Clinton discussed the threat:Judith Miller and WilliamJ. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
99,122,166. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The “One Day Policy” of March 30, 1999, they said, required anthrax immunization for anyone serving more than a single day in the “high threat areas,” p. 7. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
266 65, notes that he was trained in the U.S. army’s Chemical Corps. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
266 A later version: U.S. Army, Secretary of the Army, Memorandum of Decision, September 3, 1998, Subject: Authority Under Public Law 85-804 to Include an Indemnification Clause in Contract DAMD17-91-C1086 with Michigan Biologic Products Institute. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
269 Only 8 of 260,000 people: Ibid., p. 70. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
269 “early step”: Ibid., p.6. tiny number of serious adverse reactions: Centers for Disease Control, Epidemiology and Prevention of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 6th ed., Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
TopOff had been very expensive: The uncertainty over cost isjust one of the many unanswered questions about TopOff. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
285 At the Stepnogorsk complex: Michael Dobbs, “Soviet-Era Work on Bioweapons Still Worrisome; Stall in U.S. Dismantling Effort Could Pose Proliferation Threat,” Washington Post, Sept. 12,2000, p. Al. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Our thanks to the provider of this tape, who was not Bill Patrick and who shared it with us on the condition of anonymity. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
294 asked for a more detailed briefing: In interviews, U.S. intelligence officials main- tained that it was their usual practice to brief NSC officials and other officials who needed to know about such sensitive intelligence activities. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
295 really need rockets?: U.S. intelligence officials, in interviews, denied that the agency ever proposed to build a Soviet-style rocket to test. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
300 impasse, see Michael R. Gordon and Judith Miller, “U.S. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
300 talk about what he had done: Although Popov has been in the United States since terview, Popov said that neither the British nor American intelligence services had seemed interested in his germ warfare research in the Soviet Union, be- cause “not a single person” came to discuss his work with him until “much later in Dallas?’ Even then, according to one well-informed U.S. source, the in- telligence analyst who interviewed Popov asked only about the transfer of sen- sitive germ technology to Iran, Iraq, and other unfriendly states, and virtually nothing about his recombinant work. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
7, 1997), pp. 744—46. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Try DARPA,” Science (Feb. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
U.S. Army, 1997. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
New York: Holt, 1999. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
James E. Brooks of the public affairs office of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Queenie A. M. Byars of Defense Department public affairs; Leonard A. Cole of Rutgers University; Chuck Dacey of Fort Detrick; Cob. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
For help with the Rajneeshee story, we would like to thank Jeanie Senior (and her husband and film journalist, Tom) who not only provided on-the-ground ad- vice and support in Oregon but also shared with us her enormous knowledge and insight into the cult and the reactions of fellow Oregonians to it. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Many experts, some in government, helped us grapple with the thorny public policy issues inherent in germ defense. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
We benefited enormously from authors who went before us, most especially Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars; Seymour M. Hersh, Against All Enemies; Charles Piller and Keith R.Yamamoto, Gene Wars; and Ed Regis, The Biology’of Doom. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
We are also grateful to Times colleagues who gave us continuing support over the years, especially Raymond Bonner, Diane Ceribeffi, Cornelia Dean, Michael R. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Many experts, some who wish to remain anonymous, have been kind enough to read parts of the manuscript and help us root out errors. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It goes without saying that any mistakes that may re- main belong to us alone. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Finally, we would like to acknowledge one another. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Kennedy,John F., 52—57,72—73,244 Khattab, “Emir,” 211 kidney disease, 181 kill ratios, 215 Kissinger, Henry, 62 Kistiakowsky, George B., 5 1—52 Knapp, David Berry (Krishna Dcvi; K.D.), 26, Korean War, 41 Krulak, Charles, 154—55 Kuwait, Iraqi invasion, 98, 101, 111, 116, 185, Laden, Osama bin, 138,248,287—88 Lake, Anthony, 142—43,250 Laos, 57, 80 Lassa fever, 211 Lauder,John A., 289-90,294 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Layton, Marcelle, 256,261 LD-50, 110 LeBreton, Karen, 22 Lederberg,Joshua, 79—82,96, 139, 198,219, 157—59,196-97 203,204,270 Anti-Plague Institute, 231 Stepnogorsk plant, 165—66, 170—75, 180, 182,210,285—86,292—93 Vozrozhdeniye Island (Renaissance Island), 171,176-82,208,228—29,231,291 28—30 186 yellow rain, 78,93 284,297 242,248,293,303,312—14 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack, 151—54, 194 background, 67—69 briefing to Clinton, 238,240—41 civilian vulnerabilities and, 142—43,156-57, 163,236,250-53 as consultant to Cetus Corporation, 71—72 dangers of recombinant technology, 80—82 Iraqi biological threat, 111—12 microbial dangers in U.S., 89—91 Marine Corps, Chemical Biological Incident “Marshall Plan” for Cuba, 53—57 Matsumoto gassings (Japan), 161—62, 192 Maxygen, 306—8 McNamara, Robert 5., Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
George E., 116 Libby, I. Lewis, 109-11,156 Libya, 89,150,198 line-source disseminator, 52 Lipkin, Ian, 260 Litton Systems, 52 liver fluke infection, 207 Lockheed-Martin, 52,283 Los Alainos National Laboratory; 120 Los Angeles, 167 Lugar, Richard, 140, 198,206-7,279 Lumumba, Patrice, 72 lupus, 301 Lutgens, Dave, 15,17—18,22,25,32 Lutgens, Sandy, 15,18 lyophilization, 59—60 MacEachin, DouglasJ., Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
82,96-97 Major,John, 126 malaria, 67—68 malathion, 258 Mandela, Nelson, 150 Manhattan Project, 68, 182 Marburg virus, 93, 150, 173,211,228,232—33, 254,255 Response Force (CBLRF), 155—57 77—80,82,93—94, 312—14 150 134—35, 141, 143—44, Index Michigan Department of Public Health, 86—87,101,103,10611614218889 199,201,203~4,213,218,235,245, 266—67,308 microbial food, 147—48, 149, 183 Microcystis aeruginosa toxin (intestinal flu), 73 Mid-Columbia Medical Center (Oregon), 18, 19—20 Military Industrialization Corporation, 128—29 Miller, Frank, 211—12 Minneapolis, 42—43 Monath, Thomas P., 236,239—40,241,263, 290,312 monkeypox, 140—41 Monsanto, 52 Morris, Ralph D., 236—37 Moser, Greg, 275 mosquitoes encephalitis and, 50 West Nile virus and, 256—64,275 mousepox, 310-11 multivalent vaccines, 158, 198,305 Myatt,James M., 119 Mycobacterium tuberculosis (tuberculosis), 37, 72—73, 89, 181,207 mycotoxins, 78,93 myelin, 301—2,304 Myers, Robert, 268 myxomatosis, 44—45 National Academy of Sciences, 83, 139—40, 150,205,207,250-51,253,269 National Crime Information Center, 17 National Guard, 24,233-35,246,280-82 National Institutes of Health (NIH), 90,305 National Security Agency, 289 National Security Council, 50-51,271, 294—95,299,310,312 natural gene exchange, 209 Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 171, 172 Nazism, 204 negative air pressure, 99, 144, 147 Neisseria gonorrhoeae, 27 nerve gas, 199—200 Nevada Test Site, 297—98 New York City, 42 Aum Shinrikyo cult headquarters, 152—53 biological terrorism and, 138—39, 142, 143, 163,167 Civex ‘93 exercise, 138—39 Office of Emergency Management, 257, 258 population density, 257 377 378 Index New York City (cont.) Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
52,54 McNamara, Tracey S., 258—60,263 measles, 38 measles vaccine, 270 Medidi,Anijr, 149—50 Mendez, Enrique, 105 Merck, George W, 38 Merck & Company, 189 Meselson, Matthew S., 57—58,61,62,63,64, National Academy of Sciences committee, 139—43, Pentagon connections, 156—57 Sverdlovsk and yellow rain controversies, 79—80,93 vaccination of servicemen, 200,201 Lederle, 108 Lee,James, 271 Legionella (Legionnaire’s disease), 302 Lemnitzer, Lyman, 51,54 leprosy, 37 Lepyoshitin, Gennady L., 172—8 1, 293 Lewinsky, Monica, 247—48,250 Lewis, Col. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A Very Select Personal Bibliography 199 Index Abdullah, S. 19 Action Programme 53-4,56 Afghan National Liberation Front see ANLF Afghan refugees 1, 110, 131—3, 138—42, 153, 156, 165—8, 171 Agha, A. 130 agriculture 33, 118 Ahmadzai, S. 47—8 Akbar, M. A. A. 47—8 Alexiev, A. 139 Amanullah, King ofAfghanistan 6-8, 35, 50-1, 39 America see USA Amin, H. 30-1,44 and PDPA 27—8, 29, 46—8 as Deputy Prime Minister 43 as President 82—4, 85, 87 as Prime Minister 69, 78, 79—80, 81—2, 172 Andropov, Y. 88, 121, 145, 149-50 ANLF 62,64 Anwar, M. 72 April revolution see Saur revolution Aqsa see secret police armed forces xi, 126—7, 163 conscription 115 desertion 102, 106~ PDPA cadres 27—3 1 mutiny 28, 83, 115 training 35, 115, 124, 163 Aya, R. 32 Badakhshi, T. 75 Bangladesh 22 Barfield, T. J. 76 Baryalay, M. 47 Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties ... see reform programme Beattie, H. 77—8 Beg, M. 73 Bhutto, B. 169—70 Bhutto, N. 169—70 Bhutto, Z. A. 17, 21—5, 41, 79 Brezhnev, L 87 and Daoud 20, 21 and Iran 95 and Karmal 103 and Soviet intervention 93-4, 99, 100-1, 133—4 and Taraki 80 brideprice see marriage customs Britain see Great Britain Brzezinski, Z. K. 21,88 Cabral, A. 160 Carter,J. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Middleton, D. 96, 139—40 military aid I from USA 10, 15—16 from USSR 8, 12, 16, 35,82—3,87 Mohammed Daoud Khan see Daoud Khan, M. monarchy 13—16 money lending 38-9,49—50 Muhammad, G. 72 Muhammadi, M. M. N. 63 Muhammed Zahir Shah see Zahir Shah Mujahidi, S. 63 Muslim, A. 130 Muslim League 169 Muslim Youth 61, 75 mutinies 28, 83, 115 Mydans, S. 136 Nadir Khan, King ofAfghanistan 8,34,35,59— Naim, M. 19,29 National Awami League 79 National Fatherland Front see NFF National Liberation Front 63 National Revolutionary Party 17, 19, 26 NATO 88, 100 natural resources xii, 11, 33, 124 Neumann, R. G. 15-16, 18,21 newspapers see press and television NFF 119-20, 121 Noor, A. N. 125—6 60 Indo/ 203 204 Afghanistan North Atlantic Treaty Organizacion see NATO Nur, N. M. 47-8 Pakistan 4, 25, 66, 75 Afghan refugees I, 106, 110, 131-3, 138—42, 153, 156, 165—8, 171 and Afghan monarchy 9—11 and Daoud 17, 21, 23 and india 97, 142 and iran 22 and resistance movements 95, 110—11, 124, 128, 132, 156 and revolutionary government 79, 83-4, 128—9, and Saur revolution 41,65 and lISA 10-11, 15, 103, 130, 153, 171—2 and USSR 100, 110— 11, 142, 170—4 religious policies 65 Pakistan People’s Party 79 Parcham group 27, 47—8 and Daoud 19, 26 in coalition 41 leaders 18 origin of 14 Parcham 14-15 Pavlovskii, I. G. 87 PDPA Action Programme 53-4, 56 and NFF 119-20 and USSR 3, 41, 46,66, 157 as governing party 41—55, 66—84, 157—9, 162—74 constitution’46 factions 47—8,67,68, 98, 115, 163 founding of 13—14 national conference 120-1 organization 71, 72, 73, 76-7,80, 126 party membership 120, 121, 126, 128, 157 rebirth 25—6, 27—31 reform programme 48-55 reports by 120, 121, 122—4, 125—30 repression by 71, 75, 78—9 resistance to 56—65, 70—84 split in 14 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan see PDPA Ikiland 92 131—55, 168—71 political developmnt 12—16 political system ix—x, 32—40, 54—5, 120, 125 population census 3 ethnic distribution 2-3 statistics ix, xii-xiv Press Law, 1965 13 press and television xiii, 12—15, 128 Primakov, E 94 public health xi, 32, 128 Pushtunistan 35, 165 history 10-11 Daoud’s suppot fur 13, 17, 23, 36 Puzanov, A. M. 82 Qader-Nuristani, A. arrest of 47-8 in Daoud republic 19-20 in Saur revolution 27, 28, 29, 30 Rabbani, B. 63, 75, 105 Rasul, G. 123 Rasuli, G. H. 19 Ratebzad, A. 47-8 Reagan, R. 90, 91, 103, 140-1 rebellion see resistance movements reform programme 48—55 religious freedom 56, 115—6 religious politics see Islam religious war 58—9, 60~-5, 72 resistance movements 87, 127, 129-30, 164 American support 1, 103, 104, 119, 131, 137— 40 and Soviet forces 85, 98, 104- 10 and Zahir Shah 144-5 by refugees 1, 106, 110,131—3,139—42, 153, 156, 165-8, 171 Chinese support 69 CIA support 138, 147, 152 islamic influence 56—65,72,80,83,95, 104, 162 motivation 70—84 negotiations with 122 Pakistani support 95, 110—11, 124, 128, 132, 156 strike action 118—19 to PDPA 56—65, 70-84 training of 1, 128 Reston,J. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
137 Russia see USSR Saadabad Pact 8 Safronchuk, V. 70, 78 Sarwari, A. 81, 114—5 Saudi Arabia 75, 157, 159 and Afghanistan 21, 23, 61 and Iran 22 Saur revolution I, 26—31, 156—9 and Islam 56—65. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Amin also moved to negotiate with Afghan opponents. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
4 road, which runs close and parallel to the Panjsher Valley. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But I nom- inate celluloid and its baby cousin videotape: for more than anything else this has been the Movie Century, an epoch in which film and video and the images they mediate have replaced print and books and the words they once brokered as the chief instrumentalities of human communication, persuasion, and entertainment. Jihad vs. McWorld
By the time Paramount was in play at the end of 1993, by then itself the target of a bidding battle between friendly (and ultimately victorious) suitor Viacom and unfriendly raider QVC, its properties also included the Trans-Lux Theater Corpora- tion, USA network, Famous Music Corporation, the Miss Universe organization, and Paramount Theme Parks. Jihad vs. McWorld
1.00 Jihad vs. McWorld
5.20 Jihad vs. McWorld
billion for a total of nearly $22 billion. Jihad vs. McWorld
A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Taliban
Packed in with 200 journalists I was fortunate enough to be privy to~y of the internal stand-offs between diplomats from the UN, the USA, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Taliban
Within a few short, dramatic months Afghanistan had been catapulted into the centre of the intensified Cold War between the Soviet Union and the USA. Taliban
For commanders in the south party loyalty depended on which Pesh- awar leader would provide money and arms. Taliban
A USA-based group provided the Taliban with a mobile telephone network between Kabul and Kandahar in 1999. Taliban
So while the USA saw the collapse of the Soviet state as the failure of the communist system, many Muslims saw it solely as a victory for Islam. Taliban
Just 13 days later, after accusing Bin Laden of perpetrating the attack, the USA retaliated by firing 70 cruise missiles against Bin Laden’s camps around Khost and Jalalabad. Taliban
From being mere appendages to the Afghan jihad and the Cold War in the 1980s they had taken centre stage for the Afghans, neighbouring countries and the West in the 1990s. Taliban
In the early 1990s the USA estimated that Caspian oil reserves were between 100 to 150 billion barrels (bb). Taliban
The Caspian region’s proven oil reserves are between 16 and 32 bb, which compares to 22 bb for the USA and 17 bb for the North Sea, giving the Caspian 10-45 times less than the total reserves of the Middle East. Taliban
Proven gas reserves in the Caspian region are estimated at 236—337 trillion cubic feet (tcf), compared to reserves of 300 tcf in the USA. Taliban
Big powers such as Russia, China and the USA; the neighbours Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey; the Central Asian states themselves and the most powerful players of all, the oil companies, compete in what I called in a 1997 seminal magazine article, ‘The New Great Game’. Taliban
Today’s Great Game is also between expanding and contracting empires. Taliban
These rebels were called Basmachis by the Bolsheviks, a derogative term meaning bandit. Taliban
Turkmenistan’s dilemma was that it was sandwiched between Iran which was unacceptable to the USA as a pipeline route; Afghanistan which was trapped in civil war and Russia which wanted to limit Turk- menistan’s gas exports to the West because they competed with Russia’s own exports of Siberian gas. Taliban
Although the USA was determined to isolate Iran, Turkmenistan could not afford to do so, as Iran offered the nearest and most accessible outlet to the south and the sea. Taliban
Adroitly Niyazov wooed the USA while seeking Tebran’s help in developing road and rail links. Taliban
In 1997, the EU’s rejection of Turkey’s membership angered the Turks, but also pushed them into forging closer ties with the USA, Russia, Israel and Central Asia. Taliban
Its need for energy and desire to expand its influence prompted successive Turkish governments to push for becoming the principal route for Central Asian energy exports. Taliban
The USA also urged Kazakhstan to commit to building a similar under- the-sea Caspian oil pipeline, so that Ka.zakh Taliban
Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad developed a dialogue with the Tali- ban through Taliban liason offices in the USA and with the oil compan- ies. Taliban
Despite declining oil prices and Russia’s desperate economic plight, the battle of wills between the USA and Russia will dominate future pipeline competition. Taliban
Russia remains adamant in keeping the USA out of its DICTATORS AND OIL BARONS 155 156 Central Asian backyard. Taliban
That month, Bulgheroni signed a 30-year agreement with the Afghan government, then headed by President Burhanuddin Rabbani, for the construction and operation of a gas pipeline by Bridas and an international consortium which it would create. Taliban
The visit was a failure and Niyazov was unable to meet US leaders. Taliban
The USA could not develop strategic clout in Central Asia without Uzbekistan, the largest and most powerful state and the only one capable of standing up to Russia. Taliban
I did not begin to investigate this unfolding story until the summer of 1996. Taliban
In December 1996, a senior Iranian diplomat told me in hushed tones that the Saudis and the CIA had channelled US$2 million dollars to the Taliban — even though there was no evidence for such suspicions. Taliban
In May 1997 at an annual regional summit in Ashkhabad, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Unocal signed an agreement, which committed Unocal to raising the finances and reaching financial closure for the project by December 1997, starting construction by early 1998. Taliban
As a result, the USA began to explore other options to help Turkmenistan deliver its gas. Taliban
With the USA now preoccupied with capturing Bin Laden, it seemed for the moment that one phase of the Great Game was now over. Taliban
Yet the USA, now fervently rooting for the Baku- Ceyhan pipeline despite crashing oil prices and a refusal by oil companies to invest, persisted in the belief that pipelines could be built without a strategic vision or conflict resolution in the region. Taliban
After providing billions of dollars’ worth of arms and ammunition to the Mujaheddin, the USA began to walk away from the Afghan issue after Soviet troops completed their withdrawal in 1989. Taliban
The USA dealt with issues as they came up, in a haphaz- ard, piecemeal fashion, rather than applying a coherent, strategic vision to the region. Taliban
Between 1994 and 1996 the USA supported the Taliban politically through its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, essentially because Wash- ington viewed the Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia and pro-Western. Taliban
In 1998 and 1999 the Taliban’s support for Bin Laden, their refusal tc endorse the Un~al project or compromise with their opponents and thi new moderate government in iran provided additional reasons for thi TALIBAN T USA to get tough with the Taliban. Taliban
Nevertheless, late as it was, for the first time the USA was genuinely on the peace train and gave full support to UN medi- ation efforts to end the war. Taliban
In a confidential 1996 State Department memo written just before the Taliban captured Kabul, parts of which I read, analysts wrote that, if the Taliban expanded, Russia, India and Iran would support the anti-Taliban alliance and the war would continue; that the USA would be torn between supporting its old ally Pakistan and trying to prevent arttagoniz- ing India and Russia with whom the USA was trying to improve relations. Taliban
There was a bigger problem. Taliban
Even today the USA is muddled on the critical question of whether it wants to save Central Asia’s depressed economies by letting them export energy any way they like or to keep Iran and Russia under blockade as far as pipelines are concerned. Taliban
The USA and Unocal were essentially faced with a simple question in Afghanistan. Taliban
Although there was no CIA budget for providing arms and ammunition to the Taliban and Unocal did not channel military support to the Tali- ban, the USA did support the Taliban through its traditional allies Pakis- tan and Saudi Arabia, accepting their provision of arms and funding to the Taliban. Taliban
The only positive spin from the trip was that it convinced Iran that the USA now saw Tehran as a dia- logue partner in future Afghan peace talks, thereby reducing US—Iranian tensions over Afghanistan. Taliban
As with Raphel’s initiatives in 1996, the USA appeared to be dipping its fingers into the Afghan quagmire, but wanted no real responsibility. Taliban
The USA wished to avoid taking sides or getting involved in the nuts and bolts of peace-making. Taliban
Washington appeared to have a Bin Laden policy but not an Afghanistan policy. Taliban
In 1998 and 1999 the Taliban’s support for Bin Laden, their refusal to endorse the Un~al project or compromise with their opponents and the new moderate government in iran provided additional reasons for the j TALIBAN T USA to get tough with the Taliban. Taliban
In a confidential 1996 State Department memo written just before the Taliban captured Kabul, parts of which I read, analysts wrote that, if the Taliban expanded, Russia, India and Iran would support the anti-Taliban alliance and the war would continue; that the USA would be torn between supporting its old ally Pakistan and trying to prevent antagoniz- ing India and Russia with whom the USA was trying to improve relations. Taliban
In 1992—93, under Indian pressure, the USA had come close to declar- ing Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, as Kashmiri militants based in Pakistan carried out guerrilla attacks in Indian Kashmir. Taliban
Khatami’s victory created an immediate thaw in Iran’s relations with the outside world as it opened up to the West, wooed its old enemy the USA with the need for ‘a dialogue between civilizations’ and sought an improvement in relations with the Arab world. Taliban
Afghanistan was to become the primary issue in helping thaw relations between Iran, the USA and the Arab world. Taliban
Due to the estranged relations between Iran and the USA, the Afghan Mujaheddin groups based in Iran received no international military assist- ance. Taliban
Tehran’s own support to the Mujaheddin was limited on account of budgetary constraints because of the Iraq—Iran war. Taliban
Thus throughout the 1980s, the USA effectively blocked off Iran from the out- side world on Afghanistan. Taliban
But when Riyadh asked these Islamic groups for a payback and to lend support to Saudi Arabia and the USA led coalition against Iraq, the majority of them backed Saddam Hussein, including Hikmetyar and most Afghan groups. Taliban
The Saudis and the Pakistanis made fre- quent attempts to bring all the factions together. Taliban
Riyadh’s support for the Taliban made them extremely reluctant to exert any pressure on the Taliban to deport Osama Bin Laden, even though the USA was urging them to do so. Taliban
Saudi Arabia’s initial support for the Taliban convinced Iran that the USA was also backing them in an intensification of its 1980s policies to surround Iran with hostile forces and isolate it. Taliban
The USA, according to Tehran, had a new aim to promote oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia which would bypass Iran. Taliban
The Iranians were also furious that the Taliban actions had endangered its growing rap- prochenient with the USA. Taliban
USA—Iran co-operation on Afghanistan, ‘cer- tainly can be an exemplary case and shows that the US has a better understanding of the reality in this region and the role that Iran can play for the promotion of peace and security,’ Kamal Kharrazi told me. Taliban
If President Khatami were to push forward his reform agenda at home, the Iranian regime would increasingly desire and need a peace settlement SHIA VERSUS SUNNI: IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA 205 206 TAUBAN in Afghanistan - to end the drain on its resources from funding the anti- Taliban alliance, stop the drugs, weapons and sectarian spillover from Afghanistan and move towards a further rapprochement with the USA. Taliban
By walking away from Afghanistan as early as it did, the USA faced within a few years dead diplomats, destroyed embassies, bombs in New York and cheap heroin on its streets, as Afghanistan became a sanctuary for international terrorism and the drugs mafia. Taliban
Afghans today remain deeply bitter about their abandonment by the USA, for whom they fought the Cold War. Taliban
In the 1980s the USA was prepared ‘to fight till the last Afghan’ to get even with the Soviet Union, but when the Soviets left, Washington was not prepared to help bring peace or feed a hungry people. Taliban
Today the USA, by picking up single issues and creating entire policies around them, whether it be oil pipelines, the treatment of women or terrorism, is only demonstrating that it has learnt little. Taliban
The USA is the only world power which has the ability to influence all the neighbouring states to stop interfering in Afghanistan. Taliban
Pakistan, weakened by the demise of its strategic partnership with the USA after the end of the Cold War and in the throes of a deep economic crisis, was nevertheless determined to extend its zone of influence by trying to nominate the next government in Kabul. Taliban
Oil and gas pipelines crossing Afghanistan would link the country into the region and speed up foreign assistance for its reconstruction. Taliban
1996 APPENDIX3 227 228 ~- TALIBAN 11 July. Taliban
28 February. Taliban
APPENDIX 3 233 234 -~ TALIBAN 8 June. Taliban
~ Delta and Turkmenistan’s Turkmenrosgaz for pipe- 1997 20 January September 27 September 1 October 26 October November 9 December 29 December Iran, Turkey, Turkmenistan sign agreement for Tur- January February March April 8 line project. Taliban
ECO summit in Asbkhabad. Taliban
Seward, Desmond, The Monks of War, the Military Religious Orders, Penguin, London 1972. Taliban
Notes 4. Taliban
Chapter 6 1. Taliban
Politics in Contemporary Asia series I 1 ‘S The Taliban: War, religion and the new order in Afghanistan KARACHI LAHORE ISLAMABAD Peter Marsden Oxford University Press Zed Books Ltd LONDON & NEW YORK w 0 The Taliban: War, religion and the new order in Afghanistan was first published by Zed Books Ltd, 7 Cynthia Street, London NI 9JF, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, rw 10010, USA in 1998. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Published in South Asia by Oxford University Press, 5 Bangalore Town, Sharae Faisal, P0 Box 13033, Karachi-7535o. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Chapter II considers the apparent support for the Taliban by elements within Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and, possibly, the USA, noting the often conflicting agendas in operation. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Although it was successful in reversing an initial defeat, Britain had no taste for further fighting and agreed, through the ‘919 Treaty of Rawal- pindi, that Afghanistan was free to conduct its own foreign affairs. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Afghanistan thus increasingly looked to the Soviet Union as a trading partner and source of support. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
A $ioom loan followed in 1955 and the first major consignment of arms arrived a year later, after several failed attempts on the part of the Afghan government to obtain arms from the USA. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The process of rapprochement with the USSR and the USA was accelerated during the period in office of Muhammad Daoud Khan, who served as prime minister from 1953 to 1963. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 17 April 1978 Daoud was overthrown and killed in a military coup orchestrated by the PDPA, with possible Soviet backing. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Indications that the USA might strengthen the Islamic resistance, and fears that it might have ambi- tions to establish a military presence there if conditions allowed, combined with a growing rapprochement between Washington and Peking to create an acute sense of paranoia in the Kremlin. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Zia was, however, wary of the Pushtun tribes, whose tradition of fierce independence made them unlikely partners in a defensive coalition. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The USA was assumed to be aware of this imbalance but was said to have condoned it on the basis of Hisb-e-Islami’s apparently greater organ- isational capacity. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
From 1987, the Soviet Union demonstrated an increasing commit- ( on throughout the war, involving Pakistan, the USA and the Afghan / / ment to the UN-sponsored peace negotiations that had been going government, but excluding the Mujahidin parties. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In its dying months, the USSR finally reached agreement with the USA that both sides would halt arms supplies to their respective proteges, the Najibullah government and the Mujahidin. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, it is thought likely that they were seen by elements outside Afghanistan as being potentially useful in promoting their various interests, and that these elements decided it was worthwhile to pro- vide them with some backing. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In the ‘New World Order’ of the post-Soviet period the Islamic world is fast taking on the role of the new enemy, with Iran, until recently, assuming the symbolic lead in the eyes of the USA, at least. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The leading ideologue of the Iranian revolution was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Islam therefore became the binding force of the resistance movement and a jihad was called against the invaders, whence the resistance fighters took on the name of the Mujahidin. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
I0I The benefits of the economic assistance provided by the Soviet Union, the USA and Europe during the post-war years were quickly lost as the Soviet forces reduced highways to pot-holed obstacle courses and devastated agriculture through sustained bombing cam- paigns. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The same day, the USA warned the Taliban administration that it would not secure international recognition or aid unless it respected the rights of women. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It is primarily the USA and Europe that are giving serious consideration to the issue of recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Many cases of executions, imprisonment arian agencies and their own tortuous negotiations with the Taliban and violation of human rights can be seen in these countries. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 8 May 1997, the Taliban Voice of Shari’a radio station issued a statement on this point: There are dozens and even hundreds of states in the world that do The Taliban not comply in any way with genuine standards of human rights fol- conditions on any possible way forward. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The presence of humanit- lowed by people in the West. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The same arguments apply to the European Union. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the justification for the USA to continue its programme of support to Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, rumours have continued to persist that it has, for example, provided military training and supplies, thus supporting the onward march of the Taliban to take the eastern provinces of Afghan- istan over the winter of 1994—95 and to capture Herat and the west of the country in September 1995. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Rumours that the USA was sympathetic to the Taliban were in part fuelled by a statement on 2 October by the American oil com- pany, UNOCAL, that it regarded the Taliban’s new dominance in Afghanistan as a ‘positive development’. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Such rumours were also generated by the more active diplomacy of the USA in Afghanistan over the previous year or so and by early indications, following the takeover of Kabul, 129 The Taliban that the USA would seek a meeting with the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
By contrast, Iran was vociferous in its criticism of the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In a statement published by the Iranian News Agency on 15 October, Mr Velayati referred to ‘recent remarks by Pakistani officials admitting that the USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sup- ported the Taliban’, and said that ‘followers of a specific religious or ethnic group cannot impose their will on other groups’. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Specula- tion about possible CIA backing for the Taliban has been partly fuelled by enthusiastic reports in the Taliban press of seizures of American Stinger missiles in the midst of other arms seizures (Voice of Shari’a issued a series of announcements regarding such seizures over the winter of 1996—p7). The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Until the election, in mid- 1997, of a relatively moderate Iranian president, the USA was in- evitably concerned at the prospect of Iran acting as the major conduit for Central Asian oil supplies. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In addition, by seeking to keep its initial military assistance to the Mujahidin parties covert, the USA allowed Pakistan to act as the conduit for supplies and so to influence how those supplies were distributed. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Pakistan has therefore been strengthened by the USA in pursuing its own strategic interests, which have included a wish to control whoever holds power in Kabul and also to keep the independent-minded traditional leaders under rein. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The USA also has an interest in the creation of stability in the region. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
With the former Soviet Union in a fragile political and economic state, the USA is inevitably concerned not to have a country on the southern border of the CIS where there are no real controls and where drug production and smuggling, terrorism and the arms trade can be organised with a minimum of constraint. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Taliban movement can be seen as a product of the conifict that originated in the 1978 socialist coup and the subsequent Soviet invasion, of people’s weariness with continued fighting and their disappointment with resistance leaders who failed to unite and form a stable government. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The issue of international responsibility is therefore a factor. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The failure of these movements to form a government created the conditions for a genuine mass move- ment to emerge. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
We have, therefore, two simultaneous and contradictory processes. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
44, 52, 6i, 64, 65, 66, 70, 76, 86, ‘5° opium, production of, 124, 140—I Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 135 orphanages, 142; role of, 84 Ottoman empire, 15 Pakistan, 7, 22, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 40, 43, 53, 8~, 84, 121, 123, 126, 127, t28, 130, 131, !35, The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
But in 1900 King Umberto of Italy had been assassinated by an Anarchist,’ and a year later President McKinley of the U.S.A. by another. The Terrorists
The terrorists who undertook this execution belonged to an Anarchist cell in Patterson, New Jersey, U.S.A. They were Italian immigrants working in the silk-weaving industry estab- lished in that city of seventy thousand inhabitants and twelve thousand looms. The Terrorists
The Palestine Liberation Organization (El Fatah et alia) fathered the Black September terrorists (see Chapter 13). The Terrorists
Enough has been said about this to make the point. The Terrorists
Alarm, 46 Albania, repression in, 15 Alexander, King of Yugoslavia, 17 Alexander II, Tsar, 17, 23, 35, 43, 48, 70—2, Alexander III, 48, 122 Alexander Obrenova~, King of Serbia, 58—60 Algeria, 13, 169, 179, 181 American Civil War, 65, 84—5, 86, 87, 88 Amin, President Idi, 187 Anarchism, Bakunin’s, 33 — in Austria, 43 — in Britain, 43 — in France, 39, 63—4, 112—13 — in Germany, 42 —, International Alliance of Social Democracy, 36, 46 — in Italy, 10, 40, 116—21 — in Poland, 127 —, Proudhon’s, 33 — in Russia, 10, 33—79, 110-42 passim — in Spain, 10, 40, 110—16 in U.S.A., 40, 44-9, 118 —, Woodcock’s history of, 25 Anarchism (Woodcock’s), 25 fn. The Terrorists
Anarchist), 47 Patriotism, 151—2 Pearse, Padraic, 96 People’s Revolutionary Army (Latin American), 177 ‘People’s Will’, 10, 43, 75, 76, 77, 78, 165, 171 Perier, Casimir, 58 Perovskaya, Sophia, 43, 76—9, 121, 171 Peru, 16, 166 Peter-Paul prison, 23, 30, 34, 69 Phiippino Marxist-Leninist guerril- las, 176 Phoenix, the, 86 Phoenix National and Literary Society, 86 Phoenix Park assassinations, 90,93 PIDE (Portuguese political police in Africa), 168 fn. The Terrorists
War and terrorism compared, 13, 14, 184—5 Weathermen (U.S.A.), The Terrorists
FBI agents were eager to conduct a covert search of the group’s apartment. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruc- tion:’ part 3, Mar.27, 1996, prepared testimony of Bill Richardson, p. 81. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
As the distant chop-chop heralded the machine’s approach, they would urge me to hurry as we trekked through badly rocket-scarred villages. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The invaders had looted or destroyed food stocks, ruptured irrigation channels, chopped down fruit trees and machine... Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It has also persuaded them to see in privatization not merely a paring knife to trim the fat from overindul- gent state bureaucracies but a cleaver with which democracy can be chopped into pieces and then pulverized. Jihad vs. McWorld
Meanwhile, the Grinbergs offer a delightful respite. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
While Cowboy Weber was willing to incur Washing- ton’s anger over the unauthorized rental of a chopper, he was taking no chances with the germs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Most of them neither par- ticipate in its fledgling politics nor feel anything like a European civic identity to match their well-felt transnational commercial and com- modity identities, let alone their identity as Bavarians or Walloons or Basques or Lombardians. Jihad vs. McWorld
In his Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton:25. Jihad vs. McWorld
There was some fighting. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Instituted in 1931, it provided for an elected National Consultative Assembly and an appointed House of Elders. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
According to Ghulam M. Zurmuiwal, the Afghan troops were overcome by the use of “napalm bombs and incendiary bombs?’7 This still did not bring an end to the fighting. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
What happened to Amin is not known for sure. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Anwar was the first to describe the incident in the palace. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They were to persuade the militants to lay down their arms and enjoy the benefits of a peaceful life. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
“Many more Kabulis were summarily shot from among 5000 ar- rested after the uprising.”8 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They had already shot dead four students at the Omar-e-Shaheed Lycée and one at the Habibiyya High School when the students had risen in defiance on 25 April. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Meanwhile, they fired a signal shot into the air, after which the village was hit by long-range guns from the other side of the valley where a contingent of artillery had been stationed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In the courtyard each victim was made to run to a fixed spot; when he reached it, he was shot dead. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The method of recruitment resembled more a system of kidnapping. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In the game of survival, such excesses were understandable, though deplor- able. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Having lost men in fighting with the mujahideen in parts of the provinces of Baghlan and Qunduz, the Soviets turned on the people of the city of Baghlan in revenge. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Farms, too, were unsafe. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
~o children froze to death on the march over the mountains, and 150 people had to be amputated for frost-bitten limbs in Peshawar hos- pitals. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I have noted two cases of peculiar decomposition. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
considered Khybar a threat to his leadership. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
~. On the communist side, up to 25,000 Soviet soldiers may have died. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As a result, the main highways leading to the capital from the principal towns of Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif were cut by the guerrillas for days at a time. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Similarly, both the tank- supported 7th and 8th Afghan army divisions managed never to fire a shot. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But two of the three telephone exchanges in the capital had already been blown up by Soviet demolition teams. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, because of the harsh winter coitditionS, resistance was less intense than during the previous summer months. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Along the main highways to the south, mujahed groups did not hesi- tate to harass Soviet armoured columns, despite heavy air protection. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although considerable numbers of helicopters of all types as well as jetfighters bad been shot down by the end of 1984, some of them by anti-air missiles, overall resistance weaponry had still not improved to the point that the Soviets no longer ruled the skies. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
If the drivers protested, they were beaten or dragged off to prison as mujahed suspects. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghan party officials have been shot or stabbed in the streets, while houses belonging to com- munist collaborators in the rural areas have been destroyed or taken over by the resistance. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As we sipped tea in his mountain stronghold only a rifle-shot away from the nearest Soviet observation post, he paid little attention to the sullen roar of artillery and mortar shells exploding on the rocky escarpments. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Some of them began praying. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
All in all, an estimated I ,l 70 unarmed males, including boys in their early teens, were callously murdered at Kerala, more than the equally brutal massacres of Lidice, Czechoslovakia, or My Lai, when American troops shot down over 100 Vietnamese civilians in cold blood. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Magic Bus Company in Amsterdam, one of the last tour operators on the overland ‘hippy’ route to India via Afghanistan, was attacked in the southern part of the country; a Swiss and a Canadian were shot dead and an Australian seriously injured as bullets fired by unseen gunmen The guerrillas were becoming less selective in their attacks. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to testimony, a list was always put up on the wall of those to be taken away for execution. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Armed militants forced their way into homes in order to drag women off to class or shot mullahs who protested against Marxist indoctrination in the literacy campaign. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The other parties soon caught on. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
out. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
With little new construction, this has meant severe housing shortages and property- inflation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Since then, the Soviets have pulled all stops to Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners capture the doctors. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
During the Indochina War, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong pris- oners were confined in government-run detention centres, while shot- down American pilots or captured GIs were generally interned in hidden jungle camps or POW prisons in the north. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
225 226 Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners Afghanistan, on the other hand, presents a radically different equation . Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Whatever the semantics, however, it was evident that sooner or later the problem of POWs would emerge. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In the end, the Soviets adopted the attitude, ‘You don’t bargain with terrorists’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At the same time, few are enamoured with the idea of risking their necks to ‘save’ Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Troops had to use coal dust for fuel and were forced to slog through the mud, but the Afghan army was taking the brunt of the fighting. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The time is not so far off when there will be one single image—an Amer- 93Hollyworid: Mc World’s Videology ican image of America, something like Ronald Reagan’s opening shot in his celebrated It’s Morning in America video, or a burger sizzling on the desert-baked enamel of a Chevy V-8-—an image so generic, so affecting, so ubiquitous, and so empty that it will no longer be rec- ognized as American, it will just be.’6 Jihad vs. McWorld
Whether they hang with South Central L.A.’s Bloods or Cripps, belong to Berlin’s neo-Nazi National Alternative, or run with Tokyo’s Speed Tribes, whether they shoot at teens trying to get out of the Bosnian dead zones or are the teens being shot at, whether they are Hutu minors murdering Tutsis or twenty-year-old French paratroop- ers trying to come between the murderous brothers, they will be the twenty-first century’s makers—and its victims. Jihad vs. McWorld
Lyrics and reality get all mixed up in MTV’s savage version of McWorld.26. Jihad vs. McWorld
But as a result of complaints by leading Uzbeks, Ghulam Rasul Khan, head of the Nazarzai khans, was placed in house arrest in Kabul, where he later died. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
We girls will defend the motherland!” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
But on this balmy Thursday afternoon — the beginning of the Muslim weekend — no foreign aid-workers had been invited to watch the stadium’s inaugura- tion. Taliban
When Wali resisted, Abdullah had shot him dead. Taliban
A guard handed a kalashnikov to a relative of the murdered victim. Taliban
So we considered all the military options to rescue the convoy, such as a raid by the Special Services Group (Pakistan army commandos) or a parachute drop. Taliban
Reinforced by their new recruits, the Taliban moved north into Uroz- gan and Zabul provinces which they captured without a shot being fired. Taliban
There they castrated Najibullah, dragged his body behind a jeep for several rounds of the Palace and then shot him dead. Taliban
With their escape routes closed, thousands of Taliban troops and hundreds of Pakistani students were captured and subsequently shot dead and buried in mass graves. Taliban
‘The manner of their death was hor- rendous. Taliban
‘People were shot three times on the spot, one bullet in the head, one in the chest and one in the testicles. Taliban
‘When the Taliban stormed into our house they shot my husband and two brothers dead on the spot. Taliban
Each was shot three times and then their throats were slit in the halal way,’ said a 40-year-old Tajik widow.9 Taliban
The Taliban were to target one more group in Mazar that was to bring down a storm of international protest and plunge them into near war with Iran. Taliban
Mullah Omar emerged to blast Clinton personally. Taliban
Rabbani went off on one of his periodic long leaves and there were rumours he was under arrest. Taliban
Militants were picked up in a crescent running from Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan, Yemen, to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and the Phillip- ines.’5 Taliban
As early as 1995 Maulana Sufi Mohammed had led his Tanzim Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammedi in Bajaur Agency in an uprising to demand Sharia law. Taliban
The first interim president, Sibghat- ullah Mujadidi, assisted by Masoud as defence minister, did what he could to bring the situation under control. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
After a few days of intense fighting in the eastern suburbs of Kabul, they walked into the capital on 26 September with scarcely a shot being fired. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
One can draw certain initial conclusions about what may be understood by this, but any attempt to try to define the possible differences creates the inevitable risk that one is making gross generalisations. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
That was not the end of his troubles: Draga, who believed that the Serbs would love her if she gave the monarchy an heir, claimed that she was pregnant. The Terrorists
On the day in January 1878 when the ‘trial of the one hundred and ninety-three’ in St Petersburg was ending, a young woman of good family and education, who had been under the influence of Nechayev while at university and had already served a term in prison and Siberian exile for her work as a propagandist among the peasants, Vera Zasulich by name, walked into the office of the Governor of St Petersburg, General Trepov, notorious for his brutality, and shot at him at point-blank range. The Terrorists
It was in these circumstances that, on 5th March 1867, the Fenian Insurrection went off at half-cock and ended in farcical tragedy; a raiding column of Fenians which had crossed the Canadian border was scattered and driven back without difficulty (1866); the Fenian commando based on Liverpool which tried to seize and hold Chester Castle was shot to pieces; Clerkenwell Prison was dynamited with the loss of twelve lives, but the attempt to rescue a prisoner failed. The Terrorists
Fighting continued for a week, the British using cavalry and even some artillery. The Terrorists
The Sinn Féin leaders who fell into British hands were, with the exception of De Valera who was a United States citizen, shot. The Terrorists
The following, for example, is a not untypical finding of a Coroner’s Jury, sitting on the death of an IRA man who was shot by a constable after he, Breen, had shot the station sergeant dead: We find that John Breen died of shock and haemorrhage The Irish Case (2) 97 Terrorists and Terrorism caused by a bullet wound inflicted by Constable Martin while John Breen was fighting for his country.’ The Terrorists
One such very senior officer, Colonel Ferguson-Smyth, a Divisional Comman- der, was shot dead by a terrorist, at the bar of his club in Cork, a few days after issuing an order of that kind. The Terrorists
It was made easier by the curfew: a man wearing civilian clothes moving freely about the city at night, or a house at which, after sundown, there was coming and going, were immediately suspect. The Terrorists
The first task was to identify and locate the members of the Cairo Gang. The Terrorists
Newbury jumped out of bed as the men entered his room, and was wounded by their first shot; he tried to escape through the window, and was shot dead. The Terrorists
At the Gresham Hotel a killer squad shot dead Mr A. M. Wilde and Captain McCOrmack in their respective bedrooms to which, with guns in their hands, they were conducted by the hotel porter. The Terrorists
At a house in Lower Mount Street the terrorists found and shot an officer whose real name was MacMahon but whose ‘Cairo Gang’ name was Angliss, and who had been re- called from the Russian counter-revolutionary service; and another very senior officer of the service, known as ‘Lieutenant Peel’. The Terrorists
Bennet was taken into Ames’s room and both men were shot dead. The Terrorists
Two other members of the Cairo Gang were living at a house in Upper Mount Street and were having a Sunday morning lie-in when the terrorists arrived: they were Lieutenants George Bennet and P. A. Ames. The Terrorists
The terrorist campaign did not slacken in Spain. The Terrorists
During the nineties the workers’ union in Catalonia had been building up their strength but failing to obtain any concession from the employers. The Terrorists
Workers 1Following his return to Spain and the reopening of his schools, Ferrer was implicated by a police ‘plant’ in the Barcelona rising, was arrested, tried and shot in October 1909. The Terrorists
At the meeting the king sat on a raised platform from which he could watch the events; Bresci might have shot him then, but probably the range was too great or the crowd too dense. The Terrorists
He was admitted at once, saluted, handed over a letter and, while Sipyagin was breaking the seal, drew a revolver and shot him dead. The Terrorists
Azev was thus able to tell Gerassimov that if Stolypin and Colonel Von der Launitz attended, as they proposed to do, the inaugural mass for the new St Petersburg Institute of Medical Sciences, they would both be assassinated. The Terrorists
One of his first acts as leader was to broadcast, over Irgun’s secret radio, a warning to a CID officer, Ralph Cairns, who had an unpleasant taste for torturing Jewish prisoners; if, said Stern, he continued in this course, he would be executed. The Terrorists
The Israeli Minister of Defence, the formidable General Moshe Dayan, personally held the terrorists in negotiation through a loud- hailer, while soldiers disguised as maintenance engineers clambered onto the aircraft, burst in, shot the two male terrorists dead and captured their two girl comrades. The Terrorists
Dr. Vladimir Nikiforov has arrived with his father’s cache of photo- graphic slides. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On Yekaterinburg’s highest bluff, overlooking the Iset River, the wealth- iest merchants built ornate mansions. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He remembers in particular one victim, a man who was vaccinated once on April zi and died May i. Dr. Nikiforov believed that the vaccine inoculations were given too late to offer protection to anyone. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At this point, Olga begins to cry. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In April, Dayanova adds, she was vaccinated, getting the first shot at the factory where Fagim worked, and the next two at the local clinic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
From a file marked ozz (the international code for anthrax) Ilyenko shows us summary records. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Ilyenko is ambivalent about the vaccine and thinks that the second shot in particular caused serious complications for some people. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
According to Vershinin’s son, no livestock died in the area, but he re- members that stray dogs in the district were shot “by the hundreds.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The man’s reaction to the first shot was a painful ulcer; his wife had little reaction. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Her remembers that local yards were disinfected, stray dogs were shot, and meat was taken from other families to be in- spected, but not from his; they had none to eat at the time. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our time here in Yekaterinburg has disappeared in a flash. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Among those interviewed, no one is sure if stray dogs ate the infected car- casses or whether dogs in the area were shot, although the rumor is that these things happened in other villages and towns and in Sverdlovsk city. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Instead, people in Chkalovskiy told of stray dogs being shot by the hundreds, a slaughter that takes on a quirky symbolism reminiscent of “the Great Cat Massacre” in eighteenth-century France.5 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the last days I am in Yekaterinburg, I dash around wanting to do and see everything and feeling increasingly reluctant to leave. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the late 1980s, a young army major named Robert Eng decided to do something about the problem. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Anthrax multiplies rapidly, and the researchers had begun treating the monkeys within a day of exposure. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Schwarzkopf also said every soldier assigned to re- ceive the experimental drug should be given a release form to read and sign. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
If there was not enough vaccine to go around, nobody would get it. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Adherence to Schwarzkopf’s orders on the botulinum vaccine was spotty; some sol- diers were given the shot without being told what it was. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Owens believed that researchers were moving closer to produc- ing a “multivalent” vaccine, a single shot that protects against multiple diseases, and wanted to defer vaccinations until the new vaccine was available. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Sopko re- sponded, “Nunn’s going to retire. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Pharmaceutical companies had made biffions targeting individual diseases or maladies. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Schwarzkopf described the contents of his cable in an interview. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Schwarzkopf hims4f took an anthrax shot: The scene was described by Bales in119 January 12, 1996, testimony before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses in Kansas City Mo., Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
thirty thousand Saiga antelope: Judith Miller, “U.S. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
JV~ew York Times reporter James Sterngold, reporting on the 1993 economic summit in Japan, wrote that the Russian aid package negotiated there “clearly amounted to less than met the eye. Jihad vs. McWorld
Chehestoon Palace, a hilltop mansion normally reserved for foreign dignitaries. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Russians, they say, have The Soviet Strategy also adopted brusque, unfriendly and even racist attitudes. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The very appearance of the alien, armed, atheistic invaders in the midst of the rural Afghans was provocative, es- pecially given the absence of the guides or interpreters. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They could do so because the people were with them, whereas the regime’s men had es- tranged themselves from them. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The kidnapping of women disturbed families with young daughters. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
During the course of a house search, eight boys were taken out. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ibid., i68.13. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
17. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 2. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Their weapons ready, the men first gathered at dusk for prayer in the garden before sitting down for dinner, a simple but sufficient spread of nan, rice pilau with ~ S1~ ~‘, ~ ~~~$eti~ ~ I The Guerrilla War mutton and vegetable gormah. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
3 Country Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Italy Japan Total Recall Omoide Doraemon Malaysia )~4exico Netherlands Poland Spain Sweden Switzerland U.K. Robin Hood Terminator 2 Predator Mutant Turtles Home Alone Godfather III Dances/ Wolves Silence/Lambs Terminator 2 Terminator 2 Hot Shots! Jihad vs. McWorld
CAUSES AND CONTEXT OF RESPONSES TO THE Like in most other parts of Afghanistan, the responses of the It is argued in this chapter that the responses of the peoples SAUR REVOLUTION IN BADAKHSHAN Chapter 6 M. NazifShahrani 139 either on current events or on a regional or provincial context; an his- torical consideration of national political developments is necessary. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The court is customarily headed by a male religious judge and includes a male and female judge trained in secular law as well as Islamic jurisprudence. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Prisoners were taken from detention, told they were going to be exchanged and then trucked to wells often used by shepherds, which held about 10 to 15 metres of water. Taliban
The Okhrana gave him a ticket for the performance; he was to try to spot the terrorist and thus enable the police to arrest the man without any fuss. The Terrorists
ANTHRAX: ACCURSED FIRE, BIOLOGICAL WEAPO1~ ANTHRAX: Pack animals were his target first, and dogs but soldiers, too, soon felt transfixing pain from his hard shots, and pyres burned night and day.3 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We ask the first passerby, a middle-aged man in overalls, for direc- tions. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Later in April, he remembers, the vaccination campaign began, and he himself received a series of three shots at the ceramics factory, as did his wife and father. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Was Sysikov vaccinated? His father, speaking for the first time, replies that he himself got shots, but not Yuriy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Afterward, the two neighbors were vaccinated, with all three shots, at the ceramics factory. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Nikiforov) for a lecture on an- thrax, the same that Dr. Ilyenko attended. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
understood the destructive power of the anthrax bacillus firsthand. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
But a handful of patients had suffered severe reac- tions after taking the shots, including brain damage and death. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Even if the supplies were stretched by giving each soldier only two or three shots, the army had enough to protect at best a few thousand soldiers. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The Pentagon calculated that soldiers who received their first shots on December 10 would not be minimally protected against anthrax until January 21 and against botulinum until April 1. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A senior Saudi general asked whether Washington could at least set aside some shots for the royal family. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
By December 29, Powell notified Schwarzkopf that the decision had finally been made to immunize the troops against anthrax and botulinum. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The army’s plans for a vaccine factory were shelved. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The army projected that it could stockpile enough to prothct every serviceman by 1997, but only if Michigan doubled its production without a hitch, and only if the FDA accepted a proposal to lower the number of shots required from six to five. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Owens saw biological defense as folly. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Weber and his team had endured a year of painful shots to protect them against anthrax and other more exotic agents, but Lepyoshkin had been protected simply by stepping into a test chamber at the Stepnogorsk complex. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Five years after the Pentagon gave anthrax shots to 150,000 Persian Gulf soldiers, SAIC offered a startling assessment: “This vaccine is not li- Breakthrough 189 190 GERMS censed for the aerosol exposure expected in a biological warfare envi- ronment.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
SAIC said it was also planning animal studies that would examine whether full immunity could be attained with fewer shots. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Several recent experiments with primates had suggested that the vaccine was effective after only two injections. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The FDA-approved regimen of six shots was based on guesswork, not science. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Some blamed the anthrax inoculation. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“No immunizations,” a terse summary of the document said. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In the mean- time, there was more than enough stockpiled to begin the shots. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Senior Pentagon officials understood they might have some diffi- culty selling the program to the troops. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Taking Charge 213 214 GERMS The Pentagon’s civilian leaders also worried about whether the military was able to manage a complex vaccine program that would involve more than 14 million shots. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The FDA was determined to avoid a repetition of the administra- tive problems in the Gulf War. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
They also said that the vac- cine appeared to cause fewer side effects than its counterpart for ty- phoid and, hence, did not threaten the health of soldiers. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The day after Cohen made his announcement, a reporter asked President Clinton at a news conference whether he, as commander- in-chief, would take the shots. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Clinton defended the Pentagon’s program but said he had no plans to take the shots himself. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
American military scientists had analyzed soil samples that American teams had brought back from anthrax burial pits on Vozrozhdeniye Is- land in 1997. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Most servicemen took their shots, but more than two dozen sailors aboard the navy carriers the USS John C. Stennis and USS Inde- pendence refused, fearing the immunizations could harm their health. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In May 1998, two months after the military began giving the shots to the troops in the Middle East, Cohen gave his final blessing. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Mark Zaid, the lawyer who repre- sented some of the first soldiers to refuse the shots, had obtained thou- sand of pages of documents through his Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Anyone serving in the Mid- dle East or South Korea, even for a fekv days, would have to be immu- nized. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The GAO offered no evidence that the vaccine was dangerous or a threat to health. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Mark Zaid, the lawyer repre- senting some of the soldiers who had refused shots, stirred more doubts when he came across documents the army had drafted to in- denmif~ companies making the anthrax vaccine. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A month later, the Pentagon promised to conduct a long-term study of the vaccine’s safety, more than a year after the first shots were administered. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
But the Pentagon was nonetheless unable to sell many servicemen or key members of Congress on the value of the anthrax shots. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In the years after the anthrax vaccinations began, some servicemen who had received the shots complained of dizziness, severe lethargy, and exhaustion similar to Gulf War Syndrome. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The effects of the controversy were clear. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
An other- wise healthy group of men and women received shots to protect against a health threat that might well never materialize. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It said the United States planned to hold in reserve enough shots to vaccinate 20,000 soldiers. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
265 GAO announced its preliminary findings: US. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
266 Zaid provided the memos: Dwight Daniels, “Anthrax Shots Bad Medicine? Vac- cine’s Possible Dangers Admitted in Military Papers:’ San Diego Union- Tribune, June 29, 1999, p.1. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Robert G. Neumann, who was United States ambassador to Afghanistan from 1966 to 1973, has recorded that John Foster Dulles had turned down Afghan requests for military aid because of the ‘location and poor communications’ of Afghanistan, which would require the United J States to undertake ‘an enormous logistics effort’, risking an escalation of the cold war with the USSR26 Neumann’s successor, Theodore L. Eliot, jnr., Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Neumann listed additional factors that worked in favour of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
We believe it most likely that Daoud, having used the left to gain power, is now methodically trying to whittle it down... Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Shah committed his military forces to the preserva- tion of Pakistan’s territorial integrity and extended to Bhutto consider- able military help in putting down the Baloch uprising of 1974-75. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
PDPA was an illegal party. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘The provincial administration soon proved incapable of making major changes in the face of local opposition, and the military proved unable to put down this opposition when confronted with armed rebellion.”2 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karmal was despatched to Prague, Nur Mohammad Nur to Washington, Abdul Wakli to London, Mahmud Baryalay (Babrak’s brother) to Islamabad, and Dr Anahita Ratebzad to Belgrade. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Article No. 4 laid down that Engagements and marriages shall take place with the full consent of the parties involved: (a) No one shall force marriage; (b) No one shall prevent the free marriage of a widow or force her into marriage because of family relationships or patriarchal ties; (c) No one shall prevent legal marriages on the pretext of engagement, forced engagement expenses, or using force. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
First, it laid down that in future no family could own more than 30 jiribs of first—grade land (4 jiribs make one hectare) or its equivalent, a family could retain larger areas of poorer land in inverse relation to the land’s productivity. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He took up an office next to Taraki’s in the People’s House in Kabul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In order simply to save the Afghan revolution, the Soviets did not have to despatch to Afghanistan, in a matter of ten to fifteen days, a contingent of more than 100,000 troops. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Earlier, on 29 July, the Washington Post reported that the Soviet troops had launched their largest land and air offensive to put down a mutiny in an Afghan army division. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fighting escalated in 1982—83. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
InJanuary 1983 the Soviet—Afghan forces and Massoud’s guerrillas concluded an unwritten truce which, for a while, was held up by the Kabul media as a new pattern of relationship emerging between the Marxist regime and local resistance groups. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The regime ordered the release of several thousand political prisoners and declared an amnesty to all resisters if they laid down arms, and promised rehabilitation to all refugees if they returned to their villages and towns. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The central committee of the PDPA held two plenums in 1984; Karmal’s reports to the plenums were a mixture ofincreasing self-confidence and admission of major failures on the part of the Government and the party in accomplishing vital talks. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Movement towards a more comprehensive settlement was to be determined following initial agreement on these points. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He ended the conversation by lifting his hand, and pulling his fingers down one by one as he enumerated the reasons why a solu- tion had to be found to the Afghanistan issue. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Paradoxically, the great intensity of the civil war may make the task easier for the PDPA when Afghanistan settles down to face its terrible devastation. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
General Zia himself admitted that public opinion in Pakistan was divided down the middle on whether Pakistan’s Afghan policy served its own national interests or those of the United States. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The friendship with India has not only survived their military move into Afghanistan, but also the assassination of Indira Gandhi; it is likely to grow stronger still under the prime miistership of Rajiv Gandhi.’8 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets, of course, regard Iranian funda- mentalism as more dangerous than Pakistan’s. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Pashtun-Tajik relationship became strained for a while, and the conservative elements, represented by spiritual leaders and tribal elders, were granted scores of concessions and high positions in the government. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Notable progress was made in the national economy, which had been destroyed during the rebellion. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But progress in the economic field was visible. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On the day when Taraki’s plane was about to land at Kabul airport, Sarwari had arranged that a death squad would gun down Amin when he was on his way to receive Taraki. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
While Amin worked to weaken Taraki by removing Sarwari, Wa- tanjar, and Gulabzoy from their posts, the latter tried to do away with him. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Internal pressure on the Sitam-e-Milli proved crucial. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The jirga bore fruit on zi February, when it passed a resolution of thirty-four clauses. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
As noted, Mohammad Zahir held that such an assembly was to delib- erate over ways and means to restore Afghan sovereignty and lay down the basis for a future government. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In the rural areas the pro-Chinese communists were no more secure. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Unlike the city uprising, the student uprising was organized. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Also important was the attitude of the Islamists, who disparaged tra- ditional elders and tribal organizations. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The one excep- tion was the air they breathed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Membership was then the result more of partisanship than of qualification. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Because the Soviets had a huge army and a vast arsenal, they felt confident of victory. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I did not only see ruined dwellings, observe terror bombing myself, but I found a society where all ordinary functions were disturbed, even the basic ones: the produc- tion of food, the supplies from outside of salt, sugar and tea—other items of trade as I mentioned. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But before withdrawing, the Soviet forces brought another calamity on the locals. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To establish this new government, first a seventy-member commission and then a fourteen-member subcom- mission were set up to lay down electoral procedures. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For that purpose, on 6 March 1989, after the Soviet troops had left on time (i ~ February 1989), between five thousand and seven thousand mujahideen under the leadership of eight senior commanders advanced on the frontier city of Jalalabad, but with- out a coordinated plan of action.47 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Unlike the “broad-based” formula that Diego Cordovez had put for- ward in the summer of 1988, this plan came out in a more favorable climate. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Nearly all the Afghan power groups came out gradually in favor of the plan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
When Rabbani took over, the foundation of the Islamic state had been laid down. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The outcome was the Islamabad Accords, concluded on 7 March 1993 by the leaders of eight Islamic groups, including the Islamic Unity and the Islamic Movement; the new accords were signed in the residence of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, with representatives of the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia also present. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
As of this writing (zo June 1994) the bombing, rocketing, and shell- ing have continued on an intermittent basis. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Now the full weight of this power had been turned against his government. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
IAH, ~86. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
45. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For them it is ordinary to curse, insult, and beat a passenger and bring down his belongings and food. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Quoted in the San Diego Union-Tribune, 5 July 1994, A,z.137. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The horses, their heads down and breathing heavily, wait patiently beneath their burdens. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At 2 a.m. the Afghans stop to sleep and rest the horses. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As the day wears on, the sun beats down with growing intensitY. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The caravan climbs steeply for twelve hours, occasionallY resting by cascades of snowfllelt roaring down from the rearing escarpments above. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Huge, sinister ravens croak hoarsely from its craggy parapets, and just overhead, a lone eagle grace- fully soars on the rising and plunging air currents. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As with the French and the Americans, the Soviets have underesti- mated the resilience of a resistance force intent on gaining its inde- pendence. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
GoverflmeT~t ~uj1diflgS, stepped-up mujahed assaults. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Dating back to Peter the Great, it had been a historic Tzarist arnbitt0fl to expand the Russian empire down to the indian subcontinent. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Iran, however, remains the key to the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
While less protected Mi-8s were being brought down by guerrilla fire, even sprays of Kalashnikov bullets, the Hinds could fly with relative impunitY- Only by the third year of occupation, did one begin to see occasional evidence of Mi-24s being knocked out by the mujahideen. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Despite guerrilla claims of shooting down helicopters, a considerable number are known to have crashed or been forced to land for technical reasons. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘The military vehicle accel- erated, passed us in turn and then stopped . Afghanistan: The Soviet War
When British photographer Peter Jouvenal and I first arrived at his camp nearly five months after the invasion, he scrutinised us with flinty suspicion for several long minutes while our guide explained who we were. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Attacking the Russians was obviously considered a big lark and no one wanted to miss the fun. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Moving in single file through the fields and thick foliage of the fruit orchards, other mujahed groups from the neighbouring villages could be heard making their way down to Jalalabad, some three hours march to the north. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Helicopter rocket pods have been transformed into rocket launchers, while, in one case, guerrillas stripped down a four-barrel ZPU-4 gun to turn it into four separate weapons. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The young commander’s first attempt had obviously been too rash and unprepared. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to Massoud, their courage even won the admiration of the mujahideen, but, he said, they had never faced real war conditions. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Afghans, however, were not the only ones to defect. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In the end, it was Massoud who brought the Red Army to check, 87 5 Direct Soviet involvement with Afghanistan dates from the Soviet- Afghan Friendship Treaty of 1921 through which the USSR sought to consolidate a hold over the now fully independent Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Parliament once again served as nothing more than democratic window dressing, while nepotism in both business and government remained the prerogative of the ruling establishment. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It managed to survive for more than a year 99 100 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan before being banned in July 1969 prior to the new parliamentary elections. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The helicopter swerved away abruptly. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The security forces then fanned out into the town to track down the remaining men. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Three or four men were discovered and dragged screaming down to the field where they were unceremoniously added to the carnage. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Within weeks of coming to power, the communists ordered the arrests of mullahs and prominent landowners in the key eastern pro- vinces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
An aristocratic, finely featured man in his mid-fifties with a mag- nificently groomed beared, he listened quietly to their problems one by one, dispensing advice with the air of a Solomon. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A steady stream of followers entered the hut to consult with their chief. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Such measures did not go down well with the Nuristanis. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For two days, screaming mobs armed with weapons plundered from government arsenals hunted down Afghan communist officials and officers and Soviet advisers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Instead, both leaders regarded repression as the only means to crack down on dissent. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Stop serving the interests of the outsiders. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The resistance has also taken .steps Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘The Russians are probably just as informed, if not more, as the old British Central Asia and frontier hands who knew every Afghan characteristic right down to the last detail’, said one Western regional specialist. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Student ranks have been whittled down through flight, conscription, imprison- ment and death. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But the once highly popular British Council and American Centre have been closed down, thus sub- stantially curbing access to Western periodicals and books. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, among the organisa- tion’s few remaining projects in Kabul, its association with the regime’s controversial National Literacy Programme has aroused the most irrita- tion. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Attempts to deviate from the menu, maintained Jehani, were cracked down upon by the Ministry of Information on orders from Soviet advisers, who are present at all high-level meetings. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Sovietisation of Afghanistan As a railway terminal town with a population of 60,000, Termez has become a key military base and depot for the Russian war effort. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
There, amid the cool of the irrigated fruit orchards and wheat fields, the women’s gestures evoked such a touching sense of serenity that we momentarily forgot the war and even our utter weari- ness. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Suddenly, a lone turbaned rider on a snorting gray steed bore down on the group throwing up white clouds of fine dust. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
An Opposition-in-Exile During the Taraki-Amin periods, Afghan dissident groups in Pakistan began to proliferate. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Diplomats, journalists, intelligence agents and mysterious travellers were constantly drifting through this dusty Pathan city, some 35 kiometres from the Khyber Pass, to check on the Afghans, the Pakistani drug smugglers or whatever plots one cared to unearth. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Three months before the Soviet invasion, Peshawar exuded the atmosphere of a den of spies. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Gaylani often travels abroad in search of diplomatic and financial support, adamantly advocating a democratic constitutional monarchy as the best solution to Afghanistan’s religious and ethnic diversity. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Within weeks of the intervention, leaflets distributed by various underground organisations began to appear in the Afghan capital urging shopkeepers to show their ‘unanimous condemnation’ of the occupation by rolling down their shutters. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Thousands of demonstrators marched through the streets chanting slogans such as ‘Russians, Afghanistan is not Czechoslovakia’, ‘Down with Babrak, puppet of the Russians’ and ‘Out with the Russians!’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Heavy- handed security tactics, notably by the KHAD, and government threats to close down any shops or businesses that participated in strikes man- aged to subdue most public opposition. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For the Saur regime’s fourth anniversary in April 1982, the KHAD adroitly removed all known pupil ringleaders and closed down the high The Afghan Struggle schools for several days, now a regular procedure during all important government occasions which might arouse anti-communist fervour. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
On donkeys, camels or horses, but mostly on foot. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Leaving the mountainous frontier pass behind, the guerrilla caravan, horses loaded with guns, ammunition, food and medication, descended into the flowered valleys of Nuristan, the ‘land of light’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But in October and November 1981, the Soviets made a concerted effort to 219 220 Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners crack down by deliberately bombing three of the French-run hos- pitals. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The first attack came in late October. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Despite initial outrage at the invasion and routine condemnations by the UN General Assembly, both Western and Third World opinion has failed to acknowledge the implications of a war in which a primarily peasant resistance movement with limited resources has succeeded in pinning down a major expeditionary force representing the world’s largest standing army. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Handicraft work forms an important segment Nuristan is important for woodcarving. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The chalcolithic pattern discovered in Afghanistan is one where a semisendentary situation is pre- dominant. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
41 Febetchenko FOLK MUSIC. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Riders race at full speed down a large field and try to spear pegs which are planted 20 cms. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Cultural, commercial, and diplomatic relationships with friendly nations are maintained. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Robertson109 Sated Koh 110 SAFED KOH MOUNTAIN RANGE (EASTERN). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Our secular eternities are corrupted, however, race reduced to an insignia of resentment, and soul sized down to fit the demanding body by which it now measures its needs. Jihad vs. McWorld
We have learned well enough how eas- ily the German forests can be devastated by Swiss and Italians driving gas-guzzling roadsters fueled by leaded gas (the Europeans are far behind the Americans in controlling lead). Jihad vs. McWorld
The con- sumer who welcomes lower prices may, as an employee of a textile firm, be hostile to the export of jobs that brought prices down. Jihad vs. McWorld
The United States drew heavily on its resource banks to acquire global leadership, and would draw even more heav- ily on them to retain it into the heady years following the war when its relations with the Soviet Union were freezing down at the very moment its domestic economic growth was heating up. Jihad vs. McWorld
Even more than with minerals, energy resources represent a form of power that seems to shrink as it grows. Jihad vs. McWorld
The film industry has been a pawn in wider trade negotia- tions, however; and was recently sold down the river (or out into the Pacific Ocean) by the government in Jakarta in order to assure con- tinued textile exports to America.4 Jihad vs. McWorld
Poland does still better; having access to Wheel of Fortune itself (dubbed in Polish) along with its own licensed version Kolo Fortuna, which plays to 70 percent of Polish households on Thursday evenings. Jihad vs. McWorld
MTV Europe began broadcasting in East Germany two days before the Wall came down, which, in a certain perverse sense, almost ren- dered the latter event superfluous.” Jihad vs. McWorld
so vulgar and stimulating” are the images of Western TV and MTV being beamed down from satellites.’7 Jihad vs. McWorld
Thirty years ago Disney’s little sales-creatures crooned to theme park visitors, “It’s a small world, after all.” Jihad vs. McWorld
Michael J. O’Neill is fairly ardent in his belief that television is a form of “people power.” Jihad vs. McWorld
During a brief grace period (in the French Revolution and its aftermath) when patriotism meant love of fellow citizens no less than love of country (Rousseau), and Ia patrie referred to the democratic republic no less than to the nation, this splendid amalgam of indi- vidualist ideals and communitarian identity politics—a synthesis of the religion of humanity and the secular story of nations—appeared to make it possible for reason to set down roots and thereby secure legal personhood in a grounded identity of nationalist flesh and cul- tural blood. Jihad vs. McWorld
THE OLD WORLD OF JIHAD prewar stage classic The Time of Your 14[e, “no foundation, all the way down the line,” and expect full sympathy from audiences already exasperated by modernity even before it had produced the Holo- caust and the atomic bomb. Jihad vs. McWorld
The irony is repeated today in the stellar rise and rapid fall of Silvio Berlusconi in Italian politics: a global corporate media mogul who owns Italy’s premier AC Milan soccer team, using his media-made preeminence to give demagogic voice to the very parochial constituencies his media world is system- atically destroying; and then being brought down by media-driven charges of corruption that make him look like any other politician. Jihad vs. McWorld
The political entities that brought down and succeeded feudalism had at once to divide and to integrate old Europe: at one and the same time to dismantle the empire of the church and to weld together the provincial neighborhoods. Jihad vs. McWorld
Once the parts feel justified in jettisoning the whole, the logic of Jihad does not necessarily stop with the first and primary layer of fragments. Jihad vs. McWorld
German enragees are often if not always unem- ployed or underemployed in lower-paying jobs, often if not always young people with little education and few prospects, often if not always Ossi’s or Easterners from the old German Democratic Republic, deprived overnight both of jobs and the social safety nets that might cushion their joblessness.23 Jihad vs. McWorld
Had the indigenous political movements that helped bring down first the iron curtain and then the Berlin Wall survived the traumatic passage to German reunification and been even a little successful in the West-dominated elections that came soon after- wards, Ossi extremism might have been averted. Jihad vs. McWorld
China, like its neighbors, strug- gles against Westernization at the same time it struggles for eco- nomic market productivity and for trade with the rest of McWorld. Jihad vs. McWorld
It has restricted foreign films to 30 percent of the total market. Jihad vs. McWorld
According to Zhang Zedong who runs a state-owned satellite-dish i88 THE OLD WORLD OF JIHAD shop, “what people want is entertainment. Jihad vs. McWorld
Yet Japan is not wholly exempt and the case for its supposed immunity to McWorld may reflect Western fears of Japanese supe- riority rather than a realistic assessment of its cultural autonomy. Jihad vs. McWorld
Within the developed world, to which these jagged middle Euro- pean shards of the ex-Soviet empire affect to belong, there is no region in which Jihad has an uglier or more disintegral presence. Jihad vs. McWorld
There he has earned the epithet of traitor; how easily the language of treason comes to the warriors of Jihad! Jihad vs. McWorld
The Romanians have also continued to persecute gypsies, who suffered as much as Jews from Romania’s wartime profascist racial policies. Jihad vs. McWorld
Jihad has been a metaphor for anti-Western antiuniversalist strug- gle throughout this book. Jihad vs. McWorld
Indeed, fundamentalism may have a better record as an enemy of despots in the Middle East than have had the secular systems con- structed to put down fundamentalism and to realize Western aspira- tions. Jihad vs. McWorld
Yet as one might expect, there are rival interpretations of Islam within the Islamic world, and no single monolithic argument goes unchallenged. Jihad vs. McWorld
Further down the road, however, it is not increasingly less sovereign nations quarreling among themselves but multinational firms and their global markets that will dictate to America and other countries what is and is not possible: whether or not five-year-olds will work thirteen-hour shifts in Pakistan for 20 cents a day, whether or not scrubless on-the- cheap smokestacks in one Asian country will be allowed to undo the good work of conscientiously (and expensively) built facilities in The J~few World Disorder • 221 another.4 Jihad vs. McWorld
224 JIHAD VS. Jihad vs. McWorld
However, while he regrets the passing of spontaneous local move- ments like Solidarity and Civic Forum, he still believes civil society can be established top-down by appropriate if supple and deliberate constitutional innovation, slighting the need to establish a bottom-up foundation in schools, voluntary associations, foundations, and other communal institutions that n{ight in turn support a democratic con- stitutional edifice. Jihad vs. McWorld
per person (down from 2.17 Jihad vs. McWorld
The Wall came down on November 9, 1989: only four months later, on March i8, 1990, a coalition of conservative West German political parties led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democrats rolled to a vic- tory so complete that the Social Democrats—projected as winners just a few months earlier but as things turned out far too cautious about reunification—were soundly thrashed, securing only 22 per- cent of the vote.’ Jihad vs. McWorld
Another clis- illusioned voter said: ‘All my life I dreamed of the day when the wall would come down, but the minute they opened it, I knew the revolu- tion was over.”2 Jihad vs. McWorld
More or less everyone. Jihad vs. McWorld
By the time it closes down its operations sometime in 1995, Treuhandanstalt will have sold or liquidated close to fifteen thousand companies, including all of East Germany’s top newspapers and magazines, taken over by their western competitors and turned into outlets for West German—style journalism and opinion. Jihad vs. McWorld
Video teleconference capabilities allow local town meetings to interact with similar meetings across a region, a nation, or the world, breaking down the parochialism of face-to-face interaction without sacrificing its personalism. Jihad vs. McWorld
A culture of advertising, software, Hollywood movies, MT\~ theme parks, and shopping malls hooped together by the virtual nexus of the information superhighway closes down free spaces. Jihad vs. McWorld
The parts may become more civil and participatory, their members more civic; yet they must be aligned by some form of global organization that per- mits cooperation without destroying their autonomy. Jihad vs. McWorld
This would seem to offer a starting place to defend against the depredations both of Jihad and McWorld. Jihad vs. McWorld
Chapteri. Jihad vs. McWorld
Coke was also there recently when the Berlin Wall came down, handing out six-packs. Jihad vs. McWorld
J%/otesfor Pages 89—93 and rising prices had driven ticket sales down to only 128 million, while the number of screens available had been reduced to around thirty-two hun- dred. Jihad vs. McWorld
Meanwhile, the American share had crept up to over 41 percent while the German share of revenues was down to only 13 percent. Jihad vs. McWorld
Most viewers around the world do not understand English anyway, and for them the point is the sound, the style, and the feel, not the words. Jihad vs. McWorld
Kristof “China Sees ‘Market-Leninism’ a Way to Future,” The Yew Yorki5. Jihad vs. McWorld
billion in debt. Jihad vs. McWorld
From such early critics, the lineage extends down to Karl Polanyi, John Maynard Keynes, and John Kenneth Galbraith. Jihad vs. McWorld
Walter B. Wriston, Twilight of Sovereignty (New York: Scribner’s, 1992),i. Jihad vs. McWorld
Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Ft4fllling America’s Destiny (Washing-15. Jihad vs. McWorld
13). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The departure of the mujahidin from the familiar leadership pattern of other liberation movements is considered by many Western researchers to be a sign of weakness and evidence of the chaos they believe traditionally reigned in Afghanistan (see for example Azoy 1982, N. Newell and R. Newell 1981, and Chaliand 1982). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Tactics quickly began to break down because Afghanistan is defmitely not tank country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Initially individual Yugoslav ethnolinguistic groups resisted the Germans and The Mi-24s roam up and down valleys with impunity, im- The tactics of rubbleization and migratory genocide have back- It is important that the processes of extension of local power The current situation in Afghanistan most resembles the evolu- LOUIS DUPREE 72 Italians independently. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The tumult dies down when a man with a say cries “Listen here!,” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Thus they truly represent tribal sentiment. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The debate was resolved by fiat when, in the midst of a community conference on the subject, the people of Kombrom heard gunshots coming from the wuluswali at the base of the mountain on which Kombiom is situated. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Without further delay, the men of Kombrom rushed down the mountainside and joined the fight. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Investigating, they saw that a group of young men from the Kom village of Meroim and the Mumo village of Mumohn had taken it upon themselves to attack the post. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
until they have worked their way down to authorities at the local level. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Instead traditional local leaders and the peasantry have been success- fully mobilized by the political and military efforts of young, edu- cated Afghans. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The policy of gradualism depended on the 177 government’s other policies—i.e., Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
from rural opposition. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It was the literate urban class, many of whom were in the civil service, military, or schools, that wanted to see greater and faster change. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
EFFECTS OF THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN NAHRJN 189 family to a bride’s in connection with marriage, apart from 300 afs. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The arbab in Nahrin in the late 1970s was a much humbler Undoubtedly it was easy enough to take away the duties and EFFECTS OF THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN NA}IRIN 197 tinuing to ask their arbab for advice on such matters as disputes over inheritance. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
As noted above, there remains some doubt as to the extent to which Amanullah’s agricultural policies benefited the peasantry. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It did not repeat the mistake Amanullah made when he reduced both the size of the army and its pay (Poullada 1973:76). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Tapper points out that this change of SHEIKHANZAI NOMADS AND THE AFGHAN STATE 251 policy initiated a “wholesale northward migration of Durrani” (62), and Kakar notes that “This migration became the beginning of a north- ward movement that has continued over the years until recently” (1979:131). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Truly to be Pakhtun is (in a Ghilzai idiom which seems common HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM British analyses from the North-West Frontier tend to treat 275 commonly summarize it in positive terms as treating all persons alike and without distinction from oneself. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Given the relative rise of religious figures in the late nineteenth HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM Many tribesmen would prefer to dispense altogether with 281 Such claims mirror those of Sayyid and of pirzadah and akhundzadah families to a genetic legitimacy which parallels that claimed for qawm; on a more practical level, few mullahs practice in the place of their birth, and Ghilzai routinely take mullahs to have no Pakhtun ancestry, even though they speak Pakhto, because they do not “do Pakhto.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Opponents have been Muslim, and in an important measure avghan, even when they were the government; conflicts have been, if not settled, at least muted by piecemeal relinquishment of issues or climbing down from moral heights to the more mundane origins of disputes in which mullahs escalate and ph deescalate conflict. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Still, with growing independence of mullahs from tribes as institutions and of tribesmen themselves, which are by no means equal, a basic pattern remained in the coun- terpoint of initiatives of mullahs, who seek out tribesmen, while ph-like figures are sought out by tribesmen; the difference lies in the former becoming more institutional and the latter more individual with the values of both continuously contingent. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
many women); it also leads to late marriages, and often brings about a wide disparity of age between the spouses. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Through immediate affinal support, and ultimately through sons, a household can continue to be self-sufficient. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
They contended that education for women would lead to the break- down of the family, sexual anarchy, and ultimately degrade women. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In this connection the former leadership of the Ministry of Education slowed down to some extent the solution of the problem of eliminating illiteracy (1980:3). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
(personal communication; see also an article from New Delhi in Pakistan Times, 6/13/80:1). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Eickelman, D. F. 1976. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Children, many of them orphaned and in rags, ran up and down the alleys, gesticulating and shouting with excitement at the thought of the spectacle they were about to witness. Taliban
The Taliban, drawn from the majority Pashtun ethnic group which AFGHANISTAN’S HOLY INTRODUCTION: WARRIORS Q n a warm spring afternoon in the southern city of Kandahar, Afghan shopkeepers were pulling down their shutters in prepara- tion for the weekend. Taliban
The Tahban had closed down all girls’ schools and women were rarely permitted to venture out of their homes, even for shopping. Taliban
After several weeks of searching for him, Wali’s relatives tracked Abdullah down, arrested him and bought him to the Taliban for justice. Taliban
‘When Allah had made the rest of the world, He saw that there was a lot of rubbish left over, bits and pieces and things that did not fit anywhere else. Taliban
The Pashtuns trace their genealogy to Qais, a companion of the Prophet Mohammed. Taliban
The Soviets retaliated by cutting down thousands of trees and smashing the irrigation system. Taliban
Their leaders sold off every- thirtgto Pakistani traders to make money, stripping down telephone wires and poles, cutting trees, selling off factories, machinery and even road rollers to scrap merchants. Taliban
‘We have no favourites in Afghanistan and we do not interfere in Afghanistan,’ she said while visiting Manila.’5 Taliban
I can stop them from re-entering but most of them have families here,’ she said’6 The Taliban immediately implemented the strictest interpretation of Sharia law ever seen in the Muslim world. Taliban
The Taliban war wagons -Japanese two-door pick-ups with a stripped- down trunk at the back open to the elements — were streaming towards Herat laden with heavily armed young men in their bid to capture the city. Taliban
In 1993 he took me to see the Awn Heirvi school where 1,500 girls studied in two shifts, sitting under the open sky as there were no classrooms, desks, books, paper or ink — their desire to learn only re-emphasising Herat’s history of learning. Taliban
In contrast when the Taliban took over Kandahar, the 45 working schools were closed down and only three remained. Taliban
The Taliban treated Herat as an occupied city, arresting hundreds of Heratis, closing down all schools and forcibly implementing their social bans and Sharia law, even more fiercely than in Kandahar. Taliban
This proved even more embarrassing for Islamabad when, in May, 1,000 of Hikmetyar’s troops arrived in Kabul to support the government and defend the front line against the Taliban. Taliban
It was a premeditated, targeted killing designed to terrorize the population. Taliban
All women were banned from work, even though one quarter of Kabul’s civil service, the entire ele- mentary educational system and much of the health system were run by women. Taliban
Mullah Rabbani met with Dostum on 8 October 1996 in a bid to try and neutralize the Uzbeks while the Taliban went after Masud, but the talks broke down. Taliban
Pakistan also launched a diplomatic shuttle in a bid to break Dostum away from Masud. Taliban
The Taliban, the majority of whom had never been in the north before, arrogantly started disarming the fierce Uzbek and Hazara troops, took over the mosques from where they declared the imposition of Sharia law, shut down schools and the university and drove women off the streets. Taliban
Malik’s troops swiftly retook four northern provinces (Takhar, Faryab, Jowzjan and Sari Pul), which the Taliban bad captured only five days earlier and there was heavy fighting for control of three other northern provinces (Balkh, Samangan and Kunduz). Taliban
Once again Pakistani madrassas were closed down as 5,000 new recruits — both Pakistani and Afghan — arrived to enlist with the Taliban. Taliban
Malik’s house was burnt down by Dostum’s troops and he fled tohis base in Faryab province and then escaped to Turkmenistan from where be went on to Iran. Taliban
In November, the UNHCR suspended all its programmes when the Taliban arrested four UNHCR Afghan staff. Taliban
August 1997 in a bid to force them to surrender, the Taliban had closed all the roads from the south, west and east that entered their mountain fastness. Taliban
Western aid-workers who late investigated the incident said civilians were dragged from their homes lined up and gunned down. Taliban
The Taliban shut down the few home schools for girls that were operating in Kabul, as the religious police went on a rampage forcing all women off the streets of Kabul and insisting that householders blackened their windows, so women would not be visible from the outside. Taliban
The Taliban went on a killing frenzy, driving their pick-ups up and down the narrow streets of Mazar shooting to the left and right and killing everything that moved — shop owners, cart pullers, women and children shoppers and even goats and donkeys. Taliban
Traditionally Islam in Afghanistan has been immensely toler- ant — to other Muslim sects, other religions and modem lifestyles. Taliban
Haq shut down his madrassa and sent his entire student body to fight alongside the Taliban. Taliban
He is also the principle organizer for recruiting Pakistani students to fight for the Taliban. Taliban
However, ethnicity, personal rivalries and the urge to be the first into Kabul broke down their consensus as the Mujahed- din competed to seize the capital in 1992. Taliban
As such, the Taliban fighters resemble a lashkar or traditional tribal militia force, which has long historical antecedents amongst the Pashtun tribes. Taliban
There were huge swathes of rural Afghanistan where schools had been destroyed in the war and not A VANISHED GENDER -~ 107 108 a single one remained. Taliban
In 1997 it asked for US$133 million and received only US$56 million or 42 per cent and the following year it asked for US$157 million but received only US$53 million or 34 per cent. Taliban
TALIBAN I The plight of Bibi Zobra’s children and other kids was even worse. Taliban
A 1990 graduate of Kabul 109A VANISHED GENDER 110 TALIBAN University, she held down a good job with an NGO. Taliban
The Taliban had no knowledge of Herat’s history or traditions. Taliban
People were barred from visiting the shrines of Sufi saints of which Herat had an abundance. Taliban
The UN could not avoid ignoring the issue after the massive international media coverage of the Taliban’s hanging of former President Najibullah and the treatment of Kabul’s women. Taliban
They closed down home schools for girls which had been allowed to continue and then prevented women from attending general hospitals. Taliban
The Taliban also clamped down on homosexuality. Taliban
They remained buried under the rubble for half an hour, but one managed to survive. Taliban
‘The level of suffering experienced by the Afghan people is literally horrendous,’ said Alfredo Witschi-Cestari, the UN Co-ordinator for Afghanistan until 1998. Taliban
TALIBAN The Part 3 New Great BARONS: THE TALIBAN ANDGame minal building, was built to meet the expected flow of Western airlines to this oil- and gas-rich desert Republic, but it echoes with the sounds of silence. Taliban
Karimov has also tried unsuccessfully at throwing his weight around in Tajikistan, where 24 per cent of the population is Uzbek. Taliban
President Niyazov shut down gas supplies to his neighbours after Turkmenistan accumulated over US$1 billion in unpaid bills and Turkmen gas production slipped to 0.73 Taliban
This was particularly appealing to the Afghan warlords as Afghanistan had gas fields in the north, which once supplied Uzbekistan but had been shut down. Taliban
Unocal now also faced immense problems with President Niyazov, who was as far removed from reality as ever. Taliban
Truck drivers, Pakistani customs officials and Taliban mix in a casual, friendly way guzzling down endless cups of tea, as long lines of trucks wait to cross. Taliban
They cut down millions of acres of timber in Afghanistan for the Pakistani market, denuding the countryside as there was no reforestation. Taliban
Pakistan made several half-hearted attempts to rein in the AU by stopping the import of items such as electronics, but the government always backed down as the Taliban refused to comply with the new orders and the mafia pressurized government ministers. Taliban
In the late 1990s the repercussions were much more pervasive, under- mining all the institutions of the state. Taliban
In June 1997, the Taliban closed down the Iranian Embassy in Kabul, accusing Iran of destroying peace and stability in Afghanistan’.’8 Taliban
Complex relationships of power and authority built up over centuries have broken down completely. Taliban
Peace-making by the UN has so far failed to yield any dividends, but not for lack of trying. Taliban
There is no possibil- ity that Mullah Omar and Masud are going to be able to agree to sit down in Kabul and rule together. Taliban
18 February. Taliban
1997 24 May. Taliban
The inevitable protests by the religious leadership were put down by the army, strengthened with Soviet assistance, and a gradual process commenced of women entering the urban workforce. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There was obviously a slowing down in the construction sector, reducing the opportunities for people to engage in daily labouring work and accelerating the process of return to Iran. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, the events in Mazar are not so easily consistent with an act of treachery. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Part of the international response to the Taliban’s policies, both from the West and from other parts of the Islamic world, has been a reaction to their use of certain punishments laid down in Shari’a law, known as the Hudud. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In spite of Pakistan’s efforts to play down its possible links with the Taliban, Interior Minister Naseerullah Babar took on a high- profile role in seeking to mediate between the Taliban and Dostam following the takeover of Kabul and the reversal, at the hands of Masoud’s and Dostam’s forces, of the initial successes of the Taliban north of the capital. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Taliban were likely to have greater popular appeal than the Islamist parties because they were not seeking to overturn the 142 The regional picture decision-making structures that had always existed and to replace them with new structures appropriate to political parties. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
No judge has yet clearly laid down what should be understood by ‘an offence of a political character’, and there is little case law to refer to; but it seems clear enough, at least to the lay 16 mind; and in Rex v. Castioni (a Swiss terrorist guilty of political assassination) (1891 1 Q.B. 149), Denman, J., observed: The question really is whether, upon the facts it is clear that the man was acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political character with a political object and as part of a political movement and rising in which he was taking part. The Terrorists
The Uses of Terrorism 17 Chapter 2 The Terrorist Ego There is, as far as I know, no direct evidence that Sergei Nechayev, the second and more important subject of this chap- ter, had ever read the book in which Max Stirner (real name, Schmidt) set down the philosophy of the ego as paramount; indeed, it is most unlikely. The Terrorists
Johann Caspar Schmidt was born in Bayreuth in 1806; he was a sickly boy whose school and university career was repeatedly interrupted by illness. The Terrorists
A founder-member of this body, Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov by name, refused to carry out one of Nechayev’s orders. The Terrorists
These ‘Young Hegeians’ were a group of youthful philoso- phers mostly from Berlin University and among whom Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were, at different times, the shining lights, who had turned Hegel’s system upside-down. The Terrorists
In an effort to recover it he agreed to the Tsar’s request that he write his Conftssions. The Terrorists
It certainly damped down enthusiasm for terrorist methods, although it did not completely discourage immigrant Anarchists from using Kriegswissenschaft methods. The Terrorists
In Europe the decline of the importance of secret societies in 53 Terrorists and Terrorism politics set in with the rise of Marxist Socialism, for Karl Marx had no use for clandestine and conspiratorial methods; yet even Marxist Socialism and Communism have at least one root in a secret society, the German League of the Just which Marx himself joined in 1845 and transformed into the Communist League in 1847; and for which he and Engels wrote the Commu- nist Manifesto in 1848. The Terrorists
The first was the Mafia, founded towards the end of the eighteenth century as a Sicilian nationalist movement. The Terrorists
To explain the rise of his Black Hand something must be said about the political background. The Terrorists
The evolution of these ideas and the practice of terrorism led to some curious conclusions. The Terrorists
The arch-terrorist of the south was Valerian Osinsky, a rich young nobleman from Rostov-on-Don. The Terrorists
This act of self-sacrifice made a tremendous impression on the whole revolutionary movement; it also defeated a govern- ment attempt to play down the political aspect of the event by persuading Rysakov to claim that he had been activated by a personal motive. The Terrorists
The Populists 79 Chapter 7 The Irish Case (1) An account of terrorism in Ireland might have been included in Chapter 5; for secret societies have played a larger role in Irish history than in that of any other country. The Terrorists
One of its consequences was the revival of an eighteenth-century terrorist association, the Ribbon Society. The Terrorists
And though it was turned down, there was nothing, once the war was won, to prevent Fenian officers, including several generals, from organizing a sea-borne invasion of Ireland with a force of seasoned veterans of the Civil War, armed if not by, at least with the connivance of, the United States Government. The Terrorists
Even Macready played into the terrorists’ hands by adopting (September 1920) terrorist retaliation as official policy. The Terrorists
Farther down Lower Baggot Street another squad of terrorists had found Captain G. T. Bagally, ‘wanted’ by them for his conduct of courts-martial and his part in the murder—it was a case of mistaken identity—of a Dublin businessman named Lynch. The Terrorists
In May 1906 Alfonso married Princess Victoria Eugenic of Battenberg, a granddaughter of Queen Victoria. The Terrorists
These things being so, it is hardly necessary to add that Ferrer was regarded by the Church and all ‘right-thinking’ people as an incarnation of the devil, and they had long sought a means of suppressing him, his schools and his publishing house. The Terrorists
Down with the War! The Terrorists
Bakunin’s Disciples 115 Terrorists and Terrorism and their wives lay down on the railway tracks to stop the movement of troop trains. The Terrorists
In Barcelona alone terrorist groups burnt down seventeen churches, twenty-three monasteries or convents and sixteen seminaries. The Terrorists
She, in the course of those almost perpetual wanderings which she preferred to the company of the Emperor Franz-Josef and the 116 Court of Vienna, had been staying with the Rothschilds at their villa on Lac Léman and from there had moved on to the Hotel Beau-Rivage at Geneva, where she was using the style and name of GrAfln von Hohenembs. The Terrorists
Luccheni therefore bought a steel blade, made and fitted a handle, and ground the blade down to the gauge of a knitting-needle. The Terrorists
The spectacle of mass starvation did not arouse the king’s compassion; but nor, when Anarchist terrorists began to lead protests which took the form of riots and the burning down of town halls where the tax registers were kept, did he show fear. The Terrorists
Working-class efforts to correct this injustice, by forming trade unions strong enough to organize effective strikes, had been dealt with, very simply, by shooting down strikers. The Terrorists
At all events, it was when Umberto was leaving after the prize-giving, and standing hatless in his carriage to acknowledge the cheers of a group of young athletes, that Bresci, from behind the group, fired four shots. The Terrorists
He too showed remarkable con- fidence in Azev: at a meeting with him he explained that the preparation of the assassination was taking so much of his time and keeping him so much on the move that he was unable to keep up with the work of the Party’s propaganda among the Russian émigrés in Europe: would Azev take that work on him- self and go to Berlin for the Party? Azev asked for time to con- sider whether he was fit to assume so onerous a responsibility and went at once to report in person to Zubatov, who instructed him to accept the offer. The Terrorists
Manor-houses were burned down and factories were sabotaged. The Terrorists
They were to be strolling, at a forty-yard interval, down the Nevski- prospekt at a certain time, when Plehve was expected to drive along it. The Terrorists
There followed a long and nerve-racking wait in case the Grand Duke should leave the theatre by himself, giving the assassins a second charce; he did not, his wife and the two children were still with him. The Terrorists
There was no hitch; Sergei appeared in his carriage at the time and place given by Azev; Kaliayev threw his bomb and was promptly knocked down, though unhurt, by the blast. The Terrorists
But the arch-terrorist, Azev, remained inactive. The Terrorists
Raziel, following a policy laid down by Jabotinsky, insisted that, in Irgun’s war with the British, forced on them by British pro-Arab policy, they must fight honourably: the methods of terrorism were the only ones open to Irgun; but they must at least, for instance, always send warning to the occupants of a building before they blew that building up. The Terrorists
Then followed theattemptonthe High Commissioner’slife. The Terrorists
When H. P. Newton was the Party’s ‘Minister of Defence’ he laid it down that Panthers would answer police violence with violence, but would not use violence unprovoked. The Terrorists
Terrorism may be and often has been a manifestation of a sort of cumulative sadism, a break-down of the inhibitions which make civilized life possible, resulting in a kind of orgy of cruelty ‘justified’ by social or political grievance. The Terrorists
The word was made of more general application by the Wobblies (Industrial Workers of the World) in the United States: their preferred means of smashing capitalism was to wreck industrial machinery; of murderous terrorism they were more often the victims than the practitioners, the industrialists bent on using the lock-out to force down wages employing hired professional criminals as gunmen to protect their plant. The Terrorists
If he is to be a successful terrorist he will have to èonform more or less to the specification laid down in the Revolutionary Catechism. The Terrorists
The war really began in 1968 with an act of terrorism in Derry by Protestant militants who objected to the Roman Catholic minority’s peacefully demonstrated demand for full civil rights; in July 1969 they attacked the Roman Catholic Falls Road area in Belfast and burnt down houses without any effective inter- ference from the authorities. The Terrorists
Since World War II, the potential of anthrax as a biological weapon has focused national and international attention on its lethality for hu- mans. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As I listen to Dr. Burgasov, I have one thought in my head: I have no facts. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With the Cold War over, one hears stories of entire laboratories shut down for want of equipment, materials, electricity, or salaries to pay their employees. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The Aeroflot plane we board looks run-down, nothing like the new Finnair plane that brought us to Moscow. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As Boris Paster- nak, who was always fascinated by these mountains, wrote in one of his poems, “Arrayed in majesty, the firs arose / In ranks of glory.”15 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In 1976, in Texas and Louisiana, large herds of horses and cattle came down with anthrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The design of the 1-34 tank was created here, and though the tanks, essen- tial to the defeat of Nazi forces, were manufactured in Chelyabinsk, just south of Sverdlovsk, the trucks for carrying them to the front were made in Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The literature professor is interested in Western ideas, especially post- modernism and the breakdown of rationality. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Shelokov copies the information down and then he, Matthew, and I go over it. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The graves are scattered under trees and between random juttings 61 62 of rock, in rows that break down and reform. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dates of birth and death are either chiseled on the stone or engraved in metal. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Before we leave, we quickly inspect other nearby sectors with graves dated April and May 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Here, culture shock aside, we have to climb up seven flights of stairs to our meager rooms, where we sleep on broken-down beds. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A student down the hall plays a mournful “Hey, Jude” on a flute. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
If there was a 1979 anthrax aerosol, an important variable is the amount of aerosolized spores released over the city. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We find that some dwellings for which we have addresses have been torn down, leav- ing vacant lots. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On the map posted in front, the dif- ferent production divisions are illustrated in primary colors. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Then, around the first of May, firemen began hosing down buildings and trees right in this area, near the ceramics factory. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Komin searches in the breakfront and brings out his mother’s death certificate, dated April 10. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We have one for Nikolay Khudyakov. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Yes, some lo- cal streets and buildings were hosed down by firemen. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Alexis Shelokov is hoarse from inter- preting, a role that limits his participation in the inquiry, but one that he is reluctant to relinquish in favor of a hired interpreter. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Another anxiety is wearing me down. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He, too, has drawn a line from Compound 19 down through the villages. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
After he leaves, we discuss his construction of the outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
After this presentation, before Yampolskaya and I go with Sasha to Chkalovskiy, the group reviews the schedule for the coming week. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Mrs. T. remembers her husband getting ill. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I am beginning to think it unlikely that Timofiev died of anthrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“He fell down in the street and died in the hospital,” she says. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
My solace is that the four interviews we have done (I discount the one with Mrs. T.) have produced some information on the onset of the dis- KNOCKING ON DOORS I KNOCKING ON DOORS ease. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
These two and the Sverdlovsk relative came down with cutaneous anthrax.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It is 6:30 before she and I are again in Chkalovskiy and encoun- tering the usual obstacles. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She makes a palms-down, pushing-away gesture of finality, and once again her eyes well up with tears. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She points instead to a nearby factory, a new-meat processing plant, and complains that a pine woods was cut down to make room for it. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That dump was closed down and never reopened. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The neighborhood-level mobilization she describes is amazing. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The 1979 public health response was an obvious attempt, from Moscow on down, to restore citizens’ confidence in the state. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But, ultimately, what a sad, chaotic ef- fort it was! Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We put this case down for poten- tial inclusion in our sample, knowing that no sure medical diagnosis of anthrax is now or perhaps will ever be possible. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Her daughter Maria, who lives there now, invites us in and of- fers us tea and Russian chocolate. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As if by a roll\of dice, the invisible germ strikes down this person and lets another escape unscathed. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The articles Mishustina urged Yeltsin to read are both by Natalya Zhe- nova, a native of Yekaterinburg. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Although a pensioner, Spirina had a job at the radio works in down- town Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They also have vivid memories of the buildings in their neighborhood being washed down at night with a greenish liquid and their being warned not to leave their homes until after 8 A.M. Again we note how the scenes of crews washing down buildings vary from one interview to the next. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He worked for a farm equipment factory right next to the ceramics factory; the neighbors are sure he was there in the beginning of April. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Even- tually I pare it down to thirty basic inquiries, with emphasis on the on- set of symptoms and also on the victim’s whereabouts in the first week of April 1979—whether at home or at work or somewhere else. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Healthy mill workers were once reported to carry hundreds of anthrax spores in their noses and throats without incurring any infection.S Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Consider how few succumbed to anthrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
My frustration with this dismissal lasts down the marble stairs and out into Red Square where tourists are lined up in the June sunshine to see Lenin’s tomb. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He attributes his attraction to science to the influence of his uncle, 167 168 Irving Langmuir, who won the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1932. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Despite these accomplishments, gathering the still missing information is vital. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
What the general means by “work performed abroad” is the Soviet be- lief that the United States never gave up its extensive biological weapons program. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The videotaped interview that Dr. Burgasov was complaining about last June airs in September in Russia. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We then drive down past Chkalovskiy and take the highway south to- ward Chelyabinsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Their neighbors, the Kosterevs down the street, recall a “busful of Moscow veterinarians” arriving in the village and soon after arrogantly appearing at the doorstep to demand the ears of a calf that had died. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the fifth and last door, there is no answer, but we have heard enough to believe that in April 1979 the little village of Abramovo was turned upside down by an epizootic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Looking south down Poldnevaya Street to the smokestack of the ceramic factory pipe shop, 1993. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Viktor begins his story in a soft voice. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Her husband’s case involves the confusion of a reaction to anthrax vaccination with actual onset of the disease. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Leaving the compound, we find ourselves on the bluff that overlooks Chkalovskiy; thirteen meters down a gradient three kilometers long is the ceramics factory. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Turn back the clock fourteen years, and we are one with the victims of the 1979 outbreak, who trusted the air and never guessed that it could kill them, who knew nothing of the danger they were in. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The people we meet along the path are very much in the present. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Seated in a tight circle of four chairs, the general, Matthew, Bela, and I get down to the business of discussing the outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
By then, the ongoing anthrax epizootic south of the city was being han- dled by tearing down sheds, vaccinating owners of livestock, and quar- antining the villages. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I cannot help envisioning the everyday lives of the 1979 anthrax victims as they were innocently trapped in the lethal swath of air. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Each perspective is understandable. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This is a clinical ac- complishment to be proud of, as Dr. Nikiforov’s colleagues and son under- stood. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Olga Yampolskaya has agreed to meet me in Moscow, which is calm. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Unlike Moscow, where Soviet statuary was torn down, Yekaterinburg city officials have left standing the colossal Lenin statue and, in front of the university, the larger-than-life figure of his protégé Sverdlov, for whom the oblast is still named. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Across from the ceramics factory are Poldnevaya and Lyapustina streets, the twin corridors down which the anthrax plume traveled in 263 264 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Oregonians who drove down county public roads on Rajneesh property complained of being stopped and mis- treated by the Bhagwan’s police. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
This was a blessing in The Dalles, whose main industry, an aluminum smelter, had shut down two years earlier. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
They tracked down out-of-state visitors who had paid for meals with credit cards to see how they felt and ask what they had eaten. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
ONE man in The Dalles was sure that the outbreak was not natural. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Sannyasins had watched their homes and offices,jotting down names an~l 1icense~!~p1ate numbers of visitors. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Women were largely banned from the work after two gave birth to children with severe birth defects. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Warrior 39 40 GERMS None of the biological arms developed by the United States were used on the battlefield during the war, and afterward the effort slowed down markedly and shrank in size. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Under military orders, often clandestinely, Detrick experts fanned out to probe the nation’s vulnerability to saboteurs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
American scientists also did outdoor experiments to assess how Soviet cities could be attacked with anthrax germs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“We’d just make a lot of people sick. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
American germ-warfare scientists had developed a special cocktail of two germs and one biological toxin designed to work sequentially so that victims would come down with uncommonly long periods of sickness and debilitation. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It was not the same as putting an atomic bomb down their throat, which would have been just as easy or easier to deliver. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Detrick experts learned how to multiply the germ in chicken eggs and human tissue cultures and tested it extensively on rhesus mon- keys, which came down with high fevers, pustules, and symptoms of metabolic crisis. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In the battle between man and microorganisms, refrigeration slows down germ reproduction and metabolism. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The risk was real. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A~ the bugs-and-gas experts worried about new foreign threats, Lederberg turned his attention to new microbial dangers at home. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
LEDERBERG made little headway. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The experiment was exhausting, a staggering exercise in logistics. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The meeting quickly got down to business. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Few members of the first group of inspectors recruited by UNSCOM had much experience with biology, but the team did have one genuine specialist: David Kelly A microbiologist from Porton Down, Britain’s Fort Detrick, Kelly was one of two British officials who had initially debriefed Pasechnik in 1989. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The inspectors were greeted by Hossam Amin, a colonel who had worked before the war in the Military Industrializa- tion Corporation, Iraq’S purchasing agent for weapons. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“We got right down to it,” Patrick re- called. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
What Alibek had to say was horrifying. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
JOSH Lederberg continued to raise the alarm about civilian vulnera- bilities. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The answer was intriguing: “Project 900.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The Russians’ tour of American facilities had also been a farce. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Perhaps it was their visit to Renaissance Island that solidified the unlikely bond between Weber and Lepyoshkin. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Weber’s mission to Stepnogorsk had proved that what Pasech- nik and Alibek had told the West about the former Soviet germ- warfare program was true. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Iraq’s admissions were summarized in a three-page document that Taha read aloud to the inspectors. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
One of the senior Pentagon officials overseeing the lab, General Walter Busbee, sent an e-mail to his colleagues urging them to begin considering what they would do if the FDA shut Michigan down. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Taking Charge 203 204 Potency tests, in particular, were notoriously variable. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The Pentagon’s briefing that day played down the problems at the Michigan lab. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
COLD rain came down in torrents at the White House onJanuary 21, 1999, as President Clinton discussed the threat that he said kept him awake at night. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Seated in a large wing chair in front of a fireplace, a portrait of George Washington staring down at him serenely, Clinton seemed relaxed but focused on the interview’s agenda. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
They compared Amen- The President 253 254 GERMS can and Soviet industrial capacities for germ production at their peak levels and revealed how Moscow’s was extraordinarily large. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Sandakhchiev turned away, tears streaming down his face. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
When McNamara finally heard from the USDA lab in Ames, the news was alarming: the virologists could not identify the virus that was killing the birds. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The Pentagon played down the significance tf the documents, say- ing they were legal precautions, coth~arab1e to a homeowner buying insurance against a fire. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
By Monday, the area’s health-care system was shutting down from the strain, but the city and state had still not approved a distribution plan for antibiotics. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The Pentagon did not dispute the report’s findings and moved to shut down the office managing the project even before it was officially filed. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The Joint Biological Point Detection Sys- tem, which used some of the most advanced technology was devel- oped by Lockheed-Martin. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
By the summer of 2000, the massive fermenters had been removed and melted down for scrap metal. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Officials at Stepnogorsk eventually solved the puzzle. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The State Department rep- resentative argued that the treaty ruled out any tests involving weap- ons. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In March 1999, armed with $1.6 Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The trick again was the myelin. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Johnston’s research was important because it sped up the identifica- tion of suitable DNA snippets, reducing the search time from a year or more down to months. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
theflat steppe of Semipalatinsk:Judith Miller, “One Last Explosion at Kazakh Test Site to Aid Arms Treaty;” New York Times, Sept. 25, 1999, p. Al. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Sheela said that Alzheimer’s patients were her favorite. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Ambassador Eliot agreed with Neumann’s assessment. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The consolidation of the nation-state, as well as of his dynastic rule, made it necessary for Amir Abdur Rahman Khan to build up a strong standing army aided by an expanded bureaucracy and an extensive intelligence service, a stupendous task considering the meager state income based mainly on an agricultural economy. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
One such interference led to the downfall in October 1965 of the first government, headed by Premier Mohammad Yusuf, an ominous beginning. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A Zadran Pashtun from Paktia, Gulabzoy was by profession a tank commander. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Not long afterward the Islamic Party boycotted the MG when Hekmatyar resigned as foreign minister. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The PDPA also failed to consider the ramifications of many of its actions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In conclusion, the causes of the revolts which broke out against the Khalq government will be compared with those of the rebellion which led in 1929 to the downfall of King Amanullah, an earlier advocate of rapid and intensive modernization. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In an effort to regulate prices, in June 1978 the Khalq govern- The Khalq attack on corruption had precedents in the anti- EFFECTS OF THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN NAHRIN 199 effective they really were. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Younger and much more energetic, he was a Pashtun from Kunar who had attended the Teacher Training College in Jalalabad. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It was in these conditions that, with his usual ineptitude, or as if god-driven to his own downfall, the Tsarfilled Sipyagin’s place with the ultra-reactionary, fanatic- ally anti-Semitic Okhrana chief, von Plehve. The Terrorists
This volume does not attempt to study the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan except in its relevance to the Afghan revolution and the Marxist regime in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
By the time he took over the reins of government, Soviet advisers had obtained for themselves such a commanding position that no significant’ decision was made, no important order issued in either the civilian ministries in Kabul or the Afghan armed forces without the clearance of Soviet advisers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Within twelve days the Revolutionary Council under Prime Minister Nur Muhammad Taraki had presented the “Basic Lines of the Revolutionary Duties of the Government of the DRA” and broadcast it over Radio Afghanistan (Afghanistan, MIC, DRA Annual 1979:67-70). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
had, he said, assured him that he wanted to honor the promises that he had made, while serving in parliament, to set up a national democratic govern- ment. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
While developments took their course in Kabul over the 1992—96 period, the rest of the country operated as separate fiefdoms, each experiencing very different conditions. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
They counted the dozens of hot boxes, each about the size of a microwave oven, in which the brew had incubated before it was siphoned off into larger flasks, which were then taken to another room in Building 221, where air-bubbling machines turned the liquid into a rich, coffee-colored slurry. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It is formed into large, flat cakes and baked in earthen ovens, called tandur in Dari, tanoor in Pushtu. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Distinctive bread ovens found throughout the TANOOR see NAN and TANDUR TARNAK RIVER. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
We thank Dr. Chernich and follow a guide outside to the block-long pipe shop on the northeast edge of the plant. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Wielding syringes, Patrick’s workers injected viruses into eggs and sealed them for incubation in warm ovens. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Thus, over fifty scholars from all over the world have contributed monographs which were based on first-hand knowledge. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karmal has been trying to build an insti- tutionalized mass base for the PDPA regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Projected Data for Af~hanistan 1985 Total population (‘000) Males (‘000) Females (‘000) Total fertility rate Life expectancy (male) Life expectancy (female) Crude birth rate Crude death rate Annual growth rate Under 15s Over 65s Women aged 15—49 Doubling time Population density Urban population 18,092 9,258 8,834 6.90 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
18.0% Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan's most convenient access to the sea lies through Pakistan, or alternatively on the road and rail container route through the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Great Game of nineteenth-century geopolitics was played by British imperial power expanding northward frnm the Indian sub-< continent and Russian imperial power pushing southward through Central Asi . Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Britannia ruled the seas. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was followed in 1950 with a four-year trade agreement. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets exercised strong influence over the Afghan education system, especially higher education, and operated a large exchange programme for military and civilian students as well as the rest of the Soviet propaganda apparatus existing in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
King Zahir Shah went to Italy in July 1973. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Shah of Iran was anxious to play a greater role in the intermeshing regions of the Persian Gulf and South Afghanistan as a Republic 21 22 Afghanistan Asia; Afghanistan provided the link between the two even more than Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
An American specialist on Afghanistan claimed that in 1974 the Shah of Iran promised to provide Afghanistan with $2 b. in economic aid over ten years, of which $50 m. was actually given in that year. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the geopolitical region in which Afghanistan is located, profound political change took place in 1977—8. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Friday is the weekly holiday for Afghans. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Thursday 27 April was a half-holiday for government employees. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan revolution, then, was a one-day affair, unlike any other communist revolution or take-over in history. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Decisive action was taken by the armed forces rather than the party. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was also the least expensive in terms of human lives: casualties were definitely below the figure of two thousand. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Parcham and Khalq were factions composed of urban Marxist intellectuals and middle classes, mostly confined to Kabul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Soviet scholars and commentators have described Afghanistan at the time of the April revolution in the same vein. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There was no uniform popular attitude to central authority in Afghanistan when the communists captured state power. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Over the years, segments of the Afghan population learnt to co- operate with the central government. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Land, as noted, was the source of power all over Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Land hunger was widespread at the time of the Saur revolution, but most Afghan households had some land, and only about 25 per cent of households were landless. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It also included the leader of a Maoist faction that was outside the party, namely, Setem-i-Meli or National Opposition. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Joining the faculty of Kabul University’s Institute ofEducation, he devoted most of his time to building the party and converting Afghan youth to Marxist- Leninism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
All these three were charged with plotting to overthrow the Revolution: the Khalq Phase 47 48 Afghanistan government. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The republican constitution provided for equal rights for men and women, and land reforms had been talked about since the heady days of Amir Amanullah. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The aim of Decree No. 6 was to free ‘millions of toiling peasants from the yoke of exploiters’.20 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Decree ‘No. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was by using the concept of jihad that Abdur Rahman was able to consolidate the power of the central government over the tribes and local chiefs. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghans waged jihad against the B~i~mal power based in India. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At the same time, the triumph of the Iranian revolution over the Shah of Iran and his great patron, the United States, was undoubtedly a very important factor, which Amin totally failed to take into account. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, the Soviet military intervention and the presence of over 100,000 Russian troops in Afghanistan armed the rebels with an emotive nationalist cause; they were now fighting to rid Afghanistan of foreign invaders, they told the masses. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan peasant was busy in his fields. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Not only did the Khalq and Parcham factions fall out with one another within weeks of the revolution, within Khalq also, factional in-fighting broke out in no time, and these disputes were settled by bullets rather than by votes. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Since the summer of 1978, the man who was actually in control of the PDPA Government in Kabul was Hafizullah Amin: he was Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Politbureau Secretary, and he held complete sway over the armed forces, and over Aqsa, the new secret police force established with Soviet assistance immediately after the revolution.3 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Marxist Government had not mobilized popular political support before launching its reform programme. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The rebel forces were led by Mir Beg, who was able to bring under one banner of rebellion a number of tribes over a wide region that had seldom come together before to fight for a common cause. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
These ranged from ‘active support of the Communist government in Kabul, to passive acceptance of its rule, to an exodus from the area, to armed uprisings challenging the legitimacy of the regime’, reports M. Nazif Shahrani, of Pitzer College, Clare- mont, California.’6 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
By banning brideprice—and especially by declaring that women could marry whom they pleased—it threatened to undermine the strict con- trol over women on which the maintenance of male honor depended: Under the PDPA regime, Beattie adds, the local administration was more accessible to the poor than in the past. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In July 1979 Amin took over the defence port- folio, displacing Colonel Watanjar, who was believed to be close to Taraki. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet ambassador in Kabul showed his dis- pleasure with the regime in various ways.34 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
By defending with military force the Marxist revolution in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union signalled two important messages to the rest of the world. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
If Afghanistan was the staging ground of a Soviet military- ideological offensive, paradoxically, it threw the Kremlin into a defen- sive posture on a wide political-strategic front. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Under these circumstances, there was inevitably a lot of hyperbole in the Soviet action and the American reaction. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The military regime of Zia-ul Haq was strengthened by the powerful support it received from the United States, China, Saudi Arabia and other states. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Brezhnev conceded the partial legitimacy of American and West European concern over the uninterrupted and free flow of petroleum from the Persian Gulf, and Pravda asserted that Moscow had no designs on West Asian oil and no intention of pushing through to the warm-water ports on the Indian Ocean. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The military operations against Massoud’s guerrilla force in Panjsher Valley have a particular political significance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The mujahidin retain free movement over most of Afghanistan’s mountainous countryside, and the ability to mount limited rocket, mortar and small arms attacks on Soviet garrisons in urban areas.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
take over the direction of the civil war as well as rebuilding the ravaged Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Soviet spokesmen were hopeful that, given time, the Karma! Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Babrak Karma! Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The PDPA took over the task of the political education of the soldiers. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1981 Karma! Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Tribal chiefs were asked to take over much of the local administration and the Islamic judicial system was restored. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Saur Revolution: the Parcham Phase 121 122 Afghanistan He reported a 0.5 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The regime earnestly engaged in the task of setting up a network of ‘local organs of power’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
(June 1984), Noor Ahmad Noor, PDPA Secretary, claimed that in 1983 Afghanistan’s GNP and national income had ‘for the first time’ since April 1978 exceeded the level of before the revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
His speech covered a wide area of ground, but was chiefly interesting for what it said about the Afghan Marxist parry, the resistance, and the economic ground the regime claimed to have gained since the revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
package of military and economic assistance from the United States spread over the period 1980—86. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet Union, for its part, cannot eliminate the resistance except over a long period of time.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, there is a fundamental difference over which part of the problem is negotiable. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Over the past three years, a narrow tunnel of negotiations has been bored by the UN mediator, Diego Cordovez, through the granite walls that separate the three main parties—the Soviet Union, the United States and Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet action in Afghanistan is aimed at preventing a spill-over of(3) Islamic revivalism to the Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen Republics of the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At each successive session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviets have had to stoically bear with over two-thirds of the member nations collectively asking it to pull out its troops from Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
possible control over much of the world’s oil supplies’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The first is what one would like to call the emergence of a Soviet constituency amongst the Pakistani elites; the second is a steadily growing demand that the Afghan problem be solved in direct negotiations with Moscow and Kabul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The exercise stemmed from his belief that when the two sides pored over each other’s drafts, they would realize how concretely their respective stands on the vital issues diverged from, or converged with, one another. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The 1983 Geneva meetings were held in two phases over the months of April andJune. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was a powerful episode that in itself illustrates the tragic external dimension which prevails over the Afghan civil war. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A Third World diplomat who met Andropov in the spring of 1983, six months after the latter had taken over as CPSU General Secretary, claimed in an interview with Lifschultz: The discussion with Andropov was concerned almost exclusively with Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU, following the death of Chernenko. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He identified two different schools of thought which had developed in Pakistan over the last five years regarding Afghanistan.. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Pakistanis were in two minds about the Afghan issue being ‘settled’ between the two superpowers. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It is somewhat surprising, however, that over twenty years of Soviet influence did not produce a more viable communist party than the PDPA was in 1978/In fact, the Soviets did not wish to help the PDPA enlarge its political base beyond that of a respectable pressure group, and were apparently taken by surprise when the Afghan party captured power. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Unlike South Yemen, no National Liberation Front(NLF)was set up in Afghanistan to struggle The Future of the Afghan Revolution for national independence. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Saur revolution broke out in Kabul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Having taken over the responsibility of defending the Saur revolution, the Soviets have also assumed the responsibility for it to succeed. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan revolution is, however, the Marxist revolution which the Soviets have had to end with an impressive use of military power. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, with 100,000 Soviet troops engaging the insurgents all over the country, the propaganda sounded hollow to Afghan ears and failed to win them over to the side of the revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Sections of the opposition political elite in Pakistan have kept in close touch with the PDPA regime in Afghanistan ever since the Saur revolu- tion. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They have behaved to Pakistan with considerable sophistication during the Afghan crisis. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Hammond, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Also, Dupree, Red Flag Over the Hindu Kush, Part II, The Accidental Coup or Taralei in Blunderland, Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff Report, South Asia Series, 45, 1979, pp. 15—16. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
See f~ort. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 183 184 Afghanistan Chapter 6 1. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Major Taroon was described by the American embassy in Kabul as a ‘brutal, psychopathic killer’, second ‘only to Amin in the amount of blood on his hands’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Islam in the Contemporary World, Notre Dame, Ind., Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For the Carter administration’s responses to and perceptions of the Afghan revolution and the Soviet intervention, three indispensable volumes are: Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, New York, Bantam Books 1982; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, New York, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983; and Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1983. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
These two groups constitute the over- whelming majority of Afghanistan’s inhabitants, who numbered i ~ million in 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan disputed Pakistan’s claim over the territory, but the latter was unwilling to consider the complaint, despite the fact that it demanded itself the application of the same principle with regard to Kashmir, a territory disputed between Pakistan and India. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On the Pashtunistan issue, by contrast, the government failed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But the king, though supported by his younger son-in-law and cousin, Abdul Wali, and others, now had opponents in the persons of his other first cousins and brothers-in-law, Daoud and Na’eem, who had turned against the new arrangement because it excluded them from poli- tics. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Also, they did not have control over the army, nor could they stop members of the royal house from interfering in government affairs. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Mohammad Daoud ruled Afghanistan as president under conditions different from those that prevailed when he served as prime minister. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The government relied on the army, the police, the party, and, of course, the support of the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Sarwari and Gulab- zoy have been quoted as saying that before they entered the palace Amin was already dead, killed either by soldiers under their command or by his own hand.9 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin was anxious to be on good terms with the Soviets. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin implicated Puzanov in the plot. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The conspirators first stayed at the villa of the TASS correspon- dent, and later Puzanov managed to smuggle them to the Soviet Union in nailed wooden boxes. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The turmoil in the region also seemed conducive to such a move. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviets had built their empire with this precept in mind. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At three o’clock in the morning the news of the formation of a new government was broadcast over the radio. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Its head, Kar- mal, was still in the Soviet Union, not in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On i January 1965 twenty-eight educated Afghans assembled Se- cretly in the residence of Nur Mohammad Taraki in Karta-e-Char in the city of Kabul, and there they founded the PDPA along the lines of the pro-Moscow communist parties. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The PDPA was, however, unable to make progress in society. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The suppression of Sitamis did not create a stir. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But they were not the only people who had been exploited, nor was theirs the only region that had remained undeveloped. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The incident had wider consequences for Karmal as well. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
the true members of the party organized opposition with whose help he over- threw the government of Amin. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
divided the journalists on the basis of the cold war line distinguishing between “the imperialist bloc of the West” and the “socialist bloc countries?’ In this interview his answer to a question put by a BBC correspondent showed that he lived in the past. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Behind the curtain in his office were a Soviet adviser and an interpreter; his conversations were taped.36 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghan guards surrounded him, but their weapons were with- out ammunition. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In the first month after the invasion their numbers more than doubled, surpassing total PDPA members at the time.39 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Soviet advisers composed statements in the Russian and Tajiki lan- guages for party members and government officials to read on official occasions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To ensure victory for the vanguards, Sayyed Qutb has left them some guidelines in their “long march” toward an Islamic state. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On the strength of the support of such dignitaries, the ‘ulama held demonstra- tions for over a month in Kabul until the government dispersed them, as already noted. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But after Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan deteriorated over the issue of Pashtunistan, both countries financed and incited each other’s dissidents. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Jam’iyyat split.~ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
This point became serious when, following his victory over the Islamists, President Daoud took measures to distance Afghanistan from the Soviet bloc countries and to bring it closer to the Islamic world, in particular Pakistan and Iran.51 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Loosely structured, they can hardly be called political parties in the modern sense, since they gener- ally lacked sociopolitical platforms. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But they had made this assistance conditional on the creation of a unified center. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The response was overwhelming, despite warnings from fundamen- talists to those who wished to attend the jirga. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In general, an elderly statesman presides over the jirga until someone else is appointed for the whole session. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But they, too, were not immune to the law of Afghan politics, and by the time of the invasion they had split into many subgroups over theoretical as well as tactical and practical issues. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Such attacks were an indication of the storm that was soon to come. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
(God is great) echoed and reechoed over the breadth and length of the city, something unheard before. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Some protesters were lost, but the rest continued their march. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By nightfall calm prevailed over the city. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT RURAL TERRITORIES The Khalqi government was the government of Afghanistan in the sense that it ruled over it despite opposition. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The government retaliated by sending troops there, and in the clashes that followed government forces compelled the recalcitrants to retreat to the upper parts of the valleys. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Provincial governors were then instructed to summon local notables and explain to them that the government had plans to promote their welfare. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Also, since the educational system was a part of the government, party members—most of whom were also party secretaries—administered ed- ucational centers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A tragic aspect of the situation was the destruction of schools, which were destroyed with no remorse. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The main highways, particularly those leading from Kabul to the Soviet borders in Hairatan (Mazar) and Torghundi (Herat), became the special concern of the invading army. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Parchamis were glad that their Soviet comrades had cowed their opponents for them. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
It was beyond the means of traditional elders to obtain the weapons needed to oppose the army of a superpower. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The tendency among the commanders to monopolize power was too strong for such a council to be set up. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To acquire weapons, the mulla commanders of Logar, particularly of the Mohammad Agha front, would ambush enemy forces when they were in their locality. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Of the foreign sources of weapons, the United States and Egypt were the major ones during the first two years of the invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The above were the official concessions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
After that period, when they handed over control of prisons to KhAD’s officials, Soviet advisers kept a low profile. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To stamp out resistance, KhAD was organized to assert its mastery over Afghans: hence the dominance of KhAD over other government ministries, although it was nominally a department within the prime ministry. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They poured out the cooking oil from the jars in her kitchen and tipped over bags of rice.”’7 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviets also detained and tortured detainees in their army units before handing them over to KhAD. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The rationale for ruining the life of a person and his or her family and disturbing the community of which they were an organic part could be traced to the view that the “guilty” person was a “counterrevolution- ary” who had committed a crime against society and the state that the PDPA claimed to represent. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The actual number executed in the Khalqi and Parchami peri- ods will never be known. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In the overcrowded warrens of that prison, discord and divisiveness gradually took the place of the original solidar- ity. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviets, distrusting the Khalqi-dominated army, began to weaken the hold of the Khalqis over it, first by wresting control of weapons stores from the Khalqi officers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
If the summons had been honored, the total number of the reserve army during that ten-year period would have run well over half a million men. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They had to be summoned, but most of them had fled. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A Massed Pashtun from across the border in Pakistan and educated in Kabul and the Soviet Union, Mohammad had served the interests of the Paktia tribes when he was minister of interior in the government of President Daoud. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Kabul re- gime tried to capitalize on this difference by resorting to the same tactics as it had with the Zadrans. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Apparently the KhAD personnel had been invited for the purpose of winning over the recalcitrant tribe, but when they arrived in the Khugianay territory, the Khugianays killed them. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For the Shinwar tribesmen the border is not a border, because many routes pass through their territory to Pakistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
One khan, Pir Dost Atamarkhel, finding life in Peshawar difficult because of the associ- ation of his rival peers (turboors) with the resistance groups, went over to the side of the regime and in 1985 attended the jirgas in Kabul. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By comparison, the mujahideen were not as fortu- nate in terms of weaponry, but they had the will to defend their values, and in the defense of their own country they felt invincible. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The city’s night security deteriorated still further. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Despite the operations, the city remained as disturbed as before. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
THE UNSUCCESSFUL DRIVE FROM CITY TO VILLAGE Since rural areas were lost to the regime, it adopted new methods to extend control over them from the provincial capitals in a drive called “From City to Village.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The provincial party secretaries (munshi-e-wilayati), although only the heads of their provincial committees, were supreme. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To accomplish their jobs, they had at their disposal money, spies, and the power to arrest, with or without warrants, and to inflict tortures and punishments to the point of killing prisoners by their death squads. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By January 198 I a new wave of terrorism had become evident. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Parchamis manipulated publications without regard for cultural identity. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
According to one chronicle, “He directed that the idols should be over- thrown and that some should be cut to pieces and others burned with fire. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The idea was the same as that of Orthodox Christianity, which Viadmir had chosen for Russia over nine hundred years earlier. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But at this time helicopter gunships were seen flying almost every minute over the city of Kabul, most of them heading toward the west, where casualties during the two weeks of July and August were said to be beyond calculation. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Soon helicopter gunships were hovering over them; assuming that the nomads were enemies, the Soviets fired into the group, killing eight and wounding scores of others. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The draft dodgers had already fled to the mountains. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Of the main roads, the roads of Kabul—Jalalabad, Kabul—Gardez (via Logar), and Kabul—Hairatan (via Salang) were especially important, since the first two lead to Pakistan and the latter to the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
As a by-product of the policy of guarding the main roads, a disaster of a different kind befell the people. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Even before the major operations had begun, the plan for making the main roads safe was on the agenda. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Despite all the killings, the Soviets failed to establish control over the roads. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The town that I stayed in, Hauz Karbas, looks like Hiroshima. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By the time it was about nine o’clock in the morning, there were people in droves, a man with a camel; he had lost all his family, and all his possessions were on top of the camel. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In November Karmal returned to Kabul from his first state visit to Moscow; thereafter, the government adopted a tougher stand. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
When the mulla promised that the Soviet forces would withdraw if the people cooperated with the government, an elderly man answered, “Un- less the Soviet forces are withdrawn, we would not be willing to do any thing of the sort.”5 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The effect of these operations on Logar has been described by Borge Almqvist and Mike Barry, who visited the province in late summer and early fall 1982.. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
All during the succeeding days bombs fell on the village, and the population began to run away at night. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Military units of the Soviet and of the regime, supported by approxi- mately five thousand tanks, took positions in certain areas surrounding Parwan and Kapisa while helicopter gunships hovered over them to block exits of the mujahideen. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
reads: Although not fired at, the Soviet army showed barbarity~ especially in the villages where female folk threw certain things over them from rooftops. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To mark the triumph, the regime assembled thousands of the locals at a rally led by Dastagir Panjsheri, an eccentric member of the central committee. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
While the mujahideen had established control over the district in July 1981, later they occupied its headquarters. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
When the officers sus- pected the locals as mujahideen or collaborators, they would hand them over to the regime officers and the KhAD personnel to kill them. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet officer singled out four and handed them over to the regime offi- cer to kill them somewhere. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The man who fought hardest for this end was General Akhtar, who, as chief of ISI from 1979 to 1987, was second in command only to President Zia while the office he was heading “was considered all-powerful” in Pakistan and “the most effective intelligence agency in the third ~ Akhtar opposed the alternative view put forward by Foreign Minister Sahibzada Ya’qub Khan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The IUAM leaders also had to battle with tribal and community el- ders. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At the time the dispute over the quota for the IAC had not been settled. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Haqqani, a veteran in mediation and settlement, presided over both. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On i6 April Foreign Minister Abdul Wakeel, an architect of the coup, met Mas’ud in Parwan; afterward Mas’ud’s men, who had already occupied the Bag- ram military base ‘and the nearby town of Charikar, took positions in the northern part of the city and in some military installations. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Qutbuddin Helal represented him in the meeting but soon left because of disagree- ments principally over the assignment of the Ministry of Defense in the interim government to the Jam’iyyat, that is, Commander Ahmad Shah Mas’ud. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On the next evening (24 April) Premier Sharif summoned heads of the Islamic groups to the offi- cial Governor’s House in Peshawar. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
It declared Islamic law (shari’a), to be the law of the land. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kabul maintained educational, financial, and other links with these local governments, each of which began to assert its authority over its own domain in its own fashion with empty coffers and small income but abundant weapons. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But to establish real authority over the provinces, Kabul needed an effec- tive government, a steady source of income, and international help. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Be- fore it could procure these, the government had to assert its authority over the city itself, which had been the bone of contention among the armed groups almost from the start. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan will long feel the effects of the destruction of Kabul as the nation’s main political, industrial, commercial, administrative, and cultural center—the place where people from all over the country had mingled and begun the move earlier in the century toward detribaliza- tion, secularization, national solidarity, and modern ways of life. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But since they follow conflicting and unattain- able goals, and since they are prone to following foreign advice, their politics is anything but compromise. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The commanders and the heads of the groups are now the main actors in Afghan politics. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In 1967, when the PDPA split into the rival Parcham and Khalq factions, Karmal headed the smaller, and more cosmopolitan, Parcham faction. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
himself did not hold an official position. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
All this prompted the Kremlin decision makers to order their army to invade Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
During his short rule Taraki, in imita- tion of the Mughal emperors of India, watched dancing girls and enjoyed a good life (Haroun, “Daoud Khan,” i86). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Further, he believes that the CIA handed over approximately 900 shoulder-fired Stinger missiles to the ISI and that the latter delivered only 300 of them to the mujahideen. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
52. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Parwani, “The Jalalabad Accords,” Writers’ Union of92. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
127. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
UNWALI Social and legal codes of the Pashtuns. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet War on over six years of personal reporting and research that included five clandestine trips into Afghanistan with the guerrillas and one official visit. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
All are dressed in pyjama suits, a jacket if they are lucky, plimsols or plastic shoes — paltry attire indeed for a trek that will take them over several hundred of the world’s most rugged miles. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The track has begun to climb steeply as it weaves through fields of rock riddled with ~0~jOW~SOUflthng brooks. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The men unload the animals and bang oat bags around their necks, and then curl up on the grounds tightly wrapped in their patous against the now penetrating wind that sweeps di~wfl the valley. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The sun has yet to rise over the jagged palisades of the pass as the men prepared to move. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Communist aerial bombardments and ground operations have partially or wholly devastated countless farms and villages. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At that time, fighting in the provinces between troops of the Moscow-backed Kabul regime and Afghan rebels had been going on for well over a year. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, the tension, the insecurity, the growing hatred for the communists were apparent just beneath the surface. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Fortunately, the presence of French doctors and other foreign aid workers over long periods in various provinces has per- mitted reliable Iong.term Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As a journalist and fellow human being who has lived, travelled and shared common experiences with the Afghan resistance, it would be dis. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Watching the planes dip in through the low cloud cover over the historic Bala Hissar fort, many Kabulis assumed that they were only part of a general airlift bringing in more military advisers and equip- ment to help combat the rapidly expanding anti-communist insurgency. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In any event, at 9.15 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
pm local time, the Russians broadcast a pre- recorded statement by Babrak Karmal, who was most probably in the Soviet Union at the time, from a transmitter in Tashkeflt but using a wavelength close to that of Radio Kabul. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The other roared south to Baghian joining the main Kabul highway. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Soviet troops, Kalashnikovs slung over their shoulders and flanked by tanks, guarded intersections or openly patrolled the streets. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
We arrived just as twilight was falling. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Armed with sticks and stones but reportedly no guns, the crowds Nevertheless, over a dozen deaths were reported by both sides, among them, three unfortunate Soviet technical advisers from a nearby textile mill. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Over a 30-minute period, no fewer than a dozen Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopter gunships flew in, landed for several minutes without cutting out their engines, probably taking on more ammunition, and then took off again for the northeast. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Despite repeated Russian warnings to put their house in order, the two factions persisted with their infighting, while callous government repression further alienated the population both in the countryside and The Soviet InvaSiofl in the cities. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
More Advisers Leadership problems were also gravely affecting the fighting morale of the army, where the situation was going from bad tO worse. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Officially, the Kremlin claims to have acted according to its treaty obligations with the Kabul regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By occupying Afghanistan, Moscow secured considerable advantages over neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Already in the 1920S, the Russians became aware of its potential, particularlY in natural gas, oil, jrofl ore, copper and uranium. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Intermittently, pairs of MIG-23 jetfighters or the new, highly manoeuvrable SU-24 fighter-bombers shrieked across the skies to dislodge their loads over the huddled villagers hiding among the deep ravines and gorges to the sides. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, whether promoting Marxist-Leninist revolution in the Third World or reasserting its control over insubordinate peoples of satellite nations, the Kemlin has never adopted a short-term approach. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The more moderate, pro-Soviet Parcham, who had clashed virulentlY with thç Khalq over the ruthless imposition of reforms, wanted above all to disassociate themselves from the previous Taraki-Amin regimes. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Protected by Soviet anti-aircraft guns, tanks and troops, the building was being used as Karmal’s official residence until the Presi- dential Palace, badly damaged during the takeover, could be repaired. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Furthermore, the Soviets were suffering as many as 10,000 casUalties by the end of 1982. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
With tanks dug in on two sides and a third flank closing off the rear, they machine-gunned those caught in between, killing or wounding over a hundred mujahideen and drivers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Red Army makes systematic use of helicopter cover to escort convoys through vulnerable mountainous areas. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For well over a year, some twenty different guerrilla fronts had launched intermittent and often highly successful raids against govern- ment installations and convoys in and around the provincial capital. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At around midday, Afghan army units tried to penetrate the southern sector of the village, but were forced back suffering further casualties. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Occasionally, the glimmer of a flashlight would pierce the darkness. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Accompanied by choruses of frogs, the men walked fast, jumping over the gurgling irrigation ditches and mudwalls without breaking stride. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Abruptly flicking on its beadlamps, it outlined the cumbersome shapes The moon had set and only a few lights marked the perimeter of the With cries of ‘Allah o Akbar’ over a megaphone, the mujahideen, by 51 ~ ~ whom the mullahs have only limited influence, responded primarily 52 The Guerrilla War of half a dozen other tanks entrenched like squatting toads just outside the wire. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
While the night belonged to the guerrillas, the day was given over to the frustrations of the Soviets. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
While the Peshawar groups have managed to glean most of the world’s limited attention, their influence over what is happening inside Afghanistan has greatly diminished since the end of 1980. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Over the past few years, partisan commanders, many of them in their twenties and thirties and well acquainted with the art of modern guerrilla warfare, have distinguished themselves in their respective regions as the new young bloods of the mujahideen. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although all the parties have political platforms, their main differences result from personality clashes. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
(Militant Muslim Youth) which developed during the 1960s (parallel to the creation of the PDPA). Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At least three main Shiite groups (all based inside Afghanistan but with offices in Iran and Quetta, Pakistan) have emerged. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Tactics Since the invasion, the mujahideen have managed to retain their hold over more than 85 per cent of the country despite repeated com- munist attempts to dislodge them. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Only for short periods have they taken over major urban centres such as Kandahar and then usually at the risk of massive Soviet retaliation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
if the garrison is wiped out or defects, it is replaced by another. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Unlike the non-tribal Tadjik regions in the north, where the influ- Clan or village chiefs usually lead the traditional tribal fronts — in To an extent, tribally-organised fronts are in danger of being over- 69 F of learning how to use properly the ones they already have. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As with similar (non-Pushtun) politically-run groups, they have greater freedom to operate over large areas. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For such a highly mobile war over mountains and vast stretches of desert, the shortage of radio transmitters is both a drawback and an advantage for the resistance. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The resistance has shown a remarkable ability to exploit whatever materials happen to come its way. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although Kabul continued to function as the focal point of the communist administration during the day, the guerrillas were taking over the inner suburbs at night. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The world services of the BBC, the Voice of America and other Western shortwave radio networks frequently reported the inability of the communists to assert their control over the valley. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Over a single one-hour period, I counted no less than 60 heli- copters passing overhead, the majority of them Mi-24s and Mi-8 assault craft. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
There was a certain helplessness in the angry faces of the Panjshairis as they watched the ugly snout-nosed and camouflage-daubed Hind-Ds, the most lethal of the Mi-24 gunships, circle in packs of six over guer- rilla strongholds farther up the valley. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the end of July, the offensive had virtually petered out. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Massoud consulted with the valley’s religious leaders and local resistance, councils before agreeing to enter into negotiations. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
With the independence and partition of India in 1947, the hap. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Together with Czechoslovakia, East Germany and other COMECON nations, the USSR agreed to take over the restructuring of the armed forces by supplying Kabul with T-34 tanks, MIG-17 jets, helicopters and small arms. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Over the next three years, his movements remain vague; some reports say that he returned to Afghanistan via India and Pakistan, others that he also made a long trip through Europe and the USSR. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
To the dismay of the PDPA and the Soviet Union, Daoud began mending his fences with Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By edging closer to the Shah, he managed to secure a $1 billion aid offer only one year after the coup; the Shah, who was seeking to create a pan-Islamic Union of non-Arab nations stretching from Turkey to Pakistan soon raised it to $2 billion, more than all of Afghanistan’s foreign assistance over the previous two decades. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Most indicators suggest that the 1978 putsch was not only premature, but that events had forced the Soviet hand into supporting it. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Parcham would allow them to influence Afghan policy in a constitu- tional manner, while the ostracised Khalq had already infiltrated the armed forces, the administration and the educational system providing a cadre with the necessary organisation and clout to act against Daoud. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to some reports, these were photocopied late at night using machines at the Soviet embassy. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, within two months, the number of Soviet advisers had risen from roughly 200 to several thousand, while all major Iranian and Arab-sponsored projects were halted. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Trusted political but often incompetent appointees (primarily Khalqi) were brought in to take over from skilled techno- crats and administrators. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Internecine strife had already broken out on the night of the coup, when Taraki and Babrak quarrelled over who was to read the official proclamation of the putsch over nation-wide radio. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The patched-up reunion of the two PDPA factions disintegrated rapidly during the first few months of the Revolution. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although the factions clashed bitterly over policy, there was an attempt to present both sides as equals in public, at least until the end of May. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By October 1978, most of the top Parchami had been pushed aside, imprisoned or exiled. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Suddenly, a military helicopter emerged from beyond the river and hovered over the field, throwing up dust and blowing the men’s hair in their faces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘I watched all these wretched women and children gradually trickle in over a period of days into Sajaur. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But simply handing land over to the peasants was not the answer. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The guerrilla commander who received me The Communist Overlay had been a principal landowner before the confiscation of his properties in a semi-arid but fertile agricultural region roughly three hours jeep ride away. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘When they were sure that no one was alive in the canal, they all began applauding and then left the village’, said Sayed Mortaza, the local mullah. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As for the ‘so-called KHAD’, one Information Ministry official (who, as it later turned out, had inter- rogated a captured French reporter in 1981 for the KHAD) tried to convince two French journalists filming in Kabul at the turn of the year 1983/84 that the existence of such an organisation was a figment of the imagination. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Composed of twelve PDPA-run institutions representing different sectors of Afghan society such as the clergy, farmers, youth and women, the Fatherland Front has nevertheless failed to have much impact. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The communists have succeeded in winning over, sometimes only temporarily, a number of significant tribal groupings. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It was costing the Soviet Union well over $2 billion, possibly as much as $3 billion a year, in occupation and economic development support by the end of 1984. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By early 1984, they were believed to total well over 10,000 many of them living with their families in specially-guarded enclaves near the Soviet embassy or in the Russian-built suburb of Microrayon near Kabul airport. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Overall army strength dwindled from an initial 100,000 in early 1978 to 30,000-40,000 by mid-i 980, with many soldiers joining the resistance, weapons and all, or simply returning home to their families. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the end of 1982, military conscription had become a key factor behind public animosity against the regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the end of 1983, well over four-fifths of the country’s career diplomats had quit their posts, been forced to retire or transferred to other ministries. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Educating a New Society In order to enhance their influence over most sectors of Afghan life, the Soviets have tried to bring the country’s educational, cultural and social institutions into complete conformity with those found in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
am, the national anthem was played over loudspeakers and pupils were expected to enter their classrooms singing. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
When Amin took over, the political sessions were abandoned but overall tension in the capital began to prevail. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Just as American, British, French, German and The Sovietisation of Afghanistan other foreign teachers have taught in Afghan educational establish- ments as part of development programmes, so have Soviet Russians, Tadjiks and Uzbeks. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Still operating primarily educational programmes, UNESCO’s take- over of the British Council premises to continue with English-language courses seems innocuous enough. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
deen are tuned to Radio Kabul for music. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As for Massoud, he has been ‘killed’ on numerous occa- sions over the past three years. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As with the Soviet press, Afghan newspapers such as the Kabul Times must be read carefully and between the lines to glean signs of what is going on. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
These involved no fewer than 70 commercially viable deposits and over 1,400 mineral occurrences. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Saur Revolution put an end to all threats of Western inter- ference. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, both Western intelligence and Afghan resistance sources indicate that all these projects have been deliberately designed for total integration within the Soviet Central Asian system. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Hardly had the dust settled from the Red Army tanks crossing over into Afghanistan, when Moscow dispatched contingents of technicians with drilling equipment to join geologists already working on the in- tensive development of petroleum deposits at Dasht-e-L.aili, Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As for the Afghans, they have to make do with coal and charcoal. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
billion in 1978-79 to $2.4 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
This led to widespread peasant revolts and severe famine, but it finally gave the Russians what they wanted: complete political leverage over an exhausted and downtrodden people. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The partisans, rifles slung over their shoulders, seemed uncharacter- istically subdued - Apart from the footfall of marching, the only sounds were a smattering of small-talk and the singing of a resistance ballad. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
There seems little question that the Soviets have adopted a grim policy of attrition against the Afghans, particularly the civilian pop- ulation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Often all that remains is emptiness and desolation; dusty, abandoned irrigation canals stringing the mountain slopes, the faded vestiges of once fecund wheat fields in the valleys, cultivated as they were over centuries, the shattered ruins of ghost vifiages surrounded by bleached and shrivelled fruit orchards creaking in the desert wind. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By January 1980, well over twenty identifiable parties had established themselves in Peshawar and Quetta. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
To an extent, this relationship has made life much easier all round. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Most tend to be in their twenties and early thirties, high-school educated but originally from The Afghan Struggle rural rather than urban areas. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The communist militants moved in to grab her and fighting broke. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the beginning of 1984, the city’s population had nearly tripled from 700,000 before the invasion to over two million. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The government never held much sway over the tribal areas in peace- time; the complete breakdown of authority in the countryside has encouraged communities to fall back on traditional social structures. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
in many parts, over-reliance on traditional institutions has seriously weakened the resistance. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As part of the continuing stife between the various resistance fronts, armed mujahideen crossing the territory of a rival faction are sometimes forced to hand over their guns, ammunition and money. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Apart from unnerving Soviet troops with taunts of ‘Allah o Akbar’ and other war cries, the partisans use them to establish contact with fellow countrymen on the other side of the wire by bellowing messages across. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Any group on operations usually has one or two in its entourage. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Only an hour earlier, Radio Kabul has declared a crushing victory over the ‘bandits’ in a northern part of the country. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Once, during the early stages of the war, three Western journalists and I visited the desert camp of a large group of partisans in southern Helmand pro- vince where we dined with the local resistance committee, about 189 I 190 The Afghan Struggle twenty men in all. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At the UN-sponsored peace talks on Afghanistan, for example, the resistance parties continue to be excluded. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Soviets have been content with the relative lack of belligerence among the Hazaras and have done much to encourage it through infiltration by the KHAD and the Tudeh, the Iranian com- munist party. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
On the eve of the Soviet invasion, the refugee population in Pakistan had grown to over 300,000. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By 1984, the UNHCR estimated annual relief assistance in Pakistan at nearly $500 million, well over $1 million a day. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It is certainly the most impressive I have come across since first reporting refugee problems in Africa and Asia in 1980. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Apart from the United Nations, twenty-eight international and vol- untary agencies are involved in the monumental task of providing the refugees with decent living conditions over a long period. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Considering their numbers, the Afghans have managed to live in rela- tive harmony with their Pakistani hosts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, tension has been on the increase. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The only Afghans who have been officially resettled in a third country have been over 4,000 Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Turkmen and Kazakhs of Turkish ethnic origin who were flown from Pakistan to Turkey in 1982 and 1983. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although the Kirghiz remained in the mountainous northern areas around Gilgit at 4,800 feet. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Outside assistance should also be directed towards providing the training, work facilities and salaries of Afghan personnel to help over- come such deficiencies. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Designed to maim rather than kill, these anti-personnel explosives were scattered over mountain passes, caravan routes and fields as a means of terrorising the local population or to discourage the mujahideen from running supplies. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
To take the illustration of an incident in Nuristan in August 1981. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The first French team arrived in the Panjshair only in early 1981. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The rockets caused some damage, but no casualties. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
All in all, he was interrogated no more than half an hour by Soviet intelligence officials before being handed over 221 I 222 Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners to the KHAD. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
I was dictated what I should say . Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Concerned by repeated reports of prisoner executions ranging from captured Soviet soldiers with their throats slit to trussed-up Afghan partisans run over by Russian tanks, ICRC representatives in Peshawar had been negotiating almost from the beginning with various resistance organisations in the hope that some sort of agreement on the treatment of POWs could be reached. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For the sensitive Islamabad regime, a Soviet prisoner on Pakistani soil was the last thing it wanted and it pressured the Afghans into handing him over. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Discreetly, the Pakistanis in turn passed him over to the Soviet embassy, which promptly bundled him back to the USSR. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Over a four-month period, ICRC representatives interviewed 427 political suspects at Pul- e-Charkhi prison according to international requirements (no guard present, etc) and distributed two tons of medication to hospitals and dispensaries in certain parts of the country. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Red Cross Effort Founders By early 1985, only eleven Soviet POWs had been transferred to Swit- zerland. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
While some irate critics maintain that the ICRC has made a secret deal with the USSR, a more realistic appraisal suggests that the organisation’s pro. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The situation has led to painful uncertainty among the Soviet pris- oners. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Despite over-optimistic assertions by Cordovez in April 1983 that ‘95 per cent’ of an agreement had been reached, negotiations have remained deadlocked. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘In many places, the Soviets have dropped all pretence of trying to win over the people with a hearts-and-minds programme. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Already, the Kremlin has obtained resigned acceptance in many quarters of its tutelage over Afghanistan, just as some consider Grenada or El Salvador within America’s sphere of influence. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But legal condonation of the occupation continues to evade Moscow’s grasp. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For Western democracies, putting all one’s eggs into the basket of a military dictatorship poses certain risks. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It is also evident that Afghanistan returnees (over half a million by early 1985) will confide in their close friends and relatives. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
INTRODUCTION V enlightened Afghans, and Afghans themselves are devel- oping new and interesting forms of social organization, cultural and ideological foci. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Institute is now part of the Kabul University academic and ad- ministrative structure. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The eastern and southern boundaries of Afghanistan (the Durrand Line) were unilaterally imposed on the Amir by the British AMIR AMANULLAH KHAN (1890-1960). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
During its journey it is joined by the Tarnak River 17 miles southwest of Qandahar. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The dance is originally Pushtun in character and was diffused to other areas of Afghanistan over the past forty to fifty years, when many Pushtuns were encouraged to settle in other areas of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Industrial plants in the province are located 19 Baghlan Baihaqi BAIHAQI. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
-I -DUNYA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The period was marked by the seasonal migration of animals to pasturelands, with the bulk of the population remaining in farming villages. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
chalcolithic sites dating from the fourth to the first millennia B. C. have been excavated in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
One team member goes over to the other team’s side and is chased back by an opposing team member who tries to whip him. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The economy of Afghanistan depends pri- Amir Dost Mohammed Khan Shah Shuja (Saddozai -return) Amir Dost Mohammed Khan (return) Amir Sher Ali Khan Amir Mohammed Afzal Khan Amir Mohammed Azam Khan Amir Sher Ali Khan (return) Amir Mohammed Yaqub Khan Amir Abdul Rahman Khan Amir Habibullah Khan Amir Amanullah Khan Revolution and Bachae Saqau (not a Mohammedzai) Mohammed Nadir Shah Mohammed Zahir Shah and southwestern parts of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
45 Gandhara Geography of Afghanistan can best be divided into the f ollow- ing major zones: Central Highlands : Afghanistan’s mountainous core, the Central Highlands, is part of the great Alpine- Himalayan mountain range. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
nects Kabul with the Afghan-Russian border port of Qizil Qala on the Amu Darya. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
An archaeological site located five miles south HADITH. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It was begun in the early 1950’s and is in the last phases of its completion. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A huge irrigation and hydroelectric project on the Helmand and Arghandab Rivers. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Indo-Aryans. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Technically, any person who will lead a collec - INDUSTRY see ECONOMY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS see ARIANA AFGHAN ISLAH. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
JESHN (CELEBRATION OF AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It ranks 11th in size among the provinces of the country. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Arabs, over a period of some 200 years, attacked the city and were repulsed. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
This river rises in the Unai pass in KABUL RIVER VALLEY. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The catchment area in the Kabul is ap- 68 I KABUL RIVER. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A single -headed membranophone found Metal strings passing over a bridge The face of this Tambur-like stringed in- A bowed chordophone. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
This basin is formed by the Amu Darya OXUS RIVER. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
B. C. has also been found. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Abjush raisin is the most popular. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A major SAFED KOH MOUNTAIN RANGE (WESTERN). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Prophet Mohammed. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Timure Lung took over the chieftainship by having his brother put to death following a short -lived but violent civil war. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
ever since new roads, hotels and improved trans- portation facilities were built in the early 1960’s. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
ZAHIRUDDIN MOHAMMED BABUR. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Yet anyone who reads the daily papers carefully, taking in the front page accounts of civil carnage as well as the business page stories on the mechanics of the information superhighway and the economics of communication mergers, anyone who turns deliberately to take in the whole 360-degree horizon, knows that our world and our lives Introduction H ISTORY IS NOT OVER. Jihad vs. McWorld
The apparent truth, which speaks to the paradox at the core of this book, is that the tendencies of both Jihad and McWorld are at 4 Introduction work, both visible sometimes in the same country at the very same instant. Jihad vs. McWorld
Without citi- zens, how can there be democracy? NOT LONG AGO, Daniel Patrick Moynihan predicted that the next half hundred states likely to come into existence over the next fifty years will all be defined by ethnic conflict: that is to say, by civil war.7 Jihad vs. McWorld
And even if language alone, the nation’s essential attribute, is made the condi- tion for self-determination, a count of the number of languages spo- ken around the world suggests the community of nations could grow to over six thousand members. Jihad vs. McWorld
Together, they are likely to produce some stifling amalgam of the two suspended in chaos. Jihad vs. McWorld
IBM sloughed off labor fat to the tune of sixty thousand work- ers in 1993 to the general applause of market analysts, and it secured private advantages in the international computer market whose pub- lic costs will not be seen for several years and whose consequences will in any case not be directly borne by IBM.’7 Jihad vs. McWorld
Manufacturing is following agricul- ture. Jihad vs. McWorld
Market- driven profit has little tolerance for policy-driven punishment. Jihad vs. McWorld
And while General Motors produces over 40 percent of its cars beyond American shores, Toyota’s extranational production is up to 20 percent of its total.22 Jihad vs. McWorld
Of course nobody really intends to segment their being quite so schizophrenically: Americaps are job holders as well as consumers, and even in the narrow terms of economic efficiency, their capacity to consume over the long haul depends on secure employment over the long term—and they know it. Jihad vs. McWorld
The modern democratic state is legitimated by the priority of the public over the private, where public goods trump private inter- ests and the commonweal takes precedence over individual fortunes. Jihad vs. McWorld
These classical doctrines were conceived for a much simpler world and were pushed to the margins by Keynesianism and the welfare state. Jihad vs. McWorld
Others are “Third World” only on the way to being Second and First World—much in the manner of the United States compared to Britain a couple of centuries ago.4 Jihad vs. McWorld
The bleak prospects of many sub-Saharan countries is epitomized by Ghana. Jihad vs. McWorld
Either through military dominion over their better-endowed neighbors (Japan’s “Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere,” as its iron- handed pre—Worid War II empire was known) or extensive trade and prudent foreign policy (Switzerland’s neutrality is the preferred example), such nations have had to forge relationships with others that made a virtue of their dependency. Jihad vs. McWorld
Many nations have almost nothing they need. Jihad vs. McWorld
Yet ultimately, even where technology offsets resource depletion through new disc~very teclniques and more economical extraction methods or through recycling and substitution, the long-term trends spell ineluctable interdependence for just about everyone in just 38 THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD about everything. Jihad vs. McWorld
The most rigorous standards would put the Latin American group and India on the democratic margin, at best, giving them only 7 of the 42 million barrels produced by nations in the high- and moder- ate-risk group, and leaving over four-fifths of production in these two groups in non-democratic hands. Jihad vs. McWorld
The logic is spa~re and fearful: both Jihad and McWorld weaken nations. Jihad vs. McWorld
The multiply- ing “tigers” on the Asian side of the Pacific Rim like Japan, the Koreas, Taiwan, Singapore, and China (with Hong Kong) have thus caught up to and even surpassed European powers like Germany and France as major economic players. Jihad vs. McWorld
The choice of roadway over rail- way and the construction of the huge interstate highway system meant that the industries on which automobiles depended (steel, alu- minum, chrome, petroleum, rubber, concrete, asphalt, and electron- ics) would be continually nurtured not just for public sector defense spending but for private sector consumer spending. Jihad vs. McWorld
In 1991, for example, the United States exported $85 billion in goods to Canada, $48 billion to Japan, $33.3 Jihad vs. McWorld
The geography of the whole planet is not at issue. Jihad vs. McWorld
Of course in the long term, democracy is served by these ironies in neither the First nor the Third Worlds. Jihad vs. McWorld
For the decline of democratic control over markets at the level of the nation endangers both justice and social policy and the prospects for global democratic control over 56 • THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD the economy. Jihad vs. McWorld
Consider American Greetings Corpora- tion (cards and gift items), which earns 14 percent of its sales revenues abroad; American Express, which gets over 20 percent of its earnings beyond America; American Home Products, which earns 24 percent of sales far away from home; the American Inter- national Insurance group, which gets 46 percent of its revenue from its international rather than its American side; American Standard (plumbing), which earns 49 percent of revenue on someone else’s currency standard; American Cynamid, which like most American chemical companies earns more than half its revenue (~i percent) abroad; and finally American President (shipping), which derives two thirds of its income from foreign port saiings.’4 Jihad vs. McWorld
Twenty or more years ago, many of the American companies now deriving majority revenue abroad were almost exclusively focused on the domestic market. Jihad vs. McWorld
A “French” company like Michelin (tires), with 20 percent of world tire sales, earns only 19 percent of its revenues in France, while Sony earns less than a quarter of its nearly $30 billion in annual income from Japan, deriving over half from the United States and Europe (28 percent of its total sales in each). Jihad vs. McWorld
Of the twenty-five largest advertising companies, fifteen are American. Jihad vs. McWorld
Global advertising expen- ditures have climbed a third faster than the world economy and three times faster than world population, rising sevenfold from 1950 to 1990 from a modest $39 billion to $256 billion.6 Jihad vs. McWorld
In 1995, following its “triumph” over communism, few would want to risk saying that capitalism is imperialist; but markets must grow and advertising has a natural tendency to seep like rising groundwater into every cellar of a commercial culture’s multiple dwellings. Jihad vs. McWorld
Advertisements simulate independent editorial judgments and become advertorials; they infest news programming and turn into infomercials where the public cannot be quite sure whether they are watching a television magazine show about a product or a soft sell for the product. Jihad vs. McWorld
Licensing offers advertisers another kind of colonization. Jihad vs. McWorld
Disney is the obvious champion of synergy but the footwear busi- ness also offers an altogether apt, if rather less explicit, example of the power of name and trademark over product and of the associa- tional psychology that attaches the chic glamor of the woman’s movement and youth volunteerism to for-profit merchandising. Jihad vs. McWorld
Nike started up just over twenty years ago and sold a little over $3 million in sneakers to Oregon consumers, many of whom (Nike now gleefully reports) thought the logo said “Mike.” Jihad vs. McWorld
To act as general contractor for the information super- highway but yield control over the nature and content of the traffic for which it will act as a conduit is to misconceive where power lies in McWorld. Jihad vs. McWorld
They are busy seeking ways through mergers, acquisitions, and buyouts to extend their hardware business (high-tech paving) into the software sector (traffic control and governance over who or what rides in the vehicles). Jihad vs. McWorld
For example, in 1974 the United States exercised a complete monopoly over the production of sophisticated DRAM memory chips essential to computers. Jihad vs. McWorld
Yet services and soft goods are where the action is, and in this domain the American story is rather different. Jihad vs. McWorld
And with world trade in services now estimated at over $6oo billion annually, the edge is of growing importance. Jihad vs. McWorld
Old-fashioned class analysis associated modes of production with class structure: Marx thus suggested that the ancient slave-master relationship was founded on the sovereignty of human labor (he who mastered labor was master of his world and eventually the political master as well), that the feudal relationship was rooted in sovereignty over land (he who owned the land ruled the world), and that the cap- italist relationship rested on sovereignty over capital (he who capital- ized machinery and bought labor bought into the ruling class). Jihad vs. McWorld
To the extent there is such a relationship between control over the eco- nomic mode of production and access to political power (and surely, though it is not as neat as Marx would have it, there is some relation- ship), it is the infotainment telesector of the service economy that is acquiring a certain postmodern sovereignty. Jihad vs. McWorld
So what are they doing here? They’re just bankers, and they’re being treated like that, and eventually they won’t like it.”9 Jihad vs. McWorld
As real- ity catches up to science fiction, the literary metaphors committed by cyberspace fiction writers look ever less hyperbolic: “First,” writes Pat Cadigan in the cyberspace novel Synners, “you see video. Jihad vs. McWorld
In McWorld’s terms, the queen’s English is little more today than a highfalutin dialect used by advertisers who want to reach affected upscale American consumers. Jihad vs. McWorld
The soft hegemony of American pop culture is not just anecdotal. Jihad vs. McWorld
Under the banner of synergy which is how Mickey Mouse strong- arms the competition, they are doing and spending whatever it takes to secure monopolistic control over what they now see as a single, integrated high-tech mediological package that can dominate the global economy and all of its once diversified markets. Jihad vs. McWorld
As with the other contributing elements to the culture of McWorld, movies and videos are ever more unitary in content as they become ever more global in distribution. Jihad vs. McWorld
Mergers are driven not by coequal interdependency but by the reality of the absolute primacy Hollyworid: McWorld~s Videology 89 T O WHOM OR to what belongs this expiring century? Is it the American century? Perhaps. Jihad vs. McWorld
Local filmmakers cannot begin to compete with the monopolistic international giants that have control over production, distribution, and movie houses (the new multiplex theaters) throughout the world. Jihad vs. McWorld
The French have been driven to distraction by American inroads into French cinema audiences, their ire boiling over in 1991 when American films not only led domestic fare in the mass cinema sweep- stakes, but—led by the Coen brothers’ Barton Fink—also managed to completely dominate the Cannes Film Festival, adding the high- culture critics’ sublimest prizes to their spoils. Jihad vs. McWorld
America now controls well over 8o percent of the European market, while Europe has less than 2 percent of the American market.5 Jihad vs. McWorld
On its opening weekend, the American blockbuster Jurassic Par/c took over nearly a quarter of France’s eighteen hundred movie screens in larger towns and cities, provoking an outcry from defenders of local culture such as Lang’s successor; Culture Minister Jacques Toubon.6 Jihad vs. McWorld
The dismal story of film in Europe can be duplicated over and over again around the world. Jihad vs. McWorld
As movies and television have pursued common programming strategies, Hollywood’s creative monopoly over material has increased: indeed, the Americanization of global television is pro- ceeding even faster than the globalization of American films. Jihad vs. McWorld
Satellite dishes are showing up in China as well, in flagrant disregard of state laws banning their use in keeping with the war on “spiritual pollution.” Jihad vs. McWorld
In early 1993, its global audience stood at nearly ~ quarter of a bfflion households (60 million in the Unitect~ States) with over a half billion viewers in seventy-one countries (see map, pages 106—107). Jihad vs. McWorld
By the mid-198os when the group Dire Straits used MTV to launch its megahit “Money for Nothing” (with its own backhanded commercial tie-ins), MTV had gone international. Jihad vs. McWorld
Since earlier regulation depended on “spectrum scarcity” (the seemingly finite character of available broadcast wavelengths and delivery conduits), the explosion of media outlets and delivery vehicles—fiber optic communications that can carry millions of digitalized information and picture bytes, cable systems with a five-hundred-plus channel capacity, and satellites—coupled with our current passion for mar- kets and for privatization have delegitimized the very idea of public regulation. Jihad vs. McWorld
A few countries still try to maintain some control, if not monopoly control, over the traditional broadcast media, but with diminishing Television and MTE/~ Mc World’s Noisy Soul • 113 success against the diversifying technologies that undergird new media. Jihad vs. McWorld
Television and film do not, to be sure, wholly displace books. Jihad vs. McWorld
Ben Teleliterature and Mc World • 123 Bagdikian has been tracking the conglomerating tendencies of media for a number of years, and his statistics point unwaveringly to ever-increasing concentration.’2 Jihad vs. McWorld
Certainly that is what Richard Snyder the longtime chief of Simon & Schuster, dutifully said when Viacom took over Simon & Schuster’s parent company Paramount. Jihad vs. McWorld
Regarded as both invulnerable and indispensable, too entrenched and too invaluable to fire, Snyder was gone within a year of the takeover, leaving stunned observers like agent Mort Jankbow saying that Viacom must think selling books is like selling popcorn.’6 Jihad vs. McWorld
As early as the 196os, major corporations, many of them defense contractors including IBM, fliT, Litton, RCA, Raytheon, Xerox, General Electric, and Westinghouse, invaded the textbook business. Jihad vs. McWorld
Now, with its formidable megalith marker in New York’s Times Square, it runs book clubs in England, publishes Amer- ican magazines like Parents, owns Doubleday, Bantam, and Dell, has taken over the Literary Guild, and is active in records through its RCA and Arista labels. Jihad vs. McWorld
Teleliterature and Mc World i~i To ensure that malls are fun, many developers are installing high- tech virtual reality arcade games at very considerable cost (up to $2 million) and thereby further collapsing the distinction between Dis- neyland, McDonald’s (which is also experimenting with the games), and the suburban mall. Jihad vs. McWorld
As once the sun never set on the British empire, so today, Disney can boast, “the fun now follows the sun around the globe.”37 Jihad vs. McWorld
Traditional corporate ambitions that aimed at monopoly within a particular medium have been displaced by the drive for monopoly across media. Jihad vs. McWorld
The victory of the dollar over every other conceivable interest, public or private, entails not just a crass commercialism in the place where quality information and diversified entertainment should be, but also a monopoly antipathetic to democratic society and free civ- ilization, if not also to capitalism itself That “creative geniuses” like Spielberg, Katzenberg, and Geffen join up gives their rivals night- mares, but will not necessarily enhance competition—or even cre- ativity, though observers will once again celebrate synergy Yet how can an Edgar Bronfman (Seagram) take on a Matsushita/MCA/ Universal Pictures without creating his own megamonopoly? What- ever else McWorld’s mergers may serve in the vital infotainment tele- sector, they serve neither culture nor liberty nor democracy. Jihad vs. McWorld
More than a hundred years ago, Marx had observed that the breaking of feudal bonds by modern capitalism had decisively frag- mented traditional community He spoke of the sundering of all bonds and prophesied ongoing cultural meltdown: ‘~All that is solid,” he warned, “melts into ait”9 A h~Jf century later modernist anxi- eties had become popula’rized, so that one of American playwright William Saroyan’s characters could repeat over and over again in the 162 . Jihad vs. McWorld
To those who are East Germans, impoverished and increasingly nostalgic, with unemployment at 16 percent or worse (over double the national norm, and far worse still among the young), it is easy to regard West Jihad Within Mc World: The “Democracies” i8i Germans as an “other”—aggressive agents of McWorld and traitors to the real Germany (rather like the Jews were made out to be in the 192OS). Jihad vs. McWorld
China and the PacUic Rim . Jihad vs. McWorld
With such developments made rampant by official support for markets, it is not hard to appreciate why Asian authorities in Com- munist and non-Communist countries alike insist on state control over information and the media, though for the most part in vain. Jihad vs. McWorld
China, no less culturally defensive than France, is tightening con- trol over the production and screening of films with even more fer- 187China and the Pc4fic Rim vor than the French. Jihad vs. McWorld
Yet though the government tries to retain absolute control over political ideas, in leaving cultural images and commer- cial information to the marketplace it flails at mosquitoes with a but- terfly net. Jihad vs. McWorld
nals, many newly “free” peoples have turned the reins back over to public-sector criminals: ex-Communists and nationalists who ruled in the ancien Communist régime and, having cashed in their commissar’s chips for a privileged place in the new capitalist order and supplanted old Leninist with still older tribalist dogmas, were more than ready to reinstate the heavy hand that an exasperated and weary electorate has now come to crave. Jihad vs. McWorld
Here was the only Communist nation to be admired at least a little by left democrats and idealists in tF~ West, a state brave enough to reject Stalin, imaginative~ enough to federalize its socialist system and empower its workers, resourceful enough to bring its hostile ethnic fragments to heel, prudent enough to forge a pluralist army strong 198 THE OLD WORLD OF JIHAD and loyal to Yugoslavia.” Jihad vs. McWorld
For tragic irony, no country can rival Yugoslavia, whose very name conjures the full meaning of Jihad within the domain of McWorld more eloquently than a library of books could ever do. Jihad vs. McWorld
On the other hand, some have estimated that nearly half of all Ukrainians now disapprove of Ukrainian independence, and Kuchma’s rapprochement with Moscow has strong support in the east, above all in the Crimea. Jihad vs. McWorld
Al- Banna could be reproaching Rupert Murdoch or Barry Difier when he assailed Westerners for importing “their half-naked women into these regions, together with their liquors, their theaters, their dance halls, their amusements, their stories, their newspapers, their novels, their whims, their silly games, and their vices.” Jihad vs. McWorld
We must take back what is rightfully ours.”8 Jihad vs. McWorld
Moreover, there is a new breed of American pragmatist: a fear- some pragmatist of holy war who acts out the rage he has carefully cultured from seeds of deeply felt resentment. Jihad vs. McWorld
Jihad in fact has little more use for citizens than does McWorld. Jihad vs. McWorld
More recently Robert Reich, now secretary of labor, advanced a brilliant proposal for a “kind of GATT for direct investment” that would regulate bidding by indi- vidual nations for “high-value added investments by global corpora- tions,” and develop “fair tactics” that barred “would be threats to close the domestic market unless certain investments were under- taken within it.”8 Jihad vs. McWorld
Jihad’s parochialism also limits its access to real power in a cen- tralized, interdependent world. Jihad vs. McWorld
Tribalism is little less hostile to civil society than consumerism. Jihad vs. McWorld
Holmes proposes that Eastern Europe might benefit from a certain degree of “constitutional postponement” in which flexibility and adaptability to local conditions are favored over the formulaic applications of abstract constitutional principles.27 Jihad vs. McWorld
Left to its own devices, Jihad neither generates its own democracy nor permits others to democratize it merely by importing the constitutional mechanisms devised by others over many centuries in nation-states with long-standing and historically well-developed civil societies. Jihad vs. McWorld
Notwith- standing the renewed popularity of the laissez-faire creed in England and America over the last few decades, amplified by a deeply felt repugnance for politics and politicians, there is a long and respectable tradition that is neither collectivist nor even welfare statist that disputes the putative sufficiency of markets and chal- lenges their vaunted capacity for economic self-regulation.5 Jihad vs. McWorld
This second claim has moved profit-mongering privateers to insist that goods as diverse and obvi- ously public as education, culture, penology full employment, social welfare, and ecological equilibrium be handed over to the profit sec- tor for arbitration and disposal.’° Jihad vs. McWorld
Its loans often bankrupt its clients: Poland’s total debt in 1993 was over 6o percent of its annual GDP, while Hungary’s approached 8o percent of its GNP;’4 Uganda owes 62 percent of its foreign debt to the bank while Guatemala’s controversial World Bank—financed Chixoy Dam accounts for ~o percent of its external debt. Jihad vs. McWorld
Robert Kuttner, for example, still thinks that although “the global intelligt~ntsia may think of itself as stateless, and global capital r~ay see nation-states as anachronistic encum- brances. Jihad vs. McWorld
Those who believe in the continuing vitality of the nation-state may not worry. Jihad vs. McWorld
246 . Jihad vs. McWorld
Meanwhile, more than i~ million are unemployed (as compared with less than a million in the old Soviet Union) and critics—not all 248 . Jihad vs. McWorld
The economics of the cold shower has left Russian politics wet and shivering. Jihad vs. McWorld
Certainly there is little to suggest that the abrupt transformation of Russia from a command economy into a radical market. Jihad vs. McWorld
This looks like Jihad by default. Jihad vs. McWorld
(always Russia) and the new slogan plastered all over Moscow following “Cokefest ‘94” celebrating the opening of the first Coca-Cola bottling plant that proclaims “Vsegda Coke!” Jihad vs. McWorld
Capitalism vs. Democracy in Russia 259 The Colonization of East Germany the wall symbolized, a surprising collection of East German intellec- tuals, students, religious leaders, and even some workers—some but by no means all of them dissidents—collaborated to establish a loose opposition group to the crumbling rule of the German Democratic Republic called J~Teues Forum. Jihad vs. McWorld
East Germans who clambered over the wall in the heady days of 1989 now stay in East Berlin in the neighborhoods where the West- ern bistros and boutiques have not yet signed leases. Jihad vs. McWorld
As has happenect elsewhere in the land of McWorld where the expansion~ of the private sector has drained political sup- port for the public sector, public monies are not available for projects 264 JIHAD VS. Jihad vs. McWorld
Hungary’s most prestigious radical paper, Reform, with a circulation of over 400,000, was purchased by Rupert Murdoch in 1990. Jihad vs. McWorld
To be sure, technology’s mandarins are correct in seeing improved information and communication as indispensable to improving democracy. Jihad vs. McWorld
The 1984 Cable Act gives local franchisers (cities and towns) rather than the federal or state government control over cable, in effect abandoning it to market forces that have shown scant regard for public needs.4 Jihad vs. McWorld
Left to markets, it is likely to aug- ment McWorld’s least worthy imperatives, including surveillance over and manipulation of opinion, and the cultivation of artificial Securing Global Democracy 273 needs rooted in lifestyle “choices” unconnected to real economic, civic, or spiritual needs. Jihad vs. McWorld
The world Pocock describes is McWorld—what Neil Postman, another savvy critic of the tyranny of technology over its makers, calls technopoly. Jihad vs. McWorld
Not quite. Jihad vs. McWorld
Squeezed between the warring realms of the tw~ expanding monopolies, statist and cor- porate, civil society~lost its preeminent place in American life. Jihad vs. McWorld
If my fundamental analysis of the dialectics that bind Jihad and McWorld together continues to be validated by current events, there are, nonetheless, issues raised by critics that merit some reply. Jihad vs. McWorld
In the nineteenth century, the great monopolies in oil, steel, coal, and the railways were finally dis- mantled by vigorous government anti-trust regulation. Jihad vs. McWorld
But in their greatest numbers, they can be found trying (unsuccessfully) to separate rival factions in Somalia (over twenty-six thousand) and former Yugoslavia (over twenty-five thousand) as well as in Georgia, Cyprus, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, the western Sahara, Haiti, El Salvador, and Cambodia. Jihad vs. McWorld
one-third, are abroad; there are over one thousand in Japan alone. Jihad vs. McWorld
McDonald’s currently has nearly 15,ooo restau- rants in over seventy c~untries, and earns 45 percent of its profits outside the United States. Jihad vs. McWorld
bfflion; Vital World Statis-~j. Jihad vs. McWorld
316 J’iotes for Pages 25—26 IBM plans on a massive restructuring that will liquidate over sixty thou-17. Jihad vs. McWorld
sand jobs; although it will cost nearly $9 billion, it is supposed to save over $4 billion a year in the long run. Jihad vs. McWorld
Over half the trash in many commu- nity dumps can be incinerated (after sorting) and used to produce energy (see Barry Meier, “Finding Gold, of a Sort, in Landfills,” The Yew York Times, September 7, 1993, p. A 14). Jihad vs. McWorld
pp. 46—63. Jihad vs. McWorld
These figures are all from Gary Hoover, Hoover’s Handbook of World Business10. Jihad vs. McWorld
In the late 1950S, it had over seven thousand screens available and sold over 750 million tickets, with German films counting for nearly half of tife business done. Jihad vs. McWorld
Germany is more typical of Europe than France. Jihad vs. McWorld
God I don’t know” John Seabrook, “Rocking in Shangri-La,” The Yew York.er~ Jihad vs. McWorld
Paramount did so well selling Dancing with Wolves through McDonald’s that20. Jihad vs. McWorld
~. Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, fourth edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), p. 19. Jihad vs. McWorld
Fortune says Malone is now worth over a billion dollars. Jihad vs. McWorld
Frankfurt, for example, is nearly a third foreign, and has over 140 nation-28. Jihad vs. McWorld
the Week in Review, The Yew York Times, April 10, 1994, Section 4, p.’. 2. Jihad vs. McWorld
Yeltsin had his own sentiments about the treason of the Serbs against its sponsors in Moscow. Jihad vs. McWorld
Journal of International Affairs, No. 44, 1991, pp. 287—298. Jihad vs. McWorld
358 • .Notes Jihad vs. McWorld
Andrew Bard Schmookler in his effective if over- wrought internal critique of market economics perfectly captures the delu- sions of the marketeers in his title: The illusion of Choice. Jihad vs. McWorld
ington Post, National Weekly Edition, March 1—7, 1993. Jihad vs. McWorld
42. Jihad vs. McWorld
Stephen Kinzer, “Luckenwalde Journal: In East Germany, Bad 01’ Days Now Look Good,” The New York Times, August 27, 1994, p. A 2. Jihad vs. McWorld
Afghanistan_HistOry_Soviet occupation, 1979.1. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
inhabitants are engaged in subsistence rural cultivation or nomadic pastoral activities. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
MARXIST “REVOLUTION” AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE Decree No. 8 was announced in December 1978. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
ISLAM AND JIHAD IN THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF AFGHANISTAN Islam and the ideals of jihad have remained constant and dy- namic forces in the political processes of Afghanistan, particularly over the last two centuries. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Canfield (in this volume) asserts that in a country where over 99 percent of the population is Muslim, religious and political concepts are merged in Islam (see also Anderson, Katz, Keiser, Shahrani, and Tavakolian). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 30 in the region), Islam and the concept of jihad have played very un- portant but varied roles. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Musahiban rule. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Differential allocation of schools and recruitment of students for higher education in government boarding schools in Kabul generally favored Muhammadzai over Ghilzai Pashtun and Pashtuns living in Nangarhar and Paktya over those in Kandahar and Ghazni. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In 1967 it MARXIST “REVOLUTION” AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE A significant outcome of foreign aid and the government’s de- Despite their common complaints and grievances, however, the 39 but popularly known as Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brethren) (see Shahrani in this volume). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The groups’ forward- looking proposals for an alternative sociopolitical order have received little or no attention from journalists and scholars. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
7; and Editors of Mirror of Jehad 1982a: 10). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
But Sayyaf contends that [this jihad] has had a deep effect on all the Muslims. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In Kabul the interventionists felt safe only behind the walls of the Sherpur fortress (Khalfm 1981: 108). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Prior to his overthrow and death in a second leftist coup, Daoud charted a reasonable path for Afghanistan but made several fundamental mistakes along the way. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
penal code and civil code, based on secular law but not violating general Islamic principles. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
*A blanket of silence descended over the incident after the coup. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The confessions of those arrested—extracted by means usually em- ployed in Afghanistan regardless of the regime in power (physical and mental torture, threats to family members)—were broadcast over Radio Afghanistan, and the government-controlled press published facsimiles of the confessions in the handwriting of the accused (a tactic also employed in the past). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Reshufflings at the top followed what had become a Third World In late August 1978 the regime arrested numbers of high-ranking LOUIS DUPREE 64 decreed a series of administrative procedures and far-reaching reforms. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
As presented, the reforms ran counter to major Afghan cultural, social, and economic institutions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
in-group feuding over property rights and mate-preference toward violence against neighboring groups—i.e., Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Now they were fighting to overthrow. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Be- cause they no longer have to worry about the safety of their families and the sanctity of their villages, groups can coalesce into larger units and range more widely over expanded zones of responsibility. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
They then telephoned to the subdistrict post (alaqadari) at the village of Bragimatal, informing the Kati tribesmen there of their success. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
This emphasis on individuality is expressed in the way Nuristanis talk about society and social relationships. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Once disputants give a peacemaker authority over their case, he gathers all the in- formation he can on the causes of the dispute, and he determines what each party is willing to accept as a settlement. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In post-conquest times hostilities between the Kom and the Afghans of Kunar had ceased, but the Kunar area continued to be a fragile flank of Kom territory. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
He arrived at Kombrom in time to participate in the discussions over how to implement the Nuristanis’ decision. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Although the leaders of the Nuristani tribes had firmly agreed to mount a united campaign against the Khalq regime, they were undecided over the timing of their revolt. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
He foresaw that given more time, the Khalqis would emasculate the Nuristani leadership. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
the insurgents’ chances of receiving outside military aid and thus stem further divisive intrigues, the Nuristani leadership established its own organization, the Jabha-i Nuristan (Nuristani Front), with an office in Peshawar. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In addition, I wish to thank Mr. Muhammad Alam Melabar, Faculty of Chapter 4 David J. Katz 94 The presentation is based primarily on material collected during ethnographic fieldwork in Afghanistan between August 1975 and July 1977.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Taxes were collected indirectly. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In return for condoning expedient and unofficial settlements, these officials expected payments. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
KALASHA Ai if! Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
VIygal Valley Kalasha to the Marxist regime has cast them into an anarchic situation. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
While they do not categorically oppose government involvement in their communities, they view it with suspicion and wish to exercise control over the government’s role in their affairs. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Marxist regime. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghan sovereignty over eighty years ago, they recognized that their most serious threats came from other groups in the region. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Kalasha understand that they are immigrants to their land. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
After the revolution, changes accelerated. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It was necessary to travel stealthily over difficult mountain terrain, strike enemy camps quick- ly, and retreat rapidly. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
For the first time a motivation to overcome Intertribal conflicts also fostered leaders able to conduct com- The different ecology in the lower valley did not require as Conditions in Darra-i Nur after the Saur Revolution created R. LINCOLN KEISER 132 past political enmities, a need to form a viable military alliance, and a compulsion to rebel against the central government existed together. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
I have argued for the impor- tance of understanding how symbols motivate people to act in terms of moral imperatives. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
THE REBELLION IN DARRA-I NUR 135 PART III QATAGHAN AND BADAKHSHAN peoples of Badakhshan, the extreme northeastern province, to the Soviet-inspired military coup of 7 Saur 1357 A.H. (27 April 1978) and to the December 1979 military invasion and occupation by the Red Army have been far from uniform.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Large numbers of merchants from urban as well as rural areas of Badakhshan participated in the trade caravans, and some spent many months—or even years—in these and other Central Asian cities. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
There is no doubt that the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet army has reinforced the worst fears of the people of Badakh- shan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
25 50 25 Mountain Tajiks live. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
LOCAL POLITICAL POWER STRUCTURE where numerous mirs (local chiefs; Tajik word) claimed domain over different valleys and fought each other incessantly. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
However, they have important ruhani whom they call shahs (or pirs). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The tomb of their great Sufi ancestor is located either in the family compound or nearby and is considered a ziyarat or mazar (holy shrine). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Naqshbandi order. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Badakhshi attended the muta. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
was no different than in other parts of the country: jubilation on the part of the leftists, dismay on the part of the Islamic activists, and little reaction from the majority. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Kushkaki (1923: 174-381) estimated the total number of matchlocks (tufangi filtai) in the entire province at about 1,500 in 1921. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Although the PDPA quickly announced a program of sweeping change for the country, the “revolution” itself was merely a coup that placed a new party at the head. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In Qunduz province (in northeastern Afghanistan) the Imam Sahib Valley of the Amu River was an important subdistrict (the lowest level of government administration). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
domination by Pashtuns. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Moreover, villagers expressed doubts about the religiosity of the officials, particularly over such matters as drinking alcohol and making regular prayers. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The government’s third objective was to make social and eco- nomic reforms gradually. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Amanullah fell. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Though it has a population of less than two thousand, at the time of my visit the town had a flourishing bazaar with over three hundred small shops and a number of teahouses and modest eating places. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
PRINCIPAL KHALQ SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS Three decrees—Nos. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
1978, it looked as though people in Nahrin would try to observe its provisions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
For example, a regulation dealing with the formation and management of agri- cultural cooperatives was issued in August 1978 (Kabul Times, 8/24/78). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
However, when it came to the redis- tribution of expropriated land, the 1975 law was as radical as the decree; it gave first priority to “the farmer, who, prior to the promul- gation of the law has been toiling in agricultural work on distributable land” (Article I). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
He dealt with these personally rather than passing them over to a properly constituted court. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The stresses and strains of modernization were “tangential to the basic conflict” (p. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
A quarter of a century later Iqbal All Shah wrote in similar terms: Until quite recently the religious thraldom of the priests in Afghan- istan was quite complete. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Furthermore, the members of a single ethnic type frequently occupied a particular territory and intermarried; thus the members of a ph’s network most- ly belonged to the same ethnic type. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
and “secular” qualities. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Many Afghans still believe that the power of walls is present in As mentioned already, the dyadic tie between the ph and each ISLAMIC COALITIONS IN BAMYAN 217 the affinal bonds that formed among people of different regions nor- mally fell within the membership of one ph network. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
This minimal unit never stood alone, however. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
I ISLAMIC COALITIONS IN BAMYAN 221 tions—that is, the Sunni, Isma’ili, and Imami sect groupS. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The maximal unit of Islamic coalition in Bamyan was the sect. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
THE INTRINSIC UNITY OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS CONCERNS separable from political and material interests. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
CONFLICT IN NORTH-CENTRAL AFGHANISTAN Chapter 10 Richard Tapper 230 if not as classes; classes, inherently stratified and unequal in terms of power, acquire cultural and ideological attributes and may be per- ceived by members in ethnic terms. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
From the steppes and sandy deserts of low elevation near the Soviet frontier, the land rises in bess hills southward towards the Band-i Turkistan mountains, with peaks up to thirty-five hundred meters. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Closer to the urban market centers of Saripul, Sangcharak, Gurziwan, Bilchiragh, and Maymana, fruit orchards and vineyards predominate in the valleys and dry-farming on the mountain slopes at up to two thousand meters. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On the one hand, in the political context (as mentioned above) competition between groups over resources leads to major alignments—especially between Pashtuns and the rest—seen as an opposition of Afghan versus Uzbek. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
To Durrani tribesmen in Saripul the terms “Durrani,” “Pashtun,” and “Afghan” are practically synonymous, and they use them in- terchangeably to identify Durrani as opposed to all other groups, including non-Durrani Pashto-speakers. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
They recovered their former lands and seized more—even lands be- longing to Hazarahs and Arabs, the only local ethnic groups to have sided with the Pashtuns against the supporters of Bacha-i Saqaw. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RICHARD TAPPER 246 SOUTHERN AFGHAMSTAN PART V WESTERN AND A STUDY OF INDIGENOUS AUTHORITY AND FOREIGN RULE Islam in rural Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
While the resettlement was partially successful and some of the Durrani nomads took up cultivation in the northern regions (N. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
BAHRAM TAVAKOLIAN 254 Similarly, Stauffer (1965), Salzman (1971), and Irons (1974) discuss the economic and political controls exercised by the central state over the pastoral nomadic populations of Iran, and Cole (1975) de- scribes the relationship between Al Murrah Bedouin and the Saudi Arabian state. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These groupings are the bases for descent and inheritance; however, they are not resi- dential units, and individual camp groups of Sheikhanzai may be, and generally are, composed of members belonging to different lineage segments. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
SHEIKHANZAI SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE CENTRAL STATE the principle of patrilineal segmentary lineages and an absence of a centralized decision-making and leadership structure. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Foreign—i.e., Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These institutions are more typical of many Afghan villages, as well as of many of the nomadic populations of Iran. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Islam provides powerful motives and a central discourse for For comments on an earlier version of this chapter and on portions of my HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEMSELVES IN RELATION TO ISLAM Chapter 12 Jon W. Anderson 266 proceeds from a similarly arguable (but in this case opposed) inter- pretation which is itself part of the data. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Even if government favor did not join ‘ulama interest to that of the state or (as observers often interpret it) give influence to the government through them over the tribes (see Gregorian 1969: 305ff.), Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
that government seems increasingly to have managed to avoid relying on religious figures for mediating disputes with the tribes over the past thirty years, in contrast to its reliance on such mediation in the 193 Os. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It is significant for the evolution of this complex set of relations JON W. ANDERSON 272 It would seem that the situation confronted by ‘Abdur Rahman and in the Durrani restoration of the 193Os was not, therefore, straight- forwardly “traditional,” but rather there was a radical prominence of Muslim functionaries in the political field. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM The structure of avghan tribes is remarkably continuous over TRIBAL CONTEXTS OF ISLAM 273 ranges of agnatic codescendants are grouped under successively remoter fathers back to Qays, the notional ancestor of all avghan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
I shall begin with an overview on legal reforms concerning The first two artides in Decree No. 7 forbid (respectively) the LEGAL REFORMS AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN NANCY TAPPER 292 reforms of the institution of marriage elsewhere) is the assumption that brideprice payments and other marriage gifts directly cause general indebtedness on the one hand and an inferior status for women vis-a-vis men on the other. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These spokesmen, predom- inately male, have held that a nationalist ideology encompassing emancipation for women is essential to the creation of a progressive image for the nation. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In 1970 two conservative mullahs (Muslim religious leaders) protested such public evidence of female liberation as miniskirts, women teachers, and schoolgirls by shooting REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC AND AFGHAN WOMEN Women were automatically enfranchised, without a suffragette Over the years increasing numbers of educated women emerged Undercurrents of dissent existed. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
joined because of general dissatisfaction, usually concerning male- female relationships at home. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Dupree 1972:159-61. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The same phrases appeared over and over in speeches delivered at myriad grand functions in Kabul and in the provinces. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On 1 October 1979 a fifty-eight-member Constitution Drafting In any case the efforts toward emancipation proved purely The country slid rapidly into chaos. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The court, an inspiration of the late Justice Ghulam Ali Karimi in 1975 and one of the more positive accomplishments of the Afghan women’s movement, continued to function after the Saur Revolution. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
When rumors circulated that Soviet troops had entered the city, two men killed all the women in their families to prevent them from dishonor. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
A UFS Reports, Asia, no. 14. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
“Toward Representative Government in Afghanistan, Part II.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
L” AUFS Reports, Asia, no. 1. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Red Flag over Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
New York: St. Martin’s Press. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Rural populations: agrarian relations Sada’iNuristan, 92 Safi (Pashtun tribe): alliance with Darra-i Nur peoples, 121, 122; and Kabul Conference (December 1980), 337n; living conditions of, 97; re- lations with government of, 101, 106-12; relations with Kalasba of, 101, 109, 113, 118; relations with Mir Beg, 120; revolt among, 100, 164 Saint. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Over the centuries, trying to understand the Afghans and their country was turned into a fine art and a game of power politics by the Persians, the Mongols, the British, the Soviets and most recently the Pakistanis. Taliban
But in the last 21 years of conflict they have paid an enormous price — over 1.5 Taliban
Over the years the UN agencies and the non-governmental aid organ- izations have provided a home for me all over Afghanistan and have given me ideas, information and support. Taliban
I am deeply grateful to Cathy Gannon, the bureau chief of Associated Press in Islarnabad and Kabul, who deserves several Pulitzer Prizes for her excellent coverage over the years, not to speak of her gener- osity and modesty. Taliban
Qazi Khalilullah Ferozi, a judge of the Taliban’s Supreme Court of Kandahar spoke for over an hour, extolling the crowd on the virtues of the Taliban movement, the benefits of Islamic punishment and a full history of the case. Taliban
In the post-Cold War era, this has created unprecedented polarization across the region. Taliban
At the heart of this regional stand-off is the battle for the vast oil and INTRODUCTiON: APOHANISTAN’S HOLY WARRIORS 5 6 TALIBAN gas riches of landlocked Central Asia - the last untapped reserves of energy in the world today. Taliban
For these two ancient civilizations, which ebbed in greatness and con- quest according to the momentum of history, control over Afghanistan was vital for their survival. Taliban
A few years later Mir Wais’s son defeated the Safavids and conquered Iran. Taliban
However, one or another Durrani clan was to rule Afghanistan for over 200 years until 1973, when King Zahir Shah was deposed by his cousin Mohammed Daud Khan and Afghanistan was declared a Republic. Taliban
Abdul Rebman crushed over 40 revolts by the non-Pashtuns during his reign and created Afghanistan’s first brutal secret police force, a precursor to the communist Khad in the 1980s. Taliban
billion in economic aid and US$1.25 Taliban
It’s an old wooden stump. Taliban
The Taliban’s wounds are a constant reminder of 20 years of war, which has killed over 1.5 Taliban
In the north the Uzbek warlord General Rashid Dostum held sway over six provinces and in January 1994 he had abandoned his alliance with the Rabbani government and joined with Hikmetyan to attack Kabul. Taliban
A few months later two commanders confronted each other in Kanda- har, in a dispute over a young boy whom both men wanted to sodomise. Taliban
The Taliban had won over the unruly Pashtun south because the exhausted, war-weary population saw them as saviours and peacemakers, if not as a potential force to revive Pashtun power which had been humili- ated by the Tajiks and Uzbeks. Taliban
Their image as potential peacemakers was badly dented, for in the eyes of many Afghans they had become nothing more than just another war- lord party. Taliban
To patch over their differences, the core group of Kandaharis around Mullah Omar nominated him to become the ‘Amir-ul Momineen’ or ‘Commander of the Faithful’, an Islamic title that made him the undis- puted leader of the jihad and the Emir of Afghanistan. Taliban
All these countries stepped up military aid to the regime forces. Taliban
Bhutto sent several emissaries to Washington to urge the US to intervene more publicly on the side of Pakistan and the Taliban, but despite a common antipathy to Iran, Wash- ington resisted, refusing to take sides in the civil war. Taliban
On 26 June 1996 Hikmetyar himself entered Kabul for the first time in 15 years, to take up the post of Prime Minister offered by the regime, while his party accepted nine other cabinet posts in the government. Taliban
The speed of their offensive stunned the government. Taliban
Soviet generals termed him unbeatable and a master of guerrilla warfare. Taliban
Mazar, situated in the Central Asian steppe which begins north of the Hindu Kush, is culturally and ethnically as far away from Kandahar as Kandahar is from Karachi. Taliban
The first time I arrived at the fort to meet Dostum there were bloodstains and pieces of flesh in the muddy courtyard. Taliban
He rose through the ranks to become the commander of the armoured corps that defended the Soviet supply line into Afghanistan from Hairatan port on the Amu Darya river. Taliban
Since then he had, at one time or another allied himself with everyone — Masud, Hikmetyar, the Taliban, Masud again — and betrayed everyone with undis- guised aplomb. Taliban
Dostum was revered for the simple fact that his city had not been touched in the past 18 years of war. Taliban
The Uzbeks had been led to believe that this was a power-sharing agreement and now they realized it was a Taliban takeover. Taliban
Then all hell broke loose. Taliban
Taliban forces at the entrance to the Bamiyan valley were pushed back and Khalili’s forces moved south towards Kabul, forcing thousands of Pashtun villagers to flee to the capital. Taliban
In ten weeks of fighting between May and July the Taliban suffered over 3,000 casualties, killed or wounded, and some 3,600 men were taken prisoner.6 Taliban
With the Taliban retreating back to Kunduz, Dostum tried to consolid- ate his position, but Mazar was now virtually taken over by Hazara groups and Dostum was forced to abandon the Uzbek capital and set up his base in Shiberghan. Taliban
Acute tensions between the Uzbeks and the Hazaras undermined the anti-Taliban alliance and Dostum still had to win over Malik’s supporters. Taliban
The Taliban leadership, unversed in UN procedures and even the UN Charter, proved to be the greatest obstacle. Taliban
The Taliban harboured several unrealistic suspicions about the UN, which no amount of diplomacy could dispel. Taliban
Unwilling to repeat their mistake the previous year when they entered Mazar without guides, this time the Taliban had enlisted local Pashtuns, once loyal to Hikmetyar, who knew the city well. Taliban
The Talib responded, “Why didn’t you say so?” And the father said, “Did you ask that I could answer?”° 73BAMIYAN 1998-2000: THE NEVER-ENDING WAR 74 TALIBAN Thousands of Hazaras were taken to Mazar jail and when it was full, they were dumped in containers which were locked and the prisoners allowed to suffocate. Taliban
Dozens of cruise missiles hit six targets killing over 20 people and wounding 30 more. Taliban
UN aid agencies were unable to return to KabuL Washington was now obsessed with Bin Laden’s capture and the Taliban’s refusal to hand him over. Taliban
Brahimi’s resignation was followed by a much tougher reaction against the Taliban by die international community. Taliban
On 13 Janu- ary, the money market in Kabul was robbed by its Taliban guards, who stole the equivalent of US$200,000. Taliban
The Deobandis aimed to train a new generation of learned Mus- lims who would revive Islamic values based on intellectual learning, spir- itual experience, Sharia law and Tariqah or the path. Taliban
The Deobandis set up the JUI, a purely religious move- ment to propagate their beliefs and mobilize the community of believers. Taliban
In 1971 there were only 900 madrassas in Pakistan, but by the end of the Zia era in 1988 there were 8,000 madrassas and 25,000 unregistered ones, educating over half a mil- lion students. Taliban
Their interpretation of 89NEW STYLE FUNDAMENTALISM OF THE TAI-IBAN 90 TALIBAN Sharia was heavily influenced by Pashtunwali, the tribal code of the Pash- tuns, while funds from Saudi Arabia to madrassas and parties which were sympathetic to the Wahabbi creed, as the Deobandis were, helped these madrassas turn out young militants who were deeply cynical of those who had fought the jihad against the Soviets. Taliban
‘Before 1994 I did not know Mullah Omar because he had not studied in Pakistan, but those around him were all Haqqania students and came to see me frequently to discuss what to do. Taliban
The JUl were to benefit immensely from their Taliban protégés. Taliban
Instead they insisted they were restoring law and order, only to hand over power to a government which was made up of ‘good Muslims’. Taliban
The second element in the anti-Soviet resistance leadership were the field commanders, who became increasingly frustrated by the disunity and corruption of the Peshawar leaders and the ease with which they were held hostage over funds and weapons supplies. Taliban
Many remained independent advocating unity amongst all the resistance forces. Taliban
Several members of the military Shura are also acting ministers, creat- ing even greater chaos in the Kabul administration. Taliban
He claimed responsibility for ending lawlessness in the country through Islamic pun- ishments. Taliban
In January 1997, the Taliban faced a revolt from within the Kandahar heartland over forced conscription. Taliban
In October 1998, the Taliban arrested over 60 people in Jalalabad, the largest city in eastern Afghanistan, claiming there was a coup attempt by ex-military officers loyal to General Shahnawaz Tanai, the Pashtun general who in 1990 had deserted Najibullah’s army and joined the Mujaheddin. Taliban
‘Look at my face, don’t you see the tragedy of our lives and our country marked all over it?’ she said. Taliban
All the warlords had used boy soldiers, some as young as 12 years old, and many were orphans with no hope of having a family, an education or a job except soldiering. Taliban
Dressed in a long skirt and high heels, she rarely bothered to cover her face, throwing just a small scarf over her head when she travelled across the city. Taliban
Their recruits — the orphans, the rootless, the lumpen proleteriat from the war and the refugee camps - had been bought up in a totally male society. Taliban
All tribal Pashtuns also followed Pashtunwali, a social code which gave the tribal jwga or council the right to make judgments on cases from a traditional pantheon of laws and punishments, especially when it came to disputes over ownership of land and women and murder. Taliban
After every military defeat they tightened their gender policies ferociously, under the assumption that harsher measures against women would sustain morale amongst their defeated soldiers. Taliban
113A VANISHED OENOER 114 ‘- TALIBAN Tailors were ordered not to measure women for clothes, but learned to keep the measurements of their regular customers in their heads. Taliban
In February 1998 three men sentenced to death for sodomy in Kanda- bar were taken to the base of a huge mud and brick wall, which was then toppled over them by a tank. Taliban
Nobody was allowed to hang paintings, portraits or photographs in their homes. Taliban
The rest of the profits were made by the dealers and distributors in Europe and the US. Taliban
Over the following decade (1989—99) some US$100 million dollars of Western aid to combat narcotics was made available to Pakistan. Taliban
A staggering 13 percent of all Afghan families has had a relative killed or crippled in mine accidents and over 300 people are killed or maimed every month. Taliban
In 1986 he helped build the Khost tunnel complex, which the CIA was funding as a major arms storage depot, training facility and medical centre for the Mujaheddin, deep under the mountains close to the Pakis- tan border. Taliban
After the death of Azam in 1989, he took over Azam’s organization and set up Al Qaeda or Military Base as a service centre for Arab-Afghans and their familes and to forge a broad-based alliance amongst them. Taliban
Several camps which had been handed over by the Taliban to the Arab-Afghans and Pakistani radical groups were hit. Taliban
The energy resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, (which we shall now call the Caspian region and includes Kazakhstan, Turkmenis- tan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan), have been described with breathless hyperbole over the past few years. Taliban
The British feared that a Russian thrust on Herat from the Turkmen region could threaten British Baluchistan, while Moscow gold could turn Kabul’s rulers against the British. Taliban
Afghanistan had held Central Asia in a tight embrace for centuries. Taliban
After Stalin created the five CARs in 1924—25 by arbitrarily drawing lines on a map, he handed over Bukhara and Samarkand, the two major centres of Tajik culture and history to Uzbekistan, creating a rivalry between the two Republics which has simmered ever since. Taliban
Uzbekistan has borders with all the CARs and Afghanistan. Taliban
As Niyazov saw his economy crumble he sought alternative export routes. Taliban
While the Turkmen Consulate in Herat maintained good relations with the Taliban, its Consulate in Mazar did the same with the anti-Taliban alliance. Taliban
From the late seventeenth century to World War One, 3 Turkey and Russia fought over a dozen wars and this rivalry had prompted Turkey to join NATO and try and become a member of the EU How- ever, the independence of the CARs suddenly awakened Turkey to its much older historical legacy. Taliban
Iran sits on the second largest gas reserves in the world and has over 93 bb of proven oil reserves with current oil production at 3.6 Taliban
‘The CARs have two problems with Afghanistan. Taliban
We cannot help seeing the uproar stirred up in some Western countries over the energy resources of the Caspian. Taliban
As Kissinger pondered a route through Afghanistan he quipped that the deal looked like ‘the triumph of hope over experience’. Taliban
It took me seven months of travelling, over one hundred inter- ~ views and total immersion in the literature of the oil business — of which I knew nothing — to eventually write the cover story for the Far Eastern Economic Review which appeared in April 1997. Taliban
ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 1 167 168 TALIBAN Both Bridas and Unocal now courted regional powers with influence over the Taliban, particularly the Saudis. Taliban
Unocal’s only victory in these difficult days was over Bridas. Taliban
That should have been clearer to Unocal much earlier on, but it never was as the Taliban and Pakistan kept promising them a quick victory. Taliban
Washington’s change of heart over the Taliban in late 1997 also arose because of the deteriorating political and economic crisis in Pakistan. Taliban
This nexus extended to politicans and cabinet ministers in Baluchistan and the NWFP. Taliban
The AU fuelled the already powerful black economy in Pakistan. Taliban
The backlash from Afghanistan added fuel to the spreading fire of instability in Pakistan. Taliban
Pakistan’s economy was being crippled by the AU, its foreign policy faced isolation from the West and immediate neighbours, law and order broke down as Islamic militants enacted their own laws and a new breed of anti-Shia Islamic radicals, who were given sanctuary by the Taliban, killed hundreds of Pakistani Shias between 1996 and 1999. Taliban
Pakistan considered Iranian influ- ence in Afghanistan to be over and that Russia and the Central Asian states would be obliged to deal with the Taliban through Islamabad while the West would have no choice but to accept the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam. Taliban
Both peoples have conquered and ruled one another against a background of dispute between Sunni Arabia and Shia Persia. Taliban
In Kandahar, the Taliban had given sanctuary to Ahl-e-Sunnah Wa! Taliban
times over. Taliban
The Afghan refugees would return, easing the financial burden of sustaining them and Pakistan could begin to reas- sert some control over its dilapidated state institutions and borders. Taliban
At the same time, the Taliban refuse to define the Afghan state they want to constitute and rule over, largely because they have no idea what they want. Taliban
The anti-Taliban alliance is incapable of conquering or ruling over the southern Pashtun region. Taliban
So far Masud has proved unable to galvanize enough Pashtuns who reject the Taliban and who would give him some national legitimacy. Taliban
We request all family elders to keep tight control over their families and avoid these social problems. Taliban
German diplomat Norbert Holl appointed as UN envoy toAfghanis- tan. Taliban
Chapter 5 1. Taliban
Development of the Silk Route. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There have been considerable variations over time and between one part of Afghanistan and another, and the conflict has complicated the situation enormously. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It extends eastward from the vast Iranian plateau and incorporates the foothills of the Himalayan range, which rise to a height of 7,470 metres in the finger of land that divides Tajikistan from Pakistan and touches on western China. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There has been a process of families gradually selling off their possessions over the years and many are now facing destitution. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In 1748 he tried again and a compromise was reached whereby the Moghul ruler ceded him territories west of the Indus river. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Over the following five years he lost control of Kashmir and Sind in the east, Balkh in the north and Khurasan and Sistan in the west. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Timur Shah’s death in 1793 heralded a prolonged period of dis- unity, which saw growing competition between the Russian and British empires as each sought to stop the other gaining a hold over the area, including the various khanates of Central Asia. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Over this period Russia, concerned at Britain’s intervention in Afghanistan, proceeded to annex the Central Asian khanates or to bring them under its sphere of influence. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
A new Liberal government, which had come to power in Britain under Gladstone in April i88o and was less enthusiastic than its predecessor over British involvement in Afghanistan, had decided that British forces should withdraw from the country. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
While Abdur-Rahman had exercised a high degree of control over the religious leaders, Habibullah allowed them to exercise power at the level of the state and to have a significant influence on policy. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Within months of taking power Amanullah declared war on Britain, seeking to exploit reports of its post-war weakness. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Afghanistan was pushed even further into the hold of the Soviet Union when diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan The nature of Afghanistan 22 were cut in 1961 over the Pushtunistan issue, resulting in the closure of the border and a halt to transit trade through Pakistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Constitution also gave precedence to the secular legal system over Shari’a law, thus overturning the 1931 Constitution. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Daoud looked to the army and to the moderate wing of the split PDPA to provide his power base. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The leaders of the Islamist parties, who had fled to Pakistan in the mid-1970s, saw the opportunity provided by the declaration of a jihad to claim leadership over the resistance movement. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Zia had a clear ambition to establish in Kabul a government over which Pakistan could exercise control. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Pakistani government, perhaps in the hope of maintaining a degree of control over the refugee population, encouraged the Muja- hidin parties to set up offices in many of the refugee camps and also to establish their own camps. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
From 1979 to 1986, when Babrak Karmal was president of the Soviet-backed government, the combined government and Soviet forces were very much on the offensive. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Over the 1989—92 period, the government had controlled the cities of Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar, Herat and Jalalabad, together with a number of smaller centres, while the Mujahidin were present in the countryside, attacking government positions and launching rocket attacks on the capital. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The city became a place of constant fear, with Afghan liberals and aid workers be- coming particular targets of fringe movements taking anti-Western positions from an Islamist perspective. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It is not clear how Masoud got himself into this position. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Relations deteriorated over the following year. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The attempt failed, but it spread panic amongst the population and led to the exodus of over 65,000 people to Pakistan and to other parts of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
For the first time since the Mujahidin takeover of April 1992, Kabul was out of rocket range and the city experienced a period of calm that attracted the return of aid agencies in force. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
After continued calls for Rabbani to accede to peace deals ro- an interim government, Rabbani and Masoud finally negotiated a prow ng or a an over of power to 4° The Mujahidin deal with Hekmatyar whereby the latter would become prime minister in a new government of national unity. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There appears to be little doubt that the Islamic madrasahs in the refugee been taught on the basis of recitation of the Qur’an, have prçyed to be fertile ground for camps, with funding from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and the Mujahidin parties, will have produced strong adherents to radical Islam, some of whom will have been attracted by the call to arms issued by the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The warriors of God It is also likely that the orphanages operated in the refugee for power in the city and to have 43 t The Taliban lishments, and the contribution these establishments have made to the of how the Taliban forces have received their military trainingexpansion of the Taliban movement. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Over the winter of 1994—95, the Taliban were able to repeat this pattern many times over and, by February 1995, they were positioned on hilltops overlooking the southern suburbs of Kabul, having taken almost half of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
While the Taliban were endeavouring to take Kabul, there was also intense military activity in western Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Over the ensuing months, there was a stand-off between the forces 47 The Taliban of the Taliban and Ismail Khan at Delaram, on the border between the provinces of Farah and Helmand. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There has been much speculation as to why Ismail Khan gave in so easily to the Taliban and effectively handed over Herat to them. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Taliban were reported to have conducted house-to-house searches for those rumoured to be sympathetic to Masoud, and a number of people were arrested. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
This time they were successful in taking the settlements between Kabul and the Salang Pass, but they avoided some of the problems they had faced from insurrections during their earlier attempt by evacuating the area. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The early months of 1997 were characterised by a stalemate as fighting continued on a number of fronts. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Gradually, over the following days, they were pushed back by Abdul Malik’s forces from the west, by the Ismaii forces from the south and by Masoud’s forces from the east until Pul-i-Khumri was retaken on II June. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
This has been a real fear in the Islamic world ever since the West started to play a dominant role on the world stage, particularly over the last couple of centuries. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Over the centuries, Islamic scholars have debated at length how best to respond to situations that were not envisaged at the time of Muhammad and on which earlier scholars had not pronounced. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The objectives of the movement were well encapsulated in an interview given by a Taliban spokesman, Mullah Wakil Ahmed, published in the Arabic magazine A1-Majallah on 23 October 1996. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It is inevitable that the thinking of the Taliban will have, consciously or unconsciously, absorbed the various strands of thought that have characterised radical Islam over the past few decades. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
This chapter instead seeks to explore the possible origins of the Taliban creed and so to highlight the complexities of the movement rather than over- simplify it. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
As indicated in Chapter 5, a major element of the debate within the Islamic world over the past century or so has been how far Islam should adapt itself to the dominant Western cultures. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Abdul Aziz set up colonies of his followers, who were known as Ikhwan (brothers). The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The tribal leadership of the Pushtuns, although they had an ambivalent relationship with the Ulema, could not tolerate the idea of a Tajik ruling over them. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The reasons for his overthrow are of interest in relation to the present situation. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, there was a spectrum within each of the two camps. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Within the ranks of the so-called traditionalist parties there was a clear spectrum from Mujadidi, who had shown definite sympathies for an Islamist approach over his life but was none the less firmly rooted in tradition, through to the liberalism of Gailani, with Hara- kat, in between, representing the Ulema and tribal elders. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Pushtunwali and Shari’a law are at variance on some matters. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
An important element in Pushtun culture is that the adherents to Pushtunwali attach greater importance to the value system it in- )corporates than to their membership of the Pushtun community or of the nation. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Taliban apologised over this incident. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Taliban have also been relatively extreme in requiring that women’s faces be covered. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
A growing number of girls benefited from secondary and higher education and this in turn provoked a reaction from the Ulema, who argued that the expansion of non-traditional education was eroding the morals of the young and undermining traditional social values. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Because Western society is relatively individualistic, each individual, female or male, will normally seek fulfilment on the basis of personal life choices. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Over time, they extended the discussion process to include the wider community. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Common textbooks were published and were distributed to schools throughout Afghanistan NGOs assisted with the repair and construction of school buildings and provided financial support for the payment of teachers’ salaries and to cover the costs of materials. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Agencies working in the health sector expressed concern to the Taliban that they were not able to provide health care to women because of the ban on female employment. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
If agencies decide that they cannot disregard human rights abuses, they have a number of choices. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Another major difficulty in maintaining a common stance is that the situation is fluid. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Increasingly, donors have been meeting the agencies to discuss possible options. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The emergence of the Taliban in October attracted media The Taliban and the inter- national community “4 The Taliban and the international community 115 brother presented powerful and dramatic images onto which the media latched. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In the Islamic value system, there is not the same emphasis on individual freedom. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
They would, for example, argue that religious education is provided within the family and that this, in their view, is all that is needed to ensure the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, they have varied in the degree to which they have enforced this requirement and also in the degree to which they have relaxed it over time. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Pakistan has consistently denied backing the Taliban and there has been no concrete evidence of its support, only strong circumstantial evidence. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Iran was not only opposed to the Taliban because of competition over oil and gas pipelines. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Iran also became concerned at the potential fate of the Shi’a population living in the Hazarajat in central Afghanistan, who had enjoyed a high degree of independence since the Soviet invasion, if the Taliban were to take over the area. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The BBC correspondent in Islamabad reported on 13 October 1996, two weeks after the Taliban capture of Kabul, that many in Pakistan were worried that the widespread concern over corruption and economic decline in Pakistan might lead students of Islamic institutions in Pakistan to take inspiration from the Taliban and play a more active role in the political arena. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Even if the Taliban do take the whole country they will not find it easy to maintain their hold over the northern minorities. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It has also attempted to replace over-simplistic stereotypes with a recognition that Islam incorporates a broad spread of values, from the liberal to the radical. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In looking to the future, we can be reasonably certain that power- ful elements within Pakistan will continue to seek strategic strength against India through the establishment of stronger links with and greater influence and power over Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
If we are therefore talking about the international community accepting responsibility for bringing an end to the conflict, what are the mechanisms for achieving positive change? In the unlikely event of every party to the conflict agreeing on a way forward, what form could a permanent settlement take in a country that is as much a product of outside interference over a very long period as it is a place with its own traditions? Would the injection of outside resources to strengthen the economy improve or worsen the situation? There are no easy answers to these questions. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
At worst, they are yet further actors on an over-full stage, with the potential to increase rather than decrease the problems. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Agencies will inevitably be regarded as, to a degree, ambassadors for their countries of origin. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
While Nira Yuval-Davis’s observations relate to a dialogue between women who share a common concern over female disadvantage or oppression, the principles outlined could be applicable to the much more difficult dialogue between humanitarian agencies and those exercising power in the conflict areas where they work. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
When I say that terrorism, far from being invariably ineffec- tual, often succeeds, I do not mean that political power is often - handed over to the terrorists’ party. The Terrorists
Up to this point we have a kind of rational licence for a free- for-all including, since all this was written in the general context of political philosophy, terrorism. The Terrorists
The Terrorist Ego 21 Terrorists and Terrorism over with mastery.’ The Terrorists
Might he not have been writing for today’s New Left? This, at all events, is the key to Nechayev’s extraordinary character, to that personal force which, at one extreme of the intellectual spectrum, gave him his ascendancy over Bakunin and Herzen and, at the other, over his military guards in the Peter-Paul when, at last, he was incarcerated in that most terrible of prisons. The Terrorists
Such was the ascendancy which Nechayev obtained over Bakumn that George Woodcock, the admirable historian of Anarchism,2 finds it necessary to explain it by reference to a ‘touch of submerged homosexuality’ and by comparing the relationship between the young man and the old with the type of ‘disastrous relationship’ typified by that between Lord Alfred Douglas and Oscar Wilde, Rimbaud and Verlaine. The Terrorists
Nechayev escaped over the frontier and reappeared in Switzerland late in 1869. The Terrorists
It was now that he set about putting into practice a fantasy- feat which he had boasted of having accomplished some years earlier; and he very nearly succeeded. The Terrorists
The Saxon revolutionaries were beaten and Bakunin was taken prisoner, condemned to death, held for a year, reprieved and handed over to the Austrians, who chained him in a cell in the Olmütz fortress for a year and then handed him over to the Russians, who flung him into the Peter-Paul fortress and kept him there for six years. The Terrorists
Originating in a joint action of French and British workers trying to help the rebellious Poles to win their freedom from Russia, it had been more or less taken over, and led to real power and im- portance, by Karl Marx who ran its Central Committee from London: it co-ordinated the political activities of working men’s associations and trade unions in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and other countries and was the bogyman of the capitalists, who believed it to have seven million members, a gross exaggeration. The Terrorists
Johann Most was a true German, nothing if not painstaking. The Terrorists
And in the mid nineteenth century the great Taiping rebellion was the work of a secret society—but for General ‘Chinese’ Gordon and his ‘ever-victorious army’ in the service of the dowager-empress Tzu Hsi, the dynasty would have been over- thrown half a century earlier than it was. The Terrorists
It was founded in Naples at about the same time as the Camorra, chiefly by land workers as a mutual protection society against oppression by the landowners. The Terrorists
The third and most important of the Italian terrorist societies was the Carbonari, usually translated as ‘charcoal-burners’ but which might be more nearly rendered as ‘coal merchants’, for a reason which will appear. The Terrorists
Bakunin’s Social-Democratic Alliance and Anarchist Inter-. The Terrorists
The Klan did indeed sustain the American Way of Life in a fashion which was not perhaps intended by the soldiers who had revived it: it was taken over by shrewd businessmen who saw in it an enormous potential for profit, and who used its black- mailing power to inspire terror, accredited by frequent lynchings, burnings and dynamitings, to extort money from individuals and institutions, chiefly business undertakings. The Terrorists
Moreover, the Tsar was helping the liberals to take over the landlords’ serfs and turn them into exploited wage slaves by his emancipation edicts. The Terrorists
The kingpin of the Russian social and economic system, 70 whether considered as the old ‘feudal’ order, or the growing, new, capitalist order, was the Tsar. The Terrorists
With Ishutin he went through all the stages of evolution towards terrorism. The Terrorists
They made two unsuccessful attempts to assassinate the prosecutor Kotlyarevsky; stabbed to death the Kiev police adjutant, Baron Geyking; and made armed attempts to rescue imprisoned colleagues. The Terrorists
Whole sections of the people openly rejoiced at this news and there were even some who believed that the People’s Will would now take over the government. The Terrorists
A dozen years before that event, in the annus mirabiis of revolution when all over Europe nationalists rose against their imperial masters and social classes against their political and economic oppressors, the Irish chapter of that continent-wide revolt had been written by the Young Ireland movement. The Terrorists
According to The Times the Irish lost fifty- two killed, the British over a hundred soldiers, and the Royal Irish Constabulary twelve. The Terrorists
There followed attacks on police barracks all over the country, most of them successful. The Terrorists
A government which yields to the temptation to use counter- terrorism takes the serious risk of playing into the terrorists’ hands. The Terrorists
All people over forty will recall the horror with which English people greeted the Nazi policy, during the occupation of France in the Second World War, of taking out and shooting half a dozen or a score of hostages, chosen at random from the ordinary population, in revenge for the killing of one of their own men by the Resistance. The Terrorists
They scored much more heavily against the IRA terrorists than the RIC or the Black-and-Tans had done. The Terrorists
The Gaelic Athletic Association had arranged a football match between Dublin and Tipperary, gate money to go to the association which looked after the dependants of IRA men killed in action or imprisoned. The Terrorists
And this recalcitrance was maintained even at his trial, for when the presiding judge asked him whether, having his time over again, he would do the same deed, he replied, ‘Yes, certainly!’ The Terrorists
Given three days to think it over, he took his own life. The Terrorists
He was a silk-weaver from Tuscany who had emigrated after a quarrel with his family over the running of their small-holding and cottage weaving trade. The Terrorists
Bresci had, ofcourse, been handed over to the police. The Terrorists
In Chapter 61 have described some of the uses of terrorism in pre-Revolutionary Russia in the nineteenth century. The Terrorists
It was of this ‘Organization’ and, at the same time, of the Okhrana, that Azev made use. The Terrorists
Azev agreed to work for the Okhrana and made an impressive start as soon as he had received his first month’s pay by inform- ing on the militants among his student acquaintances at the university. The Terrorists
Meanwhile Party agitators were getting results all over Russia: in the Crimea and Ukraine bands of armed peasants were looting and burning manors of their own accord; in Lithuania rebellious peasants and industrial workers on strike were combining in riot and insurrection. The Terrorists
Small groups of amateur terrorists sprang into existence all over the country, no provincial government official was safe, no great house or municipal office either. The Terrorists
His papers showed him to be a respectable burgess called Cherkas but he was brought before Azev 135 Terrorists and Terrorism the new Okhrana chief in St Petersburg, Colonel Gerassimov. The Terrorists
By this time he had Gerassimov apologizing for his stupid mistake. The Terrorists
His information was largely responsible for forcing those Socialist-Revolutionaries who 140 were not caught and sent to Siberia, into hiding or exile; his old friend Savinkov, once again, escaped over the frontier. The Terrorists
When Arab terrorist raids on the kibbutzim were inflicting damage and taking lives, it was Jabotinsky who insisted that, since the British were, demonstrably, unable or unwilling to defend these settlements, then, law not withstanding, the Jews must defend themselves. The Terrorists
Stern was born in Poland in 1907: in the chaos caused by the ‘October’ Revolution of 1917 all over east Europe, the boy made his way across Europe, on foot and hitch-hiking, to the Mediter- ranean and, from Italy, to Palestine. The Terrorists
While Jews and Gentiles all over the world raised angry or anguished voices in protest at this expedient betrayal of a pro- mise (as if the breaking of promises by great powers were not a matter of course) and at this cold-hearted disregard of the plight of the Jews in Germany and Middle Europe (as if governments had hearts or were, or could be, influenced by anything but the balance sheets of power); and while the Haganah hesitated, the amateur politicians who composed its leadership, flabbergasted by a betrayal which, idiotically, they had not allowed for, Jabotinsky and Raziel had no doubt what this must mean; Irgun declared war on the British. The Terrorists
It was proposed to read the White Paper and then try to justify it, over the Palestine radio: Irgun blew up the studios The Palestine Case 147 Terrorists and Terrorism (17th May); and it was Irgun which, on 12th May, led the angry mobs which broke into all the offices concerned with immigra- tion in Jerusalem, Haifa and Tel Aviv, to find and burn all papers dealing with ‘illegal entry’. The Terrorists
Meanwhile, Britain’s most implacable Jewish enemy was not in Palestine: he was on a mission, for Jabotinsky, to the Polish Government. The Terrorists
While still in Poland Stern heard the news that the Palestine Police had caught David Raziel and put him into a detention camp with other Irgun terrorists; he hurried back to Palestine to take over the leadership. The Terrorists
The entire Irgun leadership was still in the Sarafend Detention Camp; it was there that they held their policy meeting and came to the same conclusion as Haganah; while the British were fighting the Nazis, Irgun would call a truce, to resume its revolt the moment the war was over. The Terrorists
Irgun responded otherwise than with a speech: all over Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Hebron, Safad and other towns suddenly appeared a rash of bills, posted on trees, on hoardings, on telegraph poles, on any surface which would take bill-sticker’s paste: ‘w~ra) FOR MURDER’ beneath a photo- graph of MacMichael, and below that: ‘Sir Harold Mac- Michael, known as the High Commissioner for Palestine, wanted for murder by drowning of 800 refugees aboard S.S. Struma.’ The Terrorists
Induction into the FF1 took place in a pitch-dark room: the recruit could see nothing; he could only hear a voice which asked him certain terrible questions: did he fully under- stand and accept that, if he joined, he would become an outcast from ordinary society, with every man’s hand against him, none to look to for help? Did he face the fact that if caught by the British he would be tortured? And the methods of torture used would then be described. The Terrorists
Irgun had kept the truce of self-denying ordinance not to harass the British while the British fought the Nazis; kept it in spite of their grief and rage over the continued cruel indifference to the fate of Jewish refugees from Europe. The Terrorists
But in 1944 their new leader, a thirty-year-old Polish lawyer named Menachem Begin, 158 considering that the war was nearly over, the Germans clearly beaten, issued this proclamation: Four years have passed since the war began and all the hope that beat in our heart then has gone without trace. The Terrorists
The British régime has sealed its shameful betrayal of the Jewish people. The Terrorists
It did not help, not peace nor money nor prayer. The Terrorists
The business had been very carefully rehearsed and was based on Shamir’s intelligence reports of Sir Harold MacMichael’s future movements. The Terrorists
There is no point whatever in trying to blink away the truth that given these conditions the IRA terrorists have got results. The Terrorists
It is very likely that, as in the cases of the Republic of Ireland, the Republic of Algeria, the Republic of Israel (and perhaps, quite soon, the Republic of Vietnam) the fact that success has been due to terrorism will be quickly masked as the men of moderate opinion take over that success and make it their own. The Terrorists
187 Terrorists and Terrorism counter-terrorism. The Terrorists
This book is dedicated to Matthew Meselson and Julian Perry Robin- son; to the 1979 anthrax victims and their families and friends in Yeka- terinburg; and to the next generation, that it may inherit sufficient con- trols over biological weapons, and all weapons of mass destruction, to live in freedom, peace, and dignity. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS - Anthrax ACCURSED FIRE Tuesday, June z, 1992. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As noted, there are two other ways of contracting anthrax in humans: Over the years, a distinction has been drawn between gastrointestinal anthrax, acquired by eating tainted meat, and inhalation anthrax, ac- quired by breathing in the deadly spores. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Inhalation anthrax resut~s from in~ialing microscopic anthrax spores (one to five microns in diameter) deep into the lungs. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The Soviet response to these suspicions was to adamantly stand by its tainted-meat explanation. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
ANTHRAX: ACCURSED FIRE, BIOLOGICAL WEAPON Moscow FRAGMENTS OF EVIDENCE Wednesday, June 3. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our hotel, the Academicheskaya, is no palace. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Ivan Bezdenezhnikh (whose last name means “without a penny” in Russian) was the Russian Federation chief epidemiologist in 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In 1986, when Matthew visited Moscow, Dr. Bezdenezhnikh gave him a graph he had made illustrating the course of hospital admissions in April 1979, a crucial representation of how people fell ill over a three-week period. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The leaflet described all three means of transmitting anthrax (“through damaged skin while caring for an animal,” “through the upper respiratory pathways,” and “through the gastrointestinal tract” from tainted meat or food). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He arrived in Sverdlovsk at the peak of the epidemic, MOSCOW: FRAGMENTS OF EVIDENCE MOSCOW: on April iz, and took over clinical treatment of the dying victims. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That he is visibly older and thinner reminds me of how each year diminishes the cast of players from ‘979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
So today two survivors of two different generations, Dr. Burgasov and the younger Dr. Nikiforov, are squabbling over the scientific legacy of their dead relatives. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The scant literature on human an- thrax cases points to patients’ developing the disease and succumbing rapidly, in two to seven days after exposure,9 which again fits the Yaro- slavl outbreak with its peak in fatalities six to seven days into the epi- demic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In less than three hours we pass over the Ural Mountains, which de- spite the spread of industrial pollution are still impressive. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
And yet, among all industrialized countries, by 1990 the USSR averaged the most anthrax outbreaks, nearly three hundred animal outbreaks per year over the last two decades and around twenty human cases, with one or two fatalities among them. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Over the years, it attracted mining barons and merchants who profited from the deposits of coal and bauxite and nonferrous metals (copper, titanium, manganese, vanadium, nickel, chromium) and precious gems—the en- during emeralds and diamonds, and semiprecious stones like malachite, the symbol of the Urals, which still is used to decorate tourist pins and mementos. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Both times he lived with fellow revolu- tionist Joseph Stalin, whom he described in letters as an arrogant loner and “egoist.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We all agree that their ownership of the data is a fair assumption. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A shiny aluminum monument marks the resting place of a man whose name is Mohammed three times over: Mukhametalin Mukhametshi- novich Mukhametshin, age forty-five when he died April zz, late in the epidemic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This near-miss, or rather this illusion of a lost chance, suddenly deflates my spirits. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
THE COMMUNITY OF THE DEAD THE COMMUNITY OF THE DEAD Over a quick lunch at a small restaurant near the university, I confide in Professor Borisov that I need my own interpreter, someone to help me while Yampolskaya assists Walker and while Shelokov interprets for Matthew and Hugh-Jones. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Grinberg’s uneasiness about the use of the autopsy data is justified. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He insists he must talk with Matthew before he will let Walker see any more material. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Actually, Harbin is Yekaterinburg’s top dining spot, set in the old park of a classic nineteenth-century mansion built for the Urals’ Head Forester. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That evening in the dormitory lounge, our team meets to mull over our commitment to Abramova and Grinberg. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Distracted, I try to lis- ten as Matthew enthusiastically goes over the schedule of confirmed ap- pointments that start Monday. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Lounging on old Danish-modern couches upholstered in orange vinyl, we mull over some of those hypotheses. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But Matthew counters that we should try to keep several hypotheses in mind, or else we will fail to ask important questions. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Even without them, fewer men than women in the over-5 5 age category can be predicted, both because of the shorter life span for Russian men and because of the great number of World War II battle deaths. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The aviator Valeriy Pavlovich Chkalov, the most celebrated of “Stalin’s Falcons,” headed the team that first flew over the North Pole to the United States in 1937. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Some houses have small bathhouses be- hind them, for the saunas and steam baths that are integral to Russian life. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Adjacent to the cafe- teria is a loading platform and a large open area where, if the official ver- sion of the epidemic is correct, a truck from the south brought the con- taminated meat that was sold to victims of the epidemic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Both his parents are now dead. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But not everyone is so resilient. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We take over the office of the vice-rector, who herds several visiting German historians to another room. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Just when the interview appeared to be over, Dr. Klipnitzer offered a surprising recollection. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our presumption is that even with legitimate military development of anthrax vaccines (not weaponized anthrax), animal research would be conducted with virulent strains. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Suppose there was an aerosol test chamber at Compound 19, and suppose in late March or early April 1979 a worker fails to notice a malfunction of its ventilation system. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His neighbor, Mrs. T., mentioned yesterday that his daughter was a doc- tor somewhere in the northern area of the city, and we make a note to find her. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The trip south to Sysertskiy rayon and its veterinarians is canceled. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The view over the city, to the river and beyond, is magi.~ificent. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Pick- ing our way over the vacant, weed-filled lot, we take Dr. Romanenko’s word that no soil has tested positive for anthrax in Yekaterinburg. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“Get people here.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But since the explanation was official, people began handing meat over to inspectors, and meat was confiscated from vehicles entering the city from the south. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As the trays of tea and cookies appear, I realize that more than any- thing, I want her to hand over additional names and addresses of the vic- tims, everything she has. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Sergei Borisov has driven his car to work, and Sasha’s i5 not big enough for all of us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Yet how could the government be trusted when a “veil” (vual in Rus- sian, which was Ilyenko’s metaphor) lay over the entire event? If there was uncertainty about the outbreak’s cause, what guaranteed the disas- ter would not happen again? The question seems not to have been asked, at least not publicly. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Is the interview with the SES veterinarian already over? “The most amazing thing has happened!” Matthew exclaims. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Over tea, as the sky outside begins to darken, Yampolskaya and I dis- cuss today’s only interview in Chkalovskiy, the last she and I will do to- gether. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The Burmistrov’s house was sold in 1984. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We spent only an hour going over the questionnaire yesterday, but she knows just what to do. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“In two days it was over!” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“I’ve heard rumors about a colonel who committed suicide over it.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Indeed he has, in the neighborhood or from the press. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As we stroll along the river- bank, pink, nearly naked Russians of all shapes and sizes are sunbathing on blankets spread over unruly grass. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
After the film is over, Matthew and the young Nikiforov have a pri- vate conversation concerning access to documents from the 1979 out- break. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Then there are those who lived outside and who commuted into the area to work. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With the strong possibility that the outbreak was caused by an emis- sion from Compound 19 always in my mind, I have often wondered dur- ing the months of our research about the motivation of the scientists and technicians inside the compound. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The superpowers are reducing their nuclear and chemical stockpiles, and Russia is mov- ing (or lurching) toward demilitarization of the Soviet BW investment. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the Centers for Disease Control, he worked for twelve years for Alex Langmuir, who was grooming him to take over his posi- tion. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It also quotes a United Nations official’s statement that the Russian BWC declaration of information is long over- due. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Pasechnik recounts discussions “about the possibility of using biological preparations in various mili- tary actions, including subversive activity. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
While the United States and Russia wrangle over issues of trans- parency, the United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM) for investi- gating Iraq’s arsenals is translating piles of documents on Saddam Hus- sein’s biological and chemical weapons arsenal. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Its dilapidated little brick church has grass growing on the roof. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Her yard was disinfected with chlorine. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Typical cottage in Abramovo village, with the ever-present dog, 1993. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
a lethal an- thrax aerosol was emitted from Compound i ~ and blew in the direction we are walking, over Chkalovskiy and out into the countryside. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Crossing over to Poldnevaya, we knock at the door of the cottage of the other survivor, Nina T., whose daytime work as a baker in 1979 took her well outside center Chkalovskiy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They needed Nina and she took them in. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
While I am distracted by this revelation, she talks about her grand- children. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The antisemitism isn’t all. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I-re is well over six feet and built like a wrestler. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
DO NO EVIL, SEE NO EVIL DO NO EVIL, SEE NO EVIL Why this hypothesis? The general notes that the graph of the epidemic, with cases occurring over six weeks, represents a protracted epidemic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He seems more pleased to see us than he was last year. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He refers to the experimental literature that indicates spores can remain dor- mant in the lungs for weeks, even months, depending on the individual. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On Monday, April z, probably between I:3o and 4:oo P.M., human victims were exposed to a plume of aerosolized anthrax that traveled southeast over Chkalovskiy at an average rate of about fifteen kilome- ters an hour. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The first two weeks were the most perilous: some two-thirds of the victims fell sick and died by April i 6. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Age was certainly an important predictor of death in the 1979 out- break. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The maps are perfected, with no compromises; the six outliers we could not account for, including those who were mobile and may have been in Chkalovskiy, remain outside the plume. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The program of six inoculations over eigh- teen months will require at least sixty million dollars in vaccine orders and is justified, according to the Defense Department, by the deployment of American military around the world in more or less destabilized ar- eas, as part of the nation’s new role as “policeman to the world.”14 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At Yampolskaya’s, after I have slept off my jet lag, we watch the new film of Lolita. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Like other Russians in industrial centers and like Americans as well, the people in Yekaterinburg have been adapting to the end of the “fordist” era of factory production. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Still, looming like a shadow over this discussion is the continued se- crecy that seems to surround Compound 19. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“The money has run out,” Irma announces in her gentle, candid way. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He wears a neat navy suit and his hair is trimmed short. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His division continues to analyze soil samples from Chkalovskiy, but after more than sixty-eight hundred tests over nearly twenty years, he has found nothing. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Asked for my explanation, I can only suggest that the 1979 emission was small to begin with and that its impact, for ex- ample, on trees or the side of the ceramics factory, cannot be compared with the burial of an infected carcass. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The only difference is that a younger generation is growing up and taking it over. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But over on Lyapustina, Anna Komina’s son opens the gate; he has been working in the garden. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That historical episode is over, just as Yeltsin wanted. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
For example, cases were scattered over a general area in the Q fever epi- Fro!ov 1992. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
1990a. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Over the next three years, we followed the story from Washington to Kazakhstan to Japan to Russia, eventually deciding to write this book. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
We came to see the de- Preface 13 14 Preface bates of the 1990s over what to do about germ weapons in a much larger context—a half century of largely secret history. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In 1982 the sannyasins had moved into the neighboring town of Antelope, whose population had stood at seventy-five before the in- flux. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
When the wave began to crest, Chamberlain thought the outbreak was over. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In fact, the citizens of The Dalles were under biological siege. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The salmonella mystery was apparently over. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Robert V. Tauxe, a CDC scientist who had in- vestigated the epidemic, said the germ detectives had been swayed by Dr. Foster’s concerns about bigotry and had begun the inquiry deter- mined not to leap to conclusions. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Puja was responsible for buying the prescription and over-the- counter drugs that the Rajneesh Medical Corporation kept in the Pythagoras pharmacy, as well as its medical supplies. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
At about the same time, according to K.D. and Ava, other san- nyasins, many of whom had donned wigs and dressed in neutral-toned street clothes for their raids, had put salmonella in restaurant coffee creamers and in blue-cheese dressing; on several occasionsihey had scattered it over fruits and vegetables at several salad bars, foods that are not usually convivial hosts for the otherwise hardy germs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
GERMS and warfare are old allies. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Over- head, a dome of warm air trapped cool air below. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
If bacteria were the size of cars and minivans, viruses would be the size of cell phones. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Over the ages, this biological intimacy has made viruses one of the most dangerous of all humanity’s foes. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Most affecting humans were not lethal. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Over the years, Patrick was often present at the sites where field testing took place, edgy over how his germs would do. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A key test centered on the nation’s newest jet fighter, the F-100 Super Sabre, the first production aircraft to break the sound barrier in level flight. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Soon Washington uncovered hard evidence. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The capture ofajapanese germ unit, the study of its techniques, and the re- solve to strengthen the Soviet military after the wartime slaughter of millions of Russians helped renew interest in germ weapons. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The dis- eases could be as mildly disabling as influenza or as deadly as atomic bombs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
But the Marshall Plan was a serious option, according to several American of- ficials involved in the preparations. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
War plans are written to cover every imaginable scenario. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
But there is no indication that attacks with germs ever figured in the high-level debate over how to dislodge the Soviet Union’s missile bases. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Patrick would say nothing, even though other officials said the plan was modified over time to draw heavily on his work at Detrick with incapacitants. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
But in a talk to military officers in 1999, Patrick did say that a Cuban attack plan had been drawn up which re- lied on two incapacitating germs that worked sequentially to lengthen the time of disability. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Very few of them were going to die.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
would tank up at Pine Bluff’s airfield, fly to Cuba, and spray the concoction over key towns, ports, and military bases, moving east to west with the trade winds. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A~ the Vietnam War intensified, scientists at Fort Detrick redoubled their work on smallpox. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Small- pox was ancient, highly contagious, and killed about a third of its vic- tims, mainly from blood loss, cardiovascular collapse, and secondary infections as pustules spread over the body. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The public had no idea at the time about the secret tests. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A light air- craft could deliver enough to kill populations over several thousand square miles, he wrote, but the disease could spread far beyond the tar- get area or create a long-term epidemic hazard. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Meselson’s arguments fell on fert~le ground. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
But Patrick was uneasy. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Nature had written the rulebooks over the eons. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
IT began over a midnight snack. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
IN October 1979, a Russian-language newspaper in Frankfurt, West Germany, that regularly carried news from Soviet émigrés, ran a sketchy report about what it called a major germ accident. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
His high-level security clearances as an army consultant and stature as a scientist gave him additional clout. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
From the start, Lederberg was called into the federal clashes over Sverdlovsk and yellow rain. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The arguments over the Soviet germ program were rooted in a clash of cultures between the biologists and the intelligence analysts. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Whatever the doubts behind closed doors, the Reagan administra- tion battered the Soviets publicly and privately over germ weapons for much of the decade. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The United States filed formal diplomatic protests with Moscow over its germ ac- tivities in October 1984, February 1985, December 1985, August 1986,July 1988, and December 1988. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In the late 1980s, skepticism over the germ threat rose as civilian Revelations 91 92 GERMS specialists assailed the military’s financing of recombinant experiments in the name of biological defense. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
To the public, the case that Moscow was making biological weapons seemed cloudier than ever. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The controversy over yellow rain faded even though some Ameri- can officials continued to believe that the Soviets had used unconven- tional agents in Southeast Asia. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A FEW months later, in October 19g9, a top Soviet biologist defected to Britain and told a very different story. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
By this point Douglas MacEachin, the skeptical CIA analyst, had been assigned to support the Bush administration’s diplomatic ma- neuvering over the Soviet germ program. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Years of neglect had left Ameritan forces vulnerable. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
S CHWARZKOPF had begun to worry about the Iraqi threat months earlier, soon after he took over the Central Command, or CENT- COM, which was responsible for defending the Persian Gulf. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The king agreed, and as the American delegation flew over Egypt on its way back to the United States, Schwarzkopf’s mind was racing over the challenges of assembling a credible force in the desert. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The scientists at Wright-Patterson had said biological weapons could be easily disseminated from aerosol sprayers used to apply pesticides. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Seaquist asked intelligence officials in Washington more detailed questions. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The impasse over when to begin inoculations continued, and Pow- ell returned to the “tank” to confer with the chiefs of the four branches of the American military. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The doctors met with Schwarzkopf on December 6 to review Jumper’s cable. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A germ weapon that takes ef- fect over several days, they reasoned, would not be very useful in a frontal assault. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Saddam 119 120 GERMS DETECTORS were still a major headache. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Saddam 123 LARRY Seaquist felt relieved as the sun rose over Washington on Feb- ruary 28, 1991. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
With President George Bush’s popularity soaring above 90 percent, the only controversy was over whether the allied forces had killed too many Iraqi soldiers. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The biological arsenal that had worried General 124 Secrets and Lies 5 Powell and the president before the bombing began in January seemed a footnote, a historical curiosity. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Over time a more accurate picture emerged. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Iraq’s failure to use its biological weapons gave powerful new argu- ments to those who believed the germ threat was overstated. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The site, about thirty miles south- west of Baghdad in the middle of the desert, seemed an odd choice for a civilian facility. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“It would have affected the investigation profoundly,” he said. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
By the fall of 1991, the demise of communism was stirring serious demands for a peace dividend. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A confrontation, however, soon erupted over whether Moscow had been candid about its germ history Britain, the United States, and Russia had agreed to make declarations to the United Nations about their respective programs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The impasse between Russia, Britain, and the United States over the United Nations declarations became public in July, when the Washington Times, a small newspaper with solid military and inteffi- gence sources, broke the story. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A fight soon erupted over who would be in charge of making the military’S vaccines. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
UNSCOM was divided over whether Patrick was right. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
At last the scientific detectives got a break. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Spertzel remembered that the intelligence report about the attempt to buy the air-handling equipment mentioned that it was to be in- stalled in buildings identified by the letters E and H. Was that part of Al Hakam? Iraq had turned over the blueprints of Al Hakam to UNSCOM; now another U.N. inspector found a copy and held it up. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Over the next two days, Louis J. Freeh, the FBI director, repeatedly called his counterparts in Japan, asking for help. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Lederberg’s guess turned out be accurate. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Clarke’s counterterrorism group had recently begun plan- ning defenses against terrorists who might use chemicals or germs to achieve their ends. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Owens clashed with the medical experts who were pushing the program, particularly Stephen Joseph, the New York physician who took over as assistant secretary of defense for health affairs in early 1994. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Days later, the FBI began inves- tigating a videotape that warned of a chemical attack against visitors to Disneyland over Easter weekend. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Federal agents swarmed over the amusement park. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
He was at DIA to gather information on a subject that his boss, Senator Sam Nunn, had made a personal crusade: Russia’s diminishing control over its nuclear arsenal. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
He traveled to Japan, interviewed the suspect himself, and found the authorities’ explanation scientifically improbable. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Presidential Decision Directive 39 delineated the agencies that were to play the lead roles in handling terrorist incidents: the State Department over- seas and the FBI inside the United States. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Stepnogorsk was listed on no map. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Institute officials estimated that there were still about forty thou- sand people in Stepnogorsk—just over half the city’s peak population of seventy thousand in the mid-1980s. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The official program was over, Lepyoshkin told his guests, filling their large glasses with vodka. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A~ the vodka flowed and the sun set over the Seleti River, the official lies that Lepyoshkin and his colleagues had told the Americans were stripped away Of course the plant had never produced vaccines or any other product of possible benefit to mankind, Lepyoshkin eventually confided to the astonished Americans. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The scientists were ordered to dispose of the stockpile on Renais- sance Island, their former test range, over a thousand miles away. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Working in haste and total secrecy, they transferred the tons of bacte- ria—enough to destroy the world’s people many times over—into stainless-steel canisters. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Iraqi officials admitted that they had produced an ex- tensive array of germ weapons for use on the battlefield, from missiles to bombs to jet-mounted aerosol tanks. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The memo left some things unsaid. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The testimony, which trickled out over the next several years, showed that the cult had repeatedly tried—and failed—to carry out biological attacks. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The gambit failed. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
At the Pentagon, Admiral Owens was targeting the budgets for chemical and biological defense for a $1 billion cut over five years, a reduction of nearly one third. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
IN early 1996, Congress moved to tighten control over laboratories and companies selling pathogens to scientists and medical researchers. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
American presidents were reluctant to order punishment un- less they had undeniable proof of culpability. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
For nearly five years, military officials had insisted that no one serving in the Persian Gulf War had been exposed to chemical or biological weapons. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Reimer, the army’s chief of staff. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
That decision, a $2 billion shift fromJanuary, re- flected a radical change in priorities. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
An economist whose son had been a platoon leader in the Gulf War, White took the recommendation seriously. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The Gre3t Patriotic War, the Soviet Union’s valiant struggle against the Nazis that had made the Allied triumph over fascism possible, was a fundamental touchstone of the post_revolutionary state and the ever-suspicious national psyche. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The disagreements among American intelligence officials over Russia’s germ program had reemerged. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Weber was stunned. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Miller looked up quizzically over his wire—rimmed glasses. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The ricin seemed misguided, one official argued. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“Anthrax,” he said, stun- ning the normally loquacious Sam Donaldson and Cokie Roberts into momentary silence. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The scenario, Haseltine assured the White House staff members, was scientifically plausible. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Discovering huge gaps in logistics, legal authority, and medical care, officials began quarreling among themselves and with Washington over how to stem the epidemic. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The hush of defeat fell over the room. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Much of the government’s support for research over the past twenty years had been spent on fighting heart disease and cancer. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Hauer, New York’s emergency-management director, outlined measures that the city had adopted to respond more effectively to a germ-weapons attack. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The President 241 242 GERMS On May 6, Frank Young, the moderator of the experts group, sent the president a seventeen-page report summarizing its unanimous recommendations. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
billion in spending over the next five years, with a total of $420 million for national stock- piles of antibiotics and vaccines. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The President 249 250 GERMS When his aides told him that the thirty minutes scheduled for the meeting had elapsed, Clinton deflected a question about what kind of toll the Lewinsky scandal was taking on his family. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The White House also asked for $87 million, a 23 percent increase over the previous year’s spending, to improve the nation’s public- health surveillance system, and $52 million to continue building a na- tional stockpile of antibiotics and medicines against anthrax, smallpox, and pneumonic plague. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“Thank God it is over,” he said. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Soon after taking over the new Office of Emergency Management, Hauer had created a computerized system to track admissions to eleven city hospitals. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Looking back over hospital records, it became clear that the first case had been seen as early as August 8, more than two weeks before Asms called in her report of a mysterious illness. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
But no one had overall authority over how the money was spent. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The issue caught the eye of Chris Shays, a Republican congressman from Connecticut. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
million of which would be paid up front to tide over Bio- Port. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Over time, the military gave soldiers more accurate information about the vaccine. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The twenty-five-year-old man (actually a plastic mannequin) had blood and vomit around his mouth, a toe with gangrene, and skin lesions all over his body. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
According to several participants, the officials managing the outbreak had bitter, protracted fights over who would receive the antibiotics. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
As in New York’s real out- break of West Nile virus, the endless conference calls involving up to a hundred officials had been time-consuming and cumbersome. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
There was also tension over making the right public-health decisions and the need to make them quickly. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Although they were well intentioned, Smithson concluded, the ad- ministration’s homeland defense initiatives had become a triumph of political “pork over preparedness.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
One of the main confusions was over how, exactly, the team would help local officials. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
But negotiations had stalled over the price. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The new focus on biological weapons was a boon for analysts like Gene Johnson, a protégé of Patrick’s who had been hired by the agency. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Moscow and Washington had solved the problem over several years, each in its own way. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A series of experiments in a wind tunnel revealed how such bomblets, after release from a warhead, would fall through the air over targets. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In the wake of the controversy over Clear Vision, the agency’s leadership also encouraged the CIA’s biodefense specialists to expand their efforts beyond the Soviet legacy. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The research had its origins in the Gulf War, when Schwarzkopf and Powell ago- nized over whether an attack on Iraq might kill tens of thousands of civilians or allied troops. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
As the world’s nations quarreled over how to improve the treaty, the new biology was racing ahead. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Popov and his colleagues had created not only a killer but a very in- fectious one. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The conc~t was an elegant elaboration of Cohen and Boyer’s discoveries. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Jones immediately saw the applications to biodefense. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In 1998, DARPA gave Maxygen a $3.8 Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Over that time, the agency was to spend $1.2 Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The job of making the bug was turned over to a secretive DIA program known as Project Jefferson. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
For civilians, Lederberg said, his inclination was to put off the question of smallpox vaccinations, which had health risks and large financial costs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Similarly, Lederberg was of two minds about ethnic weapons. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Over the next five decades, a ~series of American presidents confronted the problem, considered various remedies, and shuffled the issue into the “too hard” box. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Notes to pages 23—31 323 2.Warrior Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In the end, the judge found that the government could not be sued in the matter and that the death “was not the proximate or direct result” of the germ release. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
57 Marshall Plan was never implemented: Over the decades, Cuba has charged that the United States repeatedly attacked it with germ weapons, even though no convincing evidence of such assaults has ever come to light. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
an Israeli intelli~’ence officer turned over documents: The first contacts between Israeli intelligence were forged by Tim Trevan, a senior UNSCOM inspector, who describes the encounter in his Saddam’s Secrets, pp. 267—69,287—88. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Gene Wars: Military Control over the New Ge- netic Technologies. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Their years of germ terror are over. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
1986 958 ‘.1044 84-62667 Editor’s Preface ‘Of all the Marxist revolutions in the Third World, the Afghan revolu- tion has been most conspicously from above.' Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There were rumours that two people had been prosecuted for breaking the new laws. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Pravda added with greater lucidity, The Soviet Union will not remain passive in the face of actions against our security. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In August 1980, a high-level Soviet military delegation arrived in Kabul to reorganize both the Soviet forces and what remained of the Afghan army. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Selig Harrison’s overall picture of the political—military situation in Afghanistan in 1984 was one of a ‘deepening stalemate’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
regime would be able to gradually. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In a progress report in December 1983, the overall situation in Afghanistan was regarded as being modestly positive. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Government forces had inflicted ‘considerable defeats’ on the insurgents; the ‘big bandit groups’ in Panjsher and Andarab had been ‘suppressed’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It started with the launching of the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1957, financed partly by a Soviet loan of $ioo million; a second plan was launched in 1962. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Edward Girardet has based AFGFL4NISTAN.~ Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Overall, the real plight of the Afghan people has been quietly aban- doned by the wayside. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Seeking to gain political advantage, it announced the pull-out of 5,000-6,000 reservists in June, 1980. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Yet they remain highly polit- jcised and modernist in outlook. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Weaponry and Training Overall, the resistance remains a highly motivated force and since 1981 its strike capabilities have improved significantly. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Overall, cross-border seepage of heavy weapons has remained sporadic. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Baccha-i-Saqao, an illiterate Tadjik, proclaimed himself the new Emir. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In order to raise standards, the Soviets have dispatched numerous junior officers to the USSR and Eastern Europe for crash courses in anti-insurgency warfare and political indoctrination. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Overall, Soviet military repression and policies of economic denial have been instrumental in forcing out large segments of the population. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although the overall annual rate of inflation, officially esti- mated at 20-25 per cent, is surprisingly low considering war conditions, most Kabul residents find making ends meet extremely difficult, partic- ularly during the winter months when food and fuel are scarce. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Loya Jirghas, Alliances and Splits The first concrete attempts at overall unity came during the first few months of the occupation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In August 1983, in another attempt at overall unity, the moderates announced the estab- lishment of the ‘United Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan’ following consultations with ex.King Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For the Soviets, it is certain that guerrilla progression towards an overall military alliance, and possibly a fully representative resistance council sponsored by a Loya Jirgha, would bring a totally new dimension to the conflict. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Overall, the Iranian factor has remained a side issue in the Afghan equation, with Pakistan’s position as a ‘frontline’ state attracting far greater attention. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Incidents of violence have tended to be few and isolated, usually local resentment at relief assist- ance for the refugees or reaction over grazing and water rights. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
This was still 10,000 feet lower than they were accustomed to. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Overall, however, they have managed to adapt themselves to local circumstances. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The offensives did not represent a dramatic change in overall Red Army strategy. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Furthermore, each offensive was characterised by a rise in subversive actions. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Some defence analysts question the Kremlin’s ability to expand this commitment. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The major languages spoken in Afghanis - LAPIS LAZULI. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Although new discoveries of copper, lead, and zinc (as well as alu- minum) increased overall world reserves faster than world consump- tion reduced them through the 1980s, the patterns of production, refining, and distribution have increased dependency for all nations involved in the process—particularly for those like France, Russia, and America that once enjoyed the illusion of autarky Moreover, as the developable (non-Terminal) Third World evinces a growing First World appetite for consumption to fuel its developing industrializa- tion, global consumption is clearly going to outstrip global produc- tion by ever greater margins, increasing the urgency of resource dependency and bringing Malthusian imperatives into dramatic play once again: who will get how much of a vanishing supply of irre- placeable resources? Wifi China really pursue an automotive econ- omy for everyman as it proposed it would do in 1994? A billion more cars will do in China’s independence as surely as it will exhaust global mineral and fossil fuel supplies (not to mention the environ- ment). Jihad vs. McWorld
Our indices suggest that Jihad tends to impair economic efficiency, lowering a nation’s ranking on the GDP scale, but that it also diminishes overall energy usage, improving the nation’s ranking on the population scale. Jihad vs. McWorld
The role of agriculture in the overall economy and the number of work- ers in the agrarian sector are not correlated with gross agricultural output. Jihad vs. McWorld
David Stratton, “Gone with the Wind,” Variety InternationalFilm Guide, p. 14.13. Jihad vs. McWorld
Despite the initial popularity of some of the measures, Beattie believes the overall reaction of the people was irritation and anger at the extent to which the government was interfering in their lives (see also L. Dupree in this volume). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
With the establishment of the Nuristani Front, Anwar was recognized by the Nuristani leadership as commander-in- chief of all Nuristani forces, and Kabir was chosen to run the organi- zation’s office. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The lack of roads and trails suitable for horses made these Decisions made by the central government are not implemented To Vaygal Valley Kalasha the wuluswali and the central govern- the degree of government involvement in their affairs, and Circumstances that facilitate unwanted government involvement During the Republican era, except for a few schoolteachers, DAVIDJ. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
First, rural residents distinguish between the comportment of local administrators and the legitimacy of the central authorities, and evaluations of both levels contribute to overall assessments of the government. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
He was among the early graduates of an ibtidaija school who was sent to Kabul to continue his education. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
He had worked in the administration of the Jabal ul-Siraj cement factory near Charikar before being appointed subgovernor of Nahrin in the spring of 1978. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
contrasts significantly with that of Pakhtun on the North-West Frontier in an important respect. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
However, it is crucial to an understanding of the system to realize that these same elements may also communicate the wealth and high status of a household and indeed increase that household’s standing in the com- munity. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Significantly, it was a personal insult that guided Saudi decision-making rather than an overall change in for- eign policy. Taliban
Overall, the advances threatened to tip the balance between offense and defense decisively in favor of the attacker. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
THE following day, President Clinton announced his decision to ask Congress for $2.8 Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It also demonstrated that the “overall outdoor biting activity for the mosquito was estimated to be some 40 bites per hundred mosquitoes in the time period studied.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
AFGHANISTAN Marxist Regimes Series Series editor: Bogdan Szajkowski, Department of Sociology, University College, Cardiff Afghanistan Bhabani Sen Gupta Ethiopia Peter Schwab Grenada Tony Thorndike Guyana Henry B. Jeffrey and Cohn Baber Romania Michael Shafir Soviet Union RonaldJ. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
948 North Street Boulder, Colorado 80302 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sen Gupta, Bhabani Afghanistan: politics, economics, and society. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This series does not aim at assigning authenticity or authority to any single one of the political systems included in it. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Ethnic distribution Guerrilla and terrorist activity4. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Soviet prescence5. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
< List of Tables< Size, ownership and distribution of privately-ownedI. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Marxist regime in Afghanistan is far from stabilized. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In writing this volume, I have drawn upon the knowledge and expertise of many students of Afghanistan and international com- munism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
I have gained from my participation in an international conference on Afghanistan held in February 1985 at Columbia, North Carolina, under the auspices of the Department of International Relations of the University of North Carolina. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
I must thank the Director of the Centre for Policy Research, New xii Preface Delhi, Dr V. A. Pai Panandikar, for giving me research and secretarial facilities for writing this volume; the information and cultural affairs ministry of the Afghan government and the Afghan embassy in New Delhi for making available a lot ofofficial reports; an Indian friend in the United States (who does not wish to be identified) for sending me a num- ber of the latest books on Afghanistan; and MrM. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Population distribution Life expectancy Infant death rate (per 1,000) Ethnic groups Capital Major cities Land area Land boundaries Official languages State and government Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Central Asia, bounded by USSR (N), Iran (W), Pakistan (E & S), China (NE). Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Land- locked. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
14.2 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Monarchy 2 Afghanistan In the middle of 1985, as this book is being written, everything about Afghanistan is controversial. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan is a landlocked country roughly the size of Texas. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Arid, economically backward, it has a strategic location at the conjunction of Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the subcontinent. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The first-ever census, taken in 1979, placed the total population of Afghanistan at 15.5 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
million. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghans are a gaggle of ethnic nationalities. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan’s total land area is 652,090 sq. km. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
of new road were planned to be constructed by 1984. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
All-weather high- ways link Kabul with Kandahar and Herat in the south and east, Jalalabad in the west and Mazar-i-Sharif and the Oxus, on which there is water traffic. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A feasibility study for the country’s first railway, linking Kabul to Pakistan and Iran, was completed in 1977. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A network of asphalted highways connecting the main towns has been built with Soviet and American help; 1,060 km. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The two imperial powers never did actually collide over Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, a clash did occur between Afghans and Russians in March 1885 at Pul- i-Khatum, near Panjdeh, along the Afghan frontier. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan force had to retire with heavy losses, leaving Panjdeh to the Russians. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was the British rather than the Russians who wanted to annex Afghanistan to their empire. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
More than a hundred years ago, in the 1870s, the Russians wanted Britain to concede Afghanistan as a buffer state between the two empires. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The British refused. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Fearing an expansion of Russian influence to Afghanistan, the British invaded the country twice as pre-emptive measures, but both expeditions failed, and the British forces had to retreat. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Kipling, poet of the British Indian empire, warned his countrymen: When you're wounded an’ left on Afghanistan’s plains, An’ the women come out to cut up your remains, Just roll to your rifle an’ blow out your brains, An’ go to your Gawd like a soldier. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan only succeeded to some extent in easing out of the British sphere of influence after World War I. The process began with the coming of Amanullah to the throne in KabuL with his declaration that Afghanistan was no one’s puppet, but a fully independent sovereign state. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
His demand that this status for Afghanistan be formally recognized by the British Government and the Viceroy of India was rejected by both. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Lenin recognized Afghanistan as a sovereign independent/state and received a friendly communication from Amanullah. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In less than a month the British declared war on Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The armistice, signed on 3 June 1919, led to a peace treaty on 8 August, but in neither did the British formally recognize Afghanistan as a sovereign state. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
(Afghanistan, however, signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union on 28 February 1921 Lenin, in a letter to Amanullah, observed that the treaty gave ‘formal consolidation to the friendship and mutual sympathy between Afghanistan and Russia which have grown and strengthened in the past two years.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
But support came immediately from a newly-born state: the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Even then victory eluded the British. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There are no issues between Afghanistan and Russia likely to lead to differences, or even cast a shadow on Russo— Afghan friendship.’7 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1929, Amir Amanullah fell from power because of intensified opposition in Afghanistan to his drive for reform and modernization. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
After Habibullah was deposed and executed on 15 October 1929, Nadir Khan became King of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He tried to reduce Soviet influence in Afghanistan but at the same time concluded several treaties with the USSR, including the neutrality treatyof 1926, renegotiated in 1931, a postal accord in 1932 and an agreement to appoint officials to study frontier disputes, also in 1932;10 and a trade agreement/During Nadir Khan’s rule, Soviet—Afghan relations improved considerably, even if they were not entirely free of strain. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
(The British had a hand in the Amir’s fall.) Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Neither Britain nor the Soviets recognized a short-lived government set up by the rebel leader, Amir Habibullah. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan improved its relations with Germany in the 1930s and in October 1936 concluded a protocol with Germany under which German arms were to be supplied to Kabul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan maintained its friendly relations with Germany through World War IL This was not liked by Britain and the USSR but neither wanted to take punitive act on against Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This balanced relationship policy was pursued from 1946 to 1953. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Then came a ten- year period when Afghanistan tilted towards the Soviet Union in view of a sharp deterioration in its relations with Pakistan./After Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
1963 Afghanistan appeared to be trying to normalize its relationship with all its neighbours, including Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the period 1946-53 Afghanistan tried to maintain this balanced relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States, engaging both in its economic and infrastructural development. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The situation, however, changed in the late 1940s after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine which brought Turkey and Greece under American protec- tion. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As the British withdrew from the Indian subcontinent and the two conflict-locked sovereign states of India and Pakistan were born, Afghanistan proceeded to improve and stabilize its relations with the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1954 the Soviets voiced support for Pushtunistan, thus trying to draw Afghanistan toward its influence as the United States brought.Pakistan Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets began to extend economic aid to Afghanistan, which had the distinction of becoming the first country with which the Soviets started experiment- ing with their post-Stalin Third World diplomacy. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Khrushchev visited Afghanistan in December 1955/shortly after his and Bulganin’s highly successful visit to India. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A boundary agreement was concluded in 1948. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It’s my strong feeling that the capital we invested in Afghanistan hasn’t been wasted. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
We have earned the Afghans’ trust and friendship, and it hasn’t fallen into the Americans’ trap; it hasn’t been caught on the hook baited with American money.18 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the first decade of Daoud’s prime ministership, 1953—63, a funda- mental contradiction tore across Afghanistan’s political economy. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
King Zahir Shah had tried in the late forties and early fifties to introduce elections to the people of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A ‘liberal parliament’ was formed in 1952 through ‘relatively free elec- tions [by Afghan standards]20 and the result was the election of fifty leftist candidates in a House of 120, and several newspapers sprang up suddenly, flaunting titles that unnerved the King and his royal kinsmen—Nida-yi-Khalq (Voice of the People), Watan (Homeland), Angar (Burning Embers). Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A partly elected and partly nominated loya jirgah was convened to approve a constitution which the King promulgated in October 1964. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The full name of the political party was the People’s Democratic History and Political Traditions: The Monarchy 13 14 Afganistan P of Afghanistan (PDPA). Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Predictably, the ruling family and the 300,000 mullahs of Afghani- stan were alarmed. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Daoud, who had been waiting for his chance to return to the helm of power, and who had built up contacts with leftist elements in the political factions as well as in the army, now took an extraordinarily bold step. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the last decade of the Afghan monarchy, the United States conducted a reappraisal of the prospects for and the need for influence-building in Afghanistan, and came to the conclusion that the landlocked country was not of great importance to the United States nor was the United States in a position to dislodge the Soviet Union from the vantage point it had achieved since the early fifties. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The first was the close relations the United States had built up with Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
a source of oil or scarce strategic metals;.. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan was dependent on Soviet arms. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets were Kabul’s largest trade partner. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As already noted, King Zahir Shah’s flirtation with the concept of a 18 Afghanistan constitutional monarchy created a political-intellectual ferment in Kabul and other cities. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There was a clause in the constitution which Zahir Shah gave his people which forbade any member of the royal family from becoming Afghanistan’s prime minister. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The ‘pseudo-democracy’ of Zahir Shah, he told the people of Afghanistan, was a ‘corrupt system’ that rested ‘on personal and class interests, intrigues and demagogy’ The reforms Daoud actually introduced proved to be half-way measures, sharpen- ing discontent in most political groups. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Within two years Daoud tried to reduce the influence of the left. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In foreign policy, Daoud gave an appearance of distancing Afghanistan somewhat from the Soviet Union without being actually able or willing to do so. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On the contrary, they were pleased with Daoud’s support for the Brezhnev concept of Asian collective security—they gave Afghanistan $437m. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Wa/l street Journal perceived Soviet influence in Afghanistan in September 1977 to be greater than that of any other power.8 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
in economic aid in 1975; while, in the following year, a new Afghan—Soviet trade treaty envisaged a 65 per cent increase in two-way trade by 1980. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For a year and more of his presidency, Daoud kept close to the USSR and increased his support to the Pushtunistan movement, so much so that in 1975 Pakistan’s Bhutto accused him of training 15,000 Pushtuns and Balochs in Afghanistan for infiltration into the two Pakistani provinces of the North-west Frontier andBaluchistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The National Security Council, headed by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, devised the concept of regional influence and identified the Shah of Iran as the first of that newly labelled cluster of heads of state with which the United States could do a lot of business. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Shah simultaneously sought to build bridges of friendship with Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He wanted the Persian Gulf and South Asian regions to be less polarized between the two superpowers, and wanted countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India to draw a little distant from their respective superpower friend or patron. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At the superpower level, the Soviet Union was trying to persuade the Shah to be less dependent on the United States, while the United States pleaded with India and Afghanistan to be ‘genuinely non-aligned’ between Washington and Moscow. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
to Pakistan $750 m., and to Afghanistan $50 m. between 1973 and 1975. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The same dislike of polarization has been manifest in Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Ambassador Eliot was advising Daoud to cultivate closer ties with Iran and countries of the Middle East. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Washington also asked Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Japan to give more economic assistance to Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This project, if completed, would have significantly reduced Afghanistan’s trade dependencies on the Soviet Union.’3 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the last two years of his reign, and of his republic’s life, Daoud did appear to be cautiously but systematically asserting Afghanistan’s independence and ‘genuine non-alignment’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He was sending his Afghanistan as a Republic 23 24 Afghanistan soldiers to Egypt, India and the United States in larger numbers than before. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In March 1978 Afghanistan and China concluded a trade protocol which provided for increased trade between the two, and a credit of 100 in. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On the contrary, as already noted, the Soviets continued to befriend Afghanistan and Moscow’s rhetoric did not betray visible irritation with Daoud’s tentative search for ‘genuine non-alignment’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In India and in Afghanistan warring communist factions came together in response to changing realities in the two countries’ respective domestic politics. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Thus was reborn the PDPA, with Nur Mohammed Taraki and Babrak Karma! as its first two front-rank leaders. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the humble universe of South Asian commumsm, two significant developments took place in 1977. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fortunes of the Marxists in Afghanistan took a quantum leap in April 1978 for which neither they nor the Soviets were prepared. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Louis Dupree noted con- siderable economic vigour and diversity in Afghanistan in 1976-77, and a ‘remarkable improvement in Afghanistan’s econqmic status’.’6 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Before the newly-formed PDPA could build its organization as a strong rallying point of the urban middle class, even before it could come to grips with political and social change in Afghanistan, and certainly before it could sort out the power equations between its two long-feuding, suddenly reunited partners, it found itself catapulted to power in a revolution whose actual leadership, crucial direction, decision-making apparatus, and class character were all highly controversial, and remain still to be documented with complete cre- dibility. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the next few days, Taraki, Amin, Karma! Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At 7.05 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Cyrus Vance, who was Secretary of Afghanistan asa Republic 29 30 Afghanistan State in the Carter administration when the revolution took place, said in his memoirs, ‘We had no evidence of Soviet complicity in the coup.’22 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The communist movement in Afghanistan was weak It was not even listed in the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs until 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan revolution was described by Americans and others as a coup, or even a palace or an army coup rather than a revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was, however, not a military take—over. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The military officers acted on instructions from Hafizullah Aniin, who, this writer was told by authoritative sources in Kabul, issued his ‘orders’ on behalf of the PDPA, not on behalf of himself.24 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the next chapter we take a close look at Afghanistan’s political economy—the nature of the state—at the time of the Saur (April) revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan as a Republic 31 3 With all its disadvantages—no revolutionary base of its own, no experi- ence of a long political struggle, the PDPA membership of no more than 5,000 (most, if not all of them, recruited from Kabul and the provincial towns)—what kind of a state did the Saur revolution inherit or seize on 27 April 1978? What was the state. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The dramatic and surprising success of the Afghan revolution betrays the fundamental weakness of modernizing regimes in the Third World not based on sound and developing political systems linked to the masses. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Energy consumption, at 47 kg. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Only 16 per cent of GDP came from exports, which was 13 per cent lower than average exports of the forty-two least developed countries in the world. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In an article in the journal Asia and Africa Today in 1980, a Soviet scholar remarked that the Nadir Shah dynasty had ‘personified the most brutal form of class and national oppression of the working people and seriously impeded Afghanistan’s econothic, social and cultural development.’5 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘Capitalism in Afghanistan developed in specific conditions’, wrote an analyst in New Times, and echoed the same obser\rations: ‘The workers were ruthlessly exploited, working conditions were extremely hard. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
American political and social anthropologists who have specialized in Afghanistan speak of a far more complex political society than is visible in Soviet-Afghan Marxist analyses. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In April 1978, Afghanistan was not an entirely tribal society. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘In cases where tribal ideology exists, as among the Pashai and Nuristani, its role in the political processes is considerably different. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
When Nadir Shah founded the Musahiban dynasty in 1929, after crushing the reformist regime of. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the modernizing period of the Musahiban rule, as well as during Daoud’s republican leadership, three major political forces emerged in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The form of local-level politics was determined by economic reali- ties. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In most of Afghanistan two power structures were in existence at the time of the Saur revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Table 1. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Source: V. Glukhodcd, ‘Economy of independent Afghanistan’, Social &iences Today, Moscow, Table 2. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Size, ownership and distribution of privately-owned land in Afghanistan (Soviet figures)* Number % 420,000— 670,000* 470,000 450,000 230,000 51,600 1981, pp. 241—2. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Size, ownership and distribution of privately-owned land in Afghanistan (Indian flgures) Number NA 805,000 161,000 125,000 109,000 0 39.0 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
44.4 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
No non-Marxist political group was given a berth in the government. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was a youthful council of ministers. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The President and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was Taraki, who was also the General Secretary of the PDPA. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This was a time of political change in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Amin was narrowly defeated in the 1965 election. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A spellbinding orator, Babrak closely identified himself with those intellectuals who spoke Dan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
After proclaiming Afghanistan a Democratic Republic, the leaders of the revolution sought to reassure their countrymen as well as the out- side world that they were not communists and that the Government was not Marxist. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Only an openly and uncompromisingly revolutionary line could polarize Afghanistan along the desired class lines, he argued. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was in this revolution- ary council that the strategic—tactical issues were fought out. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
If this was a tactical move on the part of Taraki, it worked well for a few months in terms of external, especially American responses to his regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
But a bitter political struggle started among the leaders of the regime immediately after the revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Doctrinal contradictions haunted the PDPA from the time it was created. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Taraki and Amin were prompter to reveal the external affiliation and orientation of their regime than its domestic role. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The first few months of the PDPA regime went off relatively well. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Prominent among them were Major-General Qader—Army Chief of Staff—Lt.-Gen. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Then came the turn of the ‘nationalist’ faction that had turned down Karmal’s overtures. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In July, Karmal and most other Parcham members of the govern- ment were exiled to ambassadorships, some to East European capitals. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan was already short of trained and experienced personnel. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The thirty- point programme, which was called ‘Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’, had been announced on 9 May, less than two weeks after the revolu- tion. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
After getting rid of the Parcham and ‘nationalist’ elements in the government and party leadership, the Khalq faction, now in complete control of the regime, launched its controversial reforms. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Even if land reforms and equal rights for women had been tried by previous Afghan regimes without success, as some American specialists on Afghanistan claim,’8 there is no doubt that the abolition of rural indebtedness and usury was entirely new in Afghanistan’s history~ Poverty and its twin brother indebtedness were widespread in the Revolution: the Khalq Phase 49 50 Afghanistan Afghan villages, as we have already noted. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
7, entitled ‘Democratic Rights of Women’, was pro- mulgated in October 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Land reform in Afghanistan had first been attempted by Amanullah in the 1920s by selling off large tracts of public land mostly to large proprie- tors, thereby favouring large ownerships.28 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Decree No. 8—land reforms—was issued in December 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The radical reforms promulgated by the PDPA Government in the latter half of 1978 were significantly in advance of the party’s First Programme adopted in 1966. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the Marxist-Leninist perception of the PDPA, Afghanistan is a country whose society is composed of toiling peoples and nationalities who have different cultures and languages. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In building a National Democratic State, the PDPA Government announced a nationality policy that was not only politically novel but that also had great potential for making an impact on neighbouring Pakistan and Iran if it could be successfully implemented. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Some of the reforms were undertaken without scientific studies of the macro and micro aspects of the prevailing social and cultural realities. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At the same time, there were drives against high prices and rampant corruption. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Between July and December, and right through the summer of 1979, there was a drive to implement all the above reforms simul- taneously. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
With the proclamation of the Democratic Afghan Republic, the PDPA took care to assure the Afghan people that the State would protect their religious faith and that they would be free to observe their religious rites and customs. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The regime appeared to be sensitive to the key role played by Islam in Afghan society and politics, and far from itching for a confrontation with Islam, the regime’s propaganda machinery seçmed to be anxious to placate the religious leaders and to reassure them that their traditional role was secure in the new dispensation. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Nevertheless, as the radical reforms began to be implemented in October 1978, the clergy rose in protest, and byjanu- ary 1979, the traditional ruling elements—the property-holders and the clergy—joined together to mobilize large segments of the urban—rural people in all Afghanistan to offer armed resistance to the Marxist regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Early in 1982, a Soviet reporter recorded after a journey through the Balkh province of Afghanistan, Mullahs and ulems have always played an important part in the country’s life, and this is not to be disregarded. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The ulema organisation of Mazar-i—Sharif includes 120 persons. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Taraki—Amin regime did not realize, or else refused to recog- nize, the constant and dynamic role that Islam and the ideals of jihad (religious war) had played in the history of Afghanistan since the eigh- teenth century. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1919, soon after becoming king, Amir Amanullah declared jihad against the British in order to gain complete independence for Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
When he won his political battle, Amanullah, now a national hero, sought to project his image within and outside Afghanistan as a defender of Islam, both in the temporal and the religious sense. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, his efforts to establish a modern, secular state brought him into conflict, first with the vested interests in rural-urban Afghanistan, particularly the khans, and later, in 1928, with powerful ruhani, or Sufi spiritual leaders of Kabul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Nadir Khan came to power after the overthrow of Amanullah as founder of the Musahiban dynasty riding the crest of a conservative, even reactionary counter—revolution spearheaded by Islamic leaders, and this fundamental reality governed the politics of Afghanistan for the next forty years. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Their association with government and often spatial isolation from their communities resulted in the gradual weakening of their ties and Islam and the SaurRevolution 59 60 Afghanistan credibility as community leaders, creating a parallel structure to deal with community concerns. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However fragmented the rural power structure of Afghanistan— fragmented by tribal, linguistic, social, economic and even religious divisions—the tenuous links between government and community increased the importance of traditional leaders. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This was known to all rulers of Afghanistan from Nadir Shah to Daoud, and it should have been known to Taraki and Amin, although they were Marxists. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1979, the PDPA regime confronted two Islamic rebellions. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A fundamentalist Islamic movement had existed in Afghanistan since the sixties; its manifestation in Kabul was in the Jawanan-i-Musulman—Muslim Youth—which had sprung up in 1965 as a prompt response to the emergence of the PDPA. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The other Islamic rebellion was fundamentalist in political perspec- tive and ideology. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Islamic fundamentalists are revolutionaries of a different hue from the Marxists of the PDPA. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They want to eliminate ethnic distinctions between Pushcuns and the non-Pushtun tribes or national groups because they believe these distinctions are un-Islamic and only weaken the Afghan state by Islam and the Saur Revolution 61 62 Afghanistan keeping its population divided and at war with itself. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
ANLF will fight against ethnic discrimination, class distinction, economic exploitation in Afghanistan, and will strive for establishment of an economic and social order consistent with the Islamic concept of social justice. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
ANLF will fight all elements of imperialism and feudalism which hinder the establishment of a politically independent, economically prosperous, and socially progressive Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
ANLF.. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For the lslafnic fundamentalists, then, it is not enough to liberate Afghanistan from Soviet occupation and to defend Islam; it is equally important to establish an Islamic political and social order. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They hold the Musahiban dynasty directly responsible for the plight of Afghani- stan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As one of their leaders put it, ‘The Afghan mujahidin are now well aware that imperialism and communism are like the two blades of a pair of scissors for the purpose of cutting the roots of our beloved religion: Islam.10 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The four fundamentalist or revolutionary Islamic rebel organi- zations are the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (JIA) led by Burnha- nuddin Rabbani; the Islamic Party of Gulbudin Hikmatyar, a second Islamic Party, formed after a split, of which the leader is Mawlawi M. Yunus Khalis; and the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghani- stan, led by Abdur Rabbur Rasul Sayyaf. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Islam perse has not been an insuperable barrier to communism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan’s Islamic factor proved to be particularly difficult for the leaders of DRA because Islam had for centuries been a popular political-religious ideology of the people of that country, it had been woven into the emotional and symbolic myths of Afghan nationalism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fundamentalism of the Iranian revolution had a strong impact on the Islamic fundamentalists of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As Fred Halliday put it, As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the Shah’s regime would have been less menacing than that of Khomeini; although the organizational ability of the previous ~regime to assist the counter-revolution might well have been greater, the power of ideological mobilization would have been much less, especially if it is remembered how much the Shah’s previous interference in Afghan affairs had been resented.13 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fundamentalist Islamic upsurge against the Saur revolution in 1978-9 in Afghanistan was not without its own weakness, however. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Apart from the four main fundamentalist groups, there were dozens of smaller ones, including the Afghan National Liberation Front, a part of whose political programme was quoted earlier (pp. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Its greatest weakness, as noted, lay in the failure of the several funda- mentalist groups to unite and offer a credible political alternative to DRA. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Fred Halliday, in a Marxist critique of the Saur revolution, has identified four aspects of the rural structure of Afghanistan that gravely complicated the programme of social transformation.3 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Tribal, ethnic and religious factors intersected ~ Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘Any attempt to reform such a Revolution on the Verge of Collapse 67 68 Afghanistan system by appealing to the class interests of the poor and landless peasants was bound to run into considerable difficulties.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The second vital aspect of rural Afghanistan that, in Halliday's analysis, created considerable problems for the Saur revolution/was the ‘traditional independence of the mountain tribes/Fhese tribes had in the past been paid subsidies by the Government in Kabul; among them ‘the bearing of arms was a natural feature of adult life’.4 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘Afghanistan is a country where political and social issues have tended to be settled by the gun and where the room for peacefully handling conflicts within the state, or between the state and its subjects, is extremely limited.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Halliday also mentions three other problems which contributed to the checking of the initial dynamic of the revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The first was ‘the disunity and thd extremely undemocratic internal structure of the PDPA itself.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
All the ministers in the new eighteen—man Cabinet were Khalqis, including some who had been members of the Parcham Revolution on the Verge of Collapse 69 70 Afghanistan faction earlier but had defected to Khalq. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The way in which the situation on the ground deteriorated has been described by a number of American anthropologists who have done field-work in Afghanistan and who claim to have first-hand informa- tion or knowledge of how the people of a number of provinces reacted to the radical reforms put through by the Marxist regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan was so short of competent hands in government that this action soon left the PDPA regime without the personnel essential to maintain a minimum level of administrative efficiency. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The rebellion began in Nuristan, which is a 5,000-square mile region strategically located in north-western Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
After a three-day battle, the outpost fell to the attackers. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For this uncommon achievement Revolution on the Verge of Collapse 73 74 Afghanistan of the rebels, Keiser found four main reasons. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Its land area of 40,886 sq. km. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In Badakhshan the traditional rural leaders had pursued a policy of avoidance rather than confrontation regarding the state. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The regime unleashed a reign of repression, with mass imprisonments, torture and murder of suspected enemies. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
ThomasJ. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The provin- cial administration was soon found to be woefully inadequate in discharging the responsibilities assigned to it. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘People with unmarried daughters resented the Revolution on the Verge of Collapse 77 78 Afghanistan decree most because they could no longer expect to receive brideprice payments for them when they were married.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the Kunar Valley, crops were burnt by Soviet—Afghan aircraft, :reating a severe shortage of grain in Afghanistan in 1980, which the oviets had to meet through exports. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Halliday believes that Amin expected elections to take place in Pakistan in 1979 in which he was convinced that political forces sympathetic towards Afghanistan would come to power, and in 1979 he was in touch with the leaders of some of these forces, notably Khan Wali Khan, of the National Awami League, a constituent of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a nine-party coalition of banned political groups, of which the leading faction was the Pakistan People’s Party founded by the late ZulfIkar Ali Bhutto. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Government forces carried out a number of large offensives and some of these met with a measure of success. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The lack of success of the Govermnent’s military operations and the rapid spread of the insurgency inevitably intensified factional in- fighting in the PDPA.. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1979 the Islamic revolution in Iran had an immediate impact on the civil war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Amin looked upon Taraki’s talks with Brezhnev with grave suspicion. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
When Amin appointed himself president of the DRA, a congratulatory message came from Moscow. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Outwardly, everything was friendly between Amin and Moscow. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In early December, Amin sent an urgent message to Pakistan’s Revolution on the Verge of Collapse 83 84 Afghanistan General Zia-ul Haq, asking for an early meeting. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Zia-ul Haq sent his Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, to Kabul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Since November, the Soviets had been preparing the alternative of last resort—a military intervention in Afghanistan in order to save the Saur revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On 27 December, the Soviets intervened with a ‘limited contingent’ of 85,000 troops, overpowered troops loyal to Amin without a major battle, and Amin died fighting. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
was proclaimed President of Afghanistan in ,a regime now openly protected by Soviet arms. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The second phase of the Saur revolution had begun. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Washington knew of Soviet troop movements in areas close to the Afghan border, but the skeletal personnel in the American embassy in Kabul had no knowledge of it whatsoever. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet leadersjustified the despatch of 85,000 to 110,000 troops into Afghanistan in December/January 1979—80 by their obligations under the 1978 treaty as well as by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the spring of Soviet Intervention and American Response H 86 Afghanistan 1979, General Alexei A. Epishev, chief of the Main Political Admini- stration of the Soviet armed forces, made an inspection tour of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets sent him several thousand military advisers, and kept anxious watch on the range and scale of fighting in the Afghan civil war. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Amin had been asking for Soviet military help since the winter of 1979 when the insurgency began to spread in the countryside. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet intervention or invasion has been studied at length by American and other Western scholars and Soviet intervention and American Response 87 journalists in the context of the century’s prolonged confrontation been given to the Marxist regime in Afghanistan as it has tried to assert has proved to be inseparable from the survival of the Marxist regime and its gradual, slow process of gaining political ground in Afghani- ev9nt. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The principal event was the fall of the Shah of Iran and his the Soviet leaders, but they watched the grotesque unfolding of the Islamic revolution under the Ayatollah Khomeini with considerable misgiving, if not alarm.(As Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The authoritative pronouncements made by Soviet leaders justify- ing the intervention (or invasion) in Afghanistan sketched the Soviet self-image as well as Soviet images of the United States at the turn of the decade of the 1980s. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Second, the time had come for a realignment of forces in the Third World, to identify the vanguard of radical change and militant anti-imperialism as well as its firm and reliable friends and allies, and to differentiate these nations from those who had chosen, or had been forced to choose, to toe the capitalist- imperialist line.6 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
While the Soviet troops got bogged clown in Afghanistan in a prolonged civil war, brutal and gory in its daily, weekly and seasonal operations, and highly expensive in political terms, when it came to Soviet prestige and image in the community of developing countries, the Soviets fought defensive battles on several major fronts against American diplomatic—strategic offensives, lost some of the battles, won a few, and drove its adversary into a stalemate in the others. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Marshall Shulman, who was Secretary Vance’s chief adviser on Soviet affairs, told an American journal that it was his belief that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan because of a ‘broad fear’ of ‘the creation of a crescent of militant islamic anti-Soviet states on its southern borders, with the added possibility of Chinese or US influ- ence, and not because it seeks to gain access to the Indian Ocean and control over the Middle East.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Shulman added that the Soviet action in Afghanistan ‘opens up the possibility’ that the Soviets might attack Iran or Pakistan, although he did not believe that was the intention of the invasion.’8 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Brezhnev himself justified the intervention as a defensive action to ensure the security of the southern borders of the Soviet state. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘When all the positive and negative aspects were weighed from the point of view of revolutionary operation in Afghanistan and the general situation of forces in the world, it became clear that it was necessary.'16 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
That is exactly what happened, The United States made Pakistan a ‘front—line’ state in its own strategy for resisting the Soviets in Afghanistan, and offered it, in 1980—1, a package of military and economic aid valued at $3.1 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
bn. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For New Delhi, the transfer of modern, sophisticated American arms to Pakistan constituted a greater security threat than the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
So were the political cleavages within Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The traditional cleavage in the subcontinent between Pakistan and India was deepened by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the American response to it. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets knew the Afghan terrain well. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the words of Pravda, ‘the fiery ring of counter- revolution backed actively from abroad became tighter and tighter round the capital.’2 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Brezhnev also declared that the Soviet troops would not be in Afghanistan longer than necessary. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘We want to state very definitely that we will be ready to commence the withdrawal of our troops as soon as all forms of outside interference directed against the government and the people of Afghanistan are fully terminated,’ announced Brezhnev in his interview with Pravda on 22 February 1980. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It is extremely difficult to attempt an objective assessment of the military operations of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The data base is practically non-existent. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets themselves only began to report casualties in 1981, though as early as May 1980 Pravda conceded that ‘struggle against the bandits is no easy matter’.6 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Panjsher has been the centre of the strongest fundamentalist group in Afghanistan since the early 1970s. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Massoud’s mentor is the Peshawar-based funda- mentalist leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, who has wide contacts with Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami, the fundamentalist party that has been in charge of relief and care of the over three million Afghan refugees living on Pakistani territory. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Selig Harrison, after a visit to Afghanistan in 1984, wrote that the number of Afghans on the Soviet-subsidized payroll of Kabul was some 375,000, including about 60,000 in the army, another 75,000 in various paramilitary forces and at least 25,000 in the secret police. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In early 1985, the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the 40th Army, were composed of seven divisions and five air assault brigades, backed up by a few spetsnaz (special purpose commando) units, 500 helicopters, several squadrons of MiG-21s and 23s, and at least one squadron of Su- 25 (Frog Foot) attack aircraft, which represents the first deployment of this ground-attack aircraft anywhere in the world.14 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The most brutal war is a civil war, and Afghanistan has been no exception. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets view pilot training in Afghanistan as superb.’: Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet military command has drawn several lessons from the fighting experience of their troops in Afghanistan; There have been numerous articles in the Soviet military press on mountain training and some emphasizing the need to develop the ‘initiatives’ of field commanders and the physical fitness of fighting men. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Estimates of Soviet losses in Afghanistan vary enormously, and so do estimates of what Afghanistan has been costing the Kremlin. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets are said to have lost 5,000 vehicles and 600 helicopters. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It is true that the Kabul regime does not have a grip on much of the countryside, but neither does the resistance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Writing for the Congressional Research Service in January 1985, Richard Cronin drew up a more or less similar political-military land- scape in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Soviet strategy seems to be to maintain control of Afghanistan with a minimum military commitment while seeking to train a new generation of Afghan communist leaders loyal to Moscow. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Cronin’s overview of the impact of Soviet military operations in Afghanistan has been confirmed by other American sources. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
According to an Afghan scholar working at Columbia University, New York City, who has kept close track of the fighting within Afghanistan, the Soviets have had significant successes in several areas. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Perhaps their two most important successes have been, first, the failure of the resistance groups to unite politically and to set up an alternative government on ‘liberated Afghan territory’, and, second, the fighting Soviet Wingsfor the SaurRevolution 109 110 Afghanistan between and among insurgent groups. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the National Assembly members demanded retaliation, mainly in order to further embarrass the military regime which did not wish to get involved in a military conflict with Soviet-backed Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Members also demanded direct negotiation with Afghanistan, for which the military regime was not prepared. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On 12 June, the National Assembly held a thirty-minute debate on Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Under the Soviet Wingsfor the SaurRevolution 111 112 Afghanistan protective wings of Moscow, Babrak Karmal has been trying, since January 1980, to put the Saur revolution together again. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Whether the the Parchain Phase Soviets will withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, and when, will depend entirely on the Marxist regime acquiring the internal strength necessary for its survival when the Russian soldiers have gone. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They had given complete support to the regime since they had themselves helped to instal it in Kabul in the immediate wake of their military intervention. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In mid-1985, as will be seen later in this volume, the Soviets seemed to be more confident than at any time since December 1979 of bring- ing the Afghan drama to a denouement which was to their liking. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In April the Revolutionary Council proclaimed a new Afghan constitution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Revolutionary Council Total number 56 Babrak Karmal Assadullah Sarwarj Sultan Mi Kishtmand Nour Ahmad Nour Major General Abdul Qader Licutenant-Coloncl Mohammad Aslam Watanjar Licutenant-Coloncl Gui Aqa Dr Anahita Ratcbzad Dr Saich Mohammad Zcary Ghulam Dastagir Panchsheri Dr Raz Mohammad Paktin Saycd Mohammad Gulabzoi Shah Mohammad Dost Lieutenant-Colonel Shcrjan Mazdooryan’ Abdurrashid Aryan Abdui Majid Sarbuland Abdui Wakil Fazui Rahim Mohinand Licutcoant-Coloncl Faiz Mohammad Guldad Prof. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The new constitution ensured equal rights of women as well as ‘genuine equality’ of all large and small national groups and tribes in Afghanistan, providing them with equal opportunities to develop their traditions, languages, literature and arts. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Special status was con- ferred on the ‘numerous Pathan tribes inhabiting southern and south- western Afghanistan.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The public sector would extend chiefly to the production of capital goods, power development and transport. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The constitution came into force on 15 April, seven weeks after a week-long demonstration of popular resentment at the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, the February demonstration was the last public protest on a mass scale in Kabul or any other large city in Afghanistan against the Soviet military presence and/or the Karmal regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Carter administration was not willing to pay a high price for Pakistani co-operation in a bloody opposition to the Sovietization of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karmal visited Moscow twice, the second time for a meeting with Yuri Andropov. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Kabul New Times carried reports of rebel activities in different areas, the rebels being described as ‘bandits’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Kishtmand only came to the situation in Afghanistan at the end of a long speech delivered at the Non-Aligned summit. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He said that 300,000 landless peasants had been given land, free of cpst, since 1978, and the cancellation of land revenue had benefited 200,000 poor rural families. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets, he said, were doing everything in their power to help Afghanistan rebuild itself, but, said Karmal, Moscow could not solve Afghanistan’s economic problems: ‘we must take decisions ourselves’.23 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Addressing the 11th plenum of the PDPA central committee in March, Karma! said that the civil war had taken a toll of 24bn. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Sheberghan, capital of Tauzjan province, ‘one of the cradles’ of Afghan communism, was said to be fast develop- ing into a ‘big industrial sector’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Since 1983 the rebels in Afghanistan have been getting larger and better supplies of arms from the base camps in Pakistan, and reports printed in the Afghan press often speak of ‘intensified fighting with bandit gangs’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The plan gave an idea of the volume of development assistance Afghanistan was getting from the USSR. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In a long report published in the CPSU journal Party L!/~ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In his report to the 14th plenum, Karmal claimed that the political- military situation in Afghanistan had ‘improved to a certain extent’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On lOjanuary, Karmal inaugurated the ‘grand meeting’ in Kabul in the presence of fraternal delegations from twenty-seven foreign communist parties, and one from the ruling Congress I party of India.35 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The SaurRevolution: the Parcham Phase 127 128 Afghanistan parry’s membership stood at 120,000, of whom 32,000 had been recruited in the Afghan year of March 1983 to March 1984. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karmal was satisfied with the ‘consolidation of Afghanistan’s position in the world’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karma! Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karmal spoke warmly of the contributions of the Soviet Union towards Afghanistan’s economic development. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Ninety-nine projects built with Soviet assistance were in operation, he said, while ninety more were either under construction or undergoing feasibility study. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The parry’s Politburo had decided, as a matter of policy, that the border with Pakistan would be ‘sealed, protected and defended’, Babrak Karmal told the plenum. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karmal implied that most of the people who had not joined the resistance or had seemingly accepted the regime were sullen in their minds and alienated in their attitudes. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The claims that Karma! Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the gory revolutionary drama of Afghanistan, the ‘contending kings’ are five. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Three are directly involved: Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Of the five parties involved in the Afghan problem, the positions of three—the United States, Pakistan and the Afghan resistance—are weakened by inherent contradictions and gaps between their avowed objectives and the resources they are willing to deploy, and are capable Prospects for a Political Settlement 132 Afghanistan of deploying, for the achievement of their goals. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The positions of the two other parties, the Soviet Union and the Marxist regime in Kabul, are also weak, but the weakness is derived more from the hard, intran- sigent realities in Afghanistan than from the external forces that are committed to make their political objectives difficult and expensive to attain. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the last five years or more no serious attempt has been made to find a solution to the Afghan problem which is both desirable and practicable. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Indeed, a fundamental contradiction exists between the two since what is desirable for the United States, Pakistan and the Afghan resistance, namely, the liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet occupation and control, and the restoration of its status as a non- aligned sovereign state with a government that represents the political preferences of the majority of its people, is not practicable. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The United States has neither the political will nor the military power to fight the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Clearly then, the three parties cannot, even with their combined resources, reasonably e’xpect to throw the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Moscow has dug in for a long haul, and time is its ally in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets have made it clear that the situation around Afghanistan is politically negotiable, the situation within Afghanistan is not. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet position on Afghanistan has remained stubbornly consistent. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Six basic premises can be distinguished from a mountain of Soviet pronounce- ments on Afghanistan, beginning with an article in Pravda of 31 December 1979 by political analyst A. Petrov, right up to the comments in the Soviet press in the first six months of 1985, including, in this broad sweep of time, numerous authoritative statements by Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachov. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Brezhnev was more specific when he said that ‘imperialism together with its accomplices launched an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
(2) The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in order to maintain the security and stability of its southern, central Asian, flank. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet Union has gone into Afghanistan with military force to(4) defend a fraternal Marxist regime from imperialist-aided local counterrevolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet action in Afghanistan is aimed at preventing the United States(5) from advancing its spheres of influence in a region very close to the Soviet Union’s southern frontiers. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Making this point, a Pravda editorial on 29 January 1980 said, ‘Washington, it seems, proceeds from the assumption that it is enough to declare Iran, Afghanistan and other countries or areas thousands of kilometres away from the American shores as zones of America’s vital interest—to be more precise, of the biggest monopolist and the military industrial complex of the USA—for everybody to accept this.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
These six Soviet premises have remained unaltered in the five and a half years of Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Indeed, Soviet losses in Afghanistan have been more in terms of prestige and image in the Third World than in the fmancial and human costs of the military operations. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The cost of warfare, as we have seen in Chapter 8, has been bearable. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Those in the United States and elsewhere who had hoped that Afghanistan would develop as Moscow’s Vietnam have been proved wrong. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fighting in Afghanistan is not unpopular in the Soviet Union; if anything, it has stirred the patriotism of the Russian people. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan draws towards its fifth anniversary this month, it is clear that the war is not resulting in the domestic backlash that the Vicmam war stirred in the United States. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Kremlin leaders are preparing their countrymen for a long- drawn-out war in Afghanistan, the outcome of which, they are convinced, can only go in Kabul’s and Moscow’s favour. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As Izvestia put it in early December 1984, ‘Judging by the current attitudes of Washington and Islamabad toward the political regulation of the situation around Afghanistan, war against Afghanistan is more dear to them than that peace in Southwest Asia.’5 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It took the Bolsheviks more than ten years to tame the Central Asian republics and to yoke them fully to the Soviet State. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
From the beginning, the American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been a matter of dispute between the administra- tion and dissenting sections of the foreign policy elite.Jimmy Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Carter, as noted, described the Soviet action as a ‘stepping stone to .. . Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There are two contradictory versions of American aid to the Afghan resistance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On the vital question of how the Russians and the Kabul regimes are doing in Afghanistan and the success of the guerrillas operations, too, there are sharp differences among Americans as well as between American and British intelligence agencies. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Nearly two years ago, on 4 December 1983, Drew Middleton reported in the New York Times that resistance to the Soviets had diminished in Afghanistan as a result of’a shortage of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and rivalry between pro-western and pro-Iranian rebel groups’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Middleton added that ‘western analysts, surveying the present situa- tion, say they wonder whether the trend toward Soviet domination is Prospectsfor a Political Settlement 139 140 Afghanistan irreversible.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This was perhaps an American way of expressing doubt that Afghanistan could ever be extricated from Soviet influence. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1984, the level of weapons supplied to the guerrillas was raised, but it is quite clear to objective observers that it is not the United States but Pakistan which determines how ‘effective’ the resistance can be. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There is a mock heroic touch in the resolutions that get extraordi- narily rapid passage through the United States Congress calling for ‘effective support’ by the administration to the Afghan guerrillas. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘We have maintained’, the statement said, that any negotiated political settlement for Afghanistan, besides including the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the return of the non-aligned and independent status of Afghanistan, and the return of the refugees, must include self- determination for the Afghan people. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
From the American position, the consent of the Afghan people to the type of government that exists in Kabul is of the first priority, and the consent must presumably come primarily from the resistance groups in Afghanistan and the refugees who have taken shelter in Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Reagan administration knows that the Soviets would neither change the regime in Kabul in accordance with the political wishes of the rebels nor restore a regime in Afghanistan which Mr Reagan could recognize as non-aligned and independent. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This rider has proved to be an adequate brake on Pakistan’s initial earnest intention to seek a solution to the Afghan problem through the UN negotiation process. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Pakistan’s dilemmas are many and it has to ride the wave of several contradictions. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The American connection is all-important for the military regime in Pakistan, but it is not enough to get Pakistan out of the binds created by the Soviet push into Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fourth round of ‘proximity talks’ between Pakistan and Afghanistan under the UN negotiation process took place in Geneva inJune 1985. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
General Zia has kept the UN negotiating process alive, but few informed observers believe that Cardovez will be able to deliver a comprehensive political settlement of the Afghan problem. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Before the June session began, the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan provisionally agreed to the protocol of a Prospecisfor a Political Settlement 143 144 Afghanistan draft agreement. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Whether the Soviet offer was a purely tactical move or else reflected a changed approach in response to the reality of an escalating stalemate within Afghanistan was never tested. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The exact shape and constituent elements of a future coalition was to be left to a later stage following preliminary agreement on the first steps of the Geneva negotiations and once implementation had been initiated. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Zahir Shah, self-exiled in Rome since 1973, issued a declaration when the June 1983 negotiating session reopened in Geneva. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets, for their part, gave the appearance of supporting the plan elaborated by the UN negotiator. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Prospectsfora Political Settlement 145 146 Afghanistan The first pertained to the question of international guarantees, and the second concerned the establishment of a precise timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He arrived in the Chinese capital on May 15 to discuss with the Chinese the terms of the accord. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
But there is also a hard-line faction that prefers the status quo in Afghanistan as it does in Cambodia as a means of bleeding Moscow’s resources and embarrassing it internationally as an aggressor, directly in the first instance, and by proxy in the second. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The underlying assumption of the UN scenario is that a face-saving Prospectsfora Political Settlement 147 148 Afghanistan agreement in Afghanistan cannot directly address the replacement or modifi- cation of the Kabul regime as a precondition for Soviet disengagement but must leave this to paralleled processes of political accommodation before, during and after the disengagement period.’8 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In Moscow, the Yakub Khan-Gromyko meeting ran into an impasse. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Were the Soviets serious in 1983 in their quest for a political settle- ment? Would they have withdrawn their troops from Afghanistan if Pakistan had concluded the negotiated agreements with Kabul? The Americans have expressed scepticism, but in Pakistan there was certainly an air of expectancy in early 1983, to which the present author was witness. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It is quite probable that Andropov wanted to get the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan after he had been elected General Secretary of the CPSU, if an honourable exit could be arranged. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
His position became stronger on the death of Suslov in 1982 and with the setbacks the Soviet—Afghan forces suffered in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet attitude hardened after the passing of Andropov. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1983—4 the Soviets escalated their military operations against the Afghan rebels and terminated more than one local ceasefire agreement. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet hardline was confirmed in icy language by Moscow’s ambassador to Pakistan who took the unusual step of writing a signed letter to the editor of The Muslim, of Islamabad, early in 1985, stating the Soviet position on Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
First, the Afghanistan problem was created by the ‘hostile action’ of several countries against the Marxist regime in Kabul; second, the Soviet troops were in Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan Govern- ment, fulfilling Moscow’s treaty-bound obligations to a friendly regime; third, if Pakistan or any other party wished to conduct negotiations, they must negotiate with Kabul and not with the Soviet Union; and, fourth, the political future of Afghanistan was not negoti- able. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Behind the Smirnov letter was a little-known fact connected with the UN negotiations. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Prospectsfor a Political Settlement 151 152 Afghanistan With the advent of 1985, the Soviets appeared to be poised at a cross- roads. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A commentary in Pravda reviewed disclosures that secret assist- ance by the CIA to the Afghan rebels had become the largest American operation since the Vietnam war. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He received General Zia at Chernenko’s funeral, to tell him in the clearest possible terms that the Soviet Union was not prepared to remain engaged in a prolonged stalemate with Pakistan over Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Meanwhile, the political mood in Pakistan began to change after the party-less election to the National Assembly in February 1985. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
a Political Settlement 153 154 Afghanistan to a political settlement in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fourth round of Geneva talks ended without any breakthrough Prospect.sfor Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In mid-1985 few Americans and fewer Pakistanis are confident that the Afghan resistance can win the war against the Soviet and the PDPA regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Americans are generally reluctant to concede the resist- ance’s defeat. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Most Americans would prefer to wrest the maximum possible advantage from the Soviet predicament inAfghanistan, to make the Soviets bleed as much and as long as possible, and to make the price of Afghanistan so heavy that the Kremlin will not repeat the adventure in another piece of Third World real estate. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Whether the Afghanistan issue is finally settled on the rubblized mountain terrain of the Hindu Kush in more blood, sweat, agony and suffering, or through a negotiated political settlement, it is going to be a long haul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, eventually, the Saur revolution will be saved, and it will have to address itself to the Herculean task of rebuilding and remoulding the ravaged and devastated Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Prospecisfora Pol itical Settlement 155 11 In the diverse world of some thirty Marxist regimes, Afghanistan has a number of distinctions all its own. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan had been a sovereign country since 1920, though never exactly outside the British sphere of influence. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Af han revolution is the first < Marxist revolution in the< world to becomd a target of Islamic fundamentalism < Afghanistan is not the only Third World country where a numeri- cally small communist party has carried out a successful revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It would have commanded the disciplined loyalty of sizeable numbers of officers and larger numbers of soldiers, and since the soldiers were drawn from the tribes—a majority from the Pushtuns—the revolution would probably have provoked less hostility in the rural areas. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The political ambience of 1978 was very different from that of the late sixties and early seventies. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At the same time, the Soviet Union had emerged unmistakably as a global military power capable of intervening, and willing to intervene, in national liberation struggles on The Future of the Afghan Revolution 159 160 Afghanistan behalfofits friends and allies, In the early 1970s, the Soviets were supply- ing crucial military help to three Third World areas at the same time: to the North Vietnamese in South-east Asia, to the, Indians in South Asia (during the Bangladesh war), and to the Egyptians in the Middle East In the mid-seventies, Soviet military help proved a decisive factor in the Vietnam war, and the triumph of communist revolutions in the three Indo-China states; Cuban troops, airlifted in Soviet transport planes with heavy war equipment, determined the fate of the revolutions in Angola and Mozambique. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The reason why the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan with 100,000 troops will always remainamatter of controversy. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghans may reconcile themselves to the fact of Marxist rule, but they will not identify themselves with the Marxist state until they are convinced that it is a sovereign and independ- ent state controlled by themselves, and not directed from Moscow. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The compelling circumstances of a satellite revolution that existed inEastern Europe do not exist in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For the Afghans, development alone will not be sufficient recom- pense for the revolution if it is bereft of the conscious identity of an independent, sovereign people. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Each or most of them were genuine national liberation movements, whether they were aimed at foreign imperialist powers or, as in Cuba and Nicaragua, domestic reaction backed by foreign imperialism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
From 1983 onwards, PDPA propaganda has sought to portray the Saur revolution as a defender of Afghanistan’s sovereignty and independence as well as its traditional non-alignment. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They, as well as the PDPA leaders, are pinning their hopes on the build- ing up of a committed, disciplined Afghan army in the next five to ten years. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The diverse world of Marxist-Leninism is peopled with diverse models of development in a bewildering mix of Western and non- Western cultures. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
No two communisms are the same, and Afghan communisnZ as and when it develops its own identity will not only remain Afghan, but will increasingly rediscover its Afghan-ness. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The question of armed violence is as relevant to the mujahidin based on Pakistani territory as it is to the population of Marxist-ruled Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Soldiers of national liberation movements in the Third World have as a rule not fled their countries and taken shelter in adjoining states. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Louis Dupree has noted a significant result of the refugee movement out of Afghanistan, which, he believes, is loaded with political implications. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Since the Soviet military intervention, large numbers of northern-based Pushtuns have taken their families to the security of refugee camps in Pakistan and then returned to their ‘zones of origin’ to fight with their ‘distant cousins’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Among the Pushtun refugees who have assembled on Pakistani territory are many who had been compelled to move from the southern to the northern provinces of Afghanistan in the nineteenth- century reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880—1901). Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The levelling of ethnic and tribal barriers among the three million Afghan refugees encamped in Pakistan is of greater consequence for Pakistan’s political and social stability. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As of February l985, three million Afghan refugees were located in 235 Refugee Tented Villages (RTV) in the NWFP sixty-one in Baluchistan and ten in the Punjab.” Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Among the refugees are members of the former royal family, of the bureaucracy, highly educated people who had jobs in the university or colleges or worked as journalists and writers, technocrats, disenchanted Marxists belong- ing to the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA, displaced students, military officers, nomad and gipsy groups, semi-nomadic and semi- stationary groups, and migrant labourers. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They came into Pakistan in three large waves, though the movement has hardly stopped at any time since April 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Pakistan Government has fed the refugees on promises that they will be able to return to an Afghanistan liberated from the Soviet invaders and from Marxism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
International contribu- tions to the maintenance of the Afghan refugees have been adequate so fac about half the cost is said to be borne byPakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Destruction of vast areas of the countryside has deprived the resistance of their essential supplies of food and water. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This promise has been reiterated by numerous government leaders—of the United States, China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France, Japan and several other countries—who have visited the refugee camps since January 1980. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Future of the Afghan Revolution 167 168 Afghanistan Pakistan cannot create a similar situation in Afghanistan, nor can the United States, nor the Afghan refugees or the resistance within Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan refugees cannot be separated from the Afghan revolu- tion. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the long mn perhaps in ten years from now, the political impact of Marxist-ruled Afghanistan will be quite strong on Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
If the PDPA can stabilize its national democracy in Afghanistan, with support from democratic non-Marxist elements, its political and economic experi- ments will be most closely watched by the elites ofPakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A successful remoulding of the relationships among the Afghan national groups would have a strong impact on Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The strategic impact of a Marxist-ruled Afghanistan, closely tied up with the Soviet Union, on Pakistan will be felt sooner and more profoundly. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Pakistan cannot afford to live in hostility or even unfriendli- ness with the Soviet Union and India for any period of time—a reality which Pakistani strategic thinkers have recognized since 1982. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Khan Wali Khan, the National Awami Party leader of the NWFP, has been a regular visitor to Kabul; his aged father, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, still a respected figure in the Frontier Province, has lived the greater part of the last five years in the Afghan capital. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Future of the Afghan Revolution 169 170 Afghanistan Speaking in the same vein, Benazir Bhutto said that Pakistan should have med other means of resolving the crisis and should not have rushed to the United States, accusing the Soviet Union, whom she described as ‘a superpower and the fifth largest Muslim nation in the world’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Neither the Afghan revolution nor the PDPA regime in Afghanistan can be seen separately from Soviet power and influence in the strategic regions of Arabia and South Asia. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
With Afghanistan as an outpost of Soviet influence, Moscow will find it easier to operate its Pakistan policy and with greater chances of success. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Future of the Afghan Revolution 171 172 Afghanistan Yet, when Shahi announced Pakistan’s rejection of the Carter admini- stration’s ‘peanut’ offer of $400 m. in aid, he did look to the Soviet Union as an alternative source of help. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1985 the Soviets do not view their future inSouth Asia with pessi- mism either. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets face two different manifestations of Islamic funda- mentalism in the ‘situation around Afghanistan’: the radical funda- mentalism of the Aytollah Khomeini in Iran, and the conservative fundamentalism of Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Both varieties are hostile to the Marxist regime of Afghanistan, but they are unable to unite on a common political platform, and are indeed fighting each other in some resistance— held areas of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
To be sure, this has helped the Afghan communists as well as the Soviets. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The radical Islamic fundamentalists are anti-American as well as anti-Soviet, in the Soviet perception— basically more anti-communist than anti—capitalist. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The third plank of the Soviet battle plan is Marxist revolution in Islamic nations. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets seem to believe that as the fundamentalist tide ebbs, South Yemen and Afghanistan will draw the minds and ears of the Muslims of Arabia, the Middle East and South Asia as attractive models of development and modernization. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Iran and Pakistan will be special targets of the Soviet battle plan against Islamic fundamentalism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Schilz, A Geography ofAfghanistan, University of Nebraska, Omaha, Cen- ter for Afghanistan Studies, 1976. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Asghar H. Bilgrami, Afghanistan and British India 1793—1907, A Study in5. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The buffer concept was rejected by Afghanistan also. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Anatomy of the Raj: Russian Consular Reports, New Delhi, People’s Publishing House, 1981, p. Nabokov’s reports show how great was Russian concern about Islamic fundamentalism spreading from Afghanistan to Turkey. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Cited in Fred Halliday, ‘Revolution in Afghanistan’, New Left Review, London, November-December 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Ibid.17. 18. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Robert Hennman, ‘Afghanistan under the Red Flag’, International Journal25. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Chapter 2 1. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Chapter 3 1. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. CanfIeld (eds), Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan, Berkeley, Institute of Internatipnal Studies, California University Press, 1983, p. 7. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 179 180 Afghanistan 16. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Robert Neumann, ‘Afghanistan Under the Red Flag’, in Z. Michael Zsaz, The Impact of the Iranian Events Upon the Persian Gulf and U.S. Security, Washington DC, American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979, p. 138; see also Dupree, ‘Afghanistan Under the Khalq’, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
13. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Bechtel, ‘Afghanistan: The Proud Revolution’, New World Review, 49, 1, 1981, p. 11. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Vladimir Glukhoded, ‘Economy of Independent Afghanistan’s Social Sciences Today, 1981, pp. 222-45. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Sadhan Mukherjee, of the Communist Party of India (CPI) estimated the total peasant debt in Afghanistan at 722 in. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
What Is Happening in Afghanistan, New Delhi, CPI Publications, 9,July 1981, p. 16. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Nancy Dupree, ‘Revolutionary Rhetoric and Afghan Women’ in Revolu~- tions and Rebellions in Afghanistan, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
pp. 312—13; also her ‘Behind the Veil in Afghanistan’, Asia, 1,2, August 1978, pp. 10_15;ProgressR~p0rt 1977, Kabul, Ministry of Information and Culture (MIC); and Dr Anihita Ratibzad’s interview with Soviet Women, 5, February 1980. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 181 182 Afghanistan 26. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
28. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Fred Halhiday, ‘Revolution in Afghanistan’, New Left Review, 112, November-December 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
30. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
31. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Clifford Geertz, Thelnterpretation ofCultures, NewYork,BasicBooks, 1973, p. 168; Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919-1922, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
M. Nazif Shahrani, ‘Marxist “Revolution” and Islamic Resistance’ in Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
1981, pp. 93—4. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
New York Times, 13 January 1980. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For one of the best accounts of the Afghan resistance, see Anthony Hyman, Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, London, Macmillan, 1982, Ch. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For perhaps the bestjournalistic field report, see Gerard Ghaliand, Reportfrom Afghanistan, New York, Viking Press, Penguin, 1981. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Fred Halliday, ‘War and Revolution in Afghanistan’, NewLeftReview, 119, January—February 1980, pp. 20—41. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
7.Halliday, Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
See the pape,rs by these scholars in Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanis-9. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Halliday, ‘War and Revolution in Afghanistan’, (1980), op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Halliday, ‘Afghanistan: A Revolution Consumes Itself’, (1979), op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
FBIS, 10 October 1979; Halliday, ‘Revolution in Afghanistan’, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 185 186 Afghanistan 36. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Mishra (ed.), Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Kabul Radio did appear to have broadcast in Dari at 22.40 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 187 188 Afghanistan 9. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There isan element ofirony that Afghanistan’s most fundamentalist Islamic rebel leader, who swears by the Iranian revolution, should become a focus for the Western legend of the resistance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets have mobilized a formidable array of military force and have engaged in flexible tactics to overpower Masud’s guerrilla forces. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
JosephJ. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Individual Americans have claimed that Afghanistan has been costing 23. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
UN negotiation process, Selig S.. Harrison, ‘Rough Plan Emerging for Afghan Peace’, New York Times, 12 July 1982, and ‘A Breakthrough in Afghanistan?’, Fore:gn Policy, 51, summer, 1983; and Bhabam Sen Gupta, ‘A Regional Approach to a Political Settlement in Afghanistan’, paper read at International Conference on Afghanistan, Ch. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
See also, for a fuller and to a large extent corroborated overview of the Notes 191 192 Afghanistan 16. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Cited in Lifschultz. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 193 194 Afghanistan 8. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For an overview of Afghan history since the last decades of the nineteenth century until the withering of the British empire in the subcontinent, the reader may pick up Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics ofReform and Modernization, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1974 edn, and supplement it profitablywithLeonB. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919—1929: King Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1973. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Also recommended is Richard S. Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan , Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
British interactions with Afghanistan are of considerable interest and importance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On Afghanistan itself, D. N. Wilbur’s Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture ,New Haven, HRAF Press, 1962 is a good, reliable introductory volume. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Richard Tapper’s edited volume, The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan, London, Croom Helm, 1983; Ashraf Ghani, ‘Islam and State- Building in a Tribal Society: Afghanistan: 1880—1801’, in Modern Asian Studies, 12, 2, 1978, pp. 269—84; and Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973, together with M. ZazifShahrani and RobertL. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, there has also been a good deal of serious Soviet writing on Afghanistan since April 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The non-expert reader interested in Soviet perspectives on Afghani- stan may usefully read the 1981 issue of Social Sciences Today, for a number of in-depth studies of Afghanistan’s social, economic and political problems by a group of Soviet specialists. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan revolution and the Soviet military intervention to defend it from collapse are also to be seen in the context of ethnic and Islamic aspects of the Central Asian republics of the USSR Recommended reading are: E. Allworth (ed.), Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For insights into the new phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism, useful readings include Cynak K. Pullapilly (ed.), Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Harrison’s In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981, is relevant to the long-term consequences of the Afghan revolution in the area around Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At least two useful publications have emerged from Congressional concern over A Wodd View,edited by Bodgan Szajkowski, General Editor of the A VerySe!ect Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Soviet publications have been much fewer in number than American and West European put together. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For South Asian perceptions of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Power, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1982; K. P. Mishra (ed.), Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan in Crisis, New Delhi, Vikas, 1981; G. S. Bhargava, South Asian Security after Afghanistan, Lexington, Mass., Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Yearbook of lnternational Communism 1985 carries an excellent survey of the affairs of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan in 1984 by Richard Cronon (Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, 1985). Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Anthony Arnold’s Afghanistan’s Two Party Communism, Stanford, Hoover institute, 1981, is infor- mative, but dated; as are Dupree’s several papers mentioned in the Notes to the text of this volume. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
the best sources are Ka bul New Times and Public Opinion Trends (POT), Afghanistan series, New Delhi. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Finally, the reader may like to see the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the larger context of Soviet foreign policy and Moscow’s involvement with Third World revolutions and conflicts. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979—1982 M. UNIVERSITY Berkeley Hassan Kakar OF CALIFORMA PRESS LondonLos Angeles University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan: response, 1979—1982. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
*Contents AFGHANISTAN i. z. Why Did the Soviet Union Invade? Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
138 10. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
During my stay in Honolulu, Mr. Dixon also provided me with press clippings on Afghanistan, for which I am also grateful. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Last but not least, I am grateful to Mr. Zamin Mohmand for sending me press clippings on Afghanistan and the region. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Introduction Landlocked Afghanistan links Central Asia with South Asia and, to some extent, with West Asia or the Middle East. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The latter is also con- nected through Afghanistan to China. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Theii main division, the Durrani, provided Afghanistan with the ruling dynasties of Sadozay in the eighteenth century and Mohammadzay from then until recently. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
An ancient land, Afghanistan has a long and eventful history. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan has, mainly in its outlying regions, people of common descent with those of its neighboring countries. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In the nine- teenth century both powers grabbed vast territories from Afghanistan, reducing it to its present size; they then looked on it as a buffer state. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Britain was the more aggressive, warring with Afghanistan three times (in 1838, 1878, and 1918), conducting foreign relations for it (i88o— 1918), and imposing the aforementioned Durand Line (1893). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The delimitation of the boundaries of Afghanistan coincided with the efforts of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880—1901) to lay the founda- tion of a strong central government, which marked the emergence of a nation-state. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In this initial phase the state became absolute, monopolistic, protectionist, and indif- ferent to modernization schemes in fields other than the military. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
stan to the outside world, the introduction of modern education, and the emergence of a small but assertive educated and bureaucratic middle class that was nationalist and constitutionaliSt in outlook. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The failure of the reforms and the rule of a Tajik amir for the first time in modern Afghanistan had serious repercussions that became manifest during the reign of King Nadir (192.9—3 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Masterminded by the businessman Abdul Majid Zabuli, a banking system was introduced, and joint stock companies for export and import were set up. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The new prime minister, Shah Mahmud, another uncle of the king, was a mild person suitable to rule at a time when Afghanistan was applying for membership to the United Nations. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The creation of Pakistan following the British withdrawal from the subcontinent of India in 1947 prompted Afghanistan to raise the ques- tion of the principle of self-determination in regard to Pashtunistan, now claimed by Pakistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
During this decade Afghanistan experienced fundamental changes that were initiated more under his direction than under either his brother or the king. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Premier Daoud was left no choice but to approach the Soviet Union for economic as well as military aid. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For its part the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, was willing to extend aid, hoping to keep Afghanistan outside the American-dominated military blocs. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Khrushchev also supported Afghanistan’s stand on Pashtunistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
King Mohammad Zahir decided that the time was ripe for Afghanistan to be ruled demo- cratically. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The accomplishments of the constitutional decade were many. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Prisoners of the previous regime were released, and no one could be imprisoned before being tried as law required. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Also during the constitutional period, for the first time in Afghan history the government ceased to be authoritarian and its agents ceased to boss individuals. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He now had to share power with members of the pro-Moscow communist Parcham faction of the PDPA, whose military wing helped him to usurp power. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The change in relations with the Soviet Union meant distancing Af- ghanistan from it when “the Russians had become increasingly dis- turbed by the emergence of new and expanded ties between Afghanistan and its Islamic neighbors.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Further, he “wanted the Afghan government to get rid of those experts, who were nothing more than spies bent on promot- ing the cause of imperialism.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Following the coup, the PDPA ruled Afghanistan with Nur Moham- mad Taraki as president of the Revolutionary Council, prime minister, and general secretary of the PDPA. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Even within the PDPA, the ruling Khalqi faction suppressed the Parcham faction and sent its leaders abroad as ambassadors, later dismissing them. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Despite the sheer quantity of interesting events, no historian in any language has so far studied the period as a unit in detail. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The account is divided into four parts. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Part i deals with why and how the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
After darkness set in, about five thousand Soviet soldiers, who had been landing during the past three days at the International Airport of Kabul,1 headed toward Tapa-e-Tajbeg palace, where Hafizullah Amin, president of the Revolutionary Council, prime minister of the Demo- cratic Republic of Afghanistan, and general secretary of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, had transferred his seat from the city palace on 19 December 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At the time of the attack Amin was conscious but groggy. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The invading units must have been concerned with the possible reac- tion by Division Eight of Qargha and Division Seven of Rishkhor. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Never before have the Afghan defenders of national dignity failed in their duty as these communist officers failed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin returned to Afghanistan in late 1965 a bitter man but deter- mined to stand up against the political establishment, which he thought to have deprived him of his right to higher education. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin held that in developing countries such as Afghanistan the mili- tary, not workers or peasants, could bring about revolution. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For Amin, this theory had practical implications. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
“Whereas Amin did not favor the idea of Afghanistan being pushed into the Soviet bloc, Taraki did. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Simi- larly, with regard to the pursuit of the policy of non-alignment, Taraki preferred that Afghanistan should be non-aligned on the model of Cuba with the active support of the Soviet bloc, whereas Amin intended to. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Once again he was mistaken. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghan officials were forced to accept Moscow’s price schedule and its word on the amount being transported into the Soviet Union and the credit due Af- ghanistan.25 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Being a communist, and seeing that Afghanistan had been made de- pendent on the Soviet Union, Amin hoped that the Soviet Union would assist Afghanistan in its development schemes. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At the same time Amin began to remove pro-Soviet officials from sensitive positions and recruited Western-educated Afghans to higher positions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He failed to understand that the Soviet leaders pre- ferred compliant rulers in countries such as Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Although concerned about independence, Amin wanted to de- velop Afghanistan with Soviet help, stating, “We are convinced that if there were no vast economic and military aid from the Soviet Union, we could not resist the aggression and conspiracies of imperialism, its leftist-looking allies [China and others] and international reaction, and could not move our country toward the construction of a socialist so- ciety.”34 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By “military aid” Amin meant military weapons. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin knew that the Durand Line could be used by either Pakistan or Afghanistan against the other, depending on circumstances. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
When Amin usurped power, it was Pakistan’s turn. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin proceeded to follow, in the words of the Kremlin masters, “a more balanced policy.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For them it was not hard to become certain about those intentions: Taraki had assured his Kremlin comrades that “we will never be as close to anyone else as we are to you”;4° by.contrast, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To meet the assault, Afghanistan should be prepared militarily. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In December 1979 Soviet officials told Amin that the “revolution” was in danger from the United States, which was about to launch a mas- sive assault from the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The place was a sort of bridgehead where Soviet specialists and advisers with their fam- ilies could assemble if the situation got worse.”42 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet government and the regime of Karmal have claimed that the troops sent into Afghanistan were in line with article four of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation, which Taraki and Brezhnev had concluded in Moscow on ~ December 1978. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The security situation in Afghanistan was far from being so desperate as to need Soviet troops. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Had Amin requested military aid, as dis- tinct from weapons, the Soviet Union would have obtained a document about it, a point so significant that it was bound to affect, as it did, its relations with Afghanistan and to some extent also with the region and the world. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The treaty reads in part, “In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the high contracting parties, they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Since Amin was the central figure both in the party hierarchy and the II 40 state, and since he had driven away his rivals, and since he had assigned his own men to key positions in the party as well as the government, it is inconceivable that someone else would have dared to invite Soviet troops. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Also, in ordinary language the phrase “armed interference from the outside” means interference by one country in the internal affairs of another—in the present case, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In the course of the ten years that the Soviet troops were in Afghanistan, they fought against Afghans, not against the army of another country. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
If the Soviet Union sent troops to Afghanistan to be used “exclusively for assistance in rebuffing the armed interference from the outside,” why did they kill President Amin and topple his government, which they claimed to have invited them? On this point the Soviet argument was that Amin had been overthrown not by its forces but by the true Afghan 4 revolutionaries. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
December 1989 the Soviet Supreme Council declared the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan unconstitutional. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
While castigating Leonid Brezhnev and others for sending the troops into Afghanistan, it declared that the decision to invade Afghanistan “was made by a small circle of people in violation of the Soviet constitution, according to which such matters belong to the jurisdiction of higher state bodies.”48 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
First, this claim is not in line with the alle- gation that the troops were sent to repel foreign aggression. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
More specifically, across the wide Soviet empire no other country ex- cept Turkey had as geographically distinct boundaries as Afghanistan had with it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan was separated from the Soviet empire for 2,300 kilometers, for the greater part by the River Oxus and then by an unin- habitable desert. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The claims were a cover-up for an agenda the Kremlin decision mak- ers had for Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In the present interdependent world, a secret decision made by a few irresponsible men in the Soviet empire to wage an unprovoked war on Afghanistan was bound to be opposed by millions of men and women; it also led to the intensification of the cold war. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But could they succeed in Afghanistan with the outcast Karmal and his faction of Parcham? Under the Soviet Shadow When the Soviet forces started operations in Kabul, Babrak Karmal, the outcast leader of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, was in Doshanbay, the capital city of the Soviet republic of Tajikistan bordering Afghani- stan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In- stead, a tape recording of his voice was used. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
It read in part, “The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan earnestly demands that the USSR render urgent political, moral, and economic assistance, including military aid, to Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The second official announcement was also brief but stunning. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At this time the new government existed only on paper. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On i o January i 980 the names of ministers of the new government were announced. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The new government was composed of Parchamis, Khalqis, and a few pro-Parcham individuals. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin’s senior ministers, with the exception of two, were imprisoned. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The incident brought the Sitam-e-Milli to the front line of national and international attention for the first time; it also worsened relations between Afghani- stan and the United States. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Serious also was the exploitation of the locals by government offi-’ cials. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
All peoples want to know the identity of their rulers, and that desire is particularly strong among the genealogy-conscious Afghans. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
It is a custom in Afghanistan for a person of no ethnic significance to relate himself to the ethnic group into which he has been integrated. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But in Afghanistan the head of state must gain legitimacy either directly from the constitu- encies or through their representatives, in accord with social conven- tions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
According to one of these stories, he entered Afghanistan “through revolutionary pathways” and along.with Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
was hurriedly brought back. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Karmal’s poor performance in interviews with foreign journalists also failed to help his public image. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
An adviser in Herat, in return for a golden necklace for his wife, released a member of the Afghan Millat Party who had been sentenced to death. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Also, the Afghans had seen that the same Karmal following the communist coup had, with others, promised that private as well as personal property would remain safe, a promise that they violated. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Among the measures promised by Karmal, the most important were the release of prisoners; the promulgation of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; the change of the red, Soviet-style banner of the Khalq period to the more orthodox one of black, red, and green; the granting of concessions to religious leaders; and the conditional restoration of confiscated property. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In April 1980 the Karmal regime adopted a temporary constitution, the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which had been drafted while Amin was in power. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Envisaged for the country was “a new-style state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,” guided by the PDPA. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He even had to plead with his Soviet comrades: “You brought me here [to Afghanistan], you protect me.”51 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
What was needed was a lecture to the Kremlin leaders themselves on why they had blundered in invading Afghanistan and raising to power a person whom their own historian called “a nobody.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A feature of this change was the emergence of educated Afghans in the forefront of poli- tics. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In Afghanistan as elsewhere in the Islamic world, Islamic fundamen- talism (or Islamism or Islamic radicalism)4 is the story of response to a society in transition from the traditional to the modern that sets the state on the road to secularization. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In their daily confrontations with the state, they must dissociate themselves from it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In a pamphlet published by the Jam’iyyat, Who Are We and What Do We Want? it was stated that the movement was nothing but an at- tempt to liberate the people of Afghanistan from the clutches of tyranny and to bring about a renaissance in religion. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Serious also was the division among the Sunni leaders. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Another weakening factor was the Islamists’ loss of credit in the eyes of their patrons whose goodwill was essential for them, since they had to act from abroad inside Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Islamic moderate organizations were set up in various times in 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Not all resistance groups were included in the coalitions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
There were no coordinated military activities, nor did they make use of the expertise of the military officers of the Kabul re- gime who defected. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
According to one observer, 4 The Iranians consider the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the most favorable situation for the consolidation and extension of their influence in the country. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
When it did not work according to their wishes, they changed their policy and decided to federate the groups under their umbrella of one organi- zation, Nasr. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Most might be called so, since they defended their homeland against the inva- sion and stood for the view that the people of Afghanistan alone had the right to set up the kind of state they wanted. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In a proposal to the Revolutionary Islamic Coun- cil of the Islamic organizations it stated, “Since among you important talks are being held on the fate of Afghanistan, and since these talks are about our fatherland, religion, honor [namoas], and independence, we propose that on the question of determination of our fate all authorita- tive tribal elders should take part in decisions through such a loya jirga. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Since the implementation of the resolution required the cooperation of the Islamic organizations, the jirga asked their leaders to forge unity among themselves and to allow representatives of tribes to take part in the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A number of its founding members seceded from it to set up a rival jirga, the Loya Jirga of the Tribes of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
There were now two revolutionary councils: the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, com- posed of the six Islamic organizations, and the National and Islamic Revolutionary Council, composed of tribal and community elders. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Forging unity and procuring financial assistance were the two im- portant issues to which the National Islamic Council addressed itself. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ningrahar elders proposed the former king for the position; this motion was accepted after a debate in which the Kandahari proponents of the king argued against the advisability of the proposal at this juncture. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The question of the selection of a national leader (mule qa’id) domi- nated the meetings of the jirga. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The jirga is convened in times of na- tional emergency, especially when Afghanistan feels pressured by out- side powers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Even opponents of “a united front” could not reject overnight the proposal for its formation. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Under these circumstances it was not feasible for a united front to be formed through a jirga. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He also used his royal influence to commute capital punishment for persons convicted in criminal cases. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In 1979, in concert with other “nationalist groups,” SAMA forged a front, the National United Front of Afghanistan, or NUFA (Jabha-e-Mutahid-e-Milli-e- Afghanistan). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Among the pro-Chinese leftist groups SAMA, the most practical, was known to the public, while the rest were known primarily to their mem- bers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The suppression of the pro-Chinese elements shows the fate of rev-olu- tionary leftists in Afghanistan when unsupported by the might of a for- eign power. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Twice in the 1970S the Afghans were outraged: in 1978 by the com- munist coup, and in 1979 by the Russian invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Following the invasion, the Soviet army contingent increased in num- ber. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Some girls called them “Russian slaves” while others put their scarves on the officers, telling them that now they had become “women:’ an insulting word when uttered in such a manner to men in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Despite the repression, students were still inflamed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They were thus safe from being crushed, but weakened. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By the force of circumstances the invaders found themselves in a situation in which they killed hundreds and thousands of those for whose protection they had purportedly come. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The invading army used air power, particularly helicopter gunships. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Spiritual persons and the ‘ulama provided them with religious blessing by issuing fatwas (rulings) and preaching for wars as sanctioned by Islam and tradition. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
This created a form of equilibrium,24 a situation that checked the dominance of one organization over the rest and the region as a whole. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Like people of other areas, the Logaris were compelled to pay taxes to the financial heads not of one mujahid organization, but of all of them. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The United States and some Muslim countries began to support the mujahideen, “cautiously channeling limited amounts of small arms and other mili- tary equipment to them.”~ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The detainees were charged not for opposition to the invasion but for acts that were considered crimes in the criminal code, the most repres- sive code there ever was in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Although it was impossible for my interrogator, Asad Rahmani, to substantiate any of the charges, he persisted, hoping that he might detect some contradictions in my re- sponses that would incriminate me. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Inmates faced a painful situation regarding the basic necessities of life—food and toilets. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Even the British exploited this situation with some success after they invaded Afghanistan twice in the last century. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES In the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, no clear line divided the government and the PDPA. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kishtmand’s promotion alarmed educated Afghans for a different reason. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Strategically it is also significant, because it is separated from the rest of the country by the Hindu Kush and also because it is close to Central Asia. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They feared that through the importation of central Asians and the cooperation of Parchamis and Afghan sectarians, the Soviet Union intended to carve out a state in northern Afghanistan with a view to making it part of its empire. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They also feared that with the presence of such surrogates the Soviets now intended to implement their design, as they had invaded the country when the Parcham faction provided them a pretext. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Thus, the promotion of Kishtmand made the regime more unpopular, despite the view that the Soviet model of nationalities, even if applied, would not work in Afghanistan since the Afghans were so- cially and linguistically more integrated than were the inhabitants of the neighboring lands. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
His position in the civil administration was also unenviable. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Gulabzoy said that since Moscow had appointed both himself and Karmal to their posts, Karma! could not remove him. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
One of their many antigovernment tracts (shabnama), this one addressed to the people of Kabul in February 19 8o, showed their spirit. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At home people would switch on their radios to hear what foreign news services, especially the BBC, had to say in their Pashto and Dan broad- casts about Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
During the first week of July 1981 the mujahideen began to enter the city in large num- bers, although the regime had taken new security measures. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Its view was that the “bandits” must be eliminated if they persisted. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Supported by Soviet might, the regime acted on the belief that it would accomplish this in time. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In August 1980 the authorities divided Afghanistan into eight new “zones,” or administrative units, each comprising a number of prov- inces. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The permanent commission was more important than its boss, who was not present all the time. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Starting with a special session on 15 January 1980, every year the General Assembly of the United Nations passed by an overwhelming majority a resolution demanding that foreign forces be unconditionally withdrawn from Afghanistan, that the country’s integrity and non- aligned status be maintained, and that the right of self-determination of the Afghan people be observed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
the secretary-general of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, on instruction from the General Assembly, appointed a spe- cial envoy to seek the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, but because of the intransigence of the Soviet Union, no progress could be made. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Similarly, a resolution calling for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was passed by the foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries at a ~neeting held early in 1981 in New Delhi; this resolution was particu- larly notable since the number of pro-Soviet countries in the movement was considerable. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In summer 1981 the European Economic Community (EEC) used even stronger terms asking that the Soviet Union withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At the same time, the EEC assured the So- viet Union that Afghanistan would remain neutral after the withdrawal, much like Austria after the Soviet withdrawal in 1955. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In January 1981 President Giscard d’Estaing of France called for an international conference to be held on Afghanistan, but the Soviets rejected that as well. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Since it viewed the presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan as detrimental to its own security, the Chinese government made the improvement of its relations with the Soviet Union contingent on, among other things, the withdrawal of troops from Af- ghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan did not create a stir among the people of the world comparable to that aroused by the United States’ invOlvement in Vietnam, but on certain occasions anti- Soviet demonstrations were held. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
An eloquent appeal came from Czechoslovakia in January 1980, calling for an international boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow and even comparing them to the 1936 Olympics, held in the Berlin of Hitler’s Third Reich. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Inside the Soviet empire, although Soviet youths fell in Afghanistan, the voice of opposition to the war could not be heard. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet police state was too strong for Soviet men and women to express their views on the Afghan War as the American people had done on the Vietnam War. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
More serious was the policy of the regime toward “counterrevolu- tionaries.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Toward the end of the re- public, waves of terrorism and counterterrorism went hand in hand, the latter committed by radical Islamists against the leftists and government officials. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The revolutionary method of Stalinesque Russian communism, the overzealousness of Islamists, and the revenge-seeking spirit of Afghans made life in Afghanistan an inferno. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In Kabul it has not been heard that the perpetrator has been arrested. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Onlookers who in the past cooperated with authorities in seizing culprits now gaze impassively, doing nothing. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For genocide to happen, there must be certain preconditions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For example, in revenge for the killing by the mujahideen of three Russian soldiers, the commander brother of the fallen captain led his commando unit into the city of Tashqurghan in April 1982. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Because Afghanistan has long been a crossroad, famous conquerors such as Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Timur Lane, Babur, Nadir Shah Afshar, and the British have invaded it, but the Soviet invaders have surpassed all in the systematic killing of its people and the destruction of their land. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But the idea be- hind the society’s reorganization was old. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The communist idea was mo- nolithic (as opposed to pluralist): it emphasized the validity of only one truth, that is, communism. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Their works, particularly A Report from Helsinki Watch and A Nation Is Dying, are monuments of Soviet brutality in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I have used relevant sections of the final report of the International Afghanistan Hearing. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Thereafter they un- dertook major operations, and in none did they confine themselves to battles with the combatants. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan, states that three of his fellow 4 countrymen who had visited Afghanistan in the summer of 1980 “brought home pictorial documentation of bombarded farms, destroyed villages and the destruction of Kamdesh, the central town in Nuristan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
All the way from there on into Herat there was no one living there, absolutely no one. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
These areas have turned into the age before stone age. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
These operations made the people of Logar believe that “it is a nor- 2.40 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Paghman was still not pacified. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviets used chemical agents in inaccessible areas so that others might not know about it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For this reason, the Soviets and the regime wreaked havoc by helicopter gunships on areas where the presence of foreigners was suspected. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The helicopters dropped a couple of what we thought at that moment were bombs. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Mycotoxins such as yellow rain, sleeping death, and Blue X seem to ~iave been used in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
George Shultz, the former American secretary of state, has dealt with the subject of chemical warfare in Afghanistan in detail. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
indicate that the Soviet forces continue their selective use of chemi- cals and toxins against the resistance in Afghanistan.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The chemicals were stored at Kandahar Airport, which was an important staging area for Soviet military operations. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He collected information about chemical warfare from sources in Afghanistan and also from diplomatic sources abroad. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ricardo Fraile, a French legal expert on chemical warfare, visited Logar for a week in December i 982. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
We have been shown masks, we have been shown protective clothing, we hear witnesses—people who have come from different parts of the country. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Then in categorical terms he said, “In the past I was not necessarily convinced that chemical warfare was being carried out in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Besides, the commission had not visited Afghanistan, where these agents had allegedly been used as early as 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
This was in the early stage of the war. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A United Nations Commission of Enquiry set up in December 1980 had concluded, in Fraile’s words, that “at least for one case in Afghani- stan it would seem that it is almost certain that chemical agents, very specially of the irritant type, had been used.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In spring 1981, while dropping “heavy bombs” from air on villages, the Soviets also dropped plastic bombs and antipersonnel bombs on fields and pathways in Dehshaykh in the district of Baraki Barak.37 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
“The average Soviet had no motivation tofight in Afghanistan, other than to survive and go home. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Afghan adventure was not the Soviets’ only adventure, but it was their last. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
With the rise in March 1985 of Mikhail Gorbachev as the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, the scene was set for changes: in the Soviet Union by the inauguration of glasnost (openness) and per- estroika (economic restructuring); in Afghanistan by the gradual disen- gagement of the Soviet Union; and in the world by the relaxation of ten- sions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In Afghanistan the change was marked by the replacement in May 1986 of Karmal by Najibullah, first as general secretary of the PDPA and then as president of the Revolutionary Council. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
This replacement occurred after Gorbachev described the Soviet war in Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
As early as 1983 Yuri Andropov, general secretary of the Communist Party; had told Karmal that “he should not count on [an] indefinite and protracted stay of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan; that it was his obli- gation to expand the social base of his government by political 10 But Andropov died shortly afterward, and during the brief reign of his successor, Konstantin Chernenko, the issue was not pursued, and “Kar- mal did not draw the required conclusion.”11 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But the Soviet leaders did not agree on how Najibullah should pro- ceed to form a coalition government. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
If it failed, so the rumor went, he would then try to resolve the issue through diplomacy. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Sitami factions of SAZA and SZA (for- merly SAFRA) declared their support for the policy of “national recon- ciliation;’ and their leaders joined the government. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Despite these difficulties, the loya jirga succeeded in its mission. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In particular, they distrusted the PDPA and KhAD. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Despite these changes, Afghans not connected with the party or the regime held that President Najibullah was so committed to the ideals of PDPA and so loyal to the Soviet Union that he would not transform. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Since the basic parameters and structure of the agreements had been complefed at a time when Moscow enjoyed a position of strength mili- tarily, “The Geneva Accords accomplished little more than providing a respectable exit for the Soviet troops.”31 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet Union took full advantage of this situation by supplying abundant arms to Kabul and raising its fighting capability several times.33 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
However, the shura was restricted to the seven Peshawar-based Islamic Sunni groups, the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan’s Mujahideen (J1JAM). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Each group was assigned two ministerial posts. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The AIG needed to establish itself inside Afghanistan as a prelude to overcoming the Kabul regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For this purpose, some had in 1990 set up an association, the Movement for a Representative Government in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They stood behind the “broad-based” plan which the United Nations had devised for Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The breakup of the Soviet Union and the opening of Central Asia had made Afghanistan once again significant in linking the latter region with South Asia. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On 23 April, after cautioning heads of the Afghan factions against armed clashes, Benon Sevan informed Premier Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan of the dangerous situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Only Hekmatyar refused to attend, saying that “his presence was needed inside Afghanistan.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The accords were drawn to meet the requirements of Pakistan with respect to the new Central Asian republics. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Abdullah Shiniwari even goes so far as to hold that, through a “grand conspiracy agrainst Afghanistan;’ foreigners “forced a[n] alliance of the minorities and the Communists to trigger an internecine war between the majority Pashtuns and the minority represented by Ahmad Shah Mas’ud.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Shiniwari also maintains that these foreigners schemed to em- broil the Afghans among themselves with a view to exhuasting the huge stockpiles of the Scud, Oregon, Luna-I, and Luna-Il missiles, as well as the huge stockpiles of conventional weapons Afghanistan had acquired during Najibullah’s rule—weapons that not many countries in the re- gion possessed.73 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Now Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of the Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan, and General Hameed Gui, the former chief of the ISI, who dreamed of “turning Afghanistan into the base for Islamic 90 separately tried to do the same. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Islamabad Accords were an improvement on the Peshawar Ac- cords. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
An analyst notes, “Since there is no effective legal authority in the country, those who possess guns, money, and fighters call the 120 As described, in the resistance period rural Afghanistan was severely damaged, the agricultural system disrupted, and millions of mines placed throughout the land, while more than five million Afghans fled abroad. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The destruction that it has suffered since then is bound to adversely affect the future of Afghanistan as an independent nation- state. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By 1992. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To expect Afghanistan to be a country with a government constituted by the participation of its own citizens, capable of extending its rule throughout the land and con- ducting its domestic and foreign policy independently remains a dream for the present. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The educated and bureaucratic middle class, many of whose members have fled abroad, has become insignificant. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
With these policies they succeeded over the communists and the Soviet invaders, but it is unlikely they will triumph over each other. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For “during their time Afghanistan has been looted more than when the British and the Soviets had occupied it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The continuation of war politics is bound to weaken the groups further, discredit them further with their compatri- ots, and make them still more receptive to their foreign patrons. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan has experienced many critical periods in the past. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Still, all this is not cause for despair. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The United Nations for the third time has addressed the Afghan prob- lem, or what Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has called this “human tragedy.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Supporters have also urged the former king to come out of Rome. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Since the Soviet with- drawal, Afghanistan has become connected to drug trafficking and the training of terrorists. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Because of the absence of a central government and the openness of its borders, “thousands of Islamic radicals, outcasts, visionaries and gunmen from some 40 countries have come to Afghani- stan to learn the lessons ~f jehad, . Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By helping to estab- lish such a government, the world governments, among other things, would secure millions of men and women throughout the world from the dangers of the poisonous culture. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afganistan Sitam-e-milli Ittehad-e-milli Nasl-e-nao-e-hazara Jabha-e-muttahid-e- milli-e-afganistan Sazman-c-islami-e-nasr Sazman-c-mardum-c- zahamatkash Hizbullah Hizb-c-dcmokratik-c- khalq-e-afganistan Khalq Dcmokratik-c-nawccn- e-khalq Hizb-c-muttaraqi-c- demokratik Sazman-c-azadibakhsh- e-mardum-e- afganistan Sazman-e- rihaycebakhsh-e- fcdayec-e-afganistan Pashto Islami harakat Islami milli inqilabi jirga Islami milli muttahida jabha Dc afganistan islami gund Islami inqilab Islami pawczun Inqilabi islami harakat Dc afganistan islami milli mahaz Dc Afganistan de-milli nejat jabha Milli sitam Milli ittehad Dc hazara ncway nasi Dc afganistan milli mut- tahida jabha Dc nasr islami sazman Dc khwarikisho khalko sazman Dc afganistan de khalko demokratik gund Khalk Dc khalko ncway demo- kratik Muttaraqi demokratik gund Dc afganistan de khalko azadigushtun- kay sazman Dc afganistan dc azadi- gushatunko fedaycc sazman ~tppc1iuLd~ A~ 4 English SAWO (Organization of the Real Patriots of Af- ghanistan) SAZA (Organization of the Toilers of Afghan- istan) Servants of the Quran Spark Strength Struggle Surkha (Rihaye) (Or- ganization for the Lib- eration of the People of Afghanistan) Thunder Union for the Indepen- dence of Pashtunistan Union of the Libera~ tioflists United Islamic Council Unity for the Liberation of Afghanistan Voice of the People Voice of the People Dan Sazman watanparastan- c-waqiye-e-afganistan Sazman-e- zahmatkashan-e- afganistan Khuddam ulfurqan Angar Nairo Paikar Sazman-e-rihaebakhsh- e-khalqha-c-afganistan Ra’d Ittehadiyya baray-e- azadi-c-pashtunistan Ittehadiyya-e-istiqlal ta- laban Shura-e-ittifaq-e-islami Ittehad baraye azadi-e- afganistan Saday-e-’awam Nida-e-khalq Pashto Dc afganistan de re- shteeno hcwadpalo sazman Dc afganistan de khwar- ikisho sazman Dc afganistan dc khalko dc azadigush- tunko sazman Tander Dc pashtunistan de azadi de para itteha- diyya Dc khpelwaki ghush- tunko ittehadiyya Dc islami ittefaq shura Dc afganistan de azadi de para ittehad Dc khalko gag Dc khalko awaz Selected Biographical Sketches For additional biographical sketches, see J. B. Amstutz, Afghanistan, The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986); A. Arnold, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Com- munism (Stanford: Hoover Institute, Stanford University, 1983); R. Klass, Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited (New York: Freedom House, 1987). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The other leaders of the PDPA, uncertain about their success, spent the night at the Kabul airfield ready to fly to safety if the situation warranted it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He was moderate and cooperated with the Khalqi government by joining it as the head of the Publications Department in the Ministry of Education. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Badakhshi was imprisoned in 1978 and eliminated by prison authorities during Amin’s rule. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He joined the PDPA at its inception in j~, but quit it in 1968 to set up an organization of his own, the Sitam-e-Milli (Against National Oppression). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In prison Karmal was befriended by a fellow in- mate, Mier Akbar Khybar. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
KARMAL, BABRAK (1929—) Although born into a wealthy Tajikized family of Kashmir origin in the village of Kamari east of Kabul, Babrak Karmal lived in hardship following the death of his mother. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
After he felt secure in his position, President Daoud dismissed Parchamis from the presidential cabinet and tried to distance Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On i January 1965 the PDPA was founded in Kabul, with Karmal serving as one of its twenty-eight founding members in its founding congress. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Some Muslim fundamentalists claimed responsibility for the incident. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The PDPA leaders accused certain “circles” of the government, while some Parchami leaders claimed that Hafizullah Amin had engineered the killing. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
N~IIAZI, GHULAM MUHAMMAD (‘93 2-1978) N~Tiazi was the founder of the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The son of A~bdul Nabi, Niazi came from the village of Raheem Khel in the district of Andar n Ghazni Province. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
the organization still had no specific title; it was probably then that it was named the Islamic Association of Afghanistan (Jam’iyyat-e~Islame~eAfghanistan) By then Niazi had succeeded in developing three distinct cells: (~) a thinker’s cell through which religious scholars were to plan the future course of action; (z) a worker’s cell to carry its messages to the public; (~) a link cell to establish con- tacts in the government with a view to influence policymakers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In 1972. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Five weeks later, in Karachi, he disavowed his press conference and said he was returning to Afghanistan” (A. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Arnold, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism, 17). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But the ephemeral allaying of fear was the only service of note he rendered his “revolu- tion.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They will bring half of Iran into Afghanistan under the flag of [the] Herat division. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
While you will be taking counsel Herat will fall and both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan will have still greater difficulties. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I don’t want to distress you but such a fact is impossible to conceal. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
for giving me this along with a number of other books recently published on Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Farhang, Afghanistan 1:485—93. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Gregorian, Modern Afghanistan 352; Farhang, Afghanistan 1:426. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Gregorian, Modern Afghanistan, 363. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Farhang, Afghanistan 1:446—58; Dupree, Afghanistan, 494—98. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ghaus, Fall of Afghanistan, 65—79. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ghaus, Fall of Afghanistan, 90. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Fayzzad, National LoyaJirgas, 232—96. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For a background to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its wider Andrew and Gordiesky, KGB, 574. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
327 deputy chief in Afghanistan from 1975 to 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
9. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Arnold, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism, i86.13. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Roy, “Origin,” 53.5. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
From 1988 to 1989 he himself was prime minister of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
His book, which describes mainly the events in high circles, is very informative. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In addition, in 1980 the Soviets took the step of crediting its imports of Afghan natural gas against the cost of maintaining the “friendly fraternal assistance” of its “limited military contingent” in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In 1979 Soviet experts discovered another gas-bearing zone in northern Afghanistan capable of producing one- quarter million cubic meters per day. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
IL. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
15. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Baha, “Cruel Executions;’ 79, 8t. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Farhang, Afghanistan 1:498.30. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
32. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
35. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
36. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
39. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan, 136. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
46. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I told Farhang that the Soviets had introduced their troops into Afghanistan not for the sake of Karma! Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A!though Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Arno!d, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism, io6. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ministry of P!anning, General Statistics, 113—22. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Front of Afghanistan’s Militant Mujahideen, Watan; M. N. Majruh, Fundamentalism, in the words of Professor Bernard Lewis, refers to the Muslim fundamentalists, however, base themse!ves Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
2.3. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
3~. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
40. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Brigot and Roy, War in Afghanistan, z~i.41. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
49. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
50. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
58. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
6z. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
SAWO: the Real Patriots of Afghanistan). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
See also Zadran, History of Afghanistan, 673. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Hytnan, Afghanistan, 179. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Zadran, History of Afghanistan 1:67 r. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Hyman, Afghanistan, i8o. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Zadran, History of Afghanistan, 671. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
S. Sh. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For details see, Ilmi, Afghanistan; Ilmi and Majruh, Sovietization of Af- Ruiz, Left Out in the Cold, 3. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
4. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Quoted in Alam, “Jehad of Afghanistan,” ~ i. Barth, “Cultural Welisprings,” 198. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In places the intergroup clashes were so bloody that a group would dis-i~. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
21. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amnesty International, Afghanistan, i.21. Bilolavo, “One Man’s Sentence,” 13.22. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
VICTORY AT ANY COST i. buro member, was specific about the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan: “Social- ist internationalism obliged us to help the Afghan people defend the April Revo- lution’s gains”; see Payand, “Soviet-Afghan Relations,” 122. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
~. 5. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
See also Kakar, Geneva Compromise on Af- ghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In 1991 the total number of Afghan refugees abroad was estimated to be 5,670,000. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Girardet, Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For details, see International Afghanistan Hearing, 173. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For details, see International Afghanistan Hearing (hereafter IAH), i86— Alam, “Memoirs of Jehad,” 178. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
IAH, 6~.34. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Saikal and Miley, Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, i6.6. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kaka; Geneva Compromise on Afghanistan, 138; Kaka; Afghans in Kaka; “Afghanistan on the Eve of Soviet Withdrawal.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To effect equality among Afghan ethnic groups, Kishtmand, a politburo member of PDPA, wrote that the state was to carve out “autonomous adminis- trative units” on the basis of “national characteristics” within a “federal struc- ture.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 227; Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 297. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
72. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Maiwand Trust, 17 May 1992, 6.~ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
84. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
“Strange Calm in Kabul,” Afghanistan Forum, November 1993, 10.~ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For comments on the Islamabad Accords, see Kaka; “Time for91. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
97. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
110. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A. Safi, former member of parliament from Tagab, personal comunica- D. Sahari, “Afghanistan and the Islamic World,” Mujahid Wolas (news- Afghanistan Forum, January 1994, 7. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
S. Coll, “The Agony of Victory,” Afghanistan Forum, March 1994, i6. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Z. Abbas, “The Battle for Kabul”, Afghanistan Forum, May 1994, 9. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ibid. In particula; the loss in November 1993 to Dostum of the Sher D. Sahari, “Afghanistan and the Islamic World,” Mujahid Wolas (news- In Kabul an official spokesman claimed, “We have clear-cut evidence 352 114. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
117. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
124. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
12.5. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Most of these posts belong to major groups.’ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
12.8. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
1994, 4,. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Quoted in Sahari, “Afghanistan and the Islamic World,” 2. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Alam, Z. G. “The Jehad of Afghanistan: Observations, Views, and Evalua- tions.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
“Setback for Peace in Afghanistan?’ (In English.) Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kakar, M. H. “Afghanistan on the Eve of Soviet Withdrawal.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
R. “Bitter Facts on the War in Afghanistan.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
BOOKS AND BOOKLETS Adamec, L. Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Atlas of the Provinces of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan: Torture of Political Prisoners. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Washing- )n, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
ondon and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
London: Amnesty International 357 tutz, J. B. Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Gordiesky. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
~rson, E., and N. Dupree, eds. The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Lahore: Vanguard, 1988. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Fletcher, A. Afghanistan: The Highway of Conquest. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ghaus, A. S. The Fall of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Girardet, E. Afghanistan: The Soviet War. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Gregorian, V. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Haqshinas, N. Political Changes of Jehad in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
(In Dan.) Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Peshawan: Islamic Party of Afghanistan, 1988. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Hezb-e-Islami of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan: A Decade of Sovietization. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ilmi, M. Y., ed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
International Afghanistan Hearing. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Jamiat-e-Islami of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kakar, M. H. Afghan, Afghanistan, and the Afghans and the Organization of the State in India, Persia, and Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Peshawar: Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, 1988. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Pashto.) Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Front of Afghanistan, 1989. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
M. Y. A Message to the Mujahid Nation of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Zaki Ullah. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
R., ed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
intock, M. instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsur- ncy, Counter-Terrorism, 1940—1990. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
e, R. Predicting Russia’s Future. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
IL Rustar, M. 0. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Saikal, A., and W. Miley, eds. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Shultz, G. Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Wajdi, A. J. The Present and Future of Traditional Jirgas of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Wakman, M. A, Afghanistan, Nonalignment, and the Superpowers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Yousaf, M., and M. Adkin. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Zadnan, G. History of Afghanistan from ‘747 up to 1982 A.D.. Vol. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
1983. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Peshawar: Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, 1990. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
ARTICLES Alam, Z. G. “Violation of Human Rights of the Afghans.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin, R. “The Future of Afghan Society after Settlement of the Conflict.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
(In Pashto.) Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Paktia in Uprising Waves. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Hurriyat, flOs. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
1—2 (1992): 10—17. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
he Front of Afghanistan’s Militant Mujahideen. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
hani, A. “Afghanistan: Islam and Counterrevolutionary Movements.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In R. Wasserstrom, Today’s Moral Problems, 410—23. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ivanov, N. “Revelations on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan Forum, no. 3 (1993): 16—20. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, special issue, April—December 1992, 159—71. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan in the 1970s, 13—3 3. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Khan, M. A. “The Emergence of Religious Parties in Afghanistan.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kornienko, G. M. “The Afghan Endeavor: Perplexities of the Military Incursion and Withdrawal.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Peshawar: Emjay Books International, 1993. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
(1994): 2—17. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ludin, A. “Economic Conditions and the Future of Development in Afghani- stan’s Economy.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Insight, ~ç December 1988, 8—~6. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Islamabad: Cultural Council of Afghani- stan Resistance, 1991. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Index Abdul Basir, 198 Abdul Ghaffar, Engineer, z6o Abdul Haq, 2.46, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
196 Bolshevik revolution, 57 Boundaries of Afghanistan, significance Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 298 Boyarinov, Colonel, 22, z6 Bradsher, Henry, 48 Brezhnev, Leonid, 14, 37, 39, 40, 42, 50; Britain, ‘94 Buddhism, 110 Bukhara, III Byzantium, 2.17 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Cairo, 87, 312., Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
6z, 7~ 307, 315, 318 49—50, ~6, 64, 68, 69, 70, 72, 8o, 102, 121, 126, 130, 135; commercial credit to Afghanistan, 7, 10, 14, 15; effects of invasion of Afghanistan, 140, 154, i~6, i6i, 163, 164, 175, -‘I ~ t Union (continued) 87, x88, 194, 295, 2.15, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
51, 2.55; Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
2.75, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
2.98, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Critical acclaim for AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET WAR: *Citation for Excellence, Overseas Press Club in America 1985 Awards “Girardet’s is the most comprehensive, and perhaps the best, English- language book so far to explain the Afghan war to general readers.” Afghanistan: The Soviet War
“In light of the scarcity of reliable information up to now, this informed appraisal of the war in Afghanistan is most welcome.... Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Girardet closely analyzes the enormously complicated political, military, economic, ethnic and religious intricacies of the conflict in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan: Includes index. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
1985 958’.1044 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
being blessed with perfect sight, pick off our messmates left and right.’ Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Again the cry, ‘Boro, boro’ and the caravan lumbers forward. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Th~ lop of’ the Diwana flaba pass, a barren, ice-draped corridor, is ~lolstered by monumental gothic ridges. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But it took the physical presence of Soviet troops and tanks to provoke most of Afghanistan’s 15-17 million Muslims into the time-honoured tradition of grabbing their guns to defend the independence of their homeland — a homeland which, for many, has always resembled a spiritual emotion rather than a nation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As with resistance move- ments fighting against the Nazis in occupied Europe during World War II, Afghans now found themselves opposing a foreign invasion force, unwelcome~1 by all except a small minoritY of pro.SoViet Afghanistan: The Soviet War
collaborators and sympathisets. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Perhaps most poignant of all is Afghanistan’s dramatic refugee exodus, the largest in the world. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
More are leaving. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Both the international community and the Islamabad government have demonstrated generous concern for refugees in Pakistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Despite avowed concern on the part of the West, the Arab and the Third World nations, world opinion has brought 7 8 little effective pressure on the Soviets to leave. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
My own acquaintance with Afghanistan goes back to the spring of 1970 when, as part of a year off between school and university, I hitch- hiked from Istanbul to Delhi. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Following the invasion, I returned to Afghanistan in early January, 1980 on special assignment for The Christian Science Monitor and ABC Radio News to cover the war. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
This first took me on an official visa to Afghanistan’s second largest city, Kandahar, in the south. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Travelling clandestinely, I later crossed back into Afghanistan with a group of mujahideen to visit a series of mainly Afghan-Baluch partisan bases hidden in the arid Chagai Hills of Helmand province. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Since then, I have headed back to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India at regular intervals for the Monitor to cover different aspects of both the Soviet occupation and the resistance. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
This took me on major trips with the mujahideen to the eastern and northern parts of Afghanistan in 1981 and 1982 and the following year to the border areas. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
My main purpose is to provide an informed appraisal of what this tragic conflict is all about. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It is not meant to be a scholarly thesis. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Furthermore, apart from certain Western or Third World correspon- This book primarily examines Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Communications are archaic. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
To get from one area to another may take two, perhaps three, weeks of solid trekking by foot or horse. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
My reporting on Afghanistan for The Christian Science Monitor has been criticised occasionally by the Soviet and other East bloc media as ‘malicious’, ‘reactionary’ and a ‘complete fabrication’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Unbeknown to them, similar operations were being carried out at Bagram airbase to the north, Jalalabad to the east, Kandahar to the south and Shindand to the southwest. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan has all but slipped from sight . Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Curiously, as late as 26 December, President Amin showed no indi- cation of recognising what the Soviets were up to. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had begun. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By eight o’clock, half an hour before the curfew, the town was empty. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Elsewhere in the country, the occupation developed in a similar manner. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Hindered as they were by winter conditions, guerrillas both here and in other rural parts of northern and eastern Afghanistan had sharply intensified their attacks in the immediate aftermath of the coup. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
An- other included General Ivan Pavlovsky, Deputy Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
When Moscow realised that the insurgency was seriously beginning to threaten the Kabul government, it took to dispatching high-level military delegations to gauge the situation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was torn by bitter and often bloody in- ternecine strife between the two rival factions: Taraki’s Khalq and Karmal’s Parcham. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As far as can be determined, the Politburo was in two minds as to how best to deal with the Afghan problem. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Aware that the Soviets were getting serious, the Americans claim to have warned the Kremlin five times not to take any action in Afghanistan but their admonitions were ignored. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In accordance with Soviet military and political doctrine, Moscow’s ‘Blitzkrieg’ of Afghanistan was swift and decisive: a fait accompli about which the world would howl but, in the end, do nothing. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan is no different. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
periphery of the Middle East. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Unlike the British, the Americans failed to allow for the long-term strategic importance of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
On the one hand, Pakistan suddenly found itself under pressure on two fronts: Soviet troops to the West, Indians to the East. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Soviet Strategy proved to be a heavy, lumbering machine better suited to fighting in the lowlands of Europe than against a basically peasant population in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan- Soviet military planners had no doubt expected resistance to persist for a number of years, but at a tol- erably low level. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Promoting the New Revolution Among the Soviet Union’s first objectives was strengthening the coun- try’s foundering and utterly unpopular 20-month-old ‘new model t Afghanistan was not to be a mere textbook replay of Czecho- revolution’ - This meant providing the regime with a fresh and, it was hoped, human face. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Kunar refugees in Pakistan later made the fIrst reference to Soviet use of chemicals and toxins in Afghanistan by describing ‘gases’ which made one cry or laugh hystericallY or which painfully irritated the skin. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The outcome of the offensive, which had resulted in disastrous casualties, was a painful setback for the guerrillas. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the time former KGB chief Yuri Adropov replaced the late Leonid Brezhnev as head of state in the autumn of 1982, the Soviet war in Afghanistan was undergoing a subtle, yet dramatic, change. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It has made use of Afghanistan as a ‘live’ testing ground, the results of which (notably helicopter gunship skills) have already made themselves apparent among its forces in Eastern Europe. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Soviets were particularlY anxious to put an end to the remorse- less trafficking across the 320-odd mountain passes along the l,400 mile-long Durand Line dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan — some of them, traditional nomad routes, others mere goat paths open only during the snow-free summer months. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In July 1980, no fewer than 60 villageS were destroyed during a two-week operation south of Kabul. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
While numerous mujahed groups persisted with traditional but gener- ally clumsy assaults, others were steadily improving their grasp of modern guerrilla warfare. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Without doubt, the Soviets were also learning from their mistakes. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In the early spring and summer of 1982, the Soviets carried out huge military operations in western Afghanistan, notably in the provinces of Herat and Farah. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Bernard Dupaigne, the French ethnologist, who travelled around 45 46 The Soviet Strategy much of Afghanistan by bus in the late summer of 1980 on an ordinary tourist visa, reported bitter animosity and resentment wherever he went. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A few, such as the Mongolian-featured Hazara Shiites of central Afghanistan, have resented the continuation of Pushtun dominance in the resistance and have consistently refused to throw in their lot with the Peshawar parties. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Organised along military and political lines, they have • developed more or less around the personalities of their leaders, whose names Afghans often use when referring to the groups. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Parties Since the invasion, the main Peshawar parties have split into two alli- ances, both calling themselves the ‘Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The moderates, also three groups, were formed in the wake of the 1978 coup d’etat. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although the Nasr still remains a force to be reckoned with, most Iranian backing is now directed towards the more powerful Afghan Islamic Revolutionary party, the Sepah-e-Pasdara. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Another, the Jabha Motahed e Melli (National United Front) included several traditionalist groupings as well as the highly effective SAMA (Sazmane Azadibakch-e Mardom-e Afghanistan — OrganisatiOfl for the Liberation of the Afghan People), itself an urban resistance move- ment composed of five different factions. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
One French photographer visiting northern Afghanistan in late 1982 witnessed the takeover of the main mosque in Mazari-Sharif where • ~ti Despite strict government security, foreign observers touring with the mujahideen used the building’s loudspeaker system to broadcast to the local population. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The KGB, which became increasingly active in Afghanistan during the third year of the occupation, has often twisted these inside reports to its own advantage as part of its psychological warfare aganst the popula- tion. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
French photographer and traveller Alain Guillo, who has toured parts of Afghanistan regularly since the invasion, reported that on at least two occasions in the late summer of 1982 the resistance evacuated villages in Balkh province at night after normally reliable intelligence reports warned them of an impending attack. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At the same time, both ordinary commercial traffic and smuggling con- tinue despite the ravages of war; timber, semi-precious stones, dried fruits, meat and opium from Afghanistan to Pakistan, and clothes, weapons, wheat, farm utensils and radios on the return trip. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Outside assistance remains vital, however, if the resistance is to survive. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
There seems little doubt that a considerable portion of the military aid making its way into Afghanistan has been procured by American help, but many of these arms tend to be of poor quality or insufficient quantity. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Pakistan’S military intelligence keeps close track of arms movements through its vast network of informers and by recording all weapons entering Afghanistan through frontier posts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Other ethnic groups, such as the Tadjiks and the Hazaras, are prepared to judge newcomers on their merits; anyone bringing along better military skills, and who can be trusted not to be a government informer, is more than welcome. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Gesturing with constantly restless hands to the large map of nor- thern Afghanistan spread out before him he explained: Militarily the Soviets have failed to achieve their objectives. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Often referred to as the Che Guevara, even the Tito of Afghanistan, Massoud — a good-looking, charistmatic and energetic man approaching his mid-thirties — is an exceptional partisan commander. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But he soon dropped out because of anti- regime activities. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Originally, the Russians had planned it to coincide with the elaborate celebrations of the fourth anni- versary of the Saur Revolution on 27 April. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Roughly half the Soviet Union’s 200-strong force of armoured Mi-24 helicopter gunships in Afghanistan had been called in for the Panjshair operation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Until the assassination of King Habibullah in 1919 Britain had controlled the country’s foreign affairs. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Under Amanullah, Afghanistan adopted a nationalist, reformist and anti-imperialist approach. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Like his father, Amanullah disliked the way the British had treated Afghanistan as a vassal state, but through them he had become fascinated by European scientific and industrial achievements. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan’s relationship with the Soviet Union could serve as a model to the Indians. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Furthermore, the Kremlin, determined to crush the Muslim liberation movements in Soviet Central Asia, needed Afghanistan to prevent any renewed anti- Russian spillage across the border. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In contrast to their policies of exporting revolution to China, Mongolia, Iran and other ‘ripe’ countries, the Bolsheviks made little effort in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nearly half a century was to pass before Af- ghanistan had its own communist party. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The British granted Nadir Shah tacit backing by allowing him to cross India on his way to Afghanistan, but, unlike the Soviets who had used Red Army soldiers disguised as Afghans during the Charkbi expedition, they did not pro- vide him with any other means of support. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Ruling with his brothers, Nadir Shah was a stern autocrat who toler- ated little opposition. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For the Russians, Nadir Shah’s regime represented a setback. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Closely counselled during the pre-war years by Prime Mihister Hashim Khan, another of Nadir’s brothers, Zahir Shah went on to rule Afghanistan for forty years until his overthrow by Mohammad Daoud in 1973. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Under Hashim Khan’s influence, Zahir Shah’s Afghanistan was run like a police state and all political opposition was crushed. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For a long time, he spurned their offers of aid and refused to allow them to open a trade mission in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
During World War II, Afghanistan tried to remain completely neutral and at first refused the British demand to throw out the Germans. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The British Soviet Influence in Afghanistan and Soviet governments plainly indicated that Afghanistan might suffer the same fate as Iran, which had been occupied protectively by both Allied Powers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Postwar Relations When Shah Mahmud became Prime Minister in 1946, Afghanistan was allowed a limited form of democracy; more of a liberal than his brother, Shah Mabmud considered it prudent to make certain political concessions. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
One of the first poiitical-intellectual movements to appear after the The Russians were quick to encourage such sentiments. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
ance of preserving Afghanistan as a buffer state. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Washington, for its part, had never understood the strategic import. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Friction was caused by repeated rejections, or offers tied to unacceptable conditions, of Afghan requests for arms. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
When Daoud, who wanted to ensure his country’s continued non-alignment, refused to join the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organisation — CENTO) with Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Britain and the United States, the Americans opted for the Pakistanis (also a member of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation — SEATO) to whom they Soviet Influence in Afghanistan regularly supplied weapons and other forms of support. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Most significant of all, the Russians stepped in to provide Daoud with the weapons he so dearly wanted. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Intent as always on increasing their influence, the Soviets directed their Because of its proximity, Afghanistan obviously represented a 93 94 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan assistance to projects which would provide political gain almost immediately because of their tangible impact on the local population: the paving of streets in Kabul (less mud and dust), the building of grain silos and bakeries (fresh bread), housing (comfort) and power stations (electricity). Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘This detente in Afghanistan prefigured the global detente which was to follow during the 1970s.' Afghanistan: The Soviet War
While the Russians surveyed and aerially photographed the northern third of Afghanistan for maps (thus laying the groundwork for the invasion), the Americans did the same in the south. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By 1970, however, it was the USSR, which acted as the dominant power in Afghanistan’s military and economic development. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan was now almost totally dependent on the USSR for its foreign trade. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Russians shrewdly benefitted from this situation by airfreightiflg Afghanistan’s fruit harvests, which were in danger of rotting on the ground, to the USSR. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Pakistan suspended not only normal commerce but also the rights of nomads who had traditionallY moved between the two countries in search of pasture for their camels, sheep and goats. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The gesture greatly impressed local farmers and Moscow’s prestige grew. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
One of the reasons behind this was the fact that Afghanistan’s traditional tribal, ethnic and religious leaders, less than a third of whom could read and write, had recognised the advantages of sitting in parliament and therefore participated in the polls with vigour. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
ents, were elected to the 218-seat parliament, a significant drop com- pared to the ‘liberal’ assembly of 1949. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Between 1968 and 1970, Afghanistan was marked by an era of violence in which the PDPA and other left-wing parties played a leading role. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Taraki was intent on creating a Lenin-type workers’ party (there were only 40,000 workers in Afghani- stan at the time), but which would incorporate anyone, regardless of class, who was prepared to support radical change. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
These differences were strongly reflected not only in their strategies but in the make-up of their factions. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
His father was a small merchant. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Already in the late 1950s, he was known to have made regular visits to the Soviet embassy in Kabul, but there is not sufficient evidence to confirm the extent of these pre-PDPA Soviet ties. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Furthermore, Afghanistan was struck by a severe famine in 1971-2. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to some estimates, as many as 100,000 people may have died. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghan gathering of tribal, religious and political leaders representing 101 102 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan the entire country, to approve a new constitution and elect him President for the next six years. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The two party factions presented the Soviets with a choice. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Others maintain that Soviet pilots flew planes in the attack against the ‘Arg,’ the presidential palace. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Even fewer had been aware that a coup was in the making. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The new communist order rapidly came to. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Toward the end of the summer, the Khalqi discovered an elaborate The Khalq reacted harshly by secretly sentencing several of them to 105 106 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan death including Keshtmand and Qadar, who had played a major role in both the 1973 and 1978 coups. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But such changes struck at the heart of the Afghan way of life. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It was Friday 20 April 1979, almost one year after the launching of the Saur Revolution.A Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Misguid- edly, they believed that by destroying the feudal and landowner classes, they could gain the support of the peasantry, the masses. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Traditionally, agricultural production is dependent on five factors: land, water, seed, animal or mechanical power, and human labour. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Many landlords in Afghanistan take a paternalistic interest in their peasants. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Six months after the invasion, I travelled by pickup truck to the Chagai Hills in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan with a group of Baluchi tribesmen. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Kunar witnessed its first anti-communist revolt in March 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Towards a Police State By the first anniversary of the Saur Revolution, much of Afghanistan was beginning to take on the characteristics of a nation under siege. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to Western intelligence, an estimated 100 Soviet military advisers had been killed in clashes with the guerrillas during the first year of communist rule. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘The government installed by the Kremlin was becoming more and more terrorist and arbitrary’, recalled Farid, member of an urban resistance group and a high school student at the time. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As frustration and anger against the regime deepened, the opposition 117 118 The Communist Overlay felt that something had to be done. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The uprising was planned for mid-day. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Many of the officers surviving the mutiny were arrested and, if not executed on the spot, dragged off to prison where they were tortured and killed. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
American pilots of the PanAm-operated Ariana Afghan national airlines, who had already removed all their personal belongings from the country, said they would fly only as long as conditions permitted. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
First as the AGSA, communist Afghanistan’s secret police was directed by Assadullah Sarwari, a much hated Khalqi fanatic notorious for his torture methods against both the Parcham and opposition dissi- dents. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As early as the autumn of 1978, human rights observers estimated that 50,000 Afghans had passed through or were still in Khaiqi deten- tion centres. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Early in 1980, American orientalist Michael Barry, a Farsi and Pashto speaker with an intimate knowledge of Afghanistan, travelled to western Pakistan on assignment for the International Federation of Human Rights. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The young woman claimed that six female party members, all roughly her age, had carried out the main interrogation which involved beatings, electric shocks, being forced to stand for two weeks without moving and being taken through chambers where other victims were being tortured. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Later that year, the Padkhwab-e-Shana massacre, also in Logar pro. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At a press conference in Decem- ber 1982 in Paris, visiting Foreign Ministry officials from Kabul insisted that such reports were totally unfounded even when they were con- fronted by Western journalists, including myself, who had witnessed government operations against civilians. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In late 1980, Hazaras recruited by the communist Tudeh Party in Iran in conjunction with the KGB and the KHAD began to filter back to Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For financial bonuses, they are usually willing to participate in special operations. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Kremlin, via the KHAD, ensures that funds are never lacking. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
7 Since the Soviet invasion, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) has gradually adopted the profile of a Soviet autonomous republic, with the Russians assuming total control of the government and the war against the resistance. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But Afghanistan remains an independent nation only in name. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Either way, the resistance has benefitted. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Estimates of present strength hover between 30,000 and 45,000 with battalions experiencing desertions — up to 80 per cent in certain units — at about the same rate as arriving conscripts, some of whom have been drafted several times over. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Afghan leadership visits the USSR and other Warsaw Pact The Sovietisation of Afghanistan countries regularly, often staying away for long periods at a time. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although Dost has dutifully represented his government at the UN-sponsored talks in Geneva on a political settlement in Afghanistan or delivered speeches at the General Assembly in New York, he is nothing but a pawn. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For a long time, the real Foreign Minister of Afghanistan was Vassily Sovruntchuk (since replaced), head of Dost’s advisory team after the invasion and technically number two at the Soviet embassy. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The and everyone knows that is not the case — or the Russians have 139 140 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan Soviets were conspicuously interested in original maps depicting the Durand Line, possibly preparing a legal dossier for future territorial claims against Pakistan in a resuscitation of the Pushtunistan issue. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Bodies such as the Democratic Organisation of Afghan Youth, the Democratic Women’s Organisation of Afghanistan and the Union of Writers and Poets have been formed, with the party and Soviet counterparts issuing guidelines on how each group should operate. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
With military service affecting all males between the ages of fourteen and fifty, conscription in Afghanistan is reminiscent of the desperation that existed in Nazi Germany towards the end of World War 11. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In one case in Kabul, a young boy and his mother were stopped at a roadblock by militiamen in search of con- 141 142 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan scripts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Afghanistan needs soldiers, not students’, one of the men told them; in the end, the boy was released when the mother convinced an officer that he was under fourteen. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, high schools were among the first educational institu- The Sovietisation of Afghanistan tions to protest against the Soviet intervention. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to most informed sources, regular instruction in the senior classes no longer exists. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The remaining non-communist Europeans, who avoid discussing politics in class, necessarily restrain their association with Afghans. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Originally designed with UNESCO assistance to span twenty years, it was whittled down under Khalqi pressure to an unrealistic four-year programme. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
People The Sovietisation of Afghanistan began getting suspicious and started calling the instructors ‘children of Russia’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Yet even among Afghans already in the USSR, there have been numerous reported cases of disenchantment or outright anti-Sovietism. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Aluned Kasim Zariffa, an Afghan student mechanic, was arrested in Moscow by the KGB four months after the invasion and never seen again. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Kremlin has concentrated on Afghan youth as its hope for the future. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As often as not, transistor radios among the mujahi. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Come and let me rise. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For a long time, the only programme that was watched with enthusiasm was the 149 150 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan weekend Indian movie. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Following such offensives, the Afghan authorities have often resorted to well-publicised efforts to impose a political presence in the The Sovietisation of Afghanistan Panjshair. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Jean-Paul Silve, a French amateur photographer, who spent nine months in jail after being picked up in 1981 by the security forces, was accused of being a member of the Central Intelligence Agency and forced to appear three times on the air to make self-critical statements, once before his trial, once during it and once after his release. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘On the whole, if you relied on the government press’, 151 152 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan said one student, ‘you would never know what was going on’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Soviet Economic Exploitation Without doubt, strategic reasons featured prominently in the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Generally, the Soviets The Sovietisation of Afghanistan remained secretive about the extent of their findings, even to the Afghans. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the time of the 1978 communist takeover, the Soviets had amassed vast amounts of excellent geological information about Afghan mineral resources. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The World Bank report had stressed that, for a country the size of Afghanistan, present oil and natural gas prospecting was totally inadequate. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to J.P. Carbonnel, head of the last French scientific mission to Afghanistan, which had to abandon its work in central Hazarajat in 1979 because of the turmoil, the Soviet oil research operation in the Mazar-e-Sharif area alone numbered 2,000 Soviet, East European and Afghan technicians. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Russians were also exploring the possibilities of developing Afghanistan’s uranium deposits, which were thought to be much larger than reported in official documents. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan’s inclusion within the Soviet orbit, maintained Carbonnel, ‘is good busi- ness for the USSR which will seek to exploit (these reserves) and eco- nomise on their own resources’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Economic Incarporation As before the invasion, Soviet aid to Afghanistan still consists of loans rather than grants. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Through their overseas development company, Technoexport (used both for development and as a front for intelligence operations), the Soviets immediately stepped up mining exploration in the north. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The 1978 World Bank report had observed that half of Afghanistan’s hydroelectric power potential would depend on harnessing energy from the Amu Daraya (Mother of Rivers), the ‘Nile’ of Central Asia. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For years, the USSR has been using water rightfully belonging to the Afghans for the The Sovietisation of Afghanistan irrigation of its cotton fields in Central Asia and has shown no indica- tion of altering its dominance in this field. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Hydroelectric and irrigation schemes are now under construction, albeit severely hampered by guerrilla activity, or have been planned for the Turkestan Basin of northern Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
10 million tonnes in 1978. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Western oil technicians remain sceptical, often pointing out that, even if The World Bank had estimated Afghanistan’s oil deposits at a paltry 155 156 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan reserves are higher than reported, they are not necessarily commer- cially viable. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In 1980, a Soviet embasssy news bulletin published in Singapore casually, and surprisingly, noted that Afghanistan had large stocks of oil and that several deposits had been explored already, but it did not identify the fields. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Natural gas exploitation in Afghanistan is certainly one of the most striking examples of economic misappropriation by the Kremlin. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At the start, Moscow paid less than one fifth of the world commercial price, taking advantage of Afghanistan’s logistical inability to export it else- where. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The question of price, the contract noted, would be negotiated separately. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At $100.34 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Originally, 20 per cent of Afghanistan’s natural gas production from 1974 onwards was destined to be used in Afghan fertiliser and thermal The Sovietisation of Afghanistan plants in the north; the rest was pumped through to the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
157 158 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan Apart from oil and natural gas, numerous other Soviet develop- ment projects have been delayed, halted or never, begun because of the war. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Moscow’s moves to integrate Afghanistan were strategically streng- thened in June 1982 with the completion of the 2,674 foot-long Khairaton Bridge across the Amu Daraya linking Termez on the Soviet side with the new terminal of Khairaton in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Started imme- diately after the invasion in order to ease transportation bottlenecks, it consists of a two-lane roadway embedded with a single railway track. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Apart from the bridge’s obvious military advantages, if provides more direct access to Afghanistan’s natural resources. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan is one of the few countries in the world without a railway system, resulting from the fact that it was never colonised. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Iran’s proposal to build a $1.2 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Still on the drawing board because of the fighting is another massive development plan estimated at $1.2 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The impact of the war varies from province to province and, despite severe shortages following military operations, the country has remained on the whole relatively self-sufficient. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Sugar exports to Afghanistan have doubled since the invasion, while wheat has more than trebled, with 200,000 tonnes promised in 1984. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Over the same period, per capita income dropped from $114.60 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
With agriculture, the situation is no different. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Not unlike their natural gas The Sovietisation of Afghanistan import practices, the Soviets paid two or three times below world prices for the cotton and deducted this from Afghan purchases of imported Soviet machinery and other industrial products. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the same token, however, Moscow might find itself forced to bolster communist- occupied Afghanistan even more with imports from the USSR and Eastern bloc countries, as the guerrillas are unlikely to tolerate govern- ment projects unless they serve resistance purposes. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Regardless of their own losses, they seem prepared to tolerate a low degree of armed opposition lasting years if not decades, but which, they hope, wifi permit the PDPA regime to lay the foundations of a ‘new’ Afghanistan, eventually winning over its war-fatigued and dejected inhabitants. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The second of the fundamentalists is the Hezb-i-Islami faction led by Maulawi Younis Khales, known as the ‘fighting mullah’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A resolute character with an intense hatred of the Russians (his son was executed by the Soviets), he first worked in Saudi Arabia and then returned to Afghanistan where he became a university lecturer and editor of a Kabul newspaper. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A man of few scruples, Hekmatyar has aroused violent antagonism among his fellow compatriots. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
On the whole, it is the fundamentalists who have faired best both inside and outside Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although an ad hoc operation w en compared to the more experienced liberation movements elsewhere in the world, it did succeed in boosting the party’s renown. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Revolution, Resistance and Local Loyalties In Soviet-occupied Afghanistan words like ‘revolution’, ‘democracy’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘progress’ are regarded with repugnance by most rural Afghans. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As a resistance movement, the mujahideen have tended to lack the ideological motivation and discipline of other more sophisticated libera- tion organisations around the world. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In one case cited by Olivier Roy, a French Afghan studies specialist who has visited resistance-controlled Afghanistan on a number of occasions since the invasion, mujahed efforts to assassinate a known collaborator in the western province of Ghor were frustrated by local ‘gawm’ loyalties. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Fish in Water Afghanistan’s rising contingent of modernist and Islamic-oriented mujahed commanders like Massoud have been quietly instituting their own ‘revolution’ among the rural communities, a revolution that has begun to spread to other resistance fronts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The more developed fronts (Panjshair, Nimruz, Herat, Mazar, Wardak etc.) Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Political sessions held by primarily young and educated mujahed cadres are rapidly becoming part of everyday life among certain fronts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Enforcing group identity, the political parties issue pocket calendars interspersed with Koranic readings, photographs and political essays, while the presence of foreign journalists in Afghanistan has drawn attention to the importance of the visual media in the struggle. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A handful of groups in western Afghanistan also have video recorders. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Another form of propaganda, or psychological warfare, is the use of the loudhailer. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Apart from visiting journalists, French doctors and missives from the Peshawar parties, the shortwave radio stations — the VOA, BBC, West Germany’s Deutsche- welle and even Radio Moscow — remain their prime link with the out- side world. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Reliable information about events inside Afghanistan is diffi- cult to obtain. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The average Afghan has now realised that his country’s fate is not being decided solely on the battlefields of Afghanistan, but also in Washington, Moscow, Geneva, Warsaw and Managua. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It is not uncommon for outsiders to be probingly questioned by village leaders or mujahideen about international affairs. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Apart from answering their questions, we also try to ex- plain the short and long-term implications of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and why it is necessary to fight’, observed Es-Haq, a former engineering student and information director for the Panjshair. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
RFK has also been directing transmissions at the Soviet occupation forces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Apart from government bombardments and heliborne assaults aimed at knocking out the transmitters, the communist press has consistently attacked the mujahed network as an affront to the Soviet Union and the government of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Bearing in mind Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic, tribal and religious background, the notion of rapid political unity is unrealistic. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In France, where rivalry among the ‘maquis’ was often just as great as it is today in Afghanistan, the United States was still considering even after the The Afghan Struggle D-day invasion which of the resistance leaders, including Charles Dc Gaulle, to support. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Pakistanis, in particular, have never been very keen on a united resistance movement that might prove difficult to control. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Despite considerable opposition to the ex-King, notably among the non.tribal Afghanistan: The Soviet War
195 196 The Afghan Struggle Since the early days of the war, Massoud has been gradually building up a valuable network of contacts with like-minded guerrilla corn. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Evolving in a totally different manner from the rest of Afghanistan, this central highland region has not only succeeded in isolating itself from the government, but from most other resistance organisations. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But most Hazaras have remained wary of working with the Pesha- war political parties because of their strong Pushtun influences. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Yet the gradual spread of an Iranian-style ‘cultural revolution’ by the Khomeinists could have a profound impact not only on the future of the Hazarajat but on the whole of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The more fortunate refugees, thirty or forty thousand perhaps at the time, from Afghanistan’s eastern frontier provinces found sanctuary in the homes of Pushtun and Baluchi relatives living on the Pakistani side of the border. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It is our duty to help them’, explained a Pakistani headman from the Khyber Tribal Agency, who had taken in about a dozen kinsmen from a village only thirty miles inside Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
million beneficiaries in early 1984, an estimated 70 per cent, most of them Pushtuns from Afghanistan’s eastern provinces but also a slowly growing number of Farsi-speaking Tadjiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen from the north, have converged on the Northwest Frontier Province. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A further pressing predicament similar to that in the refugee areas of the Horn of Africa has been the presence of some three million camels, cattle, sheep and goats brought in from Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A disconcerting number of Afghanistan’s educated elite — university professors, doctors, lawyers — have headed for Western Europe and North America, much to the disgust of some of the resistance groups fighting at the front. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this airlift was the group transfer of Kirghiz nomads, living in the northeastern pan- handle of Afghanistan known as the Pamirs and Wakhan corridor at the time of the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Originally, the Mongolian-featured Kirghiz inhabited the inside fringes of the Soviet frontier but fled from Stalinist repression during the 1930s by seeking refuge in China and Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Many fled from Afghanistan toward the end of 1978 to escape the Khalqis, but others only left following the arrival of Red Army troops in May 1980. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Aid to the Interior: The Forgotten People The most neglected of all, however, are those Afghans ttying to survive inside Afghanistan itself. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Similarly, many of the hundreds of thousands of ‘internal refugees’ who have fled to Kabul and other towns are ignored both by the com- munist government and the UN agencies still in Afghanistan, apart from a few very limited health projects. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Some international aid organisations, which have extensive relief activities among the Afghan exiles, are prevented by their mandates from working inside Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Like the situations in South East Asia and the Horn of Africa, excessive aid outside, while at the same time turning a blind eye to the interior, has contributed towards attract- ing more refugees. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
One Paris group, the International Bureau for Afghanistan, launched a pilot livestock project in Kunar province in the summer of 1984 with EEC backing, while the Swedish Committee for Afghani- stan, which regularly sends its own observers to gauge requirements, has established some twenty health clinics and dispensaries in different provinces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Others, which do not consider it prudent to send relief personnel, notably Americans, into Afghanistan because of the problems that might arise if one were to be captured, have chosen instead to provide assistance direct to the mu- jahed fronts or to agencies already working inside. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Afghanistan Relief Committee in New York, for example, has been working in close co-operation with the French medical agencies by providing food and medication. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Another group, the Dignity of Man Foundation, organised its own direct aid shipments and provided funds for educational or social projects inside Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
On numerous occasions, doctors have been obliged to travel for days on end without protection. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
This includes relief co-ordinators, teachers, medical staff and technicians. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Many Afghan war casualties are not as lucky as Shah Mansour. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Operating in war zones such as Afghanistan, Laos, Eritrea, Kurdistan, Angola, Burma but also in Colombia, Haiti and elsewhere, they have recognised the needs of a steadily growing human phenomenon: the world’s ‘unofficial’ populations. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the end of 1980, most of the 1,600 doctors registered in Afghanistan before the Saur Revolution had fled the country, mainly to West Germany, France and North America to ‘continue their studies’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Like many developing countries, rural Afghanistan suffers from malaria, bronchitis, diphtheria, tuberculosis, parasitic and intestinal ailments. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A major drawback has been the need to find surgeons able to leave their hospitals long enough to travel to and from a region that has been particularly badly hit by the war (several days to three weeks either way), and then spend two or three months working. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
One of the first teams to work in Afghanistan consisted of two doctors, a man and a woman, who travelled to Nuristan in the summer of 1980. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The conservatism of Afghanistan’s Islamic society often poses problems in the treatment of women. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Asking for clemency, he promised to tell the truth about the ‘real situation’ in Afghanistan on his return to France and never again to ‘act against the Democratic Republic’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
might be involved with foreign intelligence organisations, notably the CIA. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Back in France, the Paris-based medical organisations immediately launched a campaign for his release. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Afghan embassy in Paris countered that ‘what is even more shocking is the way (Dr Augyard) entered Afghanistan illegally and associated with a band of murderers’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In practice, few governments or outside forces, be they Nazis in Europe, the French in Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam or the Russians in Afghanistan, have shown much humanitarian respect for their partisan opponents. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
ICRC statutes strictly limit the organisation’s humanitarian ac- tivities. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Red Cross officials have operated inside guerrilla-controlled areas of Angola and Ethiopia without the ‘permission’ of the host govern- ment. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, the strictness of the ICRC’s policy remains ambigu- ous. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It also seeks to inform them on Red Cross principles and humanitarian law through instruction and booklets published in Farsi and Pashto. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
This posed a serious dilemma for the Soviets. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
On 13 January 1980, the Kabul authorities granted it the right to operate in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Resistance leaders to Peshawar were becoming increasingly favour. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But the war in Afghanistan is no ordinary conflict. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Bitter fighting raged throughout much of northern and western Afghanistan during the summer. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As it stands, Moscow’s top priority in Afghanistan is a ‘normal. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
First initiated in early 1982 by the UN Secretary General’s special representative, Diego Cordovez, indirect negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Iran has refused to participate unless the mujahideen are included but remains briefed by the Islamabad government) produced a four-point peace plan: the withdrawal of all foreign groops from Afghanistan; the volun- tary repatriation of Afghans; a resumption of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the basis of non-interference and respect for each other’s terdtorial integrity, and finally, adequate international assurances (Soviet, US and Chinese) for the maintenance of Afghan- istan’s independence and non-aligned status. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Pakistanis have been placing greater emphasis on a precise timetable for Soviet withdrawal, which, they insist, should last no longer than three months and should coincide with the return of the Afghan refugees. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Cordovez has kept the door open for further talks. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Soviets, who 235 236 Perspectives control the Afghan delegation through a senior adviser, are expected to attend if only for the sake of appearances. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The air force appears to be faring satisfactorily as more (and better paid) cadets complete their training in the USSR. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although the Soviets are stepping up military repression as a prin- cipal means of crushing the resistance, they still seek to maintain the myth of an independent Afghanistan and are persisting in their efforts to indoctrinate the young. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘The crimes of indiscriminate warfare are combined with the worst excesses of unbridled state-sanctioned violence against civilians’, com- mented researchers Jeri Laber and Barnett Ru~n. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Western Interest in the War The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is far from being a negligible or isolated affair but it is undoubtedly one of the most under-reported strategic wars today. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Even after five years of World War lI-style repres- sion and atrocities, Afghanistan’s predicament in the mid-1980s has failed to arouse the righteous indignation, or imagination, of the inter- national community as did Vietnam, Biafra, Bangladesh, Chile, Cambodia or Poland let alone the present situation in the Middle.East Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the end of December 1984, a glimmer of hope appeared on the horizon. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan, which was badly hit by famine in 1970-71, is once again facing similar conditions in a dozen provinces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As a ‘frontline’ state, it has regulated the flow of arms into Afghanistan at a level calculated not to provoke the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
ment in Afghanistan and America’s involvement in Vietnam. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Russia: Without doubt, there are growing similarities between Soviet involve. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The result is that the Soviet public has learned little about the realities of the situation in Afghanistan from official sources. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By September 1980, the Soviet press began to admit the existence of widespread fighting but this was couched more in terms of a condem- nation of guerrilla activities than of difficulties facing Russian soldiers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Citing a report from the Soviet news agency TASS, it said that scores of small shops had been reduced to smouldering ruins by the ‘bandits’ in Herat while elsewhere they had blown up bridges, trampled crops, destroyed power lines and mutilated the bodies of old men, women and children. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The truth, however, still seeps through. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As with any war, it is the assortment of personal effects — identifica- tion cards, letters, diaries and photographs — taken from the bodies of Soviet soliders killed in Afghanistan and spread out on the floor of a guerrilla hideout that tragically humanise the ‘other side’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For many Soviet youths faced with military service, being sent to Afghanistan is equivalent to being sen- tenced to death. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
While saying nothing about low morale or drug addiction among the troops, more stories are appearing on stark conditions at the front. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Rhetorically asking ‘Why are our boys from Ryazan, Khabarovsk and Uzbekistan carrying out their military service in the environs of Kabul?’, Verstakov examined the ‘uneasy days’ and the internationalist and patriotic duty of the Soviet soldier and admitted that life in Afghanistan was hard. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Future: More International Focus Writing as a journalist, I have no doubt that the war in Afghanistan is one which deserves far more international attention. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in De- cember 1979, he was sent back to the regionto report the war. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Since then, he has made numerous visits to the Indian subcontinent includ- ing six major trips into Afghanistan — once with an official visa and five times clandestinely with the resistance. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin 56, 167, 169-71, 175,194 helicopter gunshlps 16, 20, 23, 33, 35, 36,41-3, 45, 60,65,81-5 passlm, 114,118,127,162,169, 220, 233, 239 Helmand province 9, 112-1 3, 189-90, 204; River 94 Helsinki Watch Group, New York 238 Herat 8, 15, 17, 23, 35, 39, 44, 55, 74,101, 115-16, 126, 146, 184, 196,216,233 Herle, Jean-Denis 143 Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) (Hekmatyar faction) 56, 169-7 1, 174-5, (Khales faction) 48, 56, 70, 74, 113, 167-9, 194,196,226,227, 241 highways 5,8,15,21,40,60,61, 93-4,119, 185 Hindu Kush 21, 33, 51,76 Homer, John Evans 92 hospitals 220-1,224-5 housing shortages 182, 207 194,195, 196, 229; 253 254 Index human rights 121-7 passlm, 190,238; International Federation of 122 humanitarian rights 223-32 Hungary 26 Hussein, Sayed ‘Djendnal’ 55,297 hydno-electnic power 153-5 passim Ideology 27,57,102,145-8,174, 183 India 25,27,28,88,90,92,95,98, 101,104,139,150,159,228, 235 Indian Ocean 26,28,29,159 Indochina 25, 34, 38; see also Vietnam indoctrination 5,63,132,138, 142-3,145-8, 174, 237,see also propaganda; training infiltration, of government 62-3, 130; of mujahideen/refugees 118, 124,128-30,193 inflation 160, 182 informers 62-3 intelligence, mujahldeen 62-3, 67, 74,82,130; Soviet 14,233 Interdiction tactics 37-9 International Bureau for Afghanistan, Paris 211 interrogations 117, 122,124, 125, 126 invasion, Soviet 4,8,9, 1247; cost of 135, 160-1;reasons for 26-9, 152 Iran 22,25, 27-9passlm,88,91,92, 101,157, 159,235; and mujahideen 10,54, 56, 57,65, 66,115, 129,200-1,235,242; and refugees 7,24,54,128, 132, 202,209-10 Iraq 29,92 iron ore 29, 153, 159 irrigation schemes 154-5,242 Islam 6,26-7,31,36,52,55,77, 100,106, 113-14, 131, 145, 149, 169,218,241 Islamic Alliance 193; Pan- Union 101; Republic 27, 56, 169; Unity 65,193,194, of A. Mujahideen 55 Israel 170 Italy 90 Jabha Mobarezin 57,118 Jabha Motahed-e Mdi (National United Front) 57,74 Jalalabad 12, 20, 49, 50, 51, 126, 148,169 Jamiat-i-IslamI (Islamic Society) 56, 74,168, 170, 184, 188, 194, 195, 199,241 Japan 90, 120, 239 Jawana-i-Musalman (Militant Muslim Youth) 56, 78, 166 Jebhe-ye melii-te Najat-e Afghanistan (National Front for the Salvation of A.) 54,56, 171, 173, 193 Jehani, Ban (vice-president, Kabul TV) 149-50 ‘Jihad’ 2,5, 6,52,58, 194 Jirghas 69,101-2,108, 131-2, 172, 193-4 job competition 207 journalists 9-10, 31-2, 38, 128, 151, 168, 187, 189,229,238,243, 248 Jouvenal, Peter 48 Jouzjan province 157 Kabul 8, 16, 17,40,44,55, 59,60, 62,64,70,72-6,80, 114,116, 117,126,140, 141, 149,152, 159, 172, 175-82, 216, 234; University 91, 125, 141-5 passim, 166,see also Radio; airport 12, 16,76, 80,94; Polytechnic 145 Kakar, Professor Hassan 125 Kalakani, Mjaid 57 KAM 117,121,122 Kamyan, Mohammed Nabi (Minister of Health) 158 Kandahar 8,9, 12, 15, 17-20, 35, 39, 40, 44,57,59, 74, 94, 101,126, 159,204,233 Kar-Kum Canal 155 Karmal see Babrak Karokhel, Hassan Khan 62 Kazakhs 208 Kerala 107-10 KGB 14,35, 36,41,63,98,99, 122,124, 129,130,139, 147, 207,208, 245 KHAD 105, 117, 124-31 passim, 133, 140, 145,147, 164, 180, 182,201,207,220, 222, 229, 233 Khairaton 158-9 Khales, Younis 48, 56, 70, 168-9, 194, 227, 228 Index Khalq/Khalqis5, 9,14,15,22,31, 62,76,97,101-6,110-17,119, 130,135-6,146,151,164, 166, 172, 174-5, 196, 197, 203 Khalq 96 Khan, Ismail 55, 68,168, 196 Khomeini 27, 29,56, 129, 157, 169, 200; Khom”inists 57, 66, 199-20 1 Khrushchev, Nikita 93 Khyber, Mu Akbai 102,103 Khyber Tribal Agency 203 kidnappings 59,73, 148, 170,227 Kipling, Rudyard 2 Kirghiz 46,208-9 Kishtmand, Sultan Ali 96, 105, 107, 157,235 Kissilov, Valery Yunkevich 229 Kochka Riven 154, 160 Komoskaya Pravda 247 Korea, North 67 Kouli, Mohammad Yazkoulev 229 krasnaya Zvezda 247 Kunar province 107,113, 115,190-1, 195,211;Valley 33-4,83 Kunduz province 15,42,60,66,160, 161; River 155 Kurds/Kurdistan 210,215 Kutchis 199 Kuwait 8 Kuzichkin, Major Vladimir 14 Laber, Jeri 238 land reform 106,111-13,131,132 Laumonier, Dr Laurence 215-16, 218, 219,221 I.ayeq,Suleiman 132 legal factors 26 Libya 67,170 literacy programmes 115, 242; National 146-7 livestock 207,209,211,214 lobbying, international 37, 208, 2434 Logan province 39,65,121,171,221 losses, civilian 6-7,85, 110,118, 1234, 126-7, 178-80; foreign 8, 22, 119-20; government 7,44, 45, 110; Soviet 7,14-15, 19, 21,34, 35,38,44,45,75,83,85,115, 116,152,236,246-8 Lycee Istiqlal 125, 143, 145, 179; Nejat 99, 145 van Lynden, Aernout 70 Madjnuh, Dr Sayed Burhanudin 141 Mahaz-e meW-ye Islami (National Islamic Front) 56, 171, 172 Makbar, Soi 149 Maihuret, Dr Claude 211 Maniere, Dr Philippe 218 Mansoor, Sayiid 196 Mao-Ze-Dung 41, 78-9 massacres 6-7, 107-10, 123, 126-8 Massoud, Ahmed Shah 55, 62, 68, 69, 76-87, 150, 168, 184-5, 188, 196,221, 233,234 Maximov, Vladimir 191 Mazar-l-Sharif 8, 15, 46, 54, 55, 57, 59, 93, 126, 154, 156, 184, 185 Medecins du Monde 215; sans Frontieres 198, 211, 215 media 148-51;see also individual headings medical organisations 7, 215-23; supplies 86 MIs see helicopter gunships Middle East 27, 184,240 MIGs 16,20, 30, 35, 45, 60, 77, 81, 83,113,127,237 migration, nomad 88, 95 militia 61,62,117,125,129-30, 137, 141,142,151, 196; Hazara 198-9 mineral resources 29, 152, 153-8 passim mines, butterfly 213-14, 238 modernisation 88, 89,92, 100, 104, 183; see also reforms Mohabbat, Mohammad Daoud 139, 140 Mohammadi, Maulawi 54, 74, 169, 17 1-2 Mohseni, Sheikh Asaf 241 monarchists 172, 173, 194-5 Mongolia 88, 104 morale, army 136, 137; civilian 164; mujahideen 58; Soviet 247 moutariks 79-81 Mujadeddi, Sibghatullah 54, 56, 171-3 mujahideen 1-4, 6,7, 8, 20,21,23, 30-2, 34, 37-9, 42-5, 48-55, 58-87, 107-13, 119,129, 131-3, 152, 157, 158, 161-6, 170.1, Afghanistan: The Soviet War
1. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Dictionary of AFGHANISTAN M. JAMIL H,ANIFI Metuchefl, N.J. by 1976 Library of Congress Cataloging in Pu~Iication Data Harilfi, Mohammed Jainil. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Historical and cultural dic~tionary of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Title. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The landlocked nation of Afghanistan, situated in As is the case with all volumes in this series, Dr. M. Jamil Hanifi is a Pushtun native of A!- Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Grimes who has regularly served the editor in the prep- aration of several of the volumes in the series. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
In this instance, particularly, the amount of basic library search, secondary research and, indeed, some prelim- inary writing on the manuscript has been of immense value to both the editor and author. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
There are, however, considerable differences in The spelling of proper nouns in Pushtu and Dan Dates and statistics are provided when such data vi alphabetically, and cross-references are provided as of- ten as possible to facilitate cohesiveness of the divided text. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
M.J.H. 1 ABDALI. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It has trained Afghans in mechanical, electrical, and civil engineering since the mid-1950s. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
tan, “Land of the Afghan,” has an area of about 250, 000 square miles and a population of approxi- mately 16 million. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
GHILZAI DYNASTY (post-high school) technical training school built with the assistance of the United States. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Kushans (135 B.C.-241 A.D.), the Sas- A. D.), each in turn, occupied Afghanistan Area under cultivation of main crops (in 1,000 hectares--l hec- tare = 2.471 Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
80 00 00 10 50 50 70 F 4. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
In a few years he consolidated the warring tribes within Afghanistan and formed one of the largest Muslim Empires in the second half of the 18th century. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Period Most of the kings of the Mohammedzai Dynasty as - suméd the title of Amir. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See DURRANI DYNASTIES. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The boundaries of modern Afghanistan are, to a large extent, the result of conditional agreements he signed with the governments of Colonial-British India, Iran, and Russia. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The situation was that the Pushtun and Baluch tribes east and south of the Durrand Line would ultimately be incorporated into the boundaries of Afghanistan or would be given a choice to remain independent or be part of British India. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Son of Amir Colonial Government, and the Amir, more con- cerned with stability than with boundary demarcation, agreed--but conditionally. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
This condition has not been honored by the British or by Pakistan which became a state (in- corporating the Pushtuns east of the Durrand Line) following the partition of British India into the na- tions of India and Pakistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Mohammedzai Dynasty, he ruled Afghanistan from 1828 to 1839 and from 1843 to 1863. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Both his periods of rule were marked by intrigues within and outside Afghanistan for control of the throne. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Tribal revolts inside Afghanistan and op- position to the Amir from various tribal-political centers in the country marked the period of his reign. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Amir Dost Mohammed Khan died in 1863 in Herat, where he is buried. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
AMIR HABIBULLAH KHAN. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Son of Amir Abdul Khan, he AMIR AMIR SHER ALl KHAN. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
preventing Russian advances, invaded Afghanistan for the second time. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
In 1878, the British, under the pretense of ANJUMAN PASS see GEOGRAPHY (Central Highlands) AQ KUPRUK. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A composite of archaeological sites (Aq AQCHA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A Turkman town in the province of Jozjan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A small ethnic group, primarily located in west ARBAB see MALIK ARCHAEOLOGY. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) came 11 Anjuman Pass Arab ARAB. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Shortly it joins the Arghandab River and at Qala Bist is joined with the Helmand River, ultimately emptying into the Seistan lacustrine de - pression in the south. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Capital of Kunar Province. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See also HISTORY- -ACHAEMENIDS. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Ghaznavid period. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
AVICENNA see 1BN-SINA AZAN. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Afghanistan which ranks fifth in size among the twenty-seven provinces of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The pro- vince is famous for the towering icy peaks of the Pamirs in its eastern fringes as well for the ex- cellent horses it provided to the caravans of the 13th century. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
g., regarding the sanctity of life, marriage, prestige, honor, the chastity of its female members, and other core values), then reciprocal action, prefer- ably the killing of the guilty party or a member of his group, will be incumbent upon the group which has suffered such infliction. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Doshi-Shairkhan Bandar highway) have placed Bagh- lan in closer proximity to other industrial, com - mercial, and administrative centers of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The domestic airline BAKTASH see RABIA BALKHI BALA HISSAR. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A prosaic style chronicler who lived during BAKHTAR AFGHAN AIRLINES. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It is gen- erally a quilted garment of many colors made in northern Afghanistan, and now exported to other Afghan areas. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It consists of a wooden framework covered with bamboo matting, is domed and often has elaborate decorations like those of the miniatures. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
city and townsmen in the cold season. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The quilted variety is worn in cold weather, while a lighter version is used during warm seasons. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
province of Fariab is the home of most of the best buzkashi horsemen. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
26 CHENGIS KHAN (Also spelled Genghis Khan, Jenghis CHIHL ZEENA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
DAIWA DAILY, THE (THE LAMP). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Of particular value are her published historical guides to Afghanistan and to the various important cities and major points of interest In the country. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Nancy Dupree has been of much help to the Afghan Tourist Organization in the agency’s efforts to stimulate tourism throughout Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Ahmad Shah Timur Shah Shah Zaman Shah Mahmood Shah Shuja Shah Mahmood (return) Civil War The Saddozais Dupree, Nancy33 1747 -1773 1773 -1793 1793 -1799 1799 -1803 1803 -1809 1809 -1819 1819-1826 Durrani Tribes DURRA.NI Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
These tribes are located in the west ECONOMY. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See also QAYYUM, NAWABZADA ABDUL. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
cycles of 50/60 are common throughout Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Some of the Baluch have been relocated in northern and northwestern Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
There are an estimated 200, 000 Brahuis in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Farsiwan : live in western Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They belong to the sunni sect of Islam. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Moghul : Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Tajik : in northern Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Turkman : nomadic Turkmans live in northern Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Uzbek : ist Uzbeks live in northern Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
in Afghanistan where a domestic group consisting About 20,000 live in urban centers, and About ten thousand live in Kabul and other Several thousand live in the Pamir About 20, 000 live in central and northern About 100, 000 live in eastern Afghanis- Several thousand live in urban areas occupied There are about four million Tajiks living Some 125, 000 sedentary and semi- About one million sedentary and agricultur- 37 Extended Family Faizabad 38 FAIZABAD. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Hindu : are engaged as merchants and traders. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
About 600, 000 agriculturalist Farsiwans This is a herding-farming group located About 870, 000 in number, they live in the EXTENDED FAMILY. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They speak Dari with some Mongolian words. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They speak Hindi and often Pushtu or Dan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They lead a transhumant life. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Nuristani : tan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The flora (vegetation) of Afghanistan is as FEBETCHENKO. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Universal Five Pillars FLAG. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Its width is one -fourth of the width of the flag. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Be - low the black strip is the red color (symbolizing the valor and the sacrifices of the people of At ghan- istan) which appears in the same proportion as the black strip. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
GENGHIZ KHAN see CHENGIS KHAN GEOGRAPHY. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
includes the present provinces of Kabul, Jalalabad, and some regions immediately to the eastern bor- der of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Their most distinguished ruler in Afghanistan and in India is Sultan Mahmood Ghaznavi. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It was built recently under a contract between the Ministry of Public Works of Afghanistan and the Institute of Techno -Export of the Soviet Union. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
cupy the eastern border of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It shortens the former distance between its begin- fling and end by 200 kilometers. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
EJADDA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
cated in the central part of Afghanistan where the Hindu Kush breaks up into several separate chains. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
59 History History 60 depictions of the great deeds of the ancient kings. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Holidays Hotak HOTAK see GHILZAI TRIBES HUJRA see MELMASTIA HYDROGRAPHY. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
IMAM. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
JERIB. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The most important of these sites in Had- da (q. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
As a rule, Jinn are perhaps best understood for explaining and controlling any individual’s deviation in be- havior, physical, emotional, or psychological. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It extends from the Amu Darya in the north to the Hindu Kush in the south. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See also RIVERS. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
this is the largest museum in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It houses specimens from all the historic and pre - historic archaeological sites in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A very fertile valley with a KABUL TIMES. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
KHAYR KHANA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The pass has been an important point in the routes of the invading armies which came from Greece, Central Asia, and Afghanistan to conquer and rule the Indian subcontinent. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The 28-mile Khyber gorge has been of political and military importance since prehistoric times. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
to the poor during the ceremonies and parties at the various post-burial ceremonies. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
from 1929-1933. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A khyrat can also be given when a wish or hope has been fulfilled. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Located in central of Afghanistan in Paris. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Kush west of Chitral. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Pushtu, the indigenous language of the largest tribal group, is spoken, primarily, through southern and eastern Afghanistan and has been de- clared the national language of the country. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
New residential and government buildings and a modern hotel have recently been built. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
MINERALS. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
AFGHAN WARS has done much original research on the languages of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Mua’zin are respected members of their com- munities throughout Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See also AZAN. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
gious leaders. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They are also influential in educa- tion and politics. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Close by is a large salt lake, the largest in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Some players are beginning to take the sport to audiences in Kabul. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Pushtu term for this kind of bread is dodai. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
3, 500 to 7, 500 years before historical times. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
one set of parents and their children, living in one household. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
also AMU DARYA RIVER and RIVERS. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It also has hundreds of thousands of acres of virgin timber including pine, willow, spruce, mahogany, and evergreen trees. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Some archaeological sites provide evidence of Paleolithic societies in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Pamir area which rise out of the Qaraqurom, Qun lum, and Himalayan Mountains, and shift the di- rection of mountain ranges from southeast -north - west to northeast-southwest through Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Afghanistan which follows a 65-mile course before uniting with the Wakhan River at Qala Panja to form the Panj River. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Ranked 22nd in size among the the Pamir River at Qala Panja form this river which is one of the headstreams of the Amu Darya River. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
of residence (common in Afghanistan) whereby the groom and his wife live with the groom’s paternal relatives after marriage (preferably the groom’s father or his eldest brother). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Afghan societies is in the hands of one or more males. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Parwan is also well known for its mulberries and a variety of other fruits. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See also CHARIKAR. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Although the word is derived from Pushtu, it has a universal meaning throughout all Afghan ethnic groups. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND INTERNAL ADMINIS- mountainous regions in the country, and its valleys attract tourists and commercial interests. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
who has spent many years in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
He has published extensively on the history of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Leon Poullada is among the leaders of those who have encouraged institutional and organized study and research in and about Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
history of this area of the world, but the western part of the Iranian plateau has been inhabited since the Paleolithic period and further study will likely establish Neolithic settlements as well. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Daud served Afghanistan as premier from 1953 to 1963. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
During this period the five -year economic development plans were initiated. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The results of the efforts of General Mohammed Daud’s term in office as premier are beginning to show in many dimensions of the political, economic, The oldest known sculpture found in Asia Painted pottery dating to the 4th millennium PROPHET MOHAMMED see ISLAM PUL. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A most prominent cultural value con- social, and cultural life of the Afghan society. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Pule Khumri is an important stopping point on the way from Kabul to the northern provinces. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
QALAI BOST. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Many monuments in and around the city mark im- portant events in the history of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Afghanistan with an area of 45,333 sq. km. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Qandahar pomegranates - -some reaching 18 centimeters in diameter are grown along the Arghandab River Haravati and the Rig Veda Surashuti are In 1747 in this city, Ahmad Shah Durrani Q amari Calendar101 Qaraqul QARAQUL see QARAQUL SHEEP QARAQUL SHEEP. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Raisins as well as grapes are exported. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
105 Radio Afghanistan Republic of Afghanistan 106 REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Repub - lican Government of Afghanistan particularly en- courages visits to Afghanistan by scholars and others interested in the natural beauty of the country, and/or in carrying out responsible, pro- fessional, and scholastic research and study of the Afghan society and culture. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
the composition of which is attributed to the sec - ond half of the millennium. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Samovar111 Sare Daura 112 SARE DAURA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
He died in Turkey. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
His writings on the Moghuls are a primary source of material for students and scholars interested in the ethnology of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
An Afghan title equivalent to “Sir” or SHAH FULADI PEAK see KOHE BABA MOUNTAIN SHAH RUKH. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Muslim religious mystics found throughout Afghan- Iranian border in Southern Afghanistan which is 4,262 feet in elevation. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
LAKE of Afghanistan constitutes two ears of wheat, mehrab and ____, an eagle and a rising sun. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The ears of wheat which form a circle from two sides of the emblem encircling other parts of the emblem symbolizes the fact that Afghanistan is an agricultural country. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
At the bottom of the wheat circle are the words “Republic of Afghanistan” in Pushtu and the day, month, and year (July 17, 1973 in Pushtu script, solar month, and year) of the revolution which established the Republic of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
place of prostration of Muslims and the pulpit from which believers are invited to seek the way of sal - vation) stand in the middle of the emblem. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Its attraction persists in the country and it is not The mehrab and mumbar (symbols of the The eagle symbolizes Afghanistan as a 115 Siddhartha Sufism SUFISM. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
and southeastern Afghanistan it extends beyond the boundaries of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
the Ghaznavid rulers, he extended his dominion from Afghanistan to the Punjab in India and beyond. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
the most common in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Situated about 235 miles north of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It ranks 15th in size among the provinces of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Often known, in English, as “Tamer- northern provinces of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Afghan Tourist Organization, with offices in Kabul and at points of entry, provides information, brochures, pamphlets, etc. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
for those who wish to visit Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They felt this was crucial to the safety of India. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Its altitude on the Afghanistan side of the border is 16,150 feet. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
v.), he continued his father’s march and completed the conquest of northern India. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The son of Kajula Kadphises (q. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
KADPHISES (KADPHISES II). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Jeghatto River was the site of Afghanistan’s first hydroelectric dam, which has supplied elec- tricity to Kabul for fifty years. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
tral -National Cabinet of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
twenty -eight provinces in Afghanistan, divided into districts and subdistricts. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
YURT. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
tinue in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Among them are witchcraft, black magic, shamanism, and varieties of voodoo. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Zangilak Peak125 Jr Zranda ZRANDA.PuShtU Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
term for watermill. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Tucson: University of Ari- zona Press, 1974. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Taylor (eds.). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Archer, W. “The Music of Afghanistan and Iran,” The Auboyer, Jeanine. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Art of Afghanistan . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology , Vol. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Boston: Afghanistan: Jewett . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Brockelman, Carl. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
tury; Being Selections From the Poems of Khush Hal Khan Khatak . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Edinburgh University Press, 1963. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Pathans . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Bibliography129 Bibliography Caroe, Sir Olaf. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
London: Macmillan, Centlivers, Micheline and Pierre and Mark Slobin. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
National and Literary Language of Afghanistan,” Central Asian Review , Vol. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
24, No. 3, 1966, pp. 210-220. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Settlement and Social Change in Asia, by Wolfram Eberhard. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
< Deh Morasai Ghundai: A Chalcolithic Site< City and Nation in the Developing World, by et al. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
____ < Prehistoric Research in Afghanistan< Philadelphia: 131 American Phiosoph - Bibliography Bibliography Ferdinand, Klaus. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
London: Their Relations . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
“Afghanistan,” < Royal Central Asian< Grassmuck, George, etal. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
< Afghanistan: Some< Gregorian, Vartan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Emergence of Modern Afghan Griffiths, John C. Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Kabul: Dari. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
York, 1951. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
London: Sampson Low, Marston, n.d. < The Course of Afghanistan in History.< Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Central Asia . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Pushtuns of Afghanistan,” International Journal the Sociology of the Family, Vol. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
and Transformational Processes in Afghanistan.” Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
New York: Afghanistan Council, The Asia Society (occasional paper No. 6), 1974. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
2, 1928, pp. 485-494. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Warrior-Poet,” Islamic Culture , Vol. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Asian-African Hot and Cold Desert and Steppe, < Islam and the Transformation of Culture.< Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Random House, 1964. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Lal, Mohan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Mayne, Peter. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Journey to the Pathans . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Mirepoix, Camille. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Qn the Birds of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Patai, Raphael. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Poullada, Leon B. Reform and Rebellion in Afghanis -< Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Northern Tier: Southern Bor Recent Books About Afghanistan: A Selected, Annotated Rice, Francis M. and Benjamine Rowland. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Rowland, B. Ancient Art in Afghanistan . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
__________ Study of the Washington: ties, 1955. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Hove, England: Key Press, 1954. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
of the New State of Pakhtunistan . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Chitral,” Afghanistan . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
London: Macmillan, 1940. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Bibliography139 Bibliography 140 Tilman, H. W. “Wakhan: Or How to Vary a Route,” Trinkler, Emil. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Through the Heart of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Boston: ment in Afghanistan,” Archaeology, Vol. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
< An Annotated Bibliography of Afghanistan.< Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Wilson, Andrew. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Wood-Walker, R. et al. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
47, 1960, pp. 286-295. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Their aim is precisely to redraw boundaries in order to divide—say in Kurdish Iraq or Mus- urn Sudan or Serbian-populated sections of Croatia. Jihad vs. McWorld
The question here is whether it is more than just a metaphor in the Muslim culture that produced the term. Jihad vs. McWorld
There is a second, more institutional step as well. Jihad vs. McWorld
&e also commercials; infomercials Afghanistan, 8, 207, 289 Africa, 34, 55—56, 70 Index agriculture, 27, 33, 34 Albania, 43, 44, 46, 196, 227 Algeria, 4.3, Jihad vs. McWorld
REVOLUTIONS & IN AFGHANISTAN REBELLIONS kevolutions & Afghanistan,. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Anthropological Perspectives Rebellions ROBERT L. CANFIELD, Editors University of California, Berkeley RESEARCH SERIES M. NAZIF SHAHRANI~ OF INTERNATIONAL No. 57 in jiB INSTITUTE STUDIES Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: Revolutions & rebellions in Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan—soCial conditions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
This volume is the result of a day-long symposium of the 1980 Eighteen scholars participated in the symposium. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
We believe, however, that the essays presented here suggest social conditions and developments that have been extant generally throughout the country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska at Omaha. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
I I NTRODUCTI ON PART I INTRODUCTION: To students and observers of the current political and military crisis in Afghanistan, it is apparent that there is a multitude of con- flicts and confrontations at various levels of society and with varying points of origin, motivations, and goals. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The official Soviet and Afghan government view depicts the situation in Afghanistan as a classical “international socialist” battle against “world capitalist-imperialist forces.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The view is made known in the West through a growing body of English-language Soviet publi- cations on Afghanistan and by a number of Soviet and Communist I would like to express my special gratitude to Robert L. Canfield for his unceasing support and many constructive comments and suggestions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN MARXIST “REVOLUTION” AND ISLAM IC Chapter 1 Nazif Shahrani M. 3 sympathizers and supporters among leftist intellectuals and organiza- tions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
some scholars, and the media have focused primarily on the policies of the Afghan Communist government (a coalition of the Khalq and Parcham parties), a few Afghan resistance organizations outside the country, and, particularly, on the causes of the direct Soviet military intervention and its regional and international implications for East- West relations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Commen- tators who have attempted to discuss the situation inside Afghanistan have frequently relied on a very narrow and reified knowledge of the country’s history, culture, and politics. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 6 in the same way as the Pashtun. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Pashtun ethnic groups has been complex. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
There is no evidence that the Khalq-Parcham regime withdrew such privileges from these groups. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Second,. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Marxists have characterized Afghanistan before April 1978 In an interview in World Marxist Review (April 1980), Babrak M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 10 The declared aim of the Afghan Marxist revolution was to effect social, economic and cultural transformations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
.. that would lead to the creation of a new and just democratic society in Afghanistan, where the exploitation of man by man, hunger, poverty, unemployment and illiteracy would be wiped out forever (Muradov 1981: 180). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
reaching” program of reforms. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On 9 May 1978, less than two weeks after the Khalq-Parcham party took power, it introduced most of its proposed re,forms in a Radio Afghanistan broadcast. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The thirty-point program, entitled “Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties of the Government of the Dem~ ocratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA] ,“ touched on a wide range of issues and promised numerous “democratic” changes—for example: land reform and abolition of “old feudal and pre-feudal relations” (Articles 1 and 2); a “democratic solution of national issues” (Art. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Decree No. 6: Land Mortgage and Indebtedness. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
By focusing on the costs of marriage, the new government has either totally ignored or misunderstood that in Afghanistan marriage is the focus of most economic and political activity and the way by which individuals, families, and kinship and ethnic groups recognize and validate status. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
in Nahrin (northern Afghanistan) tried to observe the provisions of Decree No. 7 by holding less elaborate wedding celebrations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Decree No. 7 Nancy Tapper (in this volume) suggests that there is little dif- Beattie (in this volume) reports that in the fall of 1978 people *Mahr in its strict Islamic sense is goods given to a bride by her husband at M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 14 while some planned marriages were abruptly abandoned, resulting in rising tensions among individuals and general resentment toward the government (see also N. Dupree in this volume). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
ternational socioeconomic indicators, during the 1960s and 1970s Afghanistan was among the poorest and least developed countries in the world, with a per capita income of about $160 in 1975 (United Nations 1978: 14). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Yet in the 1920s only one million ha was cultivated, in the 1960s, 3.5 Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Moreover, Soviet writers and the Marxist government in Afghanistan claim that the archaic methods of pro- duction were accompanied by extremely backward agrarian relations, often characterized as “feudal,” “semi-feudal” and “pre-feudal” (see, for example, Glukhoded 1981: 230-3 2). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Despite the increase in cultivated areas, the production rate of rural agriculture as a whole remained unchanged owing to extremely low levels of technology.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Official government statistics show a small increase in total annual M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 16 reason for the abject poverty reigning in the Afghan village. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE BY FAMILY/HOUSEHOLD UNITS IN AFGHANISTAN Families Number 420,000- 470,000 450,000 230,000 51,600 The figures are recalculated on the basis of first-grade land. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
BY FAMILY/HOUSEHOLD UNITS IN AFGHANISTAN The figures reflect estimates of absolute landholdings. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
0% 900,000 hectares of land are required, on the basis of the first group calculation” (1981: 242). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The government’s main reason for the speedy introduction of its land reform program was, it seems, the anticipation that “the popularity of the government will in- crease as a result of. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Halliday offers an intriguing explanation for the armed resistance which followed: “Afghanistan is a country where political and social issues have tended to be settled by the gun and where the room for peacefully handling conflicts within the state, or between the state and subjects, is extremely limited” (1980a: 23). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It certainly does not apply to most non-Pashtun peoples of the country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
When provincial officials were given the task of introducing an alien political ideology and implementing reform policies, the government began to collapse. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
MISINTERPRETATIONS AND DEFINITIONS tained that the resistance movement in Afghanistan is led by “sab- oteur gangs,” “mercenaries,” and “counterrevolutionaries” who are simply the creations of the Western imperialist powers. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
They deny that the movement has an indigenous, independent Islamic political and ideological basis. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Soviets further *The Soviets have published at least four books in English to support their claims that there are ties between the Afghan resistance with Western powers and the “reactionary regimes” in the region who are the clients of the imperialists: MARXIST “REVOLUTION” AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE THE PLACE OF ISLAM AND THE CONCEPT OF JIHAD The Soviets and the regime in Kabul have consistently main- 25 charge that the Western imperialists are “hypocritical ‘friends of Is- lam,” who are using Islam to their own advantage, while “the Soviet Union is, and always has been, a friend of the peoples of the East and a friend of the peoples of the Muslim World” (Grachev 1980: 125). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Indeed members of the resistance are said by the Soviets and the Kabul regime to be neither Afghan nor Muslim, but merely “the willing helpers of imperialism.”* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
articles by Aslanov, Arunova, Khalfin, and Korgun).* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
While recent English-language Soviet publications addressing the M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 26 Afghan conflict essentially as a religious war waged by traditional re- ligious leaders and “fundamentalist” mullahs (learned men) and their faithful horde of tribal and rural followers against the invading Soviet forces and the urban-based atheist Khalq-Parcham government. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On Afghanistan, see Volkov Ct al. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Kolarz 1966; Bociurkiw 1980.81; Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
MARXIST “REVOLUTION” AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE In the history of Afghanistan (as in most other Muslim countries In the face of constant Russian tsarist colonialist advances in the 31 nullah Khan declared a jihad against Great Britain in order to gain Afghanistan’s full independence. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Just take a look around you: Do you think that those of our Muslim brothers who are living under the iron clasps of unbeievers and foreigners possess any freedom of religion, rights to a country, and national dignity, like we do? No! Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Never! Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
(reprinted in Farhadi 1977: 345; see also Shorish 1984). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Some of them were said to be Muslims from the subcontinent who were sent into Afghanistan, while others may have been Afghans educated in India and recruited there. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Mullaha-t-Fo~~~ang refers to mullahs who, regardless of their origin, were allegedly working for the British. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
1n 1965 the Khalq was the only Communist party in Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Following their defeat, many members of the much weakened Islamic movement were forced underground or went into exile in Pakistan and elsewhere in the region. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In the summer of 1975 Mus- lim Youth groups staged armed attacks against the Daoud regime in several areas of the country, including the Panjsher Valley. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
However, the Khalqis were unwilling to share power with other Afghan Communist or secular nationalist groups, creating new tensions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
IDEOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS in Afghanistan in late 1978, attempts to organize formal resistance Power struggles raged between the Khalq and Parcham factions As local resistance grew, it was soon transformed into a national- Shortly after the beginning of large-scale armed opposition with- M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 44 organizations outside the country, particularly in Pakistan, mush- roomed. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
fall into one of two categories: (1) Groups which are inspired by West- ern ideologies of secular nationalism, socialism, Marxism, or Maoism; and (2) Groups organized according to the precepts of Islam. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Their base of support is either extremely narrow or nonexistent. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These parties are particularly well established in tribal Pathan [Pashtun] areas (in the south of the country) (1983: 12; see also N. Newell and R. Newell 1981: 93-94). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Like their traditionalist predecessors during the jihad against Amanullah, they lack any reformist ideals for the country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
They include leading figures from the former regime, tribal chiefs and traditionalist religious leaders trained in nongovernmental reli- gious institutions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
tionship between the educated Islamic-minded youth and the rural and urban masses of Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
We have also found out in the process who is good and who is bad. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Today, the Afghans know one another. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In the hetero- geneous sociocultural and demographic mosaic of Afghanistan, the creation of a close-knit network of Islamic coalitions poses a major challenge to mujahidin leadership. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
and more obvious, it is a jihad in defense of Islam and Afghanistan against the direct Soviet military intervention. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On the first In this tripartite struggle among Marxists, traditionalists, and There are increasing signs that Afghanistan is witnessing a true M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 56 ranks may decrease the risks of a totalitarian regime if the mujahidin are victorious.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The lack of organizational linkage between the mujahidin groups and outside powers, particularly the superpowers, makes the Afghan strug- gle distinct in the recent history of liberation movements. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (1973-78) Republic of Afghanistan on 17 July 1973. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Post-World War II leftist movements in Afghanistan have been minis- cule, fragmented, and on the whole home-grown. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
*Political parties were technically illegal in Afghanistan from 1973 until 1978, although several functioned unofficially—but openly. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The confessions implicated Babrak as instigator and ringleader of the overthrow plot, but most of those involved appeared to have been more nationalist and Muslim than Parcham in orientation and to have favored a genuinely nonaligned Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
As the Khalq regime preempted the leftists and nationalists, it Most objectionable, the reforms and other pronouncements were It is interesting to note that the reform programs of the DRA *For details on the so-called “women’s reforms,” see the contribution in tThe transistor radio has created a revolution in communication in the Third **M~ist dialectic sounds stilted not only in Persian and Pashto, but also in MARXIST REGIMES AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE RHETORIC AND REFORMS 65 (Islamic Party), a dissident Muslim fundamentalist group led by Engineer Gulbudin Hikmatyar, most of the opposition was quiet in Afghanistan from the April coup until late August-early September 1978. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Except for sporadic attacks from Pakistan by the Hizb-i Islami Several factors account for the relative lack of early reaction In rural Afghanistan from early spring through early fall, the *For a discussion of how seasonal warfare affected imperialist tactics, see L. LOUIS DUPREE REVOLTS 66 Indian “burying the hatchet.”) Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
tions in rural Afghanistan, tensions build up between individuals, families, and lineages. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The tribesmen of Afghanistan can be described as having a short fuse and a long feud. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Government reprisals continued throughout the fall and winter of 19 78-79, and revolts spread to every province in Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
DRA had a Soviet-equipped and trained military, and it overreacted— as have many Third World central governments when faced with opposition from the countryside. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Dupree: 1979a, 1979b)— mainly because if the Soviets invaded Afghanistan it would be the first Soviet aggression since World War II on an independent and nonaligned territory—an important and potentially dangerous prece- dent.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Czechoslovakia and Hungary were not in the same cate ory as Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
They were consi ere by NATO < an e rest of the< world as part of the Soviet bloc c jn members < of the Warsaw Pact,< but Afghanistan was not. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Central Asians mingled with the local Afghan population in the cities and were rather dis- turbed to find that no foreign troops (other than from the USSR) were inside Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
sofication” of their Central Asian republics and have always feared that influences from the south (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan) would infiltrate across the border. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
*For discussions of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, see the following (amongothers): L. Dupree 1980g; Griffiths 1981;N. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
LOUIS DUPREE 70 with the Afghan mujahidin (freedom fighters). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
As a fmal gesture of cultural affinity with the Afghans, many Muslim troops combed the bazaars of Kabul and elsewhere for Qurans to take home. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
A small number of Central Asian Muslim troops deserted to fight When they invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 (85,000 Relatively speaking, few Afghans were involved in the fighting Afghan kin units (in almost all areas) are based on vertically Soviet tactics have helped accelerate the extension of regional *1 am writing a book on The First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842): Myth as MARXIST REGIMES AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE 71 tanks—and organization they would use in the plains of Eastern Europe. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
*A number of books on Afghanistan have been published since this manu- script was submitted for publication, among them the following: Afghanistan: The Target of Imperialism 1983; T. Amin 1982; Arnold 1981 and 1983;Bhargava 1983; Bradsher 1983; Chaliand 1982; Hammond 1984; Hyman 1982; Male 1982; Manzar 1980; Misra 1981;Monks 1981; Nayar 1981; Ratnain 1981; Rubinstein 1982; Victor 1983; Vogel 1980; Volkov et al. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It is to be hoped that the unifying process will continue in Whether the Russians leave Afghanistan or not, nothing will ever MARXIST REGIMES AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE 73 EASTERN AFGHANISTAN PART II NU RI STAN AND Muhammad Taraki and the Khalq party, the political situation in Af- ghanistan had so deteriorated that the leaders of the eastern Nuristani peoples of Kunar province decided that (in the words of one) “We should drive out this Russian crumb-licker from our Islamic soil.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Eastern Nuristan was no longer under the control of the central gov- ernment. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
After a three-day battle the Nuristanis overran the post, capturing a store of weapons. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Most of their ethnosociological vocabulary consists of terms that identify the social roles of individuals. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Tales abound among the insurgents of the intrigues sown by Gulbudin to increase his own power at the expense of otherwise solid ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN EASTERN NURISTAN Parallel to the system of civilian village leaders, Anwar estab- As stated above, a chosen leader must maintain consensus for Throughout the fighting the Nuristanis’ entire supply of weapon- 91 local military commands. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
this word, although “Waigal” is the more widely used spelling. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
However, conclusions concerning post-1978 events must remain tentative until they can be verified through additional field study. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RESPONSES TO CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN NURISTAN: THE CASE OF THE VAYGAL VALLEY KALASHA* The acceptance of Afghan sovereignty and incorporation into In this chapter we shall examine the pre-1978 Kalasha-govern- *~Vaygal~~ is a more accurate transliteration for the Kalasha pronunciation of Grateful acknowledgment of support for this research is hereby given to the 10576. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
SITUATING NURISTAN AND THE KALASHA 95 involving cereal cultivation on intensively farmed, irrigated terraces and small animal pastoralism. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Kalasha came from neighboring non-Nuristani populations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Except for mullahs in every village, the only significant Kalasha integration into Afghanistan proceeded smoothly and 99 of young women and men from each village be sent to Kabul. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Fifteen years later, during heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, valley residents again actively supported the government by staging clandestine raids into Pakistani territory. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
of the Republic of Afghanistan (1973.78) Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The physical features of many Nuristanis, which are more typical of In the decades following their conquest Vàygal Valley Kalasha Stability in the region was shattered by a major uprising in 1946 The Kalasha-government relationship culminated during the era The treatment of Nuristanis by ‘Abdur Rahman and his succes- DAVIDJ. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
KATZ 100 northern Europeans than of other Afghan peoples—especially their fair complexions and blue eyes —also endeared them to the elite, making them highly desired as servants, concubines, and wives. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These officials are nearly always ethnic Palthtuns from distant parts of Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In Nuristan and elsewhere in rural Afghanistan two factors determine a community’s susceptibility to government meddling: its accessibility to officials because of its proximity to government outposts, and the government’s perceived need for involvement in the community. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Kalasha to themselves, the local government was a genuine source of concern to the residents. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These local fundamentalist activists received support, moral and otherwise, from Pakistan, where many mullahs from eastern Afghanistan are trained. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Political differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan—mainly centering on Afghan- istan’s contention that the predominately Pashtun regions of Pakistan should be a sovereign state called Pashtunistan—have at times led each country to encourage subversion of the other through propa- ganda and covert backing of anti-government elements. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
To a large extent, they merely parroted the more politically astute Pakhtun fundamentalist complaints about the non-Islamic character of the Daoud regime. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In addition, fundamentalists in eastern Afghanistan draw support from fundamentalists in other countries—especially Pakistan, where the powerful fundamentalist Jamiat.i Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Their geographic situation effectively insulated them from the most oppressive aspects of contact with local authorities. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
As a result, a balance was Struck between government representatives and the people of Dana-i Nur. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In many respects villages were left to run their own affairs, but taxes were collected, men were conscripted, and the legitimate right of the gov- ernment to handle certain kinds of civil and criminal cases was recog. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The new officials Two policies introduced by Communist officials were particu- The second policy was to increase military conscription. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Such a perspective could be extremely useful in understanding popular uprisings not only in Darra-i Nur, but in other areas of Afghanistan as well. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
By focusing only on current events, recent literature has defined the conflict in Afghanistan solely in terms of the intentions of the Marxist government (e.g., Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
rapid modernization through radical land reform) or the presumed intentions of the opposition (fighting to retain tribal, ethnic, and regional autonomy or personal wealth and privileges, de- fense of Islam, etc.).* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Viewed in light of Aya’s political model, it becomes clear that M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 140 Islamic political movements and not simply “religious” in nature (see the introduction above); second, the initial force behind the armed resistance and its leadership originated in the major urban centers (not the rural areas, as has been frequently claimed), but for tactical reasons the resistance—considered by Afghans to be an Islamic war of liberation, or jihad—has been fought to a large extent in the country- side; finally, the principal actors in the struggle for control of politi- cal power in this conflict are the newly educated elite (urban and rural, religious and secular), not the agrarian tribesmen, peasants, and nomads fighting a central government for their own narrow interests. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The government record in the field of health care, however, has been very poor. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
For example, it is commonly accepted in many parts of northern Afghanistan that in an effort to indoctrinate Muslim children, the Soviet Communists withheld food and water from them for a long time. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In addition, Badakhshan was under attack from the Uzbek khans of Qataghan, and on occasion the local mirs were made vassals of the Khanate of Qunduz. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Like many other parts of Afghanistan, Badakh- shan was left without any effective traditional local leadership above the village level. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RESPONSES TO THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN BADAKHSHAN Relationships between the mawlawis and mullahs and the gener- EDUCATION Traditional political leaders, both religious and secular, had *The government eventually provided high school education in most of the 153 the elitist high schools in Kabul. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
wasitah school at Faizabad and after finishing it was sent by his family to Kabul to attend one of the most elite non-vocational high schools (Habibiah). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RESPONSES TO THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN BADAKHSHAN Burhanuddin Rabbani, also from Faizabad, is a Sunni Tajik from *~~flj~~y claims that during a worsening of Afghan.Pakistan Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Alarmed by the Communist agitations and the government’s lack of. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Most of the Kirghiz who could leave the area have done so, the Wakhi have not rebelled, and the Soviets are thus peacefully installed in at least this small area of Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
ment of Afghanistan and its opponents differs from all previous political upheavals involving the central government (e.g., Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
to what constitutes legitimacy of state authority. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
There- fore, guerrilla warfare, which has been called “the latest weapon in the Communist arsenal” is being used against the Communists (Ahmad 1971: 138). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
With increasingly effective use of recently acquired anns, Badakh- shani youth are transformed into a formidable guerrilla force. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The changes in the reform policies of one contender in the con- *There is a major difference between the current situation in Afghanistan and 169 (PDPA) seized power in Kabul with the help of sympathetic units in the Afghan military in what has come to be known as the Saur Revolution. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
of the old political struc- ture. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
This structure was the product of fifty years of conservative dynastic rule of the Musahiban royal lineage that had begun with the installation of Nadir Shah as king in 1929 and ended with Muhammad Daoud as president of a nominal republic. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The central government was effective in expanding its power, but it did not completely displace older tribal structures. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
They dressed in Western suits, which set them off from the turban-wearing residents of rural Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Indeed, with few exceptions, govern- ment officials were embarrassed by rural Afghanistan, stating that it was a backward place full of backward people. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
This time opposition was more widespread, and the Afghan army crumbled in the face of numerous attacks, forcing Amanullah to flee Afghanistan after abdicating the throne. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
With modern weapons the army would protect the government from the MUSAHIBAN STRATEGY TO REDUCE PROVINCIAL INFLUENCE The Musahiban government policy toward provincial Afghanistan The lesson of the civil war was not lost on Nadir Shah and his The Musahiban dynasty developed a tripartite strategy. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Amanullah’s fiscal dependence on the rural areas to pay for his projects made him vulnerable to opposition from the provinces. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
However, they were still careful not to deliberately provoke provincial Afghans by demanding any great changes in the way they lived; furthermore, government reforms were always justified as being in line with orthodox Islamic values. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
One consequence of this strategy was to increase the distance between the values held by Afghanistan’s small literate urban population and the tribal village populations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s economic and social development, but also to put the party’s propaganda in a form that would attract a broader base of support outside the party itself. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Unlike the PDPA, opposition leaders used the old political language of Afghanistan, calling on their followers to defend the faith of Islam, the honor of their families and country, and their property. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Perhaps the most basic difficulty faced by the national govern- THOMAS 3. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On 27 April 1978, a military coup in Afghanistan brought to Shortly after taking power, the new government embarked upon OF NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN Chapter 8 Hugh Beattie 184 historical context. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Loess hills around the valley and the plateau of Burqa to the north are used for dry-farming. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
A river runs through this valley as well as through the Yarm (or Jilga) Valley in the southeast of the subprovince, making possible some irrigated agriculture. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
per jirib for those owning between 15 and 20 jiribs; those who owned more than 120 jiribs were ineligible for membership. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
During the autumn of 1978, the local administration in Nahrin began setting up a coop- erative to make fertilizer, seed, and machinery available to the farmers and to help with marketing their produce. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Land reform has a much shorter history in Afghanistan than do In August 1975 the government of President Muhammad Daoud EFFECTS OF THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN NAHRIN 193 dry-farming land (Article il).* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
(Decree No.8 stated that land would be redistributed first to “the landless peasant who is busy working on the distributable land” [Article 24].) Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These are inlikely to have been substantial for two main reasons. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
governor tried to stop people using the word arbab except as a term of abuse. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
During a game of buzkashi which the subgovernor happened to attend, one of the players, a former arbab named Jabar, succeeded in winning a round.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
People said that although bribery still went on in the local administration, it was less prevalent than before. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
PREVAILING IDEAS ABOUT HOW ISLAM FIGURES IN AFGHANISTAN POLITICS called “mullahs”—have had a great deal of influence on traditional affairs in Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Studies of Afghanistan’s political history fre- quently mention the significant role that religious authorities have exerted in the country’s affairs.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Most analysts of Afghanistan social affairs have noted their social and political influence. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The term “Islamic coalition” implies a certain alignment of It has long been accepted that Islamic authorities—commonly ISLAMIC COALITIONS IN BAMYAN: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ISLAMIC COALITIONS Robert L. Canfield Chapter 9 211 Elphinstone reported that Meer Wauez, a mullah, had become so popular with the Afghans that he used his influence to dethrone Shah Mahmood (1972, vol. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
More than half a century later, Sultan Muhammad Khan wrote the following: At the time of the accession of the present Amir [‘Abdur Rahman] to the throne of Kabul, he found the most arbitrary and fantastic powers being exercised in the administration of the state by the clergy of Islam. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Even though the social and political strength of the religious The three most important books on politics in Afghanistan have *In a recent shorter work R. Newell (1980) speaks more directly to the prob. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
ISLAMIC COALITIONS IN BAMYAN 213 number of anthropologists have written about politics in local or re- gional contexts,* but few have had much to say about religious or sectarian groupings on the local or regional level.t Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
I shall emphasize that the Islamic coalition is one type of social unit that bears upon local affairs in Afghanistan and so acts— at least in certain contexts—as a political force. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Islamic co- alitions like those in Bamyan seem to be an important type of orga- nizational structure through which many of these local groups have coalesced in order to resist the Marxist Afghan government and its *See L. Dupree (1976a) for a comprehensive review covering most anthropo- logical studies done in Afghanistan up to 1976. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Because craft guilds have had an influence on political affairs elsewhere (see Miner 1965), I assume that they do in Afghanistan as well. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
kind of organization. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The approach will be causal-functional: we want to examine the organizational features of Islamic coalitions in Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
•The Imami pirs of Afghanistan were sometimes called mujtahids (learned enough to make innovative interpretations), but most people acknowlçdged that they were not true mujtahids; all of the true mujtahids, people told me, were in Iraq and Iran. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
term that the resistance groups in Afghanistan now use in referring to themselves: mujahidin. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
There are, in fact, some newcomers to the study of Afghanistan who have taken the muja- hidin to be disagreeable and undesirable in ways suggested by our word “fanatic.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Another, cited as an authority on contemporary Afghanistan, is quoted as saying that the Afghan resistance fighters “are medieval.... Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Freedom is a cause for which an honorable person may justifiably kill and die. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
freedom fighters has the merit of capturing well for the Western mind a dimension of the moral sensibility of the people of Afghani- stan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
hidin as freedom fighters. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
ready in evidence as early as the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries; Hugh Beattie has pointed out that it was implicit in the position of Marsiglio of Padua (per. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
sonal communication). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
As noted, in the Islamic coalition political and social ideals are merged. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Western biases tend to mask that fact, so Westerners may miss the full range of moral impli- cations entailed in Afghanistan’s Islamic coalitions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
We do not know much about how the peoples of Afghanistan ISLAMIC COALITIONS AS ORGANIZATIONS FOR ISLAMIC COALITIONS IN BAMYAN GRASS-ROOTS RESISTANCE 229 ETHNICITY AND CLASS: DIMENSIONS OF INTERGROUP Few reports of events in the north-central region of Afghanistan have appeared since the Soviet invasion of 1979, but they all indicate that resistance there has been as strong and implacable as anywhere in the country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In the absence of specific information, I shall suggest the probable reactions of the local population to the 1978 Saur Revo- lution, on the one hand, and to an increasing Soviet presence, on the other. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
the extent that all members of a particular class are considered to have common ethnic origins, or all members of a particular ethnic group have a similar class position (relation to the means of produc- tion). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Higher mountain chains lie further to the south in the provinces of Ghor and Bamyan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Persian-speakers with no other tribal or ethnic affiliations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Then large numbers of nomads began arriving from the west and southwest, ousting Arab and Turkmen pastoralists from the local grazing lands. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The year 1400 (A.H.) Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
By no means are such relations between nomads and the central state unique to Afghanistan, of course. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Were the institutions of secular authority more firmly en- As I have stressed, the merger of indigenous religious and SHEIKIIANZAI NOMADS AND THE AFGHAN STATE 265 mobilizing political action in Afghanistan which often remain opaque in more strictly political analyses. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
That conjunction is found in mediations of Islam through shari’at (law, in the keeping of ‘ulama or religious scholars), tariqat (spiritual exemplars, often Sufi), and qawm (tribe, and more generally relations of codescent). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Durrani restoration under Nadir Shah was initially supported by Ahmadzai Ghilzai, some of whom had been punished with exile to northern Afghanistan by Amanullah for taking part in a revolt against him in 1924; but Nadir’s claims were resisted by many Ghilzai. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM One means for securing Ghilzai acquiescence and diluting their Any such institutionalization in Afghanistan marks an initiation 271 within the ‘ulama, whose capacities are self-assumed and popularly, hence variably, acknowledged. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
While to be avghan (a Pakhtun tribesman) is to be Muslim, the reverse is not true, and the truth that one can still be Muslim provides the basis for critiquing Pakhtunness as sunnat in comparison to the mediation of Islam through learning and through personal identification with the divine. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The claim for a unique mediation of Islam, analytically speaking, is an identification of Pakhtunness with Islam, but it is limited by other mediations through shari’at and tariqat, which diminish a common sense of being “already” Muslim. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Clericalization is seen as a characteristically Shi’a heresy and a mark of religion gone bad. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
By their disjunctions, each competes with a tribalism set both in relation to other Muslims and in relation to non-Muslims. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Mediations of Islam through shari’at and tariqat differ from that JON W. ANDERSON 284 mediations of Islam rests on presuppositions about settings to which they are appropriate, and the problem is that none of these settings are mutually exclusive. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
While this pattern has never been stable, but rather has fluctuated, the HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM Not to put too fine a point on it, the differentiation of these Continuity with all politics is not only potential but has Such associations of shari’at with strife and of tariqat with 285 (ideally) complementary mediations to qawm seem to have emerged as something more like alternatives to it— shari’at through institutional estrangements from tribal settings and tariqat through estrangements of tribesmen on a personal level. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM 287 THE SAUR REVOLUTION AND THE AFGHAN WOMAN PART VI Revolutionary Council in Afghanistan, initiated a wide-ranging program of change and development. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE ABOLITION In 1978 the government of Nur M. Taraki, President of the *Th in a speech on 4 November 1978 President Taraki said that it was OF BRIDEPRICE IN AFGHANISTAN Chapter 13 Nancy Tapper 291 as a radical improvement from the legislators’ point of view, this perspective has many critics in the Third World and elsewhere. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
exchange of a woman in marriage for cash or kind and the payment of other prestations customarily due from a bridegroom on festive occasions; the third article sets an upper limit of 300 afs. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
1See the interesting discussion of earlier marriage reform in Afghanistan, the political background to Decree No. 7, and some of its implications for the posi- tion of Afghan women in N. Dupree (1981:1, 10-12). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Child marriage and intermarriage between close kin were outlawed as contrary to Islamic principles. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan: Only in July 1973, when the conservative nature of the Afghan constitution was one of the issues behind the coup d’etat which established Muhammad Daoud’s Afghan Republic, did there seem some chance of promulgating more substantial marriage reforms coupled with legal sanctions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, as elsewhere in the Muslim Middle East, the legal code relating to marriage and the family is based directly on the Shari’a or canon law of Islam, and reforms in this area have typically provoked extreme reactions, explicitly in the defense of Islamic principles. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
However, it would seem that the relation between reform legislation and Islamic fundamentalism actually works the other way around. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The strength of the reaction clearly depends on the impor- tance of the institutions of marriage and the family in the regulation of daily living and the extent to which they are threatened. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF ABOLITION OF BRIDEPRICE AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON MARRIAGE PAYMENTS It has long been accepted by anthropologists that marriage Such a perspective on brideprice and marriage gifts is particularly In this context see especially N. Dupree (1981).* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Marriage arrangements can be delayed or exchanges arranged; men of any household can find brides and need not incur further debt to do so. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Yet contradictions between religion, custom, and reform have plagued the feminist movement in Afghanistan since its inception. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF ABOLITION OF BRIDEPRICE Marriage reforms such as Decree No. 7 attack symptoms, not In the longer term, however, the underlying goals of -the CONCLUSIONS 305 reform for women for a hundred years. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Women should also take part as women did in the early years of Islam. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
But very few women spoke out publicly on the subject. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In 1968 conservative members 309 at the legs of women in Western dress and splashing them with acid. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These first demonstra- tions by women were early indications that a women’s consciousness S was developing—an initial statement that women should be considered a viable force with potential leadership. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Hundreds of demonstrating girls vociferously brought their constitutional guarantee of equal rights to the atten- tion of the parliamentarians. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Positions of responsibility and power were occasionally offered to women, but disproportion- ately to the female work force. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Taraki on 1 January 1965. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
with the people of Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On the night of 24 December 1979, they airlifted many thousands of troops into Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In a desperate attempt to lncluding Suraya (former president of the DOAW and a cousin of Babrak’s) NANCY HATCH DUPREE 326 invaded. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
against the Afghan revolution and disinterested assistance of the Soviet Union to Afghanistan” (Kabul New Times, 3/9/80). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The use of the DOAW for disseminating political propaganda continued to be prominent, but the DRA stressed the following: One important criterion of a progressive regime is the efforts it makes to ensure equality between males and females.... Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
but men used women as second-rate citizens and did not allow them to acquire knowledge and therefore women are not aware of their rights (Editorial, Kabul New Times, 3/16/80)i *From its inception the DRA attempted to identify the Afghan women’s movement with the world-wide women’s socialist movement. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
NANCY HATCH DUPREE 330 However, in May 1980 Dr. Anahita quoted some remarkable statistics: “At present, 500,000 have completed literacy training in 27,000 courses throughout the country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
honor took more drastic forms. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC AND AFGHAN WOMEN Legend and fact combine in the accounts of women in the resis- The innate courage of Afghan women has been exemplified in When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains And the women come out to cut up what remains, An’ go to your Gawd like a soldier 335 to flee arrest while they remain behind to sell property and wind up other affairs. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
And so can Afghanistan!” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
positions, the Babrak regime offers women only token representa- tion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
of Representatives of the Women of Kabul City was organized by the DOAW specifically “to organize the women of Afghanistan in de- fending the revolution.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
A major objective of this conference was “to further expand the closed ranks of militant women in the country.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In addition, it elected representatives to a nationwide conference on Afghanistan’s women. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
After reiterating the party’s duty to implement the DRA’s Fundamental Principles, it continued: “Under the present circum- stances the training of sacrificing and firm adherents to . Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Her long, long speech included fulsome thanks to Karmal and the PDPA/CC for their sup- port of the women’s movement, gratitude for “the aid of the brother- ly people of the Soviet Union,” and quotes from Brezhnev on the “victories gained” by Babrak’s visit to the USSR.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE ON UNITY AND SOLIDARITY We have decided to: Promote the role of Afghanistan’s women in defense of the gains of the Saur1. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
August. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Ministry of Planning. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Amin, Abdul Rasul. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Anthropos 70: 575-601. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Tapper, ed. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Relations in Contemporary Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
New York: Asia Society, Afghanistan Council. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
“Islam Finds Marxism Wanting.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Anis (Kabul). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Occasional Paper no. 15. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Anthropological Quarterly 44, 3: 109.31. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Various issues. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
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Folk 4: 123-59. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Primitive Polynesian Economy. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
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Report submitted to government of Afghanistan and UNICEF by Compagnie d’Etude Industrielle et d’Amenagement du Territoire (CINAM), KabuL Pullapilly, Cyriak K, ed. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
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Bibliography 373 Absarinas, 186, 197 Abu Bakr, 150 Adi,Ghazi,313 Afandi, 33n Afghan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Nuristan, 79; among religious func- Dan, 38, 65, 84, 92, 239, 313, 321 tionaries, 280; during Republic of Darra-i Nur, 52, 119-35, 224n Afghanistan, 59, 63; among Sheik- Darwaz, 145, 153, 157, 167 hanzai, 260, 262; in VygaI Valley, Dastigir, Ghulam, 91 102-8passim Dawa, 243 Cotton, 171n Coup d’e’tat of 1973. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See Daoud, Mu- Debts, loans, interest rates, 12-14, 147, hammad; Republic of Afghanistan 179, 18 7-88, 291, 293-96, 298-99, Coup d’e’tat of 1978. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See also 377 25 2-53; significance of recourse to, da against, 200-201; and leftist op- Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW), 314-15, 317, 320, 329-30, 336-39 passim Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA): and land redistribution, 18- 20; and opposition, 66, 68-69, 249, 263, 264; organization of, 62; pro- paganda of, 63,313-14,329; reform policies of, 12 65, 264, 312, 316, 322-26, 330, 338; repressions of, 63. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See Democratic Republic of Af- ghanistan Dukandar, 238 Durand Line, 101 Durrani (Pashtun tribe), 58, 225n, 23