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A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A History of Modern Yemen
Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Comtemporary Yemen
Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Making of the Georgian Nation

In early 1996 a rape case, again involving secur-
ity forces, led to riots in Mukalla.
	A History of Modern Yemen

It only produced a few general declarations expressing support for national solidarity, condemning internecine fighting, urging the use of dialogue for dealing with each other, and encouraging all efforts to be directed at secur- ing the release of prisoners in Israeli jails; a joint committee was formed to deal with emergencies.38 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In fact, the gen- eral trend in student and professional association elections, particularly during 1996—98, ran in favor of Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
On the one hand the political requirements of operating in the open under the cover of politi- cal legitimacy (even its security requirements) were best served by secur- ing the largest possible number of seats in the council. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Serfs were debarred from selling property or incurring debts without their master’s permission, though this applied only to such transactions as the sale or leasing of houses, fields, and so on, and not to the marketing of farm or garden produce. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
One man is building a wine ware- house to supply the city with drink, another is trying to make a fortune out of milk—there is no limit to these bright ideas, and all their promoters are naturally keen to secure financial backing from the bank! A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
90 In 1921, when the Russian comrades felt themselves secure, they were to prove less eager to tolerate the independent ideas of their little brothers in Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In other parts of the Empire where a non-Russian population was in the majority, similar measures were taken to secure the return of Cossacks or Russian colonists. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Another member of the Berlin delegation, Zurab Avalishvili, was therefore sent to neutral Scandinavia to make contact with British and French diplomats there in an effort to secure recognition of Georgia’s neutral status and pave the way for a transfer of allegiance from the German to the Allied side. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On i6 December 1920 Georgia’s application for membership of the League of Nations failed to secure the requisite majority, though she was admitted to participation in the League’s technical sub-committees. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In spite of his declared hostility to the Kremlin ‘fanatics’, Zhordania found it prudent to initiate secret negotiations with them in an effort to secure formal Communist recognition of Georgia’s independence. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Russia reacted to this rebuff by forming a special committee for the establishment of Soviet authority in the Caucasus. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Gekker emphasized that it would first be necessary to secure the benevolent neutrality of Kazim Kara- bekir Pasha, the Turkish commander in Armenia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It passed resolutions calling upon the Revcom to defend Georgia’s rights to self-determination and independence; to hasten the formation of a national Red Army of Georgia; to secure for the working masses of Georgia the right to select their representatives by free elections; to ensure that the new Soviet order was introduced into Georgia in such a way as to respect the customs of the people; and to legalize the existence of all socialist organizations not actually engaging in activities directed against the régime. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Minor squabbles continued among tribes (the official gazette of the time and the chronicles, mean- while, list Islamic punishments for individual offences of murder, adul- tery and wine-drinking) but the peace of the Imam was real and was highly valued. A History of Modern Yemen
The British attempted through air action to secure the trade routes. A History of Modern Yemen
However, Ahmad from early in his reign was desperate to secure financial help, and an American mission visited Ta’izz in 1950. A History of Modern Yemen
Such ability was frustrated constantly by intrigue and back- biting. A History of Modern Yemen
More and more soldiers were deployed to secure Aden, which itself was meant to secure the Indian Ocean and the oil-rich Gulf The process went on until Aden, as a wit remarked, “consumed more security than it could ever produce”. A History of Modern Yemen
Northerners, with money in their pockets and secure in their posses- sion of a vast cultural history, often revelled in the image, quoting Sallal’s line from the civil war that he was “ruler of five mfflion luna- tics”. A History of Modern Yemen
Most people in towns maintain links with their rural biläd or territory But in very few cases does the countryside support the city and Sharjabi’s informants in the mid-198os seemed already by the early iggos to be speaking of a lost world: “I’d like to buy land and make a modern farm, because land makes a person’s life secure. A History of Modern Yemen
The object of migrant labour, so prominent through the twenti- eth century and so extraordinary a feature of Yemeni experience, was nearly always to bring money home, to pay off one’s debts and secure a landholding. A History of Modern Yemen
As a result the Palestinian movement felt more secure in Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Dawud never let his captors know that Mustafa Jabr had betrayed him, and pretended not to know him at all. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At the time of writing, he was living in Libya. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad told me that when Abu Mazin started to rebuke Abu Nidal for the Paris operation, an Iraqi official present at the meeting inter- rupted him brusquely. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Their most pressing demand was for the release from Egyptian jails of the five comrades who had staged the attack on the Pan Am plane at Fiumicino in December 1973 and who were awaiting trial by the PLO. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It took place in the multicolored Arab tent, pitched incongruously among the billets and guardrooms of the Bab a!- Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The man who escorted him in and out of Syria was Muftah al-Farazani, a Libyan intelligence officer and head of the Libyan People’s Bureau in Da- mascus, who was in direct touch with Libya’s intelligence chiefs, Ibrahim al-Bishari and Abdallah al-Sanussi (the latter a particu- larly powerful figure because of his marriage to Qaddafi’s sister-in- law). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the Syrians disappointed him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Portugal, Muhammad Hussein Rashid, a member of the hit team sent to kill Isam Sartawi in Portugal, guffawed in court when he heard that he had been sentenced to only three years. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
To intelligence and security officers from the East, like their West- In the late 1980s, Abu Nidal and Fatah fought over the rem- First, needing secure places of residence for himself and some Second, trading in East-bloc arms was an important source of Third, he wanted to undermine the close relations that the Several Eastern European states concluded agreements with ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 275 276 / PATRICK SEALE em counterparts, Abu Nidal was a terrorist who had to be con- tained. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Greece 20. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel~c Use ofArab Disguises 35 tinians in the West Bank and Gaza staged demonstrations to honor Fatah Day, commemorating the day that Fatah, the primary pillar of the Palestine national movement, surfaced in its 1965 guerrilla action against Israel, the first act of the armed struggle to liberate Palestine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Black September vs. Mossad 69 70 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Dr. Mahmood Hanishari, killed in Paris in 1972 by a Mossad hit team. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States confronted Israel, and Israel backed down,16 but Israel’s ambas- sador to the United States, Moshe Arens, declared that Israel would shortly invade Lebanon,17 and Arid Sharon visited Christian Maronite leaders in Beirut to secure their cooperation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The unfolding Falkland drama provided good initial cover for an aggressive operation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The evidence is overwhelming, in fact, that Yemen’s initial allegiance to Islam was at best only superficial. Comtemporary Yemen
The traditional policy of retaining the base in Aden was still filling the background but new measures had to be taken to secure its success. Comtemporary Yemen
In order to secure independence Yemen had to shun international involvement. Comtemporary Yemen
The primacy of the NLF over internal Southern political forces had been established earlier on in the independence struggle, and British withdrawal in later 1967 left the NLF in secure control of the reins of power. Comtemporary Yemen
The emphasis of existing regimes is overwhelmingly focused on survival and on personal and factional rivalries. Comtemporary Yemen
This additional equipment included a squadron of F-SE jet fighters, several C-130 transport planes, 64 M-60 tanks, 100 armoured personnel carriers and Vulcan anti-aircraft guns. Comtemporary Yemen
The President then tried to secure aid from another source, namely Saudi Arabia, Soviet Relations with South Yemen 219 220 Soviet Relations with South Yemen and he used Saudi aid to fund his own economic projects in which h relied on politically sound, but untrained, cadres, in preference tc what he saw as the ‘bureaucratic’ elements favoured by the parts leadership. Comtemporary Yemen
These countries remain perfectly and fully democratic in every way—but their citizens feel more secure as a result of responsible government efforts to ensure that those inciting and preparing for political violence are kept at bay. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But so long as the tension between these two poles is maintained, with- out one extreme becoming the permanent fixation of the society and its ruin, the democracies can hope to have the best of both, remaining at once free and secure. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
tinian political movement is commensurate, in a very basic sense, with its capacity to serve as an outlet for resistance against the occupation and with its ability to secure a minimally reasonable level of satisfaction of Palestinian rights. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This study is considered the most important and complete documentation of the proceedings of the conference, relying on oral Arrangements for convening the conference had been finalized in a cel- ebration commemorating al-isra’ wal mi’raj (midnight journey [of the Prophet to the seven heavens]) held by the Brotherhood in Jerusalem and to which it had invited a large number of participants from various coun- tries. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The strategy that Zionism and imperialism use to secure this objective, contends Hamas, is to single out each Arab country sequentially. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It even accused Hamas of being in cahoots with the Likud Party to help get Benyamin Netanyahu elected and to secure the defeat of the Labor Party and Shimon Peres in May 1996. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Fateh raised the slogan of harnessing the intifada to secure an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, the strategy endorsed by the PNC in 1988. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas also had to act within the parameters set by the Palestinian public that was supportive of Iraq and resentful of the Western-led coali- tion. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The reception given to Sheikh Yassin in Kuwait on 12 May 1998 while on his tour following his release from prison boosted Hamas’s position in Kuwait, compared with the resentment and great hostility harbored for the PLO and Yasir Arafat. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, Hamas examined in detail the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policy of nonintervention, which it saw as allowing the Serbs the opportunity to establish their hegemony. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The failure of Hamas’s rhetoric to activate Islamic movements and to secure genuine solidarity to its own satisfaction led Hamas to lament “the shortcomings of those movements with regard to support for the intifada, for the jihad of the Palestinian people, and for Hamas;” and it also criticized “the total preoccupation of Islamic move- ments with their internal concerns and issues at the expense of the Pales- tinian cause.”112 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Some Hamas leaders and others affiliated with the movement in the Occupied Territories spoke up about the need to participate. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The end of the Cold War and its bipolarity worked to the disadvantage of Hamas, in view of the international consensus that the United States was able to secure on a peace settlement in the Middle East, i.e., the Madrid Conference and the Oslo agreements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
declared that it would not use military means to secure the release of Higgins, although it insisted that its decision was motivated out of concern for the safety of the hostage. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He has backed Hezbollah’s Islamic Resistance con- sistently, even when Syria’s relations with Hezbollah were at their worst. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At that time, it was also obvious that the Syrian and French authorities were working in earnest to secure release for the hostages before the elections, so that Mitterrand could use their freedom as a trump card in his public campaign. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When Terry Waite began negotiating for the release of the hostages, the kidnappers asked him to secure the release of the Kuwait 17. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was a move that would not only provide help for the destitute, but would secure the allegiance of the Shiite population to Hezbollah and its Iranian mentors. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A mixture of dynasticism and feudalism emerged in eastern Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But just as Byzantine hegemony in the east seemed secure, the harbingers of a major new threat to the heirs of Rome appeared in Caucasia—the Seijuk Turks.39 The Making of the Georgian Nation
With the death of Queen Rusudan in 1245, an interregnum began during which the Mongols divided Caucasia into eight provinces or dumafls.66 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The bloody climax of this maneuver occurred in March 1605. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The promise of protection and a more secure future, however, was not fulfilled. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Armenian population in Georgian towns dated from the early Middle Ages. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The law tried in these ways to secure a livelihood for the nobles, even at the sacrifice of some peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgians of various classes came face to face with a well-entrenched, finan- cially secure, urban middle class whose members spoke a different language, went to a different church, and held very different values. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The failure of the manifesto to arouse any significant suppori in the population made it clear to the liberals and socialists that their claims to leadership of the opposition were much less secure than they had been in 1905. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Only in Baku were the Communists able to secure a base of support among workers, though the existing trade unions and the “workers’ conference” (which had replaced the disbanded soviet as the principal representative body for work- ers) were led by Mensheviks and SRs.59 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The growing conflict among the Communists was not merely a psycho- logical or constitutional matter; nor was it simply a question of the future shape of the Soviet republics and their relationship to Moscow. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Whatever the reasons for the lower percentage of expulsions in Georgia, Beria had other methods to secure a loyal following within his party, In the same year as the chistka, 1933, the Georgian GPU arrested seventeen agricultural specialists and accused them of economic crimes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Gam- sakhurdia’s coalition, the Round Table of the National Liberation Move- ment (erovnul-ganmatavisuplebeli modzraobis mrgvali magida), organized a rail blockade of the republic to force the government to accept a new electoral law that stipulated that only parties operating through the whole territory of the republic could contest the elections. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Foreign observers commented on the extravagant losses in blood and in money which the Russians incurred in their efforts to subdue these freedom-loving clansmen by force of arms, when better results could have been secured with time by conciliation and peaceful penetration. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Seven years later, in 1840, Eastern Upper Svaneti (the so-called Free Svaneti) also became a Russian protectorate. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the town of Batumi, the Social-Democrats secured 2,477 votes, against 1,031 for all other parties, while in Kutaisi city, the Social- Democrats got 983 votes against 639 for all others together. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Why not cut out the middleman, own the coffee, own the route, and also have access to a major port? To advance his scheme he secured a vast loan from Mubsin al-’Awlaqi.37 A History of Modern Yemen
The detailed demands concern state accounts and the farmers’ associa- tion, whose treasurer had secured for himself a loan to buy a tractor. A History of Modern Yemen
FLOSY launched raids from the North, meanwhile, none of which secured lasting gains, while Dathlnah fell to the NLF, then so did CAwdhall. A History of Modern Yemen
He was devoting himself to reading the bountiful Qur’an. A History of Modern Yemen
Back payments were secured widely The immediate effect Yemen in a wider world: the 198os 159 i6o A history of modern Yemen on the government’s budget was gratifying; but the enormous energy apparent until then in so many co-operatives withered into disillusion as state control expanded. A History of Modern Yemen
These offices were repeatedly closed in the 198os and the smaller tradersjailed and beaten, but people with the right connections smuggled dollars and riyals in huge amounts. A History of Modern Yemen
by, “but views the pool of desirable bridegrooms as distressingly small”. A History of Modern Yemen
In early igg6 a stand-by credit of $US igo million was secured from the IMF, and in the following month $US 8o million from the World Bank: Yemen as a single state 207 208 A history of modern Yemen both were in support of “structural readjustment”. A History of Modern Yemen
Such organisations as the National Democratic Institute, funded in effect by the US government, have emerged in the post-Cold War world as bodies that “validate” other countries’ politics, and along with European agencies they promote what Carapico calls “elections tourism”, monitoring polling and the like without reference to, or seeming interest in, local context. A History of Modern Yemen
By late 1968 or early 1969, Abu Nidal had persuaded Abu lyad that his talents lay in diplomacy rather than guerrilla warfare and had secured a posting as Fatah’s representative to Khartoum. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Syria was holding half a dozen of his members in jail, on suspicion of having been involved in sabotage in Damascus in the 1970s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
By the time the organization left Syria in 1987, Abu Nidal had secured the appointment of Isam Maraqa as his deputy—based in Lebanon, with Dr. Ghassan, head of the Secretariat—while Abu Nizar, stripped of his powers, was shunted aside to the Organiza- tion Directorate and transferred to Libya, under Abu Nidal’s direct control. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“I have to protect you and the organization!” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Isa knew the real identity of the cadres; the location of the secret arms caches and bank accounts; the contents of letters Abu Nidal had exchanged with foreign governments and intelli- gence services. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They gave him an apartment in Beirut and put money in his pocket so he could spend it in front of other people. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Despite these developments, the consolidation of power within the hands of the ultra-radical core had not been completely secured. Comtemporary Yemen
In short, there was a very primitive founda- tion of public administration in terms of structure, functions or procedures. Comtemporary Yemen
weakness of the Muslims, thus countering the view behind which Hamas had tried to rally the ‘ulama. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
cit., HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This quest for a common denominator is the key to understand- ing the demand by a number of prominent figures in Hamas that the PA conduct honest and fair elections, because “holding fair elections is a jusi demand by the people; it is a realistic [expectation] and not an unattainable fancy. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A charismatic figure, he was friends with Ayatollah Khomeini and President Assad of Syria. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The weariness of the southerners from the years of suffering under their Palestinian masters was reflected in their show of welcome and gratitude to those who had freed them of their tormentors. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Syria, however, was fully behind the measures, which also recognised its military presence in the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
There are no gains to be made here and so it does not matter much to them whether Israel continues to occupy South Lebanon or not. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While Abu Jihad secured the safe departure of the PLO, Dodge remained in the hands of his kidnappers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He was also displeased with the Iranians for abusing EXPORT OF A REVOLUTION 105 their diplomatic privileges and smuggling Dodge into Iran via Syria. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He claimed that a faction within the Fatah Revolutionary Council still had possession of Collett’s body and that the faction could be persuaded to give up Collett if letters were secured from his widow and daughter. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Sure, they secured the release of their hostages, but they paid. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Christian leaders concentrated on improving their own areas: they built roads and highways, extended flyovers and secured basic services for their communities. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Tarmac highways connected the villages of the Druze’s Chouf mountains, lush forests were planted in the hills and valleys surrounding the scenic area and the most basic amenities were secured. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah has also secured its influence within the community by building schools. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
She said: Our people in the South have as much right as the Israelis to lead a safe and secured life, and if Israel insists on carrying out its policy of displacing them, then we too will apply that same policy and displace their northern settlers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At this level the history of Georgia is a montage of rapidly shifting monarchs, alliances, conquerers, and rebels. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 978 David secured the crown of Abkhazeti for Bagrat by displacing Tevdos III. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Its status and function had been secured. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the mountainous areas where arable land was scarce and nobles had few holdings, all the land except for pasture was left in the hands of the peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The drastic campaign of confiscating and squeezing the grain from the villagers temporarily relieved shortages in towns, but the harsh policy stimulated resistance among peasants and crystallized a new opposition. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The mere presence of Russian troops shifted the balance of forces in Georgia and secured victory for Shevardnadze. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But Iraqi intelligence guarded Abu Nidal as securely as it guarded President Bakr or Saddam Hussein.) Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The spread of literary culture in the Russian Rule and Georgian Society 93 94 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE Caucasus also required the introduction in 1849 of that guardian of correct expression, the Caucasian Censor’s Committee. The Making of the Georgian Nation
If a political environment is created that is favorable to a settlement that secures the basic rights of the Palestinians—a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that is free of Israeli domination, Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, a return of the refugees, and the dismantling of Israeli set- tlements—then Hamas would be obliged to give up its armed operations to avoid being isolated. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In signing the Treaty of Georgievsk, Erekle undertook to renounce all dependence on Persia or any other power but Russia; he and his posterity were solemnly confirmed for ever in possession of all territories under their sway; the kings of Georgia, on succeeding to the throne, would request and receive from St. Petersburg their insignia of investiture; Erekle was to conduct negotiations with foreign powers only after securing the approval of the Russian authorities; the empress and her heirs were pledged to treat Georgia’s foes as those of Russia; there was to be no interference in the internal affairs of Georgia; the Georgian Catholicos-Patriarch was given the eighth place among the Russian prelates, and made a member of the Holy Synod; the Georgian nobility were to have the same prerogatives as the Russian aristocracy; special facilities were to be afforded to Russian traders in Georgia and to Georgian merchants in Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He saw the urgency of securing as rapidly as possible the entire area between the Black Sea and the Caspian. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The first Prime Minister of the Georgian Republic was Noe Ramishvili, while Akaki Chkhenkeli received the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1974 he sided with Abu Nidal and went to work in the Military Committee. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Moreover, Israel has bombed, shelled, and dynamited Lebanese towns and villages, intercepted vessels in international waters and aircraft in international airspace, launched long-range raids against Baghdad and Tunis, and kid- napped, tortured, and imprisoned many suspected opponents. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Qaddafi didn’t want the French to think ill of him, but Abu Nidal did not mind embarrassing Palestinians. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They were also aimed at the heads of British Intelli- gence, beginning with a brave operation by shooting Fadl Khalil of the Special Branch in a public café. Comtemporary Yemen
(1) tion at its very beginning. Comtemporary Yemen
‘The sultans and ministers should be penal- ized’, ‘Great Britain is negotiating with Great Britain,’ commented local and Arab newspapers. Comtemporary Yemen
Al-Madhoon, “Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya,” p. 20 How ItAliBegan 23 24 HAMAS al-Qishawi, Zuhdi Saqallah, Sulaiman Abu Karsh, and Kamal al-Wahidi. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For instance, rather than Hamas organizing its own meetings of support and solidarity, the country-based groups themselves organize such meetings. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “The Jihad to Liberate Palestine is Continuing and Will not be Under- Hamas’s Political ReLations 187 188 HAMAS to securing the political, social, and cultural liberation of the Arab-Islamic region. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The talks were suspended because of the incident, and the center of attention in the Middle East and the focus for the United States shifted temporarily to resolving the problem, securing the return of the deportees, and then resuming the peace talks. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is up to the Palestinian Authority, through its actions, to alleviate the fears, doubts and suspicions of the opposition, and to prove in prac- tice that it seeks fair elections in the service of the general interest of the Palestinian people.”39 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It had begun to take the initiative and was no longer restricting its warfare to the old tactics of planting roadside bombs and booby traps. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Muslims and Druze considered it to be a vehicle for securing Israel’s dominance in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Information regarding the fate of the Iranians was to become one of Iran’s main conditions in return for its help in securing the release of the Western hostages. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
We would give Abu Jihad information on his well-being and progress to pass on to the Americans in return for arms and money from the PLO that we needed in order to reorganise ourselves and prepare ourselves for carrying on with the struggle against the Israelis after the PLO’s withdrawal. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
However, when the Iran—Contra scandal broke, Waite’s credibility suffered: he had originally appeared to be instrumental in securing the hostages’ release, but in the wake of the scandal he was cast as the frontman for Oliver North’s illegal operations. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
US initiative involved securing a cease- fire based on an agreement between Hezbollah and Israel to halt all attacks against civilians. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Soviet period witnessed both the restraint of sepa- ratist and politically nationalist aspirations and the institutionalization of cultural, linguistic, and historical awareness. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Eastwards of Tbilisi, Georgia’s internal security was still threatened by the warlike Lezghian tribesmen of Daghestan, and by the independent Muslim khans of Ganja, Shekki and Baku, allies and nominally vassals of the Shah of Persia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
With language of this kind, backed by cold steel, Tsitsianov eventually abated the Lezghian menace and improved Georgia’s internal security. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Ermolov’s administration resulted in improved public security within Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘At the present moment,’ they wrote, ‘when we are witnessing the birth of new forms of government and the working out of fundamental problems, freedom of assembly and of speech, as well as personal security, are elementary and normal conditions without which it is impossible to bring about any measures of reform, or find any way out of the present intolerable situation. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Protest meetings and strikes were held throughout Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Death of a dictator At all events, Mgeladze and his deputy, the Georgian Minis- ter of State Security, N. Rukhadze, made use of the extensive files of the Georgian MVD to accuse some of Beria’s own agents of nationalist deviation and other crimes. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
N. Rukhadze, Georgian Minister of State Security, who had aided and abetted Mgeladze, was imprisoned. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In spite of his powerful position as head of the secret police, Beria fell, dragging down with him many high officials whose careers were linked with his, and whose familiarity with secrets of state made their survival dangerous to the victors. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Andreev, Russian Communist, 262 Andronik, Armenian partisan com- mander, 202 Andronikashvili, General Alexander, executed by Communists, 241 Ankara, 184, 230, 233—4 Antioch, 13 Antoni II, Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia, deposed by Russia, ~6 Apkhaidze, Shalva, Georgian poet, i88 Arabia, Arabs, 12, 14, 19, 26, 28, 178 Aragvi, river, Ii, 23 Aragvispireli, Shio, Georgian writer, 187 Araxes, river, 55, 6, Architecture, 21 Ardahan, 6, 61—2, 104, 184, 202, 208, 234 Ardaziani, Lavrenti, Georgian novelist, 87—88 Ardebil, 6o Argentine Republic, 220 Argonauts, 2, 23 Argutinsky.Dolgorukov, A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
states which form the South Arabian Federation. A History of Modern Yemen
In October a State Security Court was established and several persons at odds with Egypt were shot by firing squad,38 while the Egyptians again began bombing dissident tribal areas, sometimes using, as they had before, poisonous gas. A History of Modern Yemen
With defeated expressions, men wander the plains and mountains begging for a piece of bread or sometimes for water to drink. A History of Modern Yemen
Few people moved south after 1967, but such prominent figures in Southern politics as ‘Abd al- Fattah Ismadil and “Muhsin” (Muhammad Sadid ‘Abdullah, for years head of state security) were Northerners. A History of Modern Yemen
Prime ministers changed frequently, supposedly under Saudi pressure,’9 and in July 1974 Iryani was deposed as president in favour of Ibrahim al-Hamdi. A History of Modern Yemen
“With Hamdi the interest in national security increased. A History of Modern Yemen
Zayd al-Wazir’s Attempt to Understand the Yemeni Problem (,~7,) is a famous case, providing a sophisticated structural view of the country’s political and intellectual life; al-Shamabi’s Yemen: the people and the culture (1972) took a different tack, giving a brief summary of Yemen’s history in chronicle form as a prologue to discussing the people he knew personally and their struggle against the last Imams, while Baradduni’s radio and magazine pieces (collected as Baradduni 1978) played off early Islam and the recent revolutionary past in reflections made acceptable to all through citation of the country’s vast fund of poetry In 1977 cAbdUll~h Juzaylan, whose close association with Egyptian state security led to his exile when Sallal resigned, published an account of September 1962, the events around the revolution. A History of Modern Yemen
Saudi stipends to shaykhs in Upper Yemen were large; on occasion, funds and weapons reached their rivals from Southern sources. A History of Modern Yemen
The president’s full-brother, Muhammad cAbdullah Salih, emerged as chief of Central Security, and other obvious relatives, such as cAll Muhsin al-Ahmar, soon appeared on the lists of senior officers, as did members of families such as Bayt Ismadil and Bayt al-QaçlI related to the president’s family by marriage. A History of Modern Yemen
People spoke simply of a wish for amn wa-istiqrãr, “security and stability”, while around them swirled not only the problems of peasant life but rivalries among pow- erful factions. A History of Modern Yemen
.“ A History of Modern Yemen
Foodstuffs and basics such as washing powder were subsidised, “security and stability” were guaranteed, and basic education was widely avail- able. A History of Modern Yemen
3) All units of the armed forces and security forces. A History of Modern Yemen
The editor, Muhammad al-Yadumi, was widely held to have worked with National Security. A History of Modern Yemen
The most dramatic intersection of Western and Arab politics since Suez (1956) unfolded and as it did so Yemen had the great misfortune to be on the UN Security Council — the only Arab state among fifteen members. A History of Modern Yemen
In the Security Council Yemen spoke still for an (unspecified) “Arab solution” to the crisis, which in the circum- stances implied support for Iraq, and on ‘9 September 1990 the Saudi government revoked the special status of Yemenis within the Kingdom. A History of Modern Yemen
As the difficulties of new forms of life unsettled Southerners, however, many turned to the powers they knew. A History of Modern Yemen
The YSP paper, Sawt al- ‘uminãl (“Voice of the Workers”) later published a list of thirty-three names: not only the President’s full-brother Muhammad, head of Central Security, and their half-brother CAl! A History of Modern Yemen
I~laki and the GPC both blamed this on feuds within the YSP; the socialists blamed Islamists in the South and, increasingly, the President’s security apparatus within the North. A History of Modern Yemen
The dominant presence, however, was the Northern-controlled military Hadramawt was controlled by Muhammad Isma~i1 of Sanhan, for instance, the governor in this case was a Northerner also (cAbbad al- Khawläni), and the head of political security was from Nihm, northeast of Sanaa. A History of Modern Yemen
The aim of repatriating emigrant capital or drawing large-scale investment from foreign sources made less progress than domestic finance, for security still depended, or appeared to, on connections with a very few power-brokers. A History of Modern Yemen
when there’s no cash? I want to fix the land that the wash destroyed, but where’s the money to come from (mm ayn al-fulus)?” Another man, better off and able to recite in its entirety the Holy Qur’an, echoed the same idea: “If I had any money I’d buy land for my children because it’s security for their future.” A History of Modern Yemen
When Yahya was murdered, said Almad in the22 1953 version of Victory Day, “people lost security as if the garment which had protected them had suddenly been snatched from them. A History of Modern Yemen
249 n.27, 250 n.46 al-Iryani, QadI ‘Abd al-Rahman (president in North), 47, 78, ii6, 123, 124, 126, ‘p during civil war, 91, 103, 105, 114 al-Iryani, Qa~li Yal~ya (poet), 34, 54 I~lab (Yemeni Reform Grouping), 191, ‘93, 194, 209 nature of, 186—7, 198—200 278 Islam, 3—4, 6, 8—9, 46, 53, 98, 141—2, 172—4 and national feeling, 4, 5!, A History of Modern Yemen
Ibn al-Amir (Islamic reformeç i8th century), 102, 239 n.32 Ibn Sa’ud, ‘Abd al-’Aziz, 36, 39, 4! A History of Modern Yemen
THE ORGANIZATION 10. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In addition to the camp and the headquarters complex in ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 5 6 / PATRICK SEALE Tripoli, he has given Abu Nidal a score of houses in the city for use by his principal aides, houses belonging to opponents of Qaddafi’s regime who have been jailed, exiled, or liquidated—”stray dogs,” as the Libyan leader likes to call them; also, a three-story building on Umar al-Mukhtar Street, in central Tripoli, used as a safe house by the Special Missions Committee; a well-appointed villa near the airport, where agents rest and are briefed between assignments; and a farm some seventeen kilometers outside the city, where fruit and vegetables are grown for the men in the camp. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He also provided them with the thrill of belonging to a militant secret organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In such a paranoid outfit, where everyone was con- stantly spying on everyone else and forever writing up reports, he was certain to get into trouble. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal did not aspire to Within three weeks, Jorde was back in Tripoli with a full ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 27 PATRICK SEALE / a political relationship with Riyadh—their differences were too ludicrously great for that to be discussible—but he did expect the Saudis to buy him off. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On October 25, 1988, Abdallah Ghani Badawi, second secretary at the Saudi embassy in Ankara, was gunned down. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE KILLING OF ABU IYAD Security around the house was slack, as was usual in PLO domestic arrangements. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Finding nothing against him, they turned him over to Fatah, which put him on its payroll and posted him to the Salah al-Din camp, near Damascus. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In October 1982, he was sent to Yugoslavia on a ten-week course in weapons handling and security duties, returning to Damascus in December. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In September 1984, he spent a two-week vacation at PLO headquarters in Tunis. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But he proved rowdy and undisciplined and in November he was sent back to Tunis, where Fatah sentenced him to a month’s deten- tion. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, by the end of that same year, he was back in detention in Tunis for bad behavior. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was decided to send him to Lebanon, but as no transport was immediately available, Abu al-Ho!, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
head of Fatah security, took the extraordinary decision of appointing him as a bodyguard at his own home. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Four other people are killed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As his “step-by-step” diplomacy unfolded, it gradu. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Inevitably, the host countries turned on the guerrillas, as happened in Jordan and later in Lebanon: Made to choose between helping the guerrillas and sparing themselves Israeli reprisals, the Arab states not unnaturally put their own security first. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
contrary to the agreement, the gunmen had been allowed to go on to Benghazi, where, in protest at the handling of the affair by the Tunisian government, they had actually been allowed to take over the Tunisian consulate. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The turmoil started in Lebanon in the wake of Operation Litani, Israel’s invasion of March 1978. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Of such tortuous stuff are Palestiniaii resistance relationships made! Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When his doctors recommended that he take a glass of whiskey in the evenings, he started doubling the dose, and then doubling it again, until whiskey became an addiction, no doubt contributing to his suspicious and vengeful inclinations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But finally it was agreed to let the future be a test of their good inten- tions toward each other. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel sought to offer Hussein the job of policing the Palestinians in the occupied territories while retaining sovereignty for itself, together with control over land, water, and security. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hussein’s counter- strategy was to press for a Jordanian-Palestinian federation, which, he felt, would give Israel the security it needed while providing the necessary outlet for restless Palestinian aspirations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For years, Hussein had come under sustained Israeli pressure to “solve” the Palestine problem in direct negotiations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A few weeks earlier, one of his security men inside the Libyan People’s Bureau in London’s St. James’s Square had crazily opened fire from a first-floor window on a crowd of anti-Qaddafi demonstrators, killing a young British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From time to time, Qaddafi sent hit men to disrupt and intimidate them and, Qaddafi’s paranoia, his sense of being under siege, was more In security matters, Qaddafi’s mind was parochial: His atten- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 137 l~I III Ii II~ 138 / PATRICK SEALE between 1980 and 1984, managed to have no fewer than fifteen exiles murdered. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As fellow sufferers, Shi’ites and Palestinians were natural allies, but there were tensions between them: The Shi’ites blamed the Pales- tinians for their plight, so when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, many Shi’ites welcomed them as deliverers from the Palestinians and their women even threw rice at the invading Israeli soldiers in a gesture of welcome. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
No quarter was given, and each round of fighting had its brutal accompaniment of slaugh- ter. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When this was not forthcoming, he preferred to withdraw from the Middle East altogether and to live as a recluse abroad, as he did when he went to Poland in 1981, between his falling out with Iraq and his organization’s move to Syria. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
During Israel’s siege of Beirut, when the Palestinians were holding out under intense bombard- ment, Qaddafi sent Arafat a now famous telegram in which he urged him to commit suicide rather than allow Israel to expel him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
powers, Israel and Jordan, whose excellent intelligence services wanted to contain Palestinian militancy and penetrate the various Palestinian groups beyond their borders. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When the Black Septem- ber terrorist movement emerged in the early 1970s, Israel, Jordan, and other affected states had a further strong incentive to plant agents in Palestinian networks and training camps to monitor, and if possible abort, hostile operations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Some thought the penetration was at a low level; some believed that senior men had been recruited, perhaps even Abu Nidal him- self and members of his extended family. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Within a few weeks of the Baghdad summit, on January 22, 1979, an Israeli car bomb in a Beirut street killed Fatah’s security chief, Au Hassan Salameh (also known as Abu Hassan), together with four of his bodyguards and five passersby. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Austrian security services have established, without any doubt, that a right-hand man of Abu Nidal not only killed the municipal councillor Heinz Nittal on May 1, 1981, and attacked the synagogue in Vienna in August, but also murdered, on June 1, Naim Khudr, the repre- sentative of the PLO in Brussels . Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I didn’t want them to think I was trying to pick up a girl. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Obsessive where security was concerned, Abu Nidal was at pains to protect the identity of the committee’s members, laying down strict rules to restrict their contacts, even with each other. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Any information of a security nature gleaned by other directorates or committees was immediately passed to it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Security arrangements at airports and seaports had to be constantly reviewed, alterations to visa and immigration stamps monitored, and a host of other subjects kept up to date; the training of staff was a daily preoccupation. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Respectfully, the customs officer detailed one of his colleagues to escort Isa to the bank of his choice. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The committee functions both as an information bank and as a security sieve, for it has the power to accept or reject recommenda- tions for membership submitted by other committees and director- ates. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Its personnel files contain whatever is known about each mem- ber of the organization: birth, family background, education, rela- tives, marriage, children, career history, political allegiances—and, of course, details of any intelligence or security agencies with which he might have been involved. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal intervenes when someone is spotted with a talent for intelligence or security work. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
With his wide range of contacts in journal- ism, politics, and the world of intelligence, he made great play of being independent, even writing critical articles about Abu Nidal in the Beirut press. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
About twelve thousand copies a week are printed and distributed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
She knew that Abu Nidal controlled the company, but she was not a member of his organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The more I investigated Abu Nidal’s organi- zation, the clearer it became to me that what he cared most about was the millions tucked away in foreign banks—together with his personal security, which in turn dictated his political relations with his host countries. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He also said that he had been recruited by MIS, Britain’s security service, in 1987 to pass on information about Abu Nidal’s financial dealings with BCCI. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In exchange for the use of Druze territory, Abu Nidal supplies Jumblat with arms, expertise, funds, and security. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
IMMUNITY FROM ATTACK A curious aspect of Abu Nidal’s activities, especially in Lebanon, also attracted my attention and fed my suspicions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
behavior seemed to me suspect. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Organiza- tion Directorate’s Palestine/Jordan Committee has almost no funds or facilities and was for a long time manned by only two persons—Samir Darwish, who was sent on a mission to Peru, where he was arrested, and Fadil al-Qaisi, who died in London after undergoing heart surgery. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
sources say that he had excellent contacts with the Soviets and had given them information, and even sensitive technical equipment, which he was well placed to acquire. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal does nothing. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
of Athens, a gunman riding pillion on a motorcycle came abreast Mraish’s car and killed him outright with a burst of machine-gun fire. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel’s terror was coherent, pro- fessional, and largely successful in achieving its objectives; Abu Nidal’s was incoherent, incompetent, and invariably counterpro- ductive to Palestinian interests. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
July 18, 1984-Israel intercepts a Lebanese merchant ship off the port of Tripoli, escorts it to Haifa, and interrogates the crew. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Israelis were being driven out, while the American embassy had been blown up and American marines slaughtered in their barracks. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Beirut, the Revolutionary Organiza- tion of Socialist Muslims (an Abu Nidal front) claims responsi- bility. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
May 23, 1984-Israel’s state attorney’s office indicts Palestinian fighters “terrorists” so as to deny them legitimacy, greatly expanded its exploitation of this issue, aiming to shape American attitudes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Libya’s involvement with Abu Nidal, he believed, had undermined its security and exposed it to physical attack. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On this interpretation, the Heathrow affair seemed to be a bungled rogue operation by an uncontrolled branch of Syrian intelligence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I had investigated this terrorist incident, which implicated the Syrians, when I was researching my biography of President Assad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Apart from Hindawi, the only people thought to be in the know were two or three officers in Syrian air force intelligence, including its chief, General Muhammad al-Khuly, and two or three of Abu Nidal’s members. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Leaving his fiancée at Heathrow at about 8 A.M. on April 17, Hindawi traveled back into London and later that morning boarded a Syrian Arab Airlines bus to return to the airport to catch a 2 P.M. ffight to Damascus. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
What I did not know then, but what I learned in 1990 from a well-placed defector in Tunis, was that Abu Nidal’s Technical Committee had manufactured the suitcase bomb and had delivered it to Syrian air force intelligence, the outfit that sponsored Abu Nidal in Syria. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They knew nothing about where he lived, where he held his secret meet- ings, where his weapons were stored, and where his archives were kept. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
meet his expenses in Lebanon, a form of support Abu Nidal preferred be- cause it gave him independence and protection against sudden cuts. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
clung to the intelligence and security services of his host country. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Libya became the organization’s nerve center for its foreign Abu Nidal’s relations with the Libyans were conducted The Libyan leader treated Abu Nidal more generously than he Preoccupied with his personal security, Abu Nidal instinctively ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / ~i 262 / PATRICK SEALE It would enrage Abu Nidal if anyone in the Political Bureau protested that the organization was becoming a creature of Libyan policy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After the killing of Izz al-Din Qalaq, the PLO representa- tive in Paris in 1978, and the discovery of a number of arms caches, the DST, France’s internal security service, decided that the best way to neutralize Abu Nidal was to strike a deal with him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Its intelligence and security services have According to Abu lyad, the PLO would dearly like to work ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 271 272 / PATRICK SEALE closely with all Western governments in defeating Abu Nidal and in clearing the Palestinians from the charge of terrorism. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He often went on holiday to Hungary and appears to have had three main reasons for cultivating the Eastern Euro- peans: key members, he was anxious to conclude security agreements with Eastern European intelligence services. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A committee of Czechs, Hungarians, and East Germans met monthly to pool information on terrorism, and a larger com- mittee, on which all Warsaw Pact members were represented, also met at intervals to review the security situation throughout the bloc. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He, of course, exploited such tolerance for all it was worth. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He declared himself a Maoist and expressed admiration for the Chinese experiment, but he never returned to China after his brief visit there in 1972 (when he was still in Fatah) and never developed any sort of relationship with the Chinese. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He sometimes used to say that Albanians were the only true Marxists left in the world, but he had no relations with them either. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But in Eastern Europe, he found the best way to make friends was less by professing Marxism than by distribut- ing “gifts”—an expensive watch here, a present for someone’s wife there, or simply quantities of cash all around (in dollar bills). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
lah’s numerous operations against Israel’s self-styled “security zone” in southern Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Syrian air force intelligence asked its contact man in the organiza- tion, Abd al-Karim al-Banna (Abu Nidal’s nephew), if he knew of a member called Mujahid al-Bayyari; they wished to interview him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Drifting from one master to another in search of security and political direction, rough and untutored, politically inexperienced, prone to mutiny, they had had a checkered history. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Airport officials, probably Meanwhile, in Algiers, Atif Abu Bakr decided not to meet the “Speaking in Czech, I said to her, ‘Follow my instructions “‘In the meantime, you must leave tonight by road for Tu- So Abu Bakr’s wife left by car with her daughter and their ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 309 310 / PATRICK SEALE refused. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Their agenda stated: no to intra-Palestinian killings; no to the language of blood and to futile foreign operations; yes to the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians; yes to full support for the in- tifada. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They an- nounced the formation of an Emergency Leadership, with the de- clared aim of taking control of the organization and punishing the criminal Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Without peace, the prospect ahead is of more terror and counterterror of the cruel, remorseless sort I have described in this book. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
neighbors can only rest on mutual deterrence, on an Arab-Israeli balance of power, and eventually on good neighborliness. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Maliki, Salah al-, 31 Malta, 22, 49, 54, 201, 219, 238, 242, 267 Manara Press, 199—200 Mao Tse-tung, 87—88 Maraqa, Isam, 182, 195, 277, 288, 290—91, 294, 301 Maronites, 106, 140, 159, 224, 230, 233 Marxism, 276 Masri, Zafir al-, 254 Matar, Ahmad Abu, 198—99 Mazin, Abu, 48, 79, 92, 97—98; attempted m Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal, 5, 69—70, 79, 85—86, 92, 96, 97, 99—100, 114—16, 132—35, 151—54, 158, 159—78, 198, 200, 224, 271—72, 302—23; penetration of, 155—78, 210—27; and Qaddafi, 148—49, 313—14; U.S. relations with, 77, 94, 167—68 Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee, 76, 96, 304 Palestine National Charter, 76 Palestine National Council (PNC), 40—41, 43, 76, 93—94, 96, 304; 1974 Cairo meeting, 93; 1983 Algiers meeting, 173; 1984 Amman meeting, 142; 1987 Algiers meeting, 302—307 Palestine National Salvation Front, 303 Palestine Secret Organization, 65, 66 Palestinian resistance movement, 66—90; assassinations in, 46—50, 159—79, 210; internal quarrels, 31, 75—77, 82, 83, 85—86, 94—104, 109, 142, 155, 159—63, 214; Israeli penetration of, 154—78, 210—27; mid-1980s reconciliation in, 142—43; Abu Nidal’s development in, 66—80; terrorist and counterterrorist activities with Israel, 71—85, 88, 230—42; Third Fatah Congress, 85—87, 99; see also specy’ic organizations Pan Am Airline terrorism: flight 103 bombing (Lockerbie), 44, 254—55; 19,76—77,93, 102, 111, 121, 139, 243—47, 271—79; future of, 319; internal quarrels, 31, Karachi hijacking (1986), 183, 192, 228, 241, 252—55, 265; Rome attack (1973), 101, 102 Papandreou, Andreas, 265—66 Paris, 21, 25, 27, 44, 54, 129, 178, 184; terrorist attacks in, 47, 48, 49, 91—92, 106, 129, 157, 159, 165, 184, 270—72, 274 Party of Socialist Action, 131 passports and visas, 21—24, 25, 26, 30, 119, 144, 184, 187, 206—207, 259, 270, 308 People’s Army, 4, 139, 143, 181, 207—209, 214—15, structure and workings of, 207—209 Peres, Shimon, 26, 238, 239, 240, 251 Philippines, 37—38, 94, 190, 192, 261 Poland, 113, 176—78, 204; Abu Nidal in, 119, 125, 134—35, 139, 142—46, 195, 227, 275, 278, 294 Political Bureau, 142, 180—81, 189, 208, 259, 262, 296 Political Directorate, 45, 142, 181, 197—201, 208, 213, 220, 264, 292; structure and workings of, 197—201 Political Relations Committee, 198, 201, 259, 277, 292 Pollard, Jonathan Jay, 238 Popular Arab Movement, 118 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), 7, 41, 47, 48, 74—77, 83, 86, 95, 97, 131, 139, 176, 199, 210, 238, 254, 273, 288, 295 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command, 76—77, 95, 97, 125, 139, 176, 210, 216, 244, 295 Portugal, 49, 158—59, 170, 173, 271—72 Prague, 37, 53, 134, 279 press, 7, 78—80, 85, 98, 117, 122, 125, 182, 197—201, 228—29, 241, 254, 261; see also spec jfic publications Publications Committee, 197—201, 292 Qaddafi, Muammar al-, 3, 5—6, 39, 100, 103, 109, 144, 201, 238—41, 243, 289, 298; and Fatah, 139, 147-49; Green Book, 136—37, 147-48; and killing of Abu lyad, 3 13—14; and Abu Nidal, 136—39, 258, 261—69, 313; and the PLO, 148—49, 313—14; and Silco affair, 267—69; terrorist attacks on, 240, 247 Qaddumi, Faruq, 173 Qaddura, Abu Mustafa, 102 Qadir, Khalid Abd al-, 260 Qaisi, Fadil al-, 212 Qalaq, Izz al-Din, 44, 49, 159, 270, 272; murder of, 165—67, 175, 179 Qasim, All, 33 Qasim, Ghassan Ahmad, 204—205 226, 259, 284, 288, 290, 295; 147—50, 201, 229, 238—39, 245, Qassam, Sheikh Izz al-Din, 60 Qubaisi, Basil al-, 48 Qubrusli, Abir, 189 Rabin, Yitzhak, 160 Rafsanjani, All Akbar, 280 Ramadi training camp, 100, 120, 123, 124 Rashid, Muhammad Hussein, 272 Rashidi, Adnan al-, 170 Rashidiya camp, 269, 311—12 Reagan, Ronald, 52, 223, 229, 232—39 Red Army Faction (Germany), 229 Red Front, 157 Rejection Front, 95 refugee camps, 6, 60—61 and n., 62, 140—42, INDEX / 337 214, 215, 224, 232, 244, 249, 287, 288—89, 311—12; Naji al-All (Libya), 3—3 1, 184, 289; see also spec~fic camps Revolutionary Command Council (Iraq), 77—78, 111 Revolutionary Council, 10, 97, 98, 107, 180; formed by Abu Nidal, 99—100 Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, 235—36, 237, 240, 254 Rimawi, Abdallah, 64, 65 Riyadh, 28, 64, 65, 68—69, 91, 128, 222 Romania, 279 Rome, 21, 184; terrorist attacks in, 46, 47, 48, 49, 73, 83, 101, 102, 107, 127, 129, 157, 183, 211, 219, 228, 237—39, 243—47, 254, 271 Rosan, Nawaf, 223 Roumis, Victor, 24 Sabena jet hijacking (1972), 85 Sabra camp, 232, 244, 245 Sa’d, Mustafa, 214, 312 Sadat, Anwar, 50, 102, 107, 111, 126, 162, 164,253, 311 Sadiq, Dr., 203 Sadr, Imam Musa al-, 140, 313 Sa’id, Ahmad, 33 Sa’id, Haitham, 249, 252, 274 Sa’id, Hisham, 243 Sa’id, Hussein, 223 Sa’id, Nasir al-, 268—69 Sa’iqa, al-, 77, 97, 293 Salahat, Muhammad Khudr, 185 Salameh, All Hasan, 47, 48, 49, 167—68 Salem, Arif, 185 Salih, Abu, 132, 134, 208 Salih, Ali Abdallah, 39 Salih, Mabmud, 49 Samirra’i, Abd al-Khaliq, 77, 79 Sammur, Hani, 243 Samrin, Sulaiman, see Ghassan al-All, Dr. Sanduqa, Mustafa Ibrahim, 206, 209, 217—19, 221, 286, 288 338 / INDEX Sanussi, Abdallah al-, 144, 261 Saqr, Hisham Muhammad, 311 Saqr, Ra’id, 20 Sartawi, Isam, 49, 159, 172—76, 272 SAS, 119, 203 Saudi Arabia, 27, 48, 64—66, 88, 91, 112, 168, 236, 315; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 27—31, 91—92, 106, 128, 184, 204, 222, 280 Sayigh, Anis al-, 47 Schiff, Ze’ev, 155 Scientific Committee, 181, 182—83, 207, 217, 218 Secretariat, 181—85, 209, 218, 259, 261; structure and workings of, 181—85 Shachori, Ami, 47 Shahin, Abu Mi, 66, 154 Shakir, Sa’dun, 80, 100, 111, 166 Shamir, Yitzhak, 71, 160—61, 230, 251, 322 Sharah, Faisal Abu, 237 Sharar, Majid Abu, 49, 219 Sharif, Bassam Abu, 41, 47 Sharon, Ariel, 37—38, 82, 159, 172, 222—23, 227, 322 Shatila camp, 232, 244, 245 Shazli, Sa’d al-Din, 311 Shevardnaze, Eduard, 324 Shin Bet, 155 Sh’ites, 7, 58, 140—44, 210, 214, 226, 230, 233—37, 276, 313 Shultz, George, 233, 234 Shuquairy, Ahmad, 76 Siba’i, Yusuf al-, 164, 253, 266 Sidon, 8, 11, 106, 139, 181, 189, 196, 206, 214, 226, 236, 271, 293, 312 Silco affair, 201, 222, 267—72 Silwani, Dirar Abd al-Fattah al-, 203, 270, 278 Sinai, 48, 66, 72 Six-Day War (1967), 66, 68, 72, 73, 93, 155, 159, 315, 321 Southeast Asian operations of Abu Nidal, 27—31, South Lebanon, 8, 213—15, 236, 281, 285—90, invasions of, 113—14, 132, 226—27, 233; and War of the Camps, 140 Soviet Union, 52, 87, 90, 111, 168, 213, 230, 276, 279, 315 Spain, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 29, 48, 118, 127, 178, 191, 318; Fatah in, 156—58, 191; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 192, 204, 237, 271 Stasi, 277—78 Stern Gang, 60, 71—72, 230 Sudan, 70, 110, 137, 154, 206, 222, 230; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 263—65 Suez War of 1956, 64, 73 192 315; ASALA in, 272—75; Israeli Suffarini, Fu’ad al-, 107, 193—94, 253, 277 Sufyan, 215—17, 218 Sughayyir, Azmi al-, 102 Suwaidi, Muhammad al-, 129—30 Sweden, 271 Switzerland, 187, 204; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 205, 270-7 1, 291, 294 synagogue attacks: in Istanbul, 26, 46, 183, 211, 228, 241, 271; in Vienna, 170, 171 Syria, 16, 27, 36, 39—40, 42, 45, 50, 51, 52, 57—58, 64, 66, 72—73, 75, 77, 93, 112, 140, 155, 157, 169, 214, 222, 315, 320; and Argov affair, 222—27; Ba’ath party in, 109, 120; Fatah in, 88, 96—97, 122, 131, 132; and Hindawi affair, 247—52, 256—57; Iraqi relations with, 96—97, 106—108, 109, 111, 120—22, 166, 223—25, 242; Jordanian relations with, 120—22, 125—28, 145, 147, 151, 153, 223, 250—51; and list of 1980s terrorism, 232—42; Abu Nidal’s expulsion from, 255—57; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 106—109, 111, 112, 119—35, 139, 143—47, 150, 151, 180, 184, 186, 187, 193—98, 201, 220, 224—25, 229, 248—57, 284—85, 287, 293—97, 303; relations with Arafat and the PLO, 132, 134, 223—24 Syrian Airlines, 91, 248; terrorist attacks on, 107, 127, 247—52 Syrian Arab News Agency, 128 Syrian-Egyptian Union (1958), 65 Syrian-Jordanian war, 126—28 Syrian Social Nationalist Party, 226 Takriti, Hardan al-, 78 Tal, Wasfi al-, 81—82, 84, 85, 86, 153 Tamim, Mahmud, 208-209 Tamimi, Ibrahim al-, 200 Tariq, Abu, 49 Tariq, al- (magazine), 26, 182, 259 Technical Committee, 23, 181, 206—207, 248 Tehran, 52, 101, 280—81 Tel Aviv, 46, 47, 60, 61, 73, 77, 83, 85, 157 terrorist and counterterrorist activities, Israeli-Palestinian, 71—85, 88, 230—42 Thailand, 27—31, 192 Thatcher, Margaret, 229, 238, 249, 251, 254 Third Fatah Congress (1971), 85—87, 99 Tlas, Mustafa, 145 torture methods, 286—87 Trieste, 47, 167 Tripoli, 3, 5—6, 8, 20, 21, 22, 27, 30, 31, 38, 103, 132, 137, 143, 147, 235, 239, 240, 242, 278; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 147—SO, 165, 180, 181, 190, 219, 229, 255, 259, 298—301, 303, 308 Tunis, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 49, 53, 54, 102, 160, 175, 219, 231, 237—38, 3 18—19 Tunisia, 3, 26—27, 35, 38—39, 45, 103, 219, 320 Turk, Muhammad Harb al-, 253, 284 Turkey, 57, 94, 105, 107, 127, 186—87, 191, 192, 207, 230, 271, 273—74, 279, 292 TWA jet bombing (1986), 240 Tyre, 9, 232, 236, 311 Ubaid, Abd al-Karim, 226 Udwan, Kamal, 48 Umari, Fakhri al-, 33, 34, 35 UNIFIL, 114 United Arab Emirates, 123, 129—30, 193, 216, 245 United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), 212 United Nations, 51, 224, 226, 236; 1947 partition plan for Palestine, 59—63, 68; 1991 ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, 32, 316 United Nations General Assembly, 94; 1974 Arafat address to, 94, 160; Resolution 181, 59 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 9,236 United Nations Security Council: Resolution 242, 106; Resolution 425, 114 United States, 28, 48, 101, 110, 137, 145, 203, 230; Camp David accords, 112, 166; in Gulf War (1991), 32, 50, 268, 281, 313—16, 319; Irangate scandal, 241—42; Libya attacked by, 149, 238—40, 246—47, 251, 267; Middle East policies of, 40, 50—52, 64, 75, 77, 83, 94, 111, 114, 126, 149, 161, 167—68, 223, 230—42, 257, 267, 313—16 U.S. Marine Corps, 230; attacks on, in Lebanon, 226, 233, 234 Uthman, Faruq and Nabil, 219 Vanunu, Morechai, 241 Vienna, 30, 85, 173, 294; terrorist attacks in, 46, 170, 171, 183, 186, 211, 228, 238—39, 243—47, 254, 278 Vietnam, 73, 94, 117, 315 Voice of Palestine, 78—80 WAFA (Palestinian news agency), 98 Waldheim, Kurt, 92, 114 Walters, Vernon, 50 War of the Camps, 140—44, 159, 195, 208. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arthur Balfour and Lloyd George, the British prime min- ister who gave the agreement his personal support, were partly inspired by bib- lical injunctions.’4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On the other side, the Palestinian press began portraying the British as enemies since they sponsored Zionism (a portrayal that took on added weight when the British added hundreds of Jews to their security force), and extremists within the Muslim and Christian communities took up an unorganized call to arms. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All served in half-free circumstances and were released within three years. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the plot was uncovered, the Americans and British were understandably upset and demanded an answer. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
“We Have Taken Over Your Flight” 49 Although Sirhan was a United States resident, having arrived in the coun- Haddad’s conspiratorial mind began to turn: this could be the chance to The Popular Front sent a political officer to the United States to mount 50 Arab and Israeli Terrorism their second failure was being too arrogant to learn. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The hijackers dressed as priests and easily passed security. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel did not know what to do, issu- ing mixed statements and contradictory remarks. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His group was eventually penetrated, and two of his hijackings, which took planes to Entebbe and Mogadishu, were suc- cessfully stormed by Israeli and British commandos. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Egyptian security may have known about the plan, but they gave Tel no protection. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But no Palestinian organiza- tion had the capacity or the will to operate in the United States, and Black September did not print letterhead. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Rafael (alias Patricia Roxburg) was carrying the name of the Mossad man in Oslo, who happened to be the security officer at the Israeli embassy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel never apologized and never paid compensation to Benamane’s widow. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The five were found guilty, but since none of the arrested agents did the killing, they received light sentences; all were free within two years. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The revelations in Norway also showed the low level of professionalism used by one of the best security services. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He worked like a petty security officer, unearthing tidbits of gossip that could later be used to threaten or blackmail. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This he would not show anyone; it was Abu Nidal’s idea to create this system, a useful tool for internal security. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Arafat accepted the 1970 Soviet Union proposal for an international conference that would involve the United Nations Security Council as well as all the concerned parties in the Middle East. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Algerian Government donated a number of blank passports to al-Fatah for “Black September,” then told the French security authorities how to identify the secret mark- ings they put on them.’° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal loudly boasted responsibility for the action, claiming that he had helped the Palestinian cause. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Mossad failed in their attempt on Salameh’s life in 1973, but in the late 1970s there arose a renewed desire to kill him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Salameh and his four aides who were also in the car died, as did a German nun, an English student, and four other passersby, while at least eighteen more were injured. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Khader also produced a book coauthored by an Israeli.24 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
El Al security men took out their weapons and returned the fire, stopping the gunmen from throwing their grenades. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Not knowing that, the Arabs threw a couple of grenades and wounded ten Belgians—no Israelis, not even the El Al security people who had stayed behind to shoot back at the Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the middle of the year, there was another attack by an FRC Palestin- ian on an Orthodox Jewish school. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ben-Gurion once said that it would be worthwhile to pay an Arab a million pounds to start a war, so Said was a real bargain. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The PLO rarely learned the lesson of security; most of their leaders were vulnerable. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The group prefers flats for its members since they provide more security and, more impor- tantly, they’re better investments. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Police rushed to the scene and stopped and disarmed a car attempting to speed away, but it turned out to be the ambassador’s escort in pursuit of the attackers.7 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Before they got to Cyprus one of the crew tipped off the Arabs, saying that the Cyprus police had already been notified. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The El Al security personnel took out their guns and fired back. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
North sent a letter to Congress about the Abu Nidal threat, which he cited as justification for using thousands of dollars from weapon sales to Iran to install a home security system.~ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The airport security people inspected her bag and passed her, but she was stopped for a second check by El Al personnel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mossad sent him to Tunis in late 1985 to spy on Abu Jihad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All the main characters of the Executive Committee and a few other leaders are standing close together and smiling, with Arafat in the middle surrounded by Abu Jihad and Abu lyad, Habash and so forth. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He wanted money, the chance to live high. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
(Ibrahim would be killed in March 1990 when the Palestinians of the Int~fada went on a collaborator-killing spree.) Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He was a less obvious candidate than Ibrahim, but the Mossad wanted to develop him, so they sent him to Beirut in the late 1970s to collect trivial information in return for money, the promise of studying abroad, and a bit of sex. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He and the others had had no security protection, and the PLO had not thought it necessary to add any even though they knew this project was driving the Israeli government mad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
16. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Questionable 1980s 173 and hearing one person, who had worked for Israeli security abroad, mention that Israel ran the Abu Nidal group. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All information from the Politburo, Central Committee, and Rev- olutionary Council passed through this department, making it a store of infor- mation that served as an internal security net. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
metal detectors, train bomb-sniffing dogs, and provide dozens of “security experts” for frightened individuals and institutions. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
According to an Israeli newspaper, 800 Israeli arms and security companies operate around the world.14 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The hijacking was one of the most covered events in the 1980s. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The New York Times devoted 14 column inches to the incident,9 and much of that space was used to quote the head of the JDL, who said that Odeh got what he deserved. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Because of either police incompetence or a desire to avoid a complicated diplo- matic incident, the man disappeared. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Ghazalah was in Athens to buy a large speedboat in order to launch an operation against Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Like Abu Ghazalah, he came to Athens to buy a fast ship in order to launch an operation against Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The new Abu Ghazalah had the mentality of a farmer, trusting and polite, lacking Despite security incompetence, Abu Ghazalah was in a position that Mreich, working for Abu Jihad, was also in Athens, posing as a Moroc- 19. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Bakr’s rebellion came hard on the heels of a bloody internal fight. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They were killed by leaders who observers believe have links with the Mossad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
FRC still had 150 loyal members with their base near the Ghassan Hamoud hospital in Sidon and the Beirut refugee camp of Mar Elias, just behind a Christian cemetery. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Bakr and Issa fled Libya on diplomatic passports to Tunis and Alge- ria with wild stories of human butchery in Libya as well. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They said that men loyal to Abu Nidal jumped on Central Committee members in the group’s Asswani military camp, located southwest of Tripoli, and killed military commandant Hussam Yussef and political department head Abu Musa. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The killings and beatings of British soldiers had run down the morale of British troops, and public opinion could neither stomach nor rationalize continuing to waste lives and resources where British interests were not paramount and conffict reso- lution seemed a distant prospect. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
210 Arab and Israeli Terrorism West Bank woman who had part of her house sealed by the Israeli military when hex son was imprisoned on security charges. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The low level of vio- lence characteristic of Palestinian terrorism is dwarfed by Israeli bombings and mass arrests, even though such actions by a country have an air of legitimacy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As a cheap form of war, terrorists have concentrated on easy targets such as unguarded leaders. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
27. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This, I believe, is the only time Israel, who is thought to have been responsible, targeted a radical Palestinian. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Robertson, Terence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They of course tried to settle in places other than the tribal hijras outside the Northern Highlands, most notably in San’a’, but outside of the tribal lands they were never able to live in as much security and freedom from persecution. Comtemporary Yemen
The final paragraph of the Com- mission’s report focuses upon this rebellion; written as it was in the fall of 1904 it could scarcely do otherwise. Comtemporary Yemen
The British occupation of Aden was construed by the political regime in Yemen as the gravest outside invasion to have occurred, because it was perceived to be a direct threat to the independence and security of Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
‘Karmati’, Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edn (Brill, Leiden, continuing). Comtemporary Yemen
17. Comtemporary Yemen
Major recent works which have discussed this subject are: Adeed Dawisha, Saudi Arabia’s Search for Security (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1980); Christopher Lee, ‘Soviet and Chinese Interests in Southern Arabia’, Mizan (Aug. Comtemporary Yemen
180 The Judicial System in Democratic Yemen (iv) Law No. 11 of 1978, the Labour Law, was passed on 30 April 1978. Comtemporary Yemen
(3) That personal freedom is guaranteed, in that arrest is not per- mitted except in connection with deeds which are punishable by law and according to the law, and that no person shall be subjected to torture during investigations, nor shall he be forced to confess or be treated in an inhuman way. Comtemporary Yemen
(5) That no punishment shall be inflicted for actions committed before the enactment of the law prohibiting such acts, nor shall there be inflicted any punishment not provided for by the law, and that self-defence is guaranteed. Comtemporary Yemen
The power of the organisations is stated in sections 41 to 47 of the Penal Code 1976. Comtemporary Yemen
One of the main safeguards, where it is essen- tial that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done, is that trials are public except when the dispute necessitates privacy (especially in domestic cases), or if state security or public morality is otherwise in jeopardy. Comtemporary Yemen
13 ASPECTS OF NORTH YEMEN’S RELATIONS I WITH SAUDI ARABIA M. S. El Azhary Although North Yemen was one of the early members of the Arab League, it was not until the resolution of the civil war and the reconciliation between the republicans and royalists in 1970 that the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) ended her traditional isolation and developed multifaceted relations — including cultural, eco- nomic, political and military ties — with the other Arab states. Comtemporary Yemen
From the beginning the latter have not only espoused Marxist-Leninist principles but have also maintained as one of their aims the spread of socialist revolution throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Comtemporary Yemen
13. Comtemporary Yemen
14. Comtemporary Yemen
15. Comtemporary Yemen
The Judicial System in Democratic Yemen 193 Sir Bernard Reilly stated that there were 25 states as follows: The Constitution of 1970 consisted of 135 articles, in six parts. Comtemporary Yemen
Articles 130 to 132 of the constitution run as follows: With the aim of realising democratic legality, protecting the national demo- The People’s Supreme Council shall appoint the Republic’s Attorney- The Attorney-General shall direct the combating of crimes, and ensure that Sections 13 and 14 of the Criminal Procedure. Comtemporary Yemen
Article 35 of the constitution and section 8 of the Criminal Procedure. Comtemporary Yemen
Since then the YAR has played a significant role in most Arab councils and participated in Arab decision-making in all major regional issues. Comtemporary Yemen
Being the most densely populated country in the Arabian Penin- sula (7.039 Comtemporary Yemen
This situation is bound to continue for years to come, not only to keep the Saudi economy functioning but also to implement Saudi Arabia’s ambitious development plans. Comtemporary Yemen
Even if a compromise could be agreed upon between the two ideologically opposite regimes, as proposed in the draft consti- tution completed in early 1982 which stated that Islam would be the religion, and socialism the creed, of a United Yemen,5 the Saudis would still consider such a regime inimical to their interests. Comtemporary Yemen
The communists were never given substantial authority, especially in matters of security, and on several occasions they were imprisoned or even executed by military regimes that were officially favoured by the Soviet Union (e.g. Comtemporary Yemen
The issues surrounding the fall of Salim Rubai’a Au are comparable to those which have rent other post-revolutionary regimes — in China and Cuba. Comtemporary Yemen
But, just as the Egyptians had long controlled Soviet aid in the 1960s, so the Saudis now sought to control the flow of US aid in the 1970s, and to exact political concessions from San’a’ in return for agreeing to allow the arms to flow. Comtemporary Yemen
Some 1,500 Soviet military and technical personnel remained in the country alongside a similar number of East Germans in the state security apparatus and a comparable con- tingent of Cubans working as advisers in the popular militias and as physicians and paramedics at health centres throughout the country. Comtemporary Yemen
The nature and extent of such a foreign presence provided ample testimony to the Eastern bloc’s continuing stake in the PDRY’s stability, security and development. Comtemporary Yemen
Yet eventually the FBI was able to catch up with the entire ring. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And third, it must have a safe haven in and out of which its operatives can maneuver in their efforts to dodge the government’s security services. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Thus, the situa- tion could in principle be created in which the terrorist would sooner or later succumb to the sophistication and sheer volume of activities against him. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Con- versely, the security services, unlike those of the author- itarian regimes, are extremely limited in number, the FBI commanding no more than 11,000 men. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Just how far the con- cern with free speech has gone was driven home to me in a recent conversation with a security expert who ex- plained the constraints imposed on the FBI by the At- torney General’s guidelines which govern monitoring activities: They prohibit law enforcement officials from using government funds to so much as buy a newsletter by a militant group in order to examine it for threats of terrorist activity—and if an official were to pay for the newsletter out of his own pocket, he would be prohibited from storing the clippings in a government office, be- cause such rudimentary intelligence gathering is consid- Benjamin Netanyahu 30 ered an “infringement” on the liberties of the groups involved. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
An example of how domestic intelligence work such as that forbidden to the FBI has made all the difference in the European counter-terror effort was provided by Christian Lochte, former head of the Office for the Pro- tection of the Constitution, the branch of the German security services responsible for anti-terror activities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Of course, there is something laudable in the efforts of Western democracies to hold their governments to the highest possible standards when it comes to respect- ing the rights of their citizens—including not having intelligence gathered about them. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The belief that freedom of speech and religion are absolutes that cannot be compromised even in the slightest way out of very real security concerns is merely tantamount to replacing one kind of violation of rights with another, even worse violation of those same rights. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In Britain, that mo- Fighting Terrorism 33 ment came in 1973, after IRA violence had reached un- precedented heights. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
That year the British Parliament passed an Emergency Provisions Act, providing for ar- rest, search and seizure without a warrant, relaxed rules of evidence, trials conducted by lone judges (to avoid intimidated juries), and outlawing membership in a ter- rorist organization. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It ordered “a crackdown on all potential sources of threat,” which included surveillance, searches, interro- gations, and expulsions en masse of Iraqi diplomats, PLO operatives, and other potential agents of Iraqi terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A grisly postscript to this story took place in Greece, where students expelled from the country on suspicion of being a security threat were allowed to return the month after the end of the war—only to blow themselves up in a post office in the college town of Patras, while trying to mail a package bomb to the British legation. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The question is whether it has yet reached that same moment of truth which brought the major Western European countries to allow their security ser- vices to take the vigorous action needed to uproot the terror in the midst of their societies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After all, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution appears to prohibit convictions on the basis of self-incriminating testimony—which is just the kind that security services are practiced in obtaining in interrogation; it similarly prohibits depriving a citizen of his liberties without “due process of law”—which is exactly what an arrest without a warrant is; the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by jury—and yet the British found trials by a lone judge to be a crucial step in obtaining convictions, because the Ulster citizenry had become so intimidated by terrorists. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At the Jonathan Institute’s 1979 conference, Professor Joseph W. Bishop of Yale University inquired into the question of whether the United States Constitution could be made to square with firm anti-terror measures such as had been adopted in Britain, Germany, and other Eu- ropean democracies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As these examples strongly suggest, the American ju- dicial system is ready and able to distinguish normal, peaceful circumstances from those in which the security of American citizens is being threatened by organized Benjamin Netanyahu 44 violence from without or within. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
However, when it came to matters that endangered the security of the nation, Madison and Alexander Hamilton were unequivocal that the authority of the executive to ensure the security of the nation must take precedence over all other concerns. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
the globe from the common calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the govern- ment of a single weapon, which in any possible con- [The powers to ensure security] ought to exist As I know nothing to exempt this portion of Fighting Terrorism 45 tingency might be usefully employed for the general defense and security [emphasis mine]. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no consti- tutional shackles can be wisely imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As the constitutional scholar Walter Berns pointed oul at the Jonathan Institute’s 1984 conference, even a greal defender of democracy like Abraham Lincoln was forced to assume extraordinary powers when the security of thc American nation was in jeopardy. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The British model, which dates back to 1973 and the beginning of intensified terrorism by the new Irish Republican Army (IRA), controls the activities of the security services by requiring that they annually receive a new legislative mandate from Parlia- ment. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
On the Continent, on the other hand, the responsibility for keep- ing an eye on the activities of the security services is usually concentrated in the hands of the judicial system, which reviews anti-terror actions to make sure that they can be justified out of legitimate concerns for public safety, generally within a specified number of days. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For granting extensive security powers to law enforcement officials in a vast nation is impossible without encoun- tering a certain number of abuses as well. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And while such abuses may be relatively unimportant during war- time or when the terror threat appears to be entirely out of control, it is also natural that when the authorities get the upper hand and the threat recedes somewhat, the relative importance of every abuse will grow again, rais- ing the demand for more careful oversight of the security services. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Thus it seems that the democracies are destined to wander to and fro between the poles of too much liberty and too extensive a security effort, walking the fine line between security and freedom. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
By the close of the 1940s, a terrorist group called Volante Rosa was carrying out attacks and assassinations against government targets in Italy, and fleeing to Czechoslovakia when they felt threatened by the authorities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Support for the construction of the international terrorist infrastructure was provided by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Soviet Security Police (KGB), and Soviet Mil- itary Intelligence (GRU).4 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Signifi- cantly, this last attack was carried out by Hizballah ter- rorists who have sought, with Iranian support, to make Turkey into a regular staging area for their activities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This was the same position elab- orated by Abbas Zaki, one of the PLO’s security chiefs in the newly “liberated” territories: “This is merely a cease-fire before the next stage. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
PLO Foreign Minister Farouq Kaddoumi granted an interview in which he added: “The Palestin- ian people know that there is a state [Israel] that was founded by compulsion of history, and that this state must be brought to an end.”7 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Though the Israeli security forces provided him lists of known per- petrators, and though his police force had ballooned into an army of 16,000 armed men—per capita ten times the police force of Israel—Arafat did practically nothing to rein in terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It tied the hands of its security forces by denying them the right to enter or strike at terrorist havens, thus creating inviolable domains for terrorist actions. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The creation of even semi-free enclaves for terrorists—where the authorities struggle against a substantial pro-terrorist sympathy in the population— such as in Northern Ireland or in the Basque region of Spain, creates horrendous conditions for the security services trying to uproot terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet it is difficult for many outside Israel to accept the failings built into the Oslo accords, espe- cially since so many hopes for peace have been vested in these agreements. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Stability may be achieved and terror- ism put on the defensive if Israel reassumes responsibility for its own security and asserts a policy of local autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs instead of the independent terror-free zones now being built. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The U.S. State Department’s own 1994 report on terrorism mentions among these groups Ahmed Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP— GC), Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Japanese Red Army, and the Kurdish PKK.’ Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The ten- dency to try and bribe Syria to desist from its support Fighting Terrorism 135 for terrorism—with American aid and Israeli concessions on the Golan Heights—is the exact opposite of what is needed. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
There are those who say, for example, that the existing powers of the security services of the United States are sufficient to enable them to track terrorist threats; others disagree. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Rather, I propose that the laws of every free society must be such as to permit the security services to move against groups which incite to violence against the country’s government or its citizens. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
If the security services cannot research which groups may be dangerous be- fore they strike, there is little hope of being able to Benjamin Netanyahu following measures in all or degree of the terrorist threat its particular culture and legal 140 prevent terrorism from springing up again and again. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Whether such an approach can have the intended effect of stopping fund-raising for terrorism in America re- mains to be seen. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
• Loosen warrant requirements in terrorist cases. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
course meaningless if they are not accompanied by a commensurate mustering of will to act on the part of the executive branch and the security services. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In an age in which the power of the weap- ons which individuals may obtain grows incredibly from one year to the next, and in which information about how to obtain and use such weapons can be instantly transmitted by electronic mail from any part of the world, an active internal-security policy and aggressive counter-terrorism actions are becoming a crucial part of the mandate of every government, and officials must learn to rise to this challenge. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While those branches of Western security services spe- cializing in counter-intelligence and surveillance gener- ally enjoy a high level of professionalism and training, this is often not the case with the forces that have to do the actual fighting against terrorists. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
They should reject this criticism, responding, as has the Supreme Court of the United States, that “it is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation”3— and this includes unlimited civil liberties. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Western de- mocracy is strong enough to be able to monitor any added powers given its security services, especially if the technique of requiring periodic renewal of these powers is adopted. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Moreover, the security of the democracies and their well-being cannot be governed by the ebb and flow of local political skirmishes. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
by the Security Services” [in Arabic], Al-Quds al-’Arabi (London), 8 December 1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For exam- ple, a letter from the Brotherhood to the then Egyptian foreign minister, dated 3 April 1946, protested the presence of the Egyptian deputy consul general in Palestine at a ball to aid a Zionist society. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
85. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Charter even accuses Jews of establishing “the League of Nations through which they could rule the world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A number of lead- ing personalities who have lived abroad and been exposed to wider experi- ences than their counterparts in the Gaza Strip (who formulated the Hamas Charter) have re-oriented Hamas’s political thinking and influ- enced the formulation of its discourse. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The PA set down roots, expand- ing its police and security forces gradually and establishing its presence. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It established a state security court that passed long and severe sentences on leading figures in the move- ment despite Hamas’s policy of not turning its guns on the PA. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Instead, the organization focused on the capitulation embodied in the agreement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas made its acceptance of an interim solution contingent on a number of ideological and factual conditions that helped to differentiate its position from that adopted by the PLO several years earlier. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The continuation of activities by Hamas and the insistence by the PA of rigorously implementing the security aspects of the Oslo Agreement as a way of demonstrating its competence and of preparing for the next phase led to an escalation of tensions between them. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Arabic version of this book, Appendix, document no. 4, pp. 318—21. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas did not deviate from this position even as tensions between it and the PA increased fol- lowing the guerrilla operations launched from the Gaza Strip by the ‘Izzidin al-Qassam Brigades against Israeli targets.33 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas extended a warm welcome to the police officers and, because the PA had failed to make preparations for their housing and basic necessities, provided accommo- dations for them at its own school buildings and charitable societies. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The indecision option did entail negative consequences. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “Tasrih sahafi howl al-hiwar ma’al-sulta al-filastiniyya” [Press release The Political Relations ofHamas with Palestinian Groups I io~ 106 HAMAS bring to the table a clear and specific political agenda, apart from demand- ing the release of Hamas detainees and a condemnation of repressive mea- sures used by Palestinian security forces. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As the security forces consol- idated their presence, the PA gradually asserted its authority over the opposition. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Cairo meeting did not fulfill the expectations it had created. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Charter seeks inspiration from the history of reli- gious coexistence in Palestine and the region as a whole, stating that Islam had the best record in the practice of tolerance; according to Hamas, the adherents of the three monotheistic religions—Islam, Christianity, and Judaism—can coexist in peace and security under Islam; security and trust only can prevail under the rule of Islam. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Under the aegis of that peace, Christians and Jews lived in peace and security under the protection of the great Islamic civilization—noted for its tolerance and unbounded humanitarian horizon, which has given mankind the 78. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Despite repeated allegations in the Israeli media that the Islamic move- ment in Israel has close ties to Hamas, both movements deny this vehe- mently. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Security forces stormed the headquarters of the charitable committees on several occasions, confiscated their property, and microscopically examined their documents to find evidence for a connection between the Islamic movement and Hamas.94 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This inci- dent was followed by a number of armed attacks, most notably the series of bus bombings in retaliation for the Hebron massacre in 1994, then another series of bus bombings in February and March 1996 in retaliation for the January assassination by Israeli security agents in Gaza of the engi- neer, Yahya ‘Ayyash, then leader of Hamas’s military arm, the ‘Izziddin al-Qassam Brigades. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Since then, Hamas has developed its relations with the Sudanese regime so that it has become Hamas’s strongest ally in the Arab world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “Congratulations on the Application of the Islamic Shariah in Sudan,” dated 13 February 1991. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Egypt’s position encouraged Hamas, as did its hosting of the negotiations between the PA and Hamas in Cairo, which constituted tacit recognition of a role for the movement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
About three years after the movement was founded, Hamas’s per- spective on international affairs began to mature and grow more nuanced. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas found itself at the center of events and Hamas’s Political Relations 193 194 HAMAS was the subject of sudden and intense interest on the part of Arab and foreign actors. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From the date of the deportation incident, if progress was to be achieved toward a solution of the Palestinian problem, Hamas had to be taken into account, despite its Islamic ideology and its rejection of Israel’s presence in the region.”9 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
representing the five countries that comprise the permanent members of the Security Council. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas itself readily accepted UN Security Council Resolution 136. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Such considerations apparently con- tinued to influence the formulation of Israeli policy through the first two years of the intifada. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This claim would serve— even as it admits an error in tactics—Israel’s strategy of firmly establishing that its Arab and Palestinian foes are not capable of carrying out any under- taking that may influence events outside Israel’s masterful control. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
By virtue of the relationship between the occupation authorities and the people under occupation, Hamas leaders and others close to it were compelled to meet Israeli security and political officials. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
151. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He outlined the issues that Israel had to address: “determine the deployment of Israeli army before, during, and after the elections; determine the situation of the security detainees and prisoners; determine who would supervise the elections; determine how to guarantee the honesty of the elections; determine how much coordina- tion between Palestinians inside and outside Israel will be permitted; and determine the status of Palestinians outside [Palestine]. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Some prominent figures in Hamas also have alleged that the polls are conducted on Fridays during the noon prayers when Hamas supporters are at the mosque; they have alleged that the poli takers are instructed to avoid universities and mosques, organizational headquarters, the offices of lawyers, doctors, and engineers, and other places of support for Hamas.52 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See for example William Drozdiak, “Steadily Hamas Fills a Social Void,” International It is not difficult to demonstrate the PA’s negative record in its dealings with its ciii- Theory andPractice 241 242 funds, interfering in their internal affairs, and eventually putting them under the supervision of the security services, the overall social atmos- phere became charged with fear and occupied by the PA apparatuses. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Mohammed Dahlan, the PA’s chief of preventive security, was quoted as saying: “I don’t care if it is armed or unarmed: any activity of Hamas will be an obstacle to the peace process. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There were two operations that had a profound effect and dealt a blow to the pride of the Israeli security apparatus. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
General Shiomo Gazit, former chief of Israeli military intelligence, commented on Hamas’s modus operandi as follows: Lately, we have been facing operations that seem to be based on a policy of concentrating more and more on soldiers and security forces. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
\ size; it constitutes the Achilles heel of the Zionist projeèt. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Developments, Sources of Support and Implications for U.S. Policy,” Report submitted to the Foreign Relations and National Security Committee of the U.S. Congress (Washington: Gov- ernment Printing Office, December 1994), p. 13. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Therefore, in the shade of Islam it is possible for all followers of different religions to live in peace and security in their person, property, and rights. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
So God sets forth When faith is lost, there is neither security nor hf’ for those who do not Surah 14 (Ibrahim), v. 24—25 The Universality of the Islamic Resistance Movement ARTICLE 7: By virtue of the distribution of Muslims, who adopt the system of the Islamic Resistance Movement all over the globe, they work toward aiding it, accepting its positions and strengthening its Jihad. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They prepared for the establishment of their state; they ordered that the United Nations be formed, along with the Security Council, in place of the League of Nations, so that they could rule the world through them. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The structure of the Movement consists of two main bodies: a consultative council, which determines general policies and approves plans and budgets, and an executive body that directs the activities of the movement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Appendix I 301 302 HAMAS hands of troops as well as settlers, victimizing women, children, and old men. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
which operate throughout the homeland, vowed to avenge the blood of martyrs. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Rabin’s measures failed to stop our heroic operations, carried out amidst his efforts to implement the Oslo Agreement with all the shameful concessions on the part of the PLO leadership that it entails, and failed to fulfil the longing of the Zionist masses for peace and security. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To shift attention from the true nature and the failure of his strict and repressive security measures to end either the heroic suicide missions by the Qassam Brigades or other popular resis- tance operations carried out by our people in all parts of our holy land. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
We emphasize once again that Rabin’s claims are false and have no factual basis, because our movement works on our soil and we have no concern other than to fight occupation until victory and liberation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Yet, Hamas stands ready to reconsider this extraordinary policy on condition that the prime minister of the enemy, his government, and his army pledge finally and irrevocably to cease killing unarmed Pales- tinian civilians. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In particular, UN Security Council Resolution No. 242 called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories that were occu- pied in 1967, but the Israeli authorities still refuse to comply with the text and spirit of this resolution. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Legitimacy of Resisting Military Occupation Using as a point of departure the principle that international law and order rejects the occupation of other’s territory by force, the UN Charter oblig- ates member nations to implement the decisions of the UN Security Council in armed conflicts. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The children were victimized even while playing inno- cently in the streets; the women were victimized while on peaceful protest marches, while doing their household chores, or as they passed by a demonstration on some street. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To those sources in the book who gave me invaluable information and explanations, but who did not want to be named for security reasons or because of their sensitive positions in the military, intelligence or even political levels, I also extend my gratitude. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Lebanese government hailed Salah as a hero; the Israeli government denounced him as a terrorist and launched an investigation into its army’s security measures in South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He had always told me to be prepared for receiving news of his martyrdom.That Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
My husband’s attack only confirmed and proved to Israel that the Resistance can reach it wherever it may be and whenever it wants. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Ironically, Israel, Bern and the southern Shiites all wanted the same thing — an end to the Palestinian presence and guerrilla activity in South Lebanon, as well as security across both borders. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Salah Halawani, former director-general of the Litani Water Authority, Lebanon, argued that while Israel justified its actions with the need for security, the pursuit ol further water resources may also have been one of its objectives.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Arad was held by Amal’s head of security, Mustapha al-Dirani, also known as Abu Ali Dirani. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was a measure of their frustration that Hezbollah had accused the UN of deliberately obstructing the Islamic Resistance in an attempt to protect the security of Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘First of all I think they mainly improved their field security. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
By 1991, the Islamic Resistance was adopting bolder measures. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
There are various ways of blowing up roadside bombs, but there are certain occasions whereby we have to do so electronically from a distance, for security reasons. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Who do you think forced it to withdraw to its current ‘security zone’? [Former President] Amin Gemayel? Negotiations? The Americans? The United Nations Security Council? The Arab League? Only the Resistance forced it to withdraw. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It did, however, have important elements necessary for a jihad: Iranian money at its disposal * See The Fateful Triangle, Noam Chomsky, pp. 425—6 Hezbollah 50 and, on its doorstep, Iranian Revolutionary Guards expert in the art of warfare. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From reading and analysing their history and politics we conclude that these people, despite their talk of peace and security, which is only aimed at making us feel safe, strive to occupy much more than they already have and are willing to admit. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
weekly newspaper, Al-A hed, on 6 December 1985, Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, a leading cleric, outlined the argument: ‘Israel cannot be viewed as a state with the right to security and peace just like any other state in the region. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Washington Post reported that the failed assassination attempt was carried out by CIA-trained Lebanese agents.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its foremost priority was to drive the Israelis out of Lebanon: their presence in the South and the Bekaa Valley threatened Syria’s heartland and jeopardised its national security. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Mughniyeh had been a highly trained security man with the PLO’s Force 17, Arafat’s elite personal security apparatus, and Badredeen had been a fierce member of the al-Dawa party’s military wing. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
security experts needed no help in determining their target. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In a short while I shall avenge all the martyrs and oppressed of Jabal Amel, South Lebanon, as well as the children and sons of the Intifada in ravished Palestine. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
During the course of the hostage crisis, a security source known as ‘the Baron’ claimed that Islamic Jihad, one of the leading, faceless groups which took Westerners hostage, was simply a covert name. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He explained that the groups were part of Hezbollah’s ‘secret security apparatus’ and that their sole mission was to penalise the West by whatever means available: they were the Party of God’s hidden hand of terrorism. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The source appeared to be reliable: he was a senior member of an intelligence apparatus which headed Beirut security operations for a Muslim militia. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanese government was not equipped to stop their activities and the country’s internal security system had almost ceased to function. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They were initially set up in 1979 as an internal security apparatus to consolidate Khomeini’s grip on Iran and grew to become one of the strongest institutions ever produced by the revolution and a primary tool for promoting Khomeini’s doctrines. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The first foreign national to be kidnapped in Lebanon was the president of the American University in Beirut, David Dodge. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
One of John McCarthy’s prisons: he was held for some months in the basement of this building in the Southern suburbs of Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Until the early eighties, the practice of kidnapping was con- fined to the local population in Lebanon and thousands of Lebanese were abducted. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
According to the security source ‘the Baron’, who believed Hezbollah to be behind the kidnappings, Mughniyeh was the invisible head of Hezbollah’s security service. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Lebanese militant would become a bonus member of their special security apparatus and one of their loyal adherents in their international Hezbollah 116 network. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
According to a security source, the information which led to the kidnap of William Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut, in March 1984, was gathered during the take-over of the US embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The affair confirms the direct involvement of the Guards’ special security apparatus in the kidnapping of Western hostages and suggests that Buckley’s abduction was not a spontaneous local act but a pre-planned operation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He knew that any intervention on our part could instigate massive fighting between factions and further disrupt the country’s unstable security situation.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s security apparatus was involved in the ensuing investigation and arrested several Lebanese, including a woman, who admitted that she had been trained and hired by Mossad to carry out the attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Congress had banned the sale of American arms to countries which sponsored terrorism, but Robert McFarlane, head of the National Security Council, had hatched the plan of trading arms to Iran in exchange for the hostages. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
According to ‘the Baron’, Mughniyeh had installed his men in different locations around the clinic to ensure that Waite was indeed alone and that he was not being followed: Security was his expertise and Mughniyeh had been planning the ambush for some time. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
hostages would later be released, but the group then kidnapped two others. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A member of Hezbollah’s security apparatus warned, during an interview, that there were three ‘red lines’ which should not be crossed in this book: ‘details of Hezbollah’s internal security’, ‘the security of the Islamic Resistance’ and the ‘hostage issue’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When Hezbollah’s leadership heard about the warning which had been made, they asked their press officer to apologise: their security officer had, apparently, not been acting with their authorisation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Sunnis, on the other hand, lived within the security of Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The UN Security Council did not even meet to discuss the offensive and the US, unsurprisingly, blamed Hezbollah and Iran for starting the cycle of violence. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah 172 Hezbollah, on the other hand, vowed to continue with its attacks against Israel’s ‘security zone’ and its northern borders. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In a country where security is a cardinal political issue, Peres needed to retain the confidence of the public and he lacked the military background of his predecessor Rabin. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Following the attack on the ambulance, the UN Security Council finally agreed to convene. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon’s Arab allies in the Arab League and the Arab Collective Security Pact had failed to fulfil their moral and legal obligation during Israel’s campaign. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Where are the collective security pacts between us and the Arabs who are supposed to defend us? Let Clinton hear this from a woman who has seen her family members, friends and neighbours being removed from Qana by the bagfuls. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Al-Amaliya al-Istishhaadiya: Ashura: Belt of Misery: Al-Dawa: Fatwa: Husseiniyah: IDF: Glossary Shiite militia founded by Musa Sadr’s followers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s council. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the spring of 65 B.C., he entered Iberia to fight King Artog (Artoces). The Making of the Georgian Nation
35—51) on. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The lands directly held by the king (sakhaso) had grown enormously, since David had appropriated the holdings of the king of Ereti-Kakheti, the emir of Tbilisi, the Seljuks of Kartli, and some of the holdings of his own powerful aznaurni. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Kartli remained economically depressed and underpopulated, though Kakheti fared some- what better. The Making of the Georgian Nation
. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Its powers had been both reduced (in terms of local authority) and enhanced (in terms of security of tenure in service and as overlords of the nonstate peasantry). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgians had neither the security nor the incentive to produce more than was needed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Jews, who lived in Tskhinvali, Ali, Mdzovreti, and other places, played a relatively insignificant role. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This policy proved immediately bene- ficial, particularly to the local Armenian merchants enjoying the first period of security in a generation. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The central government, through its most enlightened governors, had by law and by example drawn significant seg- ments of the Georgian nobility and Armenian bourgeoisie into identifying their security, economic well-being, prestige, and political status with the Russian connection. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the Georgian nobility failed to adjust to the spreading market economy and lost its ancient lands to middle-class creditors or land-hungry peasants, it was also pushed aside politically. The Making of the Georgian Nation
With the withdrawal of Turkish armies from Transcaucasia, Georgian forces occupied parts of northern Lori and Akhalkalaki, and Armenians moved into south- ern Lori and Pambak. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The old leadership was largely gone or traumatized, and the new was as yet untested. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The uneasy compro- mise was based on mutual need. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In foreign policy Zhdanov was militantly anti-Western and was allied with the more revolutionary East European Communists like Tito.73 The Making of the Georgian Nation
/ While Zhdanov and his Leningrad cronies were influential, Beria’s posi- tion was compromised. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The information Stalin received was crucial to the direction of party- state policy, and Beria managed to control much of what Stalin heard. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As Beria’s influence over state security was being cut back, Stalin and Ignat’ev fabricated a police case against officials in the Georgian republic—the so-called Mingrelian Affair. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the most general Nationality Policy since Stalin 295 296 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA way one can describe the last 150 years as the period of the “re-formation” of the Georgian nation. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Unresolved ethnic conflicts south of the Cau- casian mountains inevitably bled into Russia proper, and the security of Russian military assets, as well as concerns about Turkish and Iranian de- signs on Transcaucasia, encouraged the Russia government to push for a renewed Russian presence in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The Making of the Georgian Nation
High-ranking Ital- ian officials from the secret service and the defense department—including General Gianadelio Maletti, who fled to South Africa in 1981 after being implicated in another scandal, and Vito Miceli, the head of security—covered up the affair, possibly on orders from government ministers who wanted to avoid more problems for the already troubled government. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
These events produced immediate repercussions in Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Azerbaijani-Armenian clashes continued around Erivan and Elizavetpol (the modern Kirovabad), though Baku was relatively quiet. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Some of the forts had surrendered without firing a shot and the town and port had been occupied without resistance. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
To avenge Yassin, Fatah went to war, firing rockets at the Iraqi embassy in Beirut on July 17, 1978, and, two days later, storming Abu Nidal’s office in Tripoli, Libya, killing two of his members. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
One pointed me out to the other, who rushed up and started firing at me when he was about six feet away. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestinians with bushy mustaches, their heads wrapped in red and white scarfs and their thighs draped in dhoti-type peasant cloths, began raiding Jewish settlements with long Ottoman Empire hunting rifles, crouching well outside the settlements and firing indiscriminately at chickens and walls, then running. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israelis were given to dropping a hundred bombs, or firing a hundred shots, or arresting a hundred boys, when one or two would have been enough. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the early 1980s a group dressed in keffiiehs raided Hebron University, throwing grenades and firing at students. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
If a discovered agent provocateur achieves a controlling position, it foments suspicion and brings disrepute to the cause. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Who would suspect two Japanese men and a woman return- ing to Japan via Israel? When they arrived they went to the baggage claim, collected their suitcases off the carousel, unzipped them, and immediately began firing indiscriminately while throwing shrapnel grenades. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The embassy was hosting a party for the outgoing American chargé d’affaires, George Curtis Moore; much of Sudan’s diplomatic community was present. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The French pilot and navigator (who usually flew for Air France) thought they were being followed by Egypt- ian fighters until one of the fighters began firing at them.’9 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He received his weapon from his contact in Abu Dhabi in the usual FRC manner. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In March 1974 he and Khalid Hassan had a secret meeting in Morocco with United States representative Vernon Walters, who passed on Kissinger’s negative wishes.28 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Three gunmen walked into the terminal, approached the El Al desk, and began firing. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As soon as the bus pulled up in front of the hotel, the gunmen began firing and throw- ing grenades. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
First the terrorists walked into the terminal at Rome, took out their weapons, and began firing at passengers waiting to check in at TWA, El Al, and other airlines. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ten days after the La Belle bombing, with a lot of fiery rhetoric in between, United States F-ill bombers based in northern Britain launched their surgical strike on Libya, bombing the French and Swiss embassies, hit- ting residential areas, firing missiles at a flock of migrating birds, and hitting almost no military targets. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He went there and told the PLO security office under Abu Hol that he was a spy and wanted to amend his ways, saying he had a lot of information to offer. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Who was more effective? about the Marine bombing beforehand.26 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Among his other en- croachments on civil liberties which he deemed to be endangering the United States, he authorized the exe- cution by firing squad of those who used their freedom of speech to demoralize the Union armies and incite criminal defections. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Sheikh Salah She- hadeh, another member of the Political Bureau, became head of the first military wing of Hamas; he was arrested and put on trial less than a year after the intifada began. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Arieh O’Sullivan, the distinguished defence analyst of the right-wing Jerusalem Post, made the same point when he wrote: ‘Despite all its bravado and state-of-the-art weapons systems, the IDF’s attempts to stop Hezbollah from firing Katyushas into northern Israel is like a tiger trying to catch a mosquito in his teeth.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
We do not have to be firing.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Participating towards the cost of a bullet. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They remain silent but have the audacity to ask Hezbollah to stop firing their Katyushas. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Nearly 650 air raids and 24,000 artillery shells later, Hezbollah was still firing salvoes of Katyushas, at a rate higher than when the sixteen-day offensive began and it continued to do so until the cease-fire deadline came into effect. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
To counter such a broad-based movement, martial law was declared and all public meetings prohibited. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The bees yield plenteous supplies of honey and wax; this honey is excellent and in some places it comes in honeycombs, white and firm as sugar. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Russians stood firm, until finally the Shah’s forces retired discouraged and without engaging battle. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
All manifestations of Bolshevism in Georgia were suppressed with a firm hand by the unbending Georgian Minister of the Interior, Noe Ramishvili. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
QaI~an lacked a firm power base. A History of Modern Yemen
When Hamdi was murdered (October i~77), Ahmad al-Ghashmi became President but he lacked “Ibrahim’s” charisma and his announce- ments on hoardings around the capital, even when they were Ibrahim’s with the name changed, had always a forlorn look; nor did he establish a firm grip on politics. A History of Modern Yemen
A Russian group found encouraging signs near Shabwah, an Italian firm made a small off-shore find near Mukall~ in 1982; an American company, Hunt Oil, had signed an agreement for work in the North, near Ma’rib, in ig8r, and at the end of 1983 a border clash occurred between Northerners and Saudis which some attributed to the sniff of oil, though smuggling is more likely to have been the issue. A History of Modern Yemen
The Palestinian entrepreneurs Ilasib al-~abbagh and Sacid Khurl estab- lished a huge contracting firm to work on a pipeline from Masllah (the big new oilfield in Uadramawt) to the coast and their commercial agent was said to be Shaykh cAbdullah of Hashid; the French company, Elf, al-Ilada’s voice is a lion’s roar, making clear to me how things are. A History of Modern Yemen
“Tomorrow we will take a trip together. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Birth of the Palestinian Guerrillas 43 44 Arab and Israeli Terrorism state. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
George Habash and Wadi Haddad, two AUB Palestinian Chris- tians who studied medicine and were part of a literary club called the Firm Tie, in 1954 formed the Arab National Movement (ANM). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Palestinian movement’s future remained uncertain, but the tide of nationalism had a firm hold, and though the PLO was going to suffer years of mismanagement and defeat, the movement was destined to intensify. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Coverage of terrorism is often selective. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The new structure is dependent on the integrated nature of the educational system from kindergarten to university where a rational balance between the different levels is sought — this is what Law 26 of 1972 emphasised. Comtemporary Yemen
(5) The discovery of a deposit of high-quality crude in the Hadramawt;’3 however, the important factor is not so much the reported discovery (about which further details are lacking) but the fact that the Italian firm which undertook the exploration charged nothing for the effort and was successful, whereas the Soviet team had been searching for a number of years without success, and had been charging the South Yemenis for their work. Comtemporary Yemen
It must be recognized that barring firm and resolute action by the United States and the West, terrorism in the 1990s will expand dra- matically both domestically and internationally. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet in none of the democracies has the adoption of firm anti-terror measures led to a signif- icant or lasting curtailment of individual freedoms. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Over the following days, the Americans were unrelenting in their firm and uncompromising posture. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Similar legislation could create an official list of states supplying nuclear technologies to other countries, which could like- wise be subjected to trade sanctions. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Both the Soviet Union’s Iron Curtain and South Africa’s odi- ous system of racial laws were eventually brought down by a firm Western policy of linking sanctions to an im- provement in Soviet and South African policies, and there is no reason that a much less powerful state such as Syria should be any less responsive when faced with determined pressure over a protracted period. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The “spectre” of his extremely useful if firm comments that usually have filled the margins of my dissertation drafts— comments such as why, what is the relevance, be specific, be direct, cut down, etc.—constantly HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
On the eve of the outbreak of the intifada, Israel’s policy regarding the Gaza Strip and West Bank was remarkably arrogant and highhanded, formulated in the full flush of victory, and indicating that Israel believed it had acquired a firm grip on Palestinian civil society in addition to its political and military control over the land of Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
EVOLUTION OF HAMAS’S VISION OF HOW TO CONDUCT THE STRUGGLE Against the background of the three premises on the nature of the strug- gle outlined above, one could underline a set of principal characteristics 35. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
We should keep a foot in real- ity to launch ourselves toward our strategic objective with firm steps.49 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the first year of its exis- tence, the PA proceeded cautiously and cunningly to build a firm base for itself. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In addition, as dis- cussed in the previous chapter, Hamas also refrained from unambiguously recognizing the PLO’S status as the representative of the Palestinian people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s dealings with foreign states and international organiza- tions, regardless of any pre-existing political and ideological bag- gage, will be to serve the interests of the Palestinian people, their cause, and their rights. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
We give peace and blessings upon the Messenger of God, his family, his companions, his followers, You are the best community that has been raised up for mankind, enjoin- Shame is pitched over them wheresoever they are found, except when under Israel will rise and will remain firm until Islam eliminates it as it had The Islamic World is burning. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The will was firm to offer its role in life to overcome all difficulties and to surmount all obstacles in the path. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
establishes a firm foundation in the depths of the earth and reaches to the highest heavens. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
have a firm belief in our land. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Following the linear scheme set out by Friedrich Engels in The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, Melikishvili proposes that primitive communal society was replaced by “military democracy” and firm alliances of tribes, which in turn may be seen as the beginning of the formation of a Georgian nationality.19 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Persian hold over these Georgian tribes was fairly firm until the second half of the fifth century B.C. Georgians marched in the Persian campaigns against the Greeks, and Persian terms in Georgian political vocabulary are eloquent testimony to the depth of Iranian influence in government. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Disaster befell Armenia when Rome sent Pompey to bring Transcaucasia into submission. The Making of the Georgian Nation
After receiving reports about her commander, Catherine replaced him, but Russian aid remained too meager to allow the Georgians to win a decisive victory over the Turks. The Making of the Georgian Nation
~ Himself too sickly to remain in Batumi, Ingoroqva left for the small town of Kvirili, where he found office work at Gogoberidze’s manganese firm. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But Zhordania toured the local commit- tees and quickly won them over to the Menshevik position. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Workers’ patrols and the admin- istration’s firm stand against any interethnic outbreaks prevented a repetition in Tiflis of the destruction and death that had ravaged Baku twice that year. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On June 4, the Ottoman empire for- mally recognized the Georgian state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Stalin spoke in favor of industrial development and the strengthening of national cadres in the national republics, but he combined his program of local “nationalization” with a firm commitment to political centralization. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Har- riman’s firm was to produce 300,000 tons of manganese in the first year, 400,000 the second, and 500,000 the third, for which the Soviet government would receive a royalty, of $3 a ton for the first three years on every ton exported, and $4 a ton thereafter. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The rise of patriotism and nationalism was related to the dangers that the USSR faced in Europe from the rearmament of Nazi Germany and in Asia with the expansion of the Japanese empire into China. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But his thirteen years of firm administra- tion and mild reform were rewarded by the new government of Mikhail Gorbachev at the beginning of July 1985, when Shevardnadze was made a full member of the Politburo in Moscow and appointed to succeed Andrei Gromyko as foreign minister of the USSR.58 The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the propeasant policy unfolded and Stalin’s program of building “socialism in one country” was more clearly articulated, a new opposition began to crystalize, this time around Zinoviev and Kamenev. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Since the KhArijite, Muctazii and Qarmatian movements of rebellion and others, Yemeni names have continued to glow in the firmament of thought, philosophy, dialectics and history.”6° A History of Modern Yemen
He was a more doctrinaire Marxist, closer to Moscow and a hard-liner in foreign affairs, being opposed to rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, firmer on solidarity with neighbouring Marxist Ethiopia and, being from a North Yemeni family, more determined to force unity. Comtemporary Yemen
And in 1987, Congress passed the firmest anti-terrorist legis- lation yet, ordering the closure of all PLO offices in the United States. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The firmest support for the Soviet order came from the small Georgian working class, which after a decline in numbers during the Menshevik republic began a steady revival. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He thought that it would be best to retain the Georgian language as the medium for transacting local official business. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘The peasants themselves firmly insisted on the precise fulfilment of mutual obligations—they were ready to die rather than pay any- thing extra.’43 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A new Turkish force, the Second Army, attacked the Russians from the south-west in the Lake Van sector, but was firmly held. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The QasimT state (ruled by descendants of the Zaydi Imam al-Qasim, d. 1620), which earlier had held the highlands firmly and been a regional power of some impor- tance, simply fell apart as rival claimants to the Imamate warred among themselves in a maelstrom of shifting alliances and famine and disease ravaged much of Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
Aden casualties, 1960S ‘‘I 112 A history of modern Yemen Ahmad a1~CAttAs, had licensed both parties in late 1965, and politics still turned in large part on rivalries between the Al al~CAttas and their fellow sayyids. A History of Modern Yemen
Wanting safe and peaceful frontiers with Israel, Hussein firmly rejected their overtures. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Believing that he could do so with Abu Nidal’s backing, he joined him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
All money matters were kept firmly in his own hands. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His mouth expelled a flood of hollow words calling for Israel’s destruction, but he, like other Arab leaders, firmly opposed commando actions, making him a carica- ture of Arab verbosity. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The family must have been poor, but better off than those who received Red Cross tents. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As a favor to Arafat, Iraq also closed the offices of the PFLP and CG, keeping only the PLO and FRC. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When a people firmly believe in a political or social cause but do not have an army, cannot mobilize tanks and squadrons ofjet fighters, do not have the money, space, or political liberty to build armored units, they will fight in any way they can. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was only at the turn of the tenth century that the two openly announced their mission, and simultaneously they launched a vigorous campaign of conquest that shattered the two chief Himyarite baronies of the time, the Yu’firid and Manakhi states. Comtemporary Yemen
Ultimately, this shift to commercial agricul- ture, in a land where agriculture dominated the lives of the people, was a factor for change more firmly set than any administrative reform dreamed by Constantinople or attempted by Aziz Bey and his fellow officers. Comtemporary Yemen
By forsaking the tradi- tional basis of authority and attendant legitimacy and relying increasingly on neo-traditional means of rule, the Hamid al-Din imamate forfeited the religious and tribal underpinnings on which the institution had traditionally depended. Comtemporary Yemen
Beginning with the North, the first stage in the YAR was that of civil war (1962—7). Comtemporary Yemen
In the North a principal func- tion of the People’s Constituent Assembly has been to elect the President formally. Comtemporary Yemen
Its concept of greater Yemen or the Yemeni homeland was further developed and became more out- spoken; for example, al-Hakimi, the party’s new leader, wrote, ‘The Yemeni Union firmly believes that the cause of Aden,. Comtemporary Yemen
This mind-set invented the myth of the “invincible Israeli army,” wove legends around the “supernatural” capabil- ities of its security services (including Mossad and Shin Bet), and painted a fabulous picture of its ability to influence events both regionally and on the Palestinian plane. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas continued to rebuff Israeli attempts to open communication chan- nels with it, persisted in announcing those attempts when they occurred, and used very strong language in firmly rejecting Rabin’s offer to negotiate. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Thus, it See thou not how God sets forth aparable?A goodly word is like a goodly tree, whose root is firmly fixed and whose branches reach to the heavens. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Surah 17 (al-Isra’), v. 1 Surah 59 (al-Hashr), v. 13 [General Edmund] Allenby claimed when he entered Jerusalem: “Now the Crusades are over;” and General Guroud stood by the tomb of Sal- adin and said: “We have returned, 0 Saladin.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Once the Arsacids had firmly established their hold on the Armenian throne in the second century A.D., they extended their rule to Kartli-Iberia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Some historians consider that the Byzantine empire reached its height under Basil 11(975—1025), but before the emperor was able to expand his realm he had first to establish firmly his power at home. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The prince of Samegrelo, Levan 11(1533—1572), for example, competed with the Imeretian king for local authority. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Still, no action was taken toward emancipation in Georgia until after the Polozhenie of February 19, 1861.6 The Making of the Georgian Nation
- Commercial agriculture, with all its vicissitudes, was firmly established in much of Georgia by the early twentieth century~ In most areas market relations were the rule. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The process of economic integration of Georgia, first into Trans- caucasia, then into the Soviet Union as a whole, and the increasing emphasis on planning for industrialization removed much of the initiation and control Bolshevik Georgia 235 236 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA of economic projects from the republic level. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Collective farms had not been firmly established in Georgia, Lominadze went on. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Gently but firmly, Kapitonov told the local party aktiv that secession was impermissible. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This is firmness in all matters. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Serfdom in Georgia had by the mid-nineteenth century been effectively remolded along Russian lines. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Some Soviet historians add to this nuclear “proletariat” the nearly 29,000 prislugi (servants in administration, factories, and on estates; domes- tic servants, cooks, cleaners, and so on); still others expand the figure further by adding the 30,000 agricultural workers. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The number grew steadily, and in the first two months of 1901 fifteen firms were struck in Tiflis.52 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Many industrial firms in Georgia One of the most striking changes in the post-Stalin period was the decentralization of political and, to a degree, economic decision-making. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He could not predict with confidence which seats. A History of Modern Yemen
of Balahvar: A Christian Legend of the Buddha The First Russian Radical: Alexander Radishchev 1749—1802 (Published by George Allen & Unwin) The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchji, 16y8—1832 (Published by Columbia University Press) A MODERN HISTORY OF SOVIET GEORGIA DAVID MARSHALL LANG, M.A., D.Lit. Reader in Caucasian Studies in the GROVE PRESS, INC. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
I. I A MODERN HISTORY OP SOVIET GEORGIA Also by David Marshall Lang Lives and Legends of the Georgian Saints The W’isdori.z A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The first impression was one of whiteness—the delicate whiteness of new silver—made by the vast dry beds of the rivers. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Before the introduc- tion of Christianity, they wrote in the Greek and Iranian languages, using the Greek alphabet and also a variety of the Aramaic script. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Historical chronicles followed, collected together during the Middle Ages under the general title of Kartlis tskbovreba, or The Lift of Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The first was made up of the royal family, the senior member of which occupied the throne, while the second in rank administered justice and commanded the army. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Although the Bagratids claimed for prestige purposes to be descended from David and Solomon of Israel, they were in reality princes of Speri (Ispir), in the Upper Chorokhi valley north of Erzurum, and had a castle at the modern Bayburt. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
If slain by an individual of equal tank, the blood money payable in respect of a prince or archbishop of the first class amounted to 1,536 tomans, equivalent in King Vakhtang’s time to 15,360 silver rubles. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Tsar Paul, it is true, at first promised to guarantee certain privileges to King Giorgi and the Georgian royal family. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
During these first two years of Russian rule, the internal situation in Eastern Georgia left much to be desired. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This was the first of several spontaneous mass revolts against Russian rule. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The decade which followed Tsitsianov’s death was less spectacular than these first few years, in which Russian power had spread so rapidly through Transcaucasia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The general proposed first to conquer Erzurum and overrun the Armenian highlands; next, to launch a combined operation against Trebizond, with the support of the Russian Navy; and thirdly, to advance into the heart of Anatolla by way of Sivas. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
There were frequent contacts between the Georgian aristocracy and visitors from the outside world, both Russians and travellers from Western Europe. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This session was unexpectedly postponed, first to 9 December, then to 20 December. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The first militant leader of the Murids of Daghestan was the Imam Qazi Mullah, who issued in 1829 a general appeal in favour of a Holy War. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
To the petrified company, the Tsar declared: ‘Gentlemen, mark well that this is my first act of justice in Georgia; and it will not be my last.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Formation of the Caucasian Viceroj~altj Weary of all these muddling mediocrities, as the fuming Tsar regarded his long-suffering Caucasian generals, Nicholas decided at long last that the time had come to appoint a first- class man to take over both military and civil responsibility for the entire area. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 8z TSAR NICHOLAS AND VICEROY VORONT5OV: 1832—55 He was the first of Georgia’s governors to be officially invested with the viceregal title. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
But first Nicholas demanded of Vorontsov some spectacular military action against the insufferable rebels of the mountains. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This stimulated the Georgians to emulation. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The professional company’s first night took place on i January i 8~ i. Later on, it was able to stage its performances in the fine new theatre in Erivan Square, which held seven hundred spectators. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The first important engagement was in fact an attack on Kakheti by the Imam Shamil with io,ooo or more mountaineers in August i 8~ ~, but this was beaten off by a Russian force under Prince Argutinsky-Dolgorukov. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The first notable production of the new school in Georgian literature was the short novel Suramis tsikbe (Surami Castle) by Daniel Chonkadze (1830—60), who was the son of a poor priest who had himself begun life as a serf. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
For Gogebashvili, there could be no revival of self-respect among his fellow-countrymen without a revival of interest in the Georgian language. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A Georgian anarchist One of the first Georgian professional revolutionaries was the anarchist Varlam Cherkesov or Cherkezishvili62 (I 846—1925), a native of Kakheti. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Cherkesov favoured the anarchist creed because it promised greater freedom to small nations than did Marxist dictatorship and centralist rule. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
THE STORM GATHERS: 1894—1904 121 The Third Group The first systematic Georgian Marxists were a band of young intellectuals known as the Mesame Dasi (Third Group), which set out to supersede both the so-called First Group, the movement headed by lila Chavchavadze and his contemporaries, who had led the crusade against serfdom a generation before, and the liberal Second Group of Giorgi Tsereteli and Niko Nikoladze. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘I now realized for the first time that Russian socialism was a thoroughly utopian and reactionary movement, and that if it should ever be put into operation anywhere, we should be plunged back into barbarism.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Again, the Poles’ deep-rooted antagonism to Russian ways, language and religious dogma, more intense than anything Zhordania had seen in Georgia, made him see that ‘in subjugated countries there must first of all take place a political revolution; democracy must be estab- lished first, and only afterwards, by the furtherance of economic progress and by extensive organizational work, can we pro- ceed towards social revolution’. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Meanwhile Noe Zhordanja ended his studies at the semin- ary. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In December i 892, there took place at Zestafoni in Western Georgia the first meeting of the so-called Third Group, Out of which was to grow the Georgian Social-Democratic Partji. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Ninoshvili, whose real name was Egnate Ingoroqva, occupies an important place in Georgian literature and social thought, as the first truly ‘work- ing-class’ writer, in which respect he may be compared with Maxim Gorky in Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At that first gathering of the Mesame Dasi at Zestafoni in December 1892, the Narodnik element gained the upper hand. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Both of these trends arise from the stimulus of commercial and capitalistic enter- prise. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The core of our present-day life consists in economic growth, which in its turn has given birth to national unity as well as to social cleavage. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Sweated labour It may seem strange at first sight that a people so largely made up of peasants and mountain clansmen, with a small THE STORM GATHERS: 1894—1904 129 industry and a comparatively negligible and uneducated proletariat, should be attracted to Marxian socialism. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The first of May 1899, was celebrated by the first May Day demonstration to be held in the Caucasus. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
THE STORM GATHERS: 1894—1904 ‘37 ‘The workers of the whole of Russia,’ declared a revolutionary broadsheet of the time, ‘have decided to celebrate the First of May openly—in the best thoroughfares of the city. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Let us join bands, Georgians, Russians, Armenians; let us gather, raise the scarlet banner and celebrate our only holiday—the First of May!’73 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Lado Ketskhoveli pro- ceeded to Baku, the great oil-producing centre in Azerbaijan on the Caspian, and set up an illegal printing press on which he produced the first issues of Brd~ola (The Struggle), the organ of the Tbilisi Social-Democratic organization. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Ketskhoveli and his assistants printed A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 138 broadsheets addressed to the army, inciting the troops to mutiny—’which manifestoes,’ according to a gendarmerie re- port of the time, ‘were very widely circulated among the troops’.74 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In some cases, they would politely escort their former feudal master to the railway station and bundle him on to the next train for Thilisi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Russians reacted at first with mass arrests and repressions. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Noe Zhordania, who had just been released from custody and returned to his native Guria, was rearrested; Noe Khomeriki the agronomist, future Minister of Agriculture of independent Georgia, was also taken into custody. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The local Social-Democratic organization has renewed its criminal activity among the workers of the main railway depot, the printing works in the city of Thilisi, among the salesmen of various shops, in the Adelkhanov tannery and other factories. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Pending the viceroy’s arrival in Tbilisi, a special representative of the viceregal council, Privy Councillor Prince N. A. Sultan Krym-Girey, was sent to Guria to carry out a first-hand enquiry into the underlying causes of the disorders and to assure the population that the viceroy would make every attempt to redress their legitimate grievances. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It will be recalled that the Georgian Church, whose freedom had been guaranteed by Russia by solemn treaty, had been liquidated in i 8ii and absorbed by the St. Petersburg Synod. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Now times are different. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Whereas the Bolsheviks denounced the Tsar’s manifesto as a sham and declared a boycott of the Duma, the Mensheviks and other moderate socialists were inclined at first to think that their immediate aims were attained. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The year 1906 was marked on the one hand by reprisals against the demoralized remnants of the revolutionary move- ment, on the other, by preparations for the convocation of the ON BORROWED TIME: 1906-17 CHAPTER VIII intellectual ljfe up to 1917 ¶69 First Duma. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
When the First Duma assembled on 27 April/io May I9O~ at the Tauride Palace in St. Petersburg, the well-organized Georgian Social-Democratic faction under Zhordania’s leader- ship immediately assumed a dominant role in the left-wing opposition. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘The life of our people,’ he told the newspaper reporters, ‘has been turned into a hell. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Stolypin did everything possible to influence the Duma elections. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The result of this was the opposite from that intended by the régime. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The new Georgian deputies worthily filled the places of their proscribed comrades of the First Duma. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Back in St. Petersburg, the Tsar’s government was finding the Second Duma as intractable as the First. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
While the First and Second Dumas were in session, General Alikhanov and his punitive expeditions reduced the Georgian countryside to some semblance of obedience, although strikes and sporadic unrest continued throughout 1906 and 1907. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Thus, in Feb- ruary 1907, the poet Akaki Tsereteli was arrested and conducted to the Metekhi Prison in Tbilisi for publishing a lampoon making fun of the governor, Rausch von Traubenberg. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Russian Bolshevik party and its Georgian adherents adopted from the first a strongly anti-war line. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He found the Social-Democrats, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike, strongly Germanophile in mood and quite uninterested in the fate of the Western democracies. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
His first objective was the Russian raithead at Sari-Kamish. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Among his disciples were Ivane Javakhishvili, the first volumes of whose monumental but unfinished Historji of the Georgian People appeared at Tbilisi in 1913—14, and Akaki Shanidze, the leading gram- marian and expert on the history of the Georgian language. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The rise of the Georgian ku/ak, the life of the Georgian aristocratic intellectual and dilettante, and the impact on them both of the revolutionary upheavals of 1917 and 1921 have never been more successfully depicted than in the masterly novel by Mikheil Javakbishvili (1881—1937), Jaqos kbi~nebi (Jaqo’s Guests), first published in 1924—2 ~. With devastating realism and many humorous touches, Javakhishvili contrasts the swashbuckling Jaqo, swindler, seducer and false bon- homme, with his victim, Prince Teimuraz Khevistavi, the amiable and ineffectual philanthropist whom Jaqo robs of his fortune, his wife, and even of his sanity. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
First and foremost was the agrarian problem. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In May i 917, the first congress of delegates of the Caucasian army met in Tbilisi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
of flour and 36 million poods of corn, oats and barley annually, while the needs of the civilian population of Transcaucasia amounted to another ~ i million poods of grain— a total of iii million poods. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
96 The Constituent Assembly met for the first time on iz March 1919, and con- tinued in being until the Bolshevik invasion two years later. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Early in 1918, Georgia’s first regular university was opened in Tbilisi, thus realizing a dream cherished by generations of Georgian intellectuals but consistently frustrated by Russian obscurantism. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The ~Georgian Social-Democrats were at first undecided as to how to dispose of the vast holdings of land contained in the government pool, estimated at over ~ million acres of forest, a million acres of arable land, and 3 million of pasture land. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At first, however, the weather seemed set fair for the new Georgian state. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Such a programme, particularly the first item, was naturally un- acceptable to the Georgians. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the memoirs which he wrote years later, Zhordania contrasts the ‘genuinely noble, pro- foundly friendly and respectful’ manners of the German commander Kress von Kressenstein with the behaviour of the first British representative to arrive in Tbilisi—’like a sergeant- major, coarse, rude, imperious and masterful’.99 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Armen- ians were at first victorious and marched on Tbilisi itself, the large Armenian colony of which was subjected to many out- rages at the hands of the incensed Georgians. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The main threat from the Russian side appeared at first to derive less from Lenin and Trotsky’s Red Army than from the White Russian Volunteer Army of Alekseev and Denikin. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The British withdrawal The British military representatives in Georgia at first tended to identify themselves with Denikin’s neo-imperialist fantasies. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 226 Communist propaganda in Georgia Unaware of the secret clause providing for toleration of the Georgian Communist Party, the hard-pressed Georgian Bolsheviks were at first stunned by the news that Moscow had officially recognized the renegade Menshevik government of Zhordania. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
S. M. Kirov, a member of the Caucasian Bureau of the All-Russian Communist Party, was appointed the first Soviet Ambassador to Thilisi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian commander-in-chief, Kvinitadze, was at length obliged to admit that Tbilisi could hold out no longer. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Twenty years earlier, in the days of the old Mesame Dasi when Social-Democracy was first taking root in Georgia, young Jughashvill-Stalin had been the odd man out. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In accordance with Lenin’s directive, the Georgian Communist leaders tried at first to win over the 237 people by fair words. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Lenin was paralysed during the summer of 1922 by his first 241 stroke and had to delegate much of his authority to Stalin, now General Secretary of the Party. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At first the insurgents achieved considerable success. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Small- holdings operated on a primitive subsistence basis proved less productive than the larger, systematically cultivated estates which had existed prior to the 1917 Revolution. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
When the disturbances eventually died down, the net result of Georgia’s first collectivization drive was the creation by 1932 of some 3,400 kolkho~es, incorporating about 17,000 former peasant holdings, representing 36~4 per cent, of the national total. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Lavrenti Beria came of a poor Mingrelian peasant family living in the Sukhumi district of Abkhazia, near the Black Sea. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
By the time he was thirty-two, he had been Vice-president of the Cheka in Azerbaijan and Georgia, President of the Georgian GPU, and then President of the Caucasian State Police and chief representative of the OGPU in Transcaucasia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On 2 1—22 July 1935, he delivered to a meeting of the Tbilisi Party organization a lecture ‘On the history of the Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia’, in which Stalin is given almost exclusive credit for the success of the Caucasian revolutionary movement from i 900 onwards. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The lecture itself was several times republished in book form, each edition containing more adulatory praise of Stalin, and more vitriolic denunciation of Stalin’s rivals, many of whom Beria had himself tortured and shot. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
As in Russia itself, the holocaust in Georgia was carried to diabolical lengths. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A new First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, A. I. Mgeladze, was appointed, while the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Georg- ian Supreme Soviet were relieved of their posts. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The ousted First Secretary, Mgeladze, made an abject confession, declaring that charges of nationalist deviationism which he had levelled against high- ranking Georgian Bolsheviks were based on false evidence which he had forged from motives of personal ambition. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The post of First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party was filled in September 1953 by the election of a new man, Mr. Vasili P. Mzhavanadze, a former Lieutenant-General in the Red Army. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
91—2 Belgium, 182, 220 Beinsky, V. G., Russian critic, 63, 99, ‘I’ Bell, British traveller and adventurer, 73 Beria, L. P., Soviet Secret Police chief, 20, 252—64 Beritashvili, Professor Ivane, Georgian physiologist, 271 Berlin, 208, 215, 220, 259, 267; Congress of, 104 Berzhe, A. P., 45 Bessarabia, 82, 218 Bible, translated into Georgian, 20 Bicherakov, Colonel Lazar, 215 Black-Hundred gangs, 144, 155, i6i, 178 104, i8~, 203, 236, 253, 256—7 215—16, 222, 225, 229, 231, 219, 22 1—3, 226, 230—I, 235—6, INDEX Black Sea, 1,2, ~, 6, 25, 29, 32, 47, 52, 55, 57—8, 6,, 71, 73—5, 79, 82—3, 92, 97—8, 288 105, 125, 130, 139, 155, 183—5, 206—8, 218, 222, 224, 230, 233—5, 252—3, 256 Blood money, 30—I Bloody Sunday, 148—9 Bobruisk, 8o Bodbe, 12 Bolsheviks, 14, 136, 147—8, 154, 156, i6o—i, 164—5, 174, 176—7, 182, 194ff. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Borchalo, 6, 36, 6o, 216, 249 Bori,25 Borodino, battle of, 57 Borzhomi, 271 Bosphorus, 3 Brest-Utovsk, Peace of, 198, 202—4 Britain, British, see England British Museum, 128 Brosset, M. -F., A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
00-029266 ISBN 0 521 79092 I hardback ISBN 0 521 79482 x paperback First published 2000 Dresch, Paul. A History of Modern Yemen
Both Yemens were at the centre of Arab poli- tics in the 1960s, and the South then became the Arab World’s only Marxist state; the North was the site of intense Saudi interest. A History of Modern Yemen
When I first began work in the North, however, there were maybe six Arabic books on the modern period one really had to read and now there are hundreds, of which many are excellent and nearly all are of real interest. A History of Modern Yemen
Sometimes reckoned to include the Walidi Sultanate, adjacent to Bayh~n and ‘Awlaql Federal Guard backed coalition of nationalists in South Yemen, 1966—7 Federal Regular Army gross national product North Yemeni state institution to displace party politics. A History of Modern Yemen
Most political language at first was couched in Islamic terms, and its forms were various. A History of Modern Yemen
Later Zaych writers said the first and more famous of these, the FaqTh Sa’id, claimed to be the Awaited Mahdi — a sure sign of impiety or madness — and a Zaydi Imam of the day had him executed, while twenty years later “Sufi sorcerers”, again in the ZaydT view, had Raymah and Anis up in arms. A History of Modern Yemen
The Turks’ second move to the highlands, unlike their first, won effective support locally.4 A History of Modern Yemen
Yemen, like Scotland or Ireland, has often exported population, and in Islam’s first centuries Yemeni names spread through much of the known world with the result that there are “Yemenis” real or imagined in many places across Africa and Eurasia. A History of Modern Yemen
Their venture in the north- ern parts of Yemen was launched in AD 896 around Sa’dah by the first Imam, al-Hadi, and on occasion they had ruled enormous areas, Imams being properly men of the sword as well as of the book and righteous- ness: the Qasimis in the seventeenth century had briefly held most of Yemen (even Hadramawt for some years), and certain earlier Imams less enamoured of state forms had also been conquerors. A History of Modern Yemen
Qahtan took it all From Ma’sal to the coast of Aden.38 A History of Modern Yemen
But generally they exacted a degree of respect and they refused to have their women marry non-sayyids, a principle which was challenged first in 1905 among Hadramls in Singapore. A History of Modern Yemen
Al-’U~aymat and ‘Idhar, two Hashid tribes in the region near Shaharah where Yahya first claimed the Imamate in 1904, were left alone after swearing their nominal allegiance. A History of Modern Yemen
The pattern throughout was of negotiation, blandishments and severity of a kind hard to summarise, for Yahyd and the British: 1918—1948 29 30 A history of modern Yemen one shaykh was used against another, one tribe against another, amid shifting complexities which the language of jihãd obscures. A History of Modern Yemen
A Yemeni historian does justice to the novelty: The army was divided into numbered tdbürs, or “detachments”, so the first was called the first tãbir, the second called the second tdbur, and so on. A History of Modern Yemen
The number of regu- lars rose to 15—20,000. A History of Modern Yemen
It was this which Ahmad had been “setting in order”, constraining the shaykhs and dismantling IdrIsi influence exactly where disputes with the Turks in the nineteenth century first launched the Imam’s family, Bayt Hamid al-Din, to power.’2 A History of Modern Yemen
When the Saudis — or Wahhabis as Yemenis saw them, and perhaps most still saw them- selves — enquired about borders, in 1927, Ya~ya declined to discuss the issue: The land of ‘Asir is indivisibly part of Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
Hostages were taken from a1-~ali’. A History of Modern Yemen
To replace British—Indian troops the Aden Levies were raised; in 1934 the first political officer was appointed, small forces of Tribal Guards were raised, and then another force of 200 men, the Government Guards, was established in 1937 to escort the Political Officer. A History of Modern Yemen
First he received a letter, postmarked Singapore, from Muliammad bin ‘Aqil (a learned, much-travelled Haçlrami millionaire) and a poem from Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rakiman al- Saqqaf, mufiiof the I~Iacjrami lands as the Zaydi account calls him. A History of Modern Yemen
The Kathiri state, centred on the WadI near Sayyun and with no coastal towns, hence no customs dues, was bank-rolled in effect by Sayyid BU Bakr al-Kaf whose personal expenditure on charitable works was huge: his wealth came from Singapore, where his fortune was estimated at ~25 million. A History of Modern Yemen
Tahyã and the British: 1918—1948 43 THE DYNASTIC STATE al-WasiCi’s famous History of Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
The second edition (1948) refers to His Majesty without comment as if “people of good taste” (Zaydi scholars of a certain bent) had not existed. A History of Modern Yemen
The style of his administration, however, hardly changed at first. A History of Modern Yemen
But the Imam and the First Secretary remain sometimes until the early dawn. A History of Modern Yemen
But by now the Imam’s health was failing (he was 64 years old) and the demands of the state had perhaps also grown more complex, for although Coon failed to grasp this, an attempt was being made to delegate: “The complainants coming to us from all directions have increased, to the point where it takes up all the time we have. A History of Modern Yemen
We have now forbidden any complainant coming from anywhere with an ~dmil or Mkim [a governor or judge] unless they have first put their complaint to the ‘ãmil or ~zãkim of the area.”42 A History of Modern Yemen
At home there was insufficient land, taxes were heavy, and “justice” was meanwhile admin- istered by soldiers who charged their victims for the privilege of arrest or imprisonment. A History of Modern Yemen
A later literature depicts “movements” on the model of politi- cal parties,48 and this is where one first hears of such figures as Muic al- Dammaj, cAbd al-Salam Sabrah and cAbd al-Rakiman al-Iryani, but the real significance of their networks is as markers of a widespread mood. A History of Modern Yemen
The second edition (1948) reverses the order: the ethnology comes first, the events year by year come second, and it gives more space to the country’s pre-Islamic roots, even listing the I~Iimyarite alphabet. A History of Modern Yemen
According to one story, al-Daylaml ceased attending Friday prayers.55 A History of Modern Yemen
Abmad Nucman (a nephew of the landowner cAbd al-Wahhab), born 1909 and educated at Zabid in traditional form by ShafiCi teachers, helped set up a “modern school” at Dhubhan in Hugariyyah, just south of Tacizz: “This school became widely famous for it was the first to teach modern sciences such as geography, arithmetic. A History of Modern Yemen
Nu’man and Zubayrl in Cairo formed a group called al-Katfbat al-ilã (“the First Battalion”), a name suggesting links with the Muslim Brothers, and when Zubayrl returned to Yemen, in 1941, full of ideas of progress as much as Islamic justice, he presented a memorial entitled in traditionalist form, “The First Programme of Young Men for Enjoining the Good and Prohibiting Evil”. A History of Modern Yemen
In 1926, for instance, with the Italian delegation, the first ever aircraft had appeared in the skies of Sanaa. A History of Modern Yemen
But Aden (ruled from India until 1937) offered little at first for most Yemenis except the chance to earn money under rough conditions. A History of Modern Yemen
The headmaster of the first Arab secondary school in Aden, Muhammad Luqman, was a leading reformer; raising money abroad from Arab rulers to send students to Baghdad and Cairo. A History of Modern Yemen
When Kennedy Trevaskis arrived in Aden in 1951 the issue of the day was a move to East African shillings from Indian rupees; a dozen years later when, as governor, Trevaskis had a grenade thrown at him, Yemen’s older politics had all unravelled.’ A History of Modern Yemen
Prejudice focused first on migrants from the North but then, more intensely, on Indians, and “Aden for the Adenis” (1949—50) was an early manifestation of bitter disputes overjobs and influence which increased through the 19505 as the port expanded, CHAPTER THREE A new form of politics: the 19505 CHANGES IN THE SOUTH 58 the migrant population grew, and the British introduced reforms. A History of Modern Yemen
and for the first time the Kathiri State faces the future with a well balanced budget. A History of Modern Yemen
It is regrettable that the year saw the first strikes in the Hadramawt; one in Mukalla in protest against the report of the Anglo-American Commission on Palestine, and the other in Sayyun against new taxation.3 A History of Modern Yemen
Bayhan, for instance, prior to 1943 had been in a state of anarchy and disruption which defies descrip- tion. A History of Modern Yemen
In September 1944, for instance, the monthly revenue. A History of Modern Yemen
one of the first things it acquired, in the period of the late Imam Yahya, was a govern- mental system with the formation of ministries, a council of ministers, the system of [having] a Crown Prince, a Royal diwãn, and the establishment of modern schools... A History of Modern Yemen
Court affairs account for what occurred far more than does theology Before he was Imam, Ahmad had razed the tomb of Ibn ‘Alwän near Ta’izz. A History of Modern Yemen
Others reached Cairo by them- selves.3’ A History of Modern Yemen
1956 saw seventy strikes which “produced the first warnings of what repercussions might arise from conditions prevailing in the Middle East generally”,34 and at the end of that year Britain invaded Suez, forfeiting what standing it retained in the Arab World. A History of Modern Yemen
They demanded self-rule within the Commonwealth, and when elected seats were first provided on Aden’s Figure 3.1. A History of Modern Yemen
“~ The reason, he claimed, was the success of the La~j cotton scheme. A History of Modern Yemen
Now the logic was reversed: “while the Abyan project, which was supervised by imperialism, was collapsing and deteriorating, the agricultural project of Lahj, which is supervised by the people of Lahj, was increasing in strength and prosperity;. A History of Modern Yemen
In early 1956 Nu’mAn’s and Zubayrl’s names appeared on a pamph- let printed first in Aden, “The Demands of the People” (ma~ãlib al-sha Cb): “Poverty has driven hundreds of thousands abroad. A History of Modern Yemen
Most important was the arrival through 1959, from America and Russia, of wheat as famine aid:68 there was no longer reason for mass starvation — perhaps for the first time in Yemen’s history. A History of Modern Yemen
Around the American camp at Ta’izz formed the first organised left-wing movement in the North, a union established by the MAN, the Movement of Arab Nationalists. A History of Modern Yemen
This union of Aden and hinterland was to come into force in 1963. A History of Modern Yemen
In February 1963, in Sanaa, the first conference was held of the Aden branch of the MAN (Movement of Arab Nationalists), and a second meeting, inJune, announced the formation of the NLF (National Liberation Front) which also was headed by al-Sha’bi. A History of Modern Yemen
Wheat shipments established before the war continued (8—io,ooo tons per year at first), and, apart from the flood of rifles and money from competing powers, the Egyptian presence transformed certain sectors of economic life. A History of Modern Yemen
A class of salaried urban bureaucrats emerged: about 4,ooo in the first year. A History of Modern Yemen
It was here that the MAN established the first workers’ union in the North, the year before Imam Abmad’s death, and in June 1963 a General Union of Workers appeared there with lesser branches in Iludaydah and Sanaa.’6 A History of Modern Yemen
“The fighting was not as it had been in the first days of the war, a question of life or death. A History of Modern Yemen
The first book published under the Republic was probably Ibn al-Amir and HisAge (1964) by Qasim Ghälib Abmad, who had once been a Shafi~i preacher in Aden and was several times Minister of Education. A History of Modern Yemen
The second edition of Sharaf al-Din’s Yemen Throughout History, con- tinuing the nationalist approach first encouraged by Imam Yahya, appeared at about the same time as Qasim Ghalib’s first book. A History of Modern Yemen
A Kuwaiti maga- zine at the turn of 1965—6 published four illustrated pieces on Haçlramawt.55 A History of Modern Yemen
Little thought was given to making Tadizz the capital as it had been in Abmad’s time: a meeting there proved abortive, and ideology and practical connections alike soon drew apart two separate governments. A History of Modern Yemen
The North’s achievement in the eyes of its rulers was simply to have expelled Bayt Hamid al-Din, the Imam’s family. A History of Modern Yemen
Iryani’s most intransigent problem, however, was what passed as a state apparatus: “I see it as essential [he had said in 1969] that a complete administrative revolution be announced, aiming first to control administrative corruption and chaos and wanton misuse of the state’s resources and powers.” A History of Modern Yemen
Some resented the imposition of Shaykhs at the expense of village organisations; others, often shaykhs themselves, resented govern- ment co-opting them; most, of widely differing views, preferred auton- omy to state involvement, and in the co-operative elections of 1975 — the first national elections ever held in the North — Hamdi supporters did badly. A History of Modern Yemen
“Ibrahim” was the first of Yemen’s leaders to master mass politics. A History of Modern Yemen
Such financial activity did not feel oppressive in a period of expansion, but the world seemed to some to have been turned upside down: “At night Ibb used to glow with the lights of evening qat sessions at which books were read and questions of history and religion discussed. A History of Modern Yemen
The “Sanaani” style of intricate melodic lute-runs, which some attribute to mediaeval Andalusia, had since spread as far afield as the Gulf.33 A History of Modern Yemen
First in the imagination, then in practice, an economy took form,37 and sta- tistical yearbooks expressed what Peterson calls “the search for a modern state”, a project as important and as little debated as establishing a Kingdom fifty years before. A History of Modern Yemen
In the South, state control of property (1969—73) discouraged remit- tances at first, and at the Aden refinery everyone sent abroad for train- ing between 1967 and 1974 simply stayed abroad.39 A History of Modern Yemen
The Chinese built a road from Aden to Iladramawt; more than 90 new wells per annum were sunk in the 1970s, and fisheries and canning were expanded along the coast. A History of Modern Yemen
Aden’s population in 1977 was thought to be somewhat over 270,000, dwarfing Yemen’s other cities and dominating the Southern countryside; by 1980 it was somewhere near 300,000. A History of Modern Yemen
These are historical writers on whom almost everyone agreed as distinctively part of Yemen’s heritage, and foremost was Hamdani, “the tongue of Yemen” who had lived in the tenth century, a contemporary and opponent of the first Imams. A History of Modern Yemen
In what sense ‘Umärah (d. A History of Modern Yemen
He had grown up with his stepfather ~a1iki (full-brother of his deceased father) and placed his trust first of all in his own half-brother, ~A1I Salih, whom he posted to Hizyaz, “the gate of Sanhan”. A History of Modern Yemen
The president’s position was insecure, for Lower Yemen was at times a war-zone, in Upper Yemen tribal leaders all had their conflicting aims, and subterranean party rivalries connected both these domains with Sanaa and with each other. A History of Modern Yemen
Muhammad al-Sufl of Khawlan, for instance, went to mediate with the NDF and was greeted by Muhammad al-IIaddi of Damt, near the North—South border. A History of Modern Yemen
My mission is what you requested, And the choice is entirely yours.7 A History of Modern Yemen
The phrase had been used by those who overthrew Imam Ya~ya in 1948, by the NLF in 1965, and indeed more widely. A History of Modern Yemen
“Building an enlightened, powerful, democratic, central state” was the first step sought, and “real- ising the principle of participation at local level” came second. A History of Modern Yemen
After the oil-price rises of 1973—4, the OECD countries — North America, Japan, Western Europe — had gained control of “recycling” OPEC revenues (OPEC’s trade balance went from a $67 billion surplus to a $2 billion deficit in the first four years) and Yemen was peripherally part of this. A History of Modern Yemen
With the promise, which emerged at this stage, of its own small oil revenues (the first find of oil and gas was in March 1984), North Yemen saw the structures of its internal politics turned inside out. A History of Modern Yemen
This was the first time since 1934 that borders had been at issue between the Saudis and the North. A History of Modern Yemen
For the first time since the late 1960s, North and South Yemen were potentially on the same side. A History of Modern Yemen
Sheila Carapico’s Sanaani friends provide an insight. A History of Modern Yemen
Some $200 million, for instance, was lent by Europe in 1986, and a $200 million loan was secured from Arab banks in 1987 to finance oil imports while Yemen’s own oil production was developed. A History of Modern Yemen
Public media depicted first the spectacle. A History of Modern Yemen
Private enterprise took up the theme, and T- shirts appeared with pictures of Shamsan and Nuqum, the mountains beside Aden and Sanaa, crowned with the slogan “Long live United Yemen”. A History of Modern Yemen
The GPC faced little problem with pluralism, for it acquired the habit of simply duplicating groups that claimed an independent view: a “National Conference” which emerged in 1992, for instance, was promptly matched by a “Conference of Parties” and a counterfeit Nasirist party was established also. A History of Modern Yemen
Less conspicuously, at local level, people often hedged their bets and acquired several party cards. A History of Modern Yemen
The feeling that something was deeply wrong with the polity was widespread, fuelled by the riyal’s decline. A History of Modern Yemen
The categories of the time (for instance, “the cAl! Nasir bloc”) proved, as often they do, misleading. A History of Modern Yemen
But the highest estimate by either side of their numbers was 5,000. A History of Modern Yemen
Opportunities for small investors were offered in a scheme to expand Yemen’s fisheries; a chain of Islamic groceries existed; and Detalle speaks of the Islamists’ “attempt to set up their own economic network which would coexist with that of the President’s friends”, a pattern which had also been looked for in 1990 when I~Iaç1raml traders first encountered Sanaa’s economy. A History of Modern Yemen
While the riyal was let float against the US dollar only in June 1996, treasury bills had been issued six months earlier and behaved as one would expect of financial markets elsewhere: the rates paid at first were very high (close to 30 per cent per annum) and then dropped in the course of a year to 14 per cent as the deficit in the government’s budget came down and liquidity was absorbed into state accounts. A History of Modern Yemen
Ordinary Yemenis, with their fields and their little shops, simply do not have access to much of the national wealth. A History of Modern Yemen
Treaty between Imam Yahya and the Ottomans. A History of Modern Yemen
Yahya’s treaty with Italy. A History of Modern Yemen
First nationwide elections in the North. A History of Modern Yemen
3 For the story behind Aden’s occupation, see the excellent first chapter of Gavin 1975. A History of Modern Yemen
A qadah is about a bushel. A History of Modern Yemen
When the British in Aden raised the 1st Yemen Infantry at the end of World War I they were surprised to find Shafi’s and Zaydi soldiers would happily pray together, which Sunnis and Shicites in India never would (Jacob 1923 273). A History of Modern Yemen
7, 9. A History of Modern Yemen
For a better account from the late 193os, Scott 1942: 163—77. A History of Modern Yemen
For the call to prayer, below, al- Akwa’ 1987: 383—5. A History of Modern Yemen
‘Izz al- Din (1989) provides a sketch of the Western Protectorate in the early I940s, when he himself was a political officer and the process of reform first gath- ered pace. A History of Modern Yemen
That this one is from AI~mad is sug- gested by hostile mention of ‘Abdullah al-Hakimi, a Free Yemeni based first in Cardiff. A History of Modern Yemen
63 Sanaa Radio, 13 August 1959, SWB. A History of Modern Yemen
For brief accounts of him, Sarüri 1987: 88;Janabi 1992: 231—2. A History of Modern Yemen
Dayyan and CAbd Rabbihi 1992; Traboulsi 1991: 133. A History of Modern Yemen
The new Secretary of State for Colonies visited in December 1964. A History of Modern Yemen
Speech to the first session of the National Council, March ig6g, quoted14 cUmar 1970: 154. A History of Modern Yemen
At first, however, the Command Council was entirely military 23 Qaba’il 1974: 5. A History of Modern Yemen
For al-Hajri, Burrowes 1987: 44—7; Gause 1990: 105. A History of Modern Yemen
Elections to the Consultative Council were held in19 July: the GPC elections ended in December. A History of Modern Yemen
For the South, below, Lackner51 ig8~: 123. A History of Modern Yemen
(eds.) A History of Modern Yemen
al~cAyni, Mubsin. A History of Modern Yemen
1989 Wathd’iq al-nadwah al- Ba Wazir, Sadid. A History of Modern Yemen
al-Shatiri, Muhammad. A History of Modern Yemen
[B] 91-36450 Manufactured in the United States of America Book design by Oksana Kushnir 24689753 First Edition Set in Times Roman cm. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE STORY OF JORDE 2. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
DUEL TO THE DEATH 15. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Everything had to be put down— family, relatives, contacts, friends, lovers, schools, jobs, social situ- ation, every single detail from birth to the moment of recruitment. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Within days Jorde had signed on, been given a code name and a mattress on the first floor of the building, and written a twenty- seven-page life story in which, to make himself sound important, he told a lot of fibs. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
She confided that she worked for a secret outfit that she called the Council, but she warned him not to get involved. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He stripped down to his underpants. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A couple of hours later, when they were allowed back, Jorde noticed that the hole had been filled in. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Back in the flat on Umar al-Mukhtar Street, Au asked Jorde for the films and soap powder he had carried in for him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In fact there were no Libyan stamps in it at all. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Ask for a three-day transit visa. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Thank you very much,” Jorde said in Arabic. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Harb gave him an expensive Nikon camera with a zoom uens The first assignments were relatively easy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
You’ve wasted your whole trip.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Indeed, Abu Nidal’s first operation, even before his split from Fatah, had been an assault on the Saudi embassy in Paris, in September 1973, in which two Saudi diplomats had been taken hostage. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His view was that since they contributed vast sums to the PLO, he too should have his share. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He would have shadowy partners in Thailand, although he could only guess at their identity and location. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It reveals as much about the workings of the PLO as it does about Hamza himself. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
One day, hearing a rumor that General Ariel Sharon, to them the devil incarnate, was due in town, they determined to assassinate him and set up a watch ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 37 38 / PATRICK SEALE for this purpose at the Israeli embassy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was born in the Wahdat camp in 1963 and spent his first From two internal PLO memoranda given me by Abu lyad’s In July 1982, he crossed illegally from Jordan into Syria in order to enroll with Fatah, but the Syrians arrested him at the border. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestine,” the public sym- bol of Palestinian aspirations, his closest colleagues, Abu lyad, the intelligence chief, and the military chief, Abu Jihad, ran their own autonomous outfits with their own loyalists, much as barons might I will always remember the remarkable sight of George Ha- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 41 42 / PATRICK SEALE do under a medieval king. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
like me to make. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I should have killed him fifteen years ago. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
By his first wife, he had had eleven ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 57 58 / PATRICK SEALE World War). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A Jewish attempt in 1935 to smuggle weapons through Jaffa port was one of the first incidents that roused the Arabs to What happened in Palestine in 1947-48 is one of the most In the 1930s many a Palestinian child, like the young Sabri ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 59 60 / PATRICK SEALE take up arms against the Jews and their British protectors. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hostility between Arab and Jew, in Abu Nidal’s youth, was an inescapable fact of daily life. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His mentally ill son Talal From a profound sense of grievance, an obsession with re- The Ba’ath in Jordan was an offshoot, in fact the first such ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 63 PATRICK SEALE / succeeded him but was soon deposed as unfit to rule. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
offshoot in the Arab world, of the mother party that two Syrian schoolmasters had founded in Damascus in the late 1940s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
By 1959 the two partners had managed to open a shop on al-Wazir Street, in the Saudi capital. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The only possible destination was Amman, where Pales- tinian guerrillas were preparing to fight an enemy whose forward positions had now reached the Jordan River. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal dared say things for which Abu lyad and other Fatah leaders had a sneaking sympathy—notably, that Arafat was a dictator who was inclined to rush into impulsive decisions without first consult- ing his colleagues. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was Abu Nidal’s first proper job for the Palestinian cause and a spur to his ambition. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE STRATEGY OF TERROR A history of recurrent defeat forced Palestinian leaders, Abu Nidal among them, to think hard about the strategy of armed struggle— the attempt to send guerrillas on sabotage missions inside Israeli territory—which they adopted with blithe amateurishness in the mid-1960s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The first occurred in March, when an Israeli armored force of 15,000 men, with air support, crossed the river and attacked Fatah’s guerrilla base, at Karameh in Jordan, with overwhelming strength. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This was the first terrorist operation of its kind, the prototype for many others to come, and its mastermind was Wadi Haddad, a Palestinian revolutionary from Safad who had graduated as a medi- cal doctor from the American University of Beirut. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Had the first hijacked plane not been Israeli, such piracy might have been rejected by the Palestinians themselves from the very beginning. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After this first “success,” Wadi Haddad went on to hijack planes of other nations and to establish relations with European and Japanese terrorist groups. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was there by February, in time to witness one of the first serious clashes between the guerrillas and the army, and it profoundly affected him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Women, children, and non-Israelis on board were soon freed, but to Israel’s rage, the remaining twelve Israeli men among the passengers were held for thirty-nine days and were only released in exchange for fifteen Palestinians detained in Israeli jails. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Excited by the precedent of Aden, where armed irregu- lars affiliated with MAN had forced the British out, then routed their local rivals and seized power, some guerrillas believed that power in Jordan, too, was theirs for the taking. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
bly with Abd al-Khaliq Samirra’i, the man who had promised them that Iraqi troops would intervene on their behalf and who was understandably embarrassed because the promise had not been kept. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal had already emerged as a leading radical at Fatah’s Third Congress, the first big Palestinian postmortem on events in Jordan, which was held late in 1971 at Hammuriya, in the leafy outskirts of Damascus, some six months before Black September first made itself known when it hijacked the Sabena flight from Vienna to Tel Aviv. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal was the most vocal exponent of these ideas. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Fatah was used to being racked by fierce disputes over policy and also over what were known, in the jargon, as “organizational questions,” in other words disputes over how power was to be exercised. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Mustafa must have alerted the Jordanians first, because Abu Dawud was arrested on his way back from seeing him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The king himself came to my prison cell and told me I was free.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ABU NIDAL’S FIRST TERRORIST ACT This operation was Abu Nidal’s first act of terror, planned and directed by him from Baghdad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
June--July 1974, adopted after much heated debate a ten-point political program that accepted the principle that the PLO should set up a “national authority” on any “liberated” territory. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At the appropriate moment, Abu lyad tipped off the Moroccan police and the team was rounded up, having served its purpose. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Fatah insiders knew that Abu Nidal was the agent and Iraq the sponsor. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the October War of 1973 introduced an altogether more important subject of controversy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Once again, he was signaling his readiness to negotiate a political settlement with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In support of his accusations, he published the resolutions of Fatah’s Third Congress, which Arafat had forced through. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
To give Abu Nidal every chance to clear his name and return to the Fatah fold, Abu Iyad diplomatically wrote out the questions to be put to him—and the answers expected from him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad recounted to me that when he first spoke to the gunmen from the control tower, they were violent and abusive, but he was gradually able to influence each one of them in turn, including their leader, who called himself Tony. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He then contacted the head of Libyan intelligence at the time, Abd al-Mun’im al-Huni, and he too approved the plan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Fatah may also have felt the need to clip the wings of a rival organization that was becoming a significant force in Lebanon, an especially sensitive theater of operations for Fatah. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
President Sadat of Egypt appealed to Abu lyad for help in negotiating with the gunmen and sent a plane to take him to Tunis. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
businessman, and for the first year of his stay the Polish authorities did not know who he was. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
in Iraq. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His cover was a Warsaw-based company called SAS, which had branches in East Berlin and London and through which he traded with Polish state companies. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At the same Calling himself Dr. Sa’id, Abu Nidal posed as an international Abu Nidal’s relationship with Poland dated back to contacts He had settled in Poland in 1981 because he no longer felt safe ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 119 120 / PATRICK SEALE time, Iraqi intelligence started monitoring conversations at Abu Nidal’s Baghdad offices, forcing him and his colleagues to go to the Ramadi training camp, outside Baghdad, when they wished to escape this irksome surveillance. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In July, the Madrid office of Alia, the Jordanian airline, was machine-gunned, and in Ankara, the first secretary of the Jordanian embassy was shot dead. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Assad’s view was that only a solid Arab front, which included Syria, could have any chance of making Israel yield. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They merely let fall suggestions, leaving the rest up to him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In December, the Jordanian counselor in Bucharest was shot dead. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Assad had fought the 1973 October War together with Sadat in the hope of loosening Israel’s hold over the occupied territories and forcing it to the conference table. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Three Fatah At first, this had to be done in small numbers and with very Israel’s second invasion of Lebanon, of June 1982, was a great ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 131 132 / PATRICK SEALE colonels—Abu Musa, Abu Salih, and Abu Khalid al-Amli—had been outraged by Arafat’s decision to evacuate Beirut in September 1982 rather than carry on the fight against Israel, and they resented the protection he had given to a number of cowardly officers who had failed the test of battle. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A MEETING OF MINDS In May 1984, accompanied by the faithful Isa, Abu Nidal traveled from Warsaw to Tripoli, the Libyan capital, for his first encounter with Qaddafi. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
MURDER OF THE MODERATES As I charted Abu Nidal’s career in Iraq and his subsequent moves to Syria and Libya, he seemed to me at first a classic case of a Palestinian faction leader who, in search of safe haven, had turned mercenary, and then, in search of financial independence, had turned gangster. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
What view did they have of Abu Nidal and his organization? I heard two quite different explanations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Whatever jobs he might have done for Arab sponsors, and they had been numerous and nasty, he had done many other jobs from which Israel alone appeared to “benefit.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
over the next five years, killed the most thoughtful and persuasive Palestinian spokesmen in the West. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hammami’s murder, a meeting was held in London to honor him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But no one, so far as I know, has ever denied that he worked for the Mossad or that his lengthy account, in the first part of the book, of his recruitment and training is anything but authentic. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1969, Sartawi broke from Fatah and set up a group that he called the Action Committee for the Liberation of Palestine, with funding first from Iraq and then from Egypt, which led some Pales- tinians to believe that he had sold out to Arab intelligence services. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But as it was too late to see anyone that day, he had gone to take a sauna in the health club before wandering upstairs to the café on the first floor. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Rather than sit at a corner table as I usually do, I sat at the first empty table I could see. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His first shot went through my hand. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was an attempted murder rather than a murder, and it did not involve a dove. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Committee, Dr. Ghassan is a lean, dark chain-smoker of maniacal From defectors and other sources, I have been able to identify All this activity generates a great deal of paper—most of it The present head of the Secretariat is none other than Sulai- Based in Lebanon with the title of first secretary of the Central ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / i~i IC~I’ ~ q;~ IIINIIIN i~l~ ~ ~ .~LiI~ Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Dr. Ghassan was born in the West Bank village of Silwan in 1946. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Salem, one of the chosen few, the four or five people able to paint a complete picture of the organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He had been close to Abu Nidal ever since they had first met in Jordan in the 1960s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hailing from the village of Amin, near Jenin in the West Bank, he was consumed, like many Palestinians of similar To an outside observer, there seemed to be periods when the This directorate was the object of Abu Nidal’s special atten- At the beginning, when the directorate was first founded, in When the organization planned to move to Syria in the early Although physically ugly, unshaven, and shabbily dressed, Isa But Isa was restless. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“It was work all the time,” the source said. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the first phase, in the mid-1970s, groups of students were enlisted and sent to Yugoslavia, Spain, Britain, Tur- key, and Pakistan, the main centers at the time for his concentrated instruction. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Here is a scholarship to Poland or East Ger- The first of these committees was the important one, because Some students joined Abu Nidal because they needed money; ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 191 192 / PATRICK SEALE many!” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was born on March 15, 1946, in the Palestinian village of Umm al-Fahm, which was overrun by the Israelis in 1948. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal took to him and pushed him up the ladder, securing his election to the Central Committee in 1986 and then, in the teeth of opposition from the rest of the leadership, to the Political Bureau itself. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
of an existing member, but once in his job, a new member is forbid- den to have any contact whatsoever with the cadre who first recom- mended him for membership. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
(Its name is the same as the PLO’s magazine, another example of Abu Nidal’s wish to pre- sent himself as a rival and alternative to Yasser Arafat’s move- ment.) Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The first dealt with the organization’s spending on a day-to-day basis; the second managed funds, kept an eye on companies owned or partly owned by the organization, traded in arms and other commodities, col- lected commissions due on middleman activities. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Dirar defected first to West Germany and then to the United States, spilling the beans to the CIA about Abu Nidal’s investment and trading network. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
(SAS stood for the first letters of the names of three members of the Finance Directorate: Samir Najm al-Din himself Adnan al-Kaylani; and Shakir Farhan—the last name an alias for Atif Hammuda.) Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His first real acquisitions were Fatah’s assets in Iraq, valued at some $4 million, which the Iraqis handed over to him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the 1980s, two men were largely responsible for the foreign A second important overseas manager was Samir Najm al-Din Samir Najm al-Din was a Palestinian from Iraq with a head for When Abu Nidal first thought of branching out on his own in ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 203 204 / PATRICK SEALE He made a lot of money from blackmail and extortion, adding substantially to his assets. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Ghassan al-Au), first secretary of the Central Committee and head of the Secretariat; Mustafa Awad (Alaa), head of the Intelligence Directorate; and Mustafa Ibrahim Sanduqa (Khaldun), boss of the Justice Commit- tee. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Mraish their man and wanted his killer. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Ma’mun Mraish. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Yet he has not thrown a stone in the occupied territories, either before or during the int~fada. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
revives a U.S.-Israel agreement on strategic cooperation (first concluded in 1981, suspended when Israel annexed the Golan Heights, but activated in 1982 by Alexander Haig), giving Israel wide opportunities to influence U.S. Middle East policy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
*November 29, 1984-The British Airways office in Bei- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 235 PATRICK SEALE / rut is bombed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
secretary of state George Shultz December—January 1983—84—American war planes and December 4, 1983—Eight more U.S. Marines are killed in January 26, 1984—In his state of the union address, Ro- February 29, 1984-The Israel-Lebanon accord of May ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 233 234 / PATRICK SEALE 17, 1983, is abrogated. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1985, some months before the Heathrow incident, Hai- dar had recommended Hindawi to Syrian intelligence as a London- based free-lance writer and opponent of the Jordanian regime who might come in useful in the campaign Syria was then waging against Jordan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His first move, following the Karachi raid, was to instruct his intelligence chief, Abd al-Rahman Isa, to remove the organization’s archives and other important documentary material to Libya. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was the minute-taker of the Intelligence Directorate, which meant that he kept the archives and the secret maps of overseas arms caches. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Now, at the very time when the weapons were dug out and handed over to the Syrians, Bajis decided to defect to Syria—with his father, brother (both also members of the organization), and no fewer than fifteen other members of his family. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Two couples and four children were found on board. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The ship was towed into Tripoli and its crew taken prisoner. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Several meetings took place between Abu Nidal’s members and DST offi- cers in the early 1980s, first in countries bordering on France, then in France itself. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Despite his efforts to court them, the Iranians believed that he was still tied to Iraqi intelligence, which had helped set him up in the first place. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Iran and its friends had no hand in the City of Poros affair, and indeed Tehran was one of the first capitals to denounce the operation. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
By 1986—87, beatings and torture in the organi- zation’s prisons had become routine. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
According to eyewitnesses, interrogators seemed hardly concerned to discover the truth about detainees or to investigate their background. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Twoscore and more, including women and university students, were kidnapped in Syria in the l980s, smuggled out to Lebanon, and butchered in the Badawi refugee camp, in the north of the country. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Sentences were passed on the basis of confessions, and condemned men would be shot at night and buried in the woods. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At first Badran left a widow and nine children in the village of Dum- • Ibrahim al-Abd, an able cadre of the Finance Directorate • Muhammad Khair (code name Nur Muharib), a member of ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 291 292 / PATRICK SEALE the Political Directorate’s Political Relations Committee, was an- other victim of Abu Nidal’s paranoia. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nizar and Abd al-Rahman Isa had lived and worked in Syria and were on close terms with General Muhammad al-Khuly, of air force intelligence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was, he said, a long, sometimes stormy, some- times extraordinarily candid talk that began at nine o’clock one evening and continued until three the next morning. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was said to be enraged by an article in the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur in which Abu lyad was quoted as saying (erroneously, he later told me) that Abu Nidal’s mother had been an Alawi However, events in Lebanon in 1985—86 imposed a de facto Could the historic split in Fatah be mended? Could Abu Nidal In Tripoli before the PNC session, Arafat and Abu lyad were ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 303 304 / PATRICK SEALE servant girl. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal seemed to consider the suggestion seriously. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On November 1, 1989, Abd al-Rahman Isa and AtifAbu Bakr issued a joint communiqué, which was in effect a declaration of war—a war that at the time of writing is still raging. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Might he not soon turn against his left hand? Fearing Abu Nidal’s vengeance, he fled to Algiers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE EMERGENCY LEADERSHIP Abu Bakr was a commanding figure in Palestinian circles, and his defection was a serious blow to Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
this was not always understood by outsiders at the time. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Isaac Deutscher, a historian of the Russian revolution, was one of the first to observe that colonizing a million or more Arabs would hurt Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
two things that they will not accept and that, if Israel insists on them, are bound to breed further terrorist violence such as Abu Nidal’s, and in due course further wars. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestinians and Israelis have been killing one another over a pocket handkerchief of territory—the West Bank— captured by Israel in 1967. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
We Have Taken Over Your Flight 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The word terrorism was first used after the French Revolution, when a wave of terrore swept across the country in a cycle of retaliation and rash exe- cutions. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the First Crusade arrived in Palestine in 1099, it initiated a friction between East and West, Islam and Christian- ity, a simmering conflict that continues to the present. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
end of the nineteenth century with the advent of the Zionist movement among European Jewry. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In a preview of strange alliances, he sided with the tsar’s interior minister, Count Konstanti- novich von Plehve, a confirmed anti—Semite responsible for the Kishinev pogrom (April 6—8,1903). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This wing would become the Zionists’ major fighting force, the antecedent of the Israeli army, with Vladimir Jabotinsky as its first leader.21 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
If the screen remained, Mus- lims maintained, it would open the door to Jewish control over the area—not the first time Muslims had made such a complaint. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The British authorities had been oblivious to the simmering conflict, declaring just before the fighting that Palestine was “an island of peace.”4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Philip Graves showed the book to be a fraud in 1921,13 but it continued to be brought up. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In October 1933, Palestinians staged a large demon- stration after Friday prayers in the nationalist town ofJaffa. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The patrol called the British, who encircled his hideout with tanks on November 17. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On April 15, 1936, only months after Qassam’s death, alleged supporters of this first Palestinian commando stopped cars and a bus on the Tulkarm- Nablus road, robbed passengers, both Arab and Jew, and shot three Jews, two of whom died.18 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His Night Squads became the inspiration for Ariel Sharon’s infamous Unit 101, which, beginning in the 1950s, crossed bor- ders and bulldozed through Arab areas in a wave of destruction and devasta- tion.27 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One of the first victims of British summary justice was 76-year-old Sheik Farhan al-Said. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The British thought that he was another Qassam, and they executed him for possessing a revolver, making him a martyr and creating more anti—British feeling.’2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They later told residents not to carry identity cards. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Beginning in the 1936 general strike, it became a cornerstone of Zionist or Israeli armed forces policy either to use an Arab disguise or to recruit Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The group of secret service agents inside Iraq had weapons, money, safe houses, printing equipment, and a distribution network. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Since the group kept intimate contact with each other, it was easy to round them up, but their Israeli controllers fled as soon as they discovered that something had gone wrong. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Oral evidence reveals that the NAY, which was later taken over by Abu Nidal, was infiltrated by the Mossad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel encouraged the radicalization of its enemy, as the bombing of South Lebanon attests. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By bombing villages and approaching the Middle East with warlike vengeance, dropping a hundred bombs when one would do, Israel instigated a policy designed to radicalize the region.61 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Under pressure from Eisenhower after the Suez War, Israel agreed to stop building the canal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Birth of the Palestinian Guerrillas 39 FRC poster of a copy of “Military Communique Num- ber One,” issued by Fatah on their first raid in 1965. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Pales- tinians say that the first Fatah casualty was killed not by Israeli soldiers but by a Jordanian border guard, who shot Ahmed Musa in the back after the first raid when he crossed the border back to Jordan, which was hostile to Fatah from the beginning. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Shukeiry was reaffirmed chairman at the first meeting of the Palestine National Counci~l (PNC)—also nominated by the Arab League—May 28—June 2, 1964. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
George Habash, the most charismatic of the group, became its head, and eventually he, like Ché Guevara (who met several Palestinian leaders, includ- ing Arafat), gave up his medical practice in Amman for full-time political work. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
AhmedJabril, an able but egotistic military leader who had formed his own mini-army in 1961 and joined the ANM in the mid—1960s, was the first to split. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He would be the first leading Palestinian to be interviewed by Israeli journalists and make alliances with leftist Israelis, and he was stern in his opposition to international terrorism as a means of winning back Palestine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Timing his action with the first anniversary of the 1967 war, Sirhan walked into the Los Angeles campaign headquarters and shot Robert Kennedy, revis- iting tragedy on the Kennedy family and the entire nation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
try when he was 13, and although he acted alone (contrary to conspiracy the- ories),2 the assassination could be called the first act of Palestinian interna- tional terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Pales- tinian leadership’s first failure was not understanding the American mind, and 5. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They wanted to hire a lawyer for Sirhan and use the trial for propaganda. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From this incident Algeria gained the reputation of Middle East negotiator. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Instead of avoiding El Al, Jews supported the airline, and bookings increased.5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The oppor- tunist government in Iraq rounded up 14 people, including nine Jews—one the leader of the Jewish community—and hanged them on trumped-up charges of spying, muting the uproar over the Beirut raid.’° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The first hijackings were designed to impress the West, to advertise the Palestinian cause. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As mentioned, Israel used dirty tricks to help Hussein arrive at his definitive decision, so the PFLP and Israel were oper- ating with the same intention, drawing in the entire PLO against Jordan. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Joseph Kennedy (son of Robert) was on board, and Lufthansa paid $5 million for the release, the money being divided with South Yemen for their services. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Yousef Najjar and Fakhri al-Amari, who had been heads of Fatah intelligence, were thought to have been the initial heads of Black Sep- tember since they helped plan the first action. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the PFLP outside operations stopped, creating a terrorism media Black September carried out very few actions, but those they staged were The first order of business was revenge for the Black September war, and Chapter 6 Black September vs. Mossad 58 William B. Quandt’ they chose to assassinate Wasfi al-Tel, the conservative Jordanian premier and defense minister whom they held responsible. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was the first of a few suc- cesses of Israeli counter-terrorism.2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Arafat sent two messages via the Sudanese embassy in Beirut for the gunmen to release all their captives unharmed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel, angry at Libya’s belligerence, especially the sanctuary it gave to the Munich terrorists, at first refused to apologize, blaming the crew for flying slightly off course into the occupied Sinai and asserting that the plane may have been on a suicide mission to Tel Aviv. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli government launched the attack to blacken a visit by Sadat’s emissary Hafez Ismail to Washington, the first such visit since the 1967 war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The fact is that both sides have committed unfor- givable acts of terror, both sides have killed innocents, both sides have legitimate grievances and illegitimate methods of expressing them.23 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Kanafani’s poetry kept alive the Palestinian identity, and he was one of the first advocates of co- existence in a democratic Palestine, giving lectures in Europe, being inter- vieweçl by Israeli journalists, and having contact with many European Jews active in the antiwar movement in Denmark and Sweden (Kanafani had a Swedish wife). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It is commonly understood that Golda Meir established the assassination However, the first victims were Ghassan Kanafani and his 17-year-old 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Ahmed Yunis [a member of the PFLP leadership] was on the committee. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One got under the car. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The people in the bar watched the car peel rubber and swerve away, almost crashing into a minibus as it approached the first intersection. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israelis collaborated with paid Lebanese and Palestinian agents, who helped an advance party rent cars and secure a harbor where the commandos could land. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Fewer than half a dozen people a year get shot in Norway, and this was Norway’s first encounter with interna- tional terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The two who actually did the killing took the first plane out of Oslo and were never caught. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Black September vs. Mossad 73 74 Israel for its nuclear weapons factory at Dimona.54 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In jargon, Mossad operated dirty, and perhaps Lillehammer was not their first mistake; luck and inefficient police kept them from getting caught before. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The first took place in April when three members of the Ahmed Jibril group raided Israel from Lebanon and took eighteen hostages—eight of them children—in an apartment block of Qjryat Shmona. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His distrust and hatred for It is said that Sabri’s father was a close friend of Zionist nationalists, including Dr. Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president and foremost leader of the Zionist movement, and Avraham Shapira, head of a Zionist militia.1 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Other friends doubt Sabri’s Palestin- ian origin, saying that the family came from Egypt. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Standing 5’lO”, he had good health and a big build, wore a mustache like most Arab men, and had thinning hair that would all disappear by his mid-30s; he was neither handsome nor ugly. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After 1974 almost all Palestinian acts of terrorism were carried out by the Abu Nidal group. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He was influenced by the Baath ideology and made several friends in the local underground Baath party. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It may have been Sabri’s first open contact with a Jew. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They first sought to appeal to the Arab world and the com- munist bloc to legitimize their leadership. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By the early 1970s the Fatah leadership was willing to accept the reality of Israel’s presence, although they did not concretely declare their acceptance. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He came to New York wearing a uniform and a gun, and he wanted to walk into the General Assembly with his gun as a symbol of armed struggle, but a Palestinian American persuaded him to dis- card it. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal had launched his career as a terrorist leader, for this was his first action, and it was designed not to free hostages but to embarrass the PLO. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During the fourth congress in 1972, Arafat put together an ad hoc committee to counter corruption, and Abu Nidal and his associates at first supported this initiative. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Their grandfathers were heroes in the 1936 general strike, and their deaths caused more friction between the two parties, espe- cially when Abu Nidal accused Fatah of first torturing them. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the PLO took an unquestioning stand behind Iraq, even though they had good relations with Iran after the fall of the Shah. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They go to Israeli schools, watch Israeli TV, and speak Hebrew as fluently as Arabic. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Kadura at first made only a partial confession, but eventually, after he became a promi- nent member of Abu Abbas’s PLF and helped mold their political program (which may help explain that group’s failure), he came out with hundreds of pages of confession. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Hammami openly made contact with peace activist Un Avnery and wrote op-ed pieces in London newspapers calling for negotiation and the rights of Palestinians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Right after the 1978 New Year an Arab with a Palestinian accent called Hammami and made an appointment to see him that same day. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mohsin was spending time on the Côte d’Azur, living in a most luxurious apartment in the Gray d’Abion. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They arrested 15 peo- pie but produced no tangible proof—Abu Nidal had only sleepers in Egypt. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They gave him money and brought him at least one light- skinned prostitute, telling him again to have a good time. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Rashid quietly slipped out of the country, eventually settling in Libya. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Three months before Rashid’s encounter Khader had met Israelis from the left-wing Rakah party, including attorney Felicia Langer. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Mossad planted a pow- erful bomb under his bed which blew away his body when he came home at Left: Naim Khader, noted PLO dove, killed in Brussels June 1981; right: Majeed Abu Sharara, head of PLO information, killed in Rome October 1981. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The terror group named itself Black March, after the month of Camp David, the first and last time Abu Nidal used that name.’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The intel- ligence department gives a map to the supervisor of an outside operation unit (first passing the map through the administration department). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
First, when FRC gunmen attacked the Vienna Synagogue two months after the agreement, the Israeli deputy prime minister called it a violation of the ceasefire, and the Israelis fired a few shells over the border but received no response. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the aftermath of the Lebanon invasion a few more Palestinian leaders who were effectively presenting their case before the world were killed by the FRC and Mossad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He was one of the first to realize FRC’s relationship with Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He’s the first guest, Abu Nidal, the leader of the organization that has become infamous for mad acts of death and destruction. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The camps were originally built by the United Nations in the early 1950s on the outskirts of the city, but over the decades the city swallowed them and made them part of its decomposed sprawl. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In Arab stories, evidence is unimportant. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The first item on the agenda is the siege of Em al-Hilway refugee camp in South Lebanon on the outskirts of Sidon by the militia of the Lebanese Shia movement Amal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He met her at a prearranged spot, and she gave him the signal he was told to watch for. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Again, someone called the press and identified the action as Black September.13 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They rarely do this, preferring to bring in the assassins, but Hersh was given a gun and told to kill the second-ranking Jordanian diplomat, Azim al-Mufti, which he did as Mufti was taking his child to school. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A caller in London where the FRC had financial offices claimed it was a Black September oper- ation.’° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
An hour later, three young men speaking Arabic did the same to the Alia office in Athens, injuring three women, and another lone bomber hit the Nicosia office at noon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The first one at the London Hotel was 15. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Just three days before the bombing of the British Airways office, Andreotti praised both Arafat and the PLO.26 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the middle of the terrorism heyday, barely two weeks before the hijack of the Achille Lauro, three Palestinian gunmen walked down the pier of the Larnaca, Cyprus, marina to a 38-foot sailboat. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The boat, named the First, was flying the Israeli flag, as were several neighboring yachts. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The first one listed as Reuben Pultzur was actually Zwi Balsio, one of the Mossad’s directors of European operations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He got it. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Abbas modeled the operation after a failed attempt in January 1973 when four Palestinians disguised as tourists boarded an Italian cruise ship bound for Israel via Greece and Cyprus. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States government requested that the hijackers be turned over to them, but the Egyptian gov- ernment issued a statement the next day that they had left the country. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But on the morning of the raid, two days after Christmas, their liaisons came with grenades and machine guns, giving the boys the first glimpse of their operation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel immediately gave the Germans intelligence informa- tion on how the bombing was a Syrian plot for which a Syrian air force intel- ligence deputy, Lieutenant-Colonel Haitham Said, was responsible, and West Germany temporarily withdrew its ambassador in Damascus over the incident. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Since the beginning of President Reagan’s first term there had been at least 16 attacks against Americans in Europe by Mid- dle Eastern and left-wing groups,’° but the United States chose to ignore the other attacks and concentrate on Gadaffi. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The ties to Syria were irrefutable, as Paul Wilkson observes: the first German bombing), did not just leave his fingerprints everywhere; he enshrined them into everything he touched. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
First it was Libya, and now it’s Syria.”’2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sources describe Hindawi as an opportunist who worked for anyone who would pay. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
“No one asks a question like that except a collabora- tor,” he told Sowan, directing him to leave the office. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Force 17 personnel sit in offices pretending to be central to the struggle to liberate Pal- estine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By that time his FRC had killed the best PLO leaders and was more effective at maligning the Pales- tinians than Israel’s public relations campaign. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At first I wanted to meet Abu Nidal, but later it seemed that such an interview would not be worth the effort. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He went on: At first groups such as the BR picked appropriate targets such as fascists or Mafia bosses—their enemies. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Where did he get this money? Ostensible sources would include sponsorship, first from Iraq, then Syria, then Libya. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal is thought to have tens of millions of dollars, perhaps up to $200 million. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal was organized almost exactly like the Mossad.17 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The first dealt with daily expenses: payroll, bills, mortgages, and the like. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the 1980s the first thing visitors entering American embassies saw was The desire to raid in a hostage situation indicates the United States gov- of Modern Terrorism Chapter 18 Holy Wars and Hollywood: The Manufacture 185 Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf 186 Arab and Israeli Terrorism an anti—Arab media extravaganza. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
thing on their plate by threatening, “The New Jersey will get you if you don’t.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Greece 195 196 Arab and Israeli Terrorism On instruction from his superiors }(hader married three times without getting a divorce. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One can only wonder how Abu Nidal, with his third-grade educa- tion, was supposed to converse in Greek, especially enough to pass himself off as a priest. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He managed to shell out 450,000 PLO dollars for the Santa Andrea, but although Mreich was security conscious, changing his habits and using a driver, word filtered to the Israelis about his new ship. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
organization. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From 1985 I was the only one who lived with him a long time, especially after we moved to Libya in 1987 and were in daily meet- ings. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At first I thought that the operation against Argov was by chance on 3 June and by chance the invasion began two days later. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Bakr turned him over to the PLO. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During the first decades of Middle East violence, thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, the tone of conflict set in the first years remained static. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The effectiveness of terrorism—that is, whether the use of terrorism helped the Palestinians and Israelis—is a multifaceted question. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1992 Lieutenant-General Ehud Barak said that during the first five years of the Intifada 100,000 Palestinians had been through prison,6 a remarkable statistic given that the imprisonable male population is under 500,000. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Countries with the weakest defenses were the first targets for Israeli reprisals, even if they had nothing to do with the original attack.8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States government estimated the direct cost to its taxpayers for the first four Middle East wars at $55 to $70 billion, with indi- rect costs much greater.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the first The war against Middle East terrorism did not work. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Bombing villages as revenge is clearly not the same as defending a border against armed attack. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The League of Nations met in Geneva in 1937 to discuss the issue and drafted the first conventions against terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story of the US.—Israeli Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Steven, p. 274, states, “More than a hundred Palestinians, all ter- rorists, lost their lives in the action.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel, America and the Bomb William R. Farrell, Blood and Rage: The Story of the Japanese RedArmy The story was carried in all papers during the first days of March. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This story is carried by all the papers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was the first political killing in Aus- tria since 1945; Washington Post, 8 October 1981, p. 26. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
21. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Papandreaou, and other world leaders, and he set up one of the first meetings between Arafat and Israeli peace activists. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ostrovsky and Hoy explain in the first section of their book how Mossad Times of India (Bombay), 6 September 1986, p. 1; London Times, 6 Sep- Times of India, 7 September 1986, p. 1; 9 September 1986, p. 1; New York The Middle East, #142, August 1986, p. 36, adding that the 20,000 strong Jerusalem Post, 7 November 1986, P. 1; London Times, 8 September 1986, Al-Fajr, 12 September 1986, p. 7, the news conference held 7 September. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
First published in Sho’un Falastinia; reprint, Beirut: PFLP, no date. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Little, Brown, 1988. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
MARTIN’S PRESS New York © 1984 B.R. Pridham All rights reserved. Comtemporary Yemen
The PDRY: Three Designs for Independence Salem Omar Bukair 6. Comtemporary Yemen
But the Yemeni point of view has been even less heard in the English- speaking world, and the symposium was the first of its kind in having official participation from North and South. Comtemporary Yemen
It was in the consideration of shared Yemeni experience that the participation of the two Yemeni universities and of other Yemeni scholars and administrators was particularly valuable. Comtemporary Yemen
In the nature of things the two volumes cannot claim to provide a systematic coverage of all aspects of contemporary Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
We have to look to the concurrent arrivals of the Zaidi and the Isma’ili-Fatimid da ‘was in the late ninth century AD (third century hijra) to find the true beginnings of the thorough Islamisation of Yemeni society. Comtemporary Yemen
These zones are: the Eastern Slope and Desert, the Northern Highlands, the Southern Highlands and wadi bottoms, the Western Mountains and wadis, and the Tihama. Comtemporary Yemen
Agriculture has always held great potential in this region where the periodic floods from the mountain streams had sufficient flow to allow for irrigation or to fur- nish a reliable sub-surface water-table. Comtemporary Yemen
At the time of Imam al-Hadi’s death the sayyids had established three hijra enclaves;’0 two and a half centuries later when the first of the foreign dynasties, the Ayyubids, conquered Yemen, the Zaidis had established sixteen additional such enclaves.” Comtemporary Yemen
It was amongst the jiran, the non-tribal people living within a tribe’s territory and under the tribe’s protection, that these Zaidis first found the greatest number of converts. Comtemporary Yemen
In other words, the conversion to Zaidism of the tribes of the Northern Highlands began amongst the lowest strata of tribal society. Comtemporary Yemen
The tribes accommodated the Zaidi sayyids because they desperately needed their services, and because the presence of a sayyid in their ter- ritory lent the entire tribe greater prestige and baraka. Comtemporary Yemen
He appealed to the tra- ditional elites, both Himyarite and Hamdanid, who lived in the mixed societies of the mountain tops in the Western Mountains region. Comtemporary Yemen
When Ibn Hawshab’s con- quests began to challenge the tribal domains of the Northern High- lands the Zaidis joined their natural allies in the tribes to conduct a holy war,jihad, that succeeded in containing the Fatimid da’wa in the Western Mountains. Comtemporary Yemen
Not surprisingly, in return the sayyids of the hijra often became greater advocates of the interests of their hosts than they were of the Zaidi da’wa as represented by a reigning Imam. Comtemporary Yemen
These two men spent nearly twenty years, about which we know vir- tually nothing, teaching and setting up their secret propaganda network from their respective seats of Adan La’a in the Western Mountains and Yafi’ in the Southern Highlands. Comtemporary Yemen
His initial supporters came from the baronial families who were leaders within their own small communities — such as the Himyarities Al Zawahi of Hababa, J. Dila’ and J. Masani’, or the Banu Siba’ of J. Miswar, or the Hamdanid Banu Shawir on J. Maytak — but who had been disenfranchised and enthralled to the Yu’firid state by the Yu’firid clients who ruled those districts.’2 Comtemporary Yemen
Central Highlands Plains: a Detail 14 Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen bin al-Dahhak, the Sulaihid state was born. Comtemporary Yemen
Al-Khazraji, writing at the beginning of the fifteenth century,20 documents the con- tinued spread of Shafi’i teachings into the northern Tihama and the societies of the Western Mountains. Comtemporary Yemen
Often they remained in the towns such as Sa’da, San’a’ or Dhamar, but when they entered tribal territory in the Northern High- lands most often they became part of the class of protected people called the jiran. Comtemporary Yemen
Schemes and pro- jects and new institutions there were aplenty, but not all of them died; many, in fact, lived on into Yemeni independence after the First World War. Comtemporary Yemen
The first major document utilised, issued in 1882, dealt with modifications of the system to accommodate the lack of judges in Yemen trained in the new laws and procedure, and with Memduh Pasha andAziz Bey 25 26 Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey the necessity of establishing an Inspectorate of Courts to reinforce the application of the system. Comtemporary Yemen
Both, however, by the same token directly undermined the basis of the legitimacy of the Zaidi imamate. Comtemporary Yemen
The key to that work was seen as economic development, which in turn would produce on the one hand sufficient taxes to run the government effectively, and on the other sufficient prosperity to eliminate most of the basis of support for rebellion. Comtemporary Yemen
The notebook contains thoughts on the perennial deficits run by the provincial government. Comtemporary Yemen
Since military expenses took prece- dence, very little money was left for school and other civilian expenses ~B The tax notes taken by Aziz Bey during his first year of office in Hodaida document the problem of collection. Comtemporary Yemen
A town like Zabid has long been known for its learning and scholarship,. Comtemporary Yemen
The legacy of Ottoman Yemen was a little of all of these, and a few more things besides. Comtemporary Yemen
The first printing press came to Yemen in these years, and produced the provincial yearbooks, complete with almanac, and Yemen’s first newspaper. Comtemporary Yemen
The experience of modernised government service shared by both sunnis and Zaidis in L the Gendarme Service, local, municipal, district and provincial councils and the army militia, further helped to lay the manpower foundations for a national government. Comtemporary Yemen
Perhaps only a few were affected by this — but they were the first generation of Yemen’s modern leaders and carried an influence far beyond their numbers. Comtemporary Yemen
Robert Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period (Johns Hopkins Univer- sity Press, Baltimore, 1963), p. 265. Comtemporary Yemen
There, Ahmad Muhammad Nu’man began Nadi al-Islah (the Reform Club) and al-Madrasa al-Ahliya (the People’s School) in 1934 in the village of al-Dhubhan. Comtemporary Yemen
This division in the social composition of the early elements of the FYM is an important explanation for the subsequent political development of the Movement. Comtemporary Yemen
Nu’man, al-Zubairi, Ahmad al-Shami and Zaid al-Mawshki and others who had been associated with the FYM gathered at his court to try and impress upon him their views on the need to introduce reforms since they felt that he was likely to become the Imam after Yahya’s death. Comtemporary Yemen
Until May 1944 Saif al-Islam Ahmad appeared to be fairly responsive to their views but after a particularly stormy argu- ment that month he is alleged to have declared: ‘I ask God that I do not die until this sword of mine has been coloured by the blood of the modernists [meaning the Free Yemenis].’6 Comtemporary Yemen
The founder of the Group was Qadi Muhammad Ali al-Akwa’ and the members included his younger brother, Isma’il, Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, Muhammad Ahmad Sabrah, Ahmad al-Mu’allimi and Abd al-Rahman Basalama. Comtemporary Yemen
Most were leaders of individual village associations — Alwan, for example was the Vice-President of Nadi Ittihad al-Aghabira (the al-Aghabira area association). Comtemporary Yemen
Cited in P. Wilkinson, Social Movement (Pall Mall, London, 1971), p. 22. Comtemporary Yemen
3. Comtemporary Yemen
6. Comtemporary Yemen
His broadcasts and the apparently new (and pro-Nasser) direc- tion that they indicated heralded a three-way breakdown of the FYM between (a) those who supported the Hamid al-Din and the Zaidi imamate per Se, (b) those who favoured the succession of Muhammad al-Badr (Imam Ahmad’s son and heir) and (c)those who were dissatisfied with what they considered the essentially conserva- tive outlook of the Yemeni Union and the ‘established’ FYM, and were influenced by newer pan-Arab political movements such as the ANM and the Ba’th. Comtemporary Yemen
mitted to London University’s Scfiool of Oriental and African Studies as a thesis for a PhD in August 1983. Comtemporary Yemen
This chapter is extracted from a study of the Free Yemeni Movement sub- Rudolf Heberle, Social Movement: An Introduction to Political Sociology A. al-Shamahi, Al-Yaman:Al-Insan wal-Hadara(Dar al-Huna, Cairo, 1972), The Free Yemeni Movement: 1935-62 43 44 The Free Yemeni Movement: 1935-62 p. 176. Comtemporary Yemen
A First Conference was convened by the Aden MAN branch and held in San’a’ in February 1963. Comtemporary Yemen
How- ever, in 1963 the NLF was promised much help from the Egyptians and the San’ani authorities who waited to see which way Britain’s support would go before fully backing armed struggle in the South. Comtemporary Yemen
This area, according to the British part of the Dhala’ Amirate, had always been a centre of resistance and the British once again treated the problem at first as a merely tribal one. Comtemporary Yemen
What distinguished these clashes from the The Rise of the National Liberation Front 51 52 The Rise of the National Liberation Front earlier tribal revolts and attacks on the British in Aden was the organisation behind them. Comtemporary Yemen
OLOS finally included the PSP, remnants of the SAL, a few Adeni merchants and ex-Sultans Mi Abdul-Karim of Lahej and Ahmad bin Abdullah al-Fadhli, in an organisation whose stated aim was the expulsion of the British by military means. Comtemporary Yemen
The NLF held its First Congress between 22 and 25 June 1965 in Ta’izz. Comtemporary Yemen
The sections of society which are expected to support its aims and fight for them are ‘the popular forces of workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals and students’ and in particular the workers and peasants who are to form an alliance which is the guarantor of social progress. Comtemporary Yemen
That it would not be easy was clear as the NLF had already, as we have seen, refused to join OLOS before its formation. Comtemporary Yemen
The presence and activities of the Hadramawt Arab Socialist Party, its ability to gather support for continued unity with the South and its close links with the NLF and participation in its activities were significant factors in the final NLF victory in that area. Comtemporary Yemen
The problems which the right-wing leadership was finding within the NLF may have made it more receptive to Egyptian suggestion and on 13 January 1966 three NLF leaders announced in Cairo the formation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) which was supposed to represent the merger between OLOS and the NLF (and the exclusion of the SAL elements within OLOS). Comtemporary Yemen
p. 217. Comtemporary Yemen
On this same day fell the first martyr, Ghalib bin Rajih Labbuza.’° Comtemporary Yemen
The immediate cause The PDR Y: Three Designs for Independence 65 66 The PDR Y: Three Designs for Independence was the attempt to put Radfan under the rule of the Dhal’a Amir and force it to join the South Arabian Federation.” Comtemporary Yemen
The tribes refused the order and shooting was the reply. Comtemporary Yemen
(3) ‘responsible men’ who were ready to preserve British strategic inter- ests. Comtemporary Yemen
Soon after the success of the Labour Party in the October 1964 election, the new British government found it appropriate to revise, though slightly, its policy. Comtemporary Yemen
and to civil servants to build new houses. Comtemporary Yemen
The aim of this chapter is to examine the social revolution that occurred after the Yemeni revolution of 1962. Comtemporary Yemen
Yemen was convinced that Britain had designs on it, because it had recently wit- nessed the complete partitioning of Arab lands by both Britain and France immediately after the First World War. Comtemporary Yemen
Yemen could not be impervious to imperialism or to the competition for outside possessions by the great powers of Europe. Comtemporary Yemen
The Imam was seen as the personification of Yemeni conservatism and traditionalism. Comtemporary Yemen
He was the greatest emanating personality in Yemeni society whose personality embodied the Yemeni political structure. Comtemporary Yemen
However, the factor of emanation as a source of stability had The Yemeni Revolution of 1962 Seen as a Social Revolution 79 eroded considerably by 1961 because of several factors. Comtemporary Yemen
In response to Arab nation- alism, Yemen became aligned with Saudi Arabia and Egypt when, in 1956, it signed the Jeddah Military Pact. Comtemporary Yemen
The Pre-revolutionary Yemeni States The years 1962 and 1967 have seminal importance in Yemeni history as they, officially at least, mark the establishment of ‘modern’ — or, actually, ‘modernising’ — and self-proclaimed revolutionary states in both halves of Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
By its very nature, it was completely dependent on the abilities of a single individual who was expected to be a competent combination of religious scholar, administrator, negotiator and military com- mander. Comtemporary Yemen
The Present Republics The first stages of political change in Yemen, i.e. neo-traditionalism in the North and colonialism in the South, can be very clearly distin- guished from more recent developments by the key dates of 26 September 1962 and 30 November 1967. Comtemporary Yemen
First, the attempted Egyptianisation of the fledgeling Nation-building and Political Development 91 92 Nation-building and Political Development state was firmly rejected, even though a basic bureaucratic infra- structure introduced by Cairo was largely retained. Comtemporary Yemen
The first stage (1967—71) was one of preoccupation over defining the precise direc- tion of politics in the new state. Comtemporary Yemen
Consequently, the fourth and latest stage (1980-present) featured the rise of Mi Nasir Muhammad to the top and a potential return to emphasis on pragmatism in both domestic and foreign policies. Comtemporary Yemen
First, there is a basic dichotomy between modernists and traditionalists which, although more severe in the North, shows no sign of abating in either region. Comtemporary Yemen
Furthermore, even if the determination were there the outside world presents considerable constraints, ranging from the interference of the Saudis in the North and the Soviet Union in the South to the pressures of pan-Arab and regional con- cerns, rivalries and threats. Comtemporary Yemen
Rather than force a transformation of the periphery to conform to the values of a modernist centre, the outlook of the centre should probably expand to encompass many of the goals and values now located in the periphery. Comtemporary Yemen
The initiative is undeniably there: both in the continuing strength of peripheral affiliations, and in the Nation-building and Political Development 99 100 Nation-building and Political Development positive development of the co-operatives movement, spurred in part by the impact of wide-scale labour migration. Comtemporary Yemen
Beginning with the Fifth General Conference of the NLF in March 1972 in which the programme of national democratic revolution was adopted, passing through the Conference of Unification of all Progressive Forces in February 1975, and the sixth General Conference in October 1975, and culminating in the First Conference of the YSP in October 1978 and its Extraordinary Conference in October 1980, the politico- economic programmes have emphasised the importance of and con- centration on social reconstruction on the basis of scientific socialism. Comtemporary Yemen
The report submitted to the First Conference of the party in 1978 stated: Considering the paramount importance of education in the ideological formation process, the Conference of Unification of Education for Nation-building 107 108 Education for Nation-building Progressive Forces (1975) gave special care and emphasis to the necessity to eradicate illiteracy, maintain democratisation of education and link education with production. Comtemporary Yemen
After independence things were different. Comtemporary Yemen
When we study all these laws and regulations, we should not forget that scientific socialism is the philosophy behind them, and that democratic centralism is the principle governing all relations in the Ministry, and between the Ministry and the schools. Comtemporary Yemen
This constitutes the backbone of the rela- tions between the Ministry and its branches and it usually implies that the Ministry should take the necessary measures for guaran- teeing the real participation of all those involved in the educative process, i.e. the educationists, including teachers, students and par- ents. Comtemporary Yemen
The Ministry of Education was the first Ministry to delegate authority to governorates. Comtemporary Yemen
What is the situation after independence? On 30 November 1967 the first Cabinet was formed and the first national Ministry of Education came into existence. Comtemporary Yemen
Since independence two educational structures have been adopted. Comtemporary Yemen
The first was immedi- ately after independence and was in conformity with the pattern of the Arab Cultural Pact (6—3—3). Comtemporary Yemen
On such basic philosophical grounds the First Educational Con- ference (September 1975) was convened and a new structure was adopted (see Figure 8.1). Comtemporary Yemen
So the absorptive capacity of the economy plays an important part in this rational balance. Comtemporary Yemen
The above university courses lead to the first degree from the University of Aden, and the new regulations which were adopted after the First Higher Educational Conference (1981) have intro- duced the Special Degree which is a twelve-month graduate course comparable to the Master’s Degree. Comtemporary Yemen
The students eligible to follow this course are those who attain ‘Excellent’ or ‘Very good’ in their first degree. Comtemporary Yemen
Political report submitted to First Conference of the Socialist Party of Yemen, 1978. Comtemporary Yemen
They did this by establishing a (at first) very rudimentary and tentative presence in the Adeni hinterland which, at the time, was an incredibly complex set of principalities, shaikhdoms and other statelets of various sizes, powers and wealth, most often organised on the basis of some form of tribal affiliation (or tribal confederation). Comtemporary Yemen
Under its new leadership, the South Yemeni government sought to obtain economic assistance to cover operating expenditures, and, in addition, some economic development and assistance grants and loans from the major providers of such financing — the United States and the major Western states. Comtemporary Yemen
Although the first signs of a modification in South Yemen’s ‘hard line’ on various issues began to appear in 1979, the most interesting changes have taken place in 1982—3. Comtemporary Yemen
Although the final report’° was remarkably frank in its assessment of the achieve- ments and shortcomings of the regime’s policies, the most impor- tant fact was the decision to let such an obviously Western financial institution undertake the assessment in the first place. Comtemporary Yemen
The Bases of Politics in South Yemen and the NLF Politics in South Yemen is a complex and constantly changing com- bination of a number of elements, many of which are characteristic of other developing states and/or the Arab states, among which at least the following are important: (1) personal origins: essentially we are here concerned with whether or not the individual is from North or South Yemen; for example, Mi Nasir Muhammad is the first major political figure in the NLF in some time to be of South Yemeni origin. Comtemporary Yemen
(3) personal loyalty, usually the result of previous associations ir political, economic, or social endeavours of various kinds, a~ well as the links created by the patrimonial system which char- acterises nearly all Middle Eastern politics, and which even thc NLF has not been able to eliminate completely from South Yemeni affairs. Comtemporary Yemen
The point deserves repetition: the interpretation of the motives and actions of the Soviet Union (and its allies) in this region is more than likely to have been decided upon in advance, i.e. before an investigation of the ‘facts’ in such poten- tial ‘case-studies’ as South Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
In this writer’s view the South Yemeni government’s views and orientation since 1967 have undergone a number of rather clear changes; these have been associated with a change of leadership (in the NLF and the Yemeni Socialist Party), as well as with other events in the region, e.g. the Yemeni civil war (from 1962 to 1970), the war in the Ogaden, the Dhofar issue, relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Co-operation Council, etc., Comtemporary Yemen
For the moment, then, I must conclude, first, that South Yemen is best characterised as an Arab ‘political maverick’ rather than as a Soviet ‘satellite’. Comtemporary Yemen
Contemporary Sovietologists are probably willing to accept the categories and statuses assigned to various states by the Brezhnev Doctrine as a reasonably useful definition; although not completely satisfactory on many grounds, it has the virtue of according with the Soviet definition of where its interests and concerns lie, and there- fore has some predictive capability. Comtemporary Yemen
Other ministries and agencies followed. Comtemporary Yemen
1967), pp. 9-13, is an appropriate example. Comtemporary Yemen
Data of this kind have been collected and tabulated by such organisations as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State in the United States, the International Institute of Strategic Studies in Britain and the Peace Research Institute in Stockholm. Comtemporary Yemen
The result is that it would take a considerable effort to research and collateadequately what would be required for a thorough presentation. Comtemporary Yemen
V (Sept./Oct. Comtemporary Yemen
22. Comtemporary Yemen
24. Comtemporary Yemen
Page, The USSR and Arabia, and Shahram Chubin, Soviet Policy towards Iran and the Gulf (International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1980). Comtemporary Yemen
Unfortunately, there is no consistency in the data, in their method of presentation, in the subjects covered, in the dollar values assigned, etc. Comtemporary Yemen
There was no structure or organisation which could be called a government, in spite of the fact that he retained some Ottoman officials to assist in building an administrative machinery to run the government. Comtemporary Yemen
A similar evolution took place and resulted in the establishment of the Ministries of Commerce and Supplies and other commercial and financial public institutions. Comtemporary Yemen
However, the problems of public administration in the country remained. Comtemporary Yemen
Information on the tribal affiliation of major leaders is now difficult to come by; for the significance of tribal affiliations in the past (i.e. Comtemporary Yemen
The above jurisdiction covered the work of the court when acting as a first-instance court. Comtemporary Yemen
The first step towards setting up a complete legal system came with the constitution in 1970. Comtemporary Yemen
Appeals are by way of re-hearing. Comtemporary Yemen
evidence in criminal cases (where all principles of evidence are included, for example witnesses, experts, accused’s evidence including confes- sion, exhibits and presumptions). Comtemporary Yemen
The above-mentioned procedure was only applied in Aden, because the Criminal Procedure Ordinance was in force from 1955, i.e. before independence in 1967, and continued to be effective by virtue of Republican Decree No. 5 of 1967. Comtemporary Yemen
Since 1 January 1977 a new Criminal Procedure Law has been in force. Comtemporary Yemen
The Criminal Procedure and Civil Procedure, the Penal Code and the Courts Law have given effect to the provision in the constitution in this respect. Comtemporary Yemen
Outside Aden there was no legal profession at all, and parties used to appear personally or with attorneys who were usually their close relatives. Comtemporary Yemen
Article 121 of the constitution. Comtemporary Yemen
There are Social Justice Organisations in Aden and Abyan governorates at present. Comtemporary Yemen
Article 127 of the constitution requires that the legal profession be regulated by law ‘with the aim of submitting legal aid to the citizens and Judicial persons’. Comtemporary Yemen
There are similar bodies in the Soviet Union and East Germany (called Comrades’ Courts and Social Courts, respectively). Comtemporary Yemen
But because the Saudis are never sure of how strong they want the YAR to be, it took them three years to make up their minds, and it was probably President Hamdi who forced their hands when he turned to the United States and France for arms deals.’6 Comtemporary Yemen
Article 126 of the constitution; sections 19—20 and 328 to 332 of the Criminal 194 The Judicial System in Democratic Yemen Procedure; sections of the Civil Procedure. Comtemporary Yemen
18. Comtemporary Yemen
First, although substantial communist parties have existed in some of these states — Iraq, Syria, Sudan — and smaller influential groupings in others — Egypt, Algeria — in none of these was Soviet strategic influence converted into domestic policy in such a way as to consolidate a ‘non-capitalist’ or ‘socialist-oriented’ regime. Comtemporary Yemen
The uncertain political character of these regimes was compounded by two other factors: (a) their espousal of Arab nationalist ideologies — with all their variations, these were anti-communist, Soviet Relations with South Yemen 211 212 Soviet Relations with South Yemen indulgent towards religion and resistant to concepts of class struggle; (b) the availability of large quantities of money from the Arab oil-states which were able, from 1971 onwards, to use this money to detach more radical Arab states from their alliances with the Soviet Union. Comtemporary Yemen
There is no reason to suppose that this corresponds to any preconceived Soviet grand design, but it reflects the difficulties which the Soviet Union has encountered at the centre, and the maturing of social conflicts elsewhere in the region. Comtemporary Yemen
In November 1982 Ali Nasir was one of the six leaders of ‘socialist-oriented’ states given special prominence at Brezhnev’s funeral. Comtemporary Yemen
million in that year. Comtemporary Yemen
Military Relations The Soviet Union has two military interests in South Yemen: to train and equip the PDRY’s forces, so that they are best able to defend themselves — ‘to strengthen the PDRY’s defensive capability’ in the official Soviet idiom — and to acquire facilities in the PDRY that can be of use for the Soviet Union’s global strategy. Comtemporary Yemen
Two areas where Soviet and PDRY policy converged were the Horn of Africa and Palestine. Comtemporary Yemen
The decision to sign a treaty in 1979 was taken, so it was later said, on the personal initiative of Abdul-Fattah Isma’il and without the collective consent of the YSP leadership. Comtemporary Yemen
The party was officially founded in October 1961 under the name of the People’s Democratic Union (PDU) by Abdallah bin Abd al-Razzaq Ba Dhib — the first communist in Aden and eventually the foremost communist in all Arabia. Comtemporary Yemen
After his untimely death on 16 August 1976, the PDU leadership passed, in accordance with a previous agreement, to his younger brother and party co-founder, Ali Ba Dhib. Comtemporary Yemen
At the intra-regional level, the nucleus around which many of these activities revolved was the alliance, established in August 1981, which grouped the PDRY, Libya and Ethiopia as joint signatories to a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. Comtemporary Yemen
A British view as sympathetic to the Yemeni claims as Jacob’s in the 1920s was expressed by the first Resident and Agent in Hadramawt. Comtemporary Yemen
When the federal idea was first mooted Ingrams wrote in critical vein. Comtemporary Yemen
When the first British Agent in the Protectorate arrived in the town, he instantly observed that, with the exception of a minority of local Arabs whose only home was Aden, the whole ‘polyglot mass’ of Indians, Somalis, Europeans and others was ‘parasitic’. Comtemporary Yemen
Education is essential, is essential to all people and to us more than most, for we have none. Comtemporary Yemen
Where is it? You have seen the schools, you have seen the Indians who teach. Comtemporary Yemen
The first consignment of smuggled books sent by al-Asnag consisted of seventeen copies of al-Kawakibi’s Tawabi’ al-Istibdad (The Nature of Oppression).2’ Comtemporary Yemen
To circumvent the prohibition imposed on their political activities, Luqman (who was the first Adeni Arab to study law) advised them to change the party’s name to the ‘Grand Yemeni Association’, and register it as a cultural club. Comtemporary Yemen
Hakimi’s ideas are better and clearly embodied in articles (1) and (2) of the National Covenant of 1956 which emphasised the indivisi- bility of the Yemeni homeland and that no cession or relinquishment of its parts should be permitted.28 Comtemporary Yemen
Formed in 1947, the ‘Muslim Association’ was largely supported by Adenese and ‘inclined to be Pan-Islamic in outlook’.30 Comtemporary Yemen
In the first election in 1955 three of the four elected members were candidates of the Asso- ciation. Comtemporary Yemen
However, up till 1958, when it split into two groups, the Aden Association generally kept an open mind on the question of union with the Colony and the Protectorate, preferring to wait and see how the latter developed politically and economically.32 Comtemporary Yemen
The party was set up by the first generation of university graduates who had just returned from Egypt, Iraq and Sudan. Comtemporary Yemen
Au had previously succeeded in sabotaging the first British proposals for a Federation of Sultanates and Amirates. Comtemporary Yemen
An emissary from Ahmad was sent to the Governor of Aden and indicated to him the Imam’s willingness to waive his ancestral claims over the Protectorate if the Federation proposals were to mean granting the Protectorate immediate independence.39 Comtemporary Yemen
To translate its bigger aims into practical politics, the UNF’s first action was to demand and agitate for the enfranchisement of Northern and Protectorate Yemenis in the first limited elections of 1955 for the few seats in the Legislative Council. Comtemporary Yemen
Members of the ATUC’s Executive Com- mittee were therefore office-bearers of the UNF, and the majority of members of the executive committees of individual trade unions were members of that party. Comtemporary Yemen
Sir Tom Hickinbotham, the Governor of Aden during whose term of office the labour movement was formed, said that when he first came to Aden the general working conditions of the Arab workers can only be described as disgraceful. Comtemporary Yemen
Its anti-British attitude had been strengthened by the formation of the United Arab States and the ATUC was begin- ning to use its power for political ends: it now formed the most consistent and formidable opposition to the authorities. Comtemporary Yemen
Ibid. (July 1982), p. 28. Comtemporary Yemen
FIGHTING TERRORISM How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists ii EDITED BY BENJAMIN NETANYAHU International Terrorism: Challenge and Response A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World Terrorism: How the West Can Win BY BENJAMIN NETANYAHU FIGHTING TERRORISM I How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International BENJAMIN NETANYAHU FARRAR STRAUS GIROUX Terrorists New York Copyright © 1995 by Benjamin Netanyahu All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Published simultaneously in Canada by HarperCollinsCanadaLtd LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING~INPUBLICATI0N DATA Fighting terrorism: how democracies can defeat domestic and First edition, 1995 Netanyahu, Binyamin. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
My first vote of thanks must go to my gifted colleague and friend, Dr. Yoram Hazony of the Shalem Center— National Policy Institute in Jerusalem, who, not for the first time, shouldered the burden of being my editor, my research director, and my all-around sounding board. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The consequences of this reality for anti-terrorist law enforcement in a country like the United States are of the first order. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The investigation into the back- Benjamin Netanyahu 14 grounds of the suspects in the Oklahoma City bombing has led American law enforcement officials and jour- nalists into a bewildering thicket of far-right, white su- premacist and anti-federalist groups, often heavily armed, who in recent years have begun organizing themselves into local “militias”—in many cases actively planning to fight a civil war against the federal govern- ment. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It even lacks the pernicious cho- rus of intellectual rationalizers and legitimizers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon who gave Euro- pean terrorism its short-lived flurry of faddish glamour when it first appeared. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Before I discuss the operational issues involved in defeating domestic terrorism, it is crucial to mention the battle of ideas which constitutes the first and most fundamental defense against terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The intellectual bulwarks of a free society, like all aspects of freedom, have to be constantly nurtured and protected. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In its long and unfinished march from barbarism to civilization, humanity has tried to deline- ate limits to conflict. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
If the first obstacle to the spread of domestic terror- ism in most democracies is in the realm of political cul- ture, the second is in the realm of operations. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
First, its members must be excep- tionally well trained in maintaining organizational secrecy and in the professional methods of covert op- erations and intelligence techniques. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In a modern democracy, the terrorist is most often alone, hunted, despised, and without means. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In December 1982, a neo-Nazi terrorist group embarked on a campaign of bombings against the cars of American GIs, eventually turning on Israeli targets in Vienna, Am- Fighting Terrorism 31 sterdam, and Geneva. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The attempt by an obscure cultist group Aum Shinrikyo to poison Tokyo’s congested subways with sarin—one of the most toxic chemicals ever devel- oped—was not the first time Japan had to deal with Japanese-bred terrorists. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
There was no viable option of passive defense against the terrorists, and the Bush administration concluded that there was no choice but tc Benjamin Netanyahu 38 follow the Europeans’ lead and adopt a more activist pol- icy. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
That is, democracies have a right and a duty to protect themselves in advance against those who would set out to destroy their societies and extinguish their freedoms. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu 52 As late as 1979, when my colleagues and I had organ- ized one of the first conferences on international terror- ism, there were still many who did not recognize that there was such a thing as international terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Egyptian President Nasser’s fulminations notwithstanding, Shu- keiri had never been permitted to launch extensive at- tacks from Egyptian soil for fear of triggering an unplanned Israeli response; Arafat himself had been kept on a short leash in Syria, and his gunmen had run into trouble with Jordanian troops from the very first. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
One of his first encounters was with Fidel Castro, who had repeatedly welcomed him to Havana from 1965 on. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This offen- sive was first and foremost political; it was intended to expose those countries supporting terror, and to un- equivocally label terrorism as immoral, regardless of the identity of the terrorists and their professed motives. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It was in the context of these efforts that the Jonathan Institute was founded. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From the beginning of my involvement with the Jon- athan Institute, and later in my tenure as a diplomat, I believed that the key to the elimination of international terror was having the United States lead the battle, and that this American leadership would harness the coun- tries of the free world into line, much as a powerful locomotive pulls the cars of a train. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
First, it must refuse to yield to ter- rorist demands; and second, it must be ready to confront the regimes sponsoring terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What we have learned about terrorism is, first, that it is not random, undirected, purposeless vio- lence. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In order to sharpen their demand for the release of terrorists jailed in Kuwait and Lebanese Shiites being held by Israel, the gunmen murdered an American pas- senger in cold blood and threw his body on the tarmac. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
First, while the conquest of Kuwait by Iraq was a clear act of aggression for the entire world to see (and punish), terrorism is invariably secretive, relying on its deniability for impunity. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The first, the Pan-Arab nationalism of Egypt’s Nasser and the Baath Party in Syria and Iraq, was consciously modeled after the Pan-German nationalism which had succeeded in unifying the fragmented German people in the nine- teenth century and had resurrected a defeated Germany between the two world wars. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Periodically, they would succeed in inflicting a painful blow, as when they assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981; or in provoking a vicious reprisal, as when Syrian President Hafez Assad leveled the fundamentalist stronghold of Hama, leaving tens of thousands dead, after an abortive uprising there in 1982. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
These activities gained the mili- tants no operational capacity which could be directed against Israel or the West. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But a few of them have come under Fighting Terrorism 89 the sway of a perverse and primitive interpretation of the faith, which moves them to fanaticism and vio- lence. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In 1989 Azzam was the keynote speaker at what was billed as the First Conference of the Jihad, held at the Al-Farooq Mosque in Brooklyn. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu 98 The Gaza Syndrome One of the most important boosts Islamic terrorism has received since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran has been the creation of the PLO enclave in Gaza in the wake of the 1993 Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The rec- ognition that the Arabs would not be able to defeat Israel within its new boundaries gave birth to two competing approaches toward Israel within Arab politics. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Until 1992, all Israeli governments, whether led by the Labor Party or by the Likud, sought to strengthen the first approach in the Arab world while discouraging the second, striving to achieve peace with the Arab states while remaining within the improved defensive borders. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Naïvely dismissing the PLO’s professed ultimate aims as “propaganda for internal consumption,” the La- bor government attempted for the first time to grant many of the PLO’s demands—in the hope of being able to forge an alliance with it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At Oslo, Israel in effect ac- cepted the first stage of the PLO’s Phased Plan: a gradual withdrawal to the pre-1967 border and the creation of the conditions for an independent PLO state on its bor- ders (except for Jerusalem and the other Jewish com- munities in Judea and Samaria, which were left for later negotiation). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu The first step in the Israeli withdrawal was the evacuation of the Israeli administration and military pres- ence from Gaza. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Gaza was thus handed over to the PLO along with the village of Jericho (population 15,000), as the first step in implementing the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Equally, it became apparent that far from taking action against terrorist organizations in Gaza, the PLO presided Benjamin Netanyahu 104 over a fantastic explosion of anti-Israel terrorism from Gaza that threatened to turn its mini-state there into a replica of the PLO mini-state in the Lebanon of the 1970s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Arafat’s confidants kept making the same points. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The utter moral obtuseness of the decision to grant Arafat this honor caused the resignation from the Nobel committee of one of its five members, Norwegian Member of Parliament Kaare Kristiansen—the first per- son on the Nobel committee ever to leave it in protest over an impending award. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
When the Oslo deal was signed, my party and I re- peated this warning, but much of the public at first dis- missed our arguments. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
First, a clear linkage was established early on between the Islamic ter- rorists in Gaza and the cadres of their co-religionists in the United States and Europe, who send money and di- rectives to Gaza on a regular basis. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Understandably, many Israelis do not want to see that base expanded twenty times to include the West Bank, thereby having an Iranian-influenced Is- lamic domain hovering over its major cities, and within ten miles of the sea. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The best estimates at this time place Iran between three and five years away from possessing the prerequisites required for the inde- pendent production of nuclear weapons. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Like Islamic fundamentalism, Nazism sixty years ago was directed first against the Jews and other local minorities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Undoubtedly the two greatest obstacles to dealing with this problem are, first, recognizing the nature of the threat and, second, understanding that it can be defeated. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
My first intention in writing this book has been, accord- ingly, to alert the citizens and decision-makers of the West as to the nature of the new terrorist challenge which the democracies now face. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Nuclear weapons in the hands of, say, the Dutch government are simply not the same as nuclear weapons 132 in the hands of Qaddafi or the Ayatollahs in Teheran. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While military measures should not be the first option, they should never be excluded from the ros- ter of possibilities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This is the first opportunity for me to thank properly Mark Legui who was the man from “Del Monte” who said “yes,” as we used to joke later on. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The final word of gratitude goes for the dearest person. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With respect to geography, the center of weight of Palestinian military and political leadership was moved to the furthest place from Palestine since the rise of the Palestine question early in the twentieth century. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For the first time in this century, a sort of Palestinian authority has been established over certain parts of the historic territory of Palestine, on the basis of the 1993 Oslo Agreement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first does not rely on Arabic language sources, with the result that the relevant studies tend to be superficial and somewhat repetitious of journalistic coverage. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The continuation of the brutal and repressive Israeli occupation led to the popular uprising or intifada and to the birth of Hamas in late 1987. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this respect, they are just like the “leftism” of many Palestinian resistance organizations in the 1 960s and 1 970s, which were a reflection of international ideological trends sweeping the Middle East. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The ideologies then are pressed into the service of “the resis- tance project,” thus establishing a dialectical link between resistance and social change. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first chapter provides a critical analysis of the rise and development of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, showing Hamas to be an offshoot of the organization and ide- ology of the Brotherhood. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There is also a discussion of Hamas’s perspective on the traditional dilemma of Palestinian political thought: the proposal for a small state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (which Hamas sees as an interim solution) as against the total liberation of Palestine (which Hamas calls the historic solution). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
2. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The political literature disseminated by Hamas and its ideological Musa Abu Marzouq, head of the Hamas Political Bureau, interview with author, According to the Hamas Charter which was made public on 18 August 1989; see Appen- Ibid. Ffow It All Began I 11 12 HAMAS political discourse of Hamas reflect its organizational roots and its historic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood movement in particular. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Perhaps the engagement of the Brotherhood in the 1948 war was the highlight of its history of jihad. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Al-Banna, Mudha/eara, p. 230; for a broader account of Islamist and Arabist organiza- tions prior to the 1948 war, see Bashir Nafi, Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question, 1908—1941 (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1988). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This had an influence on the cadres and the types of activities they engaged in.”46 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
According to Abu 51. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Those who remained in the Gaza Strip “were not yet fully in tune with the spirit of the Brotherhood. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Youth for Vengeance included Salah Khalaf, As’ad al-Saftawi, Sa’id al-Muzaiyin, Omar Abu al-Khair, Isma’il Suwairjo, and Muhammad Isma’il al-Nunu. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
How hAil Began 33 34 HAMAS in the entire Gaza Strip. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In fact, it could be said that the years 1984—87 were the period of building up a new confrontational perspective. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is worth empha- sizing here that the leaders of the Brotherhood became the leaders of Hamas when it emerged in late 1987. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
When a Jew forced his way into the al-Aqsa Mosque and attacked worshippers in June 1983, the Brotherhood took part in the demonstrations that broke out in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Related to their modest military effort, the Brotherhood established links with a small group of Islamists that was established inside Israel in the early 1 980s. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
1982—83, which resulted in tempestuous demonstrations flowing out of the mosques in the wake of inflammatory Israeli actions, such as the incursion into the al-Aqsa Mosque. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As mentioned earlier, Sheikh Yassin put together an organization for military operations that was discovered in 1984. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
At that meeting, the first communique of Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Resistance Movement, whose acronym in Arabic is Hamas) was written, and those present— Sheikh Yassin, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz al-Rantisi, Salah Shehadeh, Muhammad Sham’ah, ‘Isa al-Nashshar, Abdel Fattah Dukhan, and Ibrahim al-Yazuri— became the founders of Hamas.87 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
87. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It also is reflected in the constant empha- sis placed on the fact that the burden of liberation cannot be borne by a Palestinian resistance that is denied real Arab and Islamic support. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
THE PARTIES TO THE STRUGGLE In the first two years of Hamas’s existence (1987—89), the preliminary iden- tification of friends and foes presented no great difficulty; the picture was rather oversimplified. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They were behind the Second World War, in which they grew fabulously wealthy through the arms trade. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s dealings with these three circles will be discussed in later chapters. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Despite the political conflict with the PLO and the intense struggle with it for control of the Palestinian street (ongoing since the beginning of the intifada), Hamas received the first contingents of Pales- tinian police officers in Gaza and Jericho in May 1994 in a fraternal and benevolent spirit, “because they are part of the people, they are our broth- ers.”27 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s literature discussing what usually is known as the long-term and short-term options is extensive. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, one can find discussion of an interim solution, of a Palestinian state, and even of an armistice in the first year of the intifada, a time when Hamas was at its zenith and the struggle was being waged under the slogan of liber- ating Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
times the historic solution took the lead, particularly during periods of great vigor as when the movement was launched, but it fell behind at other times, notably in the post-Oslo period, when Hamas came under attack. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Israeli media in par- ticular sought interviews with Hamas figures, as well as with those close to the movement on the understanding that they were Islamists, not that they were members of or spokesmen for the movement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The former head of Hamas’s Political Bureau summed up five pillars or guidelines on which Hamas based its support for an interim solution: First, [Hamas] does not reject the interim solution on principle, but rather depending on the resulting entitlements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Before doing so, however, it is essential to state that, while these guidelines are to be found either grouped together or scattered throughout Hamas’s literature and in the statements of its leaders, their best materialization was the so-called April 1994 initiative of the movement’s Political Bureau. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The other new aspect was the external one, that is, the increasing concern with all things relating to Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Thus, the April 1994 initiative received far greater attention than al-Zahhar’s 1988 proposal had gotten. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Abu Marzouq interview, 21 April 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If that defeatist group which is in charge of the PLO leadership had put its energies in this direction, instead of wast- ing its efforts and its funds pursuing the path of defeat, then the enemy would have withdrawn under the blows of the mujahidin.”76 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Since the first year of the intifada, this belief can be seen in any read- ing of Hamas’s objectives for the intifada and the movement’s declared goals. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin, in reply to a question concerning what he hoped to achieve through the intifada, said: “In the first place, I want a total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, then to have these territories placed under the supervision of the United Nations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A statement on the subject of an armistice by Sheikh Yassin was made in mid-1995 (that is, one and one-half years after he first brought forth the idea) in an interview with Maariv newspaper during an intensive Israeli campaign against Hamas and a wave of arrests of its members. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This fact makes it necessary to emphasize two important points at the outset. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first section of this chapter examines Hamas’s relations with the PLO and Fateh. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With respect to the PLO, three principal options were available: to join the PLO and work from within the organization, in hope eventually of taking it over; to work out- side the PLO in the expectation of creating a credible alternative and replacing the organization in the long run; or to remain outside the PLO but not set itself up as a viable alternative, in effect to remain torn between the first two alternatives. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Declaration (Gaza-Jericho First Agreement) entitled “Al-Islah al-watani al-shamil huwa al-hal” [Comprehensive national reform is the solution], 28 August 1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, Arafat has charged that Hamas was established with the direct or indirect support of Israel and has reiterated this accusation since the for- mation of Hamas, although the occurrence of such accusations seems to correlate with the amount of tension between Hamas and the PLO at any given time. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It has invited Hamas to join PLO organizations or the PA, both inside and outside the Occupied Territories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One crucial juncture that demonstrates how these positions inter- twined was the period during which the PLO invited Hamas to participate in the April 1990 meetings of the preparatory committee working on reconstituting the PNC. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Mention should be made of allegations by Hamas that there have been attempts to weaken it and to exile and sometimes to liquidate its mem- bers.’6 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Keeping these conditions in mind, one now can deal with each of the three choices envisaged by Hamas for its relations with the PLO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas belongs to the first category, but in that category Fateh is the largest organization and 40 seats are assigned to it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, what is unusual about Hamas being in this position is its considerable power and weight in Palestinian affairs; this influence has made it possible for Hamas to consider the other two options. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is true that the statements and releases by Hamas were accusatory and hostile in tone, but the translation of such positions into action remained ineffectual. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas boycotted the first session, demanding the release of its detainees as a precondition for participation, but it sent a large delegation to the second one. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first two months were spent in getting acclimatized to the home- land and taking the pulse of the opposition. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaders pointed out that Arafat had used the same tactics against other factions in the Pales- tinian resistance movement in Jordan and Lebanon, but they maintained that this method would not work against Hamas because “its roots run much deeper than Arafat thinks,” and the first decade of Hamas’s existence proved that the movement was able to withstand both internal and exter- nal pressures to dissolve it.43 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This diversion of Fateh energies into internal matters is partly responsible for the lessening of 58. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Simultaneously, the conflict between Hamas and the PA was escalating, as explained above. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The “ten” organizations that initially joined together at Tehran included the following: Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Islamic Jihad, the Movement for Palestinian National Liberation—Fateh/A1-Intifada, the Movement for Palestinian National Liberation—Fateh/Revolutionary Council, Vanguards of the War of Popular Liberation, Al-Sa’iqa, the Popular Struggle Front, and the Revolutionary Palestinian Communist Party~ The first joint communique, issued on 24 October 1991, called for a general strike on 30 October, the day the Madrid Conference was to convene; however, the formal announcement on the formation of the TRO did not come until nearly one year later, on 29 Sep- tember 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The resistance organizations felt the need to turn themselves into a united front or alliance. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For the Arabic text of this proposal, see the Arabic version of this book, Appendix, document no, 7, pp. 328—30. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For the Arabic text of the modified proposal, see ibid., pp. 334—36. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first of these was their inability to work together to win elections in the Occupied Territories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s experience in working with leftist and nationalist Palestinian resistance organizations is summarized in the lengthy excerpt below that identifies the “pillars” on which Hamas based its proposals for alliance formation following the Oslo Agreement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Furthermore, why has the relationship between them remained limited to mumarasa” [Hamas and the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement: The stance and the practice], Majallat al-dirasat al-filastiniyya, No. 16 (Fall 1993): 35. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is possible, in the event of the failure of the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement and of plans for a political settlement in general—which is what we are seeking—that the alliance formula will turn into a formula for the collective leadership of the Palestinian people, which is truly representative of that people and its aspirations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The alliance relationship inside the Occupied Territories did not even rise to the level of the least common denominator it achieved abroad. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If there was an accurate appreciation of this situa- tion, it was not reflected in practice in relation to what exactly was required of the alliance with the fasa’il. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It will dismantle barriers isolating it from others and will foster understanding and a coming together with others, which will serve [the general] interest. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Periodically, opportunities did present themselves for an alternative, such as when negotiations in Washington reached an apparent impasse or when several Arab states expressed reservations about the substance of the Gaza- Jericho First Agreement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This position was formulated as a combination of policies that the movement adopted beginning with its first year. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This text first was published in Khaled Hroub, “Al-masihiyyoun fil ard al-muhtalla, waqi’ ta’ayush mujtama’i raghm al-ihtilal” [Christians in the occupied territories: The reality of social coexistence despite the occupation], Al-Hayat, 3 July 1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One can find many similar texts in numerous leaflets, such as Peri- odic statements no. 65 of 11 October 1990 and no. 81 of 1 December 1991, as well as in the 13 April 1990 statement condemning a Zionist assault on the property of a Greek Orthodox church in the holy city of Jerusalem and the subsequent attack on the monks who demonstrated in protest against the first attack. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Any researcher who follows the course Hamas has taken in the last few years in its relations with the Islamists in Israel or monitors offi- cial (Israeli) reactions and security measures will conclude that it is far- fetched to postulate an organizational link between the two. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas was immensely satisfied with the first decision because to do oth- erwise would have weakened the political rationale for its position. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Since then, Hamas leaders and prominent figures have emerged in the Arab countries surrounding Israel, and representatives have been named in those countries. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There is no difficulty in finding outspoken statements by Hamas between 1987 and 1990 that unabashedly indict (and openly antagonize) a number of Arab regimes for llamas’s Political Hamas s political thinking and discourse about the Arab regimes can be divided into two periods. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These factors had an impact on Hamas’s political thought and discourse, not only because of the presence of the movement’s leaders and representatives in the neighboring Arab countries but also because the movement was becoming politically more mature. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Even during the first period, Hamas’s discourse was remarkably restrained in the use of radical appellations, adjectives, and accusations in comparison to the discourse of the Palestinian Left, which denounced Arab regimes on numerous occasions, and in Fateh’s publications in the Occu- pied Territories, especially the latter’s statements on Jordan. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Moreover, the very process of dealing with Arab officials revealed to Hamas practical as well as ideo- logical complications and constraints, none of which it had been aware in the first stage when its political discourse had been untroubled by consid- erations of diplomacy or the need to take Arab interests into account. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first obstacle that Hamas had to surmount in forging its ties with Arab regimes was the political and historical legacy of relations—most often hostile—between the Muslim Brotherhood and those regimes. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Because Hamas is considered similar to the Brotherhood for ideological Hamas’s PoliticaiRelations 14’ 148 HAMAS and genealogical reasons (which are acknowledged in the movement’s Charter),4 two difficulties stood in the way of Hamas overcoming this categorization and establishing working relations with Arab governments free of the legacy of old positions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This connection is stated clearly in the Hamas Charter, which was issued on 18 August 1988. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This approach is also the foundation fot its relations with popular organizations, a topic that is examined later. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
First, Hamas seeks to establish positive relations with all Arab and Islamic parties (states, organizations, forces, political parties, or individuals), irrespective of their ideological and political orientations or their sectarian and racial origins. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It repeated the pattern observed in the first period [from the outbreak of the intifada to the Gulf War], when Hamas’s discourse gradu- ally toned down from initial zealotry to moderation and less condemna- tion. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Because of the extreme contradiction between settlement proposals and Hamas’s ideological and political posi- tion, the movement found itself having to denounce them constantly. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first incident was the detention of 25 Palestinian families on the Libyan border with Egypt for several days in December 1994; this led to the death of two children. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This crisis prompted Hamas to appoint for the first time an offi- cial representative outside the territory of Palestine to join the delegation representing Islamic movements and groups that was formed to help resolve the crisis through nonmilitary means. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It added that the solution “has to be based first of all on the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region and Iraqi forces from Kuwait; that an Arab or an Islamic force should be stationed in the hotly disputed border areas; that the peo- ple of Kuwait should have the right of determining the future of their country; and that disputes should be settled in an Arab or Islamic frame- work which will ensure that Iraq’s demands concerning the drawing of bor- ders or the repayment of debts arising from the war with Iran and other [debts] will receive due consideration.”39 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet dated 17 August 1990. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first was in April 1994, when Jordan announced it was withdrawing the passports of Nazzal and Ibrahim Ghosheh, both Jordanian citizens, after Nazzal declared in Amman that Hamas was embarking on armed attacks inside the heart- land of Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
63. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It may be worthwhile to find a common denominator among 73. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first set is pub- lic-oriented, aimed at nurturing mobilization, and calls for material support and participation in jihad; the second is regime-oriented, charac- terized by appeasement and moderation, and emphasizes noninterference in domestic affairs. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Yet, that suc- cess has been achieved at the expense of Hamas’s direct contacts with the Arab public, which have become rare. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first congress was organized during the Gulf crisis, and it since has become a meeting place for delegates from grass-roots Arab nationalist and Islamic movements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
PLO Chairman Arafat landed in Tehran 1979 as the first official visitor to the capital under the new regime, and he was given a triumphal welcome befitting conquerors and mujahidin. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first few months witnessed the flowering of fraternal sentiments, during which Palestine’s representatives in Tehran were hosted and feted. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This legisla- tion established an account that was funded by contributions collected from governmental and nongovernmental organizations and earmarked for support of the Palestinian people through their Islamic forces.79 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Meanwhile, on an altogether different tack, the U.S. and Western powers have mounted ver- bal attacks on Iran and Hamas for working together to undermine the peace process. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Allowing for the difference in ideology, Hamas also saw itself as part of a global movement (albeit Islamic) trying to bring about a historic trans- formation, first in the Islamic world and then in the entire world, just like other Islamic movements from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Balkans From the time that ethnic wars broke out in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence, Hamas has been protest- ing “the injustice against, and the persecution of, the Muslims” there, “just because they are Muslims.”90 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Washington based International Committee of Solidarity with Dr. Musa Abu Marzouq quoted Abu Marzouq’s lawyers as saying that he had received over five thousand letters of support in his New York jail during the first three months of deten- tion; and faxed letters of protest had so disturbed American embassies that the embassy in Pakistan had shut down its fax one week after the arrest.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
115. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With time then, Hamas’s appreciation of international relations became more sophisticated and its discourse more nuanced. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
First, it was a cruel act, considering the large number of people (413) who were exiled to a strip of wilderness where they had to camp in mountainous terrain under harsh winter con- ditions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first of their kind, these contacts were made through the American embassy in Amman during January and February 1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With the exception of occasional contacts with the International Red Cross, the record of Hamas’s ties to international groups is remarkably poor. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Israeli goal of such benign policy was to undermine the preeminent leadership position of the PLO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this study I advance a fourth interpretation, namely, that Israel’s policy toward the growing strength of Islamic movements throughout the 1 970s and 1 980s up to the first year of the intifada was characterized by confu- sion, bewilderment, and an inability to take decisive action. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
First, Israel’s position toward Islamic institutions or toward the social and educational aspects of the Islamic awakening was no different from its established position toward other nonmilitary phenomena that accom- panied the Palestinian national movement and factions of the PLO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If this assertion acquired credibility, the national struggle would be recast as an ideological one—a war between religions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Among these discussions is one conducted in April 1994 by General Doron Almough, Hamas’s PoliticaiRelations 205 206 HAMAS In the first few months of 1994, Israel’s attempts to engage Hamas intensified. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
According to this same official, Hamas believed that Israel had four goals: The first is to exert pressure on Arafat by putting him on notice that there is a strong competitor with whom Israel can negotiate. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The repeated reference by the Islamists to participation in those elections is part of their quest for the missing link in their history, during the period of their absence from the arena of armed struggle. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Theory andPractice 215 216 HAMAS between Hamas and the PLO over settlement plans. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The political thought and practice of Hamas differentiate between two different kinds of elections. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
On rare occasions, Hamas did not put up its own candidates or endorse candidates sympathetic to the movement (e.g., HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
contest alone most of the time and against an alliance of nationalist forces represented by the organizations within the PLO, including those that later would oppose the PLO’s policies on Madrid and Oslo. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The PLO rejected the proposal at the time (1979), as did the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first position supports holding elections and considers them a manifestation of sovereignty. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In contrast, the platforms of the different contestants are political first and foremost for general elections, while the public service aspect is linked integrally to political ideology and what can be achieved in practice. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To be fair, that is not Hamas’s official view because it implies an infallibility that Hamas does not claim. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Giving the process time (to work) natu- rally means voting for the candidates who are asking for patience, that is, for the PLO or supporters of the PA but not for Hamas, which is refusing to ask for it in the first place. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As discussed in chapter 1, the Mus- lim Brotherhood, the organization out of which Hamas emerged, spent many years grappling with social problems as its first priority. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This organic connection between the social and the political imparted its legacy in Hamas’s political thought and practice. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These activities led to a rise in Hamas’s popularity.58 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first process fortifies society through education, and the sec- ond challenges the occupation with a fortified society. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first area of activity pertains to Islamic charitable institutions and societies, including mosques, classes that teach students to memorize the Quran, zakat (alms tax) committees, medical clinics, relief societies, orphanages, schools and nurseries, and cultural and sports clubs. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It quoted one person who had donated $8,000 as saying that although he did not like Hamas, he had given money because he trusted his donation would reach its intended target. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Hamas and Unified National Leadership experiments were partially successful, but they were aborted after the first year when the Israeli authorities closed down a number of mosques where students were being taught, declared educational commit- tees to be illegal, and subjected their members to imprisonment.68 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first point is that Hamas’s thought and practice regarding social issues developed during the intifada, reflected the high spirits during the uprising, and interacted with it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Such has been the experience of the PA in its first few years. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
How- ever, Hamas’s view with respect to the role of military action within the totality of all action was ambiguous in the first few years of its existence. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is important to note here that there were two exceptions to the unarmed manner in which Hamas conducted itself in the first three years. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In one incident, an Israeli soldier, Avi Sasportas, was kidnapped inside the “green line,” that is, the Israeli heartland, in February 1989; in the other, and less than three months after the first, a second soldier, han Sa’don, was kidnapped in May of the same year. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
First, Hamas confined mili- tary action to the occupied territory and made a commitment not to attack Israeli targets abroad. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This change in trend implies two conclusions: First, it robs our actions of the moral justification that was based on the inhuman Palestinian violence normally directed at innocent civilians, children, women, and the elderly. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the first place, it should be remembered that the goal and strat- egy of Hamas are long-term, and theoretically, point toward “liberating Palestine from the river to the sea.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
lar suicide operations and the international condemnation and the tight- ening of the rope around the movement that followed, have forced at least some important figures in Hamas to contemplate the necessity of freezing military actions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Transcript cited in Al-Quds Press, 12 October 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It tried (but without success) to counter extensive Israeli and American propaganda campaigns aimed at attaching the label “terrorist” to Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Such a development would deprive Hamas of its lifeblood: mass support. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
1 First Communique of Hamas (Quran, 3:200) Appendix 265 266 HAMAS ment policies shall avail them nothing; and all their attempts at dissolving and exterminating our people shall crumble despite their bullets, agents, and infamy. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
That paved the way for the imperialist attack in which rance to neglect a single one of these circles, because Palestine is an Islamic land accommodating the first qibla [direction to face during prayer] and the third holiest sanctuary, from whence the ascent of the Prophet (may peace be upon him) took place. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The society that confronts a vicious enemy, like a Nazi in its behavior of not differentiating between men and women or elders and youth, must be first in adorning this Islamic spirit. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They were behind the First World War in which they destroyed the Islamic Caliphate, picked the material profit, monopolized the raw wealth, and got the Balfour Declaration. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
18 August 1988 A.D. Appendix I 29] 292 I HAMAS In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful: First: Date of Formation The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) announced itself to the world in a public communique distributed in the Gaza Strip on 12 December 1987 and in the West Bank on 14 December 1987. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Second: Motives for Formation Hamas came into existence as a result of the interaction of many factors affecting the Palestinian people since the first catastrophe of 1948, and especially after the defeat of 1967. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
their case, which to them is a question of life or death and a cultural strug- gle between the Arabs and Muslims on one side and Zionism on the other, had been transformed into a mere refugee problem in the aftermath of the first catastrophe and into a matter of negotiating a way out of the 1967 defeat by negotiating away occupied Arab land. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
ership of the PLO, suffered a series of internal and external setbacks that Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) On the first axis, it became increasingly clear to the Palestinians that In the 1 980s, the Palestinian revolutionary program, under the lead- Introductory Memorandum DOCUMENT NO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ninth: Hopes and Aspirations Despite its relative youth, the Movement, with God’s help, has played a prominent role in intensifying the struggle of our people against the Zion- ist occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The blessed intifada and its intensification was the first great step that we took. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In commenting on this subject, Hamas wishes to emphasize the following: First: The prime minister of the enemy, the terrorist Yitzhak Rabin, claiming that Jordan hosts some Hamas leaders, issued a threat to broth- erly Jordan, demanding that it take measures against the activities of Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
the first; this method was resorted to only after all political and peaceful means were exhausted without the Palestinian people and its national movement seeing any tangible results that might lead to the realization of our national goals. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first The second method is military. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
mamanasa” [Hamas and the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement: The stance and the practice], Majallat al-dirasat al-fllastmniyya, no, 16 (Fall 1993): 26—37. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Schiff, Ze’ev and Ehud Ya’ari. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Special thanks must also go to Yunis Awdeh, an old friend and a first-class Lebanese journalist, without whom this book might also not have materialised. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
To Terry Anderson, who first hired and gave me my first taste of journalism, and to his wife Madeleine, for welcoming me in their home in New York as well as helping put me in touch with some of the sources in this book and for sharing their invaluable knowledge and insight, I owe special thanks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Their history is a curious combination of revolutionary spirit and political withdrawal: their first leaders died as martyrs fighting for their inheritance but later, in order to survive in a hostile environment, the Shiites developed the theological principle of taqi~yya, religious dissimulation, which allowed them to conceal their religion. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They were fortunate to have the ear of the French, who had won the mandate for Syria and Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Within a decade of his arrival in Lebanon, Sadr became the Shiites’ champion and succeeded in giving them a sense of communal identity. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Syria’s military intervention put an end to the first savage round of the civil war, which was to continue until 1990. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Two years later, in March 1978, Israel launched ‘Operation Litani’ and invaded the country for the first time, following the PLO’s attack on a bus inside Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Sadr’s mysterious disappearance echoed the fate of a central figure in Shia theology: theTwelfth Imam, considered the rightful leader of Islam, who vanished in the ninth century. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In early 1983, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) issued the first draft of their plan to form the ‘Organisation for a Unified South’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
purpose of this newly acquired organisation and militia was, first and foremost, to protect Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Most had also received their first taste of military training from the Palestinian experts who ran scores of military camps in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While it was not a demand for an all-out war against the Israelis, the moderate sheikh’s cry was the first Hezbollah 18 official call for confrontation and one which would soon be reiterated by others. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He outlined Hezbollah’s prime objectives in its first months of development in an interview with the newspaper Al-S afir: It was then a resistance movement and nothing else. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Harb, remembered by most as the first instigator of resistance activity in South Lebanon, ranks high on Hezbollah’s list of martyrs. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In February 1985, Israel concluded the first stage of its withdrawal to the Litani River and declared an ‘Iron Fist’ policy over the 900-square-mile area it still controlled. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s withdrawal coincided with the public debut of Hezbollah and the first anniversary of Harb’s murder. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From the Bekaa Valley, where it first came into being, it had moved to Beirut where it based its central headquarters. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was the first confrontation between the two and a clear message from the Syrian government that it would not hesitate to use force to impose its will and curtail Hezbollah’s political aspirations in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s call for an Islamic state in Lebanon, dictated by the Iranians, posed a serious threat to the future and stability of Assad’s Alawite Syrian regime, the first sectarian minority to rule the country’s Sunni majority. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
and Hezbollah’s differences had first come into the open when Israel withdrew its troops from most of the South and retreated to the ‘security zone’ in June 1985. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For the first time, the group had the chance to con- vinceAssad, during a high-level meeting with the Syrian leader in Latakia, that its prime goal and mission was to fight the Israeli occupation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He is not dressed in military fatigues, as one might expect, but in the turban and cloak of a cleric. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He continues: You see Hezbollah, on the military level, has taken massive steps forward from when it first started.When Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Usually, the first signals we get of a pending operation is when there is a sudden increase in the number of motorcycle drivers in South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s television station, ‘Al-Manar’, The Beacon, soon followed: its first broadcast was Ayatollah Khomeini’s funeral in 1989. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The timing was fateful: Iran immediately volunteered to help its Lebanese brethren and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards were swiftly dispatched to Baalbeck in the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Those were heady days in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He described the group’s priorities and activities in its first months of formation in an interview with the newspaper Al-S afir: The main effort at the time went into mustering and attracting young men and setting up military camps where they could be trained and organised into small groups capable of carrying out resistance attacks against the occupying force. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
first being the banding together of young men, training and organising them into small groups and then dispatching them to the occupied areas from where they were instructed to carry out attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The second effort was spreading the word among the people, first, in a bid to raise their morale, and second to THE Piu~rY OF GOD 49 instil in them a sense of animosity towards the enemy, coupled with a spirit of resistance in the face of the occupying forces. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They became Hezbollah’s first shoura, council, and were responsible for the Bekaa, Beirut and the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He was one of the many militants who held America responsible for encouraging and allowing Israel to invade and occupy Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In other words, they seek to impose their own Western principles, not taking ours into consideration, in an attempt to suck us into their own agenda. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
the first roots of such vice being the United States.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its result was a group with two parts. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The first body represents the leadership of Hezbollah which makes the decisions and the second is the body that executes its directives. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Very little has changed in Hezbollah’s ideology since it first announced its manifesto in 1985. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah considered it to be no more than continuation of the status Ti-rn PARTY OF GOD 71 quo. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel had to watch bitterly from the sidelines as Syria tightened its hold on Lebanon.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
blast destroyed the eight-storey building and killed 141 people. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In its manifesto, Hezbollah calls the attack on the American Embassy ‘the first punishment’ and it lists the MNF bombings as further punishments. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A seventeen-year-old Sunni girl, Sanaa Muhaidily, became the first symbol of women’s participation in the battle against Israel when she drove her white Peugeot car at an Israeli target, killing herself and two Israeli soldiers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When he first tried to broach the subject of the hostages, the Iranians rebuffed him. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘It was the first opening for this issue in theory, but a very important one,’ Picco recalled. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was the first abduction of a foreign national in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He was arrested by the Syrian authorities shortly after exchanging the captive for a ransom of 1,150,000 dollars. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For more than ten years, these photographs of Dodge’s son and daughter in their graduation gowns had been sitting in the old shoebox on the top shelf of Farid’s wardrobe, in this remote village in the BekaaValley. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
About three weeks or so after Dodge was first kidnapped, his guards told him they would be taking him on a trip that would lead to his release.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘It was crazy,’ recalled Farid, revealing for the first time how the kidnappers managed to remove Dodge from Beirut under the noses of the Israelis: There was no way for us to move him without him being discovered by the Israeli troops surrounding the city. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Dodge’s kidnapping had forced the Americans to seek the influence of the PLO for the first time.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On the first anniversary of his abduction, Dodge was taken out of his cell, given back the clothes he had worn on the day of his abduction, and driven back to the airport by an official of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From there, he flew first class to Syria. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
We were told that the Americans were not interested in our demands and that Dodge had become a losing card which was better set free,’ he explained in embarrassment, as if he had realised their naïvety for the first time. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Abbas Musawi, leader of Hezbollah until his murder (along with that of his wife and youngest child) by an Israeli helicopter gunship attack on his motorcade in 1992. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
first foreign hostage to be murdered was the Dutch Catholic priest Nicholas Kluiters. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Although much is still unknown and the exact details may never come to light, some well-placed sources are currently more wffling to testify than previously. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The same sources who revealed that Buckley’s name and position in the agency were first discovered during the Iranian siege of the embassy inTehran disclosed that while ‘volumes’ of details were indeed elicited, Buckley’s confessions were never made public as the CIA managed to save their inteffigence by purchasing his disclosures from the Iranians with the help of mediators. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
first consignment of arms was 100 anti-tank TOW missiles, provided by Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Encouraged by the first result, the US president authorised McFarlane to make a secret trip to Iran to negotiate. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Waite, the Archbishop of Canterbury’s envoy, first became involved in the crisis when he was approached by the Presbyterian Church in 1984, on behalf of Benjamin Weir’s wife. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At first, his efforts appeared successful whenWeir,Jacobsen and Jenco were released in 1985 and 1986. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He agreed to speak for this book about Waite’s kidnap for the first time since the events took place, on condition that he remain anonymous, even though his identity has been revealed in the past. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
• The doctor has been haunted for years by the results of his mediation: I feel I was used by the people who brought me the letters [from Jacobsen] in the first place. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The first, Mohammed Hamadi, was arrested on 13 January 1987 for his role in the TWA hijack in June 1985. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
I think it is much better to get to the point of knowing the roots of the problem and to ask the question why is it that people take hostages in the first place. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Now I • am not saying that they [problems] necessarily justify later inflicting penalties and misery on the innocent, but what I am saying is that if you wish to prevent hostage taking and minimise acts of violence you should address yourself in the first place to the fundamental grievances that people are expressing and attempt to deal with them because Hezbollah 140 T sometimes there is something being said in these grievances. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
First of all, they are two-thirds family. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah boasts that, although its social welfare system was first instigated to cater for the need of its Shiite brethren, it is also available to the poor of other religious sects. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Relief Committee has opened the first employment office in the country and formed several handicraft and technical institutes, where some women have learnt a trade for the first time in their lives.Those Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
can deny such a thing?’ says Sheikh Subhi Tufeili, Hezbollah’s first leader. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The demand for a financial system based on Islamic ethics was first made by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 193 Os. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel claims that Hezbollah launches its attacks from the villages and that its reprisals are aimed at Hezbollah strongholds, but the damage inflicted on the villages suggests that Israel has targeted civilians in an attempt to turn them against the Islamic Resistance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The poor and illiterate Shiite population had little awareness of health issues and lacked access to affordable treatment. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
One of the largest general centres is the Dar al- Hawraa, which first started in 1984 as a childbirth centre in an apartment in the southern suburbs. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They claim that they are acting, first and foremost, out of an Islamic obligation which demands that all Muslims help the less fortunate and give aid to the destitute. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah is careful to emphasise that its Islamic vision should not be interpreted as an intention to impose an Islamic society on the Lebanese. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was from such mosques that Hezbollah first made itself known.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Although Qom, in Iran, and Najaf, in Iraq, are the Shiites’ two main centres for higher theological studies, Hezbollah has also started several theological schools in Lebanon for those seeking to specialise in religious studies and become clerics. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
After the Israeli offensive in 1993, ‘Operation Accountability’, Hariri launched the first major government compensation programme for the southern Lebanese. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Other UN soldiers lined up behind the barbed wire that separated the base from the cemetery, in a show of solidarity with the thousands of mourners who had poured into the tiny village, where the Bible recounts that Christ conducted his first miracle of changing water into wine. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The tit-for-tat war between the Resistance and Israeli soldiers first climaxed in 1993, when Israel launched ‘Operation Accountability’, an air and artillery blitz of South Lebanon in response to the killing of eight soldiers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Peres began to lose support and the leader of the right- wing Likud party, Binyamin Netanyahu, gained a lead in the polls for the first time. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On the first day of the offensive, at 4.30 Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For many of the refugees, it was the fourth occasion since Israel first invaded Lebanon in 1978. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Najla Abu Jahja, a photographer working for Reuters news agency, was less than 20 metres away when the hovering helicopter fired its missile, and she described the scene: It was awful.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
She refused for the very reasons that had driven her out of the city in the first place and instead promised to leave the village and to head to the lakeside town of Qaroun, also in the Bekaa Valley, which was not under attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On the way out of the village a helicopter fired its first missile which landed in front of the vehicle, bringing it to a halt. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah appealed to the Muslims for a general mobiisation, a call which had in the past drawn thousands of young men and fighters from other parties and Hezbollah 186 militias to support the Party of God’s regular army. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Earlier that month, before ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’ was launched, Chirac had been the first Western leader to visit Lebanon since the end of the civil war. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s military apparatus was intact: the guerrillas whom Israel was set on destroying at the start of the campaign had suffered few casualties and their popularity had risen. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Fitting out a mujahed [guerrilla fighter] 197 its needs in order to help it carry on defending our people. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel retaliated and, in its first breach of the agreement, attacked a civilian area in the Bekaa Valley injuring two people. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Since his election, Netanyahu has indicated that he would be prepared to make a deal with Lebanon, known as ‘Lebanon first’, as the basis of negotiations with Syria. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In its first four years in parliament, Hezbollah established a significant voice. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
which had once enjoyed the position of being the Shiites’ first and only representative, was again reminded that it was in danger of losing its claim. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It also appeared to have lost its position as spokesman: for the first time, foreign journalists, who had once not dared to approach Hezbollah, were courting the Party of God’s press officers and hanging on their every word. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Extracts from Speeches ofAyatollah Montazeri, Tehran, 1988 Joffe, Lawrence, Keesing’s Guide to the Middle East Peace Process, London, 1996 Katzman, Kenneth, The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Boulder, Colorado, 1993 Kramer, Martin, ‘Hezbollah’s Vision of the West’, Washington Institute Policy Papers, Number 16,Washington, 1989 Kramer, Martin (Ed.), Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
* Cited in Sacred Rage, Robin Wright, p. 233 EPILOGUE 213 So long as the West and Israel continue to regard the problem as a crusade against terrorism they are in effect denying their own responsibility for fostering the conditions which gave rise to Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
November: first human bomb attack destroys Israeli military headquarters in Tyre. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah forms first shoura, council; April: Lebanon peace accord; September: Israel withdraws to Awali River, north of Sidon; October: clash bet- ween Israeli troops and Shiite civilians in Nabatiyeh, followed by call for civil resistance; bombing of multinational forces; December: bombings in Kuwait, 17 men charged. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
February: multinational forces leave; start of hostage- taking; Sheikh Ragheb Harb assassinated; June: first issue of Hezbollah’s newspaper Al-Ahed; Jihad a!- Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
resistance begins against Israeli occupation; Hezbollah is conceived; Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrive in Lebanon; four Iranians abducted by Lebanese Forces; David Dodge is kidnapped; multinational forces arrive; PLO evacuated from Beirut; massacre of Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Chatila. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Common name for southern suburbs of Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
94-6592 For Armena, in memory of our son, Grikor Martiros Suni (1978—1980) Contents Preface to the Second Edition Preface Note on Transliteration and Dating PART ONE THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES I The Formation of the Georgian Nation 2 Christian Georgia: The First Thousand Years 3 The Long Twilight of the Georgian Kingdoms PART TWO GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE 4 Russian Rule and Georgian Society 5 Emancipation and the End of Seigneurial Georgia 6 The Emergence of Political Society 7 Marxism and the National Struggle 8 The End of Tsarist Georgia ix xiii xvii 3 20 42 63 96 113 144 16S viii Contents 9 10 I I 12 13 14 PART THREE REVOLUTIONARy AND SOVIET GEORGIA evolution and Republic 185 Bolshevik Georgia Stalin’s Revolution Stalinism in Georgia Georgia and Soviet Nationality Policy since Stalin The Georgian Road to Independence Glossary Notes Bibliographical Note Index 209 237 260 292 317 337 343 403 409 L Preface to the Second Edition In the decade after the first edition of The Making of the Georgian Nation was written, a number of coincidental processes changed the landscape for the study of nationalism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Even as nationalists insisted on the primordial and irreducible nature of the na- tional, scholars moved in precisely the opposite direction. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Understandings of ethnic and social differences, themselves always in the process of construction and contestation, were available to the intellectuals and activists who, in turn, privileged a particular perception of x Preface to the Second Edition society and history and worked to consolidate a social formation or politi. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The consequent synthesis will primarily be meaningful to the inhabitants of that cultural space, either as a contribution to self-knowledge or as advertisement for the outside world. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The nineteenth-century flourishing of national histories, in the period of nation-formation and the proliferation of nationalisms, testifies to their importance and influence. The Making of the Georgian Nation
ooze” to the present, can never be the product of one person’s research. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Its current predicament is the product of the tension between Soviet promotion of certain national forms and Soviet restrictions on their full development and expression. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the Late Bronze Age, a period that in Caucasia included the end of the second millennium and the first centuries of the first millennium B.C., differentiations in wealth within the tribes are evident in the burial sites. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This transitional phase of Georgian and Armenian national formation is not well illuminated by local historical evidence, and scholars are forced to rely on later classical sources to produce the barest outlines. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the first half of the fourth century B.C., the Persians may have managed to reassert their suzerainty over the western Georgian tribes, for it is known r L that the Greek cities of Sinope and Amis came under their authority. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian chronicles, kartlis tskhovreba, provide the tradition of the first king of Kartli-Iberia, Parnavazi (Farnavazi, Pharnabazus), who, they claim, was a descendant of Kartlosi, the eponymous ancestor of the Georgians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Armenia achieved her greatest expanse in the mid-first century B.C. under the warrior- king Tigran II, “the Great” (95—55 B.C.). In alliance with his father-in-law, Mithradates Eupator of Pontus, Tigran fought the Romans and Persians and conquered Sophene. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Pompey marched first into Colchis, where he was attacked in the rear by Iberians and Caucasian Albanians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Roman power was never very firm in eastern Georgia, and by the second half of the first century B.C. the growing strength of the Parthian successors to the Persian Seleucids was being felt throughout Transcaucasia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A pattern of Ana- tolian and Caucasian political maneuvering developed by which the lesser local rulers shifted allegiances, not on the basis of ethnicity or religion, but in desperate attempts to maintain local power in the face of constant threats from larger states. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Rather than an undiluted and consistent struggle for national independence or religious integrity, as is often proposed by modern historians, the struggles of the Armenian, Georgian, and Albanian kings and princes should be seen as a series of constantly changing political orientations. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Often this meant that princes gravitated toward one great power while their monarchs moved toward another. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A stone inscription discovered at Mtskheta speaks of the first-century ruler, Mihrdat I (A.D. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Arsacid line in Kartli- Iberia ended the next year, and the Iranians took advantage of internal strife in the Roman empire to establish their candidate, Mirian III (Meribanes; 284—361), son of the Great King of Iran, on the throne of eastern Georgia.56 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 298, after a great Roman victory, Iran and Rome signed the Peace of Nisibis, and Mirian was recognized as king, though suzerain rights over Kartli-Iberia and Armenia passed to the Romans. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Soviet economic historian, Manandian, does not consider Kartli-Iberia to have been very significant in the transit trade of the first centuries A.D., but Melikishvili takes issue with this view, contending that Manandian underestimates the importance of Kartli in classical trade. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first centuries A.D. were the period in which the distinctive features of Caucasian society were molded. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Disagreeing with Adontz that the Caucasian social structure was essentially the same as that of Western feudalism, Toumanoff argues that in the Armenian nakharar system the princes held their lands absolutely and had much greater local power than did West European nobles, whose tenure was conditional and based on service. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The king (mepe) of Kartli-Iberia appointed the spaspeti (erismtavari), or high constable, to whom all provincial and local officials were subordinated. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In its most permanent sociopolitical forms, Georgia was a reflection of Iranian organization rather than Roman. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Formation of the Georgian Nation 19 2 Christian Georgia: The First Thousand Years The ancient period of Caucasian history witnessed the transmutation of tribal conglomerations into political societies and can be seen as the gesta- tion period of the Caucasian states; the early Christian period, according to scholars like Nicholas Adontz, Cyril Toumanoff, and Nina Garsoian, can be considered the formative centuries for Caucasian civilization. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Although relatively brief, this period had long-lasting consequences, for while in the Roman orbit the Caucasian monarchies, first Armenia and then Kartli-Iberia, converted to Christianity. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the first place, it strengthened their alliance with the Roman empire, where Christianity had also been victorious, against the Persians; second, it untied the hands of the kings in the struggle against the pagan priesthood, which possessed immense landholdings and great wealth.”4 The Making of the Georgian Nation
These positions were a “feudal” element in an otherwise “dynastic” system. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Early in the fifth century, Mesrop Mashtots com- pleted his Armenian alphabet, and then, according to his biographer, Koriun, set out to devise alphabets for the Georgians and the Caucasian Albanians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A modern Georgian historian, Ivane Javakhishvili, has argued that Georgian writing goes back to the Phoenician-Semitic~Aramaic cultural world and is unrelated to Armenian. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Iranians accepted this arrangement in the peace of 591, which divided Kartli-Iberia between the two empires at Tbilisi. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Ishaq ibn Isma’il, emir of Tbilisi (833?—853), was powerful enough to defy the caliph for decades, and he forced the Bagratids to pay him tribute. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the words of W. E. D. Allen, this ended “forever the chance of Tiflis [Tbilisi] becoming the centre of an Islamic state in the Caucasus.”32 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Ashot I, “the Great” (862—890), was first among Armenian dynasts and, by aiding Bagrat I of Kartli-Iberia against his brother, Guaram of Javakheti (830-881), he gained great influence in eastern Georgia as well. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1008 Gurgeni died, and Bagrat III became the first king of a unified Abkhazeti and Kartli-Iberia (1008—1014). The Making of the Georgian Nation
For the first time since the coming of the Romans the two principal parts of Georgia were united, and after 1008 a new word, sakartvelo, came into use to refer both to Kartli in the east and Egrisi in the west. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first king of Abkhazeti and Kartli-Iberia, Bagrat III, made several attempts to incorporate the east- ernmost Georgian principality, Kakheti, into his realm, but he held that area only briefly. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In so doing, he broke the peace with Byzantium, first in 1015—1016 when he occupied Tao, and then in 1021 when he faced Basil II and his allies, the Armenian Bagratids of Ani. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But, as Allen points out, “the thirty years which followed the death of David II in 1125 were years of stagnation in the political life of the Caucasian lands by contrast with the epic period of the first quarter of the century~”58 David’s successors—Demetre 1(1125—1154?), David III (IV) (1156), and Giorgi III (IV) (1156—1184)—were unable to preserve all the territorial gains of their great ancestor. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the relative security of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a distinct Georgian Christian culture and civilization emerged, one with affinities to both the Byzantine West and the Iranian East. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Her first years on the throne were marked by a circumscription of royal power and an increase in the authority of the noble council. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Even the queen’s first husband, Prince Iurii, son of Andrei Bogoliubskii of Rostov-Suzdal, was forced on her by the nobles. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The tribute of her client states and war booty alone brought to the Crown the yearly revenue of 75 million dirhams. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Royal power had but a symbolic hold over the great princes.68 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Instead of culminat- Twilight of the Georgian Kingdoms 43 44 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES ing in royal unity, feudal dependence brought fragmentation and anarchy to Georgia’s last independent centuries. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The great noble families submitted to the king, and Giorgi was able to pass on to his heirs— David VII (VIII) (1346—1360) and Bagrat V (1360—1395)—a relatively stable and prosperous kingdom. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Finally, after a half-century of war, the Turks and Safavids signed the Peace of Amasa in 1555, which divided Georgia into spheres of influence. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first Russian contacts were made with King Levan I of Kakheti (1520—1574) in 1558, but it was during the reign of his son, Aleksandre II of Kakheti, that Moscow sent a series of embassies to Gremi. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet the first signs of revival, which led tentatively to the so- called Silver Age, began in the second third of the century under an aged administrator in Kartli. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The vali of Kartli, Vakhtang V (Shahnavaz I; 165 8—1676), tried to find a throne for his energetic son, Archil, first in Imereti (1661) and later in Kakheti (1664—1675), but ultimately the restless prince was driven into exile in Russia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Unfortunately for the Georgians-and for the Armenians of Karabagh, also engaged in a complex struggle against the Muslims—Peter’s campaign stopped short of linking with the Christian rebels, and the tsar withdrew so as not to antagonize the Turks. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Russian soldiers were to be stationed in Georgia, and the king was to conduct his foreign policy in conformity with Russian preferences. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Conveniently, Giorgi XII died just before the first Russian troops arrived in Tbilisi.52 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Responding to that resistance, the tsarist administration enticed the nobility of Georgia into participation in the new order. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the end of the first fifty years of Russian rule, the once rebellious, semi-independent dynasts of Georgia had been transformed into a service gentry loyal to their new monarch. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the first half of the nineteenth century, Georgian nobles held their estates (satavadebi) in one of three ways. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Instead of two provinces, eastern Georgia was divided into five uezdy (districts) and at every level of administration Georgian nobles were given a role to play. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The persistent sparring over local political influence between the Russian administration and the Georgian nobles usually re- sulted in incremental victories for the bureaucracy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The princes steadily lost ground, first as hereditary political and police authorities in their districts and later as rulers of their own vassal gentry, the aznaurni. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Knorring’s successor as head administrator, Prince Pavel Dmitrievich Tsitsianov (1754—1806), was a Russian-educated Georgian. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgian nobles were even permitted to enroll their children in the Russian cadet corps. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The French representative in Tiflis contrasted the two generals in a dispatch to Paris: “[Ermolov] was an administrator, [Paskevich] is nothing more than a soldier; the first understands the power of certain compromises, the other knows nothing but force.”16 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgian nobles partici- pated in most of the rebellions against the Russian occupation in the first third of the nineteenth century—the conspiracy of the Kakhetian princes (1802), the insurrection in Mtiuleti (1804), the Kakhetian uprising (1812— 1813), and the rebellion in Imereti (1819—1820). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Out of such unreconciled aristocrats the first generation of the Georgian oppositional intelligentsia was formed in the 1820s. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In July 1828 the Russian authorities authorized publication of the first Russian newspaper in the Caucasus, Tiflisskie vedomosti (Tiflis Bulletin), hoping to generate enthusiasm for Russia’s military efforts against Turkey. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But before the “Instruction for the First Night” could be implemented, the conspirators were betrayed by one of their own number, Prince Iase Palavandishvili.23 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first viceroy Nicholas appointed was Mikhail Semenovich Vorontsov (1782—1856), a man familiar with the Cau- casus (he had served under Tsitsianov) and considered a friend of the Caucasian peoples. The Making of the Georgian Nation
It had survived the first half-century of Russian occupation by being transformed from a divided political elite in conflict with its own monarch into a united corporation devoted to its new sovereign, the Romanov tsar. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Resistance to the changes brought by the Russians began soon after the first soldier passed through the Daryal. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the first years of the Russian occupation, Georgians in one region or another, members of one class or Russian Rule and Georgian Society 83 84 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE another, protested the presence of the tsarist forces. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the seventeenth century the term was applied only to those who had been specifically awarded this rank. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The particular coincidence of ethnicity and social function in the urban Armenian community gave rise to a smoldering hostility among many Geor- gian nobles toward the merchants, even as their monarch supported the Armenian urbanites. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the first years of Russian rule, competition flared up between local and outside merchants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Russians at first envisioned Transcaucasia as a trade bridge between Europe and Asia, and in the 1820s Russian and foreign businessmen penetrated Transcaucasia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Under governmental stimulation, the Armenians traveled to Europe for goods, first appearing at the Leipzig fair in 1824. The Making of the Georgian Nation
However, we are speaking here only of those manufactures which because of great profits might soon compete with similar enterprises in Russia and thus undermine their well-being.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Besides the short-lived silk mill, no other factory was opened in Georgia in the first four decades after the Russian annexation. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Vorontsov promoted education and culture in the Caucasus, building the first Russian theater and public library in Tiflis (1846). The Making of the Georgian Nation
The rivalry between Armenian and Russian merchants did not end with the restoration of lower tariffs, however, and the government remained clearly on the side of the Russians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Despite such official support, the Russian producers and merchants continued to have difficulty in local markets. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the end of the first half-century of Russian rule, Transcaucasia had been administratively integrated into the tsarist empire, and the social elites among the Georgians and Armenians had metamorphosed into estates (sosloviia) of the Russian type. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As in Russia, the government at first moved with extreme caution, appealing to the nobles themselves to make initiatives toward liberating their serfs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Not only were his efforts rewarded with overwhe1min~ support, but in the process a consensus was forged among the easterr Georgian nobility that amounted to their first united political formatior since the conspiracy of 1832. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Emancipation meant first and foremost that the former landlord peas- ants received personal liberation from their dependency on the nobles. The Making of the Georgian Nation
For the household plot a money payment of three rubles for each half-desiatina in Yiflis province and for each ktseva in Kutaisi province was established by law. The Making of the Georgian Nation
And in Ozurgeti uezd in western Georgia the average allotment was 1.3 The Making of the Georgian Nation
There was no longer any Batonishvili alternative to the Romanovs, no possible hope of restoration of the Bagratid monarchy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian peasantry did not at first understand fully the implications of the reform. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the first year of the reform the administration in Tiflis province received almost two thousand complaints from landlords about “tem- porarily obligated” peasants refusing to pay dues or work for the lords. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Responding to a few “agitators,” peas- ants would refuse to pay their dues or do begara (labor obligations) for their landlords. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Even hearing the text of the Polozhenie, which had been translated into a rather bookish Georgian, did not clarify the complex provisions of the law.55 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Giving up half the land to the nobles proved especially painful to many peasants, and they hesitated to formulate and sign the agreements on land partition (ustavnye gramoty). The Making of the Georgian Nation
For example, what kind of abolition of serfdom is it when a state Emancipation 111 112 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE official held in his hands the lord and the serf, tied together by chains, and smothered and fleeced them? What help could be expected from the courts in which one’s own language was forbidden and people, thanks to their ignorance of a foreign language, fell into the clutches of every thief and rascaL57 The abolition of serfdom in Georgia was initiated, designed, and carried out by the Russian state, by bureaucrats acting in the name of the tsar and his viceroy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
It was carried out against the expressed desires of the organized gentry and its newly chosen leadership. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian nobility, once the unquestioned first estate in the land, was threatened by the wealthy Armenian bourgeoisie. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The influx of Georgian peasants and Russian officials, army officers, and craftsmen changed the ethnic composition of the town and also created an ever-larger working class made up primarily of Georgians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Transcaucasia, as in the rest of the empire, municipal administration desperately needed reform, and the tsarist authorities decided in the first half of the 1860s to introduce elected institutions. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Armenians are higher than Georgians in intelligence and in love for work, and for that reason there is nothing surprising in the fact that Georgian properties are rapidly falling into Armenian hands. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In practice this meant that a handful of the wealthiest men in the city elected the first third of the duma, the next wealthiest elected a second third, and hundreds of propertied people elected the last third. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Enlightenment was the means by which Georgia could escape the past dominated by the Muslim East and join the Christian, modern West. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This ambivalence toward “Europeanization” and Russian rule was a constant feature of Georgian intellectual life through the nineteenth century into the twentieth. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The close social and intellectual ties of the Georgian romantics were exemplified in the life and verse of the finest poet of the period, Nikoloz Baratashvili (1817—1845). The Making of the Georgian Nation
But the first critical history in Georgian was written by Prince Teimuraz in 1848. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first members of the Georgian intelligentsia, known later as the “fathers,” were a small, close-knit group of aristocratic writers who shared with a few others of their noble brothers the benefits of Russian state service. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Called in Georgian tengdaleulni (liter- ally, “those who drank the water of the Terek,” the river that separated Emergence of Political Society 125 126 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE Georgia from Russia), the sons were distinguished by their Russian educa- tion from their older compatriots, known as the mtkvardaleulni (“those who drank the water of the mtkvani [Kura],” the river that flows through Tiflis). The Making of the Georgian Nation
The majority, however, were convinced by the young writer Ilia Chavchavadze (1837—1907) to form separate Georgian, Armenian, Russian, and “Lezgin” organizations with strong ties among them.24 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Arrested and expelled from the university, they were ordered to leave the city and return to Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At age eleven he had gone to Tiflis for his studies, first at a private boarding school and later at the noble gimnaziia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He and his contemporary; poet Akaki Tsereteli, were the first important Georgian poets to shift from the patriotic romanticism of Orbeliani and Baratashvili to a less rhetorical, more critical realism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Despite the first stirrings of romantic literature and the promotion I do not learn from the birds in flight, I listen to another voice. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the result of state policy and legal discriminations, the percentage of schools that taught a local Caucasian language steadily declined and those that taught all subjects in Russian increased.29 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first, sakartvelos moambe (Georgia’s Her- ald), was edited by Chavchavadze; although it lasted only one year, this literary journal was enormously influential. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From Chavchavadze’s journal I first learned of the existence of Belinskii, Dobroliubov, Proudhon, and Bastiat. The Making of the Georgian Nation
For some this sense of debt could be reconciled in state service, but many others perceived the autocratic state as the enemy of the people and believed that debt could be repaid only in service to the people. The Making of the Georgian Nation
After leaving St. Petersburg he went to study in Western Europe and became the first Georgian to receive a doctorate (in law) from a European university. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The meore dasi was the first group of Georgian intellectuals to become involved primarily in the urban and economic life of Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On the right was the nostalgic nationalism of the Georgian gentry, led by Ilia Chavchavadze. The Making of the Georgian Nation
That same year the first perma- nent Georgian dramatic troupe was formed, and in 1885 the first chorus for Georgian folksongs was founded by Lado Agniashvili. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Czech conductor Joseph Ratili was invited to Tiflis to assist in this ethnomusicological en- deavor, and in 1886 the first concert was held in Tiflis. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Not separatism but working together was our slogan.44 The Making of the Georgian Nation
From St. Petersburg they were able to obtain books by Lassalle, the novel Emma and Lucinda by Schweitzer, and Marx’s Das Kapital. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Armenian millionaire Aleksandr Mantashev bought the exquisite home of Prince Mukhranskii in the heart of Tiflis and then rejected an offer by the Georgian Nobles’ Bank to buy it back.54 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Nationality was made a consideration in recruitment of state officials. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But in November 1890 the Georgian noble land bank formed a political opposition to the ruling Armenian party and managed to find considerable support in the electors of the “first rank,” the richest men in the city, who opposed the reforms of the duma leadership. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The appeal of Marxism, first to Georgian intellectuals and later to workers, was powerful precisely because it gave Georgians both an analysis of their contemporary situation and a solution to it. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This would require, first, a political revolution and, later, a socialist revolution. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Although it is undeni- able that the influence of market economies was increasingly being felt in even the most remote parts of Georgia, in no sense had emancipation transformed Georgia into a capitalist economy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Niko Nikoladze wrote in Kolokol about this first generation of the Georgian working class in the mid-i 860s: The urban population of Georgia is not numerous. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Imeretian, Gurian, Mingrelian, and Rachian peasants who cannot bear the landlords’ power and “tolerate the lord’s whip” run away to Tiflis and, on the other hand, Kartlian and Kakhetian peasants (from Tiflis province) save themselves in Imereti, Guria, etc. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Their legal status remained ambiguous; most people considered them peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
work in their own apart- ments, obtaining orders and materials from the masters. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1872, in the first notable strike by factory workers in Georgia, the 800 textile workers of Mirzoev’s mill came into bitter confrontation with the owners, but to no avail. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first efforts at organization were the creation of kassy vzaimopomoshchi (mutual insurance funds) by local artisans. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Almost all these circles were Russian-language study groups of radical orientation. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Like others who aspired to a world wider than their native villages, the young Egnate was sent to the Ozurgeti seminary at fifteen, where he was expelled as a leader in student protests. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Bitter debates over conflicting allegiances to patriotism and socialist internationalism divided the Polish students and resonated in the discussions of the Georgians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This illustrated magazine of about twenty pages, kvali (Trace), was edited by the liberal writer Giorgi Tsereteli, but for its first five years it had no definite political direction except a dedicated antagonism toward Chavchavadze’s iveria. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first public appearance of the young Marxists was in the spring of 1894 at the funeral of Ninoshvili in Chochkhati. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“Language is the first sign of nationality,” he claimed, but it does not unify people in real life; material changes lead to a consolidation of nationality~ Georgian society, he continued, divided as it had been into estates (noble, peasant, and clergy), began to change under the impact of commerce and industry. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The mesame dasi’s first effort was to attract the intelligentsia to a new view of Georgia’s destiny. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Contacts with workers were minimal, though the first Marxist study circle appeared among Georgian workers in 1894. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At first there was no discussion of the revolutionary movement, and the intellectuals, fearing police reprisals, kept their distance from the strikes that broke out spo- radically.46 The Making of the Georgian Nation
One railroad worker remembered years later that he had been naively nationalist when he first began work at the Tiflis depot: “At the time I considered all Russians to be my enemies”; he and his roommate (Datiko Dvali, later a Menshevik) believed that Ilya Chavchavadze should be king of Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Early in 1899 the first Tiflis committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDRP) was formed to coordinate the numerous activities of the circles. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Its first leaflet, written by Zhordania, grandly called for unity with the workers of Europe, and organized a celebration of May Day outside Yiflis.~1 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The epicenter of the labor movement was the railroad workshops in Tiflis, where many of the earliest Russian and Georgian workers’ circles had been established and where strikes had occurred periodically since the late 1880s. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Altogether five thousand workers, many in other industries, went on strike. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The general excitement and activity of workers and students throughout Russia, the turn toward a concerted political attack on autocracy, and the escalation of violent confrontations, which grew into a revolution by 1905, resonated in Transcaucasia with new volume in 1901—1902. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The May Day 1901 observance saw larger crowds and bolder displays of antitsarist senti- ment. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Zhordania was ar- rested and held for nearly a year before being exiled, first to his village in Guria and then to Ganja.55 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Almost without exception the Georgian Marxist intellectuals were enthusiasts of the all-Russian newspaper Iskra (Spark), which through its advocacy of an all- nation political struggle against autocracy was winning the scattered social democratic circles of Russia over to its position.S6 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first actions had been motivated almost entirely by economic consid- erations—the harvest of 1901 had been quite poor—but once the police and soldiers intervened on the side of the landlords, the movement broadened into a political struggle against local Russian authority and autocracy itself. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At first the Batumi committee attempted to guide the peasant movement from the city, but by 1903 the Gurian “Com- mittee of Rural Workers” set up by Batumi was replaced with a local Gurian social democratic committee. The Making of the Georgian Nation
For the first time intellectuals from the traditional Georgian elite worked directly with workers and peasants to change Georgian society. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The First Con- Marxism and National Struggle 163 ] 164 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE gress of Caucasian Social Democratic Organizations, held at the beginning of 1903, expressed its solidarity with the program of Iskra. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Interestingly enough, the future Bolsheviks Tskhakaia and Makharadze defended the principle of co-optation onto committees.61 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Clearly a time of social fermeni and potential reform, if not revolution, was ahead, and the promise of ~ future in which Georgians might escape their colonial status encouraged men and women from every social stratum to risk their safety in a bold commitment. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Many activists on the left were cautious in their appraisal of this “constitution” from above and suspicious of the government’s intent. The Making of the Georgian Nation
With the disastrous war with Japan concluded and with renewed support from noble circles, the tsarist regime after October was able to reassert its authority, first in the center of the empire and later in the peripheries. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Three days later (December 29), the general strike ended. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Moscovite autocracy, with its unlimited powers in the person of the tsar, was for the first time compromised by laws that provided the people of the empire with elected institutions and certain civil rights. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The viceroy showed somewhat more anxiety about the Caucasian Mus- lims, among whom “ideas of national consciousness are beginning to de- velop.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
More broadly, the Bolsheviks held out for a strategy based on an armed insurrection and hostility toward Russia’s bourgeoisie. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Indeed the Second Duma was even more radical in composition than the First, and was tolerated for an even shorter time. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The young Iraklii Tsereteli (1881—1959) became the End of Tsarist Georgia 173 174 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE leader of the social democratic faction in the duma and emerged quickly as a major political figure on the Russian scene. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Without any serious rival to their dominance in Georgia, the Mensheviks engaged almost exclusively in legal work, issuing a continuous series of party newspapers and focusing on their elected duma deputies. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Aware of the risks of going it alone, the social democratic leadership refrained from declaring Georgia independent in the first year of revolution and sought the best solution to its political dilemmas within the new revolutionary Russia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Carried out by workers and soldiers in the capital, the revolution was largely spontaneous, the culmination of grievances over the conduct of the war, the lack of food, fuel, and other supplies in the city, and the general disaffection with the government of Nicholas 11.2 The Making of the Georgian Nation
When the First Congress of the Caucasian army met in late April, the soldiers made clear their opposition to separatism by urging postponement of the “national question” until the constituent assembly.7 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Gegechkori told the Tiflis soviet: “If the socialist wing of the Provi- sional Government acts in the interests of the democracy but without a socialist outlook, then it will deserve the just protests of the proletariat; if it acts in the interests of the proletariat, then this will alienate the bourgeoisie from the other revolutionary strata of society, and this will be the beginning of the end.”8 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Bolsheviks formed their own party in early June, sharply separating themselves and their advocacy of “all power to the soviets!” The Making of the Georgian Nation
For the first time the Tiflis soviet approved the coalition government and warned of the danger of counter- revolution from the Left. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But the need to create a united regional political authority led first to the creation of the Transcaucasian Corn- missariat (Zavkom; November 14, 1917) and later to the establishment of a legislature, the Seim (January 23, 1918).15 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Armenians managed to prevent the capture of Erevan, but with no mutual interests holding the three Caucasian nationalities together they were soon abandoned by the Georgians and Azerbaijanis. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Despite the hopes of the small number of Georgian nationalists, indepen- dence was not the desired goal. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The conjuncture of events that led to independence was in no sense the controlled result of social democratic aspirations or planning. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Borrowing from the German socialist theorist Karl Kautsky, Zhordania argued that “the first steps of the victorious proletariat will be, not social reforms, but the introduction of democratic institutions, the realization of the party’s minimum program, and only afterwards the gradual transition to the socialist maximum program.”26 The Making of the Georgian Nation
‘When the commissar of Gori tried to enforce the Ozakom decree, the peasants appealed to the chairman of the local Menshevik organization, who in turn sent a delegation to Zhordania in Tiflis. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Transcaucasian Bolsheviks, more because of their greater opposition to cooperation with the bourgeoisie than any genuine faith in the peasants, included the peasants and urban poor alongside the proletariat in their list of moving forces, while conspicuously leaving out the bourgeoisie.29 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first months of the new republic were not only occupied with the crucial problems of forming ties with the Germans and fending off the Turks but also with serious internal threats to the establishment of order and authority. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the northern mountainous regions of Georgia, first in Dusheti and later in Racha, Tianeti, and Lechkhumi districts, peasant dissatisfaction with terms of the land reform and the activity of the land committees created conditions for open rebellion. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At first British relations with the Germanophilic Georgians were cool, and Thomson had to pressure Foreign Minister Gegechkori into accepting an Allied occupation of Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
For the first year of the revolution the social democrats tried to hold together the revolutionary alliances of workers and soldiers that had placed de facto power in the local soviets. The Making of the Georgian Nation
An unknown commissar called upon the citizens to bring their surplus grain, soap, and other foodstuffs to Erivan Square for distribution; harsh penalties were promised for hoarders. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Late in January 1922, the Georgian Communist Party held its first congress. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Though Stalin at first resisted Lenin’s formulation as “national liberalism,” he quickly decided not to confront Lenin on this issue and altered his plan to conform with Lenin’s suggestions. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first tasks facing the new Georgian leadership were to eradicate the still-powerful Menshevik movement and recruit members of the local intelligentsia and working class into the Communist Party. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A play touring the provinces, Mensheviks in Paris, was attacked for insulting Zhor- dania. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In an obvious effort to conciliate the gathered Mensheviks, the Bolshevik leader declared that enough invective had been directed at Mensheviks. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The party made every effort to win over the small urban working class and potentially sympathetic elements in the intelligentsia, but it looked upon the peasantry as either an inert mass to be molded forcibly or a social class inevitably hostile to socialism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A massive campaign for literacy was carried out, and in the first ten years of Soviet rule a half-million people were taught to read and write.70 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Orjonikidze was assigned to Rostov to become first secretary of the North Caucasian regional committee of the party, and requests from Transcaucasia that he be allowed to remain in the Zakkraikom were rejected by Moscow. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Those party members who placed the “imperial imperative” before local considerations won out in the first political struggle after Sovi- etization, and thereafter the parameters of policy were set outside the re- public. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Though the great social transformation of Georgia would not occur until the following decade, the Soviet government’s cultural Georgianization of the republic and its sponsorship of Georgian art, language, and learning were important factors in lessening opposition to the new order, particularly from the intelligentsia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In April 1929 the Sixteenth Party Conference adopted the most ambitious variant of the first five-year plan. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Already by 1923, 62 percent of all Georgian peasant households had only one able-bodied worker.1° The Making of the Georgian Nation
Though we have little information about positions taken by individual leaders, it seems that as early as the drafting of the First Five-Year Plan in the spring of 1928 there was tension between “local nationalists” (apparently those defending the individual constituent republics) and “left centralist, i.e., great-power chauvinist, tendencies” (those who favored ex- panding the powers of the Transcaucasian government over the republics).20 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Karaev and Buniatzade of Azerbaijan, Gogoberidze of Georgia, and Aghasi Khanjian, soon to be named first secretary of the Armenian party, all pushed for more rapid tempos, though the latter two suggested that sploshnaia kollektivizatsiia (full collectivization) be linked to the availability of tractors. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first mass demonstration, typical of later epi- sodes, took place in Kakheti. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Removing the bells—think about what kind of revolutionary behavior that During the next two months the official policy of the Communist Party toward the peasantry reiterated Stalin’s criticism of compulsory collectiviza- tion and attacks on religion. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He lauded the policy of dekulakization as the first step toward the creation of a classless society in the Soviet Union. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The “greatest sin of our opposition,” he told his comrades, was coming “out against the leadership of our party, against the leader of the party; comrade Stalin.”51 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The new bureau of the Georgian Central Committee contained some familiar old names—Mamia Orakhelashvili, Mikha Tskhakaia, Shalva Eliava, and Pilipe Makharadze— as well as a new name, Lavrenti Beria. The Making of the Georgian Nation
More changes soon took place. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The violent collectivization, however, drove thousands from the land and forced changes in the traditional patterns of patriarchy and the place of women. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Kartvelishvili was sum- moned to Moscow, where he delivered a report to the Orgburo. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Great Russian chau- vinism remained the major danger in the area of the national question, the Central Committee reminded its subordinates, though local nationalism was also dangerous.59 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Confiscatory taxation replaced physical force as the means to “liquidate” the kulaks. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The crisis over party leadership in Transcaucasia was resolved for the moment when Mamia Orakhelashvili was restored as head of the Zak- kraikom and Beria, who up to this time had been a Chekist (secret police officer), was named first secretary of the Georgian party~ Clearly not a popular choice but rather the appointee of Stalin, Beria soon set about “Stalinizing” the Georgian political elite. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The overwhelming majority of the USSR ZSFSR Armenia Azerbaij an Georgia 93% 83% 88.7% The Making of the Georgian Nation
On the “grain front,” “a new offensive was launched—and first of all a terroristic wave against agencies and local authorities still too reluctant to re-engage in excesses. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The crisis continued into 1933, and a widespread opinion existed among party members that the time had come for a “retreat,” a slowdown, consolidation of the gains made in the First Five-Year Plan. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the January 1933 plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin agreed to an annual rate of industrial growth of 13 to 14 percent, a significant reduction from the 22 percent of the First Five-Year Plan. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A series of laws was passed in the first 261Stalinism in Georgia 262 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA three months of 1933 that ended the kontraktatsiia system and established quotas for deliveries of grain (postavki), which were to be paid for by the state at fixed prices. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When Lominadze and his supporters were purged, Beria was placed in the bureau of the Georgian Communist Party, his first significant political appointment. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Clearly favored by Stalin, Beria was appointed first secretary of the Georgian party and second secretary of the Zakkraikom a few months later. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Though it is not possible to know for certain why Beria was appointed to run Transcaucasia when so many senior and orthodox party members were on the scene, it may have been related to Moscow’s constant problem with controlling provincial party organizations. The Making of the Georgian Nation
First, Comrade “Ruben” in Pravda and then Or- akhelashvili in Zaria vostoka condemned a recent Georgian party history by Tengiz Zhgenti, the director of the Institute of Party History in Tiflis. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Rather than attack professional historians, Beria turned on Makharadze, who was both one of the first Marxists in Transcaucasia and a prolific writer on the early years of social democracy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
And police pressure was also employed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In January 1934 Beria announced to the Georgian party congress that a “Georgian national center” had been discovered. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Beria was careful to distinguish Georgia from the Ukraine, however, pointing out that the principal danger in the Ukraine was local nationalism whereas in Georgia it was still great-power chauvinism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Beria went on to say that the Georgian party must “increase its fire against Stalinism in Georgia 267 268 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA local nationalism” and promote the study of Russian, “the language of the greatest revolutionary achievements.”22 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The feverish campaigns of the First Five-Year Plan were replaced by more sober planning, consolidation of the new economic foundations, and an emphasis on assimilating technology, Production in agriculture slowly increased, and by 1935 rationing was ended. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The history of the second half of the 1930s, and indeed the last decade and a half of Stalin’s rule, is not as accessible to the historian as the first fifteen years of Soviet power. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Historian V. I. Nevskii, director of the Lenin Library and a prominent Old Bolshevik, was arrested. The Making of the Georgian Nation
All were ex- ecuted.49 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In May L. I. Mirzoyan, who had worked in Azerbaijan before becoming first secretary of the Kazakh party, was shot. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Though the metaphor of revolution has been too frequently employed in describing changes in Soviet society, the 1930s might be considered a period of “dual revolution”—first the economic turnover of collectivization and industrialization, and then the political upheaval of 1936—1938. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The number of workers and “em- ployees” (sluzhashchie) in the economy had tripled in the Stalin years, numbering over 600,000 in the early 1950s. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By then women made up 40 percent of that number, a rise of 15 percent since 1933.62 The Making of the Georgian Nation
After the shocks that Georgian society had experienced during the first five-year plans and the Great Purges, a more conciliatory policy by the party- state toward the intelligentsia and traditional Georgian institutions, like the church, achieved a partial reconciliation between society and the state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Other minorities also found themselves restricted. The Making of the Georgian Nation
It was reported that in the first year of the war the composers of Georgia, in a burst of patriotic energy, produced sixty-two musical com- positions! The Making of the Georgian Nation
Gam- sakhurdia published the first part of his tetralogy, David the Rebuilder. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The population of the republic fell by 307,000 during the war years to 3,232,700, with the heaviest losses among the rural popula- tion. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first signal was the replacement of V. S. Abakumov, who had over time come to serve Beria, with S. D. Ignat’ev, a man hostile to Beria and Malenkov. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Finally, in March 1952, the first secretary since 1938, Charkviani, was replaced by Akaki Ivanis dze Mgeladze. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Elaborating on Conquest’s three-faction analysis, Fairbanks says: First Stalin arrayed Charkviani’s clientele and Mgeladze’s against Beria’s (or Baramiya’s and Zodelava’s). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Party chief Mgeladze told the delegates that “the idealization of the past by the writer Gamsakhurdia is an expression of bourgeois nationalism, the essence of which is concealed in an attempt to isolate and close itself off in the confines of national narrow- mindedness without seeing what is bringing closer together and uniting the laborers of all the nationalities of the Soviet Union.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Just as in tsarist Russia or Safavid Iran, Georgians were changed by their imperial experience without having been able to determine their own fate. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Essentially the new party leadership turned its attention toward the grave economic problems faced by the Soviet state and abandoned a political solution to the nationality problem. The Making of the Georgian Nation
With the Russian annexations of Georgian lands (1801—1829), most Georgian-speaking peoples were united under a single political authority for the first time since the fifteenth century~ The security provided by the Russians permitted the re-establishment of the agrarian economy and the rebirth of urban life.10 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgia was only beginning capitalist development when the revolution of 1917 made it possible to break free of Russian control and establish an independent Georgian state, but the process of national consolidation pro- moted by the Georgian social democrats was far from complete when the Red Army overthrew the Menshevik republic in February 1921. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1939 the figure for the first segment was 19.4 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1959, 64.3 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Most important, for the first time in Georgian history a Georgian university had been founded (under the Men- sheviks in 1919), and subsidized scientific research could be carried on in Georgian. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The elimination of Beria’s supporters in Tbilisi was completed in September 1953 when Vasili P. Mzhavanadze, a man who had long served in the Ukrainian party apparatus under Khrushchev and as a political commissar in the army, was elected first secretary of the Georgian party. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Purges continued through the next few months, and by the Sixteenth Congress of the Georgian Communist Party in February 1954, the first secretaries of Abkhazeti, Ajaria, and Tbilisi had been re- placed, new elections had been held in nearly nine thousand party cells, more than two thousand secretaries had been removed from these cells, and over one thousand candidate members of the party had been expelled.23 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The party congress planned for May 1953 was de- layed, and in the interim local party meetings were held to debate past policies and future plans. The Making of the Georgian Nation
For his success in pacifying the Georgians, the first secretary was raised to candidate membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU in June 1957. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The demonstrations in Tbilisi were seen by many as a revival of Stalinism and by others as the first open expression of Georgian nationalism in forty years. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The beginning of the end for the Mzhavanadaze regime was signaled by an article in Pravda on March 6, 1972. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Corruption, “liberalism” in person- nel matters, and failure to meet economic targets were noted. The Making of the Georgian Nation
One of the first officials to be dismissed was the notorious Gelbakhiáni, the rector of the Tbilisi Medical Institute, who, along with the party secretary of the ‘institute, was discovered to have tampered with en- trance examinations, excluding qualified students and admitting those who paid bribes or had proper connections.4° The Making of the Georgian Nation
In one of his earliest speeches the first secretary complained that under Mzhavanadze “a half- baked nationalism raised its head in some places in the republic; things came to such a pass that attempts were made to rehabilitate émigré writers who are hostile to us. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The dual processes of economic development and renationalization had not been accompanied in Georgia by a significant democratization of the political superstructure. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Shevardnadze, cursed when he first tried to speak to the crowd, returned later to announce to the demonstrators that the disputed clause would be re- tained.47 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In his first two years as party chief in Georgia, Shevardnadze was able to take credit for a rise in industrial output of 9.6 The Making of the Georgian Nation
(Applause.) The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the end of the first quarter-century of post-Stalinist evolution, the contradictory developments of the Soviet past, the simultaneous drive to- ward economic development and the creation of revitalized nationalities within the Soviet federal structure, had produced neither Russification nor assimilation in Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The un- resolved tension between the assimilationist tendencies of urban industrial society and the reconsolidation of Georgian ethnicity had produced an Nationality Policy since Stalin 313 314 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA increasingly potent nationalist mood in all parts of Georgian society—.and The Making of the Georgian Nation
But the radicals, who wanted no association with the “illegitimate” Communist regime, determined the pace and shape of the movement. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On September 30 the elections were held, and the National Independence Party, led by Erekle Tsereteli, emerged as the largest delega- tion, with Chanturia’s National Democrats second.23 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Meanwhile, Gamsakhurdia, who was personally hostile to Chanturia, had decided to work with those who agreed to participate in the elections to the Supreme Soviet. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Assassination and arson were used as tactics in the increasingly violent rivalry between Gamsakhurdia and Chanturia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Elevated to deputy minister of public order and later to minister of internal affairs, Shevardnadze also found favor with Brezhnev, who promoted him in September 1972 to succeed Mzhavanadze as first secretary of the Geor- gian party. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Followers of deposed president Gam- sakhurdia fought with troops loyal to Shevardnadze; Abkhaz stood against Georgians, aided by volunteers from the North Caucasus; and finally, Rus- sia intervened and took control of the railroad.39 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In despair over the unraveling situation, Shevardnadze contemplated resignation. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Peace Bloc won the largest number of votes of any party and took thirty-five seats in the new parliament, followed by the October 11 Bloc, made up of moderate reformers from the Popular Front and other groups, with nineteen seats. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Many in Georgia, including adherents of the extra-governmental The Georgian Road to Independence 331 332 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA militias, opposed the treaty and were prepared to engage in terrorism to destabilize Shevardnadze’s government further. The Making of the Georgian Nation
First, tribes speaking related languages coalesced into a loose confeder- ation under a primitive state and were seen by outsiders as a single people. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The development of an integrated market economy broke down the isolation of Georgia’s villages, bringing peasants and nobles into closer contact with Russian offi- cials and Armenian entrepreneurs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the twentieth century Georgians were a self-conscious nationality with an articulate political leadership, the Mensheviks, who briefly held power in an independent state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet the same nationalism that unified most Georgians in their opposi- tion to the declining Soviet system in the late 1980s and early 1990s exacer- bated the deep ethnic division within the multinational society of Georgia and proved unable to overcome the political cleavages within Georgia’s elites. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But the rapid unraveling of Communist rule in Georgia, the end of empire, and the evaporation af the “socialist choice” brought to power a fractured political elite and an exciusivist nationalism imbued with an authoritarian political culture inherited from the years of Soviet power. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Bagratids—Armeno-Georgian family that ruled both in Armenia as presiding princes (7—8th centuries) and as kings (884—1045), and in Kartli as presiding princes (from 813) and as kings (888 until the coming of the Russians in the nineteenth century); Bagratids also ruled in Imereti (13—14th centuries) and in other Georgian and Armenian lands. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The chronicles give this version: “And this Parnavazi was the first king in Kartli of the Georgian race. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“The dignity of Curopalates, connected at first, apparently, with certain aulic functions, was, from the time of Justinian I to that of the Comneni, one of the highest in the Eastern Empire, ranking next to Caesar and Nobilissimus and, like them, reserved usually for members of the Imperial family. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet older and more authoritative sources than Sumbat, affirm, in accord with the Armenian historical data, that the Georgian Bagratids branched out of the Armenian Bagratid dynasty; that this branch removed to Iberia only after the defeat of the Armenian princes by the Arabs in 772, in the person of Prince Atrnerseh or Adarnase (grandson of Ashot III the Blind, Prince of the Bagratids and Prince of Armenia in 732—748); that Adarnase’s son Ashot the Great attained, the first of the Bagratids, to the Prmncipate of Iberia in 813 and thus founded the last royal house of Georgia; and that finally, the Davidic claim of that house was a further development of the earlier tradition of Hebrew origin entertained by its Armenian ancestors. The Making of the Georgian Nation
49. The Making of the Georgian Nation
211—764. The Making of the Georgian Nation
9. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Rhinelander, “Incorporation of the Caucasus,” pp. 116-17; on Tsitsianov in Caucasia, see Atkin, Russia and Iran, pp. 70—87; and Pantskhava, Ocherki (1969), p. 17. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first party favored the re- establishment of the monarchy under David, eldest son of Giorgi XII, who had ruled briefly between the time of his father’s death (December 28, 1800) and the arrival of General Knorring (May 24, 1801). The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first Georgian newspaper, sakartvelos gazeti appeared in Tiflis in 1819. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first raznochinets intellectual in Georgia, the philosopher-publicist Solomon Ivanis dze Dodiashvili (1805—1836) was the son of an enserfed clergyman and attended the only school in liflis open to non-nobles, the Tiflis seminary, and then went on to university in St. Petersburg, where he published the first textbook on logic in Russian. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Returning to Tiflis in July 1827, Dodiashvili began teaching Georgian language and literature at the noble school, and a few years later compiled one of the first grammars of the Georgian language. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Akhverdov, and N. Berdzenov, believe that these guilds were of later origin, probably first formed in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries under foreign influence. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Zaionchkovskii, Otmena, p. 335; Avaliani, Krest’ianskii vopros, vol. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When Argutinskii-Dolgorukov retired in September, Izmailov himself was chosen (62—8) to become mayor of liflis, the first mayor from the “third element.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the first years after Stalin’s death, when the possibility for such debate reappeared among historians, M. K. Dumbadze and Z. V. Anchabadze argued that there had been no significant capitalist production in Georgia before the 186Os. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Pan- tskhava, E. A. Orjonikidze, E. V. Khoshtaria, D. A. Gogoladze, and M. M. Sam- sonadze—setfled on dating the breakdown of “feudal” relations and the origins of capitalism to the first half of the nineteenth century. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This was the second May Day celebrated in Transcaucasia; the first was in 1898. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first article is on Baku, the second on Tiflis. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1967), pp. 134—36. The Making of the Georgian Nation
See Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, vol. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the end of February 1926 the First Congress of Writers of Georgia was held, and a loose federation of literary groupings was formed into the Union of Writers of Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Lewin, “Society, State, and Ideology During the First Five-Year Plan,” in CHAPTER 11 Notes for pages 232 to 238 383 384 Notes for pages 239 to 246 5. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first secretary of the Azerbaijani CC since i92S, Aligeidir Agakerim-ogly Karaev (i896—i938), was made a secretary of Zakkraikom. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Au- gust 1930, Vladimir Ivanovich Polonskii (1893—1939) became first secretary of the Azerbaijani CC, as well as a secretary of the Zakkraikom in November i930. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Levan Davidis dze Gogoberidze (i896—1937), second secretary of the Georgian CC (1926—1 929), was raised to first secretary briefly in May 1930 before being trans- ferred to Moscow. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Armenia a military man, Haik Hovsepian, briefly headed the party in 1927, followed by Haikaz Kostanian (1897—?) as first secretary in 1928—1930. The Making of the Georgian Nation
His assignment as first secretary of the Transcaucasian party committee represented a kind of rehabilitation, but his identification with the “Right-Leftist” opposition later in 1930 cost him his high posts. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Stalin, Sochineniia, vol. The Making of the Georgian Nation
1, p. 305. The Making of the Georgian Nation
81. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A Russian translation of Japaridze’s speech was published in AS 2583 in MS New York Times, April 15, 1978; April 18, 1978; Zaria vostoka, April 16, Interview with Professor Teimuraz Mamedovich Jafarli, deputy director of the The letter, which was first published in Russkaia mysi’ in Paris, was published For discussions of reformism versus preservation, see Stephen E Cohen, “The The 26th Congress of the CPSU (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. Notes for pages 309 to 311 397 398 Notes for pages 311 to 319 S2. The Making of the Georgian Nation
ceeded as party leader in Georgia by Jumbar Iliais dze Patiashvili, who had been serving as first secretary of the Gori district party committee, a secretary of the Georgian Central Committee, and a member of its bureau. The Making of the Georgian Nation
32. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970— To begin a study of ancient and medieval Georgia the indispensable primary sources are the Georgian chronicles. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This is certainly the most important document collection for the first half-century of Russian rule. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Za dva goda. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Being mostly engaged in civil wars among themselves, these minor kings and princes of Western Georgia presented little danger to Turkey’s eastern frontiers. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1768, war broke out between Russia and Turkey. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The treaty was to remain in force permanently, and any modification was to be made only by the voluntary consent of both parties. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A contributory cause of this fiasco was a mass uprising which broke out along the Georgian military highway over the Caucasus range, on which the Russians depended for all reinforcements and supplies. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The peasants broke into revolt and killed the town commandant of Ananuri. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Famine and plague broke out, and some 30,000 people perished, while hundreds of peasant families sought refuge in Eastern Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
No sooner was Western Georgia out- wardly pacified than fresh troubles broke out in Kartli and Kakheti. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
When they heard of the Russian setback, the peasants of Kakheti broke into revolt. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
During the Turkish invasion under Omar Pasha in i8~ ~ -~6, the Regent of Mm- grelia, Catherine Dadiani, showed attachment to the Russian 95 cause, and organized a militia to help drive out the intruders. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The so-called ‘class struggle’ in the Georgian countryside resulted in sporadic revolts and deeds of violence. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The intelligentsia, whose evolu- tion Alexander’s early reforms had done much to foster, were A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA io6 SOCIAL CHANGE AND NATIONAL AWAKENING: 185 5—94 seething with resentment at the dead weight of autocracy which excluded them from participation in government, and deprived public opinion of all influence on the course of affairs. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A positive impetus to their movement was provided by a series of well planned strikes which broke out from 1898 onwards in various sectors of Georgian industry. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the following month, a strike broke out at Rothschild’s over the dismissal of nearly four hundred workers suspected of subversive activities. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The priests were forbidden by their flock to repeat in church the prayer for the imperial family, and portraits of Tsar Nicholas II were torn down and burnt. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
When war broke out between Russia and Japan in February 1904, the Georgian Social-Democrats immediately set to work to exploit the new situation. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They saw that if the Tsar granted a truly democratic, parliamentary régime to Russia, with safeguards to the rights of national minorities, then support for terrorism would wither away amid the general rejoicing, and the prospect of a Marxian millennium would recede into the distant future. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian Church Militant While the Socialists sought to regenerate Georgia through the application of Marxist principles and the intensification of the class struggle, the Georgian Church, after a century of en- forced quiescence, also sought to play an active part in the national movement. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Heightened tension led to yet another general strike which broke out in Tbilisi on 20 June 1905, and lasted until the end of the month. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
When he had occasion to go to Tbilisi on official business, the local revolutionary committee would escort him to the station, put down the red carpet, and see him off with cheers and flag-waving. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Divergences often broke out over tactics and priorities. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On i 2 February 1918 the Turks broke the truce and advanced against Erzinjan. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
When war actually broke out, Georgia had a small, poorly equipped army with an insignificant cavalry, and a few aeroplanes which remained A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 232 grounded throughout the campaign through lack of high-grade petrol.” A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On ri February i 921, disorders broke out in the Lori district, south of Tbilisi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Guerilla warfare broke out in several regions. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On ~ March 1923, Lenin broke off personal relations with Stalin, and urged Trotsky to defend the Georgian ‘deviationists’ before the Central Committee of the all-Russian Communist Party. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Fierce fighting broke out in Kakheti, where a hundred and fifty soldiers were killed. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Local followings were less important now than state bureaucracy, and when the Qucayti Sultan at Mukalla, in 1950, appointed a Sudanese as state secretary a riot broke out, stimulated by the newly-formed National Party. A History of Modern Yemen
It broke up in an argument about restricting qdt. A History of Modern Yemen
Their forces broke into peaceful Lahj .. . A History of Modern Yemen
Not only was Aden part of Yemen in the view of most Yemenis, but it was “easily the most politically sophis- ticated territory in Arabia”67 while the Imam’s domain was denounced by nationalists as the most backward. A History of Modern Yemen
The police in the Federal capital of al-Ittikiad then panicked too and so did those in Crater, where looting broke out as the British for a time stood back. A History of Modern Yemen
In August 1967 fighting broke out in Lahj among FLOSY, the NLF and remnants of the South Arabian League. A History of Modern Yemen
Fighting broke out at Jabal Aswad on the border between Sufyan of Bakil and al-’U~aymat of Hashid.43 A History of Modern Yemen
In the lulls of shooting, trucks crept north towards Saudi Arabia in a procession of winking fairy-lights and others moved south piled high with the goods of return- ing migrants until the cease-fire broke and the truck lights in the dark were replaced by tracer bullets; the cycle was repeated several times, for this was not, so to speak, total war. A History of Modern Yemen
In January 1979 war broke out between the Yemens, and the Southerners took a number of towns beyond the border. A History of Modern Yemen
Even batteries for his radio were unaffordable. A History of Modern Yemen
cAll Na~ir, the president of the PDRY until 1986, had left North Yemen as one of the YSP’s conditions for unification, and the chance of him returning was never great. A History of Modern Yemen
For the prominence of Shafi’u soldiers, ibid. 16—17. A History of Modern Yemen
See Mujahid 1997: 273. A History of Modern Yemen
Jorde was broke and seeking fame: With its aura of clandestinity and power, the Council seemed right for him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A maid opened and he went in. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I made showed that Abu Nidal began killing prominent PLO mod- erates—precisely the men who were trying to influence Western opinion by preaching negotiation and reconciliation with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When I reported this to Abu lyad, he laughed and gave me the unedited tapes of a long conversation he had had with Isa, over several hours, after he broke with Abu Nidal in 1989. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Jaffa, where he grew up, had a tradition of militancy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Fatah leaders were anxious to know if they could count on these Iraqi troops to side with them in the event of an all-out fight with Hussein. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad said, “Mr. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“It was as blunt as that,” Abu lyad said. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal was of course eager to secure the freedom of his friend and fellow radical Abu Dawud: On his release from jail shortly afterward, Abu Nidal offered him a job in the secret group he was then forming. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Then, in 1974, to Fatah’s even greater alarm, word reached it that Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur and Abu Nidal were working more closely together and were considering merging their two organiza- Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur (code-named Abu Mahmud), a fervent But like many others, he was shattered by the slaughter of the In 1972, Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur broke away from Black Sep- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 101 102 / PATRICK SEALE lions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Qaddafi was clearly settling a few scores of his own—against Tunisia. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When Arafat heard what had happened, he interpreted it as a huge conspiracy against himself. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Why had Abu Dawud Abu Dawud indignantly rejected the plan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Britain broke off diplomatic rela- tions and, after a nine-day siege of the People’s Bureau, expelled the whole of its staff. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Several Western leaders called for a joint strategy to combat Libyan-sponsored terrorism, prompting Qaddafi to re- tort defiantly that he would “hurt” countries that conspired against him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the killer broke the door down and pushed the cupboard aside. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The next broke my jaw—I had to keep my mouth shut for five months while it was being rebuilt. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was a good student and was sent to study in Britain, where he graduated with a B.A. in chemistry and later was awarded an M.A. Although he calls himself Doctor, he has no such degree. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the late 1980s, Abu Nidal was believed to be spending about $165,000 a month on the activities of the Publications Committee. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The PLO concluded that either the Mossad or the CIA was responsible. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Ann Murphy, a chambermaid at a London hotel, had been given the bag by her Jordanian boyfriend, Nizar Hindawi, by whom she was five months pregnant. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hindawi’s trial at the Old Bailey in October 1986. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If, occasionally, Abu Nizar broke the rules and called on Isa at home, he would take the precaution of telephoning Abu Nidal to say, “Look, I spent the evening with Abd al-Rahman Isa.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He liked to portray himself as a Palestinian nationalist who had been influenced by the theories of Marx, but he detested the Soviet Union and frequently attacked it in his publications. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
planted Atif Abu Bakr, an old and crafty Fatah loyalist, on Abu Nidal as an agent provocateur as early as 1985, to provoke an internal explosion in his ranks. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
a halt to all propaganda wars between us; “2. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He called for the facts to be put before an international tribunal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Chaos, violence, and mayhem broke out. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
More senseless riots broke out in the coastal city ofJaffa during 1921 May Day celebrations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Fistfights broke out between the Jewish groups, and shots were fired. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, two men who had left with Jabril, Abu Abbas and Talat Yaqub, broke from the GC in 1977 to form the Palestine Liberation Front (formed March 11, 1978), which was responsible for three grand failures: in summer 1980, 80 PLF men tried to raid Israel in an Aerostat, but it burned shortly after takeoff since it was painted with flamma- ble varnish; in 1985 the PLF was in charge of the Achille Lauro episode, and after the Intifada a large number of PLF men tried to raid Israel in boats but were intercepted. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On May 2 gunmen broke into the Israeli embassy in Paraguay, killing one woman and wounding another.14 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The PFLP poured much of its wealth into these projects and was nearly broke until airlines began paying protection money.’7 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Zwaiter had lived in Rome nine years, during which he was perpetually broke, working as a clerk here and there while writing and translating. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They could have disrupted the telephone service, forcing Hamshari to call for repair, but they broke into his flat and planted the bomb. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli team finally suc- ceeded when they broke into Yousefal-Najjar’s flat, killing both him and his wife. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A month later, on the eve of Israel’s Independence Day celebrations, three men belonging to Naif Hawathmeh’s DFLP crossed the border and, the next morning, broke into an apartment in Ma’alot village, shooting three occupants. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States was insisting that Iraq get rid of Abu Nidal before they would take Iraq off the list of terrorist countries, which they did in 1983. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
To his friends he looked like a bright and successful young man. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Egyptian newspapers showed Arafat dripping in blood.17 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The FRC sent him on two visits to Baghdad, then gave him the job of keeping weapons in his apartment. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The street was already jammed with shoppers and pedestrians and children. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Posner, P. 213, says a Norwegian newspaper broke the story citing an Israeli government source, but Posner claims to have had a lettert from Rafael since then. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
and the Guardian broke the story. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This plan was fulfilled by punitive opera- tions in the Radfan region and repeated aggression against the YAR. Comtemporary Yemen
At the same time the Egyptian government supplied us with the books we needed. Comtemporary Yemen
That does not mean that the government had neglected mod- ernising the administration as an important goal; a great deal of attention was paid to developing the Civil Service Commission and the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) as impor- tant organisations carrying out the responsibility of modernising the administration, even during this critical period. Comtemporary Yemen
Courts Law No. 7 of 1980, sections 13 (8) and 23. Comtemporary Yemen
South Yemen had no relations with Saudi Arabia and none with the United States, the former because of a Saudi refusal to recognise a communist regime in Arabia, the latter because the PDRY broke links in October 1969 as a protest against US citizens with dual nationality serving in the Israeli Army. Comtemporary Yemen
This curious history of military links reflected a deeper Soviet assessment. Comtemporary Yemen
The Russians would favour Yemeni unity if (a) this could be achieved without creating an international crisis and alarming Saudi Arabia; and (b) the PDRY personnel would be able to control such a state. Comtemporary Yemen
Aden was, in a sense, ‘an Anglo-Indian colony, where it was largely British and Indian hands that made the wheels go round’. Comtemporary Yemen
Though based in Aden and concerned with Adeni politics as much as with those in the Protectorate, the SAL in fact had its genesis in Lahej, the largest and most advanced Sultanate in the Protectorate. Comtemporary Yemen
In other words, the two ‘non- Adenese’ groups who formed about half of the population of the Colony were denied the right to vote or become citizens like their ‘Adenese’ brethren by accident of birth alone. Comtemporary Yemen
The media reported that three shipments had been sent—one for each hostage re- leased—but that the terrorists, knowing a good deal when they saw one, had during the same period taken three new hostages. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Consequently, research into the historical origins of the rise of the movement must delve into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Still, the Brotherhood ignored ideological sensitivities and joined forces with the national organizations and committees that sought to mobilize a patriotic response to the UN partition resolution of 29 November 1947. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The history of its jihad within Palestine was not comparable to that of the Qassam brigades, which outdid the Brotherhood in this respect. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
anyone who called for a return to Islam was accused of being a reactionary and a conspirator and an agent [of Arab reactionary forces].”62 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Islamic Jihad was formed in the Gaza Strip by Brother- hood leaders who broke off from the organization in protest against its unwillingness to take on the Israeli occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Legrain, “Al-Intikhabat al-tullabiyya fi al-dhafa al-gharbiyya,” pp. 2 13—57. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
On the same day, mass demon- strations broke out in Jabaliya, from which three of the workers originated. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this regard, one finds evidence of the line of thinking that originated in the 1 970s and which maintained that liberation should attend change, that is, an Islamic state first should be established outside (Palestine), and such a state should take on the lion’s share of the responsibility for liberation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
At this stage the dialogue broke down, but it resumed in 1997 and took on new life after the peace process ran into trouble due to the intran- sigence of the Benymin Netanyahu government and its refusal to carry out Israeli obligations under the Oslo Agreement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Inter-Arab Conflict: The Gulf War The Gulf War, which was the most severe inter-Arab crisis since the Arabs won their independence, broke out only three years after Hamas had been formed. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, as tensions between Iraq and Iran developed and war broke out between them in 1980, the short honeymoon with the PLO ended. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas assigned special importance to a number of recurring issues covered in “At the External Level;” four such issues are reviewed briefly below. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There was no war that broke out anywhere without their hands behind it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The day the news of the attack broke in Beirut, Maha was at her in-laws, two floors below her flat, chatting with Salah’s brother: I heard that an operation against the enemy had taken place. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Under the pressure of the Israeli attacks and the activities of the Palestinian commandos, the bitter grievances of Lebanon’s confessional groups erupted and civil war broke out in 1975. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
America’s attempts to remedy the Lebanese crisis as a neutral mediator collapsed that autumn, when fierce fighting broke out in the Chouf, a Druze fiefdom. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Dodge was the acting president of the AUB. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When the story of Waite’s disappearance broke, the doctor’s name was leaked, but he refused to give interviews or to comment. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
And the danger to the family who broke the secret was extreme. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The car broke down and Ibtissam, in fear for her family’s lives, decided to split them up. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was not until the eighth day of the offensive on Thursday 18 April that Western countries suddenly became anxious to find ways of establishing a cease-fire.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hassan was still at the airport waiting to board the Middle EastAirline plane, when news of the attack broke. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
About 2300 B.C. this unified and flourishing culture went into a gradual decline, and after a period of stagnation it broke up into a number of regional cultures. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Ten years later, in 482, Vakhtang reversed his political orientation, broke with Iran, and put to death Iran’s most faithful vassal, Varsken—Arshusha’s son and the new vitaxa of Gogarene. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Lazica weakened in the 460s and 470s as Vakhtang’s Kartli-Iberia became stronger. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Iberian mon- archs ruled effectively only from their fortress at Ujarma, in the demesne of Kakheti; Tbilisi and Shida Kartli (inner Iberia) were governed more directly by Iran.1’~ The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 608 or 609, at the Third Council of Dvin, the Armenian church broke with the Iberian church and excommuni- cated the formerly Monophysite catholicos, Kireon I, for his adoption of the Chalcedonian faith. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Princes and nobles broke with their sovereign and became kings of their provinces. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Levan broke with his allies over a personal matter. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When war broke out between Turkey and Russia in 1768, Catherine the Great (1762—1796) resolved to employ the Georgians to tie up Turkish troops in the Caucasus while the major campaigns were fought in the Balkans and Crimea. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When the second Russo-Turkish war broke out in 1787, Catherine ordered her troops to evacuate Georgia in order to concentrate Russian efforts in the Balkans. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In June rebellion broke out in Imereti and soon spread to Guria, where fighting went on for another year. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Nikoladze briefly collaborated on his influential newspaper, Kolokol (The Bell), in 1865, but he soon broke with the “gentry revolutionary” when Herzen attempted a reconciliation with the autocratic government through an open letter to the tsar. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When a student disturbance broke out over the poor quality of the food, Zhordania, Makharadze, and T. Kikvadze convinced the seminarians to demand that Georgian language, literature, and history be taught. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Then suddenly a massive strike broke out in the Rothschild plant to protest the dismissal of nearly four hundred workers. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The viceroy’s liberalism was rejected by protsarist demonstrators, and the administration was unable to curb attacks by Cossacks in Kutaisi and Batumi. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“The example would be beneficial to many.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the Dem- ocratic Conference, called in Petrograd to solve the power question, the majority of Russia’s Mensheviks stubbornly held on to the notion of coali- tion, even as popular support for the Kerensky government evaporated. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In a real sense Georgia exemplified the social democratic ideal—a working class deferring to its socialist intelligentsia, prepared to follow its lead in building a democratic nation-state, and willing to wait for the distant victory of socialism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgia now was nearly sur- rounded by the Soviets, and the Red Army was poised for a final assault on the Menshevik capital. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A new government had been installed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The tensions between the Georgian leadership in Tiflis and the Kavburo in Baku broke into open conflict in August 1921. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Toward the end of March riots broke out in Tiflis, as embittered citizens, standing for hours in wet snow for bread, smashed bakery windows and beat up the bakers. The Making of the Georgian Nation
An armed detachment of Communists then surrounded the peasants’ camp, and a fight broke out. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Though Georgians conceived of themselves as the most hospitable of nations, welcoming other peoples into their country, they viewed the na- tional minorities in Georgia as stumrebi (guests), there at the tolerance of the majority population. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In May and again in June 1992, “Zviadists” rallied in Tbilisi, and armed men clashed in the streets. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Relations with Rus- sia remained strained, however, and worsened in mid-September when Ab- khaz nationalists broke the truce and took most of the Abkhaz republic. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Ortho- dox Christianity provided an identity and ideology that delineated the Georgians from their Muslim and Armenian neighbors. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea in the west, to the Caspian in the east, this imposing range of mountains stretches for some seven hundred miles, its line broken by narrow passes and defiles and by lofty peaks. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA x6 ‘It was early summer when I saw Kakhetia lying under a languid, lowering sky, a flat land of vivid green fields and sombre green woods, with ravines and broken ground where the soil showed hard and yellow, and steep, narrow cuttings that crossed its ample spaces. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Sent to complete his education in Moscow, he fell into bad company, and returned disillu- sioned and broken in health to his native mountains. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The work- ing day averaged fourteen hours, compulsory overtime bring- ing it at times up to sixteen hours. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Trotsky, then a Menshevik, joined with other rivals of Lenin in accusing the Master of reducing socialism to the level of brigandage and highway robbery. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On i~ October, a special conference on food supplies was convened in Tbilisi, attended by the Russian commander on the Caucasian front, General Przhevalsky. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Ambrosius was immediately thrown into prison by the Communists and kept there until they imagined that his spirit was broken. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A rich land- owner might open his grain-pits (madafin), weighing out and writing down all that was loaned to poorer farmers, and in the process perhaps gaining lien on their land, but “if it happened that the shaykh did not open the grain-pits, there was great commotion and grief; and they would return broken-hearted, dumb-founded, overcome with sorrow and misery. A History of Modern Yemen
The prominence of the morphine may be overstated but the nature of the rooms is not, and inefficiency beyond the palace struck many people: A lamp, costing over £ioo and meant for the hospital operating theatre, was recently destroyed because the glass looked suitable for mending a broken window; four pianos I do not know why they were ever bought — have been gutted because wire is always useful for other things; and a member of the French road-making company recently came across four unused bulldozers which had been lying, apparently forgotten, for so long that only one could be made serviceable. A History of Modern Yemen
The Southern brigade at IIarf Sufyan, well north of Sanaa, was broken up also. A History of Modern Yemen
Blood dried on his wounds. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
According to the organization’s well- tried procedures, an attack required the coordination of several elements: There was first a long-term “resident” responsible for estab- lishing the arms cache and supplying the necessary background intelligence about the target. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Why don’t you write something about it?” he said. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They kept threatening to blow up the plane, but he persuaded them to release a few passengers at a time. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
To prepare the ground, the king freed Palestinians from his jails, held frequent meetings with Arafat, promoted his plan in London and Washington, and re- stored diplomatic relations with Egypt, broken off at the time of Camp David. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Turks and the Jordanians got together, pooled their intelligence, and smashed his networks in both countries. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He had been Abu Nidal’s friend, he told me, since their early days in Saudi Arabia but had broken with him over the killing of Yassin and the other PLO representatives. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, his association with Abu Nidal has driven him to commit crimes that have broken and perverted him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He had broken irrevoca- bly with Iraq, and his relations with Syria had soured. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, sickened by the brutalities he had witnessed, he defected to the breakaway Emergency Leadership, which we will soon learn about, that Atif Abu Bakr established in November 1989, and agreed to be interviewed by me in Tunis in 1990. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In February 1969 the fol- lowers of Habash and Hawathmeh were at each other’s throats, literally: meet- ings were broken up by fistfights, then they descended into the streets of Amman in armed warfare, Arafat having to step in to mediate. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was followed by an unsuccessful attempt to kill Jordan’s ambassador to London and a failed hijacking of a Jordanian jet. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In April 1958 the Governor of Aden ordered the arrest of al-Jifri and his two brothers, but al-Jifri and one of them were able to escape to North Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
Within a century, Muhammad and his follow- ers had made the Muslim Arabs the rulers of a vast em- pire, conquering the Middle East, Persia, India and the Asian interior, North Africa, Asia Minor, and Spain, and lunging deep into France. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It was roundly criticized for this behavior, which weakened its nationalistic credentials. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nev- ertheless, Hamas regretted that contact with the United States had been broken off—and said so several times—because the talks had allowed it to communicate its position directly, without going through a mediator and without the distortion of media reports. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In Lebanon, where the Shiites were concentrated in the Bekaa Valley and the South, they were a backward, rural community. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
move indicated that Hezbollah’s fighters had broken away from the Lebanese National Resistance and was suggestive of Hezbollah’s dispute with Ama! Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It did not take long for the United States to come to the conclusion that Hezbollah was behind the attacks and that Islamic Jihad was merely a name or a wing of the group, dedicated to killing Americans and threatening Western interests in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The lengths to which feudal hierarchy (patron qmoba) had broken down and been replaced by the rule of independent princes (tavadoba) were most visibly evident in western Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Every countryman furnishes his lord with so much corn, cattle, wine and other provisions, as he is able. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet even before the Russians arrived, the satavadebi were being broken up, and some of the earliest legislation of the Russian government concerning the Caucasus was directed against the entailment of Georgian estates. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But besides these involuntarily enserfed peasants, there were different kinds of voluntary serfs (nebieri qmani) who had become serfs in order to receive protection and land. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“Our inherited and historically formed character has stubbornly prohibited commercial activity up to now and one must recognize that it is not yet evident that we have any abilities in this area.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
In an article, “Broken Dreams,” the populist Chrelashvili charged that Chavchavadze did not understand that the solution to the national question depended on the resolution of the social question.53 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Throughout the coun- try railroads came to a halt. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The government acted quickly to stifle the open opposition. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Fifty years after the emancipation, Georgia’s peasants finally held full title to their plots, the large estates had either been broken up or taken over by the state, and nobles had been reduced to petty proprietors like their peasant neighbors. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The full construction of the sociopolitical system of Stalinism took place in the 1930s, a decade both heroic and tragic. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From 1921 to 1927, the Georgian peasant population grew by 8.2 The Making of the Georgian Nation
A report to the Georgian Central Committee stated: Demonstrations of peasants against collectivization have taken place in parts of Georgia with the demands that collectivization be stopped, that existing kolkhozes be broken up, that exiled kulaks be returned, that boundaries not be violated, etc. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Loyalty to the person of Stalin had become the public ex- pression of one’s devotion to the party, its Central Committee, and the whole Soviet enterprise. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Amkari (pl. The Making of the Georgian Nation
There were 437,000 Armenians in Georgia in 1989, at which time they were Voting occurred only in ten electoral regions; in the nine districts of Ab- Former followers of Gamsakhurdia, who had broken with him in the fall of New York Times, March 17, 1993; March 18, 1993; March 20, 1993. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The growth of a republican military late in the civil war brought Hamdan and Sankian to prominence, and both Ghashmi and cAll cAbdullah rose to prominence Plate 5.3. A History of Modern Yemen
Not the least of the PDU’s roles, however, have been those of obtaining scholarships for South Yemeni students seeking further training abroad and in obtaining medical help from socialist-bloc countries for government and other PDRY leaders, The PDU, in short, has played the role of agent and broker — material, ideo- logical, cultural, educational, political — for both the Soviet Union and an important segment of the South Yemeni people. Comtemporary Yemen
Syrian state radio, a mouthpiece for the government, accused the US of exposing the region to ‘real dangers’ and urged it to keep to its role as an honest broker. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Damascus was back as a main broker in the peace process and Hezbollah’s right to continue its resistance against Israel’s occupying forces had been recognised. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
But Kissinger sent General Vernon Walters, then deputy director of the CIA, to tell an Arafat aide in Morocco that “the United States has no proposals to make.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The immediate occasion was the signing of the Camp David accords of September 1978, brokered by Jimmy Carter between Begin and Sadat. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
April 18, 1983—The U.S. embassy in Beirut is blown up May 17, 1983—An American-brokered accord between August 29, 1983—Demoralized by Israel’s mounting September 3—25, 1983—Israel pulls its forces out of Leba- October 16, 1983—In a clash with a vast crowd of Shi’ites October 23, 1983—A car-bomb attack on the U.S. Ma- *October 1983—November 1985—Syria uses Abu Nidal to November 1983—U.S. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Each hijacking was timed to coincide with a particular world event, culminating in a spectacular day of hijackings, bringing planes to an abandoned British military airstrip near Zarka, Jordan, called Dawson Field just after the United States brokered a ceasefire along the Suez.18 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One was his arsenal of Scud missiles and chemical-weapons stockpiles, which he claimed to be willing to use to “incinerate half of Israel,” thereby hoping to shift the focus of the war to an Arab— Israeli confrontation and splitting the Arab partners in the international coalition arrayed against him; the other was terror, which he threatened to loose against the United States and its allies in the event of a counter- offensive in Kuwait. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The conflict was resolved in an Iranian-brokered agreement in January 1989, signed in Syria under the auspices of President Assad and known as the Damascus Agreement. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the eyes of many Shiites, he had made the unforgivable error of participating in the National Salvation Committee, an emergency executive which brokered the 17 May 1983 accord between Lebanon and Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
After months of futile fighting, a Russian-brokered cease- fire was signed by the Abkhaz and Georgians on July 28, and Shevardnadze muscled the agreement through a reluctant parliament. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The whole issue at the end of the day is power and power brokering and self interest. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Several later series had the same effect of weaving character and family imagery — all in familiar dialect — into public issues, but “politics” was presented in less detail. A History of Modern Yemen
The government had intervened between Khawlän and Murad (across Khawlän ran a massive new pipeline to export oil). A History of Modern Yemen
They gave the appearance of people very much at home in their own country These are not the power-brokers — by their own estimation they achieve fairly little, although they do enjoy a certain status. A History of Modern Yemen
For Muthannä, below, Hamdi 1964, v: 27. A History of Modern Yemen
No one in the organization knew the details of the banks or the brokers through whom he dealt. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From 1980 onward, he kept a secret representative in Bel- grade: first Ali al-Farra (Dr. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As a result, from 1980 to 1985, Yugoslavia became the organizational center for Abu Nidal’s European operations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The evidence from Palestinian and Western intelli- gence sources suggests a more ambivalent relationship, though Abu Nidal made Poland his home for several years in the early 1980s and professed great admiration for Erich Honecker’s East Germany. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Much like their opposite numbers in the West, they had state interests to defend. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
University of London NEW YORK Copyright © 1962 by David Marshall Lang All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 62—13057 First Printing Manufactured in Great Britain TO THE GEORGIAN PEOPLE AND THE NEW GEORGIA Preface Chapter The Land and the PeopleI Geographical position of Cauca,cia — Ethnic varie& — Bj rail to Tbilisi — Or:: gins of Georgian Christian4y — Tbilisi old and new — Industrj and agriculture — National characteristics of the Georgians — Literature and the arts Rise and Fall of the Georgian KingsII From tribe to monarchj — The coming of the Romans — Christianity and the growth of feudalism — The rise of the Bagratid dj~nas~y — The Mongol joke — Ottoman Turkej and Safavi Persia — Rapprochement with Russia — Collapse of the monarcbj — The Russians take over Georgia under the Tsars: Resistance, Revolt,III Pacification: I 80 1—32 The liquidation of the old order — Prince Tsitsianov — Death of ageneral— Subjugation of Western Georgia — King Solomon II and Napoleon Bonaparte — The revolt of 1812 — Suppression of the Georgian Church — Eco- nomic progress and literarj contacts — The conspiracj of 1832 Tsar Nicholas and Viceroy Vorontsov: 1832—55IV The Murids of Daghestan — Russian reverses — Georgian feudalism and Russian serfdom — Deus ex machina — Attempts at reform — Formation of the Caucasian Vicerqyal~y — Industrial progress — Decline of the old aristocraej — Literature and the theatre — The Crimean War — Passing of an autocrat Social Change and National Awakening: 185 5—94V Alexander II and the liberation of the serfs — Shamil capitulates — The integration of Western Georgia — The peasant question in Georgia — The rise of the CONTENTS vii xiii I 23 42 70 94 VI VII VIII IX Georgian intell:gentsia — Land hunger and peasant dis- content— The edicts of x86~ — The IVar of 1877—78— Commerce and industry — Russian Pan-Slavism and the lesser breeds — Ilia Cbavchavad~e and Georgia’s re- awakening — Alexander III and Russian reaction — Great Georgian writers of the late nineteenth century The Storm Gathers: 1894—1904 Tsarism under pressure — Accession of Nicholas II — ‘Gri-Gri’ Golitsyn — A Georgian anarchist — Popu- lists and Marxists — The Third Group — Sweated labour — Stalin’s revolutionarji youth — ‘Legal Marx- ism’ and the fighting underground— ‘Down with auto- crag!’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
— Plebve and the Black Hundreds Georgia in the 1905 Revolution Russia and Japan — Bolsheviks and Mensheviks — Bloody Sunday — The Gurian communes — The Georgian Church Militant — Massacre at Tbilisi Town Hall — Witte and the Duma — The Tsar regains the upper band— The Cossacks take over — Blood and fire in Georgia — The Friends of Georgia Committee On Borrowed Time: 1906—17 The Georgians in the Duma — The Viborg Declaration — Social-Democrats and Anarchists — Sto~ypin and the Second Duma — Murder of Ilia Chavcbavad~e — The Georgian Church in crisis — Pl:gbt of the Georgian peasantry — Industrial unrest — War declared, 1914 — Mussolini and the Georgian Socialists — The Georgian Legion — Caucasian battlefields — The Turks on the defensive — Breakdown of Tsarist Russia — Literature, art and intellectual life up to ‘917 Towards Georgian Independence: 1917—18 Abdication of Nicholas II — Kerens4y and the Georgian Social-Democrats — Economic change and social revolu- tion — Restoration of the Georgian Church — Disinte- gration of Russia’s Caucasian Front — Short rations and Bolshevik broadsheets — The Bolsheviks seize power — The Transcaucasian Commissariat — The Turkish men- ace — Brest-Litovsk repudiated— An ephemeral fed- eration — Germany takes a band— Birth of the Georgian Republic CONTENTS viii 146 169 192 I X Independent Georgia: 1918—21 XI XII XIII Maps Notes Bibliographical Notes and Suggestions for Further Reading Index Formation of the Georgian cabinet — Trends in Georgian Socialism — The agrarian question — Financial in- stabil4y — The British replace the Germans — An Armenian invasion — Denikin and the Whites — The British withdrawal— Georgia at the ParisConference Georgia and Communist Russia: 1920—24 Collapse of the White Russians — The Russo-Georgian Treqy — Communist propaganda in Georgia — Up- heaval in Ossetia — Rise of Kemalist Turkey — Georgia and the Second International— Krassin and Lloyd George — The Red Army invades Georgia — Death agony of independent Georgia — Lenin versus Stalin on Georgia — Revival of Great Russian chauvinism — The insur- rection of 1924 The Stalin Era: 1924—5 3 Industrial development — Georgian agriculture collecti- vir~ed— The war against the kulaks — ‘Di~r<iness with Success’ — The rise of Beria — The Five-Year Plans— Georgia under the purges—Political reorganir~a- tion and the Stalin Constitution — The Georgian Im:grés — Georgia during World War II — The final terror — Death of a dictator Georgia in Our Time Beria’j brief heyday — The Tbilisi riots — Industry and construction — Scient~flc advances — Growing pains of modernir~ation — The housing crisis — Farming and plantations — Education, medicine and sport — Scholar- sb:p and science — The economic potential of Georgia — Russian national4y policy today CONTENTS ix 209 224 245 263 275 279 284 287 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS i Highland Georgia: A farm in upland Svaneti 2 Old Tbilisi: The Citadel and Muslim quarter ~ Modern Tbilisi: The main pavilion in the Stalin Park ~ Old Tbilisi: Houses on a cliff overlooking the River Kura ~ Modern Tbilisi: Baratashvili Bridge (Photo: Soviet Weekly) 6 The Georgian Military Highway (Photo: Paul Popper) ~ Grading grapes at Tsinandali State Farm in Kakheti (Photo: 8 The traditional game of tskhenburti or ‘horse-ball’ (Photo: ~ Modern Tbilisi: the Sports Stadium io Choir of centenarians, Abkhazian ASSR (Photo: Soviet ii The ‘Mother and Son’ sanatorium at Tsikhis-dziri, Ajar i ~ An old Laz peasant (Photo by courtesy of Denis C. Hills, Esq.) A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This deep-rooted individualism has in fact proved a major obstacle to the creation at any period of a pan-Caucasian state or federation capable of holding its own in face of the THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 3 -A great powers by which the Caucasian isthmus has always been ringed about. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The coming of the Russians, the building of roads and rail- A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 8 t I ways, the digging of mines, and the introduction and develop- ment of collective and state farms have greatly changed the face of Imereti over the last century and a half. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
There is a park with• an excellent restaurant on the summit, in addition to the Georgian state television A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA ‘4 studios. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Kakheti today is a prosperous land of vineyards operated on the collective and state farm systems. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The theatrical arts—drama, ballet, opera—are cultivated in Georgia with outstanding success. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The next class was that of the priests, who also served as diplomats and councillors of state. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
According to Strabo, Iberian society was divided into four main classes. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian realm was a political organism of con- siderable complexity. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Excluded from his dominions was the capital city of Tbilisi, still ruled by independent Muslim amirs, the Ja’farids. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The consequences of this touching but misguided con- fidence were seen most clearly during the reign of King Vakhtang VI of Kartli, who governed at Thilisi as regent from 1703 until 1711, and then as king, with interruptions, until 1723. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This state of affairs had a paralysing effect on the develop- ment of industry. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Tsar cited the defeEiceless state of Georgia, the menace of civil war, the unanimous appeals which had been received from the Christian population for protection against the Persians and Turks. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
With the royal family of Kartlo-Kakheti convulsed by dynastic feuds and Western Georgia perpetually agitated by civil strife, the dis- integration of the state had reached an advanced stage. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Russia of Alexander I was not, by Western standards, a liberal or a progressive state. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They were not reassured to see him back among them, invested with all the authority of the Russian state. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Seeing scant improvement in the state of the country, the Georgians lost faith in the Russian govern- ment and its local representatives. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A State-owned apothecary’s shop was opened, as well as a botanical garden, since famous throughout Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Neither the Russians nor their Persian and Turkish ad- versaries were in a fit state to continue the struggle. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The reason for this was that the Grand Duke Constantine, who was governing Poland, had in 1822 formally renounced the succession to the Russian throne in favour of his younger brother Nicholas, though this had been kept a closely guarded state secret. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The unsettled state of public opinion now provided them with what they deemed a propit- ious moment for their projected coup. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At the beginning of June, Paskevich resumed the offensive. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The state of affairs displayed in this document resembles that so effectively pilloried in Gogol’s comedy, Revi~or, or The Inspector-General. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The main culprits were the head of the local administration, State Councillor Perekrestov, and his col- leagues. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Senators Kutaysov and Mechnikov went on to underline the backward state of the social services and public amenities in Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They hoped that the state of Georgia would swiftly take a turn for the better.36 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A French observer wrote in 1835 that ‘if slavery is a state contrary to nature, and in opposition to cTh 75 modern ideas, in Georgia at least it is fortunately mitigated by ~ the humane character of the masters, who in general treat their men with extreme mildness’. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘~ Deus ex macbina Rumours about this state of affairs eventually reached the central government in St. Petersburg. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Un- fortunately, Hahn’s ideas on administration were ill-adapted to the outlook of the local people. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In February i 8~ ~, the autocrat caught a chill; on March 2, he was dead. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
These years, viewed in historical perspective, mark a turn- ing point in the country’s economic and social life. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This invasion imposed a severe strain on the Mingrelian economy, and particularly on the peasants. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
acres); by the time the Georgian serfs were freed, in 1864, the average holding had sunk to between five and six desjiatins. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The freer access to Russian universities which was one of the beneficial consequences of the educational policy of Alexander II in his early years made it possible for Georgian students to study at Moscow and St. Petersburg. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Ottoman Empire, long in decline, faced continual trouble in the Balkans, where nationalist sentiment was inflamed by agents of imperial Russia spreading the sacred message of Orthodoxy and Pan- Slavism. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Thus, from i 871 the study of Georgian language and literature in State Schools was replaced by compulsory Latin and Greek. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Overtaken in the end by poverty, he went out of his mind, and died after four sad years in Tbiilsi asylum. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The development of the Georgian romantic novel received powerful stimulus from the work of Alexander Qazbegi (1848—93). A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Not devoid of courage and integrity, Nicholas had been overshadowed all his life by his domineering father, and had become in many respects vacillating and easily influenced. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
There is no doubt that they helped to produce in public opinion a state of mind receptive to the socialist ideas which Zhordania and his associates, with the active encouragement of Ninoshvili himself~ were preparing to propagate in Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The animosity of the Armenian community, normally reserved for the Turks, was vented on the Russian government also after 1903, when Prince Golitsyn confiscated the property of the Armenian national Church and perpetrated other discrimin- atory measures against the Armenians, who were very numer- ous in Tbilisi itself. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Gurian move- ment began with a series of demands for reduction of rent, and with protests against the usurpation of peasant land by the state. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘Down with autocracfl’ The Cossacks and gendarmes could not be everywhere at once. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The peasant spokesmen for their part were efficiently coached by the local Social-Democratic committee, and put forward a series of demands which included the return to their homes of persons exiled to Siberia without trial; the withdrawal of troops recently sent to in- timidate the population; abolition of censorship and establish- ment of freedom of Press and publication; election of peasant deputies to a Constituent Assembly by free and secret ballot; abolition of the internal passport system, and granting of freedom of movement within the whole Russian Empire; freedom of assembly and association and the right of appeal from arbitrary acts by local officials; enlargement of peasant allotments at the expense of State and Church domains; the abolition of tithes; the regularization of share-cropping and tenantry agreements, with provision for reduction of taxes and dues in the event of bad harvests; provision of schooling for all children; and the reopening of local Georgian libraries and reading rooms, shut down three years previously by the former Governor-General. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In August 1905, Tsar Nicholas issued a manifesto drafted by his minister, Court Chamberlain Bulygin, in which he promised to convoke a State Council or Duma.~ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Fighting was heavy in Batumi, where barricades were erected in the streets and many lives were lost. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On 14/27 December, the viceroy declared a state of emergency in the Georgian capital. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
But no general appeared. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the Upper House of the Duma, known as the Council of State, a prominent part was played by the famous writer and public figure Prince lila Chavchavadze, who had been elected by the Georgian gentry and aristocracy. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Viborg Declaration The radical temper of the First Duma brought it into constant conffict with the Tsar’s government, at the head of which the vigorous Count Witte had been succeeded by the aged Gore- mykin, a quavering but wily veteran of political manoeuvre. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On 23 June 1907, there took place the famous raid on the Thilisi State Bank, led by the resourceful Armenian Kamo (Ter-Petrossian). A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The nobility elected Prince Sharvashidze, while the popular vote returned Nikolai (Karlo) Chkheidze (d. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Some Russian and Georgian socialists genuinely regarded Imperial Germany as more ‘progressive’ than France, pointing to the superior state of German industry, the excellent organization of the German Trade Union movement and the strength of the German Social- Democratic party, compared with all of which France appeared a stagnant preserve of backward bourgeoisie. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
During the latter years of the nineteenth century, the Caucasian Museum in Tbilisi (now the State Museum of Georgia) made great strides under its energetic and talented German director, Dr. Radde. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In Tbilisi and elsewhere, the police vanished from their posts and administrative offices closed down. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Thus, Zhordania was strongly critical of the ‘democratic cretinism’ which inspired the Kerensky govern- ment to postpone settlement of the many crying social and economic problems left over from Tsardom until these could be referred to a constituent assembly convened with every refinement of electoral procedure from all corners of the far- flung Russian state. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
When presenting his cabinet to the Diet, Chkhen- kei made a speech in which he outlined his government’s programme, which featured the writing of a constitution, the delineation of the new state’s frontiers, the liquidation of the war with Turkey, the combating of both counter-revolution and anarchy, and finally, the carrying through of land reform. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Minister of Agriculture, Khomeriki, favoured retention by the state and ultimately, collectivization. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Of the 70,000 full-time workers employed in Georgian industry in i92o, official statistics show that more than half were state employees, while a quarter worked for municipal and co-operative enterprises. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He declared: ‘I cannot permit the self-styled formations of Georgia and Azerbaijan, which have sprung up to the detriment of Russian state interests and which are clearly hostile to the idea of the Russian State, to receive food supplies at the expense of the areas of Russia which are being liberated from the Bolsheviks.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, Georgia had one last diplom- atic triumph on 27 January i 921, when France and England accorded her full dejure recognition as an independent sover- eign state. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, they were obliged to negotiate with him concerning the supply of wheat and oats for Georgia, and there were occasions when the Georgians failed to intern and hand over to the Communists certain White Russian units and ships seeking a temporary refuge on Georgian soil or in Georgian ports. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Three ministers—Gegechkori, Kandelaki and P. Gogichaish- vili (Minister of State Control), as well as the President of the Constituent Assembly, Karlo Chkheidze, and the special emissary of the republic, Irakli Tseretei, toured the capitals of the great powers in an attempt to win economic aid, loans and political recognition for the Georgian Republic. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Its members included such prominent Georgian Bolsheviks as P. Makharadze, Mamia Orakhelashvili and S. Eliava. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Leading Georgian Bolsheviks like Mdivani, Eliava and Makharadze were dismayed at the abyss which gaped before them and protested vigorously against Stalin’s scheme to abolish the autonomy of the non-Russian republics. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Far-reaching changes were made in the structure, curriculum and personnel of Thilisi State Univer- sity. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Both in Georgia and in Europ- ean Russia, the breaking up of the old landlords’ estates often resulted in loss of efficiency and a fall in production. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This emerges clearly from figures cited in a recent official history of Georgia, which notes that as late as 1925—26, the acreage under grain in Georgia amounted to only 92•8 per cent, of the pre-i~i~ A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 246 average, while the harvest as a whole yielded only 94’4 per cent, of the pre-i~i~ total. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A score or more of Sovkho~es or state farms were also formed. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
According to the account given by N. S. Khrushchev, Beria and Stalin between them deliberately brought Orjonikidze to such a state of nervous collapse that he killed himself. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He was then accorded a grandiose state funeral and admitted to the pantheon of the great dead Bol- shevik fathers. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In metropolitan Russia, Stalin’s fantastic delusions manifested themselves in such sinis- ter incidents as the 1949 Leningrad affair, involving the shooting out of hand of the State Planning Chairman Voznes- ensky, and the bogus ‘Doctors’ Plot’, in which leading Russian physicians narrowly escaped extermination at the hands of the secret police. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Concurrently with the Mingrelian affair, prominent Georg- ian Communists were accused of embezzling state funds, steal- ing automobiles and plundering state property. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A struggle for mastery developed at the summit CHAPTER XIII GEORGIA IN OUR TIME Georgia — Russian nationalit,y polic,y todqy 263 •1 of the Soviet hierarchy. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
But this does not mean that the Georgians are forever hatching plots against the Soviet state, as some Western writers would have us believe. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The nuclear reactor recently installed in Tbilisi enables scientists there to carry out investigations into the peaceful uses of atomic energy. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Scienti- fic contacts with countries abroad are growing more regular and varied. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In spite of its tourist attractions, Georgia suffers from a chronic shortage of hotels and restaur- ants. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The changeover from individual husbandry to collec- tive and state farms, though now virtually universal, is not yet fully accepted by all members of the peasant class, some of whom fail to devote the same loving care to collectivized cows GEORGIA IN OUR TIME 269 ‘I _1 and crops as they do to their own little yards and vegetable plots. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, the ex- tension of tea and citrus fruit plantations has tended to divert attention away from the growing of wheat and other crops needed to feed Georgia’s expanding population. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
152—3 Sumerians, 3, 259 Surami, 2, 6, 10-Il, 23, 99 Surguladze, Petre, 182 Svaneti, Svans, 6, 9—ho, x8, 32, 41, 8o, 96—7, Svyatopolk-Mirsky, Prince, Russian Minister, 147, 149 Swabian peasants in Georgia, 58 Switzerland, Swiss, 58, 120, 128 Synod, Russian Holy, 37, 56, 154, 177—8 Syria, Syrians, 13, 25, 32 Syrtsov, critic of Stalin, liquidated, 252 Tabasaran people, 4 Tabidze, Titsian, Georgian poet, purge victim, ,88, 255—6 Tabriz, 57, 6o Taganrog, 59 Tamar, Queen of Georgia, 13, 21, 29—30, 4’ Tamar, Order of Queen, 183 Tamarati (Tamarashvili), Father M., writes history of Georgian Church, 178 Tambov, 177 Tamerlane (Leng Timur), 31 Tammerfors Conference of 1905, 166 Tao, Georgian province, 7, 28, 104 Taqaishvili, Ekvtime, Georgian arch- aeologist, 189 Tarku, fortress of, 32, 71 Tatars, 14, 43, ii8, 155, 202, 205 Tatkaridze, Luarsab and Darejan, fictional types of Georgian provincial life, ioi Tauride Palace, St. Petersburg, 170 Taurus mountains, 2 Tbilisi (Tiflis), 5—7, 10, 13—16, i8, 23, 28, 32—50, 53, 55, 57—64, 66—9, 73—4, 105, 108—Il, 114, I19—27, 130-I, 134—41, 186—93, 230-I, 233—40, 243—6, 249, 253—9, 264—5, Tbilisi Public Library, 85 Tbilisi State University, see University 102, 249 77, 79-80, 84—91, 99, 102, 144—5, 149—67, 170-8, 183, 195—207, 214—20, 224—7, 267—9, 271, 273 INDEX Tchqondidi, archbishop of, 29 Tea growing in Georgia, 247, 253, 269 Tebran, 62 Teimuraz I, King of Kakheti, 34 Teimuraz II, King of Kartli, 35 Teimuraz Bagration, Georgian prince and historical scholar, 90 Telavi, 6, 16—17, 42, 54, 248 Terek, river, 71, 84, 100 Terek Cossacks, 32 Ter-Petrossian (‘Kamo’), Armenian revolutionary, 141, 176 Tetnuld, Mount, 9 ‘Tetri Giorgi’, Georgian nationalist organization, 259 Thackeray, W. M., translated into Georgian, 272 Theatre in Georgia, 21, 89—9o, 187—8 ‘Third Group’, see Mesame Dasi Thomas a Becket, 30 Thomson, British general at Baku, 216 Tiffis, see Tbilisi Tirebolu, 183 Todtleben, Count von, Russian army commander in Georgia, 36 Toroshelidze, Mikha, Georgian Com- munist, purge victim, 254—5 Tortum, 6 Tqibuli coal mines, 9, 105, 149, 213 Tqvarcheli coal fields, 230 Transcaucasian Commissariat, 200-4, 212 Transcaucasian Committee, 82 Transcaucasian Diet (Seim), 203—7, 209 Transcaucasian Federation, 238, 24!, A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Divided in the nineteenth century between Ottoman and British spheres of influence and by local connections which reached as far afield asJava, Yemen had a long tradition of imagined unity which reached political fruition in the form of a single state only in 1990. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemen’s belated union in May 1990, as the Yemen Republic, was shaken by the Gulf Crisis and by civil war in ig~z~. A History of Modern Yemen
North Yemen, under the Zaydi Imamate, was the one fully inde- pendent Arab government after World War I. South Yemen was a British protectorate. A History of Modern Yemen
(When the Turks took Sanaa in ‘872 they acquired the “registers” from which they would learn “the administration of the country and its resources”. A History of Modern Yemen
A shorthand British expression for QuCayti and KathirT sultanates of Hadramawt, plus Mahrah. A History of Modern Yemen
The Trotting Camel is dedicated to my wife. A History of Modern Yemen
Established 1982 Hadrami Bedouin Legion International Monetary Fund Movement of Arab Nationalists (~zarakat al-qawm~yjvin al- ‘arab) Economic Corporation), a vast governmental apparatus through which Northern army officers became rich National Democratic Front; from early 1976 the main leftist grouping within the North, active mainly in Lower Yemen National Liberation Front, anti-colonial movement in the South established first by Egypt but later at odds with Egypt and FLOSY Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a club of wealthy, industrialised nations Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the cartel of oil states which in the 1970s was dominated by Middle Eastern countries and which itself for a while seemed to dominate world finance Abbreviations xvii xviii PDRY SAL UAR WAP YAR YD YR YSP People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (the South, which from November 1967 to December 1970 was the People’s Republic of South Yemen) South Arabian League (rdbitah abnd’ al-janub, literally “League of the Sons of the South”) United Arab Republic; from 1958 to 1961 Egypt and Syria together, from ig6i just Egypt Western Aden Protectorate (the little states of the Aden hin- terland) Yemen Arab Republic (the state in the North, declared in 1962) Yemeni dinär, the currency of the PDRY (a little less than $US 3 in ig8o). A History of Modern Yemen
The wish for a single Yemeni state emerged in a context shaped by outside powers. A History of Modern Yemen
Much of Yemen’s history through the twentieth century connects with efforts to form that state, which was finally estab- lished in 1990. A History of Modern Yemen
Political structures through the nineteenth century were defined by reference to religion or dynasty, not territory, and a list of rulers would be indefinitely long for their claims overlap in both time and space. A History of Modern Yemen
Few places were in the grip of government, for as Muhsin al-HarAzI said near the time, the State could not be put right without soldiers, soldiers were only ruled by money, and in the treasury there was no money. A History of Modern Yemen
When the Turks again took Sanaa, in 1872, al-Mutawakkil Muhsin moved north and sustained his claim as Imam in accordance with the Zaydi (Shi’ite) school of Islamic law Though it had once, in the seven- teenth century, produced the Qasimi dynastic state or dawlah, Zaydism had usually been a tradition of the anti-state: the collapse of the Qasimis, indeed, was rationalised by saying they were less like Imams than Kings. A History of Modern Yemen
In Zaydi terms the Qasim! A History of Modern Yemen
Yahya appointed new agents to several regions. A History of Modern Yemen
This defined not sovereignty or administration but merely areas where each power, British and Ottoman, agreed the other should not trespass: in other words, “spheres of influence”. A History of Modern Yemen
Separation of the sexes, forms of greeting, conventions of dress and deference, made up an elaborate moral order in the countryside and towns alike. A History of Modern Yemen
As the Qasimi state collapsed it was northern tribes who fought for the rival claimants, but the tribes’ leading families did not claim power in their own names and in this respect the South was different. A History of Modern Yemen
Two Yafidl factions held the ports of Shilir and Mukallä. A History of Modern Yemen
The British were drawn in, partly because of India and shipping, partly to forestall the Ottomans. A History of Modern Yemen
Rival Zaydi Imams, one of whom endured around Sacdah until 1923, never threatened Yahy~’s support to the same degree and through World War I the Idrisi was Yaliya’s main rival. A History of Modern Yemen
Until World War lIthe Imam’s own state would retain a mildly Turkish flavour, requiring foreign visitors, for instance, to wear Ottoman kalpaks or lamb’s-wool caps as court dress. A History of Modern Yemen
In the North, by contrast, at about the same time, the rise to power of Imam Yahya (himself of course, a sayyid) gave many sayyid families a stake in what emerged as a dawlah — a state, and then a dynasty, which far outweighed the little dawlahs of South Yemen and claimed a place of its own on the world map. A History of Modern Yemen
Yahya himself, between 1918 and 1934, conquered much of Yemen and built a state in the North to which, as R. J. Gavin suggests, the South emerged gradu- ally as an antithesis; the state in the North meanwhile had to be invented, morally as much as otherwise, in circumstances new to Yemenis. A History of Modern Yemen
His progress around Tacizz was more rapid. A History of Modern Yemen
But a small Idrisi state under Saudi protection remained in ‘AsIr, and by 1924 Ibn Sa’ud had seized most of North Arabia (Map 2.1). A History of Modern Yemen
Within the ~iaw~ah violence was forbidden. A History of Modern Yemen
al-qawm~y~yah, a phrase to conjure with elsewhere in the 195os), and an accession speech in 1936 expressed the wish to set up an agricultural college.3° A History of Modern Yemen
“Ingrams’ peace” could as well be called the al-Käf peace. A History of Modern Yemen
In Tarim, later, one finds a movement to elide the Kathiri and Qu~ayu sultanates, in part to avoid double taxation. A History of Modern Yemen
The Qasimi state or dawlak left in the North an image of political order. A History of Modern Yemen
My trust has collapsed in my friends and my fellows... A History of Modern Yemen
Yahya, we might remember; had once studied with him; he himself had studied with a pupil of Shawkani, the man from whom Sunni-like theories of the state all derive circa i8oo. A History of Modern Yemen
every letter written, no matter how unimportant, is placed before the Couch of State and His Eminence [the Imam], after reading it and adding a word at the end in his own hand. A History of Modern Yemen
There was not enough revenue to go around. A History of Modern Yemen
From Aden some moved on not only to Africa, but to America, Britain, Indonesia, or even, by way of French Djibouti, to Vietnam. A History of Modern Yemen
But his Zaydism was scarcely that of the sect’s founders. A History of Modern Yemen
Ya~iya, by contrast, on the basis of God’s preference, felt himself rightly the sole ruler; and a document from the Appeal Court referring to “what Brother So-and-So said” brought the furious riposte — “Whose brother. A History of Modern Yemen
Nor was the work of government quite that of Syria. A History of Modern Yemen
Initially his demands were phrased in terms common to all Islam. A History of Modern Yemen
debates, first over- seas, which involved the Shaykhs of Cairo and the Zaydi Imam led also to the writing of a new kind of history and a distinctively modern form of Hadrami self-consciousness. A History of Modern Yemen
In late 1939 he set off for the North with twenty-four of his students “all with their uniforms and drums” but settled for a time in Yafic where he proclaimed himself “he who summons to God”. A History of Modern Yemen
There were murmurs that corruption and injustice went unchecked. A History of Modern Yemen
Meanwhile migrants were forced home in increasing numbers. A History of Modern Yemen
In the Western Protectorate the 1946 Report’s bland line on “shepherd- ing and stimulating new State Administrations” hides as radical an issue. A History of Modern Yemen
The Sharif of Bay~an made his state sui generis. A History of Modern Yemen
And the Imam agreed with his brother’s thinking.”26 A History of Modern Yemen
Aden in the 1930S was a provincial town in Britain’s Indian empire where such families might rise to colo- nial obscurity, but ‘Abdullah al-Asnaj, who was Ahmad’s nephew brought up in Aden though born in Sanaa, emerged in the 19505 as leader of the ATUC, “employed as a clerk by that most characteristic institution of the twentieth century in South Arabia — Aden Airways”.37 A History of Modern Yemen
The Iladrami states declined to involve themselves. A History of Modern Yemen
The dynastic state, a radical innovation only decades before, appealed vainly to lost antiquity: “Yemen is a monarchy ruled by its lawful and spiritual leader, Imam al-Näsir Ahmad bin Yahya Ilamid al-DIn the 66th, Imam of the Hashemiyyah Dynasty which was founded 1101 years ago - . A History of Modern Yemen
The Yemen Arab Republic was declared — the state later often described as North Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
The agreement was railroaded through (only four out of twelve elected members of Aden State’s government supported the deci- sion: ex officio or appointed members made up the numbers), and even then a day’s delay would have made it impossible. A History of Modern Yemen
In Sanaa, which Egypt controlled directly, a police state emerged. A History of Modern Yemen
put together a delegation including tribal leaders — ‘Abdullah al-AI~irnar of Häshid, Amin Abu Ra’s of Bakil, most notably — to go to Cairo. A History of Modern Yemen
Days later, when Sallal was to arrive in Sanaa, crowds marched to the airport but Sallal eluded them, all public discussion was suppressed and politics at state level, much as under the Imams, disappeared into plot and counter-plot. A History of Modern Yemen
In Shucayb in 1963, for instance, the Arab political officer, Ahmad Facjl Mukisin of Façlli, was murdered by his radio operator, Saliki Muqbil 97Revolutions and civil wars: the 196os g8 A history of modern Yemen al-Maqdhub, later prominent in the NLE22 Two years afterwards (1965), the new ruler of Shucayb, Nashir CAbdull~h, was murdered in Aden. A History of Modern Yemen
death before dishonour), many played all ends against the middle, and the Egyptians in the North, like the British in the South, identified tri- balism with endemic treachery. A History of Modern Yemen
Indeed through the fight to follow, when bombings, murders and assassinations became common, few were ever held for long and none executed. A History of Modern Yemen
Violence remained enmeshed in broader politics.26 A History of Modern Yemen
Elections for Aden State were held on a narrow voter-base (io,ooo Aden citizens who could pass a test in Arabic; the total population was now 220,000), which dissatisfied both militants and Federal rulers. A History of Modern Yemen
Before the British announced they would abandon Aden, the Egyptians in the North may have felt despair. A History of Modern Yemen
But if NuCman was a focus of complex tensions, his picture was nonetheless seen on trucks and in shops throughout Lower Yemen 36 CAbd al-Na~ir and King Fay~a1, for reasons of their own, agreed a cease-fire in August 1965, and Yemeni royalist and republican delega- tions met at Harad near the Saudi border in November, where Egypt pressured the republicans to accept the Saudi formulation of an “Islamic State”. A History of Modern Yemen
The joke wore thin as it became apparent that the police in Aden were as little committed to British aims as the Federal Army, and in the east, the small QuCayti and Kathiri State Forces and the Hadrami Bedouin Legion (HBL), although independent of Aden, showed the same processes as in the Federal Army All are remembered from the 1950S as lecturing rural neighbours and relatives on correct Islamic prac- tice; in the 1960s all were infiltrated by the NLE Certain Northerners had suggested early on that there was no need to fight in the South at all for the British were leaving anyway, and the Revolutions and civil wars: the 196os 109 110 announcement of a date only strengthened that perception. A History of Modern Yemen
At the end, the Sharif of Bayhan left for Saudi Arabia, pursuing some policy of his own; his state disappeared in his absence, most probably from family rivalry The Sultans of Hadramawt returned from talks in Geneva in September 1967, only to find the Bedouin Legion and NLF had seized their capitals.59 A History of Modern Yemen
Perhaps strangest of all is how naturally the country divided. A History of Modern Yemen
In a world of cheap wheat from Russia and America to cover the worst years, something might have been done. A History of Modern Yemen
The traditional answer of emigration and remit- tances — being part not just of Greater Yemen but of global commerce — was not available on the scale it once had been, but it was still avail- able, and estimates of Yemenis in the oil-producing states of Arabia ran as high as 300,000 even in 1970. A History of Modern Yemen
The “dunes” where couples had met and young men hung out to smoke or drink and discuss their dreams became an off-limits area patrolled by soldiers, while “kidnapped one night, South Yemeni prostitutes found themselves, come the dawn, as producers in a little tomato-sauce factory set up in an isolated place far from towns and men. A History of Modern Yemen
In Aden, lacking rural constit- uencies, they favoured a strong party-apparatus and demanded Yemen’s integration more insistently than did colleagues from Fadli, Abyan or Haçlramawt: “the borders and artificial separation which divide the Yemeni popular masses in two parts, the division between South Yemen and North Yemen which occurred during British occupa- tion, should disappear. A History of Modern Yemen
The “corrective movement of 13 June” won wide support, and the greatest of northern shaykhs, cAbdullãh al-Ahmar, convened a meeting in Hamdan just north of Sanaa, which ‘~joined together the tribes of Bayda’ governorate and Ma’rib, of Sa’dah, Dhamar and Ijudaydah, TaCizz and Sanaa, Ibb, Mahwit and IIajjah”.23 A History of Modern Yemen
“No active work took place worth mentioning except a well in ‘Aça’s own village” but sums of 3,000 to 5,000 riyals were being given to local shaykhs, supposedly for development, and some said Kabab paid this to his friends “because he was their Shaykh and their representative on the Consultative Council and a minister in the State”. A History of Modern Yemen
Such assumptions about the natural role of shaykhs and the State were common. A History of Modern Yemen
They stressed “institution building”, which in effect meant “state building”, and what the state was required to do that could not be done otherwise was seldom argued. A History of Modern Yemen
Remittances by then accounted for 40 per cent of GDP and food imports for 30 per cent, very much as in the North, although the South assimilated remittance wealth to state expenditure far more efficiently, and the paradox developed of massive dependence on economies which the South’s revolution was, in theory committed to overthrow The dream of self-sufficiency was vigorously pursued. A History of Modern Yemen
Faced now with a huge drain of manpower from a tiny workforce, Aden’s government tried to ban emigration. A History of Modern Yemen
This proved impossible. A History of Modern Yemen
In the later 1970S state officials would be seen to pray on major holidays, but relig- ion was treated by the Party as something that would one day disappear and Islam viewed in instrumental terms as at best a primitive form of socialism. A History of Modern Yemen
A certain standardisation of dance and song was encouraged on both sides of the border by state-run television, which in Aden goes back to the colonial period but spread rather slowly through the countryside; Sanaa began transmitting in i97~. A History of Modern Yemen
Beyond the major cities government in the North was sparse, and wealth came from either remittances or political subven- tions by other states. A History of Modern Yemen
Despite the South’s alliance with Russia, both Yemens lived in the shadow of the Saudi state. A History of Modern Yemen
Qadi CAbd al-KarIni a1~cArashl, appointed caretaker head of state, considered taking the presidency until his female relatives, so the story goes, presented him with his winding-sheet and told him not to be so foolish, and an army officer then stepped forward. A History of Modern Yemen
In the South, where “family rule” was an affront to ideologies of mod- ernity as much as of equality, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) was estab- lished in October 1978 and a revised constitution granted it control of state and people: “The YSP, armed with the theory of Scientific Socialism, is the leader and guide of society and the state . A History of Modern Yemen
The state apparatus in the North grew faster, with the aid from 1984 of locally produced oil and gas, while the South reached an impasse polit- ically. A History of Modern Yemen
Na~ir by late ig8o had amassed in his own hands all three key positions in the Southern state: president, prime minister, and secretary-general of the YSP. A History of Modern Yemen
Al-Suf! A History of Modern Yemen
An “institute” was established to comment on the text of the National Charter, “seminars” were convened which absorbed the energies of intellectuals, and com- pulsory “readings” were held in government offices as a ritual of state through the 198os. A History of Modern Yemen
The revolution transported all the Yemeni people from the dark ages to the advanced (mutatawwarah, developed) life of the twentieth century and affirmed its intellectual release from a world of darkness and political deception. A History of Modern Yemen
State farms were allowed to move towards less stringent forms of co-operative and planners in the South placed more emphasis on the private sector, whose share of the economy rose from 66 per cent to 72 per cent between 1980 and 1985. A History of Modern Yemen
The difference between state structures did not reduce to economics. A History of Modern Yemen
Both depended for their country’s viability on massive remit- tances from migrant labour, and both depended for the solvency of their state apparatus on grants and loans from elsewhere, not all of which appeared in published budgets; North and South Yemeni governments alike spent enormous amounts on the police and military, and both amassed huge external debts they had scant hope of paying off. A History of Modern Yemen
Amidst the laissez-faire economics of the 197os, the state apparatus had grown enormously with support from foreign governments and institu- tions. A History of Modern Yemen
The GPG, in 1982, had built in part on co-operatives and promised means for local voices to be heard at national level. A History of Modern Yemen
The literature deals often in terms of state against tribe, in particular, as if these were separate entities and the advance of one geographically meant the other’s retreat. A History of Modern Yemen
State patronage expanded, and in Yemen in a wider world: the 198os , 6i 162 A history of modern Yemen preparation for the ig8~ local elections, it was said (at a time when the country supposedly faced insolvency) that large numbers of private cars were shipped in by the President’s office to serve as sweeteners for local notables. A History of Modern Yemen
Such cal- culations take no account of declining aid, however, nor does an overall balance sheet suggest the structural effect, for where previously central government had depended on the kindness of strangers and wealth in hard currency came largely through private hands, now wealth came direct to the central government. A History of Modern Yemen
The dam was inaugurated in 1986. A History of Modern Yemen
His industrial operations were capital intensive and technically efficient by any standard. A History of Modern Yemen
Inequalities were built among neighbours and immediate kin, while larger-scale projects sponsored by government (a set of dams was being built in Wadi Mawr, for instance) encouraged more anonymous forms of exploitation. A History of Modern Yemen
All the trees died, and their leafless branches stood out against the sky like the remnants of a forest fire as Sanaa displaced Aden as by far Yemen’s largest city. A History of Modern Yemen
With oil exploration, com- merce was encouraged further and tensions in the South soon focused on the image of a state within the state, where money, cars and buildings seemed all in the hands of ‘Ali Nasir’s friends. A History of Modern Yemen
‘Ali ‘Antar, we might remember, had supported moves to depose ‘Abd al-Fattah Isma’il THE SOUTHERN STATE in ig8o; early in 1984 he asked that ‘Abd al-Fattab be allowed back. A History of Modern Yemen
To some, Aden’s state still seemed, at least potentially, a model of equality and order, but increasingly one heard of fawda or “chaos” of a kind the South had attributed to Northerners: soldiers simply not turning up if they did not feel like it, payments being made outside official channels, deals being done that made sense at local level but not in terms of socialism. A History of Modern Yemen
The state in the South had treated Islam as a feeble, rather distant case of socialist reform and turned it solely to the ends of nationalism. A History of Modern Yemen
Somewhat Qasimi views of state and religion (Chapters i and 2) had recurred and been developed in the thought of, for instance, Qasim Ghalib (Chapter 4), a man of his time for whom Nasirism and the views of the Muslim Brothers were ideally compatible:48 Yemen in a wider world: the 1980s 173 ‘74 an authoritarian, nationalist state seemed a better path tojustice than per- sonal decision or insistence that the ruler himself be pious. A History of Modern Yemen
The new Islam of the ig8os was a generic Sunnism which claimed to be non-sectarian. A History of Modern Yemen
The State in the North encouraged Islamist movements as compati- ble with the National Charter. A History of Modern Yemen
More generally the prominence of the movement depended on overlaps between Islamists and the State, not on formal alliances. A History of Modern Yemen
On the other hand, the panoply of State was prominent. A History of Modern Yemen
The Republican Palace, taken over from the Imam at the start of the revolution, was supplemented by Presidential Palaces, not least in Sanaa;57 government limousines multiplied, and the grandeur of the State increased. A History of Modern Yemen
In court procedure and dispute settlement, in com- mercial transactions, in employment by the State, one found endless per- sonal connections of responsibility just as there were in the Imams’ time. A History of Modern Yemen
Having lost a number of his soldiers, he demanded that Hath be crushed by the army, but the President told him simply to let it go: so long as personal relations with notables were managed and the centres of the State not threatened, feuds and squabbles were of small concern. A History of Modern Yemen
The Imamate had pro- duced a nation-state but then collapsed in war and revolution, and a greater revolution had followed with the spread of trade and cash from migrant labour, which in turn seemed to be collapsing. A History of Modern Yemen
A friend in a village as far north of Sanaa as ~Azizah was south (among “the tribes”, indeed, whom others supposed now owned the country) was in a worse state. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemen’s financial crisis of 1986 had been alleviated partly by a grant from the Saudis, whose policy no doubt was to promote “stable and Yemen in a wider world: the 198os 179 REGIONAL AND WIDER POLITICS i8o A history of modern Yemen peaceful relations between Sanaa and Aden, but not so cooperative as to risk real unity . A History of Modern Yemen
Long ago in the Näsirist age, the common red, white and black of Arab state-flags had been differentiated and by a quirk of diplomatic history North Yemen had inherited one CHAPTER SEVEN Temen as a single state YEMEN AND THE GULF CRISIS 183 184 green star in the centre, while Syria had two and Iraq three. A History of Modern Yemen
The flag was changed. A History of Modern Yemen
185Yemen as a single state i86 A history of modern Yemen national flags and portraits of cAll cAbdU1l~h ~a1ib and of ~addäm. A History of Modern Yemen
In parts of the South it had been Yemen as a single state 187 188 A history of modern Yemen Plate ~.i. ~Abd al-Majid al-Zindäni. A History of Modern Yemen
Had the GPC been a party like others these doubts might have been justified, but in fact it was the tissue of the Northern state and indirect election procedures meant that everywhere officials, shaykhs or officers dispensed benefits which the GPC controlled. A History of Modern Yemen
This in no sense disqualified them from acting within the previous form of pol- itics, and the style was nicely caught by a newspaper cartoon where the Yemen as a single state 189 190 A history of modern Yemen first man asks the other which party he belongs to: “I’ve told you twenty times,” replies the second, “I belong to the GPC.” A History of Modern Yemen
Na~ir to frighten supporters of cAll Salim al-Biçl Yemen as a single state 191 192 A history of modern Yemen within the YSP, and speculation came to centre on the foreign connec- tions of noted figures. A History of Modern Yemen
Come back cAll Na~ir!”4 A History of Modern Yemen
Large elements of YSP bureaucracy moved to Sanaa where many seemed to live as extrav- agantly as their counterparts in the GPC, and in December 1992, when the riyal slipped from 30 to 42 against the US dollar, riots broke out not least at Tacizz where the crowds turned often on expensive cars. A History of Modern Yemen
When people came out to help, they found a group of plainly drunk young men and unrelated young women: the car was set fire to not by “fundamentalists” or the like but by angry householders. A History of Modern Yemen
By late 1992 new bank-notes were appearing which many feared were backed by nothing and the prime minister of the time, ~aydar al-’Attas (a Southerner from Hadramawt), threatened to resign, for with the two major parties at odds no decisions were possible and the State seemed to be disintegrating. A History of Modern Yemen
This was opposed not only by the President, who claimed it was a tool of the YSP, but also by such tribal figures as Shaykh cAbdullah of Hashid and Sinan Aba Lahum. A History of Modern Yemen
The two erst- while governments (GPC and YSP), meanwhile, retained troops of their own and sources of state funds. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemen as a single state 193 194 A history of modern Yemen began large-scale work and their agent was Ahmad Shumaylah, a rela- tive of the President’s by marriage and himself from Sanhan; cAbdUllah al-Hadraml, head of MECO, acted as agent for a US-based gas opera- tion. A History of Modern Yemen
We have made continuously every effort we can to reach agreement with those driving the country towards ruin and destruction, but unfortunately, bitterly, sadly all we Yemen as a single state 195 CONTROL OF YEMEN ig6 A history of modern Yemen have found are lies. A History of Modern Yemen
The feeling was most intense in Aden, however: “through 130 years of British rule and thirty years of socialist rule, we learned the forms of a developed state. A History of Modern Yemen
But the style of politics complained of by Southerners as a return of tribalism was complained of by others, within as a single state 197 198 the North, as tribalism’s negation, and most of Yemen’s population makes no claim to be tribal in any sense. A History of Modern Yemen
The Islamist mountain described in YSP rhetoric before the fighting brought forth a mouse. A History of Modern Yemen
~ To generate a more active financial system, central government withdrew state accounts from commercial banks, raised base interest rates, and allowed commercial banks to set their own rates. A History of Modern Yemen
Sons of other great 201Yemen as a single state 202 shaykhs have emerged as businessmen and one cannot see them ever being shaykhs themselves. A History of Modern Yemen
The family, however, live mainly in the presidential palaces, which Yemenis unaccustomed to modern forms of state equate some- times with massive army camps, and those beyond ruling circles now speculate about family affairs — about how relations might develop for instance between the President’s son, Ahmad ~AIi, and the President’s elder kinsman, ~AIi Muhsin al-Ahmar. A History of Modern Yemen
The state acquired a certain quality of routine management, while the Presidency stood above the fray. A History of Modern Yemen
Nabil al-Khamiri, a famous merchant whose family is from Hugariyyah and who himself owns, among much else, the Haddah Hotel, is married 203Yemen as a single state 204 A history of modern Yemen to a daughter of Shaykh cAbdullah of Ilashid; but he was still held up in his Sanaa office, in early 1998, by tribesmen from Khawlan. A History of Modern Yemen
Oil revenue accounts for 6o per cent of the state budget. A History of Modern Yemen
Production of some 400,000 barrels per day does not go far among 17 million people (Saudi Arabia, Yemen as a single state 205 206 A history of modern Yemen with a smaller national population pumps 8,ooo,ooo barrels per day) but revenue is needed for “structural adjustment” and to service debt — the logic of which is as singular as that of influence by planets. A History of Modern Yemen
A survey at the time suggested 40 per cent of civil servants never turned up to work; the bureaucrats of the old Southern regime were in any case not allowed to act (after 1994, electricity in many Southern offices was simply not reconnected) and they seemed expend- able. A History of Modern Yemen
MECO, meanwhile — the very substance of the military—commercial complex — remains huge and, renamed the Yemeni Economic Corporation, has expanded from farming and retailing to packing and canning, transport and refrigeration, even running a well-known dairy business. A History of Modern Yemen
To adjust the more substantial structures underlying these would, in Yemen’s case, mean dismantling the state itself which is not sought by international agencies or by other governments. A History of Modern Yemen
Through the twentieth (Christian) century, however, the idea was pursued by fits and starts of a Yemeni national state, and in the century’s last decade the idea became fact at last. A History of Modern Yemen
The state turns out to be much like other states. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemen as a single state 209 SOMEONE ELSE’S MILLENNIUM 210 Plate 7.3. A History of Modern Yemen
Of 301 seats, the GPC took i88, compared with 123 four years earlier, and Islah’s share dropped from 62 to 53. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemen has its modernist men in suits and its men in neo-Islamic beards, its women in old Sanaani dress and its modern “veiled ones” (muhajjabdt), but the desperate unease Yemen as a single state 213 214 A history of modern Yemen that afflicts much of the Arab World in the face of the West afflicts rather few of them deeply, and arguments about global affairs return constantly even now to local detail. A History of Modern Yemen
Used inter a/ia of provincial governors under the last Imams. A History of Modern Yemen
In Zaydi theory the most perfect man available at a given time, a fortiori of the Prophet’s house an uprising or upheaval. A History of Modern Yemen
For the broader history al-Wasi’T 1928. A History of Modern Yemen
40 For ‘A- al-Wishali 1982 and particularly Bang igg6, which takes the story of the Idrisi state to its end in the 1930s. A History of Modern Yemen
A “closed” style (described with the same vocabulary) is as typical of Imams. A History of Modern Yemen
For an incident in 1953 of schoolboys arguing over sayyids versus non-sayyids, Rashid 1985: 137. A History of Modern Yemen
In fact the manifestos of the SAL and the ATUC — the latter judged correct, the former not — were near identical, and the ATUC itself later called for a Southern state before being told by Cairo not to (CO 1015/1499; SWB 27 April 1959; also Records 15 588—9). A History of Modern Yemen
For migrants going North, ~Abd al-Fattah 1974: 48. A History of Modern Yemen
The area-names of the forgotten victims all refer to places much involved with migrant labour. A History of Modern Yemen
British global strategy in so far as it existed, is beyond the scope of the present book, but see also Darby 1973 Balfour-Paul 1991. A History of Modern Yemen
3 May 1964 SWB. A History of Modern Yemen
28 Burrowes (1987: 57—87) is good on the Hamdi period. A History of Modern Yemen
Literature on state politics in the71 South gives an impression of simply poisonous intrigue and double- dealing. A History of Modern Yemen
The documents Nacnac presents (ig88: 133—65), in which ‘All ‘Antar denounces Muhsin, Mubsin denounces ‘All ‘Antar, and al-Siyayli seeks Mukiammad al-MutT’s execution, give an extraordinary impression of state politics. A History of Modern Yemen
For the state of the economy around Aden, Cigar 1990 202, n. 31. A History of Modern Yemen
7 YEMEN AS A SINGLE STATE 252 .Votes A History of Modern Yemen
bard/i, bardh,yd zuyud; ‘all n&ir ba-ya ‘Ud. A History of Modern Yemen
1977b The Anglo-Italian rivahy in Yemen and CA_ 1900—34, Die Welt des Balfour-Paul, G. 1991 The End of Empire in the Middle East, Cambridge: Bang, A. K. 1996 The IdrisI State in cAsIr: politics, religion, and prestige in Arabia, Baradduni, CAbdullah 1978 Qada~ydyaman~yyah (2nd edition), Beirut: Dar al- 1983 al-Yaman aljumhuri, Damascus: Matba~at al-Kätib al~cArabT. A History of Modern Yemen
1990 Islam and the state in South Yemen: an uneasy coexistence, Middle Eastern Studies 26, 185—203. A History of Modern Yemen
1949 The I~lngdom of Melehior: adventures in Southwest Arabia, London:John Murray. A History of Modern Yemen
Unpublished Ph.D. A History of Modern Yemen
Introductory essay, ‘L’état en face a la démocratie’, pp. 3—5. A History of Modern Yemen
na4lrft daw,~zah al-tdrikh al- Mundy, M. 1979 Women’s inheritance of land in highland Yemen, Arabian 1983 Sanca~ dress, 1920—75, in R. B. Serjeant and R. Lewcock (eds.), A History of Modern Yemen
Obermeyer, G. 1981 at-Imdn and al-Imam: ideology and state in the Yemen, 1900—1948, in M. R. Buheiry (ed.), A History of Modern Yemen
E. 1982 Yemen: the search for a modern state, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. A History of Modern Yemen
irrigation, 96, 138, 162, 565—7 qdt, 16—17, ‘3’, 539, 167, 207 self-sufficiency, 133, 534, 558, 204, 207 share-cropping, 37, 70, 85, 538, i~8, 565 state farms in South, 534, 157 yields, 134, 139, i~8, 204 see also land tenure Ahmad, Imam (1948—62), 62, 63—4, 6~—g, 76, 84, 86, 82, 89, 93, ,o6 administration, 66—7, 68, 78, 8o—i as a young man, 31—2 as Crown Prince, 44, 48, 49, 53 as King of Yemen, 67—9, 78, 8o, 8i attempted coup against (,g~,), 78 brothers of (see also Hamid al-Din family), 44—5,48—9,68,69,78 development projects, 67, 8o, 82 dynastic claims, ~7, 6~—6, 87 in Italy, 83—4 influence of women in household, 67—8 military forces, 69, 8o, 8i relations with South, 62, 64, 74—6, 78, 8o religious politics, 68 revenue and finance, 67, 71, 8o, 82 rise to power, 44—5, 48, 57 Ahmad PashA (Ta’izz notable), 32, 53, 70 al-Al~mar family (Sanhan), 202, 252 fl.9 A History of Modern Yemen
248 n.22 China, Chinese, 82, 87, 128, 129, 133, 140, 169 class and class analysis, 83, g~, 97, 103—4, 123, 191, 206—7, 238 fl.20 A History of Modern Yemen
1923), 21, 28, 31, 32 Imamate, Zaydi, ~, i~, 38, 43—4, ~9, 56, gi see also state, forms and theories of Imams, Zaydi, i~, 18, 19 ‘Abdullah bin Hamzah (c.!200), A History of Modern Yemen
45, 48, 68, 69, 122 merchants, 26, 95, 123, 162, 164 population, ‘37 port development, 67, 82, 95, 164 al-Hugariyyah, 9, 12—13, 19, 29, 5~, 137, 153, 203 andAden, 10,19,54,71,74,111 Development Association, 126, 129—30 farming, ‘~8, i6~, 207 Humar conference (1966), io8 al-Humayqan (tribe), 43, 74, 93, RIB Httriyyah, Sayyid Muhammad (Zaydi scholar), 45 Htith, ,6, 26, 38, 84, i6o, 167 Ibb, 6, !3, A History of Modern Yemen
state (i7th—igth centuries), 4, 15, 20, 204 and dynastic rule, 4—5, 43, 44, 68 theology, 141, 173—4 qat, 16—17, 23, 73, 8o, ‘47, 165, i68, 179, 197 as social occasion, 17, 131, 163, 202 economic importance, 139, 165, 167, 207 extent of, 131 see also agriculture Qa’tabah, 6, 34, 62, 76, 96, 119, 152 al-Qayfah (tribe), 90, 117, i8o Qu’ayli Sultanate, 21, 33, 59, 109, III, 113, 120 Ingrams’ peace, 36—7, 41, 59, 6o nationalist politics, 59—60, 77, 8~, 111—12 see also Hadramawt Qubatl, Yasin (Muslim Brother), 187, 246 n.58 al-Quhall, Mujahid (shaykh), ‘35 Quhra (tribe), i6, 28 Qur’an, Holy, 1, 43, 53, 98, 126, 141, 162, 173, 207 Qu~aybTs (tribe), 28, 38, 55, ~ 62, 75, 97 Rada’, 8, 55, 122, 242 fl.9 A History of Modern Yemen
SAL (South Arabian League), 77 during civil war, 107, ,o8, III, 112, 113 revived as League of Sons of Yemen (al- Rabitah), 190, 209 Salafts, ig8, 200 see also Islamists Salih Muslih Qasim (member of politburo in South), 151, 170 Salim Rubay’ ‘All, see Salmayn Salim Salih Muhammad (politician in South), i68, 170, 194 al-Sallal, ‘Abdullah (President in North), 89, 92, 94, 103—4, io6, 122—3, 140 his symbolic ambiguity, 89, 117 in Cairo repeatedly, 93, 105 overthrown, 114 “Salmayn” (Salim Rubay’ ‘All, President in South), 120-I, 128, 130, 141, 147, 151 Sanaa, ~, ~, ~—6, 14, 69, 84, 86—7, i6o, 183, 191, 212—13 and Imam Ya~ya, 8, 28, 30, 34, 45—6, 48, 49, 54 and Turks, ~, 8, 22, 25—6 demonstrations and riots, 93, 114, 191 during civil war, 91—3, 102, ,o6, 132, 137 everyday life, 145, 206 growth of; 137, 167—8, 176, 207 household economy, 167, 177—8, 206, 212 mythic value, 26, 205 population, 26, 86, 137, [76, 207 revolution (1962), 87, 89—go sacked (1948), 57, 197 siege (1967—68), 114—15, 124, 167 university, 174, 175 Sanhan (‘All ‘Abdullah Salih’s tribe), 148, 159, 167, i8o, 189, 192—3, 194, 197, 212 al-Saqqaf, ‘Abd al-Rahman (Hadraml scholar), 39 al-Saqqaf, Abu Bakr (sociologist), 242 ni, 253 n.27 Sa’ud, King of Saudi Arabia, 82 SaudiArabia, 121, 136, 147,150, i6~, i8i, 184, 213 and Imam Ahmad, 70, 78, 79, 8o, 82, 83 during civil war, 91, 95, 98, 103—5, 107, 112, 113, 115, 117 influence in North, 123—6, 147, 150, 179 influence in South, 147 Islamists supported by, 142, 173 oil wealth, 70, 158, 205—6 opposed to a united Yemen, 130, 180, 182, r86, 192, ig6 ,‘. A History of Modern Yemen
282 Saudi Arabia (cont.) A History of Modern Yemen
payments, covert, 124, 142, 146, 173, 196, 201 payments, overt, 124, 126, ~ 179—80 relations with Egypt, 79, 8o, 83, 87, 91, 103, 105, 114 relations with united Yemen, [84—6, 205, 211 support for South (iç~~), 192, 196 Yemenis workmg rn, 70, ,o8, 112, ,r8, 131, 136, 153, 173, 185 see also borders Saudis (before Kingdom formed): and Imam Yahya, 32, 34—5 protection of Idrisi, 31, 32, 34 war of 1934, 34—5, 46, 47, 51 see also Ibn Sa’ud; Wahhabis al-Sayaghi, Ahmad (governor of Ibb), 68, 8~i, 84, 86, 94 say))ZeLs,5, 15,18,38,89,125 displaced by qd~/ll, 68, 102, 123 Hadrami, 36—7, 39—41, 5°, 59, 112, 122, 123 Northern, 31, 44—5, 177—8 perceived as rulers, 6, ~3, 47, 102 status of; 27, 46—7 Sayyun, 26, 41, 59, 8~, 112, 144 schools, 37, 51, 55, 70, 140, 193, 206 in North, 129, 174, 175 in South, 140, [72—3 Islamic (religious institutes), 142, 173, 175, 200 textbooks, 143, 172—3, under British, 54, ~8, 6o, 63, 74, 8~, iii, 112 under Imam Ahmad, 6~, 76, 83 under Imam Ya~ya, 30, 50, 51—3 al-Sha’bi, Qahtan (president in South), 74, 77, 91, g6, 97, 107, 120-I Shabwah, 41—2, ,6i, 169, 196 Shafi’rs, 3, 9, 32, 34, 68, 69, 129, 153, 176 and commerce, 47, 53, 104, 123, 159, 164 discontents and history, 15, 20—I, 164 during civil war, 90, 96, 104, 114—17 regions of Yemen, 5, 7—8, 9, 26, 71, 79—80 separatism, 28—9, 104 vs. ZaydIs, ~—6, i~, 46—7, 64, 69, 103, [17, 163, 191 Shaharah, 6, 26, 29, 47, 95, 203 al-Shamahi, Qa~i ‘Abdullah (writer), 143 al-Shami, Qadi Muhammad (governor of al- Bayda’), 68, 236 n.~6 al-Shami, Sayyid Ahmad (nationalist and author), 65 al-Shami, Sayyid Ahrnad (judge and political figure), 190 Sharaf al-Din family (Kawkaban), 20 Sayyid Ahmad (historian), 102 Sayyid ‘AlT Hamud, 45 Index share-cropping, see agriculture s/zarzJl, 19, 32, 41, 229 n.32 see also BayI~an; sayyzds al-Sharjabi, Ahmad (sociologist), 93, i6~, 207 Shawkani, Muhammad ‘Air (judge and reformer c.i8oo), 44, 102, 174 al-Shayif family (Dhu Husayn), 31, 32, 38, 57, 93 Shaykh ‘Uthman (suburb of Aden), 74, 114, 121—2 shaykhs, 17, 20, 24, 26, 98, 135, 193 and Imams’ administration, 29—30, 32, 38—9, 71, 8o, 84 and Northern government, [03, 123, 124—5, 128—9, 130, 154, ,6o, r8o and Southern government, 107—8, 121, 125, [28 and Turkish administration, ~—6 contrast between Upper and Lower Yemen, 6, 24, 32, 38 Saudi payments to, 124, 146, 147, 201 Shibam, 26, 128 Shihr, 21, 144, 194 Shu’ayb, 28, 33, 98, 113 Shulaq, Abduh (merchant inJiddah), 70, 131 Siyayli, Salih Munassir (governor of Hadramawt), 170, 196, 243 n.24 slavery, 27, 6~, 233 n.,8 social life, entertainment, etc. A History of Modern Yemen
and GPC, i86, 191—2, 193, 194, ig~—6, ig8 see also NLF Zabarah, Ahmad Muhammad (mufti), 143 Zabarah, Muhammad (historian), 143 Zabid, 15, 51 zakAt, see taxes, religious Zaraniq (tribe), i6, 32, 69 Zayd, ‘Ali Muhammad (writer), 90 Zaydis, 3, 7, 28—9, 33, 46, 68, 83, 174, 190, 214 as distinct from Shafi’!s, A History of Modern Yemen
Most likely, Abu Nidal chose Naji al-Au as the name for his Libyan camp because he hates Arafat as much as Israel does, holding him responsible not just for a cartoonist’s death but for the persistent “betrayal” of the Palestinian cause, which, according to Abu Nidal, is the annihilation of the state of Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
These men are the human debris of the Middle East’s two main breeding grounds of rage and alienation: the Palestinian refugee camps and the towns of Lebanon since the civil war. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
No doubt he would have pressed his attack on Saudi interests over the years had his various state sponsors—Iraq in the l970s and Syria in the early 1980s—not forbidden it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Abu lyad’s mind there was no great mystery about it: Israel wanted to destroy the PLO and prevent negotiations that might lead to a peaceful solution involving an autonomous Palestinian state on the West Bank. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Was there some sort of link between the two halves of the list? And why the gap in the mid-1970s? I didn’t have to look far into the historical record. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Kissinger shied brusquely away. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In November 1974, he told the United Nations, “I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand,” signaling his readiness to negotiate with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The war sucked in several outside parties, notably Syria, and distracted the region for the next couple of years. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It fell into two halves, with an obvious break after 1973. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After 1977 Abu Nidal began killing Palestinian moderates—”doves” who wanted to ne- gotiate with Israel, not to bomb it out of existence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE SHOCK OF EXILE Abu Nidal’s bitter and vengeful personality was very probably shaped by the slights he suffered as a child but also by the impact on him of the disaster that overtook his family, and the whole of the Palestinian community, as a result of massive Jewish immigration into Palestine, culminating in 1948 with the establishment of the state of Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed Res- olution 181, partitioning Arab Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state, a resolution that the Zionists considered international sanc- tion for a country of their own and which the Arabs rejected. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the way the state of Israel was created, with the violent expulsion or stampeding of its Arab inhabitants, left much to be desired and has been a source of furious controversy ever since. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The wild scramble of the Palestinians to get out was matched only by a Jewish scramble to seize their property. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His death was one of the sparks that ignited the great Arab revolt of 1936—39, which the British put down with terrible ruthlessness, killing thousands of Palestinians and interning tens of thousands. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
There was no way to recover Palestine except by shedding blood. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal was also struck by the Irgun’s more extreme offshoot, the Stern Gang, which under Shamir and others played a crucial role in unnerving both the Arabs and the British in the struggle for the Jewish state. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A second decisive event was the hijacking in July 1968 of an El Al passenger plane on a scheduled flight from Rome to Tel Aviv ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 73 74 / PATRICK SEALE and its diversion to Algiers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Reprisals became still more violent when Golda Meir took over as Israel’s prime minister in March 1969, inaugurating a policy of “active self-defense,” which meant seeking out and destroying Palestinians—before or in case they attacked. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arafat’s arguments were violently contested by a “leftist” group that included Abu Dawud, the intellectual Naji Allush, an admirer of third world revolutions—and Abu Nidal, who had become their chief spokesman. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the larger aims of the Paris operation were more complex. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
One of the cap- tured guerrillas later confessed to the Kuwaitis that his orders had been to shuttle the hostages back and forth as long as the Non- Aligned Conference lasted. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“The operation was ours! We asked him to mount it for us.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
maneuvers imposed upon Fatah and Arab regimes as they strug- gled to contain such terrorist operations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad thought the whole thing a scandal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For this reason, Abu Nidal mounted his operations under different aliases. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It’s quite likely that Mossad picked up Abu Nidal in the late 1960s, when it was putting a lot of effort into penetrating the newly formed Palestinian guerrilla groups. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If he could be encouraged to kill Arafat loyalists, so much the better. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As we have seen, for both Israeli and Palestinian hard-liners this program was a deadly threat, and over the following years, Arafat found himself caught between two fires, neither of them friendly. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Israel’s hard-liners also loathed him for his advocacy of a two-state solution and his impact on British opinion. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They were both eloquent exponents of Israeli-Palestinian coexistence, of a two-state solution, ideas that were anathema to the Likud, the governing coalition in Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Another powerful blow had been struck in Israel’s war against the PLO. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Only dialogue and links to forces inside Israel could bring peace to the Middle East, a peace that might at last give the Palestinians a state of their own. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In theory, it should have served as a sort of mother directorate, except that it was always in a state of upheaval because Abu Nidal was convinced its leaders were spies in the employ of hostile powers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He also bought cut-price copies of Western weapons from Bulgarian state corporations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal sabotaged the meeting by discussing such trivia as whose wife had been seen at the hairdresser’s? Who had lunched at a fancy restau- rant in Switzerland instead of making do with a sandwich? And who had thrown away a kilo of perfectly edible tomatoes at the training camp? interfered with it, as, for example in the case of the mysterious Lt. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When, in Algiers in 1987, Abu lyad asked Abu Nidal about the In any case, the provocation that Haig said was necessary had From the earliest days of the Israeli state, the techniques of Against this background, I thought it not inconceivable that ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 227 Abu Nidal’s reputation as a terrorist rests largely on the bonfire of violence he lit in the mid-1980s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel has also used terror. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For decades, Israel has armed the Kurds against Baghdad, the southern Sudanese against Khartoum, and the Maronites in Leba- non against the Palestinians, as Conor Gearty has suggested in Terror (1991). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
nald Reagan declares: “We must not be driven from our objec- tives for peace in Lebanon by state-sponsored terrorism.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
April 3, 1984-President Reagan signs a directive author- izing reprisals and preemptive strikes against “terrorists.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Britain breaks off diplomatic relations with Libya. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They include men who car-bombed and maimed Palestinian mayors on the West Bank in June 1980. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
minister, Moshe Arens, called for the closing of all PLO offices around the world because they are “nothing more than support centers for terrorist operations.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
President Amin Gemayel travels to Damascus to pay homage to President Assad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“How can we convince Gulf Arabs that the murder of Ghubash [the UAE minister of state killed by Abu Nidal in October 1977] had nothing to do with us? How can we convince the family of the UAE ambassador murdered in Paris that we don’t have blood on our hands? I saw their faces when I went to pay my condolences. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Air force intelligence then sent the bomb by Syrian diplomatic bag to London, where it was handed over to Hindawi. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
unclear, Hindawi fled the Syrians and, after contacting his brother, a clerk at the Qatar embassy in London, gave himself up to the British police. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Who had blundered? Who had betrayed them? One of the few people who knew about the weapons was the man who had walled them in—Nidal Hamadi (code name Bajis Abu Atwan), known in the organization as the Executive. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The argument he habitually used was that a relationship with him would give a state immunity from his operations, a form of blackmail he used against Western European states as well. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel has for years wanted to destroy the PLO. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Deadtime 15. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Similarly, Palestinians declared that they wanted their own state, but they constantly obstructed the attainment of their goal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
fling with the biblical story of the walls of Jericho and continuing to the rise of Islam in the seventh century. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They did not have an easy time, Let us for now use a broad approach to discuss the incidents of violence Historians have examined the roots of the Middle East dispute begin- For purposes of our discussion, the Palestine-Israel conflict began at the Introduction 5 6 Arab and Israeli Terrorism and most left, but the movement to re-create a Jewish state received new impe- tus when the energetic journalist Theodore Herzl popularized Zionism with the publication of an 1896 tract, The Jewish State. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The establishment ofajew- ish state was being discussed by Jewish intellectuals by the time Herzl attended the 1895 trial of French army captain Alfred Dreyfus, who was framed for trea- son in proceedings that were accompanied by a vile outpouring of anti—Semi- tism, later exposed by Emile Zola. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Battle lines had been drawn, the British having worsened the situation by promising independence to the Arabs and a state on the same land for the Introduction 7 8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Jews. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The demonstrators demanded control of the Wall, and shouted that the Harem al-Sharif should be destroyed so they could rebuild the Jew- ish Temple. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Many of the new immigrants coming to Palestine were filled with intel- lectual and idealistic moral values of creating a progressive socialist state, while the Arab residents were becoming increasingly apprehensive. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Their coffins were laid in state in Jerusalem’s Hall of Heroism, and they were given a burial in Mount Herzl martyr cemetery with full military honors.16 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The gun could have done nothing to forestall the conquering Zionist armies, who by this time had heavy weapons from Czechoslovakia. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
History is written by the vic- tor; thugs and murderers become heroes and liberators; atrocities are roman- ticized into a heritage. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israelis sought to uphold a militant image and keep the Palestinians in a continuous state of fear. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As for Israel, though it had become a nation, its territorial aspirations were not achieved. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On the eve of statehood, the United Nations appointed a committee to investigate the sit- uation in Palestine, selecting a member of the Swedish royal family, Count Folke Bernadotte, as its head. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Neither side knew that the other was operating in the same area, and each group thought it had encountered an armed Palestinian unit. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In order to persuade the 130,000 Iraqi Jewish community, who had lived in Iraq since the Babylonian Captivity, to flee empty-handed to Israel, under- ground agents started panic among the Jews by throwing bombs at synagogues and Jewish cafes in the name of vindictive Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This tactic is used in any conflict for information-gathering. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Researchers have suspected that Israeli agents provoked shooting incidents in Amman, Jordan, before the September 1970 civil war to create a state of tension and allow for Israeli “retaliation” against guerrilla bases.47 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
How can such activities help the Palestinians win a state? Who benefits? If we look at these events in light of the long-standing Israeli disguise tactic, their authenticity must be called into question. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the Arab League launched the PLO, it nominated as its chair the eloquent Dr. Ahmed Shukeiry, a 52-year-old former Saudi representative to the United Nations, whose pugnacious language won him stature. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The other major component of the Palestine national movement formed in Beirut in the early 1950s around the picturesque American University (AUB). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Still, he and the ANM did not believe in mili- tary or guerrilla action. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States presidential campaign of 1968 brought with it a suc- cession of candidates pledging their loyalty to the state of Israel, a tradition reaching back to Harry Truman. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The other hijacker, Patrick Arguelo, a Central American, was killed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
American president Richard Nixon fol- lowed suit, making a badly timed statement that the United States would not negotiate just after the gunmen were promised that a negotiator was en route.’5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His avenue of diplomacy angered many Palestinians, especially the PFLP and its splinter groups, and they began congregating in Iraq, the most hard- line state, to reject Arafat’s line, being bolstered by Syria and Egypt’s accep- tance of a ceasefire. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They instigated more actions than the Israelis reported, but far fewer than the Palestinians boasted. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There were also four Moroccan officials on their way to a state visit. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The airport massacre was timed with Arab-Israeli talks in Geneva orga- nized by United States secretary of state Henry Kissinger and presided over by Kurt Waldheim. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He studied English literature at Damascus University and was a polit- Hammami was born in Jaffa in 1948. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His family was put on a truck and changed after the 1967 war, suddenly turning up as a guerrilla in Jordan and the West Bank. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Right before his death he said, “It is nonsense to talk about a secular state when we do not possess a single inch of our territory. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The day before his death, Abu Sharara met leaders of both major left Ital- ian parties. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The two men did not look alike, but they lived in the same building. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sharon passed the plan to United States secretary of state Alexan- der Haig for his approval, which he gave on the condition that Israel attack only when it had a clear provocation, stating that an attack from Jordan would not be justified.’9 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He tried to start again in Barcelona, but failed there as well, remaining constantly broke. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
politics. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He knew the West; he had graduated from Ohio State Medical School and become a competent heart surgeon, a founder of the Palestine Red Crescent, Sartawi made a habit of angering people. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Italians freed Abu Abbas, to the outrage of the Americans. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
FRC does not attack Israeli embassies or use women. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
According to the United States State Department, which compiles accurate information on FRC actions, the group killed or wounded nine hundred peo- pie on three continents, not counting the hundreds of their own fighters.2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Other gov- ernments benefit from the work of Abu Nidal, since he helped avoid the cre- ation of a Palestinian state. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, it is impossible that he should have amassed such a fortune from those means. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
According to the United States State Department, the United States mounted a diplomatic campaign on Poland and other East European coun- tries in 1987, seriously inhibiting Abu Nidal’s financial network.1’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States State Department also pressured the Greek govern- ment to close down Abu Nidal’s Athens branch of the company on Solonos Street, which operated under the name al-Noor.’2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, Najmeddin had an FRC account in the London branch of the fraudulent BCCI containing $60 million, with the knowledge of British authorities.16 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The New York Times devoted 1043 column inches to Leon Klinghoffer, the elderly Jewish American killed during the hijacking. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Shia attacked several Kuwaiti targets beginning in 1985, including the bloody hijacking of a Kuwait Airlines jumbo in 1988, demanding the release of 17 comrades in Kuwaiti prison who had been convicted on Decem- ber 12, 1983, of other terrorist attacks against the state. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
one of the most myopic and foolish the United States ever made, indicating a low level of Middle East understanding. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Everyone was understandably in a state of shock. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Talk traveled, and the Israeli embassy found out about the boat. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Historians and researchers have shown that the Zionist militias, including the Haganah, employed systematic terror as well as forced expulsion to clear the land of Palestinians, effectively terrorizing over 750,000 Palestinians into fleeing, a necessary prerequisite to the foundation of a state with a Jewish majority.2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, the terror campaign, culminating in the massacre at Deir Yassin, went hand-in-hand with military victory over Arab forces, and it would be difficult to deduce what effect the terrorist activ- ities by the Stern or Irgun might have had if the Haganah military campaign had not been such a sweeping success. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The wars they instigated led to further disappointment and further lost territory. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Because of infighting and Israeli security measures, the Palestinians turned to terrorist attacks abroad, and it is debatable whether this helped the Arabs by keeping their cause alive or hurt them by giving them a bad reputation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Cultural Industry,” in Western State Terrorism, Alexander George, ed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
74—75) adds that the U.S. State Department believed the Zionists agitated “a) to assist fund-raising in the United States [and] b) to create favorable sentiments in the United Nations Assembly to offset the bad impression caused by the Jewish attitudes to Arab refugees.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Lauri A. Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 5. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The hijack occurred December12, 1954, and Sharret wrote about it in his diary on December 22, adding that the U.S. State Department said the “action was without precedent.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Washington Post, 17 April 1973, p. Cl. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Said’s lack of memory was aug- mented by his nervous state of mind. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Asaf Hussain, Political Terrorism and the State in the Middle East (Lon- don: Mansell, 1988, p. 128), says the cruise was advertised in the New York Times with the slogan, “Come for a cruise with Maureen Reagan in the fall,” but the United States president’s eldest daughter was not on the ship. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
40. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
41. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Five FRC members were con- victed but released after only 3 years in prison, the U.S. State Department calling the release reprehensible and an insult (14 January 1991 dispatch, p. 32). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Actually, most FRC gunmen come from igno- rant poverty. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
214—20, discusses accounts from the Abu Bakr camp United States, Department of State, Factsheet, “Abu Nidal Organization Reader’s Digest, October 1986, p. 204. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
George P. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State Washington Post, 9 November 1985, p. A2. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
United States, Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1988,” To use an example from International Affairs (an English version of a This is described in Meade. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ostrovsky and Hoy, pp. 320—22. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chaliand, P. 55. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Brand, Lauri A. Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Gally, Laurent. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Preparedfor the Worst: Selected Essays and Minority Reports. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
MacBride, Sean. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Presented by Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 1937. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Perdue, William D. Terrorism and the State. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America and the State of Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Medieval Yemen The Tihama or coastal plain running from AsirtoAbyan is familiar to everyone for its torrid climate, humid yet nearly rainless weather, its fertile soils and its drab topography. Comtemporary Yemen
The settled peoples were derived from tribal peoples who had immi- grated from the highlands.5 Comtemporary Yemen
When we examine Yemen in its Islamic period, more than thirteen centuries, it can indeed be said that the severe geographical con- straints of Yemen’s physical geography are for all intents and pur- poses immutable. Comtemporary Yemen
This group was more numerous than the sayyids and it continually received fresh infusions until the Persian Zaidi state was completely stamped out. Comtemporary Yemen
In addition, Imam al-Hadi and other Imams after him had the assistance of other groups of immigrants who were adherents of the Zaidi cause: Tabaristanis, Dailamites, shi’ites seeking refuge from Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen 9 ~~____ 10 Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen the persecution of the Abbasid regime and scholars who had studied Mu’tazilite thought in Kufa or Basra and wanted to continue their studies with Zaidi scholars in Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
From their ranks came the Zaidis’ most loyal soldiers and as a group these people played a crucial role in teaching Islam and Zaidi doctrine. Comtemporary Yemen
Amongst their greatest teachers were Abu Husain Ahmad bin Musa al-Tabari (d. Comtemporary Yemen
c. AD 930), and Qadi Ja’far bin Ahmad bin Abd al-Salam al- Tamimi (d. Comtemporary Yemen
But unlike the sayyids, the Zaidis from this group of immigrants had to assimilate into Yemeni society however they could. Comtemporary Yemen
Musallim al-Lahji, writing in the mid-twelfth century, describes for us just what kind of people were Zaidis; they were shoemakers, bloodletters, polishers, chamberlains, poets and the landless. Comtemporary Yemen
Tribes, through their shaikhs, contracted alli- ances with the Imams and felt obliged to maintain good relations with the Zaidis only in accordance with how the Imams dealt with their enemies. Comtemporary Yemen
Their warriors assisted the Zaidi da’wa most frequently only when there was some immediate advantage or profit for them. Comtemporary Yemen
the tenth to early sixteenth centuries) the tribesmen themselves resisted accepting Zaidism, choosing instead to continue to deal with the sayyids and Imams through tradition-honoured political mechanisms. Comtemporary Yemen
Because of the extensiveness of the Memduh Commission’s report, it is worth discussing in some detail as an example of the official view of Yemen from Constantinople more than thirty years after the reoccupation. Comtemporary Yemen
(1) Documents presented to the Council of State by the Reform Commission of 1898 detailing the need to build a railroad between Hodaida and San’a’, the Yemeni perceptions of criminal law procedure and how the present-day shari’a courts ought to be organised, and steps needed to establish peace and law and order. Comtemporary Yemen
(2) A telegraphed report of 1898 received from the Governor of Yemen discussing a proposal for the restructuring of Yemen into four provinces. Comtemporary Yemen
The sources of this poverty, the Com- For the marketing system, the Commission recommended at The agriculture of San’a’ and Hodaida, and the trade and com- merce between these two points, would easily pay for the capital investment and make a profit for the State. Comtemporary Yemen
Both the electoral procedures of the judicial councils, as modest as they were, and the secularisation of law were intended by the Ottoman reformers to create an impartial administration of justice for the multi-religious population of their state. Comtemporary Yemen
There was no room for grand schemes there. Comtemporary Yemen
Yet the basic sources of discontent with administrative procedure would certainly have remained, and with this the Commission refused to tamper. Comtemporary Yemen
In the meantime, while the Prime Minister’s Office and the Council of State reviewed and discussed action to take on such reports as these, provincial officers in Yemen waited impatiently and often angrily for some sign of action by the capital. Comtemporary Yemen
Other state monopolies attached to the Public Debt Administration such as tobacco and general salt tax drained off another 2 million kurus in 1902 (3.8 Comtemporary Yemen
Aziz Bey offers us no comments on railroad or dams projects, and precious little on roads, save to note their state of disrepair. Comtemporary Yemen
The Shabab al-Amr advocated a Yemeni nahda (renaissance) and, like the Muslim Brotherhood, saw Islam as the vanguard of that renaissance and as the means of raising Yemen from its state of chronic backwardness. Comtemporary Yemen
In line with Nasser’s aims of ridding the Arab World of the ‘twin evils’ of reaction and imperialism, al-Zubairi’s broadcasts denounced both the Hamid al-Din and the Yemeni imamate, which predictably upset those Free Yemenis who supported its continua- tion.23 Comtemporary Yemen
The Yemeni area is an integral part of the Arab homeland, and it is a single unit historically through shared struggle and fate. Comtemporary Yemen
It discusses the position of women, making proposals which must have been considered con- troversial by the right of the Movement, and holds colonialism responsible for the backwardness in which women have been kept by misrepresenting Islam to keep women in a state of obscurity, igno- rance and slavery, and proposes: to restore their natural rights to women, and their equality with men in bearing their social responsibility, thus providing the basis for human justice and giving women the position in life which they are entitled to as full participants, developing their utmost social and productive abilities.’8 Comtemporary Yemen
The conflict with FLOSY did not prevent the NLF from con- tinuing the struggle in the hinterland in 1966 and 1967; this mainly involved the political mobilisation of the people, but in Hadramawt a significant left-wing political movement took place in that period, and made socialist reforms in land tenure and social organisation. Comtemporary Yemen
The NLF’s most important activities were, however, the gradual takeover of the sultanates of the Federation as it collapsed, the British withdrew their forces and the former sultans escaped abroad. Comtemporary Yemen
ibid., p. 88. Comtemporary Yemen
As for Aden, the site of the British military base and headquarters of Middle East Forces, fida’iyin operations began in mid-1964 and reached their climax during the visit of Anthony Greenwood, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in November 1965. Comtemporary Yemen
The Charter stated that foreign trade should be in the hands of the state and education should be free for all children having equal chances of access. Comtemporary Yemen
The policy of isolationism was meant to safeguard Yemen’s hard- won independence and to keep the religious purity of the state from being corrupted by outsiders. Comtemporary Yemen
However, although the policy of isolationism served Yemen well in the short run, it became a detri- ment to the development of the state in the long run. Comtemporary Yemen
Thus, when France, Italy and the Soviet Union tried to cultivate their economic and political relations with Yemen, their attempts were obstructed by the Yemeni political establishment. Comtemporary Yemen
Paved roads were being constructed by the Chinese and Americans in an attempt to link the major cities in Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
New schools and hospitals were being built in Hodaida, Ta’izz and San’a’. Comtemporary Yemen
This belief was instru- mental in pacifying the tribes, and in maintaining stability in the state. Comtemporary Yemen
Thus, by the latter part of 1961, Yemen witnessed riots and demon- strations in San’a’ and Ta’izz demanding changes and reforms. Comtemporary Yemen
The Imam’s appeal to the people to restore tranquillity and order was not heeded. Comtemporary Yemen
A school for girls, founded by the Turks, was later closed by the Imam. Comtemporary Yemen
Egyptians, Rus- sians, Americans, Chinese, Germans and others entered Yemen to undertake diplomatic missions, to train the army, or to help the Yemeni government improve the economic conditions of the state. Comtemporary Yemen
There were reports that between 300 and 400 Yemenis were in Egyptian secondary schools in 1961, and an additional 70 to 80 in European and American educational institutions. Comtemporary Yemen
These students were instrumental in articulating their country’s economic, social and political ills. Comtemporary Yemen
This alignment was fol- lowed in 1958 by the creation of the United Arab States, which confederated Yemen with the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria. Comtemporary Yemen
Both regions already had been buffeted NATION-BUILDING AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE TWO YEMENS John Peterson 85 7 86 Nation-building and Political Development by the first winds of modernisation and had experienced a signifi- cant degree of political change. Comtemporary Yemen
The response of the Hamid al-Din Imams to this percolation of change into the country was to attempt greater con- trol over the state in order to maintain the existing nature and values of society. Comtemporary Yemen
Gradually, these efforts transformed the imamate from a traditional state to a less effective neo-traditional one, resulting in a marked diminution of legitimacy.2 Comtemporary Yemen
Conse- quently, both Yahya and Ahmad placed considerable emphasis on championing Yemeni and even Arab nationalism. Comtemporary Yemen
The consequence of the largely indirect British presence in the Protectorate was to fossilise the existing patchwork pattern of frag- mented political authority. Comtemporary Yemen
The steady intrusion of nationalist ideas and appeal also influ- enced twentieth-century political change in North Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
Further- more, both Imams refused to delegate authority, thus denying legiti- macy to any of these fledgeling institutions. Comtemporary Yemen
Consequently, the Hamid al-Din era displayed an eventually ineffectual rear-guard action against the forces of modernisation. Comtemporary Yemen
Paradoxically, the attempt to exercise greater control in order to halt change actually resulted in less control. Comtemporary Yemen
The war further fragmented the political centre and sharpened existing political schisms. Comtemporary Yemen
At the heart of this stage was the process of national reconciliation, including both its promise and its limita- tions. Comtemporary Yemen
These years were characterised by unbridled competition and con- frontation over the structure and the direction of the YAR, as well as over the basic allocation of power. Comtemporary Yemen
Basic strategy has relied on attempts to appear to be continuing on the broad course that Hamdi laid out: formal emphasis on the modernist con- ception of the state, including some stated recognition of the impor- tance of state-building, institutionalisation and the leading role of the state in promoting socio-economic development. Comtemporary Yemen
Conse- quently, these factors have resulted in a visible weakening of the central government’s physical and moral authority over the state. Comtemporary Yemen
Only gradually was the radical wing of the NLF able to acquire a prepon- derant balance of power in Aden and impose a predominantly Marxist view of the state’s role, institutions and relations with the outside world. Comtemporary Yemen
and his followers. Comtemporary Yemen
Assessing Political Development in the Yemens This brief survey indicates that the path of political development in the two Yemens has been anything but straightforward. Comtemporary Yemen
In the North, basic disagreements over the shape of the state and society and the ordering of priorities range from arch-conservative approaches to progressive, even Marxist, outlooks, especially if the dissident NDF is considered. Comtemporary Yemen
These considerations shoUld not obscure the fact that both governments have sought to legitimise their exercise of power through efforts at institutionalisation. Comtemporary Yemen
One such model is that of social mobilisation, whose proponents, often employing Weberian concepts and terminology, perceive a gradual transformation from a traditional society to a rational/legal one through a process of increasing secularisation which eventually pro- duces a uniform, modern political culture. Comtemporary Yemen
For example, rather than an emphasis on urbanisation, light industrialisation, large-scale agricultural schemes, and promi- nent state sponsorship and control of development (whether socio- economic or political), greater reliance might be placed more con- structively on local initiative. Comtemporary Yemen
Only a few of the numerous worth-while sources on politics in the two Yemens can be mentioned here. Comtemporary Yemen
traditional) phases in North Yemen’s politics has been outlined in the author’s ‘Legi- timacy and Political Change in Yemen and Oman’, Orbis (forthcoming). Comtemporary Yemen
Basically, decentralisation and limited central authority characterised the political system of the traditional phase. Comtemporary Yemen
The elaboration will help to make the difference clear, and, more important, to prove the thesis that only in a sovereign state can the role of education for nation-building flourish. Comtemporary Yemen
Logically, one must ask: are there states, or even non-state actors, which are interested in any one or more of these outcomes as policy objectives?2 The answer has so far always been ‘yes’ — one of the reasons for the concern of the riparian powers expressed at the Ta- ‘izz Conference of March l977,~ as well as the continued interest on the part of the United States and its allies in the region ever since the revolution against Haile Selassie in Ethiopia. Comtemporary Yemen
The National Liberation Front and Independence The total withdrawal of the British was an economic blow to the new state: not only was the extensive set of British subsidy payments eliminated, there was also the loss of the indirect income from the British-operated military and maritime facilities. Comtemporary Yemen
The United States, which had already indirectly provided economic assistance to those groups and individuals which had opposed the NLF, decided for its own reasons (one of which was the contemporary involvement in Vietnam) that it was uninterested in providing any economic assistance; moreover, it seems to have effectively communicated its lack of interest (opposi- tion?) to other potential Western suppliers of economic assistance. Comtemporary Yemen
The result was that a political party which was less than enthusiastic about Britain, the United States and their allies and friends on the world stage began to move in the opposite ideological direction, with all that that implies for the social, economic and political char- acteristics of the society.7 Comtemporary Yemen
In fact, it is possible rather easily to treat the development of the NLF and South Yemeni foreign policy — from its accession to power to the present day — as well as some major internal policies as, at the very least, closely related to if not dependent upon events and developments elsewhere.8 Comtemporary Yemen
(3) North Yemen, which expected to obtain more than $300 million in military equipment which it could probably not have obtained otherwise, and which hoped that these supplies, and the assistance of the United States, would enable it to be less dependent upon Saudi Arabia, i.e. gain somewhat greater flexi- bility in its foreign and domestic policy options. Comtemporary Yemen
Never- theless, a couple of additional comments are in order: (a) the South Yemeni government has made some inroads into the rele- vance of tribal affiliation as a result of its administrative restructuring of the country and its determinedly secular pro- grammes; on the other hand, long-time observers of South Yemen would not be too surprised to learn that Mi Nasir Muhammad, for example, is from the old Dathina state, whose members have played a particularly important role in the South Yemen since Independence 135 136 South Yemen since Independence military ever since the departure of the British.’5 Comtemporary Yemen
The point, of course, is that, in this writer’s view, it is a horrendous oversimplification to attribute the policies and actions of South Yemen since independence solely to the relationship which has developed between South Yemen and the Soviet Union (and its allies). Comtemporary Yemen
In the past few years, similar installations were alleged to have been built on Perim as well as Socotra; indeed, the latter has been said to be the site of a major Soviet military base which includes submarine ‘pens’. Comtemporary Yemen
XX (16 Oct. 1968), pp. 10-12. Comtemporary Yemen
In 1931 a Cabinet was set up, albeit without ministries with the sole exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Comtemporary Yemen
Those two decrees reflected the enthusiasm of the government for establishing new organisations and administrative structures. Comtemporary Yemen
Although dated, the article by Stanko Guldescu, ‘Marxism Comes tc Yemen’, Communist Affairs, vol. Comtemporary Yemen
Out of about 35,000 government employees in 1982, NIPA alone trained about 13,000 between 1970 and 1982. Comtemporary Yemen
Among the more recent writers who have, at least indirectly, acknowledged the relevance of such designations and affiliations, see Halliday, ‘Yemen’s Unfinished Revolution’ and Abir, Oil, Powe, and Politics. Comtemporary Yemen
1971), pp. 35—47; and Stephen Page, The USSR and Arabia (Central Asian Research Centre, London, 1971). Comtemporary Yemen
Appeals from the Supreme Court, Aden, in all matters used to be sent to the High Court in Bombay, India, until 1947, and thereafter to the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, established under the constitution of the East African Common Services Organisation, with an ultimate right of appeal to the Judi- cial Committee of the Privy Council. Comtemporary Yemen
(3) The official language in the courts in Aden was English, though Arabic was also used. Comtemporary Yemen
(4) In Aden there were advocates (doing the job of both solicitors and barristers), but outside Aden hardly any existed. Comtemporary Yemen
Article 119 provided that the State shall guarantee the unity of the judiciary and shall issue gradually a democratic civil law, a law of employment, a family law and a criminal law in accordance with the principles of the constitution. Comtemporary Yemen
The State shall provide the conditions which help to resolve the problems of the citizens speedily, justly and in a democratic procedure, through the restoration of a democratic reorganisation of the Judiciary and the laying down of demo- cratic measures. Comtemporary Yemen
(3) Many small courts throughout the country were abolished, and a gradual process of relocating courts in order to correspond with the new administrative organisation in the Republic took place between 1969 and 1977. Comtemporary Yemen
To file criminal and civil suits, in which the state or any organi- sation or public corporation is a party, according to the law. Comtemporary Yemen
To suspend or stay proceedings in any criminal or civil suit in which the state or any organisation or public corporation is a party, and at any stage of the suit, before giving judgement, whenever deemed necessary for the fulfilment of public interest. Comtemporary Yemen
where the claims do not exceed 50 Yemeni dinars, otherwise the drafting should be done by advocates. Comtemporary Yemen
The law has changed with the coming into force of the Criminal Procedure Law on 1 January 1977. Comtemporary Yemen
They have to play a leading role, that is to say they have to play an active or positive part in every case, and it may be true to say that we are moving towards a kind of inquisitorial attitude in trials. Comtemporary Yemen
He concluded that the current President Ali Abdullah Salih ‘wants it to be ratified by an elected [consultative assembly], and not by an appointed one; no government would take this responsibility’ •2 Be that as it may, it is not inconceivable that this issue might cause serious problems in the future. Comtemporary Yemen
It is interesting to note that on many occasions these skirmishes result in serious fighting causing casualties, but one never hears of them because both sides prefer to keep them quiet. Comtemporary Yemen
He needs the economic help he receives from Riyadh, but he cannot afford to lend credence to the South Yemeni (and the NDF) accusation that he is a Saudi stooge. Comtemporary Yemen
In this way the Saudi authorities were able to exclude from training any YAR officers who had previously received training in the Soviet Union. Comtemporary Yemen
Sections 9 and 100 of the Criminal Procedure. Comtemporary Yemen
But this military relationship was not matched by comparable economic or diplomatic reliance. Comtemporary Yemen
of Socialist Orientation’ ~13 Whilst not rejecting the earlier theory of the ‘Non-Capitalist Road’,it marked a change in certain significant respects: (a) it laid much greater stress on the obstacles which socialism encounters — in class terms, in the survival of tribal and religious ideologies, in the possibility of right-wing coups; (b) it stressed the gap between superstructure and base, i.e. between leadership and mass, abandoning the pretence of a common front earlier emphasised; the conclusion was that the masses cannot immediately exercise power, but must be educated before this becomes possible; (c) it selected and identified a group of countries that were potentially more advanced than merely national demo- cratic ones, i.e. where the process towards socialism had gone further. Comtemporary Yemen
But the right forces within the NLF, deriving support from the army and with encouragement from Egypt, were able to impose their control and the leaders of the left went into exile. Comtemporary Yemen
PDU and Vanguard leaders were given Ministerial posts and in October 1975 the three groups united to form the United Political Organisation of the NLF, UPONF.’9 Comtemporary Yemen
For the radicals of the guerrilla NLF were not all convinced of the necessity of adopting Soviet models of organisa- tion, or of the need for a complete party and state alliance with the Soviet Union. Comtemporary Yemen
But this was not to be. Comtemporary Yemen
Inter-state and inter-party exchanges con- tinue at the same high level; but controls on trade have been loosened internally, relations with Arab states have improved, and the leadership is more attentive to popular concerns. Comtemporary Yemen
The result of the 1980 changes has not been to breach the previous alliance. Comtemporary Yemen
The Russians, far from opposing such ties, have in fact encouraged them, provided the political cost is not too high. Comtemporary Yemen
In private, the Russians urged restraint upon Aden and advised against increased support for left- wing guerrillas operating in North Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
Both Egypt under Sadat and Saudi Arabia planned to replace Soviet with Western supplies, and in February 1979 it seemed that this long-delayed transfer was about to occur, as Carter promised to send $400 million worth of arms to San’a’ as emergency aid to face the South. Comtemporary Yemen
South Yemeni forces fought in both the Ogaden and Eritrean theatres, and Abdul-Fattah Isma’il went to Addis Ababa on several visits to ‘advise’ the Ethiopians on party formation. Comtemporary Yemen
The result was that the long-latent Soviet commitment to San’a’ bore fruit: the Soviet Union agreed to supply up to $600 million worth of equipment on better terms, including Mig-2l planes, helicopters and T-55 tanks, and by 1981 the Soviet military mission had risen to 600 men, with another 1,500 North Yemenis being trained in the Soviet Union itself. Comtemporary Yemen
The Ethiopian revolution of 1974 altered these rela- tions. Comtemporary Yemen
See also Maxine Molyneux, State Policies and the Position of Women Workers in the PDR Y (ILO, Geneva, 1982). Comtemporary Yemen
Of even greater significance, however, were events on the domestic front. Comtemporary Yemen
At its First Congress, the UPONF changed its name to Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) and reorganised itself along the lines of Soviet-style Marxist-Leninist organisations found elsewhere. Comtemporary Yemen
Nevertheless, although the two founding mem- bers of the PDU were no longer in the forefront, members of the PDU and a number of other prominent leftists previously unasso- ciated with Isma’il retain an important measure of influence within the state’s ruling councils. Comtemporary Yemen
The YSP and PDU, as in previous years, were simultaneously active in developing bilateral relations with the CPSU. Comtemporary Yemen
His claims continued unabated, for example, in a brief prepared for the Minister of State for his conversation with Prince Saif al-Islam Abdullah who was in London about one month before the assassination of Imam Yahya to discuss the issue: the British Under-Secretary told his Minister that the Imain’s attitude remained adamant and that he still regarded the whole southern area ‘as indivisible from the Yemen’.8 Comtemporary Yemen
In another set of minutes written about one month after the 1948 coup d’etat to the Secretary of State, who had asked for a full account of the situation in the Yemen, Cable’s last paragraph reads: ‘The Yemen’s importance to us is derived mainly from the nuisance value of Yemeni claims on the Aden Protectorate and on Aden itself.”° Comtemporary Yemen
Near the end of this monarch’s life the extent of Yemeni claims, sentimentally at least, had reached unparalleled bounds, corresponding roughly to that area populated by the descendants of Qahtan: During the winter of 1959 the Legation of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen in Washington startled officers of the State Department concerned with Arab affairs by sending out a hand- some and unusual holiday greeting card. Comtemporary Yemen
In his highly analy- tical and critical series on ‘the means for the advancement of South Arabia’ and the ‘future of Yemen’, he discusses the problems of the area as a whole. Comtemporary Yemen
It was willing to co-operate with British authorities for peaceful constitutional advance in the Colony.3’ Comtemporary Yemen
Even during the 1958 wave of bomb and grenade explosions in the Colony, one of his juvenile relatives was directly involved in the smuggling of such explosives into Aden. Comtemporary Yemen
W. H. Ingrams, The Yemen: Imams, Rulers and Revolutions (John Murray, London, 1963), pp. 69-70. Comtemporary Yemen
8. Comtemporary Yemen
34. Comtemporary Yemen
42. Comtemporary Yemen
Whenever rigid ideologists dominated there, this led to phases of confrontation; in periods of greater pragmatism the dialogue continued. Comtemporary Yemen
For a background to the 1979 clashes one has to take account of some developments in the socio-political sphere. Comtemporary Yemen
North Yemen, on the other hand, is a country with much more complex social structures, where ancient traditions have survived and are resilient enough to resist centralisation. Comtemporary Yemen
In addi- tion to seven other committees, one had been charged to work out a constitution for a united state and it started only now with its activi- ties. Comtemporary Yemen
The division of North Yemen into Zaidi and Shafi’i areas has in the last decade lost most of its relevance since the government in San’a’ is no longer purely Zaidi as it had been during the reign of the Imam. Comtemporary Yemen
The pattern of dialogue and confrontation will, according to all experience, persist. Comtemporary Yemen
According to available information the draft provides for a united Yemen being a parliamentary democracy, Islam the state religion and San’a’ the capital. Comtemporary Yemen
Meetings of the Heads of State continue, however, as do those of the Ministerial Committee. Comtemporary Yemen
Commercial exchanges are expanding and co-operation in the fields mentioned above increases. Comtemporary Yemen
the central treasury of early Islamic states. Comtemporary Yemen
Helen Lackner is the author of A House Built on Sand (Ithaca Press, 272 I 1 1• t London, 1978), about Saudi Arabia, and has a book about the PDRY in preparation. Comtemporary Yemen
Roger’s encourage- ment on the need to clearly state the fundamentals of fighting terrorism in the 1990s were as valuable to me as they were during our earlier collaboration on this subject in the 1980s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Thus the Florida State Militia handbook warns: “We have had enough. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
None of the militias are willing to openly declare that the war with the United States has already started (much as Islamic radicals in the United States, whom I will discuss presently, are unwilling to state publicly that the jihad against the United States has already be- gun). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Indeed, every one of the active steps that a democratic state can take against domestic terror- ists constitutes a certain curtailment of someone’s freedom to speak, assemble, or practice his religion without inter- ference. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson with regard to the balance between the powers of the state and the rights of the citizen: “It is a melancholy reflection that liberty should be equally ex- posed to danger whether the government have too much or too little power.”5 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
No thinker was more important in laying the philosophical foundations of the modern democratic state, yet in his Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza was careful to define clear limits to personal freedoms, including the pivotal one of freedom of speech, without which the meaning of democracy is vitiated. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
“We cannot deny that [the] authority [of the state] may be as much injured by words as by actions; hence... Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The 1980s: Successes Against International III Terrorism 51 International terrorism is the use of terrorist violence against a given nation by another state, which uses the ter- rorists to fight a proxy war as an alternative to conven- tional war. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Sometimes the terror is imported at the initiative of a foreign movement which nevertheless enjoys the support of a sovereign state, at the very least in the form of a benign passivity which encourages the growth of such groups on its own soil. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The reason that international terrorism is so persistent and so difficult to uproot is that the support of a modern state can provide the interna- tional terrorist with everything that the domestic terrorist usually lacks in the way of cultural and logistical assis- tance. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Thus, with the support of a terrorist state, the terrorist is no longer a lonely and hunted fugitive from society. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It now pits the formidable resources of the West against the nearly comparable resources of a for- eign state or network of states—and in this contest it is by no means immediately clear who will emerge the victor. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
State-sponsored terror of a more limited variety had in fact been a constant factor in the Arab war against Israel. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
By the early 1970s, Arafat had established a quasi- independent PLO state in southern Lebanon. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Leb- anese government was too weak to extend its authority into the south of the country, and within this domain Arafat was able to set up shop, creating a mini-state which enjoyed a close relationship with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This effort began in full force during Moshe Arens’s ten- ure as ambassador to Washington in 1982. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
One of the early supporters of an active American poi- icy against international terrorism was Secretary of State George Shultz. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After twenty years in which international terrorism under the leadership of the PLO had enjoyed virtually unrestricted freedom of action, the West had finally be- gun to grasp the principle that the terrorist organizations and their state sponsors should no longer be able to es- cape punishment for their deeds. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Third, Iraq’s enemy to the east, Iran, a terrorist state par excellence, paid no price whatsoever in the Gulf War and was even accorded considerable legitimacy as a tacit ally. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fourth, Iraq’s enemy to the west, Syria, another classic terrorist state, also benefited enormously from the war. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A hint of the potential power of this policy was provided by the convening of a special Islamic conference called by Iran and held in Teheran in October 1991, on the eve of the Madrid Peace Conference between Israel and its Arab neighbors; the Teheran conference was attended by rad- ical Islamic movements and terrorist groups from forty countries, and declared itself to be against making any kind of peace with the Jewish state. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While Libya and Iraq have chafed under the yoke of Western sanctions (imposed on Libya in 1986 in the wake of its complicity in the bombing of a discotheque in Germany frequented by American servicemen, and on Iraq in 1991 after its invasion of Kuwait), and while the other Pan-Arabisi state, Syria, has had to tone down its more overt associ- ations with international terrorism to win U.S. pressure on Israel, Iran has gone virtually unscathed, carefully cul. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After all, the Iranians are mainly Shiites, and they therefore do not command the automatic attention and allegiance of Sunni militants, who stem from the other great branch of Islam. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In the aftermath of World War I, Turkey was established as a Western-style secular state, and the Arab world was put under European control: Morocco, Alge- ria, and Syria under France; Egypt, Arabia, and Iraq under Britain. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Not surprisingly, the result was bitterness and consternation in Arab society, as expressed by a leading Egyptian in- tellectual: “Anyone who reflects on the present state of the Islamic nation finds it in great calamity. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What a horrible state for a nation to live in.” Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Not long after the establishment of the European pro- tectorates throughout the Arab world, two streams of thought emerged to challenge the “horrible state” in Benjamin Netanyahu 84 which the Muslim Arabs found themselves. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Indeed, a com- mon refrain in Arab and Iranian propaganda has it that the Zionists are nothing more than neo-Crusaders; it is only a question of time before the Muslims unite under a latter-day Saladin who will expel this modern “Cru- sader state” into the sea. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
By 1995 at least fourteen militant Islamic groups were known to be operating throughout Europe, their active membership reaching into the tens of thousands. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While the United States is certainly not a state sponsor of terror, it has nonetheless become an unwitting state incubator of ter- ror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
With residence in the United States and even American citizenship, these international terrorists have now become domestic terror- ists as well, living in America so that they can wage jihad Fighting Terrorism 97 against America. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The first approach maintained that since the Arabs lacked a cred- ible war option against Israel in its present boundaries, they had no choice but to gradually come to terms with Israel’s existence, and eventually to make formal peace with it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Though there were differences as to what territorial con- cessions Israel might be prepared to make, there was a broad consensus against returning to the pre-1967 lines, which had been so fragile as to have provoked the Six- Day War, and against the establishment of a PLO state next to Israel. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
When Gaza fell into Israel’s hands 102 during the 1967 Six-Day War, the city was in a state of appalling underdevelopment, and continued to be one of the principal centers of terrorist activity until 1970, when a concerted action by Israel uprooted most of the active terrorist cells from the area. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For this reason it was chosen by the Oslo negotiators as the most likely spot to be transferred to the hands of Yasir Arafat as an “empirical” experiment to prove that a PLO state on Israel’s borders would be a step toward peace. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Under these accords, Israel was to with- draw in stages from all the populated areas in the West Bank and Gaza, and the PLO would set up a regime ostensibly called “autonomy,” but which in effect would have nearly all the trappings and attributes of a sovereign state: its own army (called a “police force”); its own ex- ecutive, legislative, and judicial branches (all of them con- trolled by Arafat); its own flag, passports, stamps, and border authorities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Shortly after Israel withdrew from Gaza, it became abundantly clear that the PLO had no intention of ful- filling any of its commitments under the Oslo agreement. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Several days before the signing of the Oslo accords in Washington, Arafat gave an interview in which he in- terpreted the event for his followers, telling them that the Oslo accord was the implementation of the Phased Plan decided upon in 1974: “[The agreement] will be a basis for an independent Palestinian state in accordance with the Palestine National Council [of the PLO] reso- lution issued in 1974.”~ Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
I am for negotiations, but they are not the only means. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Arafat’s refusal to extradite to Israel fourteen Palestinians wanted for murder prompted the legal ad- visor of the Labor government to state that “this refusal by the Palestinian Authority is a violation of the Oslo accords.”3 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From 1993 on, the Israeli government committed many of the mistakes that a state could commit in the war against terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For if hitherto Israel had shown the world how terrorism could be fought, now it showed how terrorism could be facilitated. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
ticism which threatened the continued implementation of the Oslo accords. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As they made clear to Arafat, in no way did they give up their plan to fully resume the “armed struggle” once the additional territories had been procured. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Such a PLO—Hamas state would sooner or later threaten to topple the pro-Western Hash- emite regime in Jordan, the majority of whose population is composed of Palestinian Arabs, many of them suscep- tible to the fundamentalist message. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A Palestinian— Islamic state on the West Bank of the Jordan River might soon expand to include its East Bank as well (i.e., Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
the present state of Jordan), thereby creating a much en- larged base for militant Islam in the heart of the Arab world. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Gaza under Arafat has thus become a unique Islamic base, with solid links in two directions—westward to the United States and Europe, eastward (through Hizballah) to Iran. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
tiple directions. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Such a group could emerge anywhere in the sea of militant Islamic puddles that now cover the entire West. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The mere knowledge by a terrorist state that it is opening itself up to the possibility of pain- ful and humiliating military reprisals may be enough to cool the heels of dictators entertaining the thought of undertaking terrorist campaigns against the West or its allies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Sec- retary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), p. 790. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994 (Washington: State De- partment, April 1995), pp. 23—24. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Hisham Sharabi, “That the Palestinian Entity May Be a Democracy Not a State [Run] Introduction 3 4 J HAMAS Palestinian Islamists in general are neither sufficiently comprehensive nor detailed. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hence, the fluctuations in the balance of power among Palestinian movements and in their share of public support basically are contingent on how well they embody the state of resistance. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This study also made use of a number of private interviews and state- ments by prominent figures and leaders of Hamas, as well as booklets and literature produced by the movement itself and by those close to it; these sources provide important perspectives for analysis. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The availability of new documents and texts open new possibilities for understanding Hamas and its political thought. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
under the name of the Muslim Brotherhood) would be extremely difficult if not impossible, particularly since the conflict in Egypt between the Brother- hood and Nasir was escalating. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Tatawwurat iqtisadi~yya, siyasiyya, ~jtima’:)~ya wa ‘askart)rya [Gaza Strip, 1948—1967: Economic, political, social and military developments] (Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1979). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
al-Islami wal badil” [Khomeini: The Islamic solution and alternative] (Occupied Territories: N.p., 1979); on Islamic Jihad’s contacts with Iran in the early 1980s, see Thomas Mayer, “Pro- Iranian Fundamentalism is Gaza,” pages 143—55 in Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Fried- man, eds., Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East (New York: State University of Ne~ York Press, 1990). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As the bipolar international system collapsed, Israel was able to This new imbalance of power, favoring Israel, undermined the great Political Perspective on the Conflict I 53 HAMAS The strength of Hamas and its political clout increased just as inter- national state support for the Palestinian cause was ebbing and the Arab military option in the battle with Israel had virtually been eliminated. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This state of affairs led to a sense of almost total political isolation on the part of Hamas, just a few years after its birth. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There appears to be a considerable degree of commitment to the prin- ciple of consultation in decision making. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Any decision adopted by the majority will be binding on everyone.”33 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This state of affairs affects the conduct of the struggle in various ways, as does the international context and the conflict between Islamic principles and political expediency discussed above. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, it is useful to Hamas at other times, because it protects the move- ment from the consequences of ad-hoc and ill-considered decisions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There are five such char- acteristics, each of which is discussed below. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
matter how important an event may seem, no matter how unforeseen it may be, and even if it should take up the entire political horizon for the moment, in Hamas’s historic perspective that event remains limited and definite in scope.”37 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He wrote in a letter from prison: No doubt our Palestinian people are agitated and unhappy today. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Second, there is the short- or medium-term solution, which can be called the interim solution to the problem. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is thus inalienable property granted to PoliticalPerspective on the Conflict 69 70 HAMAS Islamic generations until Judgement Day. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The movement saw the PLO as responding in phases to changing circumstances in the region and throughout the world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This change would have to come from outside Pales- tine, such as military action from a state surrounding Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nor did it constitute a cohesive view that Hamas could put forward, even as an abstract solution, which would have allowed the movement some room for maneuver and offered it some protection from the aggressive Israeli information campaign portraying the Arabs and Hamas as being bent on the destruction of Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
By analogy to the proposal formally adopted by the PLO in 1974 calling for a secular democratic state in all of Palestine—and thereby res- cuing the PLO from the theoretical problem of what to do with the Jews in Palestine—Hamas has proposed a greater Islamic state in the region. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The thinking was that the Jewish majority in Palestine would disappear once millions of Arabs in neighboring countries became part of this greater Islamic state.63 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In particular, the growing power of Islamists in Algeria and the Sudan, in addition to Iran of course, had a strong impact on the minds and spirits of Islamist activists, who began to hope that a change in the regional Political Perspective on the Conflict 71 72 HAMAS balance of power was about to occur. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Second, the main dispute concerns recognition of the Zionist entity and its continued existence on the soil of Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
69. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Statement issued by the Hamas Political Bureau, 26 April 1994; for full text, see Appen- dix, document no. 4. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These guidelines will be discussed separately in order to place them in the context of the span of Hamas’s existence, to explain how they have developed, and to show how they have been put into practice. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This dealt with an interim solution, an armistice, and the establishment of a Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist occupation forces from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including Jerusalem. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is particularly so because no one was willing any longer to tolerate the existing state of affairs between the Authority and Hamas.”84 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
PoliticalPerspective on the Conflict I 83 84 I HAMAS Yassin invoked the possibility of “renewing” the armistice. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
By saying that they would back down if a majority were to support alterna- tive ideas in a referendum, Hamas leaders have been able to maintain their positions for the time being. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin has maintained ever since Hamas was founded that the will of the Palestinian people should be given top priority, even if it went against the views of Hamas, and even if it went against the Islamic form of a Palestinian state. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Fateh and several smaller groups supported the peace process, while the PFLP, DFLP, and the PFLP-GC, as well as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, opposed the process. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It also applies in the domain of politics and resistance and was especially visible during the intifada and resistance to occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Three months later the PLO recognition was overtaken by a vituperous campaign, launched in Filastin al- Thawra (the official organ of the PLO), that accused Hamas of deserting the unity of nationalist ranks and of trying to deviate from “the commandments, the organic structure and the laws of the Palestinian family.”0 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With respect to the methods used to co-opt Hamas, a number of state- ments by the PLO, and by Arafat in particular, prior to the Madrid Con- ference asserted that Hamas was part of the PLO and that it was represented by a number of PNC delegates, who had attended the 1988 PNC session in Algiers, at which the Palestinian peace program was adopted.’4 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Political Relations of Hamas with Palestinian Groups 95 96 HAMAS Option 1: Hamas could take over the PLO from within, join the PLO, change it, and “inherit it.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The objections on principle concern the political direction adopted by the PLO after its exit from Beirut, a strategy that clearly relied on political and diplo- matic action revolving around Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Because Hamas was established when the intifada began and was linked organically to the uprising, it was necessary and politically inevitable that it should form a common front with certain Palestinian resistance organizations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Consequently, Hamas has not established relations with any Jewish group, either on the Left or among religious Jews such as Naturei Karta, which has a doctrinal position rejecting the establishment of a Jewish state at this point in time. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It became clear that Hamas had lost any political cover it had, either from the Administrative Council in the self-rule area or from any state in the region—on the contrary, it was condemned from virtually all sides. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
But Hamas encountered the hard political reality that no Arab state, no matter how close its relations with the movement, was about to endorse Hamas set- ting itself up as an alternative to the PLO or aid it in that effort. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Even the government of Sudan, which is the closest Arab state to Hamas in politi- cal and ideological terms, has suggested repeatedly that Hamas join the PLO in order to change it from within. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Furthermore, the argument goes, there is a pressing need for Hamas to step in and fill the vacuum created in the political and information area when the PLO vacated a number of positions it used to hold following its agreements with Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas has left the burden of theorizing about and working for reform of the Arabs’ “system” to grass-roots political movements in the Arab states. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Next, Hamas called on “the government and people of our sister state Kuwait to put an end to their improper practices against our Palestinian people residing in Kuwait.”29 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nevertheless, it is possible to get a glimpse of the crisis that could engulf Hamas if the Palestinians in Jordan were offered a choice between retaining Jordanian nationality or giving it up in favor of some status that links them to the Palestinian state that will emerge, what- ever its shape. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
.. Although Hamas had sided with Iraq in the face of American threats, that does not mean that it [accepts] the existing state of affairs, nor does it constitute a bias toward one side or the other.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Even while a number of its leaders and prominent figures were residing in Jor- dan, it maintained good relations with Syria through its official represen- tatives and the prominent Hamas figures living in that country. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nazzal interview, 23 April 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
When the government announced it was applying shariah, Hamas telegraphed its congratulations, calling it a step toward “the restoration of the dignity and impregnability of the ummah and the liberation of lands of the Muslims from colonialists and Zionists.”57 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
59. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In one letter sent to Arab heads of state, Hamas argued that the conflict between the Palestinians and the Jews should not be con- fined to “one piece of land or one state,” emphasizing that it was “a war for destiny and existence (of the Arabs) ~“60 Hamas believes that the Zionist threat threatens the entire region and the Arab people as a whole, citing Israeli interventions in the Bab al-Mandab Straits, Ethiopia, and southern Sudan, and argues that such interventions form part of a plan for a “Greater Israel.”61 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas called for an end to the eco- nomic boycott and declared its solidarity with the people of Iraq, posi- tions that were reiterated in consecutive bulletins, particularly during 1991 and 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas has become accustomed to putting forward its perspectiv on Palestinian issues in those appeals, in the hope of attracting attention from the Islamic states.77 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Relations with Iran Hamas’s ties with Iran are the most significant among the movement’s rela- tions in the Islamic world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For Hamas, it would be politically senseless not to value and support the state that is most adamant in its opposition to the political settlement that Hamas itself opposes. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Afghanistan continued to figure in Hamas statements until the Afghani jihad movements triumphed over the pro-Russian Najibullah regime and were able to enter Kabul in April 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas distributed the telephone and fax numbers of the White House, the State Department, and the Justice Department to hundreds of Islamic centers and groups throughout the world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Second, and quite significantly, was the deportation of over four hundred Palestinians (composed mainly of Hamas’s leaders, prominent figures, and supporters) to south Lebanon at the end of 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s interest in making contact and establishing relations with foreign states and international organizations is to seek their sup- port and sympathy and does not violate its basic commitments and strategic position. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas considers Palestine to be the battleground against the Zionist enemy and is careful not to transfer that conflict to foreign soil. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Two factors contributed to this evolution. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is particularly true with respect to Hamas’s efforts on behalf of the welfare of the Pales- tinian people, a policy that might involve dealing with one or another state or international organization while downplaying the issue of religious or cultural differences. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibid. Hamas leaflet, “Statement by Hamas spokesman responding to the statement made by the State Department spokesman Mr. Richard Boucher about ending any political dialogue with Hamas,” dated 3 March 1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Despite this, in April 1993 the Department of State put Hamas on its annual list of groups engaged in “terrorist activities.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The December 1994 Depart- ment of State report to Congress, which covered the PA’s implementa- tion of the Oslo Agreement, cited the Palestine Mosque incident in October 1994—in which 14 Hamas supporters were shot by the Pales- tinian police—as a turning point in the struggle between the PA and extremist groups such as Hamas that opposed the peace process; it said more needed to be done in this direction.’3’ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The United States supported all the collective punishment measures Israel applied against the Palestinians at the time. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Furthermore, the United States vetoed the participation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the National Dia- logue Conference organized by the PA in April and August of 1997. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Such a move, according to a Hamas release, “would represent [crossing] a red line. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They also point out that Israel is the most “rejectionist and violating” state in the world with respect to UN resolu- tions.’38 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The majority denies any possibility of negotiation or recognition of the Jewish state. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
155. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If the Palestinian people were to express their rejection of an Islamic state, I would respect their will and honor their wishes. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, this position, which was clearly enunciated in Hamas state- ments under the slogan “No Elections Except After the Expulsion of the Occupier,”28 did not endure for long. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In a written response to the author on 9 March 1996, al-Zahhar avoided a question about his view of Hamas’s decision not to participate in the election by saying: “My personal opinion differs from the opinion of the movement, and I do not wish to state it.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas also realized, however, that boycotting the elections altogether would allow its competitor, the self-rule authority, to gain both power and legitimacy, regardless of the extent of the boycott that it and the opposition were able to mount. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Autonomous structures in civil society have been seized, the atmosphere has been militarized, and there is rapid movement toward a traditional kind of police state, where the state exercises its hegemony over civil soci- ety. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
No Arab state nor all Arab states combined, no king or president nor all kings and presidents, and no orga- nization nor all organizations~ Palestinian or Arab, have the right to dispose of it or relinquish or cede any part of it, because Palestine is Islamic land that has been entrusted to generations of Muslims until the Day of Judge- ment. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nothing corrects the soul if it is deliberating than a change from state to state. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Being affected by the situation that surrounded the formation of the organization and that overwhelms the Arab world with chaotic ideologies due to the ide- ological invasion which has swept the Arab world since the defeat of the Crusades and the ongoing consolidation of Orientalism, missionary work, and imperialism, the organization adopted the idea of a secular state and as such we considered it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The state of oppression is an hour, but the state of truth lasts until the coming of the hour. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Zionist contempt for Arab ability reached its zenith in 1982 when Zionist forces swept into south Lebanon and laid siege to Lebanon’s capi- tal and bombarded it for months and afterward permitted the horrendous massacres of Sabra and Shatilla, which claimed hundreds of Palestinian vic- tims. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The odd contrast in that year was the convening of an Arab summit conference at Fez, Morocco, in September 1982, which came as a sort of Recognize the Zionist existence and its legitimacy Cede the larger part of Palestine to the Zionist entity. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It welcomes all those who believe in its ideas and stands and who are ready to bear the consequences of sacred struggle for the liberation of Palestine and the establishment in it of an independent Islamic state. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Doing so implies maintaining the state of divi- sion, backwardness, and dependency in which the Arab Islamic nation lives. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Inasmuch as Hamas is a part of the national libera- tion movement of the Palestinian people, it seeks to gain their interna- tionally established national rights, foremost among them being the rights of self-determination, establishing an independent state, and the return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
No party has the right to infringe on them or to deprive Hamas of exercising them, especially in the fields of information, politics, self-defense, and political participation in the self-determination of the Palestinians. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Al-Quds (Jerusalem), various issues. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949—1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See Palestinian problem; Palestinian-Israeli con- flict Palestinian Authority (PA), 2, 7, 55, 63, 69, 82, 93, 94, 102, 122, 130, 157, 161, 166, 212, 229, 232, 233, 250, 260; and relations with Hamas, 8, 55—56, 59, 67, 88, 103—109, 198, 219, 224, 228, 230, 240—42, 245, 256; as representative of 118—19, 170, 187, 196, 244—45, 249—50, 256, 258, 259; see also Oslo Agreement, PA’S establishment under Palestinian National Council (PNC), 15, 25n. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
know, he always told me that if and when he died I would never feel lonely or suffer a sense of loss, because he would come to me in my dreams and, thank God, he does so nearly every night. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
1 Surat al-Hajj, 39, The Quran 7 Israelis called their campaign ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’, an Orweffian code-name which concealed Sharon’s ambitious plan to destroy the PLO’s power base and impose Israel’s political will on the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The new areas contained a large population of Sunni and Shia Muslims. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
triumphant return ofAyatollah Khomeini and his establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran were an inspiration for the Shiites of other countries, who had long suffered discrimination under dominant Sunni Muslim rule. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His time in Lebanon was a pivotal era. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The fate of Sadr and the triumph of Shia Islam under Khomeini, at a time of civil ferment in — THE SHIITES STRIKE BACK 13 Lebanon, was a potent political and theological cocktail for the Lebanese Shiites. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In 1948, David Ben-Gurion, the founder of the state of Israel, spoke of creating a Christian state in Lebanon which would form an alliance with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Everyone remembered how the Palestinians were driven out of their homeland when the state of Israel was founded. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The region had become a war-like state severed from the rest of the country.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Amal, with military support from Syria, instigated the war on the basis that it was foiling Hezbollah’s attempts to take over its territory in South Lebanon and transform the area into an Islamic state. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Sheikh Nabil Qaouq, Hezbollah’s main military leader in South Lebanon, claims that the Islamic Resistance is in some respects more advanced than the Israelis: We have acquired a level of technology which, for example, prevents even their state-of-the-art technology from locating and diffusing our roadside bombs. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
scrutinised the types of weapons used by the enemy, how they used them and what their effects were, as well as studying the psychological effects of our operations against the Israeli soldiers and the psychological state in which the soldiers returned to Lebanon to fight. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They pledged their theological allegiance to Khomeini and harboured the dream of instigating a similar revolt in Lebanon in the hope of transforming the multi-confessional state into an Iranian-style Islamic country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
were encouraged not to defect by the Party of God and were urged to work on transforming the Shiite movement from within. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The manifesto stated: Hezbollah 58 Our struggle with Israel stems from an ideological and historic understanding to the effect that this Zionist entity is an aggressor in its development and formation and is existing on a land usurped at the cost of the rights of the Muslim people. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Khomeini, for example, set the agenda regarding Israel when he made the infamous declara- tion that Israel was an evil and called on all Muslims around the world to ‘fight the Jewish state until its eradication’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He had preached the doctrine of an Islamic state in Lebanon since he returned to the country in the sixties, long before the Iranian Revolution. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
US Under-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told a congressional investigating committee that the attack was ‘virtually impossible to defend against if the driver was prepared to commit suicide’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In their eyes, the United States was largely responsible for the Israeli invasion in not having taken a tougher stance against the Jewish State. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
crowd usually works itself up into a state of frenzy. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
We do not use it as a means of imposing our views on others, but consider ourselves in a state of jihad to defend our rights. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
only difference is that they had at their disposal state-of-the-art and top-of-the-range means and weaponry to achieve their aims. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The State Department and the CIA claims that Iran has been behind 1,000 deaths in 200 terrorist strikes since 1 979** French targets were being attacked from as early as 1980 by the Guards’ apparatus. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Not only had France offered sanctuary to members of the Shah’s administration, it had also armed * See The Warriors of Islam, Kenneth Katzman, pp. 95—10 1 ** ‘Iran’s State of Terror’, Time Magazine, 11 November 1996 EXPORT OF A REvoLUTION 111 Iraq in its war against Iran and had frozen Iranian assets. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The US Department of State continued to place advertisements in European and Arabic newspapers for a year after the release of all the hostages, offering rewards of between one and two million US dollars to anyone with information leading to the identity of the captors. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On 12 December 1983, six weeks after the attacks on the multinational forces in Lebanon, a chain of explosions had rocked the Gulf state of Kuwait. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Moreover, the Church envoy had not been able to deliver on his earlier pledges of providing letters and news on the welfare and state of the prisoners in Kuwait. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was 7.00 Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Some commentators have described Islam as the prototype of the welfare state, since the obligation towards the poor is embodied in Islamic ritual practice through the payment of religious taxes. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the words of Hajj Hussein al-Shami, the head of Hezbollah’s social services, the group’s social work has succeeded in transforming it into something ‘larger than a party, yet smaller than a state’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
An officer was killed in the attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Political analysts claim that Israel was given the go-ahead for its campaign against Lebanon in March, during the anti- terrorism summit at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Most were in a state of fear and shock and could not believe the fact that they were once again being forced out of their homes. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
President Clinton was on official visits to Tokyo and Russia and dispatched both his Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Dennis Ross.Warren Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Russia’s Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov was said to have had a rancorous meeting with Israel’s Prime Minister at which he said: ‘If you sought to convene the Sharm el-Sheikh conference today, the heads of state would not come.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In an historic ceremony on the lawns of the White House, Yitzhak Rabin had shaken hands with Yasser Arafat, the man whom Israel had denounced as a ‘terrorist’ and attempted to destroy in 1982. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Binyamin Netanyahu’s victory in the Israeli elections changed everything. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah 214 Sources written in English: Agha, Hussein J., and Khalidi, Ahmad S., Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Co-operation, London, 1995 Ajami, Fouad, The Vanished Imam: Musa Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon, NewYork, 1986 BBC World Service Newspack, Foreign Hostage Crisis in Lebanon, Cyprus, 1991 Chomsky, Noam, The Fateful Triangle:The United States, Israel and the Palestinians, London, 1983 Coughlin, Con, Hostage, London, 1993 Dekmeijan, R. Hrair, Islam in Revolution, New York, 1995 Ehteshami, Anoushiravam, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic, London, 1995 Esposito, John L., The Islamic Threat:Myth or Reality?, NewYork, 1995 Fisk, Robert, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, Oxford, 1992 Bibliography 215 Hiro, Dilip, Islamic Fundamentalism, London, 1989 Hiro, Diip, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, London, 1993 Hollis, Rosemary, and Shehadi, Nadim, (eds), Lebanon on Hold, London, 1996 Izadi, Mostafa (Ed.), Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire, accompanied by the resurgence of ethnic conflict and even genocidal nationalism, the intellectual foundations of much of social science were also shaken. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When the first edition of this book was being written, from the mid- 1970s to the early 1980s, the transformation of the study of nation makin~ and nationalism had not yet taken place. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“The history which became part of the fund of knowledge or the ideology of nation, state or movement,” writes Eric Hobsbawm, “is not what has actually been preserved in popular memory, but what has been selected, written, pictured, popularized and institutionalized by those whose function it is to do so.”1 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Once again a relatively independent Georgian state was overwhelmed by Russian occupation. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Georgia, as in other republics of the USSR, the Soviets eliminated full political sovereignty but initiated a process through which Georgians took over the institutions of their own republic, dominated the political and educational system, and expanded their own national cultural production. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Assyrian king, Tiglath-pileser I (1115—1077 B.C.), led several expeditions into the lands of Nairi, later to be central Armenia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Kashkai had participated in the destruction of the Hittite empire, then moved westward, where they came up against the Assyrians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Cimmerians destroyed the southern Colchian state, known as Kulkha in Urartian inscriptions. The Making of the Georgian Nation
For a short time a distinct “kingdom of the Mushki” to the west, a state closely connected with the Phrygians, reigned as the strong- est state in Asia Minor. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The brief ascendancy of the Phrygian-Mushki state came to an end at the hands of the Cimmerians, who were probably allied with Rusa II of Urartu (685—645 B.C.).’8 Some of the Mushki assimilated with local peoples, but others moved northwest out of the area known as Speri, taking with them their Hittite religion and culture. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Not included in the empire as a satrapy, the kingdom of Coichis was an autonomous vassal state of the Achaemenids. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Colchis in Achaemenid times thus was a tributary state, largely agri- cultural, with some ironworks, slaves, and commerce in its Greek ports. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The chronicles state that Parnavazi united Georgians of the east with those of Colchis~Egrisi to drive the “Greeks” from Mtskheta. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The overthrow of Azon, founder of the Mtskheta state, and the explusion of the Macedonians left Parnavazi the most powerful ruler in Transcaucasia, and he soon brought western Georgia under his rule. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Although an older state than Kartli, Egrisi’s independence did not prove as durable, and it was successively ruled by Achaemenid Persia, Hellenistic Pontus, Rome, and Byzantium. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Parnavazi’s new state, on the other hand, soon demonstrated an enviable independence and energy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
To the Greeks they were known as Iberoi (Iberians), a name that Melikishvili believes came from the land from which they had migrated, Speri. The Making of the Georgian Nation
‘With the elimination of Achaemenid authority the eastern Georgian tribes might have fallen under Macedonian rule, but early in the third century B.C. the ruling dynast of Armazi-Mtskheta in eastern Georgia estab- lished his primacy over the other Iberian princes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In his view, Parnavazi, whose reign he estimates at 299 to 234 B.C., probably operated as such a Seleucid vassal.41 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The king appointed a military governor (eristavi) to each of the seven major provinces (Argveti, Kakheti, Gardabani, Tashir-Abotsi, Javakheti-Kolas-Artani, Samtskhe-Ajara, and Kvarjeti) while keeping the central district of Shida Kartli under the administration of his highest official, the spaspeti. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Caught between the Roman and Persian worlds, Armenia and Kartli-Iberia were clearly influenced culturally by both, but in the formation of their societies Persian norms played the dominant Formation of the Georgian Nation 17 18 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES role.6’5 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Caucasian society was at first dynastic and only later did it approach feudal forms. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Rome-Byzantium the “ruling class” was an imperial of- ficialdom, nonhereditary and largely the creature of the emperor. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Whatever the spiritual appeals of the new religion, Christianity in the early fourth century had political and economic attractions for the Iberian state, as Soviet Georgian historians are quick to point out. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But the Roman defeat at Adrianople in 378 restored all of Kartli-Iberia to Iranian control. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As Toumanoff points out, this “can only imply acceptance of Zeno’s formulary of faith.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the surviving members of the Chosroid house passed away, Adarnase’s son, Ashot I, “the Great” (813—830), became the complete master of the Guaramid state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Bagratids ruled effectively only in western Kartli-Iberia, while the emir of Tbilisi held the capital, and Kakheti had its own mtavari. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The former Arab province of Arminiya fragmented into small kingdoms and principalities, and from this new political mosaic eastern Georgia was to emerge as the most powerful state in Caucasia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Against these tiny states the Byzantine empire moved relentlessly, annexing Taron in 966 and Manazkert in 968, and threatening a rising new state being formed by David the Great of Tao (Tayk). The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the early eleventh century Caucasia had been so fragmented, by what Toumanoff calls a “fissiparous process,” that it had “largely lost its raison d’être as a buffer state in the eyes of the [Byzantine] Empire. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The united Georgian kingdom of Abkhazeti-Kartli was a decidedly decentralized state, in which the great dynasts could successfully challenge the Bagratid king for local power. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Forty thousand Qipchak Turkish warriors, with their Christian Georgia 35 36 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES families, moved into Georgia from the north Caucasus and Russian steppe area. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But as Speros Vryonis notes, this new state, created by years of fighting, was far from a flourishing economic order: “By the time of his death, David had conquered Tiflis and Ani and extirpated the Turkmen settlements from most of his lands. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Whereas earlier, in the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, Georgian monarchs and vassals had fought as adversaries within a feudal hierarchy of dependence, from the fifteenth century on the breakdown of ties of dependence changed the conflict into a struggle between a weak state and increasingly independent princes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the classical period of feudalism, kings like Bagrat IV (1027— 1072) or Giorgi 11(1072—1089) had been able to make concessions to rebel princes, even to grant them lands, without weakening the royal authority, for the monarchy was not based on the power of the state opposed to private powers but was itself a private order that rested on personal ties.5 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Others in Safavid service fared better than Giorgi. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the vacuum left by Iran’s troubles and Russia’s withdrawal, Taimuraz II and his son set out to rebuild Georgia and create a multinational Caucasian state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When Taimuraz, his aged father, died on a mission to Russia, Erekle succeeded him and thus became king of a united Kartli-Kakheti (1762—1798). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Internally he continued the efforts of his strongest predecessors to reduce the autonomy of the eristavni and replace them with royal appointees (mouravni). The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the Russian point of view Georgian society was peculiar in that the princes held ordinary nobles in subordinate, vassal relations, and held many clergymen as simple serfs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The aznaurni were released from obligations to the princes but were required to prove title to their land; if they could not, they lost the land to their former lords and themselves become state peasants.9 The Making of the Georgian Nation
An ukaz (edict) of February 25, 1827, declared that all Georgian nobles, whether in state service or not, were equal in privilege and status to Russian nobles. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Those serfs owned by non- nobles had either to be sold or allowed to buy their freedom; otherwise they reverted to state peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Many well-off serfs petitioned the authorities to improve their status, either by becoming freemen or by leaving their lords and becoming state peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This would have the additional effect of co-opting and rewarding potentially dissident individ- uals. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The ideal Georgian noble of the past had been a brave military servitor, an expansive host, and an absolute ruler in his isolated rural domain; the successful new noble had to earn a rank in state service, and could do so only with a European education and a knowledge of the Russian language. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Some nobles were dedicated to careers in state service; others were content to live a life of leisure on their estates; a few simply refused to accept the new political regime. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Throughout the Russian empire serfowning nobles resented the state bureaucrats (the chinov- niki), who were often of lower birth and less well educated, and formed a potentially rival elite. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He urged the minister of education, Count Uvarov, to require the children of Russian officials to study Caucasian languages. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The essence of Hahn’s program was the immediate and complete incor- poration of Transcaucasia into Russia’s administrative system, the introduc- tion of Russian law and language into government, and the elimination of local divergences. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Suspecting that the reform was responsible for the disturbances, Nicholas I sent Minister of War Chernyshev and State Secretary Rozen to the Caucasus to review the situation. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The poet Akaki Tsereteli later wrote, “As long as Georgia is remembered, so will the name Vorontsov live.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian intelligentsia was inspired, and the hope appeared that the cultural-national progress of the Georgian people would be possible and a common language with the Georgian nobility and make a significant part The aim and result of Vorontsov’s policies were to reduce opposition to 73Russian Rule and Georgian Society 74 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE Russian system.3° The Making of the Georgian Nation
Vorontsov ordered the liberation of the vassal gentry in western Georgia and, to avoid the hardships that their brethren in eastern Georgia had experienced after their emancipation in 1837, granted the vassals time to prove their gentry pedigree before being demoted to the state peasantry. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The brilliance of the viceroy’s court, the numerous balls and receptions at the newly built palace, and Princess Vorontsova’s insistence on fashionable attire for the women of liflis forced the local nobles to spend great sums on their increasingly Europeanized style of life. The Making of the Georgian Nation
It shared power with Russian of- ficialdom and increasingly defined itself as a service nobility, or dvorianstvo, whose identity stemmed as much from its members’ performance as state servants as it did from possession of land and serfs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The laziness and incapacity of the [Georgian] peasants reaches such a pitch that there are none to be found for ordinary work, even if they are offered splendid wages.38 The Making of the Georgian Nation
An elder—the natsvali or mamasakhlisi or kevkhi—was elected by the peasants, sometimes by all the peasants in a village, other times by peasants of one category (a leader might represent only the landlord peasants or only the state peasants). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Occasionally pressure was put on the electors to choose a candidate favored by state authorities or the local nobility, and sometimes a noble was elected. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The separation between the functions and authority of landlords and state of- ficials was blurred, and nobles usually had the final word. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Farming in prereform Georgia was still quite primitive, and productivity was low. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Tiflis province the heavy plow required eight to nine pairs of draft Russian Rule and Georgian Society 79 80 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE animals and five to seven workers; in one day not more than a third of a desiatina could be plowed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In western Georgia agriculture was even less developed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Peasants grew corn and ghomi (millet) almost exclusively, and planted just one crop for ten to fifteen years until the land was exhausted and had to be abandoned. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Mgaloblishvili’s village, Diabi, the peasants turned over a set share of their grain and wine to the monastery that owned the village and also worked part time on the holdings of the clergy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
If the peasants had any surplus after consumption and duties, they were permitted to sell it to merchants who took it to market. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As painful as it might be to leave the village, these men were highly respected for their experience and acquired skills.48 The Making of the Georgian Nation
For many peasant households agriculture alone was not sufficient to maintain the family and had to be supplemented by other kinds of work. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgian society at the time the Russians arrived was made up mostly of people who were in a variety of ways “bound” or “obligated.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Vassal gentry, many clergymen, urban dwellers, and most peasants were to various degrees unfree, required to render service or dues to an overlord. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the Middle Ages such serfs could leave their lord at will by giving up their land, but by the eighteenth century they had lost this mobility.49 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet another category, the tskalobis qma, was a serf given by a lord to his vassal and thus passing into the jurisdiction of a new lord. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A naskhidi qma was simply a peasant bought by one lord from another, either with or without land. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In western Georgia some unlucky prisoners were sold to the Ottoman Turks despite the anathema of the Georgian church and the efforts of Solomon I to end the slave trade.51 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The dualistic policy of the Russian authorities toward the Georgian noble elite, which at one and the same time eliminated nobles from tradi- tional political posts and attempted to draw loyal elements into state service, offered no compensating advantages for the peasantry. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Tsarist administrators believed that to enhance the state, the Georgian social order had to be integrated into the Russian system as fully as possible. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Furthermore, the state’s interests coincided with the power of the nobles over the enserfed peasantry. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Nobles gained new judicial powers over peasants and state support for dues collection and retrieval of runaway serfs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the same time Russian state power was used to restrict peasant movement and maintain an agri- cultural work force for the nobility. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the 1830s almost all hired workers in eastern Georgian cities were Imeretians, and in 1840 the police forcibly removed peasants to their native villages if they had no written proof of permission to migrate—a graphic example of state authorities using the means at hand to maintain the labor force required by the noble pro- prietors.6° The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1843—1845 the government ordered all payments by state peasants to be made in money; although the peasants protested vigorously, and were joined by seigneurial and clerical peasants, the order stood.61 The Making of the Georgian Nation
By 1812 plague, frosts, and poor harvests combined to create food shortages and high prices in eastern Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgian clergymen in western Georgia, like their brethren in the east, became state employees paid by the treasury, and the lands of the monasteries and churches became state property. The Making of the Georgian Nation
discontent among the Georgian peasantry, no major changes in state policy toward the serfs were made in the last decade of the reign of Nicholas I. Throughout Russia educated men and women were becoming concerned about the inhumanity and apparent inefficiency of Russian Rule and Georgian Society 85 86 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE serfdom; even the tsar seemed convinced that emancipation was necessary. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As a historian of the peasants of Transcaucasia has noted, this transformation had two aspects: On the one hand, into the disorderly Georgian institution of bondage Russian legislation had introduced regularity, greater stability and firmness; on the other—thanks to the continual effect of Russian law on the serf population—the Georgian enserfed peasantry more and more entered into those norms which historically had shaped the position of the Russian peasant estates; in other words, toward the end of the first half of the nineteenth century, on the eve of February 19, the Georgian institution of serfdom was governed by the Russian law on serfdom; it is possible to say that Russian and Georgian serf estates were being equalized in their rights and obligations to their landlords and to the state.68 The Making of the Georgian Nation
These changes brought the state and its officials in much closer contact with the peasants of Georgia than the Georgian monarchy had ever been. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When Castella died, the state took over the plant and ran it until the 1 840s. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Kankrin stated bluntly in 1827 that “the Transcaucasian provinces not without reason could be termed our colony, which should bring the state rather significant profits from the products of southern climes.”85 The Making of the Georgian Nation
As Russia itself began to initiate some industrial development, Russian officials visualized Transcaucasia as a supplier of raw materials rather than an area to be developed economically. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Europeanization of culture was more directly advanced in the state schools, which over three thousand students attended in the late 1840s.92 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Its permanence can be attested to late in the twentieth century. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A Trans- caucasian Committee for the Reorganization of the Landlord Peasantry was set up, headed by State Secretary Aleksei Fedorovich Kruzenshtern, and the nobles were told to elect district committees that would supply local plans for reform. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Then, on March 5, the Caucasian Com- mittee in St. Petersburg secretly ordered Bariatinskii to begin the reform in Georgia “with appropriate caution.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
The primary beneficiaries of Russian rulership were the large landhold- ing aristocrats, the princely Orbeliani, Eristavi, Bagration-Mukhranskii, and Chavchavadze families. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But most Georgian nobles at midcentury were simply not in the economic and social sphere occupied by such aristocrats. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The negative votes were cast by members of the most exalted families in Georgia, nobles closely allied to the Russian state and least vulnerable, given their immense holdings, to the danger of impoverishment after emancipa- tion.15 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Kipiani, angered that the aristocrats refused to accept the wishes of the majority of the nobles, decided to run for the office despite an attempt by a state official to dissuade him. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Baron Aleksandr Nikolai’s report to the Cauca- sian Committee, reassuring the members of Kipiani’s devotion to the mon- archy, may have helped: Emancipation 101 102 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE As far as the political convictions of Mister Kipiani are concerned, it is possible to say one thing about them, and that is that he is sufficiently intelligent to comprehend that unconditional submission to the Russian government is the single rule for the survival of his homeland.25 The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the fall of 1863 the debates in the local noble assemblies had ended and the various projects had been submitted to the Transcaucasian Commit- tee for the Reorganization of the Landlord Peasantry. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Kipiani plan represented the clear preferences of a relatively united Georgian nobility, but the committee, now chaired by Baron Nikolai and including both members 91 the Georgian nobility and the state bureaucracy, developed an alternative plan by early 1864. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Believing that the peasantry should not develop into a mobile proletariat but should remain settled on the land and provide tax revenues for the state, the committee decided that the peasants should be given allotments of land for which they would have to pay noble owners.28 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Central to the terms of emancipation was a two-part principle: while officially recognizing that all the land belonged to the noble landlords, including lands that peasants had worked for centuries, the state nonetheless required that henceforth the land be divided between nobles and peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The traditional obligations of gala and kulukhi had varied from district to district, but they had ranged upward from one-tenth of the harvest, rarely exceeding one-fifth. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the latter decision, a landlord would receive the state loan but lose forever the peasants’ payments. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Avaliani indicts the government for the effects on the Georgian peasantry: “From the first moment of the dissolution of serfdom the base was laid for the formation of a landless and small landholding peasant proletariat, and this acted as the catalyst for constant ferment and social disorder.’ The Making of the Georgian Nation
Thus, immediately above the Georgian village government stood the tsarist administration rather than elected volost authorities. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The nobles received money payments from the state for the loss of their rights over the peasants, as well as much of the land. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The tsar also preserved the nobles’ police powers over the peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Instead the govern- ment appointed these officials usually from the local nobility or state bu- reaucracy, and did not permit them to gather in congresses as was possible in Russia.~3 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet in the 1860s their opposition to emancipation was contained within legal bounds, and once the tsar’s will was announced, they took no further action. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgia’s finest families were no longer primarily a national elite, as they had been in the first three decades of the century, but a cosmopolitan aristocracy with loyalties extending beyond Georgia, binding them to the Russian autocratic order. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This was not merely psychological or cultural. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Also, it should be noted that there was no reform of the status of state peasants corresponding to that undertaken in Russia in 1866, and they remained on state land, paying dues to the treasury. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the poet Akaki Tsereteli wrote of the reforms in Georgia: In words everything was as good as possible, but in fact it was good for no one. The Making of the Georgian Nation
After the emancipation of the serfs, however, and until the revolution, the principal blows to the status of the nobility no longer came from the state but from the changing economic environment, which increased the wealth and influence of the Armenian middle class. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Taking little interest in their estates, the nobles were in general satisfied to receive their dues or rents and borrow from moneylenders in the towns. The Making of the Georgian Nation
What distinguished these Georgians most completely from the Armenians and Russians in Tiflis was their almost complete isolation from positions of political and economic power. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When the fraud is very apparent, the Armenian often pays for his greed with all the blood that can be extracted from his jugular vein.12 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet some secular learning also was evident. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Clearly not even the Georgians themselves yet valued their own literature; not enough interested readers could be found to support a modest press for very long. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When a student reached middle school the courses were taught in Russian, with Georgian given as a separate course. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Here for the first time appeared the novels of Chavchavadze, Tale of a Poor Man and katsia adamiani?, his best poetry, filled with civic feeling, his “Kako” and his critical-humorous articles, “Conversation of Spiridon and Tadeoz.”3° The Making of the Georgian Nation
Rather than advocate a particular solution to Georgia’s backwardness, the meore dasi sought widely for a program, ranging from state-regulated capitalism to various forms of “association” and collectivism.33 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Russia and in Georgia most intellectuals rejected an unqualified defense of capitalism as it was then developing in the West, preferring some means of ameliorating the struggle between capital and labor through state regulation or “association.”34 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In contrast to gentry nationalism, Caucasian liberalism was based on a respect for the experience of Western Europe and the successes of industrial capitalism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The majority proposed Switzerland as a model of what a Russian federal state should be in the future.48 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the 1880s and 1890s a series of laws imposed new restrictions on the Jews, reduced the autonomy of Finland, and reversed the long-standing policy that permitted the Armenian church to run its own schools. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1902 the entire Tiflis duma was arraigned for corruption and taken to court.59 The Making of the Georgian Nation
As we have seen, the great majority of former serfs in Georgia remained “tem- porarily obligated” long after their Russian counterparts had been freed from that category~ Former landlords and the state bureaucracy retained much of the power they had exercised before 1864, and they continued, all too frequently, to abuse their prerogatives. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Conflicts with the landlords could be referred to state officials, but the cases dragged through the bureaucracy for decades.6 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The population of Georgia was overwhelmingly rural. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1866, 82 percent of the population in Tiflis province and 95.8 The Making of the Georgian Nation
After emancipation the Georgian peasantry was made up of four major groups: the “temporarily obligated” former landlord serfs; state peasants; the khizani, who had been freed without land; and a small number of independent landowners. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Tiflis province they held on the average 17.67 The Making of the Georgian Nation
For those who had redeemed their land, the figures were a bit higher: 4.3 The Making of the Georgian Nation
I. G. Antelava has shown that in some districts of Kutaisi province, such as Ozurgeti, Racha, Senaki, and Shorapani, more than 70 percent of state peasant households could not meet these minimal requirements.13 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The peasants of Transcaucasia, who held more than ten million desiatinas of land, paid twenty times as much in state and land taxes as the nobility, with about five million desiatinas. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Whereas agriculture itself was only partly organized capitalistically—few large estates hired labor or made rational calculations of costs and revenues—farming was in- creasingly geared toward commodity production: growing salable produce for a market. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Following the January shootings of “Bloody Sunday,” Gurians refused to pray for the imperial family. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On August 1 the acts appropriating Armenian church properties were repealed, thus removing the principal grievance of the Armenian community, and on August 6 the tsar’s manifesto establishing a state duma (the so-called Bulygin duma) was pub- lished. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On January 8, 1906, Starosel’skii was replaced as governor of Kutaisi by none other than General Alikhanov. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By returning the church lands to the Armenians and abolishing the ethnic restrictions on entrance into the state service, Vorontsov-Dashkov went far toward winning over powerful elements in the Armenian com- munity. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Tiflis the Bolsheviks formed a separate organization from a tiny minority of the party’s supporters. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Legal Social Democrats, it seems, can work. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The essential difference between Stalin and Zhordania was not so much in their specific recommendations for state organization (though Zhordania clearly favored a more decentralized state structure than Stalin) but rather in their sympathies toward national culture. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Mensheyjks were still dominant, and the Bolsheviks who managed to escape arrest did not formally break with their rivals, though they often met separately and supported Lenin’s efforts to form a separate Bolshevik party complete with its own central committee at the Prague Conference in January 177End of Tsarist Georgia 178 1912. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Following their leaders in the state duma, they refused to work actively for the war and held to the hope that the conflict would lead to political revolution. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Interestingly enough, the grand duke did not report this “treason” to anyone, indicating how widely the disenchantment with the regime of Nicholas II had spread. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Provisional Government’s inability to maintain credibility without the active participation of prominent members of the Petrograd soviet forced the Mensheviks and the SRs to agree reluctantly at the end of April to a coalition government. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The attempted coup in late August was thwarted by railroad workers, and all over the country workers and soldiers registered their hostility toward the upper and middle classes (tsenzovoe obshchestvo) by passing resolutions of no confidence in the government. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The major beneficiaries of the radicalization of the lower classes were the Bolsheviks, and on October 25 they seized power in Petrograd. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Because the social democrats so easily dominated Georgian politics through 1917, there was no particular urgency about implementing political autonomy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first task of the prime minister, Noe Ramishvili, and the foreign minister, Akaki Chkhenkeli, was to open secret negotiations with the Germans in Poti. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The cause of our defeat was the absence of one fully-empowered democratic organizations of one class must refuse to take on state funrtions and return to their true role, to the leadership of their class.24 The Making of the Georgian Nation
As prime minister in a socialist government, Zhordania understood the paradox of administering a bourgeois state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian state, limited as it had to be by the level of social development, “cannot avoid serving in one way or another . The Making of the Georgian Nation
Social democracy was com-~ pelled to “play the principal role in building a modern state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The peasantry presented the most serious internal problem for the A week later Tsereteli told the joint meeting of the Transcaucasian state authority. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The democracy ought to create one. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The revolutionary Revolution and Republic 195 196 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA Mensheviks. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet the Mensheviks, more than any other party in Transcaucasia, had roots in the countryside and palpable support from the villagers. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Cauca- sian SRs held a dominant position only among the “peasants in uniform,” and the First Congress of the Caucasian army (April—May 1917) had voted overwhelmingly for the SR resolution calling for socialization of all land. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On December 16, 1917, the Zavkom decreed that state, church, and private land above a certain norm was to be transferred to a national land fund to be directed by land committees. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Poor peasants whose land fell below the norms were able to lease land from the state land fund, but the private market in land was elimi- nated.3S The Making of the Georgian Nation
The smallholders of Dusheti were incensed that large estates were being transferred to state control rather than turned over to the nearest village.36 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Khomeriki was convinced that the government had no choice but to deal with this strong tendency toward private property by transferring much of the state land fund into private hands. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The congress resolved that most land should go to landless peasants, that other land could be sold at low prices, and that only land with “broad social significance” would be held by the state or transferred to zemstva (local governing bodies).39 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The least fortunate peasants received the most land from the reform, and the state held the forests, much of the pastureland, and the waterways. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Given their position at the helm of a “bourgeois” state, their broad base among the peasantry, and the fact that they were now a party of the whole nation, the social democrats of Georgia were nevertheless careful to maintain and nurture their special relationship with the small and variegated working class. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Mensheviks preferred such policies of state mediation of economic disputes, rather than the outright nationalization favored by the Bolsheviks. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In August 1919, a state monopoly on manganese export to Europe was established, the forerunner of Revolution and Republic 201 202 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA a general state monopoly on foreign trade. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgian social democratic leaders frequently contrasted their moderate and democratic system of government and economy with the more cen- tralized and dictatorial system in Soviet Russia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Based on their conviction that the preconditions did not exist for socialism, the Mensheviks held back from assaults on the capitalist mode of production. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Mensheviks’ hegemony over the urban workers of Georgia was so complete that they made few concessions to the left. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Montague, secretary of state for India, objected to station- Revolution and Republic 203 204 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA ing troops in Caucasia, and Curzon replied, “You cannot take them away and have everybody cutting everybody else’s throat.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Mirzoevs’ landlord was to learn a few days later that the Bolsheviks were serious about their commandments. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From Tiflis the Georgian leaders wired Moscow in protest and heatedly criticized the authoritarianism of the Trans- caucasian Territory Party Committee (Zakkraikom), which had replaced the Kavburo. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Lenin undoubtedly would have seen that resolution as lacking the necessary guarantees for national autonomy, but mortally ill and with less than a year to live, he was never again able to intervene in the politics of the state he had founded. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Support for the regime was to be established through “nationalization” of the local governing institutions, or what had been referred to as korenizatsiia (“rooting” or “nativization” of the Soviet superstructure in the non-Russian areas), but overt nationalism was not to be tolerated within the party or state apparatus. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Then the Georgian Social Democratic Party was officially disbanded within Georgia.38 The Making of the Georgian Nation
On April 6, 1921, the Revkom nationalized all land in Georgia and prohibited all sale, government, nobility, church, and monasteries were confiscated and placed in the state land fund to be administered by local soviets. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Like his superiors in Moscow, Orjonikidze was anxious to broaden the base of the Soviet government in the countryside, but at the same time he was careful to tread a fine line between opening the rural economy to market forces, which in the view of most Communists would have benefited the kulaks, and maintaining some restraints on the richer peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
two groups, and feared that the inability of the government to employ the intellectuals would lead to their further alienation from the state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgians dominated state as well as party institutions, and with Tiflis the capital of both Georgia and the Transcaucasian federation, men like Or- jonikidze, Orakhelashvili, Eliava, and Makharadze played leading roles in the governance of the whole territory. The Making of the Georgian Nation
238 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA Economic historian Alec Nove goes so far as to claim, “The ‘revolution fron above’ which transformed the entire political, social and economic scene in sense ... was more revolutionary than the Bolshevik revolution itself.”~ The Making of the Georgian Nation
Moshe Lewin contends that “the period 1929—1933 is probably one of the most momentous quinquennia in the history of Russia, indeed in moderr history.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
The poor harvest of 1928 led to “an unprecedented degree of intervention by the party and state authorities in the affairs of the coun- tryside.”5 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The peasants were left to run their own economy within the broad limits set by state policy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Large families divided, sometimes only on paper, in order to receive the land allotment granted to individual households or to escape the agricultural tax from which poor peasants were exempt. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Industrial crops, like wool, were already being exchanged for grain rather than sold to the state, and there was a real possibility that the sown area of industrial crops would be reduced in favor of grain. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This severe warning came precisely as the Stalin faction was engaged in its struggle with the Bukharin group. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As Carr and Davies have written about this period: The last months of 1928 brought a slow but inexorable widening of the rift between the two groups in the party leadership, between those who believed in the conciliation of the individual peasant as the way to guarantee grain Some local party organizations called for forced requisitions from richer Stalin’s Revolution 241 242 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA supplies, and those who had become convinced that grain at the prices which the state and industry could afford to pay, could in the long run be got only by fighting the kulak and collectivizing production.16 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Perceived dangers from abroad and the isolation of the USSR internationally made solution of the grain crisis imperative. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The radicalization of the state’s policies toward the peasantry and na- tional minorities came from the top down, from Moscow rather than from local Transcaucasian Communists. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A virtual war between the state and the peasantry raged in Muslim areas of Georgia and Armenia and throughout Azerbaijan. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A law was to be drawn up on abuses of the electoral rights of citizens. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Kakheti and Khobi (Zugdidi) were exempted from full collectivization.42 The Making of the Georgian Nation
It can and must move only toward the organization of large enterprises of a socialist type, armed with new technology. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On October 31 the Central Committee in Moscow sent down a highly critical resolution on economic work in Transcaucasia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Along with a general policy move toward moderation throughout the USSR, the pace of collectivization in Transcaucasia slowed down in 1932, except in certain subtropical regions where especially valuable crops were given high priority by state authorities. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The relative freedom that they had enjoyed in the 1920s disappeared, and they fell into a new and degrading “state serfdom,” losing even the right to leave the land without special permission. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The political bureaus (politotdely) set up in the MTSs in January 1933 were assigned the task of ensuring that peasants fulfilled their obliga- tions to the state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
76.5% The Making of the Georgian Nation
The “war on the peasantry” was the most momentous and most long- lasting of the campaigns of the First Five-Year Plan, but the related processes of industrialization, urbanization, and political mobilization also changed Georgian life. The Making of the Georgian Nation
That same year, on May 28, 1931, the Commissariat of Public Instruc- tion in Georgia dismissed ten professors from institutions of higher learning, among them Ivane Javakhishvili, the dean of Georgian historians and a founder of Tbilisi State University; Grigori Tsereteli, Mikhail Polievktov, Giorgi Gamkrelidze, and Viktor Tevzaia.69 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Korenizatsiia continued to be official state policy through the Stalin years, but official support for its implementation dissipated rapidly in 1933— 1934, a casualty of new concern for political unity and economic efficiency. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Over the next decade, as the Soviet state attempted to reduce the autonomy of regional authorities, the centralizing tendencies also led to the promotion of Russians and Russian language. The Making of the Georgian Nation
nationalism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A certain portion of the crop had to be paid in kind (naturplata) to the MTS for its “services.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Stalin and Molotov sent a secret “instruction” to party, soviet, and police organizations in May, ordering the end of mass repression in the countryside and a more selective practice of making arrests. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By 1934 the Stalinist economic structure had been set in place, and its general outlines lasted beyond its originator’s death. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Prices were largely set by the authorities; workers were permit- ted a degree of movement; and rationing was ended. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Great Purges of 1936—1938, which he directed in Transcaucasia, represented the sanguinary victory of this police state over the remnants of the old party and their replacement by a docile administration loyal to “socialism” as defined by the general secretary. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1926 he became head of the Georgian GPU (state police). The Making of the Georgian Nation
The most long-lived of such models, that of totalitarianism, was designed to link Stalinism with its contemporaries, nazism and fascism, which in their political aspects—one-man rule, applied state terror, economic development through state intervention and direction, ideological conformity, and elevation of the party—seemed quite similar. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In May 1935 the Central Committee ordered a proverka (checking) of party documents to deal with the chaotic state of record-keeping. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In a private letter Boris Pasternak, a close friend and translator of Tabidze, urged the poet to disregard the attacks on for- malism: “Rely only on yourself. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The police had manufactured, out of forced confessions and circumstantial evidence, a vast conspiracy against the state, allegedly organized by a “Trotskyist-Zinovievist Terrorist Center.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
In January 1937 a major show trial of old oppositionists—Piatakov, Sokolnikov, Se- rebriakov, and Radek—opened the way to a full-scale assault on the eco- nomic apparatus. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On ~September 15 Malenkov arrived in Erevan with Mikoyan and Beria. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In March Bukharin and Rykov were put on trial and executed.54 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Besides those already mentioned, among the prominent party members killed were Mikha Ka- khiani, Levan Gogoberidze, lason Mamulia, Soso Buachidze, Petr and Levan Agniashvili, and Ivan Bolkvadze. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The ruling apparatus had no challengers in society, and it possessed a new status and prestige, though it had little independence or autonomy and only moderate security of tenure. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgian national culture was institutionalized in state-sponsored folk dance companies, operas, Georgian-language films, and officially sanctioned literature. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Early in the 1930s the dean of Georgian novelists, Konstantine Gam- sakhurdia, had been severely criticized. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The latter film won a Stalin Prize for its director, M. Chiaureli. The Making of the Georgian Nation
During the war he was a member of the de facto government of the USSR, the State Defense Committee, which was headed by Stalin and included Molotov, Malenkov, and Voroshilov and, later, Voznesenskii, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Bulganin. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“From then on Beria and Malenkov appeared to be inseparable friends”—”those two rogues,” in Stalin’s ominous phrase.76 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Armenians living in Georgia “were subjected to restrictions, deprived of their rights as Soviet citizens, and in many cases deported,” writes Roy Medvedev~ Stalin’s personal anti-Semitism was written into state policy, and a vicious campaign against “cosmopolitanism” led to the arrests of prominent Jews, including Molotov’s wife, Polina Zemchuzhina. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgia became a protected area of privilege for Georgians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Another conception of Soviet colonialism, proposed by Alvin W. Gouldner, avoids the ethnic dimension and suggests that “what had been brought into being was an urban-centered power elite that had set out to dominate a largely rural society to which they related as an alien colonial power; it was an internal colonialism mobilizing its state power against colonial tributaries in rural territories.”93 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The picture that emerges from Georgia is complex and at times indistinct, but available evidence indicates that mod- ernizing forces from beyond the Caucasus and nationalizing forces within Nationality Policy since Stalin 293 294 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA Georgia itself have been engaged in an intense struggle ever since the heavy hand of Stalinist police rule loosened its grip. The Making of the Georgian Nation
And chairmen of republican supreme soviets, councils of ministers, supreme courts, and planning committees became ex officio mem- bers of the corresponding all-union organs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But this Soviet version of “benign neglect” soon proved inadequate, for within a few years it became apparent that two developments were occurring that were undesirable from the Kremlin’s position: first, local national elites with a base of support in their republics were acquiring independent attitudes and practices with nationalist implications; and second, a new nationalism with oppositional overtones was being articulated more and more openly. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This ambivalence toward Russia remained part of Georgian national consciousness for the next century and a half. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Initiated in the early Soviet period and accelerated during the Stalin revolu- tion, these two trends continued to influence the life of Soviet ethnic minor- ities long after Stalin’s death. The Making of the Georgian Nation
That part of the old intelligentsia that remained in Georgia after 1921 was comple- mented by a new Soviet-educated intelligentsia, and state-supported arts and publishing nourished an expanding creativity, though strictly within the framework of Soviet socialist norms. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Ethnicity was actively fostered by the state even to the extent of forcing ethnic motives on modern architects, painters, and sculptors. The Making of the Georgian Nation
While the state-initiated economic de- velopment was creating a new industrial, urban society with greater mobility and material wealth, and greater opportunities for education and integration into Russian and European life, renationalization was creating a new national culture, preserving and revitalizing local traditions, and in a variety of ways preventing the assimilation of the Georgians into an amorphous interethnic conglomerate. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Georgia the long tenure of Mzhavanadze aided the establishment of entrenched local authorities who developed their own eth- In the immediate post-Stalin years, central political interference in the Nationality Policy since Stalin 301 302 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA were transferred from all-union ministries to the republic’s control; by 1958, 98 percent of industrial output in Georgia was produced by enterprises under the republic’s management.24 The Making of the Georgian Nation
For a brief time it looked as if the purge of the Mzhavanadze machine might end with these lower-level maneuvers, but Moscow soon promoted the fortunes of Shev— ardnadze, and on September 29, 1972, he replaced Mzhavanadze as first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party~ The major reason for this change in leadership was the widespread corruption in the administration of the republic, which in turn had caused consistently poor economic performances by Georgian industry and agri- culture and the tolerance of nationalist tendencies within the party and intelligentsia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Total income for the family of an average worker or office employee had declined by twenty rubles from 1971 to 1972.36 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Much produce never reached the state or collective farm markets but was sold illegally. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Shevardnadze’s plaintive remarks about the psychological effects of the corruption were very revealing. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The government made an ill-advised attempt to remove from the draft of the new Georgian constitution a clause that affirmed Georgian as the sole official state language of the republic and attempted to replace it with a clause that gave equal status to Russian and other languages. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This was a highly unusual concession to an open expression of opposition to state policy, a clear indication of the uneasiness and caution of government policy toward the new nationalism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When in March 1981 Tbilisi State University students and faculty demonstrated in protest against the dismissal of a popular literature professor, Shevardnadze spoke to the demonstrators and had the professor reinstated.48 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Their former superior in the KGB, Andropov, had opposed the corrupt practices that permeated the party-state elite, up to the family of Brezhnev himself. The Making of the Georgian Nation
His methods contrasted with those of his predecessor, Mzhavanadze; he would not permit the un- limited “exploitation” of the state economy for private gain nor would he allow the unfettered growth of Georgian nationalism at the expense of the Russian language or of other ethnic groups in the republic. The Making of the Georgian Nation
counternationalisms among the ethnic minorities within the republic. The Making of the Georgian Nation
That nationalism was expressed in culture, in cadre favoritism, and in the economic “exploitation” of the Soviet system. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This requires the demonstration of “manliness” and use of goods in display and consumption. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In this kind of “honour and shame” society where peer approval is so important hierarchical official relations are resented and resisted and are the source of perpetual conffict. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In such a context there is little role for the state or for any centrally-organized hierarchy.61 The Making of the Georgian Nation
It remained a society dominated by men; the traditional role for women was one of subordination, sexual modesty, and domesticity. The Making of the Georgian Nation
< The Georgian Road to 14 Independence The coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and his invitation to Shevardnadze to come to Moscow as Soviet foreign minister initiated a series of political and social changes in the USSR that led half a dozen years later to the splintering of the Soviet Union. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When the director of the Georgian State Archive of Literature and Art, Vakhtang Gurgenidze, decided to give a lecture contending that the Old Bolshevik Pilipe Makharadze was involved in the assassination of the beloved Geor- gian poet Ilia Chavchavadze (in 1907), the party leaders dismissed him. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A few months later, in September, the Abkhaz regional party committee criticized the Georgian party leader- ship and again protested the state of Georgian-Abkhaz relations. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the same time as the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict intensified through 1989, with armed clashes in Sukhumi over the establishment there of a branch of Tbilisi State University, tensions also increased between Geor- gians and Ossetians.16 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian national movement was immediately transformed by April 9 into a radical movement against the Communist regime responsible for the Tbilisi massacre. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When it appeared that most of the opposition would boycott the March Supreme Soviet elections, the Popular Front convinced the regime to postpone the elections until the fall. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The more moderate groups—includ- ing the Popular Front, the Rustaveli Society, and the Social Democratic Party—sought to lay the foundations for a multiparty system and agreed to participate in the parliamentary elections scheduled for March 1990. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In July, the Abkhaz leader, Vladislav Ardzinba, declared Abkhazeti an independent state, and within a month a five-sided struggle began. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In early October, when the Abkhaz broke a ceasefire agree- ment mediated by the Russians and seized Gagra on the Russian frontier, Georgia threatened a full-scale attack to retake the city. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Former party chief Jumbar Patiashvili was elected from Mtskheta, the ancient Georgian capital, and other local bosses from Kutaisi, Kobi, and Telavi found seats in the new parliament. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A secular national awareness was con- structed recently by Georgians, first by the patriotic intelligentsia, and later, through the mediation of Marxists, was passed on to workers and peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Dasturlamali (Georgian)—the law code of Vakhtang VI (eighteenth century). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Atabeg (Georgian)—official; first an administrator, later, with the decline of the Se! juk dynasty, an independent lord; ruler of a saatabago. The Making of the Georgian Nation
acres. The Making of the Georgian Nation
forfeit one-twentieth of a divided estate to the state was rescinded, thus removing the penalty for individualizing collectively owned lands (A. The Making of the Georgian Nation
While all too typical of the Caucasian administration, the high-handed manner of bureaucrats like Baron Hahn found its nemesis in officials like Count Kiselev, the minister of state properties, who believed that the disorders in the Caucasus “derived from the premature introduction of our laws there,” and that this opinion was based “on that well-known truth that the civil laws of each country ought Notes for pages 69 to 72 357 358 Notes for pages 72 to 79 to flow out of the elements of that people’s life and correspond to all their civil needs and relationships” (Akty, vol. The Making of the Georgian Nation
26. The Making of the Georgian Nation
For the most complete STATE PEASANTS 68.6% The Making of the Georgian Nation
percent; state peasants, 65.5 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Tiflis province 14 percent of the serfowners (214 nobles) owned serfs without land; these serfs lived on state lands or lands of other landlords. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Kutaisi province (Kutaisi, Shorapani, Ozurgeti, and Racha uezdy), there were 4,785 landlord families at the time of emancipation with 48,785 peasant households and 96,732 male serfs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
1, pp. 195—96. The Making of the Georgian Nation
His memoirs are a valuable source on the emancipation of the serfs in Transcaucasia from the point of view of a high official in the state bureaucracy (“Vospominaniia iz moei zhizni: Krest’ianskaia reforma v Zakavkazskom krae,” Russkii arkhiv 2, no. 5 [1892]: 91—12S, no. 6, 222—46, no. 8, 445—78). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Chkhetiia, Dokumenty, p. 232; Gugushvili, Sel’skoe khoziaistvo, pp. 279—80; Esadze, Istoricheskaia zapiska, vol. The Making of the Georgian Nation
1, p. 344. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“Social relationships in Georgia,” Zhordania argued, “have given rise to three democratic classes—the workers, the peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie—which constitute the social basis for the building of the Georgian state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In such circumstances the state can only be democratic or it cannot exist at all” (p. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“L’Etat en lutte contre lui-meme: Tensions sociales et conflicts politiques en U.S.S.R. 1936—1938,” Libre (Paris) 4 (1978): 3—38 [English translation: “The State Against Itself: Socialist Tensions and Political Conflict in the U.S.S.R. 1936—1938,” Telos 41 (Fall 1979): 87—104]; “Société et appareil d’etat soviétiques (1936—i938): Contra- dictions et interferences,” Annales E.S.C. 4 (1979): 843—67; “Staline en 1938: Apogee du verbe et défaite politique, Elements pour une étude du ‘stalinisme reel,’” Libre 6 (1979): 99—164 [English translation: “Stalin in 1938: Political Defeat Behind the Rhetorical Apotheosis,” Telos 46 (Winter 1980-81): 6—42]; “Du Goulag de la littérature a l’histoire de Ia politique pénale en Union soviétique, 1933—1953,” Critique politique 7/8 (198i): 3—68; “The i93Os in the Longue Durée of Soviet History,” Telos 53 (Fall 1982): iO7—i6. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Rittersporn argues that this trial signaled to the new people in the state and party apparatus that they would be relatively safe, for the accused were guilty of crimes linked to their oppositional past or, in the case of lagoda, to police excesses (“Staline en 1938,” p. 147). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Ibid., no. 31, February 8, 1938. The Making of the Georgian Nation
73. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The historian of this period, David Marshall Lang, writes: “By the year 1800, the process of disintegration of the Georgian state had reached a critical stage. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Strikers demanded that the investigation of the July events be turned over to Moscow and that no branch of Thilisi State University be opened in Sukhumi. The Making of the Georgian Nation
v Gruzii: Sbornik dokumen- toy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Tiflis, 1919. The Making of the Georgian Nation
w flat is not statea explicitly, Dut wnat Fighting Terrorism ~ 1 1 ~,3 1 Muslim audiences understand well in its historical con- text, is that Saladin’s peace treaty with the Crusaders was merely a tactical ruse that was followed by Muslim at- tacks which wiped out the Christian presence in the Holy Land.4 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
i~ A village in the Daghestan ASSR 14 King Erekie II of Georgia (I7~—.c)8) A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The middle basin of the Chorokhi, the Klarjeti-Tortum-Ispir area, and Lazistan along the Black Sea coast, are all inhabited by peoples of Georgian stock, and have now been for some four centuries under Turkish rule. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It would seem more logical to regard the emergence of a feudal monarchy in Georgia as the natural outcome of the patriarchal rule of the ancient Georgian mamasakblisni, or ‘fathers of the house’, as the tribal chiefs of old were called. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
While the Persians were establishing their rule over Eastern Georgia, the Turks dominated Imereti and the minor principal- ities of Western Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The destruction of his capital city was a death blow to Erelde’s dream of establishing, with Russian protection, a strong and united Georgian kingdom, into which Imereti and the lost provinces under Turkish rule would all eventually be drawn. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
But neither the Russian romantic cult of the Caucasus, nor the hospitable welcome extended by Tbilisi society to Russian officers and poets, could efface the deep-seated antagonism which the experience of a generation of Russian rule had implanted in the Georgian nation. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A striking portrayal of the results of a generation of Russian rule over Georgia is contained in the report submitted by two Russian senators, Counts Kutaysov and Mechnikov, who carried out an official inspection of Georgia in 1829—30. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Within Russia, the spirit of Georgian nationalism was kept alive principally by Okropir Bagration, a younger son of King Giorgi XII and the heroic Queen Mariam, and also by his cousin, Prince Dimitri, son of Yulon. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Shamil began his rule by strangling the boy prince of Avaria and throwing his body over a cliff. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
His appointment was well calculated to restore the faith of the Russian public in the prospects of bringing the Circassians and Shamil’s highianders to heel, as well as to instil much-needed confidence into the Georgians and other Caucasian peoples who had suffered under the rule of Voront- soy’s mediocre forerunners. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Like Moliere’s Monsieur Jourdain, his aim was now to become accepted in high society and have his daughter marry a prince. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
After the Crimean War was over, the Russians looked for a chance of extending their direct rule to Abkhazia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The last shots in the long series of Russo-Circassian conflicts were fired in 1864. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Serfdom as practised in Georgia is depicted by Chonkadze, not without a measure of exaggeration, as the rule of darkness and superstition, brutal violence and unchecked wickedness. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘What has come over us, what has happened to us?’ asked the veteran poet and administrator Prince Grigol Orbeliani on the morrow of the war of 1877—78. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgians had accepted Christianity more than six centuries before the Russians, had been a bulwark of Christendom in the East for a millennium and a half, and had entered voluntarily under the Russian sceptre—only to be treated now as if they were barbarians. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The growth of capitalism, the spread of education, and the emergence of a vocal intelligentsia focused attention on the inadequacies of Tsarist rule, and heightened popular dislike for alien domina- tion. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Accession of Nicholas II On succeeding to the Russian throne in November 1894, Nicholas II took over no comfortable heritage. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In Georgia, of course, there had been many sporadic rebellions against Russian rule, as well as peasant insurrections against the landed proprietors. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Prince Grigory Golitsyn, who was appointed governor-general in December i 896, was an individual of very different stamp: nicknamed ‘Gri-Gri’ in St. Petersburg society, he was a man of the narrowest upbringing and outlook, owing his appoint- ment to the personal patronage of a member of the imperial family. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, he parted company with his Russian associates over the issue of Georgian inde- pendence. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They were addressed by Lado Ketskhoveli and other orators, who stressed the significance of May Day as a symbol of the international solidarity of the toiling masses. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The ferment spread throughout the province and into neigh- bouring regions as well. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In December 1904, Nicholas finally issued a decree, but did not go beyond vague and general promises, no mention being made of a representative assembly. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It is in fact ironic to observe how the Georgian Social- Democrats, whose leaders were working as late as i 918 for the triumph of democratic socialism in a Russia united and undivided, were at length transformed by the force of circum- stances into nationalists of chauvinistic fervour and of an intransigence common in countries where independence has recently been regained after a long spell of alien rule. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Child labour was proscribed, as well as night work for women and adolescents. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian People’s Guard displayed a A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA zz8 frenzy of chauvinistic zeal during the mopping-up operations, many villages being burnt to the ground and large areas of fertile land ravaged and depopulated. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The death of Lenin, the onset of the Stalin era, and the defeat of the 1924 insurrection mark the final establishment of Soviet rule over Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Opposi- tion to the new measures was by no means confined to the rich peasants or kulaks, but was met with among the majority of the middling or poorer ones also. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Partisans in mountain Svaneti declared Soviet rule at an end and set up their own administration. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Georgia during W’orld W’ar II After killing Marshal Tukhachevsky and decimating the Red Army high command during the purges, Stalin proceeded in 1939 to make war inevitable by concluding the Molotov- Ribbentrop pact with Nazi Germany. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This isolated incident led foreign observers to draw much exaggerated conclusions as to the present strength of Georgian nationalist sentiment. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The prosperity of the working people has grown tremendously in Georgia under Soviet rule. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
There are naturally some Georgians who would like to cast loose the leading strings of Moscow, while retaining the concrete benefits which have accrued in recent years. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
One finds oneself interrogating again and again, from this angle and that, the same range of sources, and all manner of basics on, for instance, land tenure remain informed guess-work. A History of Modern Yemen
That is not true for me but it may be for some of them and for those who rule them. A History of Modern Yemen
An immediate attempt on Sanaa came to nothing (the Ottoman force, although invited in, was largely massacred) and through the decades fol- lowing, ‘Asir, further north, was repeatedly up in arms against Turkish rule. A History of Modern Yemen
For tribesmen swept up in Ya~iya’s following it was war to the knife. A History of Modern Yemen
is a timeless obli- gation on Zaydis. A History of Modern Yemen
Turkey and Britain, between 1902 and 1904, drew a line dividing their separate areas. A History of Modern Yemen
The crux of Zaydism was that legitimate rule descends through the Prophet’s line, the line of his daughter Fatimah and son-in-law ‘Au bin AbI Talib. A History of Modern Yemen
The Ottomans, while their presence lasted, never formally ceded their own right to rule the Islamic World, of which Arabia, including Yemen, formed a vital part as the “cradle of Islam”. A History of Modern Yemen
1137). A History of Modern Yemen
The rather primitive nineteenth-century “ground return” system of wires and buzzers was to be an important part of rule in the North until the ig6os, but outside the major towns Turkish hopes for reform made little progress. A History of Modern Yemen
Later Shafi’i writers, such as Muhammad Ahmad Nu’man, depict the period as a Zaydl conquest of Shafi’T territory It was not so simple. A History of Modern Yemen
Yahya’s campaign against the I~lubayshIs at Makhadir, north of Ibb, for instance, was supported by shaykhs of Ibb and al-’Udayn. A History of Modern Yemen
When a number of Lower Yemeni leaders conspired in the 192OS (perhaps specifically against Zaydi rule; the sources obscure the issue) Yal~iya had large numbers of shaykhs sent in chains to Sanaa where few survived.2 A History of Modern Yemen
The Idrisis had only usurped an area which they cut off from Yemen’s lands when under Turkish rule. A History of Modern Yemen
They did not appear to understand the word ‘rule’. A History of Modern Yemen
In 1936 H. St. John Philby, an English acolyte of Ibn SacUd, cut the corner by motoring across the desert from Najran to Shabwah and then Mukalla, collecting as he went protestations of enthusiasm for Wahhabi rule. A History of Modern Yemen
But Abmad’s rule was not imminent and certain of his brothers seemed likely to be claimants in due course, not least al-Husayn who A history of modern Yemen reputedly was the most learned of Yahya’s sons and was certainly among the nicest.38 A History of Modern Yemen
There was hardly a house in the village that did not have a migrant or two outside the country. A History of Modern Yemen
Ahmad, they felt, was a “med- iaeval” figure whom no-one could take seriously; and no Shäfidi, they told themselves, wished Zaydi rule. A History of Modern Yemen
The growing Northern diaspora of workers and small traders over- lapped with a spread of students. A History of Modern Yemen
The widespread, if somewhat abstract, pop- ularity of the President seemed to others hukmfard~ “individualised (self- centred) rule” of a kind the Imams had practised.28 A History of Modern Yemen
As with Hamdl in the North the year before, what to some was unstruc- tured popularity seemed to others hu/cm fardi, individualised and arbi- trary rule. A History of Modern Yemen
The Saudis, said Salmayn’s enemies, had intended tc dominate the South through “family rule by the tribe of Fadll”. A History of Modern Yemen
Na~ir claimed by contrast to support demo- cratic centralism and thus collective rule. A History of Modern Yemen
We can’t accept going back to tribal rule.” A History of Modern Yemen
The mode of rule is in most respects as personal as forty or even sixty years before. A History of Modern Yemen
6 For Ya~ya’s father, al-Mansur Muhammad, see Zabarah 1956, i and Kruse 1984 which discusses Zaydi arguments against the Turks. A History of Modern Yemen
(Allfree 1967: 147). A History of Modern Yemen
His books ~ 1955) provide a detailed account. A History of Modern Yemen
Gavin, R. J. 1975 Aden Under British Rule, London: C. Hurst. A History of Modern Yemen
1985 Yemen Under the Rule of Imam A,mad, Chapel Hill: Documentary Publications. A History of Modern Yemen
227 fl.II, A History of Modern Yemen
Popular Resistance Forces, I 14—17 population, 3, 76, 139, 158—9, 175, i86, 204 prayer, ‘5, 17, 23, 43, 47, 49, 67, 126, 174 press, see newspapers progress, rhetorics of, 36, 50, 53, 65—6, 79, 87, 104, 123, 126, 140, 171, 173 proletariat, 71, 120, 172 Prophet, Muhammad the, 3, ~, 6, 44, 198 descendants of, see sa~yids Traditions of, 1,44, 172, 173 al-Qadi family (Sanhan), 149, 201, 202 al-Qadi, ‘All Husayn (president of ATUC), hO qadzs, 27, 47, 51, 54, 68, 102, 103, 123, 125, 140 Qahtan and Qahtanl identity, i8, 68, 84, 8g al-Qarda’l, ‘All Na~ir (poet and shaykh), 41—3, ~6, 125, i6i al-Qarda’l, Husayn Husayn, 126 Qarmatians, 142 Qasim Ghalib Ahmad (writer, historian), 102, 104, 173—4 Qasim! A History of Modern Yemen
He was scorned by his older half-brothers and -sist- ers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was then that the intractable Palestinian refugee problem was born. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
YOUTHFUL AGITATOR Abu Nidal’s early teens in the West Bank city of Nablus were difficult. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They endured still worse suffering when Palestinian guerrillas moved into Lebanon and brought down ferocious Israeli reprisals on their own heads—and on those of the unfortunate Shi’ites living alongside of them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
overlap, some common ground between Abu Nidal and the Mos- sad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal has struck targets in nearly all parts of the world—Bangkok, Australia, Peru. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
groomed by Israel to rule in Lebanon, is assassinated, almost certainly with the complicity of Syrian agents. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Israeli writer Amos Oz says that Israelis and Palestinians have gone mad and, for their own protection, need to be separated until they can recover their sanity. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Israeli army always displayed a savage face in an attempt to rule the Palestinians by intimidation, by the implication that they were ready to kill and torture men and to rape women. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Using Jordan as a base, the guerrillas began attacking Israel within months of the 1967 war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Many sources describe the Zionist campaign against the British, such as Michael J. Cohen, ed., Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Jewish Resistance to British Rule in Palestine 1944—47. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Nomadic tribes entered the Tihama, pillaging and dis- rupting its trade routes, from at least the year AD 500,2 and they remained an important, albeit unstable, part of the population until Imam Ahmad was finally able to crush the nomadic tribes called the Zaraniq in the 1950s.~ Comtemporary Yemen
I was informed by the foremost sayyid of the Sa’da region that in 1960, shortly before the end of the Zaidi Imams’ rule of Yemen, the hijras of the Zaidi sayyids numbered 47, most of them located in the Northern Highlands. Comtemporary Yemen
It was only later when the tribes were pressed by the greater threat of the Ottoman Turks that the qaba’il in great numbers began to abide by Zaidi law and rule and to acknowledge more sincerely their Islam. Comtemporary Yemen
The two Yemeni leaders were in agreement on the need for immediate amnesty. Comtemporary Yemen
It was not a formal political organisation since it lacked both office- holders and a formal membership, and can perhaps best be described as a group of like-minded intellectuals who shared certain views and attitudes concerning the desirability of introducing material reforms (roads, schools, hospitals and a ‘modern’ adminis- tration in Yemen). Comtemporary Yemen
However, Imam Yahya was not so enthusiastic and imprisoned all those associated with the Movement in December 1941, again fearing that it challenged the nature of his rule. Comtemporary Yemen
In February of that year al-Shami and al-Mawshki returned to Yemen leaving Nu’man and al-Zubairi to carry the banner of the FYM in Aden. Comtemporary Yemen
Al-Band al-Adabi (1945—?) When al-Shami left the FYP in early 1945 and returned to Yemen he established al-Band al-Adabi (the Literary Post). Comtemporary Yemen
(Peace) published by Abdullah al-Hakimi, the head of the Yemeni community in Britain from December 1949 until May 1952. Comtemporary Yemen
It is a long analysis of colonialist rule and a programme for NLF rule. Comtemporary Yemen
The Charter emphasises the need to get rid not only of British occu- pation and British military bases, but also of the rule of the ‘agent reactionary sultans’. Comtemporary Yemen
III, no. 4(1967), pp. 355—75. Comtemporary Yemen
Armed struggle began on the eve of 14 October 1963. Comtemporary Yemen
R. J. Gavin, Aden under British Rule 1839-1937 (Hurst, London, 1975), p. 350. Comtemporary Yemen
In such a system, tradi- tional values were to be maintained and promoted. Comtemporary Yemen
The rulers were called imams, hence the term imamate. Comtemporary Yemen
Certainly, Yahya and Ahmad did establish some new governmental institutions and adopt respon- sibility for a limited number of new functions. Comtemporary Yemen
It is a process that would even- tually benefit all concerned parties but also requires considerable patience. Comtemporary Yemen
As for the second concept, the opening quotation implies a great deal: (1) It was written by one of the pillars of colonialism who played the major role in establishing British rule in the Hadramawt. Comtemporary Yemen
It considers all children as future citizens having a role to play, and as partic- ipants in the implementation of national, social policies. Comtemporary Yemen
Tasks Bestowed by the Constitution During colonial rule two constitutions were passed some five years before independence and less than a year before the armed libera- tion movement was declared on 14 October 1963. Comtemporary Yemen
One actually won- ders how Britain denied these rights for 129 years of colonial rule; one also questions the haste of the belated action. Comtemporary Yemen
We must remember that, during colonial rule, education up to secondary level was limited to Aden and Hadramawt only, while some of the other governorates did not have even primary education, e.g. al-Mahra governorate. Comtemporary Yemen
Table 8.2: Comtemporary Yemen
In conformity with the party’s directives, the constitutional objectives and the government programmes accepted by the People’s Council, the Ministry has made its plans to universalise the Unity school level (grades 1—8) and expand the secondary level to the extent which will meet the different categories of manpower requirements. Comtemporary Yemen
In conclusion, we have to proclaim loudly that what has been achieved in education since November 1967 is unprecedented, com- pared with the achievements of 129 years of British colonial rule. Comtemporary Yemen
As often occurs in sUch situations, certain tribes or tribal confeder- ations are more inclined to associate themselves and co-operate with the foreign power Thus British rule in turn tended to favour certain tribal groupings and leaders more than others. Comtemporary Yemen
under British rule) see South Yemen since Independence 145 146 South Yemen since Independence Wenner, ‘The People’s Republic of South Yemen’. Comtemporary Yemen
Some of these efforts have failed and some have succeeded. Comtemporary Yemen
The new Criminal Procedure Law consists of 581 sections and is made up of the following chapters: Chapter Ideals with the general principles. Comtemporary Yemen
These have to be in open court, with the public having the right to be there; this is as a general rule, the exceptions being on grounds of public morality, state security, etc., Comtemporary Yemen
(7) That the courts adjudicate and pronounce judgements in the name of the people. Comtemporary Yemen
The case of Egypt is paradigmatic: Nasserite reforms did effect wide-ranging land reforms and nationalisations, but this period of etatist rule (1956-70) only paved the way for the later reopening of Egypt to capitalist markets and investors in the 1970s. Comtemporary Yemen
Somalia did the same thing in 1977 — as had earlier been the case with Egypt, Somalia’s switch owed not a little to the financial inducements of Saudi Arabia. Comtemporary Yemen
Many YSP members have remarked that it is difficult for them, in policy matters, to accord PDU leaders and members the kind of respect that others receive for the roles they played in liberating Aden from colonial rule. Comtemporary Yemen
He himself was a founder member and through his newspaper a campaign was vehemently and relentlessly waged by the Free Yemenis against the Imam and his autocratic rule. Comtemporary Yemen
Negotiations on the ‘closer links’ between the Colony and the Federation accele- rated after the withdrawal of the PCC and by 1 July 1962 the author- ities were able to announce the continuation of their final talks in London. Comtemporary Yemen
242-4, 252. Comtemporary Yemen
Few Westerners are fa- miliar with even the highlights of the strained history of relations between Islam and the West, a history which is the cornerstone of Islamic education throughout the en- tire Arab world—how in the year 630 the Arab prophet Muhammad united the Arab peoples, forging them into a nation with a fighting religion whose destiny was to bring the word of Allah and the rule of Islam to all mankind. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What the two movements had in common was their abiding hatred of the weakness and treachery of the Arab monarchies (and of the Shah’s rule in Iran) and of the Western powers, which they believed to have dismem- bered the Islamic world, leaving it humiliated, impov- erished, divided, and culturally colonized. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
An even more powerful organization is the Association for a New World Out- look in Europe (AMGT), the European branch of the Turkish Welfare Party (RP). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The overly blunt Zaki was discounted as having fallen from grace with Arafat. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Anyone familiar with the warped fanaticism and increasing technical profi- ciency of Islamic militants cannot rule it out as a growing danger. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu 128 What Is to Be Done by now nearly everyone understands, “history” did not end with the collapse of Soviet Communism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Geographically, the erup- tion of the Palestinian popular uprising, or intifada, in December 1987 brought the center of struggle to the heart of the historic territory of Pales- tine for the first time since the Israeli occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It attacked the Eisenhower Doctrine, which the regime supported; and parliamentarians representing the Brotherhood voted against granting confidence to some cabinet appointments by the king, notably that of Wasfi al-Tal in 1963. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This turn of events naturally had an impact on the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip, which was under Egyptian rule. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In addition, Jews are said to be able, through the use of money, to establish “clandestine organizations, such as the Masons, the Rotary and Lion’s clubs, etc., HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Afatwa [formal religious opinion] issued by religious scholars in Jordan in 1992 made it Islamically unlawful to participate in the self-rule elections. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
intikhabat naziha” [Conditions and possibilities of conducting fair elections], a working paper for a conference entitled “Palestinian Self-Rule Elections,” published by the Center of Middle East Studies, Amman, 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Seeking to define the nature of Hamas’s relationship with the PA, Sheikh Yassin warned in October 1993 that the PA should not attempt to “lay its hands on the Islamic institutions and mosques, or Islamic book- stores ... We have declared our rejection of self-rule in civilized and non- violent ways. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Related to Hamas’s call for the “historic solution” was the failure of the movement’s leaders to offer a convincing answer to the question of what was to become of the millions of Jewish colonial settlers in Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is an exception to the general rule mentioned earlier that Hamas’s positions on an interim solu- tion are both new and old and are parallel to each other, appearing in new garb periodically but remaining unchanged in their essence. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It also is noteworthy that once the PA took control of the self-rule areas in mid-i 994, the intensity of Hamas criticism of the PLO declined significantly. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The publication of an article in Filastin al- Thawra, the organ of the PLO, demanding the release of Sheikh Yassin, article, “Innama al-’Aajez man la yastabbidd” [The feeble one is he who does not rule (autocrat- ically)], published in Al-Liwa (Jordan), 14 October 1992; the quotes attributed to Arafat cre- ated a storm and spoiled the atmosphere for the dialogue scheduled to be held in Khartoum. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, in August 1992 Israel prevented ‘Abdul ‘Aziz al-Rantisi and al-Zahhar The Political Reiations ofHamas with Palestinian Groups 117 118 HAMAS prompted Israeli fears that this could be the beginning of a real rap- prochement.58 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A few comments are in order here: Palestinian society remained free of sectarian tensions, although some observers interpreted Hamas’s very presence as having given rise to sectarian apprehensions and alleged that Hamas as a general rule had an anti-Christian attitude, making things uncomfortable for Christians and encouraging them to emigrate.84 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It highlighted the need for solidarity, support, and the provision of moral and material aid to “the jihad of the Palestinian peo- ple inside [the occupied land]” and warned against using the intifada in the service of peace agreements, as a bridge to self-rule, or for the convening of an international conference that would “liquidate the Muslim Palestin- ian cause.”5 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See for example, Ziad Abu ‘Amr, “Al-Islamiyoon al-filastiniyoon: Al-t’addiya WaI- 6. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For the full text, see Appendix, document no. 4, “An Important Statement Issued by 7. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It also impelled Hamas to challenge the PLO, albeit tacitly, on the issue of who was the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In many instances Hamas tied with Fateh, and in some cases it exceeded Fateh’s support. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas realized early on that holding elec- tions in the occupied Palestinian territories concerned it directly and was integral to the issue of political legitimacy—on which point Hamas was challenging the PLO’s long-standing and exclusive claim. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From Hamas’s perspective, the only elec- tions acceptable to the Palestinians are “those which are conducted under international supervision, [because that] guarantees the freedom of the Political Elections particular attention to general elections of a political nature and the pro- posals pertaining to them. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas realized that the idea of elec- tions had become inseparable from a settlement, which in essence did not differ much from the Camp David formula for self-rule. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas refused to participate in such elections, arguing that they could not break through the ceiling on self-rule and the task of the victors would be 26. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, Hamas would be willing to participate if the elections were for a legislature, not tied to self- rule, and the objective of such elections was to choose an elected body representing the Palestinian people, which then would implement its own agenda in the service of Palestinian national goals.3’ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas, special leaflet, “Hamas’s Positions on the Self-Rule Authority,” dated 7 July 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As set out early on in Hamas, special leaflet, “Our Position on Self-Rule and the Elec- tions Associated with it,” dated 9 September 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He main- tained that there are four different Palestinian political positions with respect to participation in the self-rule elections. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
to the symposium on “The Palestinian Self-Rule Elections,” organized by the Center for Mid- dle East Studies, Amman, 17—18 August 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Muhammad Nazzal, “Palestinian Forces and the Self-Rule Elections,” paper presented Ibid. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Self-Rule Elections of January 1996 The decision whether or not to participate in the self-rule elections of January 1996 may have been the most difficult one that Hamas has faced to date. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Khaled Mish’al (then a member and now head of Hamas’s Political Bureau), “The Con- ditions for and Probability of Fair Elections,” working paper presented at symposium, “The Palestinian Self-Rule Elections,” Amman, 17—18 August 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “An Important Statement from the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Concerning the Elections for Limited Self-Rule,” dated 19 November 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Khalil Shikaki, “Tawajahat al-nakhib al-filastieeni” [Attitudes of the Palestinian voter], presented at the symposium, “Palestinian Self-Rule Elections,” Amman, 17—18 August 1994; also see his summary of poll results over a limited time period in idem, “Mostaqbal al-tahowal nahw al- dimoqratiyya fi filastin” [Prospects for a turn to democracy in Palestine], Majallat al-dirasat al- Filastiniyya, no. 25 (Winter 1996): 7—38. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
54. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As a general rule, these considerations give an advan- tage to the candidates of Islamic blocs because of their religious faith and Islamic discipline. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Moreover, hard evidence or witnesses have not supported charges that Hamas adopted a policy of force to compel adherence to proper Islamic behavior.65 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The independence of Islamic institutions that either directly or indirectly were associated with Hamas was a major concern for the move- ment. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas stated this point explicitly in one press release that was issued to condemn the PA decision to close mosques except during prayer hours and to limit their activities: “Our steadfast mosques are the castles which always have been the fortresses of rebellions against all forms of occupation since the turn of the century. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nevertheless, the accelerating pace of events relating to the Palestine conflict and the succession of settlement proposals put the growing Hamas movement in an unnatural position. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
At the pan-Arab level, as a general rule, Hamas avoided joining politi- cal blocs or siding with one camp against the other. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It has a comprehensive understanding and precise conceptualization of the Islamic percepts in all domains of life: concept and belief, politics and economics, education and society, jurisprudence and rule, indoctrination and training, communications and the arts, the hidden and the evident, and the rest of life. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Those conferences are no more than a means of forcing the rule of unbelievers in the land of Muslims. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is forbidden for the hypocrites to rule over the believers, and they will die in wony and darkness. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They created the League of Nations through which they could rule the world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Followers of other religions should stop fighting Islam over ruling this area, because when they rule there only is murder, punishment, and banishment. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
B. Hamas strives to cooperate and coordinate its efforts with all the forces and groups, its guide being the golden rule: “We cooperate in what we agree about; and we excuse one another in what we dif- fer about.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Accordingly, the Movement has rejected the proposals of [George] Shultz and [James] Baker, [Hosni] Mubarak’s ten points, {Yitzhak] Shamir’s plan, and others. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Appendix I 299 300 I HAMAS Because of the danger posed by the currently proposed settlement, the Movement has adopted a position based on the following points: 1. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Demanding that the negotiating team and the effective leader- ship in the PLO withdraw from the negotiations; 4. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Despite Hamas’s rejection of the Israeli project for self-rule and its decision not to participate in the process—because it contradicts UN res- olutions and international law, falsifies history and the facts, and makes the future of Palestinians uncertain, it has not used any type of violence or political assassination against the Palestinian side that has participated in it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas espouses a political and operational program that it believes to be more effective in ending the occupation than the weak self-rule pro- ject. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Paper presented at symposium on Palestinian self-rule elections, Center for Middle East Studies, Amman, 17—18 August 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Proceedings of the Third Egyptian- French Conference. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Cairo: Author, 1991. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Masha’al, Khaled. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Al-Fajr (Jerusalem), various issues. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hezbollah associates the West with European imperialism and the struggle for independence from colonial rule. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When Khomeini had returned to Tehran he argued that an Islamic government not only meant the implementation of Islamic sharia, law, but also required the rule of the clerics. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Khomeini argued that the clerics should rule under the guardianship of a sole Shiite exemplar or jurisprudent, Wilayat al-Faqih. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While Hezbollah subscribes to this principle of rule by a supreme guardian, it elected to follow Ayatollah Khomeini as its faqih. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His followers became known as the Shiites or partisans of Ali. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Either he would demand that the mother and children come and live in his household or he would often move into his daughter-in-law’s home. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Their selection of an ethnic group or a specific territory as the focus of a history spanning many centuries—in the case of the Caucasian peoples, several millennia—is predi- cated on an assumption that nationality or geographical space is the most appropriate boundary for historical investigation. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The first section of the book, “The Rise and Fall of the Georgian Monarchies,” briefly surveys the ethnogenesis of the Georgians and traces their political and social development from a variety of linguistically and culturally affiliated tribes to a single, though still inchoate, ethnic formation divided by loyalty to various princes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the end of the third millennium, the Indo-European Hittites entered eastern Anatolia and established their rule over Asia Minor and Syria, a dominion that lasted over a thousand years. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Herodotus tells us: Gifts were also required from the Colchians and their neighbors as far as the Caucasian mountains (which is as far as the Persian rule reaches, the country north of the Caucasus paying no regard to the Persians); these were rendered every five years and are still so rendered, namely, one hundred boys and as many maidens.3° The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the time Xenophon marched through Asia Minor to the Black Sea (401—400 B.C.), the Colchians and other Georgian tribes had freed them- selves from Achaemenid rule. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The local princes, although recognized as autonomous rulers under the suzerainty of the caliph, were uneasy under Arab rule and frequently rose in revolt. The Making of the Georgian Nation
About the year 689, Justinian II, after a successful campaign against the Muslims, forced the caliphate to cede Cau- casia to Byzantium. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By 693 the Arabs had again taken Kartli-Iberia and Armenia with the help of their Khazar allies, and this time they established direct rule through their viceroy at Dvin. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Although Kartli-Iberia lived under the direct rule of the Arabs, the eastern regions of Georgia, Kakheti and Ereti, managed to maintain an autonomous existence under their local mtavarni. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But his lenient treatment of Tbilisi Muslims did not end David’s struggles with the Seljuks. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Whether through princes or puppet kings, the Mongols organized their administra- tion with one principal aim in mind: to secure a steady flow of taxes and tributes from the subject peoples. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Georgian feudalism meta- morphosed into a new system known as tavadoba, the rule of the princes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The secular political, military, and economic functions of the Georgian church remained intact when feudalism was replaced by the rule of the princes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Kartli, Kakheti, and the eastern part of Samtskhe saatabago were declared to be Iranian, while Imereti, its “vassal” states, and western Samtskhe were to be Turkish.21 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgians called on Taimuraz to rule in Kartli-Kakheti, and faced by rebellion, Shah Abbas gave in to the urging of Muscovy and recognized the rebel king.31 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The osmanloba was replaced by the kizilbashoba (rule by the kizilbash, or “redheads,” as the Safavids were known). The Making of the Georgian Nation
After some hesitation, Paul’s son, Tsar Alexander I (1801—1825), de- cided that Russia’s interests and Georgia’s future could best be guaranteed by outright incorporation into the empire, and in 1801 the young emperor declared that the kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti had been abolished. The Making of the Georgian Nation
After the incorporation of Kartli-Kakheti in 1801, the Russians moved westward, first taking Samegrelo (Mingrelia) under their formal protection in December 1803, and then forcing King Solomon II of Imereti to accept Russian sovereignty in 1804. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Two years later Mamia Gurieli followed suit, and Guria became part of the Russian empire. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Most often the entire noble clan owned the property in common (sakhaso or sasakhlo tenure), under the rule of the tavadi himself.3 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Commonly owned land was the general rule among the upper classes, and traditional restrictions to dividing estates were codified in the dasturlamali, the law code of Vakhtang VI. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Almost immediately with his decree to abolish the Georgian monarchy, Tsar Paul ordered that “Georgia” (Kartli-Kakheti) be Russian Rule and Georgian Society 65 66 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE organized as the Gruzinskaia guberniia (Georgian province) and divided into two provintsiia: Kartli and Kakheti. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the early 1830s a Georgian Russian Rule and Georgian Society 67 68 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE nobleman faced an alien bureaucracy that at one and the same time de- manded that he prove he was of noble status and that he owned his serfs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the eighteenth century Georgian serfdom had permitted peasants to “volunteer” for bondage, but this practice was ended by the Russians in 1821. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The process of transforming Georgian tavadni and aznaurni into Rus- 69Russian Rule and Georgian Society 70 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE sian dvoriane was not merely a matter of more clearly defining their tax status and their rights over peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the third decade of Russian military rule closed, some highly placed Georgian aristo- crats planned in secret to overthrow their foreign rulers. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Then Alexander Batonishvili, the royal pretender exiled to Iran, would be invited to rule in Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In fact, the noble status of many of the conspirators saved 71Russian Rule and Georgian Society 72 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE them from harsh punishment, and most returned from exile before the end of the decade. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Typically, Hahn, knowing almost nothing about the Caucasus, chose to work alone using Speranskii’s law code as a guide rather than to consult with Baron Rozen or other local authorities. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The land and the peasants belonged to the lords, who had full power over them, although landlords could not Russian Rule and Georgian Society 75 76 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE maim or kill serfs without penalty of law. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The dominance of Russian Rule and Georgian Society 77 78 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE the nobles over these petty clerics compromised their independence in mat- ters spiritual, as reflected in the Georgian saying: “Don’t expect paradise from the family priest.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Their right to purchase land was recognized by Article 160 of the Code of Vakhtang VI, and many peasants used this to acquire new lands, thus breaking the nobles’ near-monopoly on land ownership.55 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Russian rule also brought an increase in the use of money. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Russian garrison at Sighnaghi was then exterminated, and the town of Telavi was occupied by the rebels, who were joined by noble supporters of the Bagratid pretender, Aleksandre Batonishvili. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the end of March the revolt had been crushed; 13 peasants were hanged, 520 were killed in the fighting. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Tiflis this office merged Russian Rule and Georgian Society 87 88 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE in the eighteenth century with the Armenian community’s melik, a position that was concerned primarily with economic matters and was usually held in hereditary succession by members of the Bebutov family. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Not until 1840 was the Russian Rule and Georgian Society 89 90 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE guilds’ influence in urban affairs officially recognized in a municipal statute. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Such a colonial relationship would keep Transcaucasia somewhat apart from the empire’s political system: “Calling the Transcauca- Russian Rule and Georgian Society 91 92 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE sian territory a colony means that it is not the object of the government to join it to the general state system, that it is not hoped to make of this part of Russia and the Russian people in the moral sense, but to leave this territory as an Asian province, although better governed.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Before he arrived, the city had changed little under Russian rule. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Russian rule did not successfully foster Russian trade with Caucasia, but it did permit local merchants to flourish and turned the attention of the Armenian mokalakebi toward Europe. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Russian Rule and Georgian Society 95 5 Emancipation and the End of Seigneurial Georgia “I am convinced that sooner or later we must come to this, I think that you agree with me, consequently, it is better that this come from above than from below.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
In his acceptance speech Kipiani spoke of the ex- traordinary and difficult step the nobility had taken, but ended by affirming the complete loyalty of the Georgian nobility to the tsar: “I speak directly that I do not understand any interests outside this rule, that is to say, outside our innate consciousness of our duty and our dignity: noble dignity involves irreproachable service to the throne.24 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Despite Kipiani’s professed loyalty, St. Petersburg, already challenged militarily by the 1863 uprising in Poland, was apprehensive about the shift in noble leadership in Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Now noble authority, however slightly, was compromised, and peasants, however incompletely, gained a degree of freedom. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the dispersed, insecure pieces of seigneurial Georgia with its various princely houses and distinct economies, one national political and economic unit was being formed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Protection by tsarist arms was both a necessity and a restrictive imposition for Georgians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Under the impact of Russian rule Georgian intellectuals initiated their own search into their country’s past, a search that immediately raised doubts about Georgia’s present and future while at the same time it created a congenial view of the past and a source of national pride. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The dissemination of Georgian national feeling by the patriotic intel- ligentsia in the last third of the nineteenth century paralleled developments among the Armenians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Caucasus lost its special status as a viceroyalty and was reduced to equal footing with other regions of the empire. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the earliest years of Russian rule peasants who could not find work or make a livelihood in their villages migrated, at least for a season, to the towns. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The city was a revelation to the young Geor- gians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Betweer 1905 and 1917, the possibility of a revolutionary overthrow of tsarism remained a vivid hope, even in the dark days of “reaction” and the years ol working within the new “constitutional” framework. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The social democrats, for their part, adjusted their program tofit the aspirations of the Georgian peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Through the last decade of tsarist rule three major areas concerned the Transcaucasian administration: the now somewhat muted tensions with the nationalities; the persistent problem of peasant discontents, particularly with the outmoded “temporarily obligated” status; and the continued activity of the social democrats and the revival of the labor movement after 1912. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Reviewing his eight-year rule, the viceroy in 1913 reminded the tsar: “Six years ago I reported to you, Sire, with complete candor that within the borders of the Empire we ourselves created an [Armenian] problem by carelessly ignoring the religious and national views of the Armenians.”12 The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the new year began, Khatisov visited the grand duke in Tiflis and told him of the conspiracy, but the viceroy rejected the plot. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The century of Russian rule had prepared Georgians for statehood, but its full realization presented dangers and difficulties. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The question arises: how to reconcile our Social Democratic ideology with the work of creating bourgeois institutions; how to do this so that in the process the party does not go off the track of Social Democracy and turn into a petty-bourgeois party~” At the same time there was no reason to fear opposition to socialist rule from the upper and middle classes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Tht major danger to democracy in a primarily peasant country like Georgia, ht asserted, comes from the village, but the government can guarantee “support for the revolution and the rule of democracy” by satisfying the peasants foremost demand and promulgating a land reform.27 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Though much of the population, especially the intelligentsia, was still hostile or at least unfriendly to the regime, an accommodation to political realities had led to a general acquiescence in Soviet rule. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At least as important as the economic recovery to the stabilization of Soviet rule in Georgia were the measures undertaken to promote ethnic Georgian culture—building schools, promoting publication in Georgian, encouraging opera, theater, and film. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In essence the Stalinist “command economy” had curtailed markets and private trade and had centralized decision-making far more than any other economy in history. The Making of the Georgian Nation
To many in the West the building of “socialism in one country” seemed a triumph of human will and effort, the concrete validation of Marxism-Leninism; many intellectuals and politicians were prepared, particularly in the face of the fascist danger, to excuse Stalin’s dictatorial rule while admiring Soviet economic achievements. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At great expense and with little concern for economic rationality, a huge steel mill was constructed in Rus- tavi, despite its distance from the natural inputs needed for making steel. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Economic stagnation at home and political repression throughout the Soviet empire marked the declining years of the old dictator’s rule. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Indeed, an in-depth look at the last thirty-five years of the history of Georgia demonstrates that the experience in that country was not shaped to any great extent by the twists and turns of official nationality policy but, while evolving under the influence of general Soviet policy, was rather the product of indigenous social and political developments and local resistance to imperatives from the center. The Making of the Georgian Nation
For Armenians it meant a fundamental demographic shift,. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet these contradictions were not articulated during Stalin’s rule; only in the more tolerant period after 1953 did the tensions developed during the long years of Stalinism surface in a new nationalism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A policy of indirect rule through dependent local elites replaced the old Stalinist system of direct control from Moscow. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Such a rule, they contended, would inhibit the development of Georgian scientific thought and the Geor- gian language and was a violation of the constitutional principle of equality of all peoples of the USSR. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Instead of having each branch of the rural economy report separately to the corresponding higher republic or all-union authority, all aspects of the region’s economy were controlled locally by the production association. The Making of the Georgian Nation
More specifically, four major reasons for the appear- ance of this nationalism can be elaborated: First, the reduction in political penalties with the relaxation of the Stalinist terror had made it easier for people to express long-latent national feelings. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Whereas other forms of political action and expression were more strictly prohibited, in Georgia the state made significant concessions to the population’s national feelings. The Making of the Georgian Nation
An early entry into the campaign for greater intellectual and cultural openness was the allegorical Georgian film Repentance, shot by Tengiz Abuladze during Shev- ardnadze’s rule but suppressed after a few showings in the republic. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Abkhaz had fought against Georgian rule during the years of the Russian Revolution and Civil War, but with the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia in 1921, they were given their own cultural and political autonomy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Within two weeks, two hundred buses from Tbilisi drove toward Tskhinval to rally against the soviet’s decision, and for twenty-four hours Ossetians and Georgian faced each other with MVD troops between them. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Though not without challenge from more militant elements in Armenian society, the government of President Levon Ter Petrosian man- aged in its first years in power to build a democratic political order, even while overwhelmed by devastating economic problems, the aftermath of the 1988 earthquake, hundreds of thousands of refugees, blockade from Azerbaijan, and a debilitating war in Karabagh.~ The Making of the Georgian Nation
The independent republic of Georgia is a nation possessed by its own history. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The nation is seen as the most natural of human associations, not unlike the family, which breaks the oppressive bonds of empire and reaches its fullest flowering with sovereignty and independence. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Begara (Georgian)—duty, service; for peasants, labor obligation (corvée in French; barshchina in Russian). The Making of the Georgian Nation
-y) (Russian)—land measurement equal to 2.7 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Cyril Toumanoff, “Iberia on the Eve of Bagratid Rule: An Enquiry into the Melikishvili, K istonii drevnei Gruzii, p. 125. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Cyril Toumanoff, “Iberia on the Eve of Bagratid Rule,” p. 27n, and “Christian Caucasia Between Byzantium and Iran,” p. 124. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Speri and southern Klarjeti were annexed by the Byzantine empire (Toumanoff, “Iberia on the Eve of Bagratid Rule,” p. 201; The History of the Caucasian Alba- nians by Movses Dasxuranci, trans. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Toumanoff, “Iberia on the Eve of Bagratid Rule,” pp. 275, 300—302, and Studies, pp. 466, 486—87. The Making of the Georgian Nation
All this has now come to be accepted in modern Georgian historiography” (Toumanoff, “Iberia on the Eve of Bagratid Rule,” p. 22). The Making of the Georgian Nation
For details, see Allen, History of the Georgian People, pp. 88—90; and Toumanoff, “Armenia and Georgia,” Pp. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the early seventeenth century, silver coins minted in Kartli bore the inscriptions of the Iranian shahs, and only copper coins had distinctive Georgian features (Lang, Last Years, pp. 29—30). The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1658 Taimuraz was received by Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich in Moscow. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The best lands, including the large vineyards, were as a rule kept by the lords and worked by the serfs to fulfill their labor obligations (A. The Making of the Georgian Nation
1, pp. 68— 82. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, Mass.: The Making of the Georgian Nation
Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, p. 233. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But two weeks later, his government decided to place Nagorno-Karabagh under the direct rule of Moscow, an interim solution to the conflict that satisfied neither the Azerbaijanis nor the Armenians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The century of tsarist rule has been treated in both documentary source books and monographs: Antelava, I. G. Gosudarstvennye krest’iane Gruzii v XIX veke. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Baku Commune, 1917—1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian ed., The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Scythians and Cimmerians, warlike nomads of the Eurasian steppe, passed through the Caucasus as they rode against the empires of antiquity which ruled over Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Imereti was reckoned to comprise the Colchis of the ancients, including the low-lying, densely vegetated land of Mingrelia on the Black Sea coast; Guria, between the Rioni and Cholok rivers; Atchara around Batumi; and mountainous Svaneti, land of the Svans, once a nation of warriors ruled by their own king and council of elders and capable of launching into battle an army many thousands strong. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Following the Arab conquest of Georgia, Tbilisi was ruled by Muslim amirs or governors and was an important commercial centre of the Arab caliphate, celebrated for its natural hot springs and healing waters. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the age of myth and legend, Jason and his Argonauts are said to have found Colchis, the present- day Mingreia and Imered, ruled by King Aietes, father of the sorceress Medea; through her magic lore, the Greeks gained possession of the Golden Fleece. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The building of roads gave the country access to markets in Asia Minor and other parts of the Roman Empire. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This RISE AND FALL OF THE GEORGIAN KINGS 27 decline had become so marked by the time of the Persian king, Khusrau I (531—79), that the Persians were able to abolish the monarchy and assert direct control over Georgia’s internal affairs. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
David won victories over the Seljuk Turks and annexed large tracts of the former Armenian kingdom. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The existence of strong feudal institutions prevented the royal power from degenerating into sheer despotism. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The senior line ruled at Thilisi over the kingdom of Kartli; a second ruled over Western Georgia or Imereti—’the land on the far side’; a third possessed Kakheti, Georgia’s most easterly province. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The censorship brooded over the Press, and the law courts fell more and more under govern- ment control. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Trends in Georgian Socialism Few regimes have been more harshly condemned by hostile critics than the Social-Democratic government which ruled Georgia from 1918 to 1921. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The West was treated to a sad spectacle of two peoples, ruled by parties which were members of the Second International and professed peace to be their chief aim, fighting over a few strips of land in the manner of a Germany or a Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The enemies of Transcaucasia’s independence were pro- vided with excellent material, on the basis of which they could, and did, argue that Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan ruled by the Dashnaks, the Mensheviks and the Musavatists, were incapable of preserving order and of guaranteeing a peaceful existence to their peoples. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Like his father, he launched a rising in northern Yemen, and all the old calumnies against the Turks from the last time that “Turks” ruled Yemen, in the sixteenth century, were redeployed: that they were corrupt, allowed the drinking of wine, had a taste for small boys, exploited the poor, failed to uphold God’s law and, in short, were scarcely Muslims. A History of Modern Yemen
The land of Yemen was in the hands of our ancestors, the most noble family [i.e. A History of Modern Yemen
Many thought he had ruled a dawla/i. A History of Modern Yemen
Over 50 per cent was allotted to Imam Abmad. A History of Modern Yemen
Everything turned on personal intrigue, and the Imam, as Aponte said of his father, had not a government but instead a court, where he decided even such tiny matters as whether a school could have ten ink- wells: had he not ruled like this, says Claudie Fayein, “he would have felt himself less a King”. A History of Modern Yemen
The erst- while governments remained in place as parties: the GPC (General Popular Congress), which had ruled the North, and the YSP (Yemeni Socialist Party) which had ruled the South. A History of Modern Yemen
When Imam Ya~iya claimed dominion over Yemen, near the start of the fourteenth Muslim century (A1 1906, All 1324), he invoked the fact that Zaydl Imams had ruled “all or part of it” for a thousand years. A History of Modern Yemen
24 Wilkinson 1991: 3—4. A History of Modern Yemen
It would be unrealistic to think that these groups would abandon their cause because their opposition is more powerful. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
court in Jerusalem ruled that Manning and his wife, Rachel, must be extradited to the United States to face charges of murdering Patricia Wilkerson, who died from a 1980 letter bomb. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the first three centuries of Islam, after the Arab conquests and after the great caliphates moved the centre of Islamic activity far from Yemen, it can be fairly said that Yemen became a backwater and that Islam and Islamic instruction were restricted to a handful of key towns and cities, such as San’a’, Janad, Aden and Zabid. Comtemporary Yemen
The Free Yemeni Movement (FYM) (Harakat al-Ahrar al-Yamaniyin) did not share any of these characteristics. Comtemporary Yemen
Source: Compiled by the World Bank from statistics prepared by the Directorate of Planning and Statistics, MOE, and the University of Aden, May 1981. Comtemporary Yemen
But these retainees did nothing’ more than organise the army. Comtemporary Yemen
Article 48 of the constitution. Comtemporary Yemen
Cuba is a special case, as is Vietnam; South Yemen does not fall in this category, above all because of remaining political doubts. Comtemporary Yemen
During the mid-1970s South Yemeni officials said that Somalia was the country with which their relations were closest. Comtemporary Yemen
The European powers divided up the map of the former Ottoman lands into several arbitrary entities, and ruled by making alli- ances with local clans who found the relationship prof- itable, styling themselves “royal families” and adopting the titles of “king” and “prince” after the European fash- ion. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As Patrick Seale sums it up in his book Asad: ‘“Greater Israel” went to war against “Greater Syria”, both controversial concepts of uncertain definition but which certainly ruled each other out.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Ruled by Mitas, whom some scholars identify with the legendary Midas of the golden touch, the kingdom of the Mushki had its capital at Gordion, and its people spoke Phrygian, an Indo-European lan- guage. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Roman dominance of Kartli-Iberia was shaken in the year 363 when Emperor Julian was killed in an ill-considered campaign against Iran. The Making of the Georgian Nation
About the year 540, an Iranian viceroy was again reported living in Tbilisi, though the government was being run by local princes, the catholicos, and Grigoli, the kartlisa mamasakhlisi (prince-regnant) of Kartli-Iberia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Although the chronicler Juansher praises the reign of the Romanophile Guaram, his son and successor, Stepanoz I (590?—627), is condemned as “impious and without fear of God.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
For several decades Kartli-Iberia, like Armenia, had no local dynast as presiding prince but was ruled directly by an Arab administrator.27 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Only Kakheti to the east eluded him.3° The Making of the Georgian Nation
With his own Arab emirs growing ever more independent of Baghdad, the caliph decided to rely on the Christian Georgia 29 30 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES Bagratids to enforce his authority. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Thus in the last years of his reign David the Rebuilder ruled over a multinational empire of Abkhazians, Georgians, Armenians, and various Muslim peoples, extending from the Black Sea and the Caucasus south to Greater Armenia and east to the Caspian. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The king had also established new towns, like Gori, in which he settled merchants emigrating from Armenia, and he had promoted learning and culture by founding an academy at Gelati in western Georgia.57 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgians ruled again in Ani, captured Kars, established their vassals in Shirvan, and helped the Byzantines to establish the Empire of Trebizond. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Mongols moved south to Hamadan, only to return two years later to destroy Somkheti, Shirvan, and the lands of the Qipchaks.64 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Avag Zakharian arranged the submission of Queen Rusudan to the Mongols in 1243, and Georgia of- ficially acknowledged the Great Khan as its overlord. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the end of the thirteenth century, a series of joint kings ruled in Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Henceforth the Gelovani clan in Svaneti, the Sharvashidze in Abkhazeti, the Dadiani in Samegrelo, and the Vardanidze in Guria ruled as semi-independent princes.13 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Then Bagrat of Imereti, taking advantage of the confusion in eastern Georgia, invaded Kartli and ruled as Bagrat VI, king of Georgia (1465—1478). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Defeated by the atabeg in 1462, Giorgi attempted three years later to invade Samtskhe, only to be taken prisoner. The Making of the Georgian Nation
47Twilight of the Georgian Kingdoms 48 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES For the kings of Kartli the principal military threat came from the Safavids of Persia, who took Tbilisi in 1536 and held the city for two years. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Western Georgian princes pledged loyalty to the Ottomans, and in Kartli the Bagratid princes ruled at the discretion of the Safavid shah. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Then sixty-seven years old, Rustam, known in Georgia as King Rostom (1632—1658), ruled Kartli (and from 1648 to 1656 ruled Kakheti as well) and brought relative peace and prosperity to the country. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Chardin reported that “the greatest part of the Georgian lords Twilight of the Georgian Kingdoms 53 I 54 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES are outwardly Mahometan; some professing that religion to obtain prefer- ment at court and pensions of state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The history of eighteenth-century Georgia is dominated by two extraordinary monarchs, Vakhtang VI and Erekie II, who between them managed the affairs of their realms for nearly three-quarters of the century~ Both were, for a time, successful servants of their Iranian sovereigns, yet when opportunities were presented by civil wars in Iran, both sought the phantom aid promised by Russia’s autocrats. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Taimuraz ruled in Kakheti as an Iranian governor, while his son, Erekie, campaigned for Nadir in India. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Thus, all of eastern Georgia was ruled by Kakhe- tian Bagratids, father and son, but Nadir Shah, their overlord, continued to impose new taxes on his Georgian subjects. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The highest circles of society were occupied by the royal princes and princesses, members of the Bagratid family, which had ruled in Georgia for over a thousand years and still claimed descent from King David of Israel. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From 1816 to 1827 General Aleksei Petrovich Ermolov, a hero of the Battle of Borodino, ruled the Caucasus as chief administrator while con- tinuing the Russian expansion against the Iranians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Svaneti was divided into two parts: “princely” Svaneti, ruled by the Dadeshkeliani family, and “free” Svaneti, where serfdom, and indeed nobles, did not exist. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan managed to maintain independence in the brief period when the empires that had ruled Caucasia for centuries were themselves in disarray. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The party that ruled Georgia by the end of the 1920s was significantly different from the group of Bolsheviks who had entered the country with the Red Army. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgianized princes ruled for centuries in the region; the Georgian language was the principal language of governance; and many Abkhaz converted to Orthodox Christianity. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Rather than seeing the history of Georgia as the unfolding of a deep ethnic essence or the awakening of a long-repressed national spirit, with fixed cultural boundaries and senses of difference, historians can provide a more contextual and contingent view of the social and cultural construction of a nation that in its various incar- nations over many centuries represented itself in different ways. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Samtavro, a principality ruled by a mtavani, was an independent entity with nothing more than formal ties binding it to a monarch. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Satavado, a seigneury ruled by a tavadi, was an autonomous territorial and economic unit with one tenant, a fortress and monastery, and a number of vassals and serfs (Charachidzé, Introduction a l’étude de Ia feodalite géorgienne, p. 105). The Making of the Georgian Nation
About the same time the kings of Kakheti eliminated the old saenistavo units and replaced them with smaller administrative districts ruled by an appointed royal official, the mouravi, who had no military force and was given strictly defined functions and duties. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Its ruler, Javat Khan, had been a bitter enemy of the Georgian kings, and had helped Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar to invade Georgia and sack Tbilisi in 1795. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Loyalty to the Russian Tsar and his own personal ambition overrode any regard which he might have had for Georgia’s glorious past and for her ancient dynasty, the Bagratids. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
King Solomon II and Napoleon Bonaparte The remaining independent princes of Western Georgia hastened to accept Russian suzerainty. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In spite of these factors, Rosen carried out the Senate’s orders to the letter. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In that case you, the ruler of this land, are excused from building any bath- houses!’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Russian gen- eral, 91 Armazi, 21, 23, 25 Armenia, Armenians, 2, 4, 5, 14, 21, 26, z8, 36, 48, ~8, 6o, 62, 79, 87, 96, 104, ii8, 131, 138, 141, 144, 155, 161—4, 204—07, 225, 229, 233—4, 238, 252, 256, 258 Arsacid dynasty, 25 Arsena of Marabda, Georgian popular hero, 22 Arsenidze, R., Georgian Minister of Justice, 209 Artag, Georgian ruler, 19 Artanuji, 6, 28 Artvin, 6, 185, 234 Ashilta, 72 Ashot the Great, Bagratid ruler of Georgia, 28—9 287 x8i, 185—6, 193, 196—202, 210—Il, 214—17, 219, 221, Asia Minor, 2, ~, i8, 25, 62 Aslanduz, battle of, 55 Asparukh, 25 Assyria, Assyrians, 3 Astrakhan, 32, 35—6 Atchara (Ajaria), Atcharans (Ajar), 4—7, Athens, 26 Athos, Mount, 13 Austerlitz, battle of, 57 Australia, 223 Austria, ,o8, ,8,, 201 Avalishvili, Zurab, Georgian jurist and negotiator, 205, 208, 215, 220 Avaria, Avars, 4, 71—2, 84 Avchala cast-iron factory, 253 Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis, 4, 5, 3~, 49, 138, 162—3, 193, 199, 204—6, 215, 2 17—22, 225, 233—4, 238, 252, 258 Azov, Sea of, i Babylonians, 3, 26 Baghdad, 28, 184, 186 Bagrat III, King of Georgia, 28 Bagratid dynasty, 28—69 Bagration, General Prince Peter, 20 Bagration-Mukhra~~, General Prince Ivane, 93 Bakradze, Valerian, Georgian Prime Minister, 26!, A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Turks landed thousands of fresh troops, retook their capital, and pushed north to the mountain stronghold of Shaharah where they were beaten with heavy losses. A History of Modern Yemen
Issued ~afar 1331 [February 1913] In another scribbled note the Imam complains that the expenses of jihdd were enormous and people were unwilling to pay even their zakãt. A History of Modern Yemen
His treaty with the Ottomans was not recognised by the Idrisi, for instance, a separate (Sunni) ruler of ‘Asir to the north and west. A History of Modern Yemen
In due course the two imperial powers laid a ruler on the map and drew a further line from near Harib northeast across Arabia to somewhere near Qatar. A History of Modern Yemen
It is separated from Oman by a sparsely populated belt of territory where people speak languages other than Arabic and pursue ways of life distinct from their neighbours’ (a border in the modern style was drawn amicably between Yemen and Oman in 1991; one could have drawn it a little west or east without upset- ting anyone), while north of Ijaçlramawt and east of ~a’dah is a sea of sand. A History of Modern Yemen
The shadows of past greatness did not inspire coherent attempts at self-rule but rather forms of piety and memory which left power to the (Sunni) Turks. A History of Modern Yemen
In the North the Imam was a ruler straightforwardly. A History of Modern Yemen
In its day (1650—1750 was the high point) it had taken over grand forms of governance, with the Imam processing to Friday prayers among his troops, court officials as “gate keepers”, and documents stamped with the ruler’s seal, much of which persisted or had been revived. A History of Modern Yemen
Certain of the sons nurtured relations between the two great families, others moved quietly in support of Abmad, and the al-Wazlr domain in Lower Yemen was washed away by stages. A History of Modern Yemen
Ya~ya formed a “history commission” in 1937. A History of Modern Yemen
When the ruler of Dali’, Ilaydarah bin Nasr, was driven from office rn 1947, he and his son fled to North Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
Legally and in his own view Sultan C~L\Jj remained a sovereign ruler. A History of Modern Yemen
The fighting was depicted at the time as war against colonialism, and later as class struggle. A History of Modern Yemen
They then declined to support the ruler of Shucayb, and a1~Dalic then fell to CAT CAntar, who had fought in the area for years. A History of Modern Yemen
Nimran’s mud house was scarcely a palace, however. A History of Modern Yemen
The poor around Aden and Mukalla formed part of this constituency; such figures as Tariq al-FaçllI (son of Fadll’s ex-ruler from British times and himself a veteran of the Afghan wars, newly returned from exile) formed quite another. A History of Modern Yemen
There is little to dispute but sand, and a ruler could be laid on the map with almost the freedom that the British and Turks enjoyed at the century’s beginning (Chapter i). A History of Modern Yemen
per cent of all the votes cast and thus to be Yemen’s unquestioned ruler. A History of Modern Yemen
Two different dramas of power turn equally on hay bah, the dread inspired by the ruler’s person. A History of Modern Yemen
Detalle (I997a: 23) mentions also a “wedding present of some tens of mil- lions of dollars” from the Iraqi ruler. A History of Modern Yemen
The fact such rumours exist is symptomatic of ho~ mysterious power seems. A History of Modern Yemen
the way there he tried to prepare us for what to expect. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hussein even called on Assad in December 1985, his first visit to Syria since 1979. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Qaddafi, ruler of a handful of desert tribes on the Mediterranean seaboard, was con- vinced that he was born to leave his mark on Arab history. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It must neutralize him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He did not, but on vari- ous occasions he would provide the Libyan foreign minister with cases of Black Label whiskey, a fact he was no doubt able to use against the Libyan ruler at some propitious time. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But in the final analysis the Fatimid movement was doomed to become an insignifi- cant, isolated minority community, because it never won extensive popular support. Comtemporary Yemen
Yamaniya greeted the manifesto enthu- siastically and Shabab al-Amr cells were established in San’a’ and Ibb. Comtemporary Yemen
Notes 1. Comtemporary Yemen
Prophetic tradition. Comtemporary Yemen
This was not so much a supersedure of the princes, who remained too powerful for that, as the conversion of the more important among them into officers of the State entrusted with the control of others. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The second caste is that of the priests, who among other things attend to all matters of controversy with the neighboring peoples. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The king of Kartli-Iberia was a hereditary monarch, like the Iranian Great King, not an elected or appointed ruler as in the Roman tradition. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian chronicler, Juansher, makes it clear that the curopalates, although he enjoyed the loyalty of the great nobles, “could not remove the dukes of Iberia from their duchies because they had charters from the Great King and from the Emperor confirming them in their duchies.”17 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Then the most powerful ruler in Caucasia, David of Tao used his new prestige and strength to arbitrate dynastic disputes in both Georgia and Armenia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
And in the place of people, wild animals roamed.”44 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The next year Giorgi crowned his daughter Tamar co-ruler of Georgia, indicating clearly his chosen successor. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Giorgi even extended the feudal structure of his kingdom into the mountainous district.8 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Aleksandre hoped that Russia would aid Kakheti in its conflicts with Persia and with the powerful ruler of the Kumykhs in Daghestan, the shevkal (shamkhal) of Tarku. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the seventeenth century opened, the Ottoman Turks remained the dominant power in Transcaucasia, but the vigorous ruler of the Safavid empire, Shah Abbas I (1587—1629), was determined to restore Iranian pres- tige and power in Asia Minor and Transcaucasia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Peasants migrated westward to escape the new burdens, and prominent nobles, like the eristavi of Ksani, Shanshe, and the vakili (ruler) of Kartli, Givi Amilakhori, rose in rebellion. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The urgency of resolving the peasant question in Georgia became evi- dent in January 1857 when three thousand peasants in the Jvari district of Samegrelo rose in revolt against the Dadiani family, the mtavara or heredi- tary ruler of the Mingrelian lands. The Making of the Georgian Nation
men.. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Unlike the efforts of the English barons under Tamar’s contemporary, King John, this Georgian constitu- tional movement came to naught. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Not long afterwards, Shah Ismail Safavi of Iran invaded Kartli—a foretaste of many onslaughts which the land was to suffer at the hands of this dynasty of Persian rulers. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, Todtleben quarrelled with the Georgian rulers, whom he despised as ignorant orientals, and left them to bear the brunt of the fighting themselves. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This success enhanced Russian prestige to such an extent that for the time being, to use the historian Dubrovin’s metaphor, the rulers of neighbouring k.banates took on a demeanour of lamb-like meekness.23 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
During the reign of King Erekle II, the rulers of both Ganja and the chief city of Armenia, Erivan, had been vassals of the Georgian crown. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Now it was simply an insignificant province, engulfed in a vast, alien empire, whose rulers seemed lacking in sympathy for this cultivated, Christ- ian nation which had voluntarily placed itself under the protection of its northern neighbour. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
We suffered long! A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘Although certain provinces have been joined to Russia for about thirty years,’ the senators continued, ‘the administration in Transcaucasia still bears the stamp of the irresponsible, capricious and vague A ‘~ Ojtmethods of government practised by the former rulers of this country.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The coffee trade which had once made the country prosperous had decayed (Mocha is named for a Yemeni town; plantations elsewhere in the world, however, brought the price down sharply before i8oo), and the Red Sea ports from which highland rulers continued drawing revenue from local trade had all been lost. A History of Modern Yemen
In accordance with British—Indian practice, the “rulers” (actually few of them were rulers in an Indian or in a British sense; most were prominent for other reasons) were eventually accorded different ranks and thus salutes of different numbers of cannon as if on a list of protocol around Delhi:2° Turkey Britain and Imam Yai~zyã: circa 1900 9 I0 Agreements sometimes overlapped with and contradicted each other. A History of Modern Yemen
y~fiC, for instance, had a memory of expelling the Imams: The Sultans of Y~fic, intermarried with the cAbdalTs of Lahj, claimed descent from learned rulers of the sixteenth century The Amirs of D~li~ held documentary proof of their importance from the same period. A History of Modern Yemen
The terrain was more severe, certain tribes were more extensive, the “rulers” recognised by Britain were far more numerous, and local relations among chiefs, tribesmen and non-tribal share-croppers were in places deeply invo- luted. A History of Modern Yemen
Access by political officers was enforced in some places (Lower ‘Awlaqi, for instance, was bombed to this end in 1936), but no grand truce spread; instead tribes were forced into sullen, temporary compli- ance with unwanted “rulers”, cutting loose when the chance offered, and the Western Protectorate remained ever after a dangerous place where ambitions of “sound administration” locked bitterly against pol- iticking among chiefs and tribes. A History of Modern Yemen
Certain Turkish forms were then appropriated after World War I and so were “international” forms whereby Arab rulers became Kings, although the Holy Qur’an says, “Kings when they enter a town [or village] ruin it and make the mightiest of its people lowly . A History of Modern Yemen
If Yahyã and the British: 1918—1948 45 46 A history of modern Yemen officials did their jobs, no complainant at all would come to us. A History of Modern Yemen
His top political priority was to rid the Arab World of the relics of British domination and his voice carried, literally and metaphorically, to the furthest peasant hut and bedouin ~ Local rulers in the South who opposed his aims were condemned as imperial- ist stooges. A History of Modern Yemen
Others, such as Dalic and cAwlaqi however, were a standing reproach to British aims, where rulers’ income was disbursed on the basis not of administrative needs but of recipients’ “importance” — a euphemism, thought Trevaskis, for nuisance potential. A History of Modern Yemen
Not only could Cairo Radio support dissent but so could Imam A new form of politics: the 1950s 63 64 A history of modern Yemen Ahmad, as when a plan for federation among rulers in the Western Protectorate was floated in 1954. A History of Modern Yemen
The family were Northerners by origin. A History of Modern Yemen
The rulers of the country have been evil, false and ignorant.. A History of Modern Yemen
•18 Post-independence writers explain the war itself as class struggle against “feudal” rulers who with British support bled their people dry’9 Economism poses difficult questions, however. A History of Modern Yemen
At the time of Radfän, Cairo Radio menaced Aden too: “Tomorrow the revolution will extend to each of the iz~. A History of Modern Yemen
In Britain, at the same time as the Aden elections (October 1964), the Conservative government was replaced by Labour, who strongly favoured talks with the ATUC, not realising perhaps the difficulties of what in Aden passed as labour politics, and had as strong a distrust or incomprehension of the Federal rulers (all apparently “feudal” figures) as their predecessors had of Asnaj.29 A History of Modern Yemen
They still hoped the Federal Government might succeed them, but by now lacked the will to support that government, and as British troops withdrew from the coun- tryside (a process well under way by the start of summer), the Federal Rulers and their little states fell one by one. A History of Modern Yemen
Radfan, where the fighting had started four years earlier, Hawshabi, a thorn in British flesh since 1920, andJabalJahhaf enemies of the “feudal” Amir of Dalic, all stood for the moment with FLOSY, as did the remaining rulers in what had once been the Western Protectorate — in Bayhan, Upper CAwlaqi and Wahidi. A History of Modern Yemen
The army arrested leaders of the left, only to face riots in Aden and in the Fadli cotton zone of Jacar, and Qabtan a1~Shacbi changed his line by proclaiming that property of deposed rulers would be redistributed to NLF guerrillas. A History of Modern Yemen
Central Government set them free again. A History of Modern Yemen
Viewed politically, “official” Islam now preached only the piou~ hope that rulers behave honestly; but freed by circumstance from prac- tical concerns with conformity and power, Yemenis in everyday life gol on with simply being Muslims. A History of Modern Yemen
Late in the 19705 Ci\~~jzah had run the house, while her parents-in-law farmed and her husband gained money from migrant labour. A History of Modern Yemen
Kuwait, having for years helped Yemen with few strings attached, had reason to feel aggrieved; Saudi Arabia, already discontented if not alarmed by unification before the war, turned more fiercely than any against Yemen’s government and the dislike of Saudi rulers for Yemen’s president gained the colouring of feud. A History of Modern Yemen
and the rights of i~ million citi- zens would again be put before the personal benefit of rulers. A History of Modern Yemen
“Structural readjustment” is pri- marily an adjustment of balance sheets. A History of Modern Yemen
38 Trevaskis (1968: 94) catches Adenis’ parochialism well: “having, with the rarest exceptions, never passed a day of their lives out of sight of Jabal Shamsan they had come to look on Aden not as the untidy municipal area it was, but as a country in its own right”. A History of Modern Yemen
1999 Yemenis on Mars: the end of the ma/qar(diaspora), Merzp2II~ 29—3 I. forthcoming Le don précieux de la genealogie, in P Bonte, E. Conte and P Dresch (eds.), A History of Modern Yemen
housing, 140, i68, 187 politics, 523, 146—7, i68, r~i, 195—2 population, ii8, 140, 153 public art, 175 sacked ~ 197 university, 173 Aden hinterland, 19, 33, 73, 112, 119, 120 and Imam Ahmad, 62, 63—5, 76 and NLF, 97—8, 104—5, io8, 109—Il British “forward policy”, 35—6, 6o—2 connections with Aden port, 9—Jo, 59, 72, 98, II,, ii8 Federation of Amirates ~ 64, 85 rulers, 9, 20, 37—8, 60—2, 74, 75, 96, 100, 104, 507, 113 treaties, advisors 6o treaties of protection, ro, 38, 6o 272 see also Aden Protectorate, Western; Federation of South Arabia Aden Protectorate(s), 35, 112—13, 118—19 Eastern, 36—7, 39—40 59 Western, 37—8, 39, 63, 74, 76, 85—6 see also Aden hinterland; Hadramawt Aden Protectorate Levies, 35, 75, 91 Aden Trades Union Congress, see ATUC ‘Adnan, ‘Adnanis, 68, 84, 8g Afghanistan, war in, 572, 187 Africa, 12, i~, i6, 46, 6o, 83, 90, 112, 123, 130, ‘47, ‘49 agrarian reform, see land tenure agnculture, 53, 14, i6, 17, 23—4, 74, 165—7 cotton, 63, 67, 77, 95, 121, 233 fl.15 A History of Modern Yemen
230 n.44, n.48, 234 fl.32, A History of Modern Yemen
Radfan, 37—8,55, 90, 96—7, 99, 113, 120, 121, 195 radio, 77, 88, 141, 145 Cairo, 62, 63, 76—9, 86—7, 89, 96, gg, ,o8 programming, 145 Sanaa, 82, 87, 90, 145 rainfall, see water resources a1-Raji~, ‘Abd al-Latif bin Qayid (shaykh), 8~, 93 Raydah, ii~, 184, 214 Raymah,Jabal, 24, 31, 125, 187, 200 Razih,Jabal, 24, 31 Reilly, Bernard, 35, 40 remittances from migrants, io8, ~ ,68, 177—8, amounts estimated, 131, 134, i~8, 164 boom of 1970S, 131—5 effect on economy, 133, 157, i6i, 162, 171 in Hadramawt, 15, 59, 6o, 112 republicans, 89—91, 93, 102, 124 at odds with Egypt, 92—3, 103—5, 106—7 divisions among, 103, 104—5, 114—17 Resisters (Organisation of Yemeni Revolutionary Resisters), 125—6, 129 Rida, Muhammad Rashid (Islamic reformer), 47, 5’ RThani, Amin (writer), 45, 67 roads, 3, 37, 39, 41, 48, 62, 67, 70, 75, 82, 87, ‘39—40, 205 Rouleau, Eric, io6 royalists, 91, 93—4, 98—9, 105, ,o6, 114, 115, 124, ‘35 Russia, 76, 153, i6i, 171, 182, ~ relations with Imam Ahmad, 81—3, 87, 162 relations with North, 115, 150 relations with South, 134, 147, i6g, 172 Ruwayshan family (Khawlan), ~, 201 Sabrah, ‘Abd al-Salam (Northern politician), 47, 9’ Sa’dah, 14, 15, i6, 26, 45, 68, 93, 128, 166—7, 200 19,, 207 Index 281 Sa’Td, Faqlh (Lower Yemeni leader, i9th centuly), 4, 20 saints, i8, 20-I, 36, 68, 98, 142, “A’ ~73, ig8, 214. A History of Modern Yemen
war in South (1963—7), 96—7, 100, 107—8 aid from North, 91, 97, 107, 113 British army, 97, 109, 113, 114 Yemeni military forces, 91, 109, 112—13 see also FLOSY; NLF wars between North and South, 124, 149—50 GPC vs. YSP (1994), 196—7 al-Wartalani, al-Fudayl (Muslim Brother), ~6, 231 n.66 al-Wasi’i, ‘Abd al-Wasi’ (historian), 43—4, 49 water resources, 19, 23, 129, 137, 204 drought, 5, i6, 17, 49, 59, 67, 82, ,o6, 124, 230 fl.52 A History of Modern Yemen
irrigation, i6, 63, 138, i~o, 162, 165—7 rainfall, 13—14, ~6, 17, 38, 130 wells, 97, III, 166—7 al-Wazir family, 31, 44—5, 46, 47, 48, ~, 190, 232 n.73 ‘Abdullah Ahmad (Imam, 1948), 31, 56—7, 68 ‘Abdullah ‘AlT, 53, ~6 ‘All (prince of Ta’izz), 31, 48, 53, 54 Ibrahim ‘All (leader of Union of Popular Forces), 190 Muhammad (governor of Dhamar), 31 Zayd ‘All (writer), 143 Wilkinson,John, II, 229 n.33 women, 23, 137, 144, 145, 174—5, 212, 234 n.25 dress and manners, 17, 49, 6~, 132 education, 140, 175 influence over rulers, 67—8, 147, 202 politicised, 57, 122, 154, 175, 200 position in South, 171, 246 n.~6 songs and poems, 54, 136 television viewing habits, u~—~ work, 132, 137, 144, 174—5 World Bank, 134, i6i, 207—8 writers, Yemeni, xv, 28, 6~, 83, 90, 102—3, 121—2, Wusab, 24, 31, 200 al-Yadumi, Mul~ammad (newspaper editor), 175, 187 Yafi’, 19, 24, 38, 43, 74, 90, 107, 144, i8g, 196, ‘97 and Aden politics, ~6, 63, 146, 170 and British, 38, 55, 63, 97 and Hadramawt, 19, 21, 33, 50 136, 142—3 and Zaydis, 20, 33, 50 houses, 135 Sultans, 20, 38, 107 Yafi’ Reform Front, 91, g8 Yaliya bin al-Ilusayn (historian, ,8th century), 223 fl.1 A History of Modern Yemen
In March 1984, a bomb exploded outside the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman, and in November of that year the Jordanian chargé d’affaires in Athens narrowly es- caped being shot when his attacker’s gun jammed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From blackmailing the Saudis and lesser Gulf rulers, he is estimated to have collected some $50 million in the twelve years from 1976 to 1988. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His solution was awakening the Arab masses to revolt against their kings and reactionary rulers and uniting under a progressive, socialist banner. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
About the same time, the PLO warned its CIA contacts about a plan to shoot down Henry Kissinger’s plane over the Bakaa Valley, and Kissinger’s security people changed their plans. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Negotiations between the two parties ended in the signature of the Jeddah treaty of August 1965 which stressed the necessity of securing peace and order in Yemen, and of letting the Yemeni people decide their own destiny and choose the political system they preferred without any pressure or external intervention. Comtemporary Yemen
The National Charter described fully the local design — South Yemen would be an independent country without the British rulers and their base, without sultans, with means of production owned by The PDR Y: Three Designs for Independence 73 Nasser’s Egypt: Abdul Nasser’s call for an anti-colonialist The Algerian Revolution: the armed struggle of the Algerian Experience of national liberation movements: particularly The theory of scientific socialism and socialist construction in Experience accumulated from the revolutionary struggle 74 The PDR Y: Three Designs for Independence workers and land distributed amongst poor peasants. Comtemporary Yemen
The term ‘Mutawakkilite’ evokes religion. Comtemporary Yemen
7) of 1961. Comtemporary Yemen
By the time of the British withdrawal in November 1967 the NLF had defeated not only the planned South Arabian Federation, composed of local rulers loyal to Britain but also a rival, Egyptian-supported, group, the Front for the Libera- tion of Occupied South Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
Others, however, are considered to have deliberately avoided the armed struggle that, from 1963 to 1967, was waged against the British and other groups in Aden and against the traditional, tribal-oriented rulers in the interior. Comtemporary Yemen
When those proposals were put to a meeting of rulers in January 1954 his reaction was recorded, “They were like surrender terms dictated to a defeated enemy!” Comtemporary Yemen
5. Comtemporary Yemen
Terror, of course, had been a staple crop of Middle Eastern politics for a thousand years, since the time of the eleventh-century Shiite As- sassin sect, originally called hashishin, for the hashish with which they drugged themselves to better carry out their deadly attacks against their Seijuk Turkish rulers. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Until the fall of the Shah of Iran, the history of Islamic radicalism was one of agitating against the Pan-Arabist strongmen ruling their countries. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It sent representatives to Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, and they met with Arab rulers and officials. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Its members were vehemently opposed to Saddam’s regime and the Guards recruited them to carry out attacks against Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime and against the rulers of some of the oil-rich Gulf states. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He addressed a vast crowd of men and women who had gathered to hear him: Some people have asked me what our plans are for the Resistance if peace is realised. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Tibal and Mushki had moved into eastern Georgia, where they merged with local tribes to form the Georgian people. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Originally a tribal confederation, the Persian empire had evolved by Parthian times into a class society; though one that remained characterized by tribal underpinnings. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Ashot sought friendship with the rulers of both Abkhazeti and Kartli-Iberia, but when it was discovered that Giorgi II of Abkhazeti had joined in a conspiracy to assassinate Ashot, the Armenian king turned back to his traditional ally, Adarnase of Kartli-Iberia, and together they made war on the Abkhazians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Beginning his reign as a minor, Levan was forced to watch as the princes of Abkhazeti grew independent of Samegrelo, but when he came of age, he allied with the Abkhaz and Gurian rulers and fought the Imeretian king, Giorgi III (1604—. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The deposed king of Kakheti, however, refused to accept the Muslim rulers in Georgia and plotted with the Russians and Turks to regain his throne. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He promotes all the great nobles in such an advantageous manner that they forget their fatherland and their religion to attach themselves to him. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgians are dependent on them just as the Poles are on the Jews and similarly feel toward them the same contempt and hatred (if not more than the Poles feel toward the Jews). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Instead of fitting the Western-imposed model of totalitarian effi- ciency and control, the Soviet Union more readily resembled the ruined landscape following a civil war. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Stalin’s denigration was an appropriate symbol for the treatment of Georgian national consciousness at the hands of the Russian (Soviet) rulers. The Making of the Georgian Nation
this house was deduced in direct male line from an earlier dynasty of Iberian rulers, the Guaramids, and the latter, in turn, was traced back to the official ancestor of the Bagratid race, King and Prophet David. The Making of the Georgian Nation
One of their branches moved out to Armenia, the other to Kartli, and both won for themselves the dominant position among the other rulers of Transcaucasia” (Berdzenishvili et al., The Making of the Georgian Nation
His successor, Jovian, was forced to cede the Roman suzerainty over Kartli- Iberia, which had been established three centuries before by Pompey~ The Roman vassal in eastern Georgia, Sauromaces 11(361—363), was replaced by Christian Georgia 21 22 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES his younger brother, Bakur I (363—3 65), called Aspacures II by the Romans, who ruled as an Iranian vassal. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the same time, a renewed danger to Arab hegemony in Caucasia appeared. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The most powerful local figures in Georgia and Armenia were Avag Zakharian (Mkhargrdzeli), the atabeg of Queen Rusudan, and the aznauri of Kakheti, Egarslani Bakurtsikheli, whom the chronicler described as “an estimable man and very versed in the science of war, [who] had such consideration that he only lacked the name of king. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The nobles began their deliberations, wary of the consequences of emancipation but also hopeful that their privileged position would not be seriously compromised. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The guild councils were drawn from among the principal master craftsmen, each guild having its high master and two assistants, and its own banner, rules and customs. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The rules of this new world order, to borrow a recent phrase, were those of European-style states which identify legitimate power with ter- ritory and historical continuity, and part of Yemen, with the Ottoman demise, now had a place in this. A History of Modern Yemen
But the most important did so. A History of Modern Yemen
The Egyptian leader rules Yemen with his forces. A History of Modern Yemen
and a colleague of Ghashmi, took Two Yemeni states in the 1970.5 A History of Modern Yemen
Parts of the region were a battle-ground, however, and existing literature understates the brutalising effect on Yemen’s politics. A History of Modern Yemen
falwd ~zadith /iãkim ~id Imam in4/~1ah jabal jihãd kafti khuruj kufalã’ libnah mashãyi/c/i mufli qãdi a local governor, in charge of anything from a village or town to a whole province “prince” or “commander”. A History of Modern Yemen
Long before that, in the matchlock age, one finds elaborate rules about who can shoot at what in which circumstance. A History of Modern Yemen
Our meetings took place over several months in PLO safe houses in Tunis and its suburbs, reached after long car journeys, usually at night. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, it was only a matter of time before these two mavericks of Arab politics, two men who lived by their own rules, gravitated toward each other, They had much in common—a neurotic suspicion of the outside world, an inferiority complex—but they also shared the belief that they were men of great destiny. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE ORGANIZATION DIRECTORATE This directorate dealt with the recruitment of new members, their education in the rules and philosophy of the organization, and their preparation for a job within it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestinian On August 20, 1983, a hot summer’s day, in a coastal suburb But the Russians did not let the matter rest. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He rules out permanent Israeli control of the occupied territories, calls for an immedi- ate freeze on settlements, and pronounces in favor of Pales- tinian self-government “in association with Jordan.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They were staying at the Cumberland Hotel, hardly venturing out, waiting for their liaison to give them instructions for an FRC action. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chapter 1 ing that to remove it would violate religious rules prohibiting work. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
20. Comtemporary Yemen
(xi) The Civil Code, consisting of 1,930 sections, was passed by the People’s Supreme Council in April 1983. Comtemporary Yemen
Civil Procedure In civil cases the procedure is governed by ordinances and rules of courts effective throughout the Republic. Comtemporary Yemen
There are rules of court governing appear- ance of the advocates, their rights and duties, their relationship with their clients, the fees that they can charge in all types of cases and applications, their dismissal (which is by striking the name of the advocate off the register) or their suspension if there is any breach of the rules governing their rights and duties. Comtemporary Yemen
Though such organi- zations—the French National Front is a good exam- ple—are unsavory in their views, they are often genuinely convinced participants in democracy, accept- ing its basic ground rules and defending its central ten- ets. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It is evident that such terror-inflicted violations of the civil rights of a people may, if attacks are an extraordi- nary rarity, be insufficient to justify taking any kind of serious action; but it is equally evident that there is some point at which terror becomes by far the bigger threat to citizens’ rights and the time comes to take unflinching action. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet Bishop’s conclusion was that even under the rigid civil liberties orientation of the American Bill of Rights, the courts had consistently upheld the authority of the Fighting Terrorism 43 executive branch to curtail civil freedoms where there was compelling evidence of a threat to the security of the United States if these unlimited liberties remained in force. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Islamist prisoners refused to obey those instructions that they considered inconsistent with religious beliefs. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Palestinian tradition in Israeli prisons required a newly sentenced inmate to join a prison group identified with one of the major organizations, such as Fateh, the PFLP, or the DFLP. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Its statements stressed the significance of worship and religious obser- vance, such as fasting during Ramadan and praying regularly, and appealed to women to be modest and wear hijab; it related all these matters to resis- tance against the occupation, invoking the example of historic paradigm cases in which Muslims had won victories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Role of Islamic Art in the Battle for Liberation ARTICLE 19: Art has rules and standards by which one can determine whether it is Islamic or ignorant. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
liberation movement of the Palestinian people and represents a large seg- ment of it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Not to carry out any operation outside occupied Palestine and to concentrate the effort inside the Occupied Territories—that being the natural and legitimate arena of confrontation given the occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Our agreement with the Government of Lebanon expressly rules out any combat responsibilities for the US forces.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Russian craftsmen filtered into the city to compete with local producers, and by the 1840s they numbered more than seven hundred.79 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Though no immediate crisis threatened the Soviet Union in 1985, Gorbachev and his closest associates resolved to reverse the long, slow secular decline of the economy and to end the international isolation of the USSR by redefining what socialism had come to mean. The Making of the Georgian Nation
77. The Making of the Georgian Nation
error, this time a fatal one. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The rebellious Gaza Strip, teeming with hapless refugees, had suffered the same death and destruction. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For the next three centuries, hereditary magnates ruled over each province under the supervision of governors appointed by the Great Kings of Iran and the Byzantine emperors, and later, after about A.D. 6~o, by the Arab caliphs. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
in Eastern Georgia, the liquidation of the branch of the dynasty ruling in Western Georgia was only a matter of time. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Okropir himself visited Georgia in 1830, and held talks with the principal conspirators, who included members of the princely houses of Orbeliani and Eristavi, as well as the publicist Solomon Dodashvili. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Two years later, in 1834, the new Imam sought to extend his authority by massacring the ruling khans of Avaria and making himself master of their capital, Khunzakh. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1833, Michael (Tatark- han) and Nicholas (Tsiokh) Dadeshkeiani, miavars or ruling princes of Western Upper Svaneti, signed a treaty of protector- ate with Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Samurzaqano had since 1758 constituted a separate principality, and its last ruling prince was Manuchar Sharvashidze. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Not long afterwards, the Dadian or ruling prince of Mingrelia was deprived of his powers of criminal juris- diction, which he had retained since becoming a vassal of the Tsar in 1803. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The satirical book by Prince bane Bagration (1772—1830), called Kalmasoba or The Alms-Collecting Tour, contains an account of a visit to the Dadian or ruling prince of Mingrelia, who liked to spend the fishing season in a roofless, floorless house by the River Rioni, which afforded him shelter only from the wind. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It will be recalled that the Dadian or ruling prince of Mingrelia had been placed under a Russian protectorate in 1803, but had retained a large measure of authority as a vassal of the emperor. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The ruling prince of Western Upper Svaneti was exiled to Erivan in Armenia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Turkish envoys who arrived at the Abkhazian capital, Sukhumi, found the ruling dynasty of the Sharvashidzes divided: the Christian princes adhered to the Russian interest, but bskander (Alexander), a Muslim, was prepared to help the Turks in return for permission to annex the neighbouring Mingrelian district of Samurzaqano. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1864, they deposed the ruling prince, Michael Sharvashidze, and annexed his country by force of arms. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Many Georgian intellectuals greeted these readjustments with approval, and were glad to see the old ruling class stirred from its torpor into fruitful enterprise. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Ottoman claim to broader suzerainty is accepted in some degree (the ruler of the Empire is addressed throughout such correspondence as “Sultan al- Islam”; the term “Caliph” is reserved to the Imam) but the right of Imams to rule all Yemen brooks no argument. A History of Modern Yemen
His grandson Muhammad al-IdrIsi we have seen rejecting Yaliya’s truce with the Ottomans, but the region he dominated was very much part of Zaydi history for the “Mikhlaf SulaymanI”, which takes its name from a governor of the BanI Ziyad (c. A History of Modern Yemen
They were in fact shy of ruling. A History of Modern Yemen
The ruling family of the Upper ‘AwlaqT Shaykhdom split. A History of Modern Yemen
These, so the argument ran, a jealous imperial- ism had to sabotage; and the fact the LaI~ij scheme benefited largely the ruling family was not at this stage relevant.46 A History of Modern Yemen
Inequality of land tenure was striking in parts of Hadramawt, for instance; so it was in Lahj where pump irrigation produced large holdings owned by the ruling family. A History of Modern Yemen
A1-Asnaj, the Aden trades union leader now in Cairo, had formed an alliance with such anti-colonial members of ruling families as Muhammad cAydarus of Yafic and with al-Jifri’s South Arabian League, themselves somewhat compromised in Yemeni affairs by Saudi connec- tions which date to 1959. A History of Modern Yemen
The ruling family are not the only ones involved in commerce. A History of Modern Yemen
1994 War between the ruling parties. A History of Modern Yemen
As Abu Dawud told me, “I was myself released far sooner as a result of numerous appeals on my behalf. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The same day Salah was killed, members of the PLO, headed by Dr. Issam Sartawi, met in Paris with a delegation of Israeli peace activists. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Before Mohsin took his rightful place, Saika had limited autonomy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Someone spotted a getaway car which took off like lightning, and its license number was broadcast on French TV. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When Britain canceled the PLO’s visit, FRC’s terror against it stopped. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ali bin Fadl, supported as he was by tribesmen from Yafi’ and Madhhij, won spectacular successes throughout Yemen, but his influence and success in spreading the Fatimid mission and attracting converts and adherents were vitiated by the radicalism of his personal regime. Comtemporary Yemen
A triumvirate within the ruling Presidential Council dominated the second stage (197 1—8). Comtemporary Yemen
These differences and the internal contradictions and instability of South Yemeni politics were aptly illustrated by the composition of the ruling triumvirate. Comtemporary Yemen
New York Times, 4 Mar. 1982. Comtemporary Yemen
It should be mentioned here that YAR policy has been to exclude Soviet-trained personnel from important positions.’8 Comtemporary Yemen
In October 1975, the ruling National Front Party (NF), in a major reform, aligned itself with both the PDU and al-Tali’a (the Van- guard), a comparatively small, pro-Syrian, Ba’thist group. Comtemporary Yemen
Outlook: Union by Convergence or Persisting Divergences? It would probably be wise not to press for an immediate merger as proposed in the draft constitution: a formula for federation or con- federation might be a better solution because social structures and political orientations are too diverse for a truly unified state. Comtemporary Yemen
More bizarre is the Benjamin Netanyahu 40 fact that afatwah (Islamic legal ruling) ordering the death of Salman Rushdie for having written The Satanic Verses is—incredibly—being preached in the United States as “protected” speech, shielded by an absurdly generous in- terpretation of “freedom of speech and religion.” Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A good example of the absurdity of shielding terrorist incitement is provided by the case of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian cleric whose Gamaa Isla- miya terror network has been charged with the World Trade Center bombing and with planning attacks on tar- gets such as the Lincoln Tunnel. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At the start of the crisis, a special communications channel was established between Shultz and the two key leaders in the govern- ment of Israel, Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir (who, although of opposing parties, were jointly ruling in a National Unity Govern- ment); I was then serving as Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, and sensitive messages concerning the crisis were passed back and forth through my office. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The ruling classes sent their children to study at European universities and gladly assisted in maintaining foreign influence over their economies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This vacillation was seen in another way as a dilemma 1.See, HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It was clear that there could not be two paral- lel authorities ruling over Gaza and that power, not love, would decide the issue in favor of one or the other. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Soviet role in the region ended in a way that was as disappointing to its Arab allies, including some Palestinians, as it was unexpected by them. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The available sources largely tell us the exploits of royal houses and stories of foreign invasion and domestic revolt. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Thus a ruling prince appointed from Byzantium replaced the hereditary monarchy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The emperor recognized Guaram 11(684-693?) as curopalates of Kartli-Iberia.24 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the formation of his ruling apparatus, David employed the great eristavni, thus making them dependent upon him. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But David’s successes against the Turks, as well as his demands for tribute from the independent city of Tbilisi, gave rise to an alliance between the Seljuk. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, more particularly in the sixteenth and seventeenth, the vassal relations that had formerly united the Georgian princes and their sovereign were found to be in question and their legitimacy ceased to constitute the basis of royal authority.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Although eastern Geor- gians had grown more ambivalent about the Russian connection, a Russian orientation still found supporters among the Georgian ruling elite, which hoped for Christian aid against Iranian, Turkish, and Daghestani intrusions. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Transcaucasia was divided into two administrative units: the Caspian oblast’ (region) and the Gruzino-Imeretinskaia guberniia (Georgian-Imeretian province). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Eventually a stratum of “first mokalake” or “honored mokalake” developed within this general category. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The “second rank” split between the two parties, and the “third” gave enough support to the opposition to elect a duma divided between the old ruling party and the new opposition. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This time the opposition was easily beaten; the party of Matinov and Izmailov remained dominant in the duma.57 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The local nobility’s advan- tages in landholding and freedom from tax and labor obligations (like road work) infuriated the peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He expressed alarm that the Georgian intel- ligentsia remained sympathetic to the old ruling class. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Bolshevik revolution, like other social revolutions, had transformed the class structure and brought new social groups into power; but in contrast to the great revolutions in England and France, the long civil war in the Russian empire had removed the old ruling elite so completely that restoration was impossible. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In stark contrast to the views of the ruling triumvirate, the left wing in the party drew its own lessons from the current impasse, emphasizing the need for more pressure on the peasantry through taxation and price policy in order to increase investment in industry. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From a small group of underground revolutionaries it had been transformed into a broad-based ruling elite. The Making of the Georgian Nation
With the loss of political independence and the curtailment of much of Georgia’s political autonomy, the peoples of Georgia adjusted to a new ruling elite, one that had at the best of times a dual loyalty—to the develop- ment of a socialist Georgia and to the maintenance of a strong centralized Soviet Union. The Making of the Georgian Nation
All the constituent peoples of the Soviet Union were affected by the social revolution of the Stalin years as well as by the political changes that followed, but the emphasis of most analysts of the recent Soviet past has been, understandably, on the center and on the top, that is, on the Russian heartland and the ruling communist elite. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The costs and limits of reform within the system left by Stalin became apparent within the first few years after his death. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The swift and brutal response from the Soviet government illustrated starkly its inability to resolve the dilemma of how much of the Soviet system to change and how much of Stalin’s authoritarianism to preserve. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In March 1958, a festival of Georgian culture was held in Moscow, and later that year the lSOOth anniversary of Tbilisi’s founding was celebrated. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The autonomy permitted by Moscow, which now chose to rule indirectly through local cadres, gave the national elite the chance to culti- vate popular support through the exploitation of national feelings. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Gorbachev’s attempt to revive the Soviet economy, combined with Shevardnadze’s efforts to reorient Soviet foreign policy, brought new freedoms and a much more democratic political order to the Soviet people. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Insecurity and instability in the perpetual ranking and re-ranking of personal relationships is the norm. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Central to the national myth promoted by nationalists is the triad oppres- sion, struggle, freedom. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Desiatina (p1. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Rigby, Communist Party Membership, pp. 230—31. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As quick as lightning, she drew the dagger and stabbed Lazarev through the body with such force that the tip of the weapon emerged through his left side. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The execution of the plot was entrusted to ‘Silva’—the hardened conspirator Sylvester Jibladze—wbo enlisted the services of an expert bomb-thrower named Arsena Jorjiashvili. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Negotiations in 1926 came to little, and in 1927 Qa’~abah (just north of the old Anglo-Turkish line) was bombed and machine-gunned for five days, at which stage the Imam’s men were 50 kiometres from Aden. A History of Modern Yemen
But the flags appeared in strange places. A History of Modern Yemen
Two sons of cAbdullah al-Ahmar, the paramount shaykh of Hashid, threw themselves into lives of multinational money-making, and a succession of quiet scandals unfolded in Sanaa as property that was waqf (gifted for religion) fell under their control. A History of Modern Yemen
Once every two or three days he was allowed to go out to the lavatory. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On the pretext of wanting to take a tissue from a box inside the car, Hamza threw open the door of Abu lyad’s Mercedes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At great length, and with complicated excursions into Arafat’s obscure genealogy, he had tried to persuade me that the PLO chairman was a Jew of Moroc- can origin. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As a chal- lenge of sorts, he threw himself into terrorism, as if to convince those Palestinians already engaged in it that he was stronger and more effective than they were. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They wanted Arafat to sack the cowardly officers; to share power with them in a “collective leadership”; to smuggle back into Lebanon the Palestinian fighters who had been dispersed abroad; and to opt unequivocally for armed struggle rather than political compromise. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Each country has its sensitive areas where we can put pres- sure!” he warned. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
~ Ith i~o / PATRICK SEALE and character, presenting him with a number of critical choices: What sort of movement did he wish to command and what sort of leader did he wish to be? The main impetus for the organization’s transformation was the so-called War of the Camps, a pitiless struggle between Pales- tinians and Shi’ites, which lasted from 1985 to 1987, leaving count- less thousands dead, wounded, or uprooted from their homes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the rifle made such a terrible noise. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One of the gunmen, hooded and sinister, walked onto the balcony and raised his arms in defiant victory. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israelis then went downstairs and threw a grenade at Kamal Adwan in front of his wife and two small children. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The gunmen aboard the plane killed an Italian pas- senger and threw his body on the tarmac; then, over the radio they playacted killing other passengers, and the authorities believed them, considering what they had done in Rome. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Sharara, a member of the PLO’s Central Committee, worked with Naim Khader on drumming up European support for the Palestinians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the morning a Palestinian in Rome was given a bomb by someone he had never seen before, who told him to throw it at the Alia ticket office. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All three Alia offices were located a short distance from the El Al office, which, like the nearby offices of United States airlines, the FRC did not touch. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
architecture destroying the Mediterranean. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
If Abu Nidal wanted to make a statement against the British, why not strike a prestigious hotel such as the Grande Bretagne in the center of Athens in Sintagma Square? Why pick such an obscure place? Rome took a hefty share of the anti—British bombings during this period. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The FRC attacker drove from Vienna and stayed in various hotels before his liaison gave him a disposable RPG, $1000 cash, a fragmentation grenade, and his instructions. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Perhaps this growing British support for a political settlement to the Pales- tinian-Israeli conffict explains the terror directed towards Britain. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Rome group leader, Ibrahim Khaled, knew Ahmed Ismail Givara, the one who threw a bomb at the British Army office. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The new movement lasted only two months, since FRC was not inter- The 1983—85 split harmed the Palestinians more than the Lebanon inva- But Algeria, the host country, threw a wrench into the works when they 16. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He threw a grenade, but it did not work; then he threw another, which also failed to explode, and two off-duty plainclothesmen rushed to the scene and wrestled him to the ground. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The other Palestinian groups had followings, people who supported Habash or Arafat or Jabril. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On November 25, 1987, Jabril’s GC organized an ultralight plane raid into an Israeli military camp. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After Israel invaded and occupied Lebanon, it threw thousands of Shia in makeshift prisons in Lebanon and transported others to prisons in Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But the car blew up, and instead of hijacking the ship, the gunmen sprayed the passengers with bul- lets and threw a couple of powerful grenades. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
terrorist activity in Greece. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It appeared as if the group had out- lived its usefulness and imploded. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Screaming abuse at the invaders, men, women and children threw stones at the soldiers, set fire to tyres and placed obstacles in front of the moving line of vehicles. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The force of the blast threw a huge armoured personnel carrier twenty yards across the road and into the wall of the orchard. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Once the fortress was taken, “then came a dreadful spectacle: the women threw their little children down from the rocks and then threw themselves down after them, and the men did likewise.”33 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Threatened by a blow to their status, the great majority of the Georgian nobles unhesitatingly threw off their traditional leaders from the noblesse d’epée and rallied around Kipiani, the articulate representative of the small and middle nobility.23 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Not content with the range of political options, Nikoladze threw himself into his studies. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The social democrats attempted another general strike, this one to mark the first anniversary of “Bloody Sunday,” but the next day party members were rounded up by the police. The Making of the Georgian Nation
While kulaks were not to be admitted to collectives, it had been thought by many that dekulakized peasants might be admitted. The Making of the Georgian Nation
al-Tayyib, ‘Abd al-Malik. A History of Modern Yemen
The demand for European manufactured goods was stimulated by the presence in Georgia of a large number of Russian officers and civilian functionaries, with their families. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
following day gave him a well-used North Yemeni passport, with various stamps and visas in it, in the name of Muhammad Ahmad al-Salihi, domiciled in Abu Dhabi, occupation petroleum engineer. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Georgian rural economy was most definitively noncapitalist; only in the towns, among Armenians, might one find the earliest signs of bourgeois development with its accompanying notions of thrift, delayed gratification, and the steady accumulation of wealth. The Making of the Georgian Nation
An Arabic proverb says that marriage makes a man both prudent and thrifty. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
1992 al~Siracfi Cadan Cairo: Maktabat Madbüli. A History of Modern Yemen
1928 7?irilch at-yaman, Cairo: al~Matbacat al- Salafiyyah. A History of Modern Yemen
And he paid good money. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After being subject to terrorist incidents, England, France, Italy and Greece opened secret dialogues with the PLO, including small arms donations under the guise of student grants and medical aid, to keep the dirty war away from their shores and keep the oil pipeline open, since the Palestinians seemed to exercise influence in this area.27 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They included Ramsay MacDonald, Vandervelde, Mrs. E. Snowden, Renaudel, Kautsky, Huysmans and others, who were thrilled by the official honours and gracious hospital- ity dispensed to them by the Georgian government. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
1995 Ijarb alyaman: aI-qablla/z tantasir CaM I-dawlah, Beirut: al- al-Bakrj, Salah. A History of Modern Yemen
The style of pious care for those less fortunate is familiar from the record of Imam Yaliya’s reign, but the setting in which such piety may thrive is different. A History of Modern Yemen
As fashions changed, certain craftsmen suffered, like those who made Oriental slippers (koshebi) while others, like those who made European shoes, thrived, even when faced by new competition from mechanized production. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Terror- ism thrives in the dark and withers when stripped of its deniability. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
williamj@tenbase2.com