sound(RealPlayer)Welcome to the George Home Page.

 

To run George from your browser, click here.

 

To view only the New York Times search results, click here.

Here are keyword searches from today's headlines of the Chicago Tribune.

"Chicago archdiocese removes eight priests from ministry"

Here is the list of searched books:

A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A History of Modern Yemen
Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Comtemporary Yemen
Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Making of the Georgian Nation

His presence in Beirut was greatly benefited from.
	Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance

Hezbollah 214 Sources written in English: Agha, Hussein J., and Khalidi, Ahmad S., Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Co-operation, London, 1995 Ajami, Fouad, The Vanished Imam: Musa Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon, NewYork, 1986 BBC World Service Newspack, Foreign Hostage Crisis in Lebanon, Cyprus, 1991 Chomsky, Noam, The Fateful Triangle:The United States, Israel and the Palestinians, London, 1983 Coughlin, Con, Hostage, London, 1993 Dekmeijan, R. Hrair, Islam in Revolution, New York, 1995 Ehteshami, Anoushiravam, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic, London, 1995 Esposito, John L., The Islamic Threat:Myth or Reality?, NewYork, 1995 Fisk, Robert, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, Oxford, 1992 Bibliography 215 Hiro, Dilip, Islamic Fundamentalism, London, 1989 Hiro, Diip, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, London, 1993 Hollis, Rosemary, and Shehadi, Nadim, (eds), Lebanon on Hold, London, 1996 Izadi, Mostafa (Ed.), Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Then Chicago-gangland-style, he fired an imaginary submachine gun at the assembled cabinet members. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In October 1983, during the United States invasion of Grenada, the Jordanian ambassador in Delhi, Mohammed Ali Khourma, was wounded by a lone FRC gunman.6 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Perhaps if either the Jews or the Arabs had not been passionate about their cause they could have abandoned it. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
12. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chicago Tribune, 14 May 1990, p. 3, and 15 May 1990, p. 3. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chicago Tribune, 30 July 1993, p. 2. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
London Times, 5 January 1978, p. 1; Chicago Tribune, 5 January 1978, p. 1. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Kameel Nasr and Dma Lawrence, Children of Palestinian Refugees vs. the 5. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the Iranian revolution the American and Israeli 10. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The authors also point out (p. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chicago Tribune, 21 May 1978, P. 4. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chicago Tribune, 31 August 1981, p. 8. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Corriera della Sera, 6 April 1986, p. 2. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chicago Tribune, 17 July 1993: Rezaq was turned over to the FBI in Nige- ria and taken to Washington for trial. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
by Sacha Rubinovitch (Man- Christopher Hewitt, The Effectiveness ofAnti-Terrorist Policies, (Lanham The United States criticized the deal, saying that the hijackers evaded Notes—Chapter 18 -w have in-depth articles on the negotiations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
29. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Wilderness of Mirrors. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
These include arms of the Hamas, Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and cells of the Sunni Mujahdeen, with centers of activity in Brooklyn, New Jersey, Tampa, Chicago, Detroit, Kansas City—and even Oklahoma City. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In 1994, a pathbreaking piece of investigative journalism, Jihad in America, was aired by PBS, weaving together the threads of the quiltwork of Islamic terrorist groups and terrorist sponsors which have sprung up across America since the Iranian revolution. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Accusations against the PLO intensified, and references to the unrep- resentative nature of the PLO became more frank. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Particular scrutiny was maintained on the activities of charitable committees, especially when the struggle 93. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
by James Piscatori (Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Chicago: International Center for Research and Study, n.d. Harakat al-mu qawama al-Islam:yya (Hamas): Hadathun ‘aber am badilun da’im [The Islamic resistance movement (Hamas): An ephemeral event or a permanent alternative?]. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Chicago: The Inter- national Center for Studies and Research, 1990. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Chicago: International Center for Research and Study, 1991. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Al-Hadaf various issues. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They found, bor rowed, or invented the social and ethnic “traditions” they needed, revivin~ symbols and rituals that soon appeared to have a naturalness and authentic• ity that originated deep in history and possessed clear legitimacy for shap• ing the future.1 The Making of the Georgian Nation
25.Ibid., The Making of the Georgian Nation
pp. 607, 54, 329—30. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Alongside Islamic banks, there are nov~ also investment institutions such as Kuwait’s Internationa] Investor, which opened a branch in London in 1994. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
During the winter of 1919—20, the impending collapse of Denikin’s army in North Caucasia and the Black Sea region encouraged the Soviet Comrnissar for Foreign Affairs, Chich- CHAPTER XI 1920—24 of 1924 224 em, to invite Georgia to unite with Russia against the Whites. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Grigol Uratadze, a veteran Menshe- vik, was sent clandestinely to Moscow to negotiate with Chicherin and the other People’s Commissars. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Chicherin replied to the British Foreign Secretary that ‘Soviet Russia has not committed and will not commit in future any hostile acts against the Republic of Georgia’, with which assurance Curzon had to rest content. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Russian Finance Minister, “7 Byron, Byronism, in Russian and Georgian literature, 63, 88 Byzantium, 21, 27—8, 30, 113 ‘Cadets’ (Constitutional Democrats), 159—6o, 170—i, 174 Cambon, Jules, 22! A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Meshech and Tubal of the Prophet Ezekiel were ancient tribes of metal-workers, related to the ancestors of the Georgians of today. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The present-day Georgian or ‘Kartvelian’ nation no doubt results from a fusion of aboriginal, autochthonous inhabitants with immigrants who infiltrated into Transcaucasia from the direction of Asia Minor in remote antiquity. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Georgian novelists and essayists have in modern times attained a high standard of originality. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
and Safari Persia — Rap- prochement with Russia — Collapse of the monarcbj — The From tribe to monarchj THE INSTITUTION of monarchy in Georgia stretches back into remote antiquity. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Tsitsianov’s successors were less talented than he. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
These shrewd and hardened individuals usually outclassed in business ability their former feudal lords, who tended to drift into the cities where they felt more at home than in the dilapidated chdteaux of the remote countryside. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In his relations with the Georgian Republic, Denikin’s fatuity was matched only by the intransigent volubility of Foreign Minister Gegechkori, who spent months arguing with the White Russians about some insignificant strips of remote territory in the region of Sochi and Gagra along the Black Sea coast. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In Mingreia and Abkhazia, groups of women armed with sticks marched through the kolkbo~ fields, persuading the peasants to abandon work and go home. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
We’ll give you some money to travel and live abroad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He had in effect surrendered to Abu Nidal what was left of the organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Instead of being a small, closed, clandestine outfit that Abu Nidal could direct by remote control, the organization was develop- ing into a mass movement with its own strong leaders and cadres. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
All the principal groups—Fatah, the PFLP, the Democratic Front, the PFLP—General Command, the Arab Liber- ation Front, and Abu Nidal’s organization—are studied. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hamshari, the most lucid and respected Palestinian representative in Europe, was an intellectual who opposed violence, a philosopher with a strong personality who became friends with journalists and government leaders. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
According to Time, Israel used 14 agents, including some of the same peo- After Chambers knew Salameh’s habits, the agents rented a Volkswagen When Salameh’s car passed the Volkswagen, Chambers pressed the remote Zuhair Mohsin loved a fine cigar, a dark, fat Havana. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The man looked like an Arab but spoke Arabic with an accent. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He offered his services to the PLO and did small jobs for them,2’ meeting Abd al-Rahim Mustafa, a not-too-bright mem- ber of Force 17, the security branch of the PLO headed by Abu Tayib, a semi- literate who worked from Amman until he was dismissed in 1991. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
VI, no. 2(1970), pp. 189—211. Comtemporary Yemen
His aura as a commanding personality had eroded con- siderably. Comtemporary Yemen
Familiarity with terrorism and its complete rejection would create a citizenry which is capable of “living with terror”—not in the sense of accepting terror, but rather in the sense of understanding what is needed for society to survive its attacks with the least damage. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Since 1988, American and international efforts to find a peaceful solu- tion to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have intensified, while an Arab mili- tary option became remote as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For more than ten years, these photographs of Dodge’s son and daughter in their graduation gowns had been sitting in the old shoebox on the top shelf of Farid’s wardrobe, in this remote village in the BekaaValley. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Furthermore, they had organised special teams to rove the region and the remote vifiages scattered around the Bekaa Valley to preach the tenets of Islam and the teachings and doctrines of Khomeini to the villagers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They were not only Shiite areas: they included remote villages in Christian and Sunni districts in the far north of the country, where the inhabitants still relied on candles and oil lamps. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Another two such mobile clinics exist in the BekaaValley and treat the residents of seventeen remote villages. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Many vifiages in the remote western Bekaa and South Lebanon have only had schools built in the last decade. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In an attempt to address the problem, Hezbollah embarked on a project of building and rehabilitating schools in remote vifiages and towns. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Svaneti, the most remote and inaccessible part of Georgia, was dis- tinguished by the ferocity of its people’s determination to preserve their traditional way of life. The Making of the Georgian Nation
To the Georgian working class, separated by language, culture, wealth, and power from the Armenian bourgeoisie, the Marxists made their supranational appeal, exposing a stark world of cap- italist exploitation and foreign dominion that they claimed could be over- Marxism and National Struggle 145 146 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE come only by creating a national liberation movement based on class war. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Gurian peasantr~ keep in mind, is a cultured element among whom the percentage of literacy is great.41 The Making of the Georgian Nation
A school for girls, founded by the Turks, was later closed by the Imam. Comtemporary Yemen
In the same year the British foreign secretary issued the Balfour Declaration, which announced that Palestine would become a homeland for Jews. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The existence of strong feudal institutions prevented the royal power from degenerating into sheer despotism. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It was natural, given these conditions, that the Georgians should have yearned for the removal of Russian dominance and the return of the house of Bagration. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In spite of these factors, Rosen carried out the Senate’s orders to the letter. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On 7 May 1920 the Georgian Menshevik government felt it advisable to sign a treaty of friendship with Soviet Russia, pledging themselves among other things to work for the removal of all foreign troops from Georgian soil. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Other obstacles are of a more profound character and their removal requires the emergence of a truly national political culture. Comtemporary Yemen
Article 48 of the constitution. Comtemporary Yemen
Sections 9 and 100 of the Criminal Procedure. Comtemporary Yemen
It was also hoped that, once this modernisation plan was completed, the re-equipped YAR armed forces would be modelled on the Saudi force structure in equipment and training. Comtemporary Yemen
After the failure of the 1948 revolution, many of its leaders, including some of the Free Yemenis, lost their heads to the execu- tioner’s sword and the majority of the remainder (e.g. Comtemporary Yemen
In Britain, that mo- Fighting Terrorism 33 ment came in 1973, after IRA violence had reached un- precedented heights. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
al-mutlaqah] . HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The removal of the PLO from the South therefore appeared to be of mutual benefit to both the Israelis and the southern Lebanese. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The affront to the national church was as serious a blow to traditional Georgian society as the removal of the Bagratid house, the replacement of the noble mouravebi by Russian officials, and the stiffer requirements placed on the peasantry. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The removal of royal power over formerly royal towns and the downgrading of noble officials such as the mouravni and natsualebi meant that local guilds, hitherto in virtual subor- dination to the seigneurial elite, ascended to positions of great power in the city. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The depu- ties left the hail, and the crowd, led by social democrats, held their own meeting. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A special commission headed by Felix Dzerzhinskii went to Tiflis to sort out the sources of conflict, which had become so intensely personal that one evening late in November Orjonikidze lost control and slapped a Mdivani supporter. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the very beginning of 1929, the central government decreed that Muslim women were to be required to remove the chadra, the heavy veil covering their faces. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the resolution of Zakkraikom in November put it: “A decisive struggle is needed against the manifestations of federalism, against the holding back by party leaders of the rapid tempos of economic con- resistance to the radical policies of the center ended dramatically with I struction, against the tardiness and passivity of party organs in the correcting of all sorts of harmful phenomena in party organizations.”25 The Making of the Georgian Nation
This would be stupid and reactionary.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Another “antiparty group” calling for Stalin’s removal was discovered, and in January 1933, a Central Committee member, A. P. Smir- nov, and two other Old Bolsheviks, Eismont and Tolmachev, were expelled from the party.3 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Gorbachev’s attempt to revive the Soviet economy, combined with Shevardnadze’s efforts to reorient Soviet foreign policy, brought new freedoms and a much more democratic political order to the Soviet people. The Making of the Georgian Nation
There are two recent studies of the Zhdanov period: Gavriel D. Ra’anan, International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional “Debates” During the Zhdanovshchina (Hamden, Conn.: The Making of the Georgian Nation
Short of removals, the leadership also resorted to repeated exhortations, production campaigns, wage incentives, rewards and bonuses for highly productive “shock” workers. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Filling up their time by indis- criminate love-making and the prosecution of the blood feuds resulting therefrom, the Svans were too idle even to clear away the mountains of refuse which accumulated in front of their hovels. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He was busy enriching himself by disreputable speculations in the bazaar, and allot- ting key positions in the government to his relatives and A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 44 friends. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
But if you show your devotion in some other way, perhaps I will remove this quitrent. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This happy consummation would indeed remove all conflict of interest between them.58 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Bunge, en- acted a series of factory laws designed to suppress the more scandalous forms of exploitation, restrict the hours worked by children and progressively remove causes of unrest and dis- content. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The relatives of the dead were refused permission to remove the bodies, which were flung into a common grave. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Palestinians from the territories hardly know his name, because he has commit- ted no men, donated not a penny, done nothing at all—absolutely nothing—to support their struggle against Israeli rule. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His first move, following the Karachi raid, was to instruct his intelligence chief, Abd al-Rahman Isa, to remove the organization’s archives and other important documentary material to Libya. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He knew, of course, that Abu Nizar was by then long since in his grave, buried in cement under Abu Nidal’s Libyan villa. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Another guerilla leader named Abd al-Rahim al-Ha] Muhammad also com- manded a group in the hills until he was killed in March 1939. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chapter 1 ing that to remove it would violate religious rules prohibiting work. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The North has so far placed greater emphasis on personal legiti- macy. Comtemporary Yemen
Its concept of greater Yemen or the Yemeni homeland was further developed and became more out- spoken; for example, al-Hakimi, the party’s new leader, wrote, ‘The Yemeni Union firmly believes that the cause of Aden,. Comtemporary Yemen
Rather than adopting an attitude of dismissive or fatalistic acceptance, this book is a plea for action, which, if prosecuted reso- lutely and consistently, is bound to remove the threat or at least substantially reduce it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
With respect to the issue of targeting civilians, Hamas offered an initiative in April 1994 to remove civilians from the arena of struggle between Palestinian mujahideen and Zionist occupation forces and to spare them the brunt of military operations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel, which for years had rightly blamed most attacks and the Islamic Resistance’s progress on Musawi, believed that by assassinating him it would remove the head of the dragon and weaken the military wing of Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘It was crazy,’ recalled Farid, revealing for the first time how the kidnappers managed to remove Dodge from Beirut under the noses of the Israelis: There was no way for us to move him without him being discovered by the Israeli troops surrounding the city. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In Lebanon, schooling is not provided free and many Lebanese have had to remove their children from school either because they could no longer afford to pay for their education or because they required their children to contribute towards the family’s income. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Georgian chronicler, Juansher, makes it clear that the curopalates, although he enjoyed the loyalty of the great nobles, “could not remove the dukes of Iberia from their duchies because they had charters from the Great King and from the Emperor confirming them in their duchies.”17 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Clearly, in contrast to Guaram, the late sixth-century curopalates, Bagrat could remove princes holding hereditary possessions. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the first years of the Russian occupation, Georgians in one region or another, members of one class or Russian Rule and Georgian Society 83 84 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE another, protested the presence of the tsarist forces. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By campaigning against all Armenians rather than just the ruling party~ the opposition produced a backlash among the electors and assured its own defeat. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Back in Tiflis, the governor extracted a promise from Vorontsov-Dashkov to remove General Alikhanov and his punitive expedition from Guria. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet Russia was cut off economically from the leading capitalist nations; Caucasia could coexist and trade with the West much more easily. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In an early attempt to bring unity to the party, Stalin and Orjonikidze had the Georgian Central Committee remove Makharadze as Revkom chair- man and appoint Mdivani in his place (July 7). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Orders from the center forced the local Stalin’s Revolution 243 244 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA cadres to carry out policies that many feared would lead to resistance. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The government made an ill-advised attempt to remove from the draft of the new Georgian constitution a clause that affirmed Georgian as the sole official state language of the republic and attempted to replace it with a clause that gave equal status to Russian and other languages. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But the continuing downward spiral of the economy, the resistance of conservative Communists to reform, and the emergence of ethnic nationalism seriously eroded authority in the center and provided an opportunity for nationalist forces in the union republics to push for sovereignty and independence. The Making of the Georgian Nation
With the Georgian royal family removed from power, the commander-in-chief on Russia’s Caucasian front was now supreme head of the central government at Tbilisi by virtue of proconsular powers conferred on him by the Tsar. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
One eyewitness, Colonel Rottiers, a Belgian in the Russian service, went so far as to recommend that Russian officials be removed altogether from service in Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The senators removed these persons from office and committed them for trial. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A peasant revolt broke out, led by a blacksmith named thu Mikava. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
As viceroy he appointed General-Adjutant Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, an elder statesman of an intelligent outlook far removed from that of the chauvinistic Golitsyn, and a kinsman of the distinguished and popular Prince Michael Vorontsov, viceroy from 184~ to 1854, whose memory was much respected throughout the Caucasus. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Master’s real fault lay in his possessing greater realism and less cant than most of his disciples. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
pulsory labour. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Two Georgian Communist Party secretaries, the Chairman of the Georgian Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice were among those removed from their posts late in 195 I. These changes failed to satisfy Stalin. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The fact that several high officials removed by Mgeladze, notably Valerian Bakradze, Deputy Chairman of the Georgian Council of Ministers, were personal nominees of Beria was taken at the time as a symptom of Beria’s waning prestige in the inner circles of the Kremlin, where rising stars such as Malenkov and Khrushchev were supplanting him in Stalin’s favour. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Stalin’s death removed from the world stage the most formidable Georgian of all time, a man who combined almost superhuman tenacity and force of character with quite sub- human cruelty and criminality. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Stalin personality cult received a fresh setback at the time of the 22nd Party Congress held at Moscow in October 1961, at which the accusations levelled at the dead Georgian dictator in secret session in 1956 were repeated in public with added vehemence, and his embalmed body removed from the famous mausoleum in Red Square. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The false mark of dignity was removed from their faces, revealing their pre- meditated intention and their malicious plan without shame or remorse. A History of Modern Yemen
British reports, also, suggest a world far removed from Aden. A History of Modern Yemen
The South Arabian League remained a force in WadT Du~an and WadI CAmd while the coastal towns became dominated by the Arab Socialist Party, soon to be a stronghold of the NLF; but the QuCayti government, under Revolutions and civil wars: the 196os Figure 4.1. A History of Modern Yemen
But the list of names is canonical. A History of Modern Yemen
Small shopkeepers in ~Iudaydah and Tacizz, and truckers further north, suffered as controls were imposed on trade and currency, the exception being trade with the South, where customs dues were removed by both sides. A History of Modern Yemen
Parliamentary elections took place in April 1993. A History of Modern Yemen
Compare Lackner 1985:124. A History of Modern Yemen
His office was closed in 1986, and his staff dispersed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Saudi Arabia, Abu Nidal had been no more than an arm- chair guerrilla—plotting, talking, dreaming of great deeds, but not actually doing very much. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
What choice did it have? A possible candidate was the PFLP, Arafat and his Fatah central committee were by now thor- Abu lyad told me later that even at this eleventh hour, he “Abu Mazin and I were very close friends,” Abu lyad told me, But Abu lyad could no longer stem the tide. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Having removed Egypt from the Arab front line by the 1979 peace treaty, Begin now wanted to bring Lebanon into Israel’s orbit—and thus neutralize Syria. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
To chastise him for not displaying the right slavish mentality, Abu Nidal removed him from his post and from the Central Committee and demoted him to being an ordinary cadre. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This prohibition applied even to the most senior members, such as Abu Nizar, for many years his deputy, and Abd al-Rahman Isa, his former intelli- gence chief. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A steel pipe in his mouth sticking out ol the ground would allow him to breathe. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Isa knew enough to say no. “Let them send me Abu Nizar as an emissary,” he told the general. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Surgeons at the Algiers military hospital managed to save his sight, but they had to remove one of his kidneys. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Defected Mossad agent Ostrovsky believes that Abu Nidal was head of the PFLP-GC and that Ahmed Jabril orchestrated the Achille Lauro operation, showing how removed the Mossad is from Palestinians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Rosan claims that he made the decision of the action himself and was unable to contact FRC headquarters for their approval because it was late. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Yahya posed as a nationalist leader in leading the Yemenis’ struggle against the Ottomans. Comtemporary Yemen
Rather than force a transformation of the periphery to conform to the values of a modernist centre, the outlook of the centre should probably expand to encompass many of the goals and values now located in the periphery. Comtemporary Yemen
The first decree was No. 8 of 1963, which established the General Commission for Employees’ Affairs under the President of the Republic’s supervi- sion. Comtemporary Yemen
This situation is bound to continue for years to come, not only to keep the Saudi economy functioning but also to implement Saudi Arabia’s ambitious development plans. Comtemporary Yemen
Both Egypt under Sadat and Saudi Arabia planned to replace Soviet with Western supplies, and in February 1979 it seemed that this long-delayed transfer was about to occur, as Carter promised to send $400 million worth of arms to San’a’ as emergency aid to face the South. Comtemporary Yemen
In fact, the more removed the target of the attack from any connection to the grievance enunciated by the terrorists, the greater the terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Here the carefully concealed, one-step-removed brand of Soviet-supported terrorism found a ready partner in the rabid anti-Western antipathies of the radical Arab regimes led by Syria, Libya, and Iraq. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet one event served to activate this hitherto dormant Sunni potential for violence. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
They can wait no longer. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After these events, Hamas offered Israel a mutual “armistice” in which civilians would be removed from the arena of struggle.88 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Its ideology sprang from Ayatollah Khomeini’s circle in Najaf.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
are you Hosni Mubarak, or you King Hussein? If you have an ounce of blood and conscience left, you should have come and seen the women who were removed by the kilo [from the UN post in Qana]. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Where are the collective security pacts between us and the Arabs who are supposed to defend us? Let Clinton hear this from a woman who has seen her family members, friends and neighbours being removed from Qana by the bagfuls. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They were set down by the Greeks who served through the expedition, as the most uncivilized people whose country they traversed, the furthest removed from Greek customs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Advisors loyal to Tamar and her father were removed by the aznaurni, and Tamar failed in her attempt to use a church council to dismiss Mikel. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the 1830s almost all hired workers in eastern Georgian cities were Imeretians, and in 1840 the police forcibly removed peasants to their native villages if they had no written proof of permission to migrate—a graphic example of state authorities using the means at hand to maintain the labor force required by the noble pro- prietors.6° The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1848 Vorontsov removed the remnants of the old city wall, and the town began to expand to the north and west. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Inhibitions to discussing the national question and moving toward separation from Russia were removed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The last vestiges of the seigneurial system had been removed, but, unlike Bolshevik Russia, Menshevik Georgia did not take all the land away from the nobility. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In May and June customs barriers and border guards between the three republics and between Transcaucasia and the RSFSR were removed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Bolshevik revolution, like other social revolutions, had transformed the class structure and brought new social groups into power; but in contrast to the great revolutions in England and France, the long civil war in the Russian empire had removed the old ruling elite so completely that restoration was impossible. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The process of economic integration of Georgia, first into Trans- caucasia, then into the Soviet Union as a whole, and the increasing emphasis on planning for industrialization removed much of the initiation and control Bolshevik Georgia 235 236 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA of economic projects from the republic level. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But as the line from Moscow clarified and “purges~’ removed the more moderate elements from the Transcaucasian party organizations (7,625 were expelled in the second half of 1929), the moderates began to lose ground. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The “greatest sin of our opposition,” he told his comrades, was coming “out against the leadership of our party, against the leader of the party; comrade Stalin.”51 The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the Stalin revolution solidified into a rigid and authoritarian social and political formation in the early 1930s, the bureaucratic-administrative integration of the Georgian republic into the Soviet system was completed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Anyone who was unable to commit a criminal act was not merely removed from power but physically eliminated.8 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In January 1937 a major show trial of old oppositionists—Piatakov, Sokolnikov, Se- rebriakov, and Radek—opened the way to a full-scale assault on the eco- nomic apparatus. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In August the trial of the Sighnaghi “counterrevolutionary terrorist diver- sionary-harmful organization of Rights” was held. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the first three days of September prominent Communists were arrested in Trans- caucasia.50 The Making of the Georgian Nation
A Zhdanov associate, A. A. Kuznetsov, was put in charge of state security organs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Shonia— were removed for protecting officials who had committed crimes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Purges continued through the next few months, and by the Sixteenth Congress of the Georgian Communist Party in February 1954, the first secretaries of Abkhazeti, Ajaria, and Tbilisi had been re- placed, new elections had been held in nearly nine thousand party cells, more than two thousand secretaries had been removed from these cells, and over one thousand candidate members of the party had been expelled.23 The Making of the Georgian Nation
His political methods contrasted with those prevalent in other parts of Brezhnev’s Soviet Union. The Making of the Georgian Nation
It had even been suggested that he be removed from the leadership. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Perhaps most symbolic of its ideological journey was the decision at the end of August to give up its struggle to protect the statue of Lenin in the center of Tbilisi and allow it to be removed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet older and more authoritative sources than Sumbat, affirm, in accord with the Armenian historical data, that the Georgian Bagratids branched out of the Armenian Bagratid dynasty; that this branch removed to Iberia only after the defeat of the Armenian princes by the Arabs in 772, in the person of Prince Atrnerseh or Adarnase (grandson of Ashot III the Blind, Prince of the Bagratids and Prince of Armenia in 732—748); that Adarnase’s son Ashot the Great attained, the first of the Bagratids, to the Prmncipate of Iberia in 813 and thus founded the last royal house of Georgia; and that finally, the Davidic claim of that house was a further development of the earlier tradition of Hebrew origin entertained by its Armenian ancestors. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In a further twist, char- acteristic of Abu Nidal, a pension paid to his old mother, who was then living with him, was stopped and the air conditioner from his house removed—a grueling enough punishment in Libya in mid-summer.) Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
‘He called upon him on any important occasion and asked his help in difficulties, and counted him a support for his army and a remover of any unpleasantness.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Toyota and Datsun pick-up trucks bought by Yemenis with money earned at few removes from oil were an aspect of the global phe- nomenon; power-stations, sewage systems and telephone networks built in Yemen by foreign companies through the 1970s were equally “recy- cling”. A History of Modern Yemen
The key division now was between those with access, directly or at few removes, to hard currency and those without such access. A History of Modern Yemen
No less anarchic was the situation in Western Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Private enterprise took up the theme, and T- shirts appeared with pictures of Shamsan and Nuqum, the mountains beside Aden and Sanaa, crowned with the slogan “Long live United Yemen”. A History of Modern Yemen
This book is hardly the place to rehearse the old polemics or to set out the rival versions of history as seen by Arab and Jew. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As usual, this readi- ness was couched in terms of removing civilians from the arena of violent struggle. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Interview with Sheikh Ahmad Yassin conducted in prison by ‘Abdel Jawad Saleh on 71. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The militant group has modified its definition of confrontation with the West since the publication of the manifesto. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Nobles and peasants began removing in large numbers to the Empire. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By uni- laterally removing the Bagratids from the throne, Alexander ended any pretense of Georgian acquiescence in Russia’s actions. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In attempting to realize both these goals the Russians managed simultaneously to alienate a significant number of Georgian nobles and to draw others into the service of the tsar. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On August 1 the acts appropriating Armenian church properties were repealed, thus removing the principal grievance of the Armenian community, and on August 6 the tsar’s manifesto establishing a state duma (the so-called Bulygin duma) was pub- lished. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He insisted that the fundamental form of the collec- tive farm was to be the “agricultural artel,” rather than the more extreme commune or the moderate “cooperative with joint labor.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the meeting of the Georgian party aktiv in April 1973, it was reported that “in Abkhazeti a half-baked ‘theory’ according to which responsible posts should be filled only by representatives of the indigenous nationality has gained a certain currency - No one has been given the right to ignore the national composition of the population or to disregard the continual exchange of cadres among nations and the interests of all nationalities.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
forfeit one-twentieth of a divided estate to the state was rescinded, thus removing the penalty for individualizing collectively owned lands (A. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Herodotus provides us with much of what we know about Caucasia in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. The first great “world empire,” that of the Persians under the Achaemenid dynasty, covered most of Asia Minor and Transcaucasia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Tiflis, 1919. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Long and narrow, the city stretches today for eight miles along the river banks, and numbers 8oo,ooo inhabitants. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Russian occupation turned the eyes of the Georgians away from Muslim Asia and gave them a window on to Europe, with all the opportunities which that implied, while the population of their country, surrounded by a ring of Russian bayonets, increased eight-fold in a century and a half. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The effectiveness of the Russian Army in this sector was ‘I weakened by the presence within it of thousands of deported Poles who, abominably treated, were constantly on the verge 73 of mutiny. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The procurator went on to report that out of eight police officers recently detailed for duty in the Ozurgeti area, one had been killed, another wounded, four had tendered their resigna- tion, and another scarcely dared to emerge from his quarters. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In one conflict with army units, forty-eight peasants were killed. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, who had reached the age of seventy-eight, was succeeded as viceroy in September 1915 by the former commander-in-chief on Russia’s western front, the Grand Duke Nicholas. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
An eight-hour day was established. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The leading spokesman of the dissident Abkhaz Bolsheviks, Nestor Lakoba, died a natural death in 1936. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Georgia’s ten best sportsmen par- ticipated as members of Soviet teams in the i6th Olympic Games at Melbourne, eight of them returning home with Olympic medals. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
and the dis- tance between Tacizz and Sanaa was known as eight days, suddenly the telegraph shortened this to moments”.47 A History of Modern Yemen
Aden circa World War II 56 A history of modern Yemen When Zubayri and Nucman reached Aden (i~~) they joined an exist- ing ferment not only of Arab Nationalism but of specifically Yemeni Nationalism — a reformist complement to Yahya’s vision. A History of Modern Yemen
During such periods — eight days, fifteen days, whatever it was — one could not hope for any- thing from him, for nothing at all got through.”24 A History of Modern Yemen
Almost 12 per cent of the shares were divided among “merchants” — unfortunately we do not have their names — and io per cent among various princes. A History of Modern Yemen
People there, after Ahmad’s cam- paigns of the 1920s, were like sheep with no shepherd, as CAbd al-Malil~ al-~ayyib was to phrase it later: “official control and military domina- tion over them is greater and stronger than in any other area”.5~ A History of Modern Yemen
To protest against Salläl’s return the Presidential Council, along with eight ministers and many others, went to Cairo, where in effect the whole Yemeni government was detained by Egypt — “one is faced,” said Muhammad al-~Aftar “with a phenomenon unprecedented in the history of international relations!” A History of Modern Yemen
The police nearby killed eight British soldiers. A History of Modern Yemen
The British once planted a flag at Aden and stayed there 129 years to what profit one could not be certain. A History of Modern Yemen
‘ashar (~ vols.), A History of Modern Yemen
Fourth, and finally, there was the “intermediary,” usually a high-ranking cadre, whose sole task was to collect the weapons from the resident and deliver them to the supervisor. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
One sum- mer the Banna family brought home to Jaffa a handsome young Alawite girl of sixteen. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He then contacted the head of Libyan intelligence at the time, Abd al-Mun’im al-Huni, and he too approved the plan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
So Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur was gunned down in the Ashrafiya district of Beirut in late 1974 by a certain Azmi al-Sughayyir, a Palestinian of murky background who had worked for the Israelis, then for the guerrillas. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1986, Israeli intelligence es- timated the strength at five hundred to eight hundred active mem- bers and several hundred sympathizers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
That Abu Nidal should be left to kill Jews with impunity is an extraordinary—indeed outrageous—de- parture from Israeli policy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In all the years I have been talking to people from the territories, no one has ever heard of a single operation—no matter how trivial—attributed to Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Old women brave tear gas. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1985, some months before the Heathrow incident, Hai- dar had recommended Hindawi to Syrian intelligence as a London- based free-lance writer and opponent of the Jordanian regime who might come in useful in the campaign Syria was then waging against Jordan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Instead, it rallied young radicals to the cause of Armenian nationalism, giving them a reason, if often a violent one, for staying within the fold of the Armenian community. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From the PLO’s standpoint, Europe has either bowed to Abu Nidal’s blackmail or has chosen to rid itself of prisoners whose presence in European jails might provoke Abu Nidal into further terrorist acts to secure their release. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal then accused Abu Nizar of being a Syrian agent. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
changed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was not close to Dr. Ghassan or to his own replacement, Alaa, and he may have lost his job because he was beginning to ask awkward questions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Fatherland Front, a name used by the Stern, took responsibility for the action in a statement to Agence France Press, and Freidman Yellin, a Stern leader, was sentenced to eight years by a Jerusalem court for the crime, though he did not do the actual shooting. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Eight soldiers were put on trial and given prison sen- tences of between 7 and 17 years. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
George Habash, the most charismatic of the group, became its head, and eventually he, like Ché Guevara (who met several Palestinian leaders, includ- ing Arafat), gave up his medical practice in Amman for full-time political work. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A mixture of people loyal to Arafat, Habash, and Hawathmeh cre- ated cells of three to eight men with an outside supervisor, one cell not know- ing another. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
PLO political chief Khaled al- Hassan, who at the time of the killing was scheduled to have a meeting at the Cairo Sheraton with Tel in order to solidify an agreement between Jordan and the PLO, claims that it was actually an internal struggle that led to Tel’s assas- sination. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was the first of a few suc- cesses of Israeli counter-terrorism.2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Khalil died when Sabri was about eight, and his family fled to Gaza on the eve of the declaration of statehood, when the entire population of Jaffa cleared out overnight. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On the jet, the terrorists hurled eight or ten phosphorus bombs, which immediately ignited fires. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Three months before Rashid’s encounter Khader had met Israelis from the left-wing Rakah party, including attorney Felicia Langer. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On March 11, 1978, eight Fatah commandos, led by woman named Dalal Moghrabi who worked with Abu Jihad, landed two rubber dinghies in North Israel and hijacked two busses. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The report doesn’t give num- bers, but FRC has about 30 fighters there. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The third rank, the Revolutionary Council, with about 50 mem- bers, including all those of the Central Committee and Politburo, looked and functioned as a parliament and took on constitutional and theoretical issues. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The pilot, Khaled Aker, threw grenades and opened fire, killing six soldiers and wounding seven before he was later killed.18 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Deacon, p. 255; The Washington Post, 29 December 1972, pp. 1, AS. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was confirmed to me by an ex-CIA agent. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
If Aziz Bey’s figures are correct, exports of salt to India and Djibouti in 1902 brought in an impressive 78 million kurus gross, nearly eight times the real tax income of the sancak. Comtemporary Yemen
The congress also elected an Executive Committee of eight members who included Qahtan al- Sha’bi, Faisal Abdul-Latif al-Sha’bi, Taha Muqbil, Salim Zain, Mi Salami and Saif al-Dali’. Comtemporary Yemen
Al-Tali’a, no. 140, 21 July 1965. Comtemporary Yemen
It was during this era that an infrastructure was developing. Comtemporary Yemen
Comparative Analysis of the Role of Education in Two Socio- political Environments To develop the theory that only in a national political system with full sovereignty can the educational role for nation-building flourish, we have to elaborate the above eight components and Education for Nation-building 105 106 Education for Nation-building compare in detail the practical steps of their implementation in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Colony. Comtemporary Yemen
The new structure gives eight years of schooling (Unity schools of grades 1—8) which is considered to be the basic right for every citizen. Comtemporary Yemen
He was, in addition, a high-ranking PDRY government official in his own right. Comtemporary Yemen
In 1964 and 1965, Egypt and Syria established rival “Palestine Liberation” groups modeled after the National Liberation Front (FLN), whose eight-year insurgent war had succeeded in driving the French from Algeria only two years earlier. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The new line of strategy, adopted in a major decision by the leadership of the Brotherhood in Palestine in the summer of 1985, “called on all members of the Brotherhood wherever they may be in occupied Palestine, to take part in demonstrations against, and clashes with, the enemy occu- pying [our land] and even to organize such demonstrations and clashes.”79 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Eight months after that incident, Israel exiled 413 Palestinians—all 73. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Official Level Hamas has made an effort to establish direct relations with the govern- ments and peoples in the Islamic world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This support was crowned by the convening in Tehran of a conference of forces opposed to a settlement with Israel on 22 October 1991, just eight days before the Madrid Conference began. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
4. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Blocks of flats up to eight storeys high, one side collapsed like a deck of cards, are still home for the desperate. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Islamic Resistance carried out seven or eight assaults a day against the occupying force and the southerners lived under the constant threat of Israeli reprisals.Timur Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Syria, however, was fully behind the measures, which also recognised its military presence in the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah 74 On 11 November 1982, a new style of warfare made its shocking debut when a young man drove a white Mercedes, filled with explosives, into Israel’s military headquarters inTyre.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Six months after the bombing of the * See Sacred Rage, Robin Wright, p. 37 Hezbollah 76 embassy, 241 US Marines died in the single largest non-nuclear explosion since the Second World War.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
How come every country in the world rallied its support against Saddam for invading Kuwait, and the United States, the so-called defender of human rights and freedom, instigated a war against him to free Kuwait. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He was thirty- eight years old. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
So to take someone as big as Waite at such a time, what with all the checkpoints around, was simply not practical.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Relief Committee has branches in eight regions of Lebanon: western Bekaa and the eastern Bekaa; Tripoli and the Hirmel area in north Lebanon; Sidon,Tyre, Nabatiyeh and Jebaa in the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The tit-for-tat war between the Resistance and Israeli soldiers first climaxed in 1993, when Israel launched ‘Operation Accountability’, an air and artillery blitz of South Lebanon in response to the killing of eight soldiers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
She had come into the world in the early hours of Sunday 14 April to the thud of artillery. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
All the Georgians obeyed him as a monarch.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
The great noble families submitted to the king, and Giorgi was able to pass on to his heirs— David VII (VIII) (1346—1360) and Bagrat V (1360—1395)—a relatively stable and prosperous kingdom. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The land- holding and serfowning system was brought under Russian law almost completely. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Tiflis province the heavy plow required eight to nine pairs of draft Russian Rule and Georgian Society 79 80 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE animals and five to seven workers; in one day not more than a third of a desiatina could be plowed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Catholicos Antoni II, a son of Erekie II, who had been called to St. Petersburg in 1811, was not permitted to return to Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Thirty-eight peas- ant leaders were arrested and exiled. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Even I, a child of eight, was interested in the journal. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The influence of the old mesame dasi, still strong among intellectuals, was being challenged among the prak- tiki (activists) of the labor movement. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Reviewing his eight-year rule, the viceroy in 1913 reminded the tsar: “Six years ago I reported to you, Sire, with complete candor that within the borders of the Empire we ourselves created an [Armenian] problem by carelessly ignoring the religious and national views of the Armenians.”12 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Without any serious rival to their dominance in Georgia, the Mensheviks engaged almost exclusively in legal work, issuing a continuous series of party newspapers and focusing on their elected duma deputies. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In May 1907, there were twenty-eight trade unions with 13,000 members who united in a Central Bureau. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The number of members of the organization in Chiatura district, as well as in Poti, has fallen. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Repeatedly the Arme- nian liberals sided with the Georgian social democrats to defeat the chau- vinist candidates. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The government (mtavroba in Georgian) had fallen. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Every issue that arose in 1917— the eight-hour day, the question of the war, the coalition government, Geor- gian national autonomy, or soviet power—was debated and decided by balancing the competing interests of these contending political actors. The Making of the Georgian Nation
To alleviate shortages, from the second half of 1918 the ministry moved more than eight thousand families to free lands in other districts. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This petty nobility, which has eight to ten desiatinas of land, are closer to the Russian kulaks. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Four years later about eight thousand Muslims in Georgia, the Mes- khian Turks, who lived along the border with Turkey, were deported to Central Asia, and plans were made to exile the Abkhazians as well.89 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Mzhavanadze leadership remained in power for another eight years, and corruption, inefficiency, and discrimination against minorities continued to mark Georgian economic and political life. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In June, fifty-eight Abkhaz Communists sent a letter to the Nineteenth Party Conference in Moscow, demanding the secession of Abkhazeti from Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Nikolai, “Vospominaniia,” 2, no. 6, p. 229. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The newspaper iveria was closed down by the government for eight months in 1896 because of “harmful propaganda, aimed principally at students, against Russian authority in the Caucasus, against the Russian language, and in general against Russian influence in any form” (from a government order, cited in Bakhtadze, Ocherki, p. 166). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Though a minority, the Abkhaz would receive twenty-eight of the sixty- five seats in the local parliament, while the Georgians would have twenty-six, the Armenians six, and the other nationalities five. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Imereti was reckoned to comprise the Colchis of the ancients, including the low-lying, densely vegetated land of Mingrelia on the Black Sea coast; Guria, between the Rioni and Cholok rivers; Atchara around Batumi; and mountainous Svaneti, land of the Svans, once a nation of warriors ruled by their own king and council of elders and capable of launching into battle an army many thousands strong. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
After spending eighteen months in various Caucasian jails, Stalin was deported for three years to the Irkutsk province in eastern Siberia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Eighteen out of every thousand of the popu- lation hold a university degree or training college diploma. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The YSP had submitted eighteen points to be met, the GPC submitted nineteen, and the Dialogue Committee produced in the end a list of many points with what appeared to be almost a fresh constitution. A History of Modern Yemen
To cure him of his “disci- plinary disorder,” the first man was brought to the cells, chained to the wall, and beaten senseless. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At this point in Hamza’s career, the PLO lost track of him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Yaqzah (The Awakening), which the local Jordanian branch of the Ba’ath party published occasionally on the West Bank. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A gun, equipped with a silencer, which he confessed to having supplied, was submitted in evidence, together with sketch maps prepared by the conspirators showing the location of Abu Mazin’s house. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“You might have seen them as you came in.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nizar was involved, it will be recalled, in Abu Nidal’s botched attempt to kill Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin), of Fatah, in Damascus in 1974. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Israelis were being driven out, while the American embassy had been blown up and American marines slaughtered in their barracks. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
*March 28, 1984-Ken Whitty, a cultural-affairs coun- selor at the British embassy in Athens, is killed when a gunman opens fire on his car. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
And what of the dozens of people who had passed through his hands to be tortured and executed? One of Abu Nidal’s more disturbing habits was to get people to do his dirty work for him and then kill them once they had served his purpose. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The first took place in April when three members of the Ahmed Jibril group raided Israel from Lebanon and took eighteen hostages—eight of them children—in an apartment block of Qjryat Shmona. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In another PLO security blunder, no one spotted her even though her picture had been all over the newspapers during her highly visible trial in Norway. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Additional and more ambitious attacks were in the works, including assaults on prisons in which Fighting Terrorism 23 FALN members were being held. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Equally, it became apparent that far from taking action against terrorist organizations in Gaza, the PLO presided Benjamin Netanyahu 104 over a fantastic explosion of anti-Israel terrorism from Gaza that threatened to turn its mini-state there into a replica of the PLO mini-state in the Lebanon of the 1970s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
‘What sort of Islamic summit is this that supports the containment and slow death for eighteen million Muslims in Iraq? ‘What sort of Islamic summit is it that supports conferences of capitulation and the surrender of the holiest of the holies of Islam and Muslims?”108 Hamas appealed to the world Islamic movement to take effective action to censure the Dakar summit’s resolutions and to reaffirm the centrality of the Palestinian cause 104. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel’s invasion had followed fast on the heels of the most significant event in modern times for Shia Muslims: the Iranian Revolution of 1 979.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He was eighteen years old and had been raised in Jibsheet. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The battalion had been garrisoned in the sleepy village of Qana for eighteen years. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At about 7.00 Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The five Caucasian Mensheviks, on the othei hand, led the labor bloc of eighteen Mensheviks and workers who made uç the left in the duma, and this faction elected Zhordania its chairman.17 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The social democrats had a faction of sixty-five: thirty-six Mensheviks, eighteen Bolsheviks, eleven nonfactional. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Of the eighteen members of the editorial collective only one was clearly a Georgian; the others were Armenian, Russian, and Jewish. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Giorgi Eradze, Eighteen interviews with Leopold Haimson, Menshevik Project, Columbia University, interview no. 10, p. 38. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This is the country of which the eighteenth-century Georgian historian and geographer Vakhushti wrote: ‘This land is very wooded and its open spaces, apart from stretches of cultivated ground, are of small extent. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At Telavi, one can look out from the eighteenth-century palace and chapel of King Erekle II, now converted into a regional museum, over the great green plain of Kakheti to the mount- ains of Daghestan, or walk down the road to an immense tree under which Georgian writers and poets of half a century ago used to assemble and talk. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the eighteenth century, Prince Vakhushti had this to say about his fellow-countrymen. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This hierarchical division of Georgian society is strikingly exemplified in the official table of wergild or blood money rates, drawn up at the beginning of the eighteenth century by King Vakhtang VI. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The disintegration of the monarchy was further the blood money of an abbot. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Afghans of Qandahar had revolted against the King of Persia, Shah Sultan Husayn, and marched on Isfahan from the east. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
His subject, Ibn al-AmIr, was a Zaydi reformer of the eighteenth century In Qasim Ghälib’s view he had been a radical whose insistence on using Sunni as well as ShiCite sources meant “non-sectarian” rapprochement between ShãfiCls and Zaydis and whose rhetoric was of impartial justice. A History of Modern Yemen
With the Grain Corporation and Foreign Trade Corporation it had 6o per cent, while permissions for the rest were largely put out to tender, producing in effect monopolies of the kind sold by Europe’s kings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A History of Modern Yemen
A qadah is about a bushel. A History of Modern Yemen
DIALOGUE IN ALGIERS What had made the Algiers meeting possible was the eighteenth session of the Palestine National Council, the Palestinians’ “parlia- ment-in-exile,” which met from April 20—26, 1987, at the Residence des Pins, a conference center some fifteen kilometers west of Al- giers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
These two men spent nearly twenty years, about which we know vir- tually nothing, teaching and setting up their secret propaganda network from their respective seats of Adan La’a in the Western Mountains and Yafi’ in the Southern Highlands. Comtemporary Yemen
Since the beginning of the eighteenth century smaller amirates in the South had become independent and since 1839 Britain had occupied the port of Aden and influenced develop- ments in that area. Comtemporary Yemen
The central question posed is, How did the Georgians become the Georgian nation? How did their par- ticular historical experience shape them as a people, later as a self-conscious nationality, and still later as a nation with its own political institutions and the trappings of a kind of sovereignty? More specifically, this study explores the impact on Georgia of its powerful neighbors—Persians, Greeks, Romans, Turks, and Russians—and attempts to understand how the imposition of foreign rule, and change directed by imperial powers, affected the making of the Georgian nation. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Part III, “Revolutionary and Soviet Georgia,” parallels Part II. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Raids by the Mongols stimulated peasants to migrate from Armenia to the safer areas of Georgia, and within Georgia peasants moved from Kartli to Samtskhe. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, more particularly in the sixteenth and seventeenth, the vassal relations that had formerly united the Georgian princes and their sovereign were found to be in question and their legitimacy ceased to constitute the basis of royal authority.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
But between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Georgian feudalism meta- morphosed into a new system known as tavadoba, the rule of the princes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The greatest posts of the empire are today in their hands.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Transcaucasia in the mid-eighteenth century was a mosaic of kingdoms, khanates, and principalities, nominally under either Turkish or Iranian sovereignty but actually maintaining varying degrees of precarious autonomy or independence. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Nevertheless, when compared with the sixteenth and seventeenth cen- turies, the eighteenth century was a period of material growth and reviving trade. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Natadze, discovered after careful reading of existing documents that increasingly in the eighteenth century there were records of sales of property—fields, gardens, orchards, windmills—whereas earlier, property had been granted by lords to vassals. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the eighteenth century Georgian serfdom had permitted peasants to “volunteer” for bondage, but this practice was ended by the Russians in 1821. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But besides these involuntarily enserfed peasants, there were different kinds of voluntary serfs (nebieri qmani) who had become serfs in order to receive protection and land. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The work done by the mojalabe was considered the most humiliating in Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The political disintegration permitted some peasants to live more freely from noble supervision and taxation, but in many areas the nobles freed themselves from royal authority and increased their pressure on the peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Altogether, in the late eighteenth century, over three-quarters of the population of Tiflis (77.3 The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Georgian towns were gov- erned by royal officials, the mouravni, appointed by the king from among the aristocrats. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The peasants often interpreted the emancipation as more complete than it actually was. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Without an unnecessarily rigid application of Hroch’s model, it is possible in a discussion of the formation of the Georgian intelligentsia to trace a similar evolution—from the initial revival of the Georgian past and attention to the language in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries through the journalistic activity of the 1 860s and 1 870s to the active political nationalism of the turn of the century. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the second half of the eighteenth century, at a time when Russian letters were flourishing under the patronage of Catherine II and the founda- tion of the Armenian national revival was being laid by Catholic monks in Venice (the Mekhitarist fathers), Georgia was still imperiled by both the Ottoman and Iranian empires. The Making of the Georgian Nation
It may be that twentieth-century historian Ivane Javakhishvili exaggerates somewhat when he speaks of a strong rise in Georgian national self-consciousness in the eighteenth century, but his characterization of the process is very suggestive. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Orbeliani, who eventually became gover- nor-general of Tiflis province, served loyally as a tsarist officer but in his poems called for restoration of Georgia’s past glory. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Stalin’s policy of rapprochement with the Western powers had brought some short-term bene- fits but not a firm alliance against Hitler. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgia has the experience and potential of intoler- ance and exclusivity, as do most nations, but it also has traditions of inclu- sion and generosity, tolerance and acceptance of other cultures. The Making of the Georgian Nation
211—764. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the late eighteenth century there were 574 shops in the capital, of which 310 were occupied by craftsmen and 264 by merchants (Meskhia, Goroda, p. 126). The Making of the Georgian Nation
In contrast to this postponement of the arrival of capitalism, a historian of the reign of Erekle II, A. A. Rogava, put forth the extreme proposition that capitalism actually came to Georgia in the late eighteenth century (A. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Earlier, historical sociologist P. V. Gugushvili had defended the notion that the manufacturing enterprises of the late eighteenth century should be considered the foundation of capitalist production in Georgia, but most historians working on the question—I. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The family first attained the highest dignities of state in the Armenian kingdom, and then spread into Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In signing the Treaty of Georgievsk, Erekle undertook to renounce all dependence on Persia or any other power but Russia; he and his posterity were solemnly confirmed for ever in possession of all territories under their sway; the kings of Georgia, on succeeding to the throne, would request and receive from St. Petersburg their insignia of investiture; Erekle was to conduct negotiations with foreign powers only after securing the approval of the Russian authorities; the empress and her heirs were pledged to treat Georgia’s foes as those of Russia; there was to be no interference in the internal affairs of Georgia; the Georgian Catholicos-Patriarch was given the eighth place among the Russian prelates, and made a member of the Holy Synod; the Georgian nobility were to have the same prerogatives as the Russian aristocracy; special facilities were to be afforded to Russian traders in Georgia and to Georgian merchants in Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It will be recalled that the Russo-Georgian treaty of 1783 had guaranteed to the Patriarch of Georgia the eighth place among the prelates of Russia and a seat in the Russian Holy Synod. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He had previously been the Ottomans’ supervisor of waqf(relig- ious property) and was now appointed president of the Appeal Court, an institution which perhaps echoes earlier Qasimi forms but accords more directly with Ottoman views of judicial order and, from 1911 onwards, carries through the discontinuities of political control until our own day. A History of Modern Yemen
Tiny sums of money were assessed and disbursed by Yal~iya personally: [Seal] Commander of the Faithful, He who Relies on God. A History of Modern Yemen
A tax was agreed of 5 buqshahs (an eighth of a riyal) for each riyal paid the government as zakOt, and foreign donors were approached for help as well as ministries. A History of Modern Yemen
Listening to him, Abu lyad reflected that this was the man who had been Abu Nidal’s closest colleague for fifteen years, his partner in terrorism and crime. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For example, when in the eighth year of Hamas’s existence tension between it and the PA reached a high pitch and civil war 95. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Contacting the relevant Arab and Islamic governments and requesting that they withdraw from the negotiations and adopt our stand, which rejects the proposal for self-rule. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It was not until the eighth day of the offensive on Thursday 18 April that Western countries suddenly became anxious to find ways of establishing a cease-fire.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its current predicament is the product of the tension between Soviet promotion of certain national forms and Soviet restrictions on their full development and expression. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Kashkai had participated in the destruction of the Hittite empire, then moved westward, where they came up against the Assyrians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The most important tribal formation of possible prom-Georgians in the post-Hittite period was that of the Diauehi (Diauhi, Daiaeni), formed about the twelfth century B.C. southwest of Transcaucasia, in the region to the north of present-day Erzerum. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The fragility of the various “empires” of the eighth century became evident about 720 B.C. when nomadic peoples from the northern shore of the Black Sea, the Cimmerians, swept down the coast, passing through Colchis and into Urartu. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The king of Kartli-Iberia was a hereditary monarch, like the Iranian Great King, not an elected or appointed ruler as in the Roman tradition. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Early in the fifth century, Mesrop Mashtots com- pleted his Armenian alphabet, and then, according to his biographer, Koriun, set out to devise alphabets for the Georgians and the Caucasian Albanians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the end of the seventh century the Arabs and Byzan- tines began an intense struggle over Lazica and Abkhazeti, as well as Armenia and Kartli-Iberia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By 693 the Arabs had again taken Kartli-Iberia and Armenia with the help of their Khazar allies, and this time they established direct rule through their viceroy at Dvin. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the end of the eighth century, Kartli-Iberia and its neighbor to the south, Armenia, had clearly reached a political nadir. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Royal power had but a symbolic hold over the great princes.68 The Making of the Georgian Nation
When Mamulia, Sukhishvili, Okujava, and others defended their policies at the Eighth Congress of the Georgian party (January 1932), they were attacked by Meladze, a spokesman for Beria, for “right opportunism” in their agri- cultural work. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the Eighth Congress of Georgian Writers in April 1976, Revaz Japaridze angrily opposed suggestions by the Georgian minister of education that history, geography, and other subjects should be taught in Russian. The Making of the Georgian Nation
acres. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Through their farsighted, flexible policies, the Bagrationi achieved great influence from the sixth through eighth centuries. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Mark Kipnis, “The Georgian National Movement: Problems and Trends,” Cross- roads 1 (1978): 193—215; Stephen F. Jones, “National Conflict at the Eighth All- Union Writers’ Congress,” Nationalities Papers 15, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 7—21. The Making of the Georgian Nation
They agreed that on arrival in Tripoli, the gunmen would be handed over to the local PLO office. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When the intended victim was too prominent to be murdered in Iraq, Abu Nidal would arrange to send him “traveling” on a foreign mission and have him killed abroad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Then, in the eighties, following the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, the Palestinian cause was marginalized at both the Arab and international levels ... And the policies of the Zionist entity have become more obdurate and arrogant with the encouragement and sup- port of the United States of America, which signed a strategic coopera- tion agreement [with Israel] in 1981. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In Iraq, where the Shiites form the majority, they were ruthlessly crushed by Saddam Hussein during the seventies and eighties, as well as in the wake of the GulfWar. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
By the late Eighties, Hezbollah was facing opposition on another front which posed a serious threat to its future. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The group made three demands in return for Higgins’s freedom: an Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, an end to American ‘interference’ in the Middle East, and freedom for all Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah ultimately emerged from the crises of the late eighties as a stronger force. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Musawi was one of the few visible radicals in the early eighties. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The group had by then become an umbrella for most of the Muslim factions around, ranging from Islamic Amal to the al-Dawa party and the Islamic Students’ Union. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the early eighties, there were at least three female human bombs. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Until the early eighties, the practice of kidnapping was con- fined to the local population in Lebanon and thousands of Lebanese were abducted. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Mughniyeh blatantly visited France in the late eighties, at the height of the hostage crisis, when the US secret services were hot on his trail. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
By the early eighties, the suburbs had become a Hezbollah bastion, where its leadership lived and worked. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the late eighties and early nineties, during the ‘War of Liberation’, the southern suburbs suffered acutely. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As a student at St. Petersburg, he asso- dated with Karakozov, who made an abortive attempt on the THE STORM GATHERS: 1894—1904 I 19 life of Tsar Alexander II in i866. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Expelled with more than eighty othei students from the Thilisi Theological Seminary in 1894, Ketskhovei went to Kiev, where he made contact with clandestine groups of Russian socialists and became initiated into the underground revolutionary movement. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Between seventy and eighty railway and industrial workers and socialist agitators assembled at a spot called Ghrma-Ghele (Deep Ravine) on the outskirts of Tbiilsi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This volte-face caused consternation in Georgian and Trans- caucasian Communist circles. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
To prepare the ground, the king freed Palestinians from his jails, held frequent meetings with Arafat, promoted his plan in London and Washington, and re- stored diplomatic relations with Egypt, broken off at the time of Camp David. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
America’s policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute would thereafter be limited largely to counterterrorism rather than an attempt to trace the roots of violence to the dispossession of the Palestinians, to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, or to the Shi’ites’ burning sense of injustice. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
were arrested and sentenced to death, but the sentences were not Four days after the Nicosia bomb, Abu Nidal’s gunmen struck Abu Nidal tried to justify the attacks to his colleagues by The operation, which was strongly condemned by both the Five of Abu Nidal’s young fanatics, aged twenty-two to thirty, ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 263 PATRICK SEALE / carried out. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Several killers of PLO representatives in Europe have been released after serving just a few years in jail. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Led by a member of the Political Bureau, Shawki Muham- mad Yusif (code-named Munir Ahmad), the delegation included the demoted intelligence chief Abd al-Rahman Isa. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hart, p. 361, adds, “After the Khartoum killings the Israelis could do no wrong.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
and the fault is entirely with India. Comtemporary Yemen
It killed eighty-five people, including children and pregnant women and maimed nearly two hundred. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Abbas and his surviving family with pictures of his wife and daughters who were killed as they fled the South of Lebanon in an ambulance which was attacked by a helicopter gunship. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
During the hostage crisis, at least eighty-seven foreigners were kidnapped, including seventeen Americans, fourteen Britons, fifteen French, seven Swiss and seven West Germans. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Six people died and more than eighty were injured. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s 1993 July offensive against South Lebanon and the western Bekaa sector left a trail of destruction across eighty villages and approximately 6,000 homes.Thousands Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As a result of the intensity of Hezbollah’s campaign and the persistence of its members in the Lebanese parliament, the government has also taken action. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As early as 1827, the Russian government lent eighty thousand silver rubles to a Frenchman named Castella to build a silk-spinning mill in Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Early in September Trotsky’s “Platform of the Eighty-Three” was printed and distributed illegally. The Making of the Georgian Nation
However, he had punctually carried out the orders of his august sover- eign, for which he was awarded the title of Prince of the Russian Empire. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, Georgia had one last diplom- atic triumph on 27 January i 921, when France and England accorded her full dejure recognition as an independent sover- eign state. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This was the routine side of the organization’s work and the main activity of its agents in the field. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
President Sadat of Egypt appealed to Abu lyad for help in negotiating with the gunmen and sent a plane to take him to Tunis. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
lyad said. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Breaking with the past, it wanted to put an end to intra-Palestinian killings; to give up “for- eign operations”; and to build bridges to Fatah, the mother organi- zation from which it had strayed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Inside the host countries it was responsible for instructors, weapons, and stores at the organization’s various training estab- lishments. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It now pits the formidable resources of the West against the nearly comparable resources of a for- eign state or network of states—and in this contest it is by no means immediately clear who will emerge the victor. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
However, taken as a whole and over time, the pronouncements of Hamas have vacillated between depicting the struggle as a purely ideological one and portraying it as resistance to a for- eign occupying power and thus a means of combating tyranny and driv- ing out the occupier. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The recent American casualties in Beirut were as good as inflicted by the New Jersey’s guns... Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Assassination and arson were used as tactics in the increasingly violent rivalry between Gamsakhurdia and Chanturia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On June 15, 1989, the Writers’ Union sent a “Demand” to the Georgian Supreme Soviet: acknowledgment that the RSFSR had violated the May 7, 1920, treaty with Georgia when it invaded and illegally annexed Georgia on February 25, 1921; real Georgian sover- eignty; Georgian citizenship; Georgian veto over Soviet laws; national mili- tary formations to serve in Georgia; an end to mass immigration into the republic; and the rectification of mistakes of the past.19 The Making of the Georgian Nation
By July the Ezhovshchina (Ezhov-led terror) was tearing through the party, the gov- ernment, and even the NKVD. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In April Politburo members Eikhe and Kosior were arrested, and in May their colleague Chubar was imprisoned. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Bibliographical Note 407 Index Abakumov, A. S., 287 Abasgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By contrast, tens of thousands of Jews served in Allied armies and learned how to fight (including the teachings of sabotage and terrorism, which some of them used to devastating effect in 1947—48 against the ill-prepared Arab popula- tion of Palestine and the rabble forces of the Arab states). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This means that one could, by controlling Bab al-Mandab: (1) affect access to the Suez Canal from Asian points of origin; (2) affect traffic patterns to Israel’s port-city of Eilat; (3) affect traffic patterns to Saudi Arabia’s major harbours on the Red Sea, i.e. Jeddah, Yanbu’ and Jizan; (4) affect traffic patterns to Sudan’s ports; (5) affect traffic patterns to Egypt’s Red Sea maritime facilities; (6) affect traffic patterns to Eritrea and Ethiopia; and, (7) in more general terms, perhaps effect a change in the trade patterns of one or more of these Red Sea riparian states. Comtemporary Yemen
The churches were levelled to the ground; every priest was put to death. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The first notable production of the new school in Georgian literature was the short novel Suramis tsikbe (Surami Castle) by Daniel Chonkadze (1830—60), who was the son of a poor priest who had himself begun life as a serf. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Populists and Marxists During the 1870’s, the Russian Populist or Narodnik move- ment made considerable progress in Georgia, where the Populist dream of social progress via the destruction of the Tsar’s government and the realisation of the moral and economic potentialities of the peasant class seemed highly attractive. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The revolution of 1905 was finally rendered inevitable by the tragedy of Bloody Sunday, 9/22 January 1905, when many thousands of working men, women and children, led by the priest, Gapon, marched with icons and singing hymns towards the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to present a mass petition to their ‘little father’, the Tsar. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1910, Father Michael Tamarati (Tamarashvili), a Georgian Catholic priest, brought out in Rome a detailed and well documented history of the Georgian Church, written in French, in which he showed how this important branch of Christendom, which neither Arabs, Mongols, Turks nor Persians could exterminate, had finally been subjugated and crushed by Russian fellow-Christians of the Holy Orthodox Church. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Andreev, Russian Communist, 262 Andronik, Armenian partisan com- mander, 202 Andronikashvili, General Alexander, executed by Communists, 241 Ankara, 184, 230, 233—4 Antioch, 13 Antoni II, Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia, deposed by Russia, ~6 Apkhaidze, Shalva, Georgian poet, i88 Arabia, Arabs, 12, 14, 19, 26, 28, 178 Aragvi, river, Ii, 23 Aragvispireli, Shio, Georgian writer, 187 Araxes, river, 55, 6, Architecture, 21 Ardahan, 6, 61—2, 104, 184, 202, 208, 234 Ardaziani, Lavrenti, Georgian novelist, 87—88 Ardebil, 6o Argentine Republic, 220 Argonauts, 2, 23 Argutinsky.Dolgorukov, A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He happened to be the only Christian among PLO ambas- sadors, and an ex-priest in the bargain. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If a priest, for example, over- steps his territory and kneels for prayer in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, which is strictly divided between different denominations, it may lead to awk- ward fistfights between heavy old bearded priests in their weighty robes. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was Haddad’s touch to add the priest symbolism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It seems unlikely that someone could have made such a huge error about the island-hopping ship. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A funny sidelight comes from one of the ubiquitous anti—Arab terrorism experts, who claims that Abu Nidal himself landed in Greece dressed as a Greek Orthodox priest, ready to negotiate with or to threaten the Greek gov- ernment.3 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
first foreign hostage to be murdered was the Dutch Catholic priest Nicholas Kluiters. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Tsereteli family had its own priest, who was a serf—though not required, as were others, to kiss the hand of the lord. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Before the house stood a small church that, until Russian influence made itself felt, was divided into a section for men (in the front) and one for women (in the rear). The Making of the Georgian Nation
After lunch people would congregate once again, play games, and sing. The Making of the Georgian Nation
It had only been a few years since Jibladze had been expelled for slapping the rector and Laghiashvili had been sentenced to death for killing the hapless priest. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Such resentment was especially keen in Georgia which had, after all, formed an independent and highly civilized kingdom within the Greco-Roman world when the ancestors of the Russians were still nomads wandering about the draughty steppes. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Like Stalin after him, he received his education at the Tbilisi Theological Seminary; but although destined for the priesthood, he early lost faith in Christianity and found himself drawn step by step into the role of a political agitator and reformer. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Refusing to enter the priesthood, he went instead to Warsaw to attend the veterinary institute there. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Toumanoff suggests that once Seleucid overlordship had been established in Armenia it may have been necessary for the Seleucids to set up a vassal state in Kartli-Iberia to provide pressure on Armenia from the north. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Their possessions are held in common by them according to families, although the eldest is ruler and steward of each estate.59 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the first place, it strengthened their alliance with the Roman empire, where Christianity had also been victorious, against the Persians; second, it untied the hands of the kings in the struggle against the pagan priesthood, which possessed immense landholdings and great wealth.”4 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Melikishvili claims that the nobility in Georgia quickly adopted Christianity in order to displace the enormously wealthy pagan priesthood, and he believes that a period of intense civil warfare was experienced in eastern Georgia during the conversion. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The next class was that of the priests, who also served as diplomats and councillors of state. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1876, the Georgian Narodniks held a conference at which, according to police reports of the time, speakers proclaimed the impending destruction of the auto- cratic régime, following which everyone would be equal, and all property would be shared out equally.—Why, A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
the Narodniks demanded, should the famished masses bow down to kings, and themselves groan in poverty and squalor? They should get rid of the Tsar and his agents and laws, and then no one would extort taxes from them any more. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Under the promise of an amnesty, Zhordania had returned to Georgia from Western Europe in 1897. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The peasants refused to pay taxes to the government or tithes to the priests. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The priests were forbidden by their flock to repeat in church the prayer for the imperial family, and portraits of Tsar Nicholas II were torn down and burnt. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The village headmen were powerless to keep order, and were in any case overwhelmingly in sympathy with their stubborn compatriots. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
As the Social-Democrats had placed him under a boycott, not a single gravedigger would dig the prince’s grave; not a coachman could be found willing to take his relatives to the funeral; of three priests summoned to conduct the funeral service, only one made his appearance, but was too much frightened of the revolutionaries to consent to officiate. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Many of the country squires and village priests, either to save their skins or from genuine sympathy with the rising against the Russian GEORGIA IN THE 1905 REVOLUTION IS’ overlord, lent support to the insurgents. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Nor was the insurrection confined merely to the poorer peasantry. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Third Congress of the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party, which met in London that April, listened with rapt attention to the report of the Georgian revolutionary Mikha Tskhakaia (i86~— 195 o), and declared: ‘That the special conditions of social and political life in the Caucasus have favoured the creation there of the most militant of our party’s organizations; that the revolutionary mood of the majority of the population of the Caucasus, both in the towns and in the villages, has already brought about a national uprising against absolutism; that the autocratic régime is already sending an army with artillery into Guria, and preparing the most merciless onslaught on all the chief centres of insurrection; that the victory of absolutism over the popular uprising in the Caucasus, which might be facilitated by the multi-racial composition of the local population, would have the most harmful consequences for the outcome of the revolt throughout Russia as a whole.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Bolshevik Central Committee and all its branches were directed to make known to workers all over Russia the success of the revolutionary movement in the Caucasus, and prepare if necessary to lend armed support to the insurgents. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Many officials joined with local Russian residents in supporting the ultra-patriotic, monarchist organization known as the Russian Patriotic League and run by the priests S. Gorodtsev and I. Vostorgov. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Old women in the audience, some of whom had fed and sheltered Stalin when he was hiding from the Tsarist secret police, shouted: ‘Accursed one, renegade, traitor!’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The hijackers dressed as priests and easily passed security. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Khader was a Palestinian Christian from a small town near Jenin on the northern part of the West Bank. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This is because there are priests and monks Hezbollah 60 among them and because they do not behave proudly. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The former religious elite was replaced by a Christian hierarchy, as each Christian commune or ekiesia was tied to another under the supervision of priests and bishops. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In stone, in manuscripts, and in simple illustrations and carvings, artists and writers formulated a Georgian Christianity that was distinct from that of their Armenian neighbors and alien to the Muslim faith of the Arabs and Seijuks. The Making of the Georgian Nation
They seize upon ‘em, whether wife or children; they fell ‘em, or dispose of ‘em, otherwise as they think fit. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A few Tiflis seminarians, led by David Kezeli, met in 1872—1873 to read revolutionary Emergence of Political Society 137 138 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE literature. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgian language studies were further discouraged, even in the Yiflis seminary where a harsh Russianizing regime was installed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Some landed pro- prietors even numbered among their followers Armenian and Jewish hawkers, who supplied them gratis with tea, sugar, coffee, rice, candles and olive oil. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This leads to the dialectic of interests and ethical principles, morality, and politics, the pro- priety of establishing alliances with non-Islamic parties, and adherence to the constraints imposed by Islamic law on the political behavior of groups and individuals. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Georgian provinces of the south-west, notably Meskheti or Samtskhe, land of the Meskhians, and Tao-Klarjeti, the latter now within Turkey, played a vital part in the evolution of Georgia’s national language and civilization. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
I. I A MODERN HISTORY OP SOVIET GEORGIA Also by David Marshall Lang Lives and Legends of the Georgian Saints The W’isdori.z A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
None the less, I think that some useful purpose may be served by putting down on paper some salient facts of recent Georgian history while eyewitnesses and protagonists are alive to be consulted, and impressions from visits to Soviet Georgia in 1960 and 1962 remain fresh. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At the same time, I hope that this book may arouse interest in a fascinating and congenial people whom the accidents of history have too often cut off from the Western civilization with which they have so many ‘Criticize your friend to his face, your foe behind his back.’—Georgian A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Important industrial developments are afoot, such as the building of a new nylon factory, construction of a pipeline to bring natural gas from North Caucasia, and an irrigation scheme for Kakheti. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea in the west, to the Caspian in the east, this imposing range of mountains stretches for some seven hundred miles, its line broken by narrow passes and defiles and by lofty peaks. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The main Caucasus range separates Georgia and Transcaucasia from European Russia and the North Caucasian steppe. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Climatically and geographically, the Caucasus is a land of extreme and abrupt contrasts. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Caucasus has from prehistoric times been a meeting point for the civilizations of East and West and a market place for the exchange of the products of Europe and Asia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Its Caspian littoral gives on to Iran and Central Asia, through which ran the trade routes to Turkestan, India and China. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Like a lofty fortress, the Caucasus provided a natural refuge for all manner of peoples drifting southwards from the Eurasian plain or northwards from Asia Minor and the Iranian plateau. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Ossetes are reckoned to be descended from the once mighty Alans and speak a language belonging to the Iranian family. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgians form an autonomous or ‘autocephalous’ Church within the Greek Orthodox communion. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
These last four districts, wrested by Russia from the Ottoman Empire in the war of 1877—78, were ceded back to Turkey by the Bolsheviks at the Treaty of Kars in March 1921. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
There has always been a basic division between Western and Eastern Georgia, marked by the Surami range, beyond which, looking from the capital city of Tbilisi, lay Imereti—’the land on the far side’—as Western Georgia is commonly called. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The main cities of Western Georgia are Kutaisi, Akhaltsikhe, Makharadze (formerly Ozurgeti), Zug- didi, and the ports of Batumi, Poti and Sukhumi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On Eastern Georgia’s northern borders are A M0DE~.N A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It is warm in winter, so that the running waters and THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 7 muddy places do not freeze hard enough for beasts and men to pass over. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, the natives seldom took the trouble to plant such crops, and contented themselves with millet, from which the people made their staple diet, a paste called ghomi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They are prodigal and no misers, living from one day to the next without bothering about the morrow; fond of singing and music and skilled calligraphers; many of them possess fine voices and various other natural talents. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From Rioni Junction, about twenty miles east of Samtredia, a branch line runs north to the chief city of Western Georgia, Kutaisi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Five miles from Kutaisi is the monastery of Gelati, to which in mediaeval times was attached an academy renowned as a centre of learning. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Ossetian Military Road runs northwards from Kutaisi towards the Matnison Pass, passing through the picturesque, thickly settled Rioni valley. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At Alpani, thirty miles from Kutaisi, a secondary road branches off to the left towards Tsageri, the main centre of Lechkhumi, whence one can proceed into the mountain fastnesses of Lower and Upper Svaneti. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The traveller has a close-up view of the glaciers and peaks of the main Caucasus range rearing up behind the dark slate cliffs of the Svaneti range and sur- mounted by the snow-capped summits of Tetnuld (i 5,920 feet) THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 9 J and the still more impressive peak of Shkhara (i 7,040 feet). A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Until modern times the Svans and their neighbours lived by hunting, subsistence farm- ing, and raiding the villages of rival clans. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The climate is already different from that of Western Georgia—drier and less humid, though hot in summer. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From Gori the line continues south-eastwards, and passes through the ancient capital of Georgia, Mtskheta, situated at the confluence of the Aragvi and the Kura. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian military highroad runs northwards from Mtskheta over the Daryal Pass to Dzaujikau (formerly Vladikavkaz, later Orjonikidze) and then onwards into European Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Among the episodes added were the bringing of Our Lord’s tunic from Jerusalem to Mtskheta by Elioz the Jew, the destruction of the pagan idols by a hailstorm sent from heaven, the fashioning of crosses from the wood of a miracle-working tree, and the appearance of a fiery cross over Nino’s church, the saint’s mission to Kakheti, and her death at Bodbe.4 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From the time of Saint Nino onwards, the Georgian Church grew and prospered, in spite of persecution by Persian, Arab and Turkish invaders. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
We read in the Passion of Saint Abo, put to death by the Saracens in A.D. 786: ‘Georgia is called Mother of the Saints; some of these have been inhabitants of this land, while others came among us from time to time from foreign parts to testify to A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 12 the revelation of Our Lord Jesus Christ.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 13 Tbilisi old and new The capital of the Georgian kingdom of Iberia was trans- ferred about the sixth century A.D. from Mtskheta to the new town of Tbilisi, some twenty miles further down the River Kura to the south-east. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Under the Safavi shahs, Thilisi was one of the chief towns of the Persian empire, with its bustling markets and caravanserais, its churches and royal palaces, and its citadel, now in ruins and surrounded by a botanical garden, from which one can look down over a vast expanse of house- tops and spires, through the midst of which the muddy Kura winds. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The guild councils were drawn from among the principal master craftsmen, each guild having its high master and two assistants, and its own banner, rules and customs. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They hawked fruit, vegetables and fish, and sold them from trays which they carried on their heads. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Today, it has a fine university, an Academy of Sciences, museums and theatres. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Though organized today into collective craft associations, the metal workers and cobblers carry on their trades as before or gather in lively discussion at tea and coffee houses, while Armenian stall holders argue over prices and clansmen from the hills swagger by in their cherkesskas, their ornamental cartridge belts and high boots. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Industrj’ and agriculture From Thilisi, one may motor rapidly down to the great metallurgical combine at Rustavi, which has done so much over the last dozen years to transform the economic life of Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The principal geographical regions of Georgia are distinguished from one another by distinct linguistic or dialectal differences. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They change rapidly from a good mood to a bad one; are headstrong, ambitious, and apt both to flatter and to take offence. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A French traveller entering Georgia from Turkey in 1701 expressed himself delighted with his reception at the hands of the honest country folk, who ‘come and present you with all manner of provisions, bread, wine, fowls, hogs, lambs, sheep’. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He contrasted the Georgians’ smiling and courteous manners with the ‘serious fellows that survey you gravely from head to foot’ in Turkey.9 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The same author also gives the opening formula deemed appropriate for use in official despatches from the Egyptian Sultan to the King of Georgia: ‘May God make permanent the felicity of the exalted presence, the presence of the great monarch, the hero, the bold, the lion, the illustrious, the attacker, the dauntless, the enthroned, the crowned, a scholar in his community, just to his subjects, the successor of the Greek kings, Sultan of the Georgians, treasure of the kingdom of the seas and gulfs, protector of the homeland of the knights, THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE ‘9 the heir of his fathers in thrones and crowns, bulwark of the lands of Asia Minor and Iran, offspring of the Hellenes, the quintessence of the kings of the Syrians, the successor of the sons of thrones and crowns, the strengthener of Christianity, supporter of the religion of Jesus, the anointed leader of the Christian heroes, who glorifies Jerusalem by sincere purpose, the pillar of the sons of baptism, the helper of the Bab who is the Pope of Rome, the lover of the Mus- lims, the best of close companions, and the friend of Kings and Sultans.”° A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The history of Georgian art stretches back into remote antiquity. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Every medal has its reverse. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 22 From tribe to monarcbj — The coming of/be Romans — Christianitj and the growth of feudalism — The rise of the l3agratid q’ynastj — The Mongol joke — Ottoman Turk.ej A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Legends such as this combine with the findings of archaeology to imply the existence in Western Georgia from time immemorial of petty monarchies, governed in a simple patriarchal fashion. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In Iberia was situated the ancient capital city of Mtskheta- Armazi, a short distance up the River Kura from the modern metropolis of Tbilisi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Armazis-tsikhe, the Greek Harmozika, signifies ‘castle of Armazi’, and took its name from the local embodiment of the Zoroastrian deity Ahura-Mazda. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Wide differences in wealth and status declared themselves and became perpetuated from one generation to another. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This is demonstrated by such finds as the Akhalgori hoard, discovered in the river Ksani valley, and dating from some four hundred years before Christ. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This was the clan of the Bagratids, who were to unify Georgia under a single crown and reign there for a thousand years. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From then on, the unification of the Georgian lands pro- ceeded apace. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In ioo8, Bagrat III became king of a united Eastern and Western Georgia, having inherited Iberia from his father, and Abasgia (as Western Georgia was then called) through his mother. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Excluded from his dominions was the capital city of Tbilisi, still ruled by independent Muslim amirs, the Ja’farids. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In this way there was erected the imposing structure of the Georgian monarchy, a veritable Caucasian empire, exercising suzerainty over the Muslim kingdom of Shirvan on the Caspian Sea and A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA z8 later, over the Christian realm of Trebizond on the Black Sea— an empire renowned for its political and military might, its cultural efflorescence and its economic prosperity. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Though compiled relatively late, this table includes data handed down from earlier periods. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
No sum of blood money is prescribed to be exacted from a man slaying either of them, for such a crime was punished as high treason, by execution. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At the top of the scale are the king and the Catholicos- Patriarch of Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
under whose sons the realm split up into squabbling prince- doms. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The lowest grade mentioned in Vakhtang’s table is that of peasant or small tradesman for whom the wergihi payable was 12 tomans. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Both of them are accorded equivalent status as heads of the temporal and spiritual orders of the nation respectively. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From the north, the Grand Princes of Muscovy had already begun their drive towards the Caspian Sea and the North Caucasian steppe. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Threats and protests from the Shah of Persia soon led to the Cossacks being withdrawn. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The expulsion of the Turks from Eastern Georgia by Shah ‘Abbas was followed by a reign of terror instituted by the Shah with a view to eliminating the more vigorous Georgian princes, and turning the land into a Persian province. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Without actually annexing these RISE AND FALL OF THE GEORGIAN KINGS 33 regions, they maintained a loose suzerainty over them. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From time to time, they would stage an invasion to dethrone some disobedient prince and remind the people of the nearness of Ottoman power. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Several embassies were exchanged with King Teimuraz I of Kakheti, son of the martyred Queen Ketevan, who visited Moscow to appeal for Russian aid against the Persians. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The consequences of this touching but misguided con- fidence were seen most clearly during the reign of King Vakhtang VI of Kartli, who governed at Thilisi as regent from 1703 until 1711, and then as king, with interruptions, until 1723. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He codified the laws, set up a commission to edit the national chronicles, installed a printing press at Thilisi, built palaces, A MODERN HISTORY OP GEORGIA 34 restored churches, dug canals for irrigation purposes, and generally improved Georgia’s economic and social position. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1721, the Caucasus was suddenly affected by an international crisis. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From the north, Peter the Great of Russia cast covetous eyes on Persia’s Caspian provinces and sent messengers to Thilisi to rally the Georgians to his banner. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
King Vakhtang VI, whom the Shah had coerced into abjuring Christianity and embracing Islam, responded with alacrity to the Tsar’s overtures. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Seeing Persia in chaos, the Turks invaded from the west in 1723, occupying Thilisi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Vakhtang was one of the most gifted monarchs Georgia has produced; as patron of the arts and sciences, he may be compared with the Renaissance princes of Italy. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
There was a steady outflow of much-needed capital from Georgia as the wealthier Armenian merchants left Tbulisi and Gori to make their headquarters in Moscow or Astrakhan. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The treaty was to remain in force permanently, and any modification was to be made only by the voluntary consent of both parties. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On z8 December i 8oo, before his emissaries had returned from St. Petersburg, Giorgi XII died. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Tsar cited the defeEiceless state of Georgia, the menace of civil war, the unanimous appeals which had been received from the Christian population for protection against the Persians and Turks. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A number of petitions were received from Georgia, urging the claims of the Prince-Regent David or of his uncle, Prince Yulon, to be retained as titular head of the Georgian admin- istration. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Corruption and abuse went unchecked. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In April, Tsitsianov heard that Queen Mariam was planning to flee to the mountain strong- holds of Khevsureti with the aid of loyal clansmen from the hills. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The general replied that his orders were from Prince Tsitsianov himself. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
As quick as lightning, she drew the dagger and stabbed Lazarev through the body with such force that the tip of the weapon emerged through his left side. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They dragged her from the house all covered in blood, and hurled her with her children into a carriage. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From his headquarters in Tbilisi, he turned his attention westwards to Imereti. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Its unmistakably popular character distinguished it from earlier movements of protest headed by the Georgian royal house and landed aristo- cracy. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Ossete mountaineers and the villagers of Mtiuleti were forced to toil without payment on the roads and were mercilessly flogged, some dying from their injuries. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Others perished from cold in clearing away snow drifts. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They received encouraging messages from Prince Yulon, who still hoped to win the Georgian throne, and from the Shah of Persia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The rebels defeated a regiment of Don Cossacks sent from the North Caucasian Line, cut communica- tions between Georgia and Russia, and menaced the town of Gori. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
nobility. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Tsitsianov was well aware of the urgency of improving trade and communications, with a view to feeding the Russian garrisons off the land and clothing them from local resources, increasing the customs and excise revenues, and generally/ making the country self-supporting. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He recommended that the transition from the old oral system of administering justice to the bureaucratic formalism characteristic of Russian official A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 50 procedure should be brought about by gradual stages. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The element of surprise C GEORGIA UNDER THE T5ARS: 1801—3 2 5’ which had enabled the Russians to overcome the petty Caucas- ian states one by one was now lost; the Persian shah and the Turkish sultan were on the alert, and neither the British nor the French could view with approval this Russian wedge being driven down towards Mesopotamia and the Levant on the one side, and towards the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean on the other. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Under Tsitsianov’s successors, the war against Persia and Turkey continued with varying success and great ferocity. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
King Solomon II and Napoleon Bonaparte The remaining independent princes of Western Georgia hastened to accept Russian suzerainty. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A few weeks later, Solomon staged a dramatic escape from Russian custody, and took refuge with the Turkish pasha at the frontier city of Akhaltsikhe. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
But may you deign to liberate me, together with a million Christian souls, from the yoke of the pitiless emperor of Moscow, either by your lofty mediation, or else by the might of your all-powerful arm, and set me beneath the protective shadow of your guardianship!’26 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
But as things turned out, Napoleon could not save even his own Grand Army from virtual annihilation, let alone a princeling down in the distant GEORGIA UNDER THE TSARS: 1801—32 53 Caucasus. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Ten years of Russian occupation had greatly changed the attitude of a people who, a decade before, had welcomed the Russians as deliverers from the infidel Persians and Turks. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘It was impossible to look on this intrepid prince, however wild and obdurate, without interest; without that sort of pity and admiration, with which a man might view the royal lion hunted from his hereditary wastes, yet still returning to hover near, and roar in proud loneliness his ceaseless threatenings to the human strangers who had disturbed his reign.’27 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
When they heard of the Russian setback, the peasants of Kakheti broke into revolt. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They wiped out the garrison of Sighnaghi and blockaded Telavi, the capital town of Kakheti. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Prince Alexander Bagration arrived in Daghestan from Persia to mobilize the Lezghis, those inveterate foes of both Georgia and Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The movement also spread into Guria and Mingrelia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Economic progress and literarj contacts Now that Russia controlled a stretch of territory extending from the Black Sea to the Caspian, commerce began to revive. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
By this route, manufactured goods from Russian cities and Western Europe could be trans- ported via Tbilisi to Baku on the Caspian, or into Persia overland via Tabriz. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Ermolov had some of the Tbilisi streets paved, and roofed over the bazaar. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Tbillsi merchants began to establish connexions with Marseilles, Trieste, and Germany, and to re-export European wares to Persia on a substantial scale. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1830, an official of the finance department reported from Tbilisi that trade was in the most flourishing condition. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1824, for instance, the Acting French Consul in Tbilisi reported that although Georgia produced timber, cotton, saffron, madder, wax, honey, silk and tobacco, there was little attempt as yet to ~, market these commodities on a large scale. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
By Western commercial standards, Georgia could not furnish a worth- while cargo of goods for export at any one time, while acts of piracy by the Circassians and Abkhazians on Black Sea shipping made sea trade hazardous.3° A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Ermolov was soon under fire from another quarter. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The warlike tribes of Daghestan were cut off from direct contact with their co-religionists in the Islamic world outside the borders of the Russian Empire. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
During the century following the Caspian campaign of Peter the Great, the main chain of the Caucasus mountains had lost its old importance as an impregnable bastion shielding the Middle Eastern lands against invasion from the north. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Caucasia had become a base from which Russian political and military power could be directed westward across Anatolia towards the Mediterranean, southward across Persia towards the Indian Ocean, and eastward across the Caspian into the heart of Central Asia.33 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In future, the Muslims of the Caucasus were to look to the Turks alone for support. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The campaign opened in May i8z8, with the surrender of the Turkish garrison in Anapa to a combined expedition of the Russian fleet and troops from the Caucasian Line. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The loss of Anapa cut off the Turks from direct access to Circassia, over which the Porte formally renounced all claim to suzerainty. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Intellectual life began to revive as Tbilisi became more and more of a A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 6a t GEORGIA UNDER THE TSARS: 1801—3 2 cosmopolitan centre. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In one of his lyrics, Griboedov describes the charm of Kakheti, ‘where the Alazani meanders, indolence and coolness breathe, where in the gardens they collect the tribute of the purple grape.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘The Georgians,’ he wrote, ‘would submit to a governor from among their own nation. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Even the higher aristocracy were discontented, especially as the Russian administration had curtailed the landlords’ feudal jurisdiction over their peasants and ousted them from participation in local government, as well as questioning the titles of nobility of some of the leading princely families. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It is safe to say that from the year i 8z6 up to the present time she has suffered in the aggregate heavier losses in cereal crops, pack animals and beasts of burden, drovers, etc., A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Russians] have taken from us the entire Not satisfied with Kartli and Kakheti, they have added to We have grown poor in misfortune, and have no advocate We ask justice from above; we shall see how God decrees! A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On arrival there, they spent their period of service in wandering idly from one department to another, and waiting impatiently for the moment to return home. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
There were even cases where the authorities acted as receivers of stolen property, and protected the thieves from prosecution by the rightful owners. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The senior members of the Georgian royal family were by now dead, or else for the most part resigned to exclusion from power. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The conspirators would then seize the Daryal Pass to prevent reinforcements from arriving from Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Prince Alexander Bagration would return from Persia to be proclaimed king of Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
These waverers refrained, however, from disclosing their knowledge to the Russian authorities. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
GEORGIA UNDER ~HE TSAR5: 1801—32 69 j VICEROY VORONTSOV: 1832-55 The Murids of Daghestan — Russian reverses — Georgian feudalism and Russian serfdom — Deus ex machina — Attempts at reform — Formation of the Caucasian Vicerqyaltji — Industrial progress — Decline of the old aristocracj/ — Literature and the theatre — The The Murids of Da,ghestan IT WAS a misfortune for Georgia that the Russian government, in view of the Polish uprising of 1830, had found it necessary in the following year to recall Prince Paskevich-Erivansky from the Caucasus and send him to take charge of operations in Poland. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
His loss was deeply felt in Georgia, which he was rapidly getting into order, and he had nearly succeeded in bringing the tribes of the Caucasus into pacific relations with the Russian Government by employing a portion of their troops and not interfering with their internal government—the only system of policy, as I often heard from his own lips, that he thought likely to succeed.’37 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The government at St. Petersburg was at this time disturbed by the abuses revealed by the report of Senators Kutaysov and Mechnikov, extracts from which have been quoted already. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Early in 1837, his followers inflicted a severe reverse near Gimri, on a detachment under General Kiuge von Klugenau. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the summer, Baron Rosen decided to send an expedition against Shamil’s headquarters at Ashilta, which the Russians took in face of the Murids’ desper- ate resistance. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Although the British Foreign Office refrained from adopting an openly anti-Russian policy, succes- sive British ambassadors to the Sublime Porte, such as Pon- sonby (1833—41) and Stratford Canning (1842—58) were on the alert to stir up trouble for Russia all round the Black Sea and in areas adjacent. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The British advent- urers Longworth and Bell made several trips across the Black Sea to establish contact with the Circassians, to whom they held out hopes of material help and diplomatic support from the British government. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Arms and ammunition were smuggled in from Turkey under the noses of Russian gunboats, while the impetuous British diplomat David Urquhart helped to set up a Cherkess political centre in Istanbul. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Russian governor of Western Georgia, with some 12,000 troops, joined forces in 1835 with General Velyaminov, the commander in northern Caucasia, in an expedition to sub- due the Abkhazians and Circassians, an& prevent the Turks from landing arms and launching pirate raids on Russian ship- ping. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Although a Society for the Encouragement of Rural and Manufacturing Industries and Trade was set up in Tbilisi in 1833, the French Consul there calculated that the total imports of Russia’s Trancaucasian provinces sank in value from 12,000,000 francs in 1830 to 5,610,000 in 1834, while exports declined from 5,ooo,ooo francs in value to 1,500,000.40 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Following the report of Senators Kutaysov and Mechnikov, and the enquiry arising from the abortive conspiracy of 1832, the Russian government tried hard to con- ciliate the landed proprietors, whom they regarded as the most reliable bulwark of the Russian autocratic system in Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
An example of this occurred in 1834, when the Russian Senate decided that peasants from Western Georgia (Imereti and Mingrelia) who had run away from their masters and taken refuge in Eastern Georgia should, after due investi- gation, be handed back to their owners. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Many had come there during the famine and plague which ravaged their country in 1811—12, often with the active encouragement of their then lords, who had no means of feeding them. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Later on, the Molokans were joined by several thousand of the famous sect of the Dukhobors, some of whom settled down near Akhalkalaki, in a region only lately recovered from the “ Turks. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Among the various dues and services which might be required of the peasant were working a stipulated number of days on the lord’s private land, helping to build the lord’s house or barns, handing over a share of the harvest or of flocks and herds, offering hospitality A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 76 TSAR NICHOLAS AND VICEROY vORONTSOV: 1832—55 to the lord’s guests and their retinue, gathering and delivering firewood, and providing food for the lord’s table at weddings and church festivals. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 78 TSAR NICHOLAS AND VICEROY VORONTSOV: 1832—55 The impending arrival of Tsar Nicholas in Tbilisi had an effect similar to that produced on the corrupt mayor and officials in Gogol’s comedy Revi~or by the visit of the In- spector-General from St. Petersburg. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
After visiting Kutaisi, the capital of Irnereti, the Tsar turned southwards towards the city of Akhaltsikhe, taken from the Turks during the war of 1828—29. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From Erivan, the chief city in Armenia, Nicholas proceeded 79 to Thilisi, where he received from Baron Hahn a report highly critical of Rosen and his methods. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Turning to the military governor, Nicholas said: ‘General, tear off his aiguillettes, take his sword from him, and have him sent off within two hours to the fortress of Bobruisk.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Petitions from the nobility and common people continued to pour in. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1833, Michael (Tatark- han) and Nicholas (Tsiokh) Dadeshkeiani, miavars or ruling princes of Western Upper Svaneti, signed a treaty of protector- ate with Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The principality was annexed to Russia, but the Gurians were far from re- conciled to the new order. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In Circassia, forts were built along the coast to cut off the tribesmen from their outlets to the Black Sea. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
By that time, General Golovin’s army in Daghestan was being depleted through casualties at the rate of 12,000 men a year, apart from the loss of scores of guns and other valuable equipment. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
When finally Vorontsov extricated himself and the famished and threadbare survivors of his force from enemy territory, it was with a loss of 4,000 men, including three generals and zoo other officers. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the spring of x 846, Shamil set out in force from his highland fastnesses, and crossed the military highway and the River Terek to the north of Vladikavkaz. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘Until the memory of Georgia itself vanishes from the earth, the name of Vorontsov will remain alive,’ was a phrase which he had often heard repeated in conversation in the Georgia of those days.48 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The answer is that Vorontsov was one of those few highly- placed Russians who genuinely enjoyed being in Georgia, derived pleasure from the company of Georgians, and evinced a real interest in their language, culture and national past. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He would receive deputations from the various peoples and communities dwelling under his aegis, listen patiently to their point of view, and do his best to satisfy their grievances and aspirations. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Decline of the old aristocracj As usually occurs during the transition from an agricultural and pastoral to an industrial society, the landed proprietors began to feel the pinch. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It was during the reign of Nicholas I, which lasted from 1825 to i 8~ ~, that the industriaL revolution really got under way in Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The satirical book by Prince bane Bagration (1772—1830), called Kalmasoba or The Alms-Collecting Tour, contains an account of a visit to the Dadian or ruling prince of Mingrelia, who liked to spend the fishing season in a roofless, floorless house by the River Rioni, which afforded him shelter only from the wind. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In that case you, the ruler of this land, are excused from building any bath- houses!’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The hero, a Caucasian Scrooge or Shy- lock living in the Tbilisi Armenian milieu, starts modestly as a small tradesman, and then turns to money lending. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Seek not shelter, my flying steed, from scorching skies or storm; Pity not thy rider sad, by self-immolation worn. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From this period also dates the birth of modern Georgian drama. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
With the encouragement of Prince Vorontsov, a Georgian amateur dramatic society was formed, under the direction of the talented playwright Giorgi Eristavi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Eristavi then formed a professional company, which was granted a subsidy of 4,000 rubles a year, and the use of the Russian theatre building. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Soon his troops were without bread and his animals without forage, and his army was bogged down in the Mingrelian quagmire. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In spite of the incompetence of the local Russian commander, who was the Georgian prince Ivane Bagration-Mukhransky, Omar’s campaign gradually petered out. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Now that most of the country had been thoroughly subjugated from a military viewpoint, it could be peacefully assimilated into the Tsarist system, and the old arbitrary methods of military government replaced by more civilized methods of administra- tion. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The spread of education combined with resurgence of national pride to pro- duce a new and vigorous Georgian intellectual life which was to manifest itself increasingly during the second half of the century. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
To the Governor-General of Moscow, who expressed alarm at nineteenth centurj 94 j SOCIAL CHANGE AND NATIONAL AWAKENING: 1855—94 the implications of these amiable generalities, the Tsar replied: ‘Better to abolish serfdom from above than to wait till it begins to abolish itself from below.’52 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Thus ended the inde- pendent existence of this renowned nation of fighters and hunters, mentioned with respect by Strabo and the ancients, but sunk in more recent times into squalor and ignorance from which contact with European ways has only lately begun to redeem them. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Omar Pasha had subsequently landed at Sukhumi, from which he advanced south-eastwards into Mingrelia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Cut off since the Crimean War from contact with Turkey and the Western 97 European powers, the Circassians were no match for Russia’s military might, especially after the surrender of Shamil and the Murids of Daghestan. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In Chechnya and Daghestan, the Russians were satisfied with the submission of the local popula- tion to Russian law. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
More corn had to be brought in to feed the growing population, while maize and wine were exported in bulk. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The steady increase in the population of Georgia meant that by the I 8~o’s, land hunger was becoming acute. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Its message was none the less clearly understood by contem- poraries. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
To reach the proprietor without getting filthy or collecting some kind of choice odour in the process was a great achievement.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Little wonder that Luarsab and Darejan Tatkaridze became proverb- ial figures of fun, or that many a Georgian squire should have cursed Ilia and his clever young friends as harbingers of ruin and destroyers of traditional values. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The whole of Russian Trans- caucasia was now spanned by rail from the Caspian to the Black Sea coast. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
There was a constant drift from the countryside to the towns. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Between 1865 and 1897, the population of Tbilisi more than doubled —from 71,0 5 i to I 59,590. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Many Georgian intellectuals greeted these readjustments with approval, and were glad to see the old ruling class stirred from its torpor into fruitful enterprise. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
One man is building a wine ware- house to supply the city with drink, another is trying to make a fortune out of milk—there is no limit to these bright ideas, and all their promoters are naturally keen to secure financial backing from the bank! A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The emperor whose accession and early reforms had aroused the most sanguine hopes, who had freed the peasants from servitude and carried through so many promising reforms, was spending his last years hunted like a beast by revolutionaries, and hiding in his palaces in a vain effort to ward off their bombs and guns. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
If the 1870’s were, for Russia as for Georgia, a time of new ideas and new possibilities, they were also a period of frustra- tion and disillusionment. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
But the mu~hik refused to respond to the advances of these town-bred zealots, most of whom were rounded up and imprisoned or deported to Siberia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘What invisible agency has been exercising so lamentable an effect upon us, so that we are all beading for general ruin precisely at that moment when the external enemy no longer exists for us? From every side, from every household is heard nothing but the sound of weeping and wailing. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘What has come over us, what has happened to us?’ asked the veteran poet and administrator Prince Grigol Orbeliani on the morrow of the war of 1877—78. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Thus, from i 871 the study of Georgian language and literature in State Schools was replaced by compulsory Latin and Greek. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1872, an inspector arrived from St. Petersburg and banned the use of Georgian as medium of instruction in the Thilisi Theological Seminary, A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA io8 SOCIAL CHANGE AND NATIONAL AWAKENING: I 855—94 the main training college for the Georgian priesthood. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A venerable Georgian writer, Prince Dimitri Qipiani, who ventured a protest against the prelate’s intemperate mouthings, was deported to Stavropol in the North Caucasus, where he was soon afterwards mur- dered in mysterious circumstances. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
lila’s real aim, which under the Tsarist censorship could not be proclaimed in print, was to unite his fellow countrymen, regardless of social status, into a closely knit national com- munity capable one day of winning independence from the Russian overlord. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Returning to Thilisi, Gogebashvili taught arithmetic and geography in the ecclesiastical school and later in the seminary. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From then onwards Gogebashviii became a free-lance and devoted his energies to spreading education and enlightenment among his fellow-countrymen and their children. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘The status of the Georgian tongue in Georgian scholastic institutions may be compared with that of a wretched foundling, deprived of all care and protection. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Great Georgian writers of the late nineteenth centur)’ Despite official discouragement, the last decades of the nine- teenth century witnessed a Georgian literary revival in which there emerged writers of a stature unequalled since the Golden Age of Rustaveli seven hundred years before. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The development of the Georgian romantic novel received powerful stimulus from the work of Alexander Qazbegi (1848—93). A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
There he sought refuge from worldly temptations by taking to the life of a simple shepherd, in which condition he passed seven years. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Sent to complete his education in Moscow, he fell into bad company, and returned disillu- sioned and broken in health to his native mountains. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Among his best-known novels are Elguja and Khevisberi Gocha. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
By sheer strength of charac- ter and by refusal to make any concession to the new social forces and political trends stirring in the Russian empire, Alexander had succeeded in maintaining some semblance of order and stability. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Student clubs and fraternities were banned, on pain of conscription into the ranks of the army. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The industrialists of Moscow, where hordes of workpeople poured in from the surrounding countryside, paid low wages. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Under pressure from the employers, Bunge was driven from office on the charge of promoting ‘socialism’, and there was a return to full-scale laisse~<-faire. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Children of ten to twelve years of age could now be employed on night work, while the manufacturers could resort to abuses such as substituting payments in kind for wages in cash, imposing arbitrary fines, and forcing workers to buy their supplies from the factory shop. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Accession of Nicholas II On succeeding to the Russian throne in November 1894, Nicholas II took over no comfortable heritage. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Pronouncements such as these, far from intimidating the Russian public, merely exacerbated opinion. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Liberals, moder- ate socialists and clandestine revolutionaries alike set to work with a will to undermine the Russian leviathan and topple it from its throne. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Several leading Georgian writers had been imprisoned for their part in the student demonstrations at St. Petersburg in i86i. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He became a great friend and disciple of Prince Kropotkin the anarchist. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1907, Cherkesov helped to organize a mass petition of the Georgian people against Tsarist oppression, which was presented, though with scant result, to the Inter- national Peace Conference at The Hague. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
By 1874, the group counted about a hundred members; they had a small secret printing press on the bank of the River Liakhvi, in the quarters of a priest named A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 120 Samadashvili, who had learnt type-setting at the Thilisi Theological Seminary. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Those Narodniks who escaped exile turned from radical agitation and conspiratorial plotting to more peaceful methods of furthering their ideals. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
as they were called, to distinguish them from the Marxist Social-Democrats or ‘S.-D.s’, A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1879, a secret conference of the Narodniks held at Voronezh divided into two factions. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From Warsaw, Zhordania kept up a clandestine correspond- ence with friends in Georgia, such as Sylvester Jibladze and the proletarian writer Egnate Ninoshvili(Ingoroqva), whom he also kept supplied with Russian subversive political literature. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A contemporary who saw him at work there was shocked to see this frail young intellect- ual dragging great planks about the factory, with blood dripping from his torn fingers. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Ninoshvili, whose real name was Egnate Ingoroqva, occupies an important place in Georgian literature and social thought, as the first truly ‘work- ing-class’ writer, in which respect he may be compared with Maxim Gorky in Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1894, he returned desperately ill to his native village in Guria, where he died in the same year from tuberculosis. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The story, Gogia Uishvili, tells of a poor peasant flogged for defending his wife and children from insult at the hands of the police, and then com- mitting suicide rather than survive such shameful punishment. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This document, entitled Economic Pro- gress and the National Question, was presented to the next meeting of the group at Tbilisi in February 1893, and met this time with unanimous approval. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Both of these trends arise from the stimulus of commercial and capitalistic enter- prise. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Zhordania received warning in time, and sailed from Batumi to Europe in May 1893, some weeks before a warrant arrived for his own arrest. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The countries of Western Europe (apart from special instances like that of Alsace- Lorraine) were free from foreign domination and the handicap A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA iz8 of a colonial régime. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
But of true peasants on the Russian or Georgian model, no sign was to be seen. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The liberal writer Giorgi Tsereteli, prominent as leader of the so-called Meore Dasi (‘Second Group’), declared that a new epoch in Georgian social and intellectual life had begun, and hailed the birth of this new school of economic and political thought—the Mesame Dasi or ‘Third Group’. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, there were several factors which contributed to this leaning. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
By 1900, the number of Georgian industrial workers was reckoned at about 35,000, or up to 50,000 if one includes the railwaymen. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Trade unions were proscribed, strikes forbidden and suppressed by the police and militia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It is true that industrialization affected as yet only a relatively small proportion of the population and that Georgia was still a predominantly agricultural and past~ral land. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Such views were anathema to Ilia Chavchavadze and the other leading Georgian nationalists, who were not slow in taking up Zhordania’s challenge. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A positive impetus to their movement was provided by a series of well planned strikes which broke out from 1898 onwards in various sectors of Georgian industry. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The strike was directed by both the local Georgian socialists and by workers of revolutionary sympathies who had been deported from Russia; it lasted a week and led to the arrest of forty-one ringleaders. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From 1900 onwards, Georgia, like the rest of Russia, was caught up in the backwash of a world- wide economic depression. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The export of petroleum products from Batumi was reduced and the workers put on to short-time working. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From the ‘underground’, he played a prominent part in organizing opposition to the authorities. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At midday, the sounding of the noon cannon shot from the Thilisi arsenal gave the signal for action. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
There were some 11,000 industrial workers, a motley, polyglot mixture of Christians and Mus- lims, with some of the riffraff always to be found in ports and dockyards. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Wages were from sixty kopecks to one ruble per day. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
When it was learnt that all the detainees were to be deported from Batumi, an even larger crowd of demon- strators, including workers from the Rothschild and Mantashev factories, the docks and the railway yards, in all about 6,ooo, set out for the barracks where the prisoners were held. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Losing hope in a solution from above to the problems of land tenure and the general impoverishment of the countryside, the peasants began to impose their own solution from below. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They sent troops to round up the ringleaders, who included the majority of the local village schoolmasters and a number of socialist agitators who had arrived from the towns. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Noe Zhordania, who had just been released from custody and returned to his native Guria, was rearrested; Noe Khomeriki the agronomist, future Minister of Agriculture of independent Georgia, was also taken into custody. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Demon- strations took place, red flags were waved, and the cry of ‘Down with autocracy!’ was repeatedly to be heard. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
These outbreaks helped to bring about Witte’s dismissal from the Ministry of Finance in August 1903. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Before any social gathering could be held, per- mission had to be sought from the police. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
During the summer of 1904, bad news from the theatre of war seriously unsettled Russian public opinion. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This banquet campaign was particularly well supported in Georgia, where natural con- viviality reinforced the universal patriotic urge to free Georgia from Russian absolutism. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The war party at St. Petersburg, headed by Plehve, cherished high hopes that Russia’s revolutionary fever would be speedily cured by this timely ‘small, victorious war’. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Nicholas was away from the A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 148 I I k GEORGIA IN THE 1905 REVOLUTION capital. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The railway workers of Thilisi were already preparing to go on strike in solidarity with their comrades at Baku, the great oil port and revolutionary hotbed on the Caspian. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky resigned in despair, and was succeeded as Minister of the Interior by Court Chamberlain Bulygin. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The procurator had abandoned all hope of holding the forthcoming Ozurgeti Quarter Sessions, since ‘several cases of political murders were due to be tried at these assizes, but the Ozurgeti police are absolutely unable to afford the Court even the most feeble protection from deeds of violence on the part of the population’. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At this very moment, I have received from Ozurgeti almost simultaneously telegrams relating to two attacks on village constables, resulting in one of them being wounded, and their arms being stolen, also two attacks on village courtrooms, two attempted murders of village headmen, and the assassination of the nobleman Urushadze.’78 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From Guria, the revolutionary fever spread with lightning rapidity into neighbouring Imereti and Mingrelia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Sultan Krym-Girey was descended on his father’s side from A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 152 the former Khans of the Crimea, dispossessed of their domin- ions by Catherine the Great in 1783; his mother was British. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The peasant spokesmen for their part were efficiently coached by the local Social-Democratic committee, and put forward a series of demands which included the return to their homes of persons exiled to Siberia without trial; the withdrawal of troops recently sent to in- timidate the population; abolition of censorship and establish- ment of freedom of Press and publication; election of peasant deputies to a Constituent Assembly by free and secret ballot; abolition of the internal passport system, and granting of freedom of movement within the whole Russian Empire; freedom of assembly and association and the right of appeal from arbitrary acts by local officials; enlargement of peasant allotments at the expense of State and Church domains; the abolition of tithes; the regularization of share-cropping and tenantry agreements, with provision for reduction of taxes and dues in the event of bad harvests; provision of schooling for all children; and the reopening of local Georgian libraries and reading rooms, shut down three years previously by the former Governor-General. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Sultan Krym-Girey reported favourably on the Gurians’ loyalty to Russia, emphasizing that they were in no sense attempting to break away from the Empire, but merely desired to emerge from their colonial status and enjoy the same rights and privileges as the citizens of European Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The whole of Georgia, from Abkhazia in the north-west to Kakheti in the east was in the throes of insurrection. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In Georgia, the agrarian conflict spread from Western Georgia into the district around Tbilisi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
GEORGIA IN THE 1905 REVOLUTION I” From Kutaisi in Western Georgia, the head of the Secret Police reported that the revolutionary movement resembled ‘a huge cauldron filled with water and hermetically sealed and sus- pended above an enormous furnace. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
All parties of the opposition, from the Liberals to the Bolsheviks, con- demned the edict as half-hearted and inadequate. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, the organizers forced their way in and the meeting began in the presence of an audience of some 2,000, including many ordinary citizens who had come from sheer curiosity. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Thereupon, Cossacks opened fire on the assembly through the windows, while others invaded the ball and shot down the audience from the platform. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The mob fled from the building and were A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA i shot down indiscriminately or felled with rifle butts and sabres. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
AU the attempts of the Tbilisi Town Council to protect the local popu- lation from every form of arbitrary act have resulted in failure. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
With increasing frequency, any of our enactments which have ex- ceeded the limits of minor domestic management have been forth- with annulled and prevented from being carried into effect. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At present, the public is even excluded from our deliberations; the newspapers have already been long deprived of the possibility of publishing a major part of the councillors’ speeches, especially if these speeches touch on any but the most trivial issues. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Prince Amilakhori, a prominent land- owner, was shot dead in a Tbilisi tramcar by unidentified assassins. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Now times are different. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘The proletariat will not demand petty concessions from the government, it will not call upon it to rescind martial law and A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA i6o flogging in several towns and villages—the proletariat will not sink to such trifles. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Staroselsky recommended that martial law should be lifted from Western Georgia, and ex- tensive concessions made to the local population. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Fighting was heavy in Batumi, where barricades were erected in the streets and many lives were lost. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On 10/2 3 December, General Shirinkin, head of the Caucasian police department, reported to St. Petersburg that the posts and telegraphs had ceased to function; the law courts were paralysed; the newspapers were full of inflammatory appeals to the population. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Azerbaijani-Armenian clashes continued around Erivan and Elizavetpol (the modern Kirovabad), though Baku was relatively quiet. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In November i 905, the Cossacks took the law into their own hands. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
During November and December 1905, the fate of the Russian administration in Transcaucasia hung in the balance. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The workers fired on the attackers from roofs, windows and cellars. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They planned to make the most of the forthcoming convention of the Russian Duma, send to St. Petersburg their best orators, and proclaim Georgia’s cause from the housetops, to the confusion of their country’s oppressors. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At the Tammerfors conference of the Russian Social- Democratic Party held in 1905, the Master argued against the barren tactics of boycotting the Duma: he saw no reason why revolution should not be furthered from the parliamentary tribune. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Revolution, said Lenin, could be preached even from a dungheap or a pigsty. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This does not imply that the Georgian Mensheviks were content from now on with a passive or submissive role. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘We have missed our chance, it was all my fault!’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Silva leapt up and rushed into the road shouting: ‘I am lost, they have done it without me!’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Silva sta- tioned Arsena and his assistant in front of General Gryaznov’s residence, while himself taking up a position on the Golovinsky Avenue whence he could signal the general’s approach to his alert accomplices. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Once the emergency was past, the autocrat and his entourage did their best to annul the concessions which had been wrested from them. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The one Social-Democratic regional party to ignore the boycott and enter wholeheartedly into the election campaign was that of Georgia, where the native Mensheviks had ousted Lenin’s local henchmen from control of the party machine. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Viborg Declaration The radical temper of the First Duma brought it into constant conffict with the Tsar’s government, at the head of which the vigorous Count Witte had been succeeded by the aged Gore- mykin, a quavering but wily veteran of political manoeuvre. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
When the First Duma assembled on 27 April/io May I9O~ at the Tauride Palace in St. Petersburg, the well-organized Georgian Social-Democratic faction under Zhordania’s leader- ship immediately assumed a dominant role in the left-wing opposition. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On his arrival at the Russian capital, Ilia declared that he intended to be not a defender of sectional interests, but a champion of the Georgian national cause. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Large categories of voters were arbitrarily struck off the register, while the police held up ballot papers, fixed impossible dates for polling, and did all they could to dis- courage unreliable elements like Jews and Socialists from vot- ing. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The result of this was the opposite from that intended by the régime. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The only exception was Stalin who arrived, as he bad done at the previous Congress, with forged credentials from a non- existent Social-Democratic branch in southern Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Such a suggestion, coming from the leading champion of A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA ‘74 country gentry exercised complete predominance in rural I international working-class solidarity, surprised Zhordania greatly. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Stolypin demanded the exclusion of the Social-Democrats from the Duma and the surrender of twelve deputies to the police. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The representa- tion of Poland was reduced from thirty-six to fourteen seats. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Caucasian revolutionary organizations were forced under- ground. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The next day, the viceroy was compelled to set the poet free. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Murder of I/ia Chavchavad~e Far more serious and tragic was the fate of Georgia’s other great man of letters, lila Chavchavadze. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The con- Commissar for Foreign Affairs, were arrested while trying to change the money. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Trotsky, then a Menshevik, joined with other rivals of Lenin in accusing the Master of reducing socialism to the level of brigandage and highway robbery. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian Church in crisis While the Russian police were busy protecting their banks and convoys from Bolshevik bandits, fresh trouble arose from a different quarter. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Nikon was said to sympathize with the cause of the Georgian Church, and his murderers were alleged to be hooligans from the Russian extremist Black-Hundred gangs who feared that Nikon would intercede for the Georgian Church with the authorities in St. Petersburg. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The dissolution of the Second Duma in 1907 evoked a general mood of lassitude and gloom in Russian political circles. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The elections to the Third Duma were rigged by agents of the government and produced a gratifying swing to the Right. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Fourth Duma, which sat from 1912 until the Revolution of 1917, was of a similar complexion to the Third. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Particularly unfortunate was the lot of a category of peasant known as khi~ani, originally free migrant peasants who settled on a lord’s estates for a period and entered into share-cropping and other contractual relationships with the local squire. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The people of the Caucasus, who realized that sooner or later Ottoman Turkey would become embroiled in the struggle, greeted the news with markedly divergent emotions. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Tsar and his government did everything possible to encourage the Armenians in their wishful thinking. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Russian Bolshevik party and its Georgian adherents adopted from the first a strongly anti-war line. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Zhordania, who had lived for some years in France and England, parted com- pany on this issue with some of his Menshevik colleagues, notably Noe Ramishvili and Noe Khomeriki, and lively argu- ments in Georgian socialist circles continued for some time. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1915, a leading Georgian Bolshevik, Prokopi (Alesha) Japar- idze (I 880—1918), was arrested and exiled to Siberia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1915, a German Caucasus expedition was formed, A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA i8z incorporating a body of Georgian volunteers, some seven hundred strong, known as the Georgian Legion. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Legion’s first commander was Lieutenant Horst Schliephack, later succeeded by Count F. W. von der Schulenburg, a former German Vice-Consul at Tbilisi and an expert on Georgian affairs, who also acted as German liaison officer with the Turkish Third Army. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Turkish supreme commander and War Minister was Enver Pasha, who conceived a grand strategy which would, he believed, open the way to the expulsion of Russia from the entire Caucasus. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At the northern end of the front, a Turkish detachment from Trebizond drove the Russians out of Ardahan. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He mustered his forces for a counter-attack, defeated and virtually destroyed the Turkish 9th and ioth Corps and then repulsed the iith Corps from its advanced position. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In February 1916 the Russians captured the great citadel and supply base of Erzurum, from which the Turks retreated in disorder with heavy losses in men and material. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A new Turkish force, the Second Army, attacked the Russians from the south-west in the Lake Van sector, but was firmly held. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The transport of troops and supplies was attended by grave difficulties. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Hunger was rife in Tbilisi and other cities, and deaths from famine occurred in country districts. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA i86 To counter the revolutionary menace, the Russian Minister of the Interior sent to Thilisi a special emissary empowered to deport from Georgia any individual suspected of defeatism or subversive activities, with the sole exception of the viceroy himself. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From 1910 onwards, how- ever, a reaction against patriotic and civic modes in poetry set ON BORROWED TIME: 1906—17 187 in, under the leadership of a group of youthful poets and novelists whose debut took place under the fashionable banners of Symbolism and Decadence. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Their early, and now seldom republished works were characterized, according to a Soviet literary manual, by ‘mysticism, lack of political content, absence of ideas, extreme individualism, the cult of Bohemian life, the aesthetics of deformity and preciosity’. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From the 1890’s onwards, a great revival took place in the Georgian theatrical world. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Par- ticularly fruitful was the help given to Georgian antiquarian and ethnographical studies by Countess Praskovya Uvarova (1840—1924), who succeeded her husband, Alexey Uvarov, as President of the Imperial Moscow Archaeological Society in ON BORROWED TIME: 1906—17 189 1884. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In spite of the repressive features of the Stolypin era in Russian history, the Tsarist government could not annul all the concessions which had been wrung from it during the revolu- tion of 1905. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This new class was recruited in large part from scions of the old Georgian aristocracy. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In Tbilisi and elsewhere, the police vanished from their posts and administrative offices closed down. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Bands of revolutionaries appeared from their hiding places. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Having no one to cultivate them on their behalf, the nobility found their domains slipping from their grasp, while the peasants were now endowed with both their own former small-holdings and those portions of their former lord’s estates which they had formerly cultivated as share-croppers. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This did not deter the Georgians from going ahead with the re- organization of their old national Church. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Pending the establishment of a regular People’s Guard, Zhordania and his colleagues recruited from Guria a detach- ment of people’s militia commanded by V. and K. Imnadze, which helped to maintain order where needed. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From March ~ then, local authority within Georgia resided principally with the Social-Democrats, whose Tbilisi committee, directed by Zhordania and his deputy Noe Ramish- viii, formed the backbone of the Petrograd-appointed Ozakom. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Thus, Zhordania was strongly critical of the ‘democratic cretinism’ which inspired the Kerensky govern- ment to postpone settlement of the many crying social and economic problems left over from Tsardom until these could be referred to a constituent assembly convened with every refinement of electoral procedure from all corners of the far- flung Russian state. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Mortally afraid of the Turks, the Armenians had been encouraged by the American President Wilson to believe that an Allied victory would be followed by the creation of an independent Greater Armenia carved from the debris of the Turkish empire and stretching from the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In May i 917, the first congress of delegates of the Caucasian army met in Tbilisi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Social-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks professed, in public at least, to believe in the need to continue the war to a victorious end, whereas the Bolshevik minority unsuccessfully demanded peace at any price. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Whatever the Georgians might have felt, the need to continue the struggle to the bitter end was irresistibly pressed by the Armenian Dashnaks and other representatives of the Armenian nation. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A ship which arrived at Batumi carrying corn from Russia was commandeered by A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 198 Constituent Assembly. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It was estimated that the requirements of the Caucasian Army amounted to 24 million poods (i pood =36 lb.) A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Caucasia had long depended for a large portion of her wheat and other grain supplies on South Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Since this was regarded as merely a temporary expedient, pending the suppression of the Bol- shevik rebels, the Georgians continued to make arrangements for the forthcoming elections to the all-Russian Constituent Assembly. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the event, the Constituent Assembly, in which Lenin’s followers were a minority, was forcibly dispersed by Bolshevik troops after one sitting in January 1918—an event which marked the death- knell of Russian parliamentary democracy. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
While shrinking still from any formal declaration of inde- pendence from Russia, the Transcaucasian Commissariat entered forthwith into negotiations with the Turks for an armistice on the crumbling Caucasian front. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, Enver Pasha’s Young Turk government at Istanbul was well aware of the heaven-sent chance which the Russian revolution offered for Turkey to recover Caucasian territories wrested from her by Russia over the preceding century, so that this move was mainly designed to gain time pending further weakening of Russia’s military and political grip on Caucasia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Vehip Pasha protested repeatedly to the Russian commander and the Transcaucasian government about alleged massacres of Turks and other Muslims by vengeful Armenian guerilla bands. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the meantime, Trotsky had signed the Treaty of Brest- Litovsk, whereby the Bolsheviks agreed to exclude from Russian territory the districts of Batumi, Ardahan and Kars, where the fate of the population was to be decided by a free plebiscite. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Nikolai Chkheidze and Irakli Tsereteli, dethroned from their tribunes in the Petrograd Soviet and Provisional Government, now reappeared in their native Georgia to raise the clarion call of revolutionary democracy. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Muslim Georgians of Lazistan and of Atchára, of which Batumi is the main city, were helping the Turks, tearing up railway lines, wrecking trains and conducting guerulla operations generally. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Three days after its forma- tion, the Turks occupied the great fortress of Kars, from which thousands of panic-stricken men and women streamed out, carrying their children and their possessions on their backs. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Spurning all allegiance to the Menshevik régime in Tbilisi, the Baku Bolsheviks nationalized the vast oihields around their city and placed them at the dis- posal of the Moscow government, from which they derived constant moral support. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Transcaucasian delegation, forty-five strong, was headed by Premier Chkhenkeli, and also included the veteran Georgian revolutionary and publicist Niko Nikoladze, and the jurist Zurab Avalishvili. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Headed by the Bavarian general von Lossow, it also included Count von der Schulenburg, a former German Consul in Tbilisi, Arthur Leist, famous as a translator and scholar of Georgian literature, and 0. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He also sent to Tbilisi Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, who entered into close touch with the Georgian members of the Transcaucasian government and started collecting together a special German task force from prisoners of war, peasants from the German settlements around Tbilisi, and any other German nationals whom he could assemble. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
True to their policy of playing off the Turks and Germans against one another, the Georgian delegation in Berlin declared to the German Foreign Ministry that ‘inasmuch as Georgia, under direct pressure from Turkey, was compelled to sign any agree- ment whatsoever with her alone, the obligations incurred in such conditions must be considered null and void’. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Trends in Georgian Socialism Few regimes have been more harshly condemned by hostile critics than the Social-Democratic government which ruled Georgia from 1918 to 1921. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
After Georgia had fallen and her government been forced to flee into exile, the former régime was often criticized from the opposite viewpoint by Georgian patriots who alleged that the Zhordania government placed socialist class warfare before national unity and adopted social and economic policies which played into the hands of the Communists and facilitated the annexation of Georgia by Soviet Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Neither assessment appears altogether just or balanced. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Given time and immunity A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 210 from foreign interference, their economic policy would have turned Georgia into a land of prosperous yeoman farmers and craftsmen and traders. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Mensheviks confiscated the domains of the great landowners and commandeered their city mansions, while the aristocracy often assented to the inevitable with a good grace and served loyally as officers in the republican army. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Such policies inflicted hardship upon Russian and Armenian officials and professional men, who became estranged from the new régime. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
From its walls there soon began to emerge hundreds of H INDEPENDENT GEORGIA: 1918—21 211 keen and well-qualified graduates who rapidly made their mark as teachers, scientific workers and members of the professions. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
By I January 1920 over 4,000 landed estates had been nationalized. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The right to strike, withheld from the worker under Tsarism and again later under the Communists, was established by law. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Hydro- electric power, mineral springs and spas, the Tqibuli coal mines, the Chiatura manganese industry, the ports and rail- ways, were all nationalized. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Of the 70,000 full-time workers employed in Georgian industry in i92o, official statistics show that more than half were state employees, while a quarter worked for municipal and co-operative enterprises. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At the same time, the wily financier Khoshtaria safeguarded his own sumptuous mansion by lending it to the British Mission, whose chief could disport himself in a bath adorned with solid silver fittings, squirting water from every conceivable angle.98 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The vicissitudes of the international situation and the activities of her predatory neighbours cut short the life of the Georgian Republic before she had even emerged from the aftermath of war and revolution. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On 14 September 1918, Dunsterville had to evacuate Baku, which fell to the Turks and Azeris. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Another member of the Berlin delegation, Zurab Avalishvili, was therefore sent to neutral Scandinavia to make contact with British and French diplomats there in an effort to secure recognition of Georgia’s neutral status and pave the way for a transfer of allegiance from the German to the Allied side. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Britain desired to liberate the Caucasus from the Germans and the Bolsheviks; to re-establish order without interfering in the internal affairs of the country; to restore trade with the ports of Persia and other areas not occupied by Bolshevik Russia; and to provide for the movement of Allied military personnel over the Transcaucasian railways. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Now free from Turkish occupation, Armenia was basking in the favour of President Wilson and confident of world support in the redressing of her millennial wrongs. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The main threat from the Russian side appeared at first to derive less from Lenin and Trotsky’s Red Army than from the White Russian Volunteer Army of Alekseev and Denikin. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He declared: ‘I cannot permit the self-styled formations of Georgia and Azerbaijan, which have sprung up to the detriment of Russian state interests and which are clearly hostile to the idea of the Russian State, to receive food supplies at the expense of the areas of Russia which are being liberated from the Bolsheviks.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
By now it was too late to salvage anything from the wreck of the counter revolution. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Not until February 1920, when the Whites were being rolled back in disorder by the Red Army, did Denikin deign to acknowledge de facto the governments of Russia’s border areas which were hostile to Bolshevism. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Denikin further noted with satisfaction that Georgia was specially vulnerable to an economic blockade, since the harvest of 1919 had failed, which aggravated the chronic shortage of grain.’03 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The British withdrawal The British military representatives in Georgia at first tended to identify themselves with Denikin’s neo-imperialist fantasies. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
An eye-witness has left a graphic des- cription of one of those crucial meetings, in which Karlo Chkheidze, the chief Georgian delegate, ‘stood with his head thrown back, his eyes starting from their sockets and his face purple, enraged by the French texts and formulae, the shades of meaning of which he could not quite grasp, all his coolness and self-control gone, in the pose of a minor Polish country squire vetoing an important decision of the Diet’.’°5 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The special correspondent of Le Temps reported from Batumi: ‘This city, as well as the entire province, has become a centre of agitation and corruption, where the Turkish nationalists and the Bolsheviks have already been able to fraternize without A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 222 danger.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
INDEPENDENT GEORGIA: 1918—21 223 GEORGIA AND COMMUNIST RUSSIA Collapse of the W”bite Russians— The Russo-Georgian Treatj~ — Communist propaganda in Georgia — Upheaval in Ossetia — Rise of Kemalist Turke3 — Georgia and the Second International — Krassin and Liojid George — The Red Arm3 invades Georgia — Death agonj of independent Georgia — Lenin versus Stalin on Georgia — Revival of Great Russian chauvinism — The insurrection Collapse of the lVhite Russians FROM THE TIME of the October revolution in 1917 until early ~in 1920, there was no regular communication between Georgia and Communist Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian government were forced to release the local Communist party members and sympathisers from prison. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Gegechkori retorted that ‘members of the Georgian Communist Party in addition to their legal work engage in active propaganda among the troops, in the ranks of the People’s Guard, and among the wide masses of the peasantry, using for this purpose huge sums of money received from abroad, and aiming at the overthro’w of the order existing in the country’.109 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Conflict also arose out of Georgia’s contacts with Baron Wrangel, who had succeeded the inept Denikin as head of the White Russian movement, and managed to maintain himself from April until November 1920 in the Crimea. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Upheaval in Ossetia Another hotbed of discord was the unsettled situation in South Ossetia, a part of Georgia inhabited by a people of Iranian stock, quite distinct from the Georgians in customs, language and ethnic origin. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A Russian-sponsored Ossete force crossed the border from Vladikavkaz in June 1920 and attacked the Georgian Army and People’s Guard. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgians were in reality as hostile towards Wrangel as they had been towards Denikin. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Anxious to cut the losses sustained by the Churchillian policy of anti-Bolshevik intervention, Lloyd George was eager to resume normal commercial relations with Russia, from which Britain’s strained post-war economy stood to benefit substantially. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The moral of this was that to make his goods more marketable, Krassin had to persuade his masters to gain possession of the land separating Baku from Batumi, namely the Republic of Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In view of Lloyd George’s attitude, the Kremlin could discount a telegram of protest from Lord Curzon against Russian mobilization on the Georgian border. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian General Staff was far from complacent about the position. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Soviet envoy in Tbilisi, Sheinman, received on the next day a secret telegram from Gekker, the Eleventh Red Army commander: ‘Resolved to cross the Rubicon. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Simultaneously, Red Army units prepared to invade Georgia from the north through the Daryal and Mamison passes and along the Black Sea coast towards Suk- humi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Any encouragement which the Georgians might have derived from this was outweighed by the actions of the Turkish commander in Armenia, Kazim Karabekir Pasha. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A Communist Revolutionary Committee (Revcom) had by now been formed in Shulaveri. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Revcom proclaimed a Soviet régime and declared that only the forces of foreign reaction were keeping the Tbilisi Mensheviks in power; an appeal for help was addressed to the toiling masses of Moscow. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Death agonj of independent Georgia The Georgian Army put up a stubborn fight in defence of the approaches to Tbilisi, which they held for a week in the face of overwhelming odds. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On 23 February 1921, after prolonged con- sultations with his superiors in Ankara and with the Russian government in Moscow, Kazim issued an ultimatum demand- ing the evacuation of Ardahan and Artvin by Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian commander-in-chief, Kvinitadze, was at length obliged to admit that Tbilisi could hold out no longer. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Far from permitting the formation of a Georgian Red Army, Stalin saw that all military formations were disbanded, and posted Russian garrisons at strategic points. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Workers’ organizations and trades unions were sub- ordinated to the Bolshevik party committees, which received their instructions from Moscow. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In July 1921 Stalin came to Tbilisi on a personal visit of inspection and addressed a mass meeting in the working-class quarter of Tbilisi, where he had spent so A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 238 many months of revolutionary activity. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The crowd reserved its ovation for the veteran revolu- tionary leader Isidore Ramishvili and another of their leaders, Alexander Dgebuadze, who asked Stalin straight out: ‘Why have you destroyed Georgia? What have you to offer by way of atonement?’ Surrounded by the angry faces of his old comrades Stalin turned pale and could only stutter a few words of self- justification, after which he left the hail cowering behind his Russian bodyguard. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The most urgent task of the Georgian Communists was a ruth- less struggle against the relics of nationalism. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The moral dilemma confronting the Georgian Communists emerges clearly from a report sent by P. Makharadze, then Chairman of the Georgian Communist Party, to the Central Committee of the Party~in Moscow on 6 December 1921. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Several members of the former Men- shevik government returned clandestinely from exile, including the former Minister of Agriculture, Noe Khomeriki, as well as the commander of the old National Guard, V. Jugheli; both were caught and subsequently shot. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Following a spate of rumours and complaints coming in from Tbilisi, however, an investiga- tion commission headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky, head of the Soviet secret police, was sent to Georgia to report on the position there. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Dzerzhinsky’s report contributed to Lenin’s growing distrust of Stalin and his decision to exclude him from the future leadership of the Party. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He resolved also to suspend Orjonikidze from party membership. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the middle of these moves, on 9 March 1923, Lenin suffered the third attack of his illness, from which he never recovered; his death took place on 21 January 1924. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 242 The insurrection of 1924 Lenin’s illness and death saved Stalin from disgrace. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He even helped Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to conceal from the world Lenin’s deathbed confession of shame at the intolerant treatment of the non-Russian nationalities, the text of which was not published until 1956. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
With Lenin’s notes suppressed, every word uttered from the platform against Georgian or Ukrainian nationalism was greeted with stormy applause, while the mildest allusion to Great Russian chauvin- ism was received in stony silence. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Rector, the noted historian Ivane Javakhishvili (1876—1940), was dismissed from his post and replaced by a professor more in tune with Communist aims; as it turned out, this eclipse probably saved Javakhishvili’s life, since the then Rector of the University was among the purge victims during the terror of 1936—37. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Although the entire land surface had been nationalized follow- ing the Bolshevik occupation in i9zi, ri~ attempt was made as yet to enforce collectivization, so that the peasants continued for the time being to enjoy the use of the land distributed to them during the period of Georgian independence. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This emerges clearly from figures cited in a recent official history of Georgia, which notes that as late as 1925—26, the acreage under grain in Georgia amounted to only 92•8 per cent, of the pre-i~i~ A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 246 average, while the harvest as a whole yielded only 94’4 per cent, of the pre-i~i~ total. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
~The peasants, cherishing their new-found mastery of the land, refused to deliver food to the towns at government-controlled prices. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Both in Georgia and in Europ- ean Russia, the breaking up of the old landlords’ estates often resulted in loss of efficiency and a fall in production. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian peasantry, to whom such characteristically Russian institutions as the peasant mir or commune were alien, clung with the cour- age of desperation to their individual small-holdings. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
2. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Five thousand agricultural students and young Communist propagandists were recruited for the campaign. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
is to be turned When wine-growing areas are subjected to general collectivi- Livestock and implements are to be taken from kulak.s. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Lands belonging to kulaks are to be confiscated and given to Economic, administrative and legal sanctions are to be applied Kulaks are to be forced to engage in public works and com- 248 L distributing their goods and chattels to the poorer peasants. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The women besieged the offices of the local authorities, demanding the release of their husbands from jail, and the abolition of the koJkbo~ system. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Over a thousand families were deported to Siberia from Kakheti alone. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian Communists could not deny that many of those who had been victimized and driven from their homes were not rich k.ulakj at all. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A temporary halt in the ‘building of socialism’ was called while heads of revolutionary com- mittees made a tour of inspection through the villages. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, a scapegoat was found in the person of Kakhiani, who was dismissed from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Com- munist Party and sent off to a minor post in Turkestan. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
There existed in the whole of Georgia only thirty-one tractor stations, and it was a long time before agricultural production recovered from the chaotic condition into which doctrinaire folly had plunged it. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It was no secret that Stalin himself was personally responsible for all this misery. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In October 193 I, Beria was transferred from his post in the secret police and made Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Transcaucasian Communist Party, the First Secretary of which, Kartvelishvili by name, strongly disliked Beria’s unsavoury personality and methods. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
His skill in this work led to his appointment in 1921 to a post in the Caucasian Cheka. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
His special task was the elimination of all anti-Bolshevik groups in the Caucasus, for success in which task he was decorated with the order of the Red Banner of the Republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Further progress was made in harnessing the power potential of Georgia’s rivers. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Rioni, Atcharis-dsqali and Sukhumi hydro-electric schemes were completed and a start was made with the hydro-electric station on the River Khrami. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On 2 1—22 July 1935, he delivered to a meeting of the Tbilisi Party organization a lecture ‘On the history of the Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia’, in which Stalin is given almost exclusive credit for the success of the Caucasian revolutionary movement from i 900 onwards. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Denunciations by personal enemies or the receipt of an innocent letter from some friend abroad were sufficient to bring about imprisonment, exile or death. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Among those who perished was the famous classical scholar and papyrologist Grigol Tsereteli, guilty of having attended international conferences in which scholars from bourgeois countries also participated. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Vigorous and ruthless when neces- sary, Orjonikidze had a reputation for decency and tried to thwart Beria’s wholesale executions in Georgia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
According to the account given by N. S. Khrushchev, Beria and Stalin between them deliberately brought Orjonikidze to such a state of nervous collapse that he killed himself. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The importance which Stalin attached to the activities of the Georgian émigrés was displayed in 1938, when the Soviet embassy in Paris brought effectual pressure to bear on a pusillanimous French government to ban a celebra- tion of the 75oth anniversary of the Georgian national poet Shota Rustaveli, which was to have been held at the Sorbonne. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
With the rise of Nazi Germany, a number of Georgian exiles A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA a~8 joined the Fascist movement. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
His inordinate self- confidence led him to ignore repeated warnings from foreign governments and from his own agents abroad, with the result that Russia was caught largely unprepared when Hitler launched his lightning attack in June 1941. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the northern Caucasus, Stalin celebrated the retreat of the Germans by ordering the deportation in 1943—44 of the entire Karachay-Balkar and Chechen-Ingush peoples as a punishment for alleged collaboration with the Nazis; the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous SSR was obliterated from the map of the Soviet Union. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In April 1952, Beria, now Vice-President of the Soviet Council of Ministers, came from Moscow to attend a meeting of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, at which be subjected the party leadership to severe criticism for failing to instil the Communist creed in Georgian youth and to tear out all traces of local nationalism. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Mgeladze set to work to purge the party and governmental apparatus from top to bottom. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
By methods which cannot be condoned by any standards of human or divine morality, he fashioned the social and industrial springboard from which the Soviet Union today is leaping irresistibly forward as one of the two dominant world powers of our generation. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Beria’s old protégé Valerian Bakradze, whom Mgelaclze had dismissed from government office, now became Prime Minister of the Georgian Republic. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The ousted First Secretary, Mgeladze, made an abject confession, declaring that charges of nationalist deviationism which he had levelled against high- ranking Georgian Bolsheviks were based on false evidence which he had forged from motives of personal ambition. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It is also true that they exhibit at times an unreasonably cantankerous attitude towards neighbouring peoples, including the Russians themselves, from whom they have suffered injury in the past. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
It is clear that as the economy and cul- ture develop, and as the Socialist consciousness of the working masses in Georgia grows, the source from which bourgeois nation- alism draws its strength evaporates. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Between 1913 and ~ the quantity of electricity generated rose from 20,000,000 to 2,573,000,000 kilowatt-hours. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Iron production rose in the two years between 1955 and 1957 from 436,000 to 640,000 tons, and steel production, totalling only 200 tons in 1940, reached 803,000 in 1957. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Cement production rose between 1932 and 1957 from 133,000 to I,oz5 ,ooo tons. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 266 country was turned into a single economic region beaded by an Economic Council in charge of more than five hundred large industrial establishments. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the comparatively short period of its working, the Economic Council has demonstrated the advantages of this new form of industrial administration. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
New scientific institutes have arisen such as the Institute of Applied Chemistry and Electrochemistry, the Research Institute of Automation of Production Processes, and a big electronic data-processing centre. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
This applies to the capital itself: the Thilisi Intourist hotel on Rustaveli Avenue to which most visitors are directed is as sepulchral in its dusty decor as its management is friendly and civil, and most of the rival establishments which existed prior to the 1917 Revolution have long since been taken over for other uses. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
While Tbilisi now has its own efficient tele- vision studio and transmitter, the production and marketing of television and radio sets, as well as such consumer durables as refrigerators, washing machines and electric cookers, is far from being equal to the potential demand. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, the ex- tension of tea and citrus fruit plantations has tended to divert attention away from the growing of wheat and other crops needed to feed Georgia’s expanding population. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Thus, in 1950, Georgia had to import three-quarters of the bread supply from other Soviet republics and hardship was experienced by the masses. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The changeover from individual husbandry to collec- tive and state farms, though now virtually universal, is not yet fully accepted by all members of the peasant class, some of whom fail to devote the same loving care to collectivized cows GEORGIA IN OUR TIME 269 ‘I _1 and crops as they do to their own little yards and vegetable plots. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The supply of butcher’s meat, for instance, increased between 1950 and 1954 from 51,000 to 84,000 tons; thereafter it rose very slowly, amounting in 1957 to 86,ooo tons, a negligible advance. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Milk production rose between 1950 and 1956 from 293,000 to 415,000 tons, but sank in the following year to 398,000 tons. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Sheep raising in Georgia is clearly on the decline, production of wool having sunk from 4,352 tons in 1950 to 3,894 tons in 1957. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
However, as the Soviet Union’s internal trading and communications system becomes further rationalized, it should be easy to supplement local food pro- duction with cheap grain and dairy products from the Ukraine and elsewhere, leaving Georgian growers free to concentrate on the more rewarding sub-tropical and specialized crops for which Georgia’s climate is uniquely suited. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The 4,500 schools have a total en- rolment of 700,000, which means that one in six of the country’s population is attending school. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Scholarsh:p and science Science, scholarship and higher education are in a flourish- ing condition, as the writer was able to verify when visiting Tbilisi as well as from regular correspondence and personal contacts with Georgian colleagues. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Stalin’s name was deleted from the official designation of Tbilisi University, and Stalinir, the capital of South Ossetia, reverted to its old name of Tskhinvali. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgians have had much to suffer from that same Big Brother in their time. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Translated from the French by Helen Jessiman, London 1924, pp. 4—7. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
On Hamzat Bek, see Lieutenant-General A. A. Neverovsky’s short book, Isireblenie avarskikb khanov v 1834 godu (The slaughter of the Avar kbans in 1834), St. Petersburg 1848. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
39. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Text taken partly from Revolyutsjya 190J—1907 gg. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
v Grur~ii, p. 502, partly from Beria, On the history of the Bolshevik organir~ations in Transcaucasia, p. 137. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Figures taken from Gr. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Some idea of Georgia’s ancient Christian civilization may be gleaned from my little book, Lives and Legends of the Georgian Saints (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956). A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Walter Kolarz’s thorough survey, Russia and her Colonies (2nd edition, London: George Philip, 1952) is written from a highly critical viewpoint. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Amongworks written from a standpoint definitely favourable to the Soviet Union, one may cite Russia: The Oj7Icial Report of the British Trades Union Delega- tion to Russia and Caucasia, Nov. and Dec., 1924 (London: TUG, 1925), as well as a good, up to date little booklet on Georgia written by the present Prime Minister of the Georgian SSR, Mr. Givi Javakhishvili, and published for sixpence in the series The Fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics Todqy and Tomorrow (London: Soviet Booklets, 1960). A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Drawing on his skills as an anthropologist, Paul Dresch handles the story deftly, using poetry quotations from local sources, and personal experi- ence to evoke what the events of the twentieth century meant to Yemenis, who today form Arabia’s largest national population. A History of Modern Yemen
Subject to statutory exception CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain © Cambridge University Press 2000 and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. A History of Modern Yemen
Y48 D74 2000 cm. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemeni writers have begun to include in their books photostat documents, which are one important path to a better history leaving work such as mine redundant, but there are no central archives from which to recover past forms of life save those of the British, whose views were a small part of what affected Yemenis. A History of Modern Yemen
Arab Nationalist rhetoric and Islamic rhetoric before it portray all difference whatever as derived from error or from foreign plots, but well before igoo there were separate cul- tural and political foci just as there are in many countries. A History of Modern Yemen
One finds oneself interrogating again and again, from this angle and that, the same range of sources, and all manner of basics on, for instance, land tenure remain informed guess-work. A History of Modern Yemen
(When the Turks took Sanaa in ‘872 they acquired the “registers” from which they would learn “the administration of the country and its resources”. A History of Modern Yemen
While writing, I have checked and discussed what I can with those I could reach from Oxford. A History of Modern Yemen
Help was sought from and freely given by all the following: I~usayn al~cAmrI, Noel Brehoney, Sheila Carapico, Fred Halliday, cAbd al-Rabb al-Habili, the learned Bernie Haykel, Peter Hinchcliffe, the learned Engseng Ho, David Ledger, Godfrey Meynell, Khadijah a1-Sal~mi, cAbduh Salih, John Shipman, Zayd al-Wazir, Robert Wilson, and C~\J. A History of Modern Yemen
Sometimes reckoned to include the Walidi Sultanate, adjacent to Bayh~n and ‘Awlaql Federal Guard backed coalition of nationalists in South Yemen, 1966—7 Federal Regular Army gross national product North Yemeni state institution to displace party politics. A History of Modern Yemen
The Trotting Camel is dedicated to my wife. A History of Modern Yemen
Established 1982 Hadrami Bedouin Legion International Monetary Fund Movement of Arab Nationalists (~zarakat al-qawm~yjvin al- ‘arab) Economic Corporation), a vast governmental apparatus through which Northern army officers became rich National Democratic Front; from early 1976 the main leftist grouping within the North, active mainly in Lower Yemen National Liberation Front, anti-colonial movement in the South established first by Egypt but later at odds with Egypt and FLOSY Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a club of wealthy, industrialised nations Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the cartel of oil states which in the 1970s was dominated by Middle Eastern countries and which itself for a while seemed to dominate world finance Abbreviations xvii xviii PDRY SAL UAR WAP YAR YD YR YSP People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (the South, which from November 1967 to December 1970 was the People’s Republic of South Yemen) South Arabian League (rdbitah abnd’ al-janub, literally “League of the Sons of the South”) United Arab Republic; from 1958 to 1961 Egypt and Syria together, from ig6i just Egypt Western Aden Protectorate (the little states of the Aden hin- terland) Yemen Arab Republic (the state in the North, declared in 1962) Yemeni dinär, the currency of the PDRY (a little less than $US 3 in ig8o). A History of Modern Yemen
Much of Yemen’s history through the twentieth century connects with efforts to form that state, which was finally estab- lished in 1990. A History of Modern Yemen
The coffee trade which had once made the country prosperous had decayed (Mocha is named for a Yemeni town; plantations elsewhere in the world, however, brought the price down sharply before i8oo), and the Red Sea ports from which highland rulers continued drawing revenue from local trade had all been lost. A History of Modern Yemen
Haraz, west of Sanaa and itself a partly Isma’311 region, was dominated by Ism~’TlTs from Najran, northeast of Sa’dah; the highland agricultural zone near Tacizz was in the hands of tribes from Baral. A History of Modern Yemen
In Zaydi terms the Qasim! A History of Modern Yemen
His claim in correspondence, like that of all Imams, was to descent from his ultimate ancestor, the Prophet of God; his duty was to wage the jihãd against oppression. A History of Modern Yemen
Like his father, he launched a rising in northern Yemen, and all the old calumnies against the Turks from the last time that “Turks” ruled Yemen, in the sixteenth century, were redeployed: that they were corrupt, allowed the drinking of wine, had a taste for small boys, exploited the poor, failed to uphold God’s law and, in short, were scarcely Muslims. A History of Modern Yemen
In Lower Yemen the Turks co-opted successfully local magnates, dominating systems of inequality on their own ground and granting notables such titles of respect as Pasha, while in Upper Yemen there is little to exploit.’0 A History of Modern Yemen
When control of such wealth was threatened by the Turkish presence they could call on their tribesmen, who themselves, without a source of patronage in grain or cash, lived on the edge of famine. A History of Modern Yemen
The Ottoman claim to broader suzerainty is accepted in some degree (the ruler of the Empire is addressed throughout such correspondence as “Sultan al- Islam”; the term “Caliph” is reserved to the Imam) but the right of Imams to rule all Yemen brooks no argument. A History of Modern Yemen
.) A History of Modern Yemen
But in practice the Turks retained control of majority Turkey Britain and Imam Yai~iyd: circa 1900 7 Plate i.i. Turks and Yemenis before World War I. 8 A history of modern Yemen Shafi’i areas such as Tacizz and al-Hugariyyah, and the Sanaa-based government became something of a condominium. A History of Modern Yemen
Yahya, on the other hand, made no contribution to the volunteer force from Lower Yemen (about 6,ooo Shafi’i soldiers) which accompanied the Turks on their march against the British base.’8 A History of Modern Yemen
World War I collapsed the Ottoman Empire, with repercussions throughout the Middle East, and when the Turks withdrew from Yemen in 19 18—19, Ya~ya expanded his influence south- ward with Turkish encouragement into what had been their domain, that is into largely Shafi’i areas (we shall look at this in Chapter 2). A History of Modern Yemen
Apart from that, all the British did was make treaties with out- lying notables. A History of Modern Yemen
The East India Company which had taken Aden town in 1839 had given way to the (British) Indian Empire, and the initial lodgement in Aden had been expanded by acquiring water-wells and land across the bay. A History of Modern Yemen
With the growth of Suez canal traffic, post-1869, the town itself began to grow, attracting a diaspora-colonial population of, for instance, Indians (already about 40 per cent of Aden’s people in 1856) and the beginnings of a Yemeni migrant population from further north who slaved in the coaling trade. A History of Modern Yemen
By the 189os half of Aden’s population was Arab, mainly from I~Iugariyyah and al-Bayda’, but few workers came from the immediate hinterland. A History of Modern Yemen
The treaty system, as with most things British, ‘~just growed”, but con- nections with these notables figured in grand strategy when, in 1873, a note was sent to Istanbul warning the Ottomans off from Aden and claiming nine “tribes” as under British protection. A History of Modern Yemen
From i886 formal Treaties of Protection were signed.2’ A History of Modern Yemen
In due course the two imperial powers laid a ruler on the map and drew a further line from near Harib northeast across Arabia to somewhere near Qatar. A History of Modern Yemen
It is separated from Oman by a sparsely populated belt of territory where people speak languages other than Arabic and pursue ways of life distinct from their neighbours’ (a border in the modern style was drawn amicably between Yemen and Oman in 1991; one could have drawn it a little west or east without upset- ting anyone), while north of Ijaçlramawt and east of ~a’dah is a sea of sand. A History of Modern Yemen
It cuts the more densely settled areas of Yemen off from those of Najd as clearly Turkey Britain and Imam Yai~yd: circa 1900 PREMODERN YEMEN II Name of tribe etc. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemen is the Peninsula’s southern part. A History of Modern Yemen
Separated from the Peninsula’s other regions by natural and political barriers, Yemen faced its neighbours across the Red Sea. A History of Modern Yemen
Much of Yemeni history concerns the north—south axis along the mountain spine from there to the agricultural zone near Ta’izz. A History of Modern Yemen
The relation between the highlands’ two poles was not sym- metrical, and among the great landlords of Lower Yemen in the years around 1900 were families from further north. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemen in detail, south and east history ties in closely with India and Southeast Asia: the Foreign Minister of Indonesia for many years, ‘AlT al-’Attas, came from an old HadramI family. A History of Modern Yemen
There the sayyid presence was established in AD 952 by a migrant from Iraq named Ahmad ‘Isa, but the venture he began was very different from that in the far north and the Shafi’i (Sunni) style of Islam, unlike the Zaydi, launched no great bids for power: sayyid influence was local, often built around mediation and sacred tombs, although family connections and connections of learning reached beyond particular towns or tribes. A History of Modern Yemen
When families moved there from Upper Yemen they often simply became Shafi’i, and doctrinal markers such as forms of prayer were seldom a great issue.30 A History of Modern Yemen
The western mountains, which are Zaydi in the north, Shafi’i in the south, overlook the Tihamah, and along the terraced mountain ridges run little villages built of stone, usually the same three- or four-storey fortified houses that characterise the highlands from Huth down through Tacizz and ‘AwdhalI: grain and livestock were kept on the ground floor, while the family crammed in to little rooms of the upper storeys. A History of Modern Yemen
Northwest to southeast behind this, from Sa’dah and Najran out to Hadramawt, runs a multi-storey architecture of packed mud. A History of Modern Yemen
The Wadi was spate-fed (that is, run-off came as flash floods), as also were the wadis running south to Lal~j, east to Ma’rib, and westward from the mountains to the Red Sea coast, where a major crop was often millet (dukhn) or sorghum (dhurah). A History of Modern Yemen
Al-Akwa’, remem- bering Turkish times from the vantage of old age, relates how the major grain harvest came all at once in late summer, when as the saying went, “there is nothing yet and nothing left”; before the harvest was gathered, all last year’s may have been used up. A History of Modern Yemen
They provided a kind of neutral space in which people from different tribes could meet freely, and around them were built systems of trade and arbitration. A History of Modern Yemen
From the Imam’s point of view, soon after 1900, there were few natural limits to his ambition. A History of Modern Yemen
To hindsight there were only two valid alternatives: either the whole hinterland should have been subjected to outright occupation and imperial disciplines, or Aden should have been isolated from it but rendered impregnable, leaving the A history of modern Yemen POLITICAL CONNECTIONS interior to its own (or Ottoman or Yemeni) devices. A History of Modern Yemen
Why not cut out the middleman, own the coffee, own the route, and also have access to a major port? To advance his scheme he secured a vast loan from Mubsin al-’Awlaqi.37 A History of Modern Yemen
Later Imams held Lower Yemen (the object of LaliT and ‘Awlaqi designs) with tribesmen of Dhü Muhammad and Dhu Ilusayn from Jabal Barat, a region at almost the latitude of Abu ‘Arish but inland near the desert. A History of Modern Yemen
The dawlahs or petty states of the South had split off from the Qasimis (the cAbdalT Sultans of LaIij did so in 1728) and had been there ever since, as had their connections with specific tribes. A History of Modern Yemen
y~fiC, for instance, had a memory of expelling the Imams: The Sultans of Y~fic, intermarried with the cAbdalTs of Lahj, claimed descent from learned rulers of the sixteenth century The Amirs of D~li~ held documentary proof of their importance from the same period. A History of Modern Yemen
Qahtan took it all From Ma’sal to the coast of Aden.38 A History of Modern Yemen
To the north and west lay a ruler of more recent provenance, Muhammad al-IdrTsT. A History of Modern Yemen
1837) had a reputation as a holy man and worker of miracles. A History of Modern Yemen
Rival Zaydi Imams, one of whom endured around Sacdah until 1923, never threatened Yahy~’s support to the same degree and through World War I the Idrisi was Yaliya’s main rival. A History of Modern Yemen
cAwlaql families, as we sa~ were involved not only with Lahj and Lower Yemen but also with India as mercenaries, specifically with Hyderabad. A History of Modern Yemen
Two Yafidl factions held the ports of Shilir and Mukallä. A History of Modern Yemen
In the mid-i8oos ‘Umar cAwad al-Qifayi~i (himself from a wealthy dynasty of Yafi~i mercenaries) began to build a state — very clearly a dawlah — in Hadramawt and was opposed by Ghälib Muhsin al- Kathiri.42 A History of Modern Yemen
His family — relatives of the SanUsis who after World War II were Kings of Libya — came originally from Morocco, and this branch established itself in ~Asir a Sunni region, after study and res- idence in Mecca.4° A History of Modern Yemen
Perhaps the most important technical innova- tion, changing more obviously forms of politics, was the telegraph, which linked Tadizz to Sanaa, for example, from 1902 or so: “at a time when the people still used camels, donkeys and horses. A History of Modern Yemen
The minor shaykhs there had tobacco and qishr (a drink made from spiced coffee- husks) and could even serve mutton to a guest; but the staple was bread A history of modern Yemen FORMS OF LIFE or sorghum porridge, and bodily luxury meant smearing oneself with often rancid butter. A History of Modern Yemen
The windows were tiny. A History of Modern Yemen
The author’s father was a minor judge, a cut above the peasantry He bought in his qat from elsewhere, and a lunch for important guests ran to meat and chicken, wheat-based bread which the author’s mother made, samn (clarified butter) “of a soothing smell”, white honey and eggs. A History of Modern Yemen
His stepmother, for whom the author still said prayers in his seventies, died early too; and the memoir is littered with still-births, deaths in infancy and deaths later from disease. A History of Modern Yemen
People’s skin collapsed on itself like the mud on a fresh wall, and all one could do was lay them on finely sieved dirt or dust, hold their hands to prevent them touching their eyes (the disease often caused blindness) and fumigate them with smoke from dung.5° A History of Modern Yemen
Locusts were roasted as a feast, and in the course of the chase boys and girls could meet away from their parents’ eyes. A History of Modern Yemen
They would come quickly from their homes not bothering about anything else, the children with the chil- dren and the women and the men in a yelling mob, carrying cane sticks with cloths tied on them, and they would rush through the farmland yelling at the top of their voices, “God’s locusts, let God take care of you! A History of Modern Yemen
The usual tales are related of tribesmen eating soap which they thought was sugar and shooting at their own reflections in mirrors, which supposedly they had never seen before, and a1~Akwac saw a tribesman driving a cow laden down with loot from the town’s pillage. A History of Modern Yemen
In the ecologically richer areas of the western mountains from Raziki through Maliwlt and Raymah to Wu~ab this was common, as it was more intensely in Lower Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
Two brothers at odds may seek help, perhaps, from different governments. A History of Modern Yemen
Sanaanis had sometimes, when public order collapsed, acted as a tribe of their own against others, but here, despite punctilious differences of rank among families and professions, was a bloc of people with a less confrontational vision of events (“unwarlike, yet rancorous”, said an English visitor, “always ripe for sedition, yet shrinking from its bloody issue”; the Yemeni view, one might note, was and is of a city full of subtle humourists).54 A History of Modern Yemen
Within this were famous mosques, gardens, and extraordinary mud-brick houses, sometimes five or six storeys high, picked out in whitewash and elaborate brickwork. A History of Modern Yemen
Hudaydah, on the Red Sea coast, is hard to esti- mate, for it seems to wax and wane freely with passing trade, but in 1913 was prosperous: “the wealthier classes live in tall, white houses, and pervade the sandy streets in flowing robes, silk waistcoats and expensive turbans — all imported from Europe or India” ~ Aden, meanwhile, was already by igoo almost as large as Sanaa, with some 40,000 people. A History of Modern Yemen
British forces were pushed back even from Lahj — “the Turks are on the golf course” ran a signal from Aden’s garrison — and there they stayed until 1918, concerned with sea routes from India to Suez. A History of Modern Yemen
Colonel H. E Jacob left from there in August 1919 for Sanaa, but the Quhra tribe of the Tihamah, fearful of what deal he might do with the Imam, imprisoned him and the Imam’s attempts to buy him out (thus to discover what was going on) all failed. A History of Modern Yemen
line and the garrisons were drawn from Zaydl tribes near Sanaa. A History of Modern Yemen
Yahya’s campaign against the I~lubayshIs at Makhadir, north of Ibb, for instance, was supported by shaykhs of Ibb and al-’Udayn. A History of Modern Yemen
Hashid, for example, had supported the Imam against the Turks in the fighting of 1910—11 and Ya~ya had lived among them through much of World War I; in December 1924, however, Imamic forces fought their way into Hashid’s main town, Khamir, and “set their affairs in order”, taking hostages from BanI Suraym and Kharif and billeting troops on them “as is done to subjects other than them in all the Imamic lands” (the urban chronicler’s satis- faction is plain here, though committed to print three decades later; the term “subjects” denies any difference between tribes and peasants). A History of Modern Yemen
But the most important did so. A History of Modern Yemen
Every tãbür was made up of four blocs. A History of Modern Yemen
Unlike tribal levies, this army had a fixed pay scale. A History of Modern Yemen
Yahya’s claim was to “establish the true shañ’ah” and such divisions as tribes proved to count for little, for greater shaykhs could be by-passed in favour of lesser or the great could be turned in the name of religion against each other. A History of Modern Yemen
Epithets such as “evil ones” and “servants of idols” were used of people who themselves served as allies in God’s cause against their neighbours, and from those whose obedience mattered the Imam took hostages (by the ig~os there were probably about 4,000). A History of Modern Yemen
At family level there was often resentment. A History of Modern Yemen
All larger identities were irrele- vant when the call was made, however, for there were no other forms of claim to righteous order, nor means to organise, and Yahya at first had only one effective rival. A History of Modern Yemen
A little later the eldest son, Ahmad, arrived in Sanaa from Hajjah: “There went out to meet him the princes and learned men, the nobility and merchants, and all the people. A History of Modern Yemen
Connections of religious learning provided governors and judges, the greatest of whom were from famous sayyid families. A History of Modern Yemen
Au al-Wazir, who had acted for Yaliya in the siege of Sanaa (igii), was from 1920 Governor of Ta’izz, where his court rivalled that of the Imam.9 A History of Modern Yemen
So were the Regular Army and levies from Lower Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
The Idrisis had only usurped an area which they cut off from Yemen’s lands when under Turkish rule. A History of Modern Yemen
He rein- forced what he said with books of history that show the Milthlaf Sulaymani was always under the influence of Yemen’s Imams before the Turks arrived, and he stressed that the Sharifs of Abil ‘ArIsh [before the Ottomans] derived their prin- cipality from Imams of Yemen.’3 A History of Modern Yemen
When the Saudis — or Wahhabis as Yemenis saw them, and perhaps most still saw them- selves — enquired about borders, in 1927, Ya~ya declined to discuss the issue: The land of ‘Asir is indivisibly part of Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
The same posi- tion emerged on the southern front. A History of Modern Yemen
Hostages were taken from a1-~ali’. A History of Modern Yemen
Saudi expansion and “classical” Yemen 33Yahyã and the British: 1918—1948 34 A history of modern Yemen a decade while their leading families invoked claims to British protection conceived in a different setting. A History of Modern Yemen
Even Ibb, 100 kilometres north again from Qa’tabah, was strafed and Ta’izz itself was bombed. A History of Modern Yemen
A fight would be a fight were you warriors who do not fear soldiers.’7 A History of Modern Yemen
The Imam pulled back. A History of Modern Yemen
Between 1934 and 1941 the number of political officers rose from two to twelve. A History of Modern Yemen
This “forward policy” was associated with Bernard Reilly, who served as acting Aden Resident in the Ig2os, then as Resident in the 193OS (he negotiated with Ya~iya the 1934 treaty); he was Governor 1937—40, and from London played a part in Yemen’s affairs through the I95OS. A History of Modern Yemen
Keeping out the Imam was not enough in his view20 Good order and sound administration seemed an obligation — as much so as “establishing the Yahyã and the British: 1918—1948 35 ADEN’S HINTERLAND AND HADRAMAWT 36 A history of modern Yemen Plate 2.!. A History of Modern Yemen
Many areas were para- lysed by feuds, highway robbery was common, and in some places people had not dared leave the house for years or had to reach their fields through trenches — if the fields were not in rifle shot. A History of Modern Yemen
In the decade from 1934, the Qu’ay~i revenue spent on medical services went from 4,400 (Indian) rupees per annum to 74,000, the amount for education went from 6,ooo rupees to 154,000. A History of Modern Yemen
Each had a sultan (apart from the plethora of section shaykhs) whose family was called the dawlah locally and claimed vague precedence, though various of the shaykhs themselves had treaties independently with Aden and none obeyed the others, while the Lower Yafi’ Sultan was associated primarily with a sacred drum and the ability to make rain. A History of Modern Yemen
One key to his success in Upper Yemen was that, among these rivalries, he favoured the lesser shaykhs over major figures from such families as al-Ahmar, al-Shayif or Abü Ra’s; in Lower Yemen the power of shaykhs was more localised and less a threat. A History of Modern Yemen
Minor squabbles continued among tribes (the official gazette of the time and the chronicles, mean- while, list Islamic punishments for individual offences of murder, adul- tery and wine-drinking) but the peace of the Imam was real and was highly valued. A History of Modern Yemen
First he received a letter, postmarked Singapore, from Muliammad bin ‘Aqil (a learned, much-travelled Haçlrami millionaire) and a poem from Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rakiman al- Saqqaf, mufiiof the I~Iacjrami lands as the Zaydi account calls him. A History of Modern Yemen
“Ingrams’ peace” could as well be called the al-Käf peace. A History of Modern Yemen
The Kathiri state, centred on the WadI near Sayyun and with no coastal towns, hence no customs dues, was bank-rolled in effect by Sayyid BU Bakr al-Kaf whose personal expenditure on charitable works was huge: his wealth came from Singapore, where his fortune was estimated at ~25 million. A History of Modern Yemen
In Tarim, later, one finds a movement to elide the Kathiri and Qu~ayu sultanates, in part to avoid double taxation. A History of Modern Yemen
Sayyid I~Iamid al-Muhdar, Wazir in Mukalla of the Qu~aytis’ growing state, later still took up this movement; but from interest in the Imam he shifted soon to internal Qucay~i politics and fell foul in the end of the rival al-’Attas family and of Ingrams’ policy. A History of Modern Yemen
In 1936 H. St. John Philby, an English acolyte of Ibn SacUd, cut the corner by motoring across the desert from Najran to Shabwah and then Mukalla, collecting as he went protestations of enthusiasm for Wahhabi rule. A History of Modern Yemen
A shared genealogy connects families of Sharifs (again descendants of the Prophet) in Ma’rib, Harib, the Jawf and Bayhan; some would also claim a relation with parts of DhU ~Iusayn at Barat, and Dhu Husayn’s own connections reach far eastwards.32 A History of Modern Yemen
The only newspaper in the North apart from the official gazette (both were run from the Imam’s press) responded predictably: Harib~——r We covered the ground on camel by night, In t~i _______________ ~. ———— Main tracks __...—~Zimakh.k A History of Modern Yemen
The Yemen is encircled by sea from the west, south and east. A History of Modern Yemen
More striking is a poem from the man on the ground, cAll Nasir. A History of Modern Yemen
They’re all in agreement from Sanaa to London All in it together, Sayyids and Christians. A History of Modern Yemen
Yahya, we might remember; had once studied with him; he himself had studied with a pupil of Shawkani, the man from whom Sunni-like theories of the state all derive circa i8oo. A History of Modern Yemen
Yahya himself provided ambivalent support for Al~imad over many years, encouraged in 1927 by Mukiammad bin CAqil of hlacjramawt.39 A History of Modern Yemen
This is AmIn al-Rihani’s account from 1922: No furniture, no desks, no chairs; the secretaries sit cross-legged on cushions and write with the knee supporting the left hand, in which the paper is held...; A History of Modern Yemen
But by now the Imam’s health was failing (he was 64 years old) and the demands of the state had perhaps also grown more complex, for although Coon failed to grasp this, an attempt was being made to delegate: “The complainants coming to us from all directions have increased, to the point where it takes up all the time we have. A History of Modern Yemen
Few Islamic rulers avoid the problem that zakdt is small and ma/cs (non- canonical tax) is offensive in the sight of God. A History of Modern Yemen
Ilusayn al-Maqbali, for instance, whose father was “of the middling sort”, a village preacher near Yarim whose own father owned a camel and two plough oxen, wanted to go to Aden when he was about thirteen (this would be the late Ig3os): “My mother’s three brothers, cAbdUll~h Muhammad, and cAll were migrants in Sudan. A History of Modern Yemen
Actually there was no shortage in the 1930S of ShafiCi shaykhs or of Zaydi merchants, and ShafiCis were probably the majority of army regulars through the 194os, but freelance (barrãni) soldiers from the Zaydi north attached themselves to officials as enforcers and tax-collectors, and these are remembered in Lower Yemen still as a “Zaydi army”. A History of Modern Yemen
‘All al-Wazir, the Tacizz Governor; was kept in play with a marriage between his son and Yahya’s daughter; while three of Yahya’s Sons took up residence at al-Wazir’s home village in Bani ~Iushaysh near Sanaa. A History of Modern Yemen
Certain of the sons nurtured relations between the two great families, others moved quietly in support of Abmad, and the al-Wazlr domain in Lower Yemen was washed away by stages. A History of Modern Yemen
On occasion Ya~ya would ensure the proper ordering of his realm by decreeing that all young people at once get married, sending soldiers to enforce this, but develop- ing roads or the like was not pursued with equal vigour: the Imam himself lived simply — his greatest extravagance was having fresh fish brought up to Sanaa injerry-cans by camel — and his notorious personal meanness extended to state expenditure. A History of Modern Yemen
An old tribesman turned up seeking charity and held forth on how he had fought the holy war with Yahya against the Turks. A History of Modern Yemen
In 1946 Sayyid Zayd bin CAll al-Daylami, the Sanaa appeal judge of the day, submitted a memorial to Yahya, demanding that za/cãt be given voluntarily and not extorted by force, that un-canonical taxes be abol- ished, that political exiles be pardoned, and that public officials (not least princes of the royal house) be prohibited from exploiting people through trade.54 A History of Modern Yemen
For all the colour of “strange events”, the layout of the work is modern: the telescoping of the distant past to situate recent history, for instance, the mirroring of Yemeni concerns in reports from foreign newspapers, and the “ethno- graphic” section which lists customs and traditions, place-names, and such gems as “the colour of women in the towns”.56 A History of Modern Yemen
Initially his demands were phrased in terms common to all Islam. A History of Modern Yemen
Congregational prayer; ran Zaydl theory, was valid only under a true Imam — which YaI~iya by implication no longer was. A History of Modern Yemen
Such history encompassed all Greater Yemen (at- yaman al-/cubrd). A History of Modern Yemen
Certain sayyid authors wrote in the opposite vein, elaborat- ing genealogies and tales of righteousness. A History of Modern Yemen
From there, through the 1950s, builds a IIaçIramI literature in which the North figures marginally when at all.59 A History of Modern Yemen
and physical educa- tion.”64 A History of Modern Yemen
‘All al-Wazir was squeezed from his position as gover- nor of Tacizz in 1938 and went on the Mecca pilgrimage; his son cAbdullah squeezed from his own post in Dhi Safal, went also on the pil- grimage that year and arrived in Cairo in 1940 accompanied by Muhammad al-Zubayrl, a promising young poet. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemen bought two more planes from Germany, and they flew over Sanaa to the delight of Sanaani ladies: “In God’s good morning there came to us a flyer”, ran their song, “And left all the women trembling with love.” A History of Modern Yemen
“67 The lights of Aden port were visible from NuCmän domains in I~Iuga- riyyah. A History of Modern Yemen
But Aden (ruled from India until 1937) offered little at first for most Yemenis except the chance to earn money under rough conditions. A History of Modern Yemen
The headmaster of the first Arab secondary school in Aden, Muhammad Luqman, was a leading reformer; raising money abroad from Arab rulers to send students to Baghdad and Cairo. A History of Modern Yemen
Zubayrl and Nu~man had gone to Cairo; missions of students had been sent from Sanaa to Baghdad. A History of Modern Yemen
From Mukalla he moved to Lahj, where he set up another; and to Aden where he founded yet a third. A History of Modern Yemen
~Iusayn al- Dabbagh of Mecca, however; at about this time, “shook Yemen and put fear in the Aden Government”.70 A History of Modern Yemen
The only state that was wholly Yemeni was, as modernists saw it, backward and oppressive. A History of Modern Yemen
The Muslim Brothers’ emissary to Yemen, al- Fucjayl al-Wartalani, arrived in 1947 and the Charter was partly of his drafting; but cAbdullah ~~L\II al-Wazir, back from Cairo after almost eight years away, may perhaps have been the driving force to kill Yahya. A History of Modern Yemen
The comment of an old man from klashid a generation later is probably near the truth: “It was ‘God preserve the Imam!’ and off we went. A History of Modern Yemen
Even the women did not hang back from competing with the men, trilling wildly with joy at the procession of the Crown Prince... A History of Modern Yemen
From the time the birds left the city until the present day they have never been seen again. A History of Modern Yemen
If it was like this in Ta’izz, what must it have been like in the north? Those close to cAbdullah al-Wazir (fellow sayyids, qddis, but also friends and in-laws from shaykhly families such as Abu Ra’s of Dhu Mubammad and al-Shayif of Dhu Husayn) were executed. A History of Modern Yemen
So too was the “liberal Imam” himself whose severed head, by one account, was shown to the late Imam Ya~ya’s women-folk before being thrown on a rubbish tip. A History of Modern Yemen
Ya/zyd and the British: 1918—1948 57 The dominant language in Yemeni affairs through the 19405 was of Islam. A History of Modern Yemen
When Kennedy Trevaskis arrived in Aden in 1951 the issue of the day was a move to East African shillings from Indian rupees; a dozen years later when, as governor, Trevaskis had a grenade thrown at him, Yemen’s older politics had all unravelled.’ A History of Modern Yemen
We shall follow events to September 1962. A History of Modern Yemen
Prejudice focused first on migrants from the North but then, more intensely, on Indians, and “Aden for the Adenis” (1949—50) was an early manifestation of bitter disputes overjobs and influence which increased through the 19505 as the port expanded, CHAPTER THREE A new form of politics: the 19505 CHANGES IN THE SOUTH 58 the migrant population grew, and the British introduced reforms. A History of Modern Yemen
Between the port and its growing labour force, meanwhile, there remained a gap. A History of Modern Yemen
The Japanese invasions of 1941—2 had cut off remittances from Southeast Asia (in the war years, which were years of drought, thousands starved when landowners lacked means to employ or feed them), and the privileged position of Ilaçlramis in the Far East was unlikely to be re-established. A History of Modern Yemen
Through the 1950s one finds a plethora of local movements, from the sayyid-centred Hadrami Reform A new form of politics: the 19505 59 6o A history of modern Yemen Association to a Social Democratic Party to the People’s League Party concentrated in the coastal towns.5 A History of Modern Yemen
Debt among agriculturalists was severe, however, and the British, para- lysed by a cult of indirect rule, failed to address the problem.7 A History of Modern Yemen
exceeded £230 — the first time that revenue had ever been collected.8 A History of Modern Yemen
The contradictions sharpened as the area became subject to the nationalist rhetoric of Gamal CAbd al-Nasir, whose influence would be difficult to overstate: “from 1952 till his death in 1970 he simply bestrode the Arab World.. A History of Modern Yemen
The cAwdhalI Sultans, for instance, came to run their affairs effectively, and in Fa~lli there grew up a prosperous and complex administration. A History of Modern Yemen
When the ruler of Dali’, Ilaydarah bin Nasr, was driven from office rn 1947, he and his son fled to North Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
Several members of the family were as dissatisfied with this as was Haydarah and joined him in Qa’~abah, from where they encour- aged “dissidence” among tribes near Dali’.’3 A History of Modern Yemen
These ‘Arniri” tribes, so- called on British maps, no more considered themselves subjects of Dali’ than the Amirs considered themselves subjects of greater powers: indeed the year before Ilaydarah fled North to get away from the British, the Sha’iris (around Qali’ itself) had fled North to get away from Haydarah. A History of Modern Yemen
In 1956, supplied with money and guns from the Imam, they backed Flaydarah against the British and the new Amir. A History of Modern Yemen
Less obvious were the implications of cash- cropping and new forms of finance. A History of Modern Yemen
La~j was paid more for cotton than was Abyan (the debt-structure of the projects differed), and it was widely assumed the British were extract- ing great wealth from agriculture; in the British vie~ meanwhile, the Protectorate States absorbed ~i ,ooo,ooo per annum in free hand-outs. A History of Modern Yemen
the Voice of the Arabs exposes the Coloniser and his lackeys and warns our brothers, the people of the South, from falling into the trap set for them by the British. A History of Modern Yemen
The Republic which succeeded Abmad stressed his tyranny, and docu- mentary sources from which to think further remain in private hands. A History of Modern Yemen
Ahmad Nu’man, a major progressive figure jailed in 1948, was brought to Ta’izz from the dungeons of Hajjah on the second anni- versary of the coup’s collapse, and his speech in praise of the Imam “is reported to have been so excellent that the Imam and others of the audi- ence were reduced to tears”.20 A History of Modern Yemen
In 1950 beggars appeared in Aden from the North, where starvation was widespread on account of drought. A History of Modern Yemen
Cotton-growing was tried in the Tihamah from about 1951; the old Turkish salt-works at SalIf were revived. A History of Modern Yemen
However, Ahmad from early in his reign was desperate to secure financial help, and an American mission visited Ta’izz in 1950. A History of Modern Yemen
Expansion of the port at Hudaydah was discussed, and a road from there to Sanaa (the trip by truck took at best about i8 hours), yet agreement was baffled through a whole decade, for the Americans needed some indication of where funds might be applied while the Yemenis had constantly to refer to Ahmad, whose governance remained as Rikiani described for Yaliya. A History of Modern Yemen
Physically he was unforgettable, and Ingrams’ picture from 1941 applied through the 195os: His most alarming feature was his great bulging eyes set off by a forked beard, one prong shorter than the other. A History of Modern Yemen
His household differed from his father’s in the role of important women. A History of Modern Yemen
Ahmad, as Ya~iya had done, gave the brothers “ministries”. A History of Modern Yemen
Unlike his father, he did not retain them long as provincial governors where power lay. A History of Modern Yemen
And the Imam agreed with his brother’s thinking.”26 A History of Modern Yemen
Tacizz, not Sanaa, was now the capital. A History of Modern Yemen
Court affairs account for what occurred far more than does theology Before he was Imam, Ahmad had razed the tomb of Ibn ‘Alwän near Ta’izz. A History of Modern Yemen
The aristocracy, if we wish to call it such, was vast and sprawling. A History of Modern Yemen
The growing Northern diaspora of workers and small traders over- lapped with a spread of students. A History of Modern Yemen
Aden schools saw a constant thin stream of Northern students, and from Aden to the North moved pamphlets and satirical broadsheets criticising Ahmad’s rule. A History of Modern Yemen
British Petroleum set up an oil-refinery at Little Aden, in 1952, whose construction drew in a large work-force from Shafi’i areas of the Imam’s domain (mainly from I~Iugariyyah); and shipping increased, because of bunkering on the Europe—Far East route, to the point where, by 1958, Aden was said to be the second busiest port in the world after New York. A History of Modern Yemen
1956 saw seventy strikes which “produced the first warnings of what repercussions might arise from conditions prevailing in the Middle East generally”,34 and at the end of that year Britain invaded Suez, forfeiting what standing it retained in the Arab World. A History of Modern Yemen
In 1950 a Yemen Trading Company had been formed to deal in sugar, flour, rice and tobacco. A History of Modern Yemen
Over 50 per cent was allotted to Imam Abmad. A History of Modern Yemen
(The monopoly was formally revoked; the practice seems not to have reverted.) A History of Modern Yemen
In 1956 a deal for oil and mineral explora- tion with a US-based corporation upset certain northern shaykhs, but “the Imam replied that though the land might be theirs it was his too, that the money was his and that he was going to keep it, and that they were going to prison”. A History of Modern Yemen
The view of old Aden families differed from that of the new class, some of whom were Aden citizens. A History of Modern Yemen
Old Aden families, new class, and Lower Yemeni migrants, meanwhile, felt equally distant from the hinterland, which they all saw as filled with savages.38 A History of Modern Yemen
State systems, however, continued growing. A History of Modern Yemen
Many of Abyan’s new farmers, for example, had been non- tribal share-croppers, and two-thirds of the project staff were local, most of them, like trades-unionists in Aden, being newly educated men unat- tached to local governance. A History of Modern Yemen
Qa1~itan al-Sha’bI, later to be President of South Yemen, was in the 1950S an agricultural officer; Anwar Khalid held a similar post later. A History of Modern Yemen
The British tried to push a road through from Aden to Upper ‘AwlaqI: with Abmad’s support, the RablzIs of Upper ‘AwlaqI (320 armed men) and Dammanls of ‘Awdhall (maybe ~oo men) rose with effects far beyond their numbers. A History of Modern Yemen
Even FadlI, which borders the southern coast, received 3,000 rifles from the North in 1957—8 as some turned to one power, some the other, and Jahhaf near al-Dali’ produced a “spec- tacular revolt”. A History of Modern Yemen
He opened a school in Qactabah to children from Southern tribes, and plainly felt these were his people;42 few of them felt so, but nor did most wish to be British “sub- jects” (ra c~yah a word also used of peasants and “weak” share-croppers). A History of Modern Yemen
To some, the way forward seemed to be to lease base-rights by treaty from an independent South comprising Aden and Protectorates together, but London, they complained, saw the port and its hinterland as separate issues. A History of Modern Yemen
Sultan CJ\JJ bin cAbd al-KarTm al~cAbdalI, however, from early in the 19505 declared himself an Arab Nationalist, supporting and supported by Muhammad al-JifrI of the sayyid family who had tried in the 1930S to help form a peace in cAwlaqi A history of modern Teinen Al-JifrT was president of the South Arabian League (SAL), formed in 1951, which demanded independence for Aden and Protectorates together.44 A History of Modern Yemen
In 1959, however, Sultan cJ\JT broadcast from Cairo: “This time last year, the imperialists lost their temper and were betrayed by their tricks. A History of Modern Yemen
“~ The reason, he claimed, was the success of the La~j cotton scheme. A History of Modern Yemen
we were achieving great deeds”. A History of Modern Yemen
The power of the Arab Nationalist “summons” turned on transistor radios. A History of Modern Yemen
Imam Yahya, quite successfully, had restricted wireless receivers, but Ahrnad, faced with pocket-sized devices, could not do the same and neither could the British. A History of Modern Yemen
Increasingly he was said to be impressed with the achievements of CAbd al-NAsir, as Trevaskis was told by a doubtful source: I came to know a Yemeni, who hovered on the fringe of Mukiammad al-Badr’s household, and from him I would hear how eagerly the young man would read the Egyptian papers: his eyes shining as he looked at photographs of N~~ir’s tri- umphant progress, . A History of Modern Yemen
The Tihämah, where emigration rates seem not to have been so high, suffered worse than did the highlands. A History of Modern Yemen
A new form of politics: the 19505 79 8o A history of modern Yemen Merchants in I~Iudaydah were able to organise a form of local co-operative and gain minor concessions from Alirnad, though even here anti-Alimad slogans were appearing by now on walls; labourers in Hudaydah were miserably paid, and agricultural labourers beyond the town were paid stifi worse. A History of Modern Yemen
Egyptian instructors were provided, thus bringing the prospect of revolution very close to A new form of politics: the 1950S 8i 82 A history of modern Yemen Plate 3.4. A History of Modern Yemen
In early 1958, certain networks of discontent around Ta’izz were co-ordinated by ‘Abd al- Ghani Mutahhar, a wealthy merchant newly returned from Ethiopia. A History of Modern Yemen
Among the shaykhs one finds Husayn al-Ahmar, QAsim Abu Ra’s, Muti’ al-Dammaj and others; the army officers involved seem to come from everywhere; the merchants are a smaller group, but include such figures as Muhammad al-Dumayni (the family are from Barat originally) and ‘Ali al-Wajlh as well as A1?mad al-’Udayni.6° A History of Modern Yemen
The identity of the traitors was not specified but plainly they were close at hand and on 22 May al-Badr came to Sanaa to address the army, for soldiers who had gone unpaid were everywhere disobeying orders. A History of Modern Yemen
Al-Sayaghi was summoned to Hudaydah, where Al?mad greeted him with his standard rough affability: “Oy, Qahtani, where have you been?” Fearing the Imam meant he was anti-sayyid (QahtAnis were native Yemenis, ‘AdnAnis the sayyids), Sayaghi arranged with friends in Nihm and KhawlAn to flee to Bay~An. A History of Modern Yemen
The Iladrami states declined to involve themselves. A History of Modern Yemen
The port was also booming, but prosperity “created more, not less trouble as the Colony’s population was swollen with people new to the experience of contemporary wealth” — the total reached about 200,000, of whom perhaps 8o,ooo were Northern workers, still mainly unaccompanied men (Sanaa’s whole population, by comparison, was 5o,ooo counting babes in arms). A History of Modern Yemen
The only unifying view of specifically Yemeni affairs, as opposed to those of Arab Nationalism, was that beamed intermittently from Cairo by Zubayri and Nu’män. A History of Modern Yemen
Resistance to the Imam in Khawl~n (east of Sanaa) never quite died out, and the Sharif enouraged it. A History of Modern Yemen
Most important was the arrival through 1959, from America and Russia, of wheat as famine aid:68 there was no longer reason for mass starvation — perhaps for the first time in Yemen’s history. A History of Modern Yemen
The Chinese meanwhile pressed on with the Sanaa—Ijudaydah road and the Americans started work on a road from Mukhä’ to Ta’izz and thence to Sanaa. A History of Modern Yemen
There were strikes in Ta’izz, and pamphlets circulated from the “Free Officers” while radio broadcasts from Cairo depicted Arab republics as everywhere the form of progress. A History of Modern Yemen
The fol- lowing day the immediate issue was Yemen’s unity, triggered by the Northern coup and expressed with a sense of destiny familiar from Europe a century before: The homeland will never surrender or submit. A History of Modern Yemen
Nuqum is the mountain beside Sanaa. A History of Modern Yemen
Revolutions and civil wars: the 1960s Through the 1960s Yemen was trapped in overlapping wars. A History of Modern Yemen
Only when Egyptians and British left at last were Yemeni disagreements that evolved through the war made explicit, and not until 1970 did politics take settled shape. A History of Modern Yemen
Serious rioting erupted: “Indeed we are one family”, shouted ‘Abduh al-Adhal above the crowd, “one people,. A History of Modern Yemen
Spirit in revolt, she fills her breast with pure air. A History of Modern Yemen
See how she lifts her head and moves forward, Trampling with disdain these foolish idols... A History of Modern Yemen
As far off as Iluraydah in Wadi Haçlramawt people clustered around transistor radios, swept up in “revolution fever”, and from Aden migrants moved North by the thousand to help build a new Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
The Saudis decided Egyptian-backed revolution on their borders was a mortal threat6 and rapidly they armed the royalists, a term used by both sides from the start. A History of Modern Yemen
From the South, meanwhile, help reached the royalists from the Sharif of Bayhan whose connections of amity and kinship extended through Ma’rib, the Jawf where Bin Mu’ayli of ‘Abidah was a friend, and KhawlAn, the bloc of Bakil tribes east of Sanaa. A History of Modern Yemen
A state of emergency was declared, however. A History of Modern Yemen
This drew together royalist and republican shaykhs, most of whom would have walked for days to get there for trucks were all but a monop- oly of the army still, and a peace council was proposed involving shaykhs from as far afield as Humayqan near the North—South border and ~a’dah near the Saudi frontier. A History of Modern Yemen
Many alignments as royalist or republican resulted almost from acci- dent. A History of Modern Yemen
Major tribes and the civil war The reply dismisses Khawlan and their allies as mercenaries bought with Saudi money from al-Badr and his uncle Hasan. A History of Modern Yemen
Wheat shipments established before the war continued (8—io,ooo tons per year at first), and, apart from the flood of rifles and money from competing powers, the Egyptian presence transformed certain sectors of economic life. A History of Modern Yemen
Merchants moved into Ibb, for instance, where they turned from exporting agricultural produce to importing foreign manufactures; small shopkeepers flourished, selling cloth and consumer goods to Egyptian soldiers. A History of Modern Yemen
There was something of a building boom, and although most development projects came to little, several merchants (nearly all from Lower Yemen) invested in Tihamah cotton and the wartime growth of I~Iudaydah port.’4 A History of Modern Yemen
But areas far from trade routes simply dropped from view. A History of Modern Yemen
Bullets from M.i’s and Lee-Enfields won’t stop mortars. A History of Modern Yemen
But a law of that year banning political associations was used against most such initiatives and tight Egyptian control left the two revolutions almost unconnected. A History of Modern Yemen
It was not depicted greatly in eco- nomic terms, which war in the South was by some from the very start. A History of Modern Yemen
In 1959, more than two years before the Sanaa coup, Qahtan al~Shacbi had broadcast from Cairo: Could the iron screen which the British imperialists put around the Arab South prevent the spread of news about our struggling people?.. A History of Modern Yemen
We submit to you this complaint from all Ahi Quteib Aqils [headmen] and Shaikhs against Naib [deputy; local governor] Mahmood Hasson. A History of Modern Yemen
We have got nothing from him except oppression. A History of Modern Yemen
he has relinquished [sic] the Aqils and notables of Ahl Quteib from their responsibilities and deprived them of their stipends. A History of Modern Yemen
New “fronts” were opened by the NLF in Lower Yäfi~ (the territory of Mul~ammad CAydarus, still active as he had been in the late 1950S but from the start at daggers drawn with Qab~an al~ShaCbT) and in Dathinah, where a single camel-train was thought to have supplied 45 mines, 150 grenades, 200 rifles and a war-chest of 40,000 riyals.2’ A History of Modern Yemen
The stories extend in conflicting ripples. A History of Modern Yemen
The Aden hinterland (like some parts of Lower Yemen) had many such figures, with a smat- tering of education, some experience of the wider world, and enormous hopes. A History of Modern Yemen
Violence remained enmeshed in broader politics.26 A History of Modern Yemen
The political crux remained the fran- chise in Aden State, which excluded the ATUC’s base of migrant workers, and a “pathological reluctance” among the British to deal with al-Asnaj of the ATUC in formal terms. A History of Modern Yemen
The large turnout of this tiny electorate, despite al-Asnaj’s call for a boycott, perhaps signifies how far Aden’s politics stood from practicality The man thought to have thrown the grenade at Trevaskis (“Grenadier Khallfah” as the British called him) was elected, along with Hashim ~ already with the NLF, and representatives of such old Aden fam- ilies as Makäwi and Luqman. A History of Modern Yemen
As Yemeni nationalism became realistic politics with the coup of 1962 so the British for other reasons had raised the stakes, naming Aden’s base as the major link between Britain and Singapore: it was elevated, says Pieragostini, “from colonial backwater to strategic necessity”. A History of Modern Yemen
In the same year (1964) CAbd al-Malik al-Tayyib, writing as CAbd al-Ilah, A history of modern Yemen ‘ABD AL-NASIR AND YEMEN published in Beirut his angry Collapse of the Revolution in Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
Invitations were issued by CAbd llah al-Al~imar, paramount shaykh of Ilashid, who at that time was minister of the interior: from relative obscurity under the last Imams, tribal shaykhs had emerged since the start of the war as major governmental figures. A History of Modern Yemen
The analysis of Yemen’s “backwardness” in modern times, so at odds with a noble past, unfolds in broadly Leninist terms from Europe’s industrial revolution and the spread of imperialism to depict an alliance of colonialism and feudalism within the two parts of Yemen and between them whereby sultans in the South (by extension also shaykhs in the North) had seized the people’s land. A History of Modern Yemen
Complaints were heard about the power of “merchants”, Zaydis complained of being squeezed from posts by ShafiCis, and among the ShafiCis themselves a group including Qasim Ghälib complained of the NuCmans: “We are not going to swear alle- giance to an Imam named Ahmad Nucman~~, they said, after a difference over who controlled al-Rahidah, a customs post involved with smuggling (not least of whisky and beer) from Aden. A History of Modern Yemen
The NLF formed part of such disputes also, but the context was far from simple. A History of Modern Yemen
Nucman, with certain shaykhs, was seeking an end to fighting in the North: demonstrations in TaCizz against a meeting of sultans from the Aden hinterland in Spring 1965, may well have expressed concerns with the prospect of the Northern war being ended at Lower Yemeni expense as much as concerns about the Southern war, and if the NLF had reason to encourage such demonstrations, so too did Egypt. A History of Modern Yemen
ShafiCi shaykhs who aligned themselves with al-Al?mar (Zaydi) and Nucman (ShafiCi) now found themselves attacked by troops from (Zaydi) Sanaa to the delight of the (ShafiCi) left. A History of Modern Yemen
In early 1966, when Britain announced its intention to withdraw from Aden, Egypt consoli- dated its forces in the triangle of the main Northern cities, intent on waiting the British out, and the war quietened, but attempts to pursue independent Yemeni positions, whether by NuCman and Iryani or increasingly by Hasan al~cAmrT, were all frustrated by Egyptian policy. A History of Modern Yemen
Juzaylan, who grew up in TaCizz though the family are originally from Bara~ (his grandfather had been a cavalry trooper with the Turks), was very much Egypt’s man: his wife was Egyptian and he himself saw Cairo as the model of progress and mod- ernity. A History of Modern Yemen
A1~cAmri tried to prevent him landing. A History of Modern Yemen
Some were cynical about Ahnümi himself, “who used to live in some hut in the TihAmah where he didn’t even own a mat and now lives in a great palace. A History of Modern Yemen
Prince CAbdullah Hasan had fruit, meat, tinned chicken, Egyptian cigarettes and fuel for his generator from republican commerce, while sections of Khawlan took money and guns from both sides, but this was the third successive year of drought. A History of Modern Yemen
The meeting was protected, it seems, by MU1IC al-Dammaj, a shaykh from near Ibb who had fled to Aden in the 19405 to escape Imam Ahmad (Chapter 2), seized Ibb for the republic in 1962, and gone on to espouse more radical ideals.44 A History of Modern Yemen
The last, which derived from lectures given to French workers in the 1930s, is classical Marxism of the Stalin period, informed by not only historical materialism but dialectical materialism, a whole philosophy of the universe which in Arabic might sometimes have seemed as obscure yet powerful as a tract of the Jewish kabbala. A History of Modern Yemen
Such figures as Muthanna, whom we mentioned earlier returning from Kuwait with a little schooling, were open to such appeals quite as much as were the better read. A History of Modern Yemen
Disputes between governments overlay, and only sometimes interrupted, an unwritten history of movement and migrant labour. A History of Modern Yemen
As early asJanuary 1964 ajoke military communiqué had gone around in British circles: “Enemy — consists of FRA and FG personnel on leave, armed with rifles on loan from their parent units... A History of Modern Yemen
The joke wore thin as it became apparent that the police in Aden were as little committed to British aims as the Federal Army, and in the east, the small QuCayti and Kathiri State Forces and the Hadrami Bedouin Legion (HBL), although independent of Aden, showed the same processes as in the Federal Army All are remembered from the 1950S as lecturing rural neighbours and relatives on correct Islamic prac- tice; in the 1960s all were infiltrated by the NLE Certain Northerners had suggested early on that there was no need to fight in the South at all for the British were leaving anyway, and the Revolutions and civil wars: the 196os 109 110 announcement of a date only strengthened that perception. A History of Modern Yemen
South approaches independence, we look for support from our brothers in Yemen [i.e. A History of Modern Yemen
British hypocrisy and inefficiency are blamed. A History of Modern Yemen
They still hoped the Federal Government might succeed them, but by now lacked the will to support that government, and as British troops withdrew from the coun- tryside (a process well under way by the start of summer), the Federal Rulers and their little states fell one by one. A History of Modern Yemen
FLOSY launched raids from the North, meanwhile, none of which secured lasting gains, while Dathlnah fell to the NLF, then so did CAwdhall. A History of Modern Yemen
At the end, the Sharif of Bayhan left for Saudi Arabia, pursuing some policy of his own; his state disappeared in his absence, most probably from family rivalry The Sultans of Hadramawt returned from talks in Geneva in September 1967, only to find the Bedouin Legion and NLF had seized their capitals.59 A History of Modern Yemen
But the flags appeared in strange places. A History of Modern Yemen
The last British troops were lifted off to an assault ship on 29 November 1967. A History of Modern Yemen
Sallal rejected this, as did many others, and large demonstrations took place in Sanaa, where thirty Egyptians were killed by crowds. A History of Modern Yemen
The “seventy days” became a national epic. A History of Modern Yemen
The National Guard of the early days was recreated as the Popular Resistance Forces. A History of Modern Yemen
The Republican army was expanded hugely, from hundreds to thousands in two months, but the roads to Hudaydah and Tacizz were reopened only in February ig68. A History of Modern Yemen
Many ShafiCis attribute this final triumph to Al?mad al~CAwacII, a shaykh from al-Bayçla’ who in many ways was larger than life: a fighter and a fierce man with a bottle, he was also a poet whose songs performed by Alimad Sanaydar of Sanaa remain famous.6’ A History of Modern Yemen
“As soon as you get away from Yemen, you tend to fall back into classificatory schemes: royalists and northern tribes (roughly the Zaydis) on one side against mercantile republican trades-unionists (the Shäfidls) on the other.” A History of Modern Yemen
When Salläl was deposed in November 1967, crowds in Shäfidi Tacizz had rioted, crying “We are your soldiers, Salläl”,66 while those who ejected Sallãl had worried primarily about a counter-coup not from trades-unionists, merchants or the MAN, but from Abd Rabbihi al- Awadi, a Shafi ishaykh of al-Bayçla . A History of Modern Yemen
with horror of attacks on the Arab quar- ters of the city by ‘bedouins’, a term which for them is at best synony- mous with ‘savages’.”67 A History of Modern Yemen
Traditionally Aden’s hinterland had supplied grain to Ijaçlramawt in good years, and parts of the hinterland in bad years had imported grain from Bayçla’ and Qa~abah in the North. A History of Modern Yemen
Through the 196oS the export in return of sheep and goats to the North from ha Iramawt had grown. A History of Modern Yemen
In a world of cheap wheat from Russia and America to cover the worst years, something might have been done. A History of Modern Yemen
As hope of wider revolution faded, Aden’s government attempted “socialism in one country”. A History of Modern Yemen
Revolutions and civil wars: the 196os 119 Intermittently through twenty years, from about 1970 to 1990, each Yemen denounced the other in terms appropriate to the Cold War. A History of Modern Yemen
Great emphasis was placed on the “toiling masses” of workers and peasants to be led by revolutionary intellectuals. A History of Modern Yemen
Tribal disputes had been suspended by decree inJanuary 1968, and tribalism now collapsed from within as it once had further north in face of Imam Ya~iya. A History of Modern Yemen
The country was under attack from elsewhere. A History of Modern Yemen
From the distance of Rouen a quarter century later, Habib Abdulrab looks back on Aden’s suburb of Shaykh cUthman in novel-form. A History of Modern Yemen
Our people is entirely Marxist! A History of Modern Yemen
Sinan Abfl Lahum, governor by self-appointment of Hudaydah Province, was as disturbed as were Aden’s Marxists by long hair and flared trousers; but in other respects the two regimes differed. A History of Modern Yemen
The rhetoric of the time condemned personalised rule (hukmfardi, a slogan also applied to Sallal’s period) and contrasted republican progress, though in fact little changed at first, with the backwardness of “theocratic government”. A History of Modern Yemen
Important merchants had shifted operations from Aden to Hudaydah soon after 1962; now, as socialist policies were applied in the South, lesser merchants also settled in Hudaydah, the North’s only major port, where they were joined by returnees from Africa and by Adenis who had lost their property Older Sanaani whole- salers were forced out of business. A History of Modern Yemen
A Shafidi commercial class took form, centred upon Ta’izz, and a certain practical alliance with shaykhs was evident, while the North also harboured large numbers of Southern ref- ugees from tribal areas.’0 A History of Modern Yemen
In Aden, lacking rural constit- uencies, they favoured a strong party-apparatus and demanded Yemen’s integration more insistently than did colleagues from Fadli, Abyan or Haçlramawt: “the borders and artificial separation which divide the Yemeni popular masses in two parts, the division between South Yemen and North Yemen which occurred during British occupa- tion, should disappear. A History of Modern Yemen
But already by 1969, before the 22June corrective movement, the North’s foreign minister could complain, “we are further from unity than we were a year ago”.” A History of Modern Yemen
In 1969, 52 per cent of the North’s few exports went to the South and almost 30 per cent of its imports came from there: four years later the figures had dropped to less than 7 per cent and 6 per cent. A History of Modern Yemen
In December 1970 the South changed its name to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, no longer simply “South” Yemen, while the North (the Yemen Arab Republic) gave a series of ministries to ‘Abdullah a1-A~naj whose Aden associates in FLOSY had been crushed by the NLF; exile groups received support from Sanaa, and border incidents worsened until, in late 1972, a war was fought between the Yemens. A History of Modern Yemen
The rains in these years were poor, which without foreign shipments of grain would have spelled famine, and the strain of South against Saudis was constant. A History of Modern Yemen
North Yemen at the time had an extraordinary 775 governmental figures with the salary and rank of min- ister. A History of Modern Yemen
From 1970 the Organisation of Yemeni Revolutionary Resisters (al- muqOwimmn al-thawr~yymn) claimed to lead a struggle against “feudalist and reactionary forces” and “imperialist plans”. A History of Modern Yemen
At Raymah in 1972, for instance, the Resisters captured the lands of feudalist Shaykh Ahmad bin Ahmad al-Muntasir and dis- tributed the lands to the masses of the poor peasants [despite heavy opposition from] the mercenaries of Shaykh (feudalist) Sinan Abu Labum who is well known [for] his hiredom to Saudi reaction and link with the American central intelligence. A History of Modern Yemen
For example, a bomb was exploded in al-Jubah “at the palace of puppet of Saudi Arabia Nagi bin Man~ür Nimran”, the Nimrans being shaykhs in Murad, the tribe south of Ma’rib from which Imam Ya~ya’s assassin ‘Au Na~ir al-Qardadi had come a quarter century earlier. A History of Modern Yemen
The meaning of “tribe” differs greatly among these regions (Chapter i). A History of Modern Yemen
In late November 1973 he visited Shibam in Hadramawt: the crowds, lined up to dance and sing, saw something being dragged behind cars in the approaching retinue, which turned out to be the naked bodies of “feudalists”.24 A History of Modern Yemen
Al-Ghashmi was a tank officer and brother of the Shaykh of Hamdan, a minor Hashid tribe. A History of Modern Yemen
are not from China or America, or Africa or India, but are sons of beloved Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
His military uniform was set aside before long in favour of a short-sleeved suit, and he spoke in persuasive terms of progress; he welcomed home expatriates from the Horn of Africa (then slipping into long-term warfare) and from as far afield as Vietnam, and offered Yemen’s help internationally in mediating, for instance, between Ethiopia and Eritrea, thus presenting his country as one to be taken seriously. A History of Modern Yemen
From early 1975 he encouraged work on joint problems, and somewhat isolated from local powers in the North, turned increasingly to talks with Aden: in early 1977 klamdi and Salmayn met near the North—South border. A History of Modern Yemen
He was also, to take a lesser parallel, Yemen’s Bill Clinton, with an undisciplined taste for young women; his close associates, arranging clandestine girls and whisky, rose from obscurity to power through his patronage and in the, end, when his enemies wished him dead, arranged his destruction easily In October 1977 “Ibrahim” and his brother ‘Abdullah were mur- dered in circumstances of contrived squalor.29 A History of Modern Yemen
Apart from salt, hides and small amounts of coffee (all much as under Imam Ahmad) there were no exports, and the formal trade deficit was therefore vast. A History of Modern Yemen
In the 197Os, however, “the süqs came to know foreign black bread from West Germany, birthday cakes from Italy, fig rolls from Britain” and indeed much else. A History of Modern Yemen
With two other men I read Jurji Zaydan’s multi-volumed history of the Arabs aloud, taking turns. A History of Modern Yemen
Tins of Abu Shaybah rolled-oats, named TWO STATES IN A SEA OF MIGRANTS 131Two Yemeni states in the 1970S 132 A history of modern Yemen for the “old man” on the Quaker Oats label, of “tuna” (often pilchards in fact) and processed cheese were everywhere, while the standard measure of volume in small transactions was a foreign pineapple tin. A History of Modern Yemen
Large ministries were erected; the number of clerks and officials multiplied, although with government wages low, many came from elsewhere in the Arab World. A History of Modern Yemen
More work passed through government hands, and in the course of the 1970s capital expenditure by government rose from almost nothing to about half North Yemen’s total. A History of Modern Yemen
Little was raised internally, almost none from direct taxation of remittance wealth, and most came from foreign aid and debt, a system of relations among banks and governments which attached only loosely to local needs. A History of Modern Yemen
The South ran parallel. A History of Modern Yemen
A three-year plan, which events overtook, covered 197 1—4, and then a five-year plan treated the period through i978. A History of Modern Yemen
Faced now with a huge drain of manpower from a tiny workforce, Aden’s government tried to ban emigration. A History of Modern Yemen
In 1975 about 125,000 Southerners were thought to be migrant workers, and by the end of the decade perhaps 200,000. A History of Modern Yemen
Criticism from visiting officials was rejected: The autonomy of households was maintained in the South by law (one could not buy another’s land), in the North by the fact that remittances were in private hands, and one’s impression is of household life being rather similar in both Yemens. A History of Modern Yemen
Two Yemeni states in the 1970S 5ALMAYN AND GHASHMI 135 136 A history of modern Yemen tribal ditties, and an intensely “political” clash was rewritten in tribal terms. A History of Modern Yemen
Most people, however, glad to be richer than they were, simply got by. A History of Modern Yemen
By the late 197os a surprising number of places in the North had generator electricity and water from pipes or from bowsers and donkey-carts (twin-tub washers and flush-toilets began to undermine the foundations of Sanaa houses). A History of Modern Yemen
The population of Tacizz by the mid-197os had grown to 8i,ooo, Iludaydah to almost 83,000, even Hajjah to over 40,000, but Sanaa grew from perhaps go,00o to 200,000 in the course of a decade. A History of Modern Yemen
The price of agricultural land as well as building land rose; the returns from agricultural land declined, for the huge inequalities of landed wealth on which the Resisters and NDF dwelt were no longer the whole of life (cash from wage-labour changed everything) and share- cropping agreements were often renegotiated or land ceased being worked. A History of Modern Yemen
Development of both spate-fed and pump-fed schemes now marginalised traditional land-rights, leaving farmers (far poorer than in most highland regions) clinging to the land through sub- sidies from kin abroad and unpaid family help at home.52 A History of Modern Yemen
North Yemen, late Ig7os 139 ‘4° centrally, but there was less of it overall. A History of Modern Yemen
Northerners, with money in their pockets and secure in their posses- sion of a vast cultural history, often revelled in the image, quoting Sallal’s line from the civil war that he was “ruler of five mfflion luna- tics”. A History of Modern Yemen
Viewed politically, “official” Islam now preached only the piou~ hope that rulers behave honestly; but freed by circumstance from prac- tical concerns with conformity and power, Yemenis in everyday life gol on with simply being Muslims. A History of Modern Yemen
The Muslim Brothers, from the distance of Cairo in the 194os, hac been fascinated by Yemen as a Muslim country untouched by Westerr influence (Chapter 3). A History of Modern Yemen
Young men dispatched tc Plate 5.2. A History of Modern Yemen
As early as 1974 cAbd al-Fatt~h invoked names from the distant past, which “shone in movements of rebellion throughout history. A History of Modern Yemen
In his 1974 address cAbd al-Fattäh continued with a list of later figures: “Hamdani, Nashwãn al-Himyari, cUmarah the Yemeni, al-Maqbali, Ibn al-Amir and al-Warith were merely leading Yemeni scholars, a few slight cases from a vast caravan of revolutionary thinkers through the history of Yemen across the last twelve centuries.” A History of Modern Yemen
Mukiammad Zabärah, for instance, the best “official” historian under Imam Ahmad, had been working at the time of his death (ig6i) on The Excursion of Perusa4 a compendium of biographies of learned and influential Yemenis in Islam’s fourteenth century (that is, from ~.D i88i). A History of Modern Yemen
In the North in the early 19705 contemporary work, often published elsewhere, dealt with the civil war or transition to post-war politics. A History of Modern Yemen
In print there was no discussion of who in practice was a Bacthist, for instance, or who a Näsirist, but often one had to know the details to grasp who was writing and reading what. A History of Modern Yemen
The second edition of Ba Maraf’s book on the subject of the martyrs appeared in 1973; al-Shatirr’s Eras in Hadrami History was published in Mukalla the year before, and in publishing terms Ilalramawt bore a charmed life. A History of Modern Yemen
Several later series had the same effect of weaving character and family imagery — all in familiar dialect — into public issues, but “politics” was presented in less detail. A History of Modern Yemen
In the North, television and radio adopted a style common elsewhere in the Arab World and the news began with a jaunty brass-band march (tubas were prominent) then went on to say almost nothing: “The President, Brother Colonel Ahmad al-Ghashmi, Head of the Republican Council and Commander of the Armed Forces, today met in his office at the Republican Palace with the ambassadors of sister neighbouring Arab states and discussed with them regional developments. A History of Modern Yemen
Agreement was expressed on a range of topics. A History of Modern Yemen
.“ A History of Modern Yemen
In Lower Yemen warfare between government and NDF went in cycles, which most people tried simply to avoid. A History of Modern Yemen
Saudi stipends to shaykhs in Upper Yemen were large; on occasion, funds and weapons reached their rivals from Southern sources. A History of Modern Yemen
generously ($570 million was given in immediate aid), the Saudis from the mid-I97os reduced support for Southern exile groups and cautiously accepted overtures from Salmayn in Aden, ~ process complicated by disputes about the war between Somalia and Ethiopia and by the Saudis’ habitual indecision in matters of grand policy70 Salmayn, however, was concentrating power too much in hi~ own hands for the comfort of cAbd al-Fattah, cAll cAntar and cAll Nasir InJune 1978 matters came to a head. A History of Modern Yemen
was blown uç by a briefcase bomb in the hands of an emissary from Salmayn. A History of Modern Yemen
Qdt was officially frowned on in the South at the time, though not wholly banned, and the Southern president had supposedly received a shipment from his Northern counterpart, repaying him through an emissary It proved embarrassing when the emissary was searched. A History of Modern Yemen
Ali Abdullah relied from the start on those he knew. A History of Modern Yemen
The growth of a republican military late in the civil war brought Hamdan and Sankian to prominence, and both Ghashmi and cAll cAbdullah rose to prominence Plate 5.3. A History of Modern Yemen
The state apparatus in the North grew faster, with the aid from 1984 of locally produced oil and gas, while the South reached an impasse polit- ically. A History of Modern Yemen
The family is originally from Barat, in the far northeast, but he himself grew up near Ibb, joined the Bacth Party as a young man and studied economics in Russia. A History of Modern Yemen
cAbdullah the North’s president, was later to claim that 6~ per cent of Adenis were from the North originally, which was likely true. A History of Modern Yemen
From the time of the civil war, many Yemenis referred to “the Central Area”, al-min~aqah al-wus~d. A History of Modern Yemen
The hideous death of “Qabul al-Ward”, a pregnant woman burned to death by soldiers for supporting the left, is still remem- bered in Lower Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
Whoever turns up, you can give him a screw We’ll give you a squeeze, treat you like women, and The money we leave you can stick in your pockets.5 A History of Modern Yemen
a noted poet, thus declaims a zamil: Black mountains, greet al-Sufi, Leader of this first delegation. A History of Modern Yemen
Al-Suf! A History of Modern Yemen
The revolution transported all the Yemeni people from the dark ages to the advanced (mutatawwarah, developed) life of the twentieth century and affirmed its intellectual release from a world of darkness and political deception. A History of Modern Yemen
After the oil-price rises of 1973—4, the OECD countries — North America, Japan, Western Europe — had gained control of “recycling” OPEC revenues (OPEC’s trade balance went from a $67 billion surplus to a $2 billion deficit in the first four years) and Yemen was peripherally part of this. A History of Modern Yemen
Remittances from the oil states themselves levelled off, and the government, dependent on loans and indirect taxation, saw its foreign currency reserves evaporate. A History of Modern Yemen
In 1983 a serious attempt was made to ban imports of fruit and veg- etables, and Yemen now has grapes, melons, pomegranates, bananas, all locally produced where before they came in cardboard boxes from abroad. A History of Modern Yemen
State farms were allowed to move towards less stringent forms of co-operative and planners in the South placed more emphasis on the private sector, whose share of the economy rose from 66 per cent to 72 per cent between 1980 and 1985. A History of Modern Yemen
Both depended for their country’s viability on massive remit- tances from migrant labour, and both depended for the solvency of their state apparatus on grants and loans from elsewhere, not all of which appeared in published budgets; North and South Yemeni governments alike spent enormous amounts on the police and military, and both amassed huge external debts they had scant hope of paying off. A History of Modern Yemen
An agreement was formed by OPEC to hold the price at $i~, but the boom was over and construction projects in the oil states were wound down. A History of Modern Yemen
The scale of these events was ‘57Yemen in a wider world: the 198os r~8 A history of modern Yemen massive. A History of Modern Yemen
6. A History of Modern Yemen
The official exchange rate against the $US went from near 4.5 A History of Modern Yemen
A farmer from Hugariyyah was better off than some, for he owned a small plot of land and share-cropped as much again, but depended financially on his sons who worked as builders: We grow sorghum, mifiet. A History of Modern Yemen
The rest we buy from market in Turbah or Ta’izz, like wheat, flour, rice, sugar, [cooking] oil. A History of Modern Yemen
Long ago most of what we ate was from our farming It wasn’t enough at all.’6 A History of Modern Yemen
Grain imports, more recently, had risen from about i6o,ooo tons per annum in the mid-197os to more than 6~o,ooo tons. A History of Modern Yemen
Amidst the laissez-faire economics of the 197os, the state apparatus had grown enormously with support from foreign governments and institu- tions. A History of Modern Yemen
It began from 1984, however, to work top-down and use the co-operatives for purposes of central government; in ig8~, indeed, they were merged with the GPC apparatus to form “local co-operative development councils” answer- able to the Ministry of Local Administration. A History of Modern Yemen
The range of patronage widened. A History of Modern Yemen
The dam was inaugurated in 1986. A History of Modern Yemen
The aim in development theory, meanwhile, is to accumulate investment capital so that national wealth can be increased, which had not really happened in the North: roads had been built with foreign aid or by local co-operatives, the major cities acquired power sta- tions and sewage systems, but “industry” remained largely a matter of family workshops. A History of Modern Yemen
These offices were repeatedly closed in the 198os and the smaller tradersjailed and beaten, but people with the right connections smuggled dollars and riyals in huge amounts. A History of Modern Yemen
Under Imam Akimad he had secured the right to 6o per cent of North Yemen’s trade with Russia; after 1962 his base of Oper- ations shifted to Hudaydah from Aden, and later he suffered losses from Southern nationalisation. A History of Modern Yemen
There emerged by the mid-198os a military—commercial complex. A History of Modern Yemen
Production was not the basis of wealth and power, nor yet was aggres- sion against outsiders. A History of Modern Yemen
Such cal- culations take no account of declining aid, however, nor does an overall balance sheet suggest the structural effect, for where previously central government had depended on the kindness of strangers and wealth in hard currency came largely through private hands, now wealth came direct to the central government. A History of Modern Yemen
(Qur’an 34:15). A History of Modern Yemen
Political scientists, as we noted in Chapter 5, speak of states as “cap- turing” resources. A History of Modern Yemen
The most famous of Yemen’s “merchants”, Hayl Sacid An’am, deserves mention. A History of Modern Yemen
His industrial operations were capital intensive and technically efficient by any standard. A History of Modern Yemen
Here, by contrast, the husband of the family is earning YR 1,200 from a government job, which just pays for the firewood his wife uses baking bread, and the bread is then sold, not least to prisoners in the local jail.3° A History of Modern Yemen
Mubsin Pasha of al-’Udayn had carried through from Turkish to Imamic times (Chapter 2), and ‘AlI Muhsin lasted through the revolution (Chapters 3 and 4); ~adiq ‘AlT Mubsin continued through the 198os, emerging as a staunch GPC man like his son in turn, ‘Abd al- Raqib. A History of Modern Yemen
The degree to which economics, in the sense dwelt upon by planners, could be separated from political economy was not great. A History of Modern Yemen
In the very different setting of ~a’dah new starts on irrigation wells went from 84 in 1983 to more than triple that number the next year as grapes, apples, even citrus fruits, were tried: the economic effects of banning imports were predictable and to planners gratifying. A History of Modern Yemen
Near Huth, a friend was still expanding qdt fields at the decade’s end: even after pumping water from a bore well, he reckoned qdt pro- duced the cash equivalent of 25 sacks of wheat from land that otherwise would give three sacks,33 and there seemed no limit to the amount of qdt one could sell. A History of Modern Yemen
The owner, himself a big qdt farmer, must have made a fortune from these government- enforced charges, and as others were quick to note, he came from Sanhan, the tribe to which the President belongs. A History of Modern Yemen
By the early 1980S hand-dug wells of 20—30 metres depth had been replaced by bore wells to 120 metres; by late in the decade Sanaa was drawing from an aquifer 300—900 metres down and the water table was dropping five or six metres yearly. A History of Modern Yemen
The old tower-houses and new apartment blocks were complemented by walled suburban villas of the kind common in the Gulf; isolated from their neighbours and accessible by car, and along the Haddah Road were palaces of new private money as well as a new hotel and the offices of several oil-related companies. A History of Modern Yemen
Complaints were heard of con- sumerism, encouraged it was said by the arrival in 1983 of Palestinian fighters whom Israel had driven from Beirut. A History of Modern Yemen
The governor of Abyan, an ally of ‘Alt Nasir, is said by his enemies to have built no less than a palace, with gardens, swimming pool and satellite television: “As for the rooms for qat-chewing, he had imported furnishings from the markets ol the world. A History of Modern Yemen
In Aden each faction plotted against the other, stock-piling arms at home and buying abroad both weapons and equipment, and at a meeting on ‘3 January 1986 a large part of the Politbureau was slaughtered by ‘Ali Nasir’s men, who themselves feared a coup from the other faction. A History of Modern Yemen
Recently ‘All Na~ir, president of South Yemen, began to draw away a little from the Soviets and seek help elsewhere. A History of Modern Yemen
The official South Yemeni version was fantastical in a different genre: The triumph of the Yemeni Socialist Party over this bloody treasonable con- spiracy proves the organisational and ideological strength of the party as a mil- itant vanguard of the workers, farmers and all toilers during the stage of the national democratic revolution with its socialist horizons, and its being the guar- antee for preserving the revolution from. A History of Modern Yemen
Islam had aimed to free humanity from slavery, says the text, and the chapters jump directly from the conquest of Mecca (seventh century AD) to the nineteenth century: “Egypt, like all the Arab World, MODERN YEMEN was in a severe state of backwardness. A History of Modern Yemen
The “Institutes” he supported continued multiplying, however, with large subventions from the education budget as well as with Saudi funds: by 1986—7 there were reckoned to be 1,126 “religious schools”, and by the following year they claimed i i8,ooo students of whom more than 4,600 were trainee teachers to continue the work.46 A History of Modern Yemen
Enthusiasts from Saudi Arabia, Sudan and not least Egypt became prominent. A History of Modern Yemen
Other imagery came from elsewhere. A History of Modern Yemen
The expulsion of the Imam from Sanaa and the British from Aden were now merely paragraphs in school books, and very distant from those teaching — many of whom were not Yemeni.53 A History of Modern Yemen
The numbers enrolled in schools in the North rose steadily from 567,000 at the decade’s start to over ~ million by 1985/6 and to 1,300,000 for 1986/7. A History of Modern Yemen
Authors difi’er as to how fast the capital had grown, but from some- thing of the order of 200,000 people at the end of the 1970s, Sanaa’s pop- ulation had doubled by 1986 (a census that year gave 427,000) and continued growing to perhaps 780,000 by the decade’s end.56 A History of Modern Yemen
Africans, Europeans, Arabs from elsewhere, were all highly visible, and shopkeep- ers, taxi-drivers and day-labourers had moved in from both Upper and Lower Yemen in enormous numbers. A History of Modern Yemen
The Republican Palace, taken over from the Imam at the start of the revolution, was supplemented by Presidential Palaces, not least in Sanaa;57 government limousines multiplied, and the grandeur of the State increased. A History of Modern Yemen
They still did so, but where it used to be two riyals at worst, says a1~AkwaC, now one was charged 50 or ioo riyals to be arrested in the simplest circumstance and up to i,ooo riyals if the soldiers had to stir from town: they could not any longer be bothered A history of modern Yemen walking anywhere and the person arrested was expected, on top of every- thing else, to pay for car-hire. A History of Modern Yemen
Ya~iya Muslih, an army officer from Raymah then governor of Dhamar, was appalled by disorder in the countryside and what seemed to him “rebellion”. A History of Modern Yemen
Eruptions of such squabbles within the major cities were to those from other regions or classes an offence against modernist ideals but also something of a joke. A History of Modern Yemen
The Imamate had pro- duced a nation-state but then collapsed in war and revolution, and a greater revolution had followed with the spread of trade and cash from migrant labour, which in turn seemed to be collapsing. A History of Modern Yemen
Late in the 19705 Ci\~~jzah had run the house, while her parents-in-law farmed and her husband gained money from migrant labour. A History of Modern Yemen
The rise of fundamentalism did not impress her favourably, for the activists seemed insincere, and her son meanwhile spent more on qdt and cigarettes than he earned from his government job. A History of Modern Yemen
Another drew a handsome stipend from the Republican Guard in Sanaa: he scarcely went there once a month, but at home he had qa7, tobacco, meat for lunch, ai~id his television. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemen’s financial crisis of 1986 had been alleviated partly by a grant from the Saudis, whose policy no doubt was to promote “stable and Yemen in a wider world: the 198os 179 REGIONAL AND WIDER POLITICS i8o A history of modern Yemen peaceful relations between Sanaa and Aden, but not so cooperative as to risk real unity . A History of Modern Yemen
‘Azizah wants them to marry close Plate 6.4. A History of Modern Yemen
by, “but views the pool of desirable bridegrooms as distressingly small”. A History of Modern Yemen
But that was the shape of the modern world: everything seemed to rest not on work and saving but on having the right contacts. A History of Modern Yemen
His immediate family were never pros- perous. A History of Modern Yemen
The part- time painter had none of this. A History of Modern Yemen
All of those speaking were plainly Yemenis — very different as a group from other Peninsula Arabs — yet each had their distinctive accent and their vifiage names. A History of Modern Yemen
A delegation from al-Birär of ~Ir~l Surayh delivered a poem: In other words, for a return to the prominence which Yemen enjoyed in early history. A History of Modern Yemen
Now there is a new festival, through fresh effort (~jtihdd) and accomplishment Of union complete from the South to the North. A History of Modern Yemen
The conflict itself passed quietly in Yemen, and in the capital two years later the only visible remnant of the Gulf War, apart from jobless Iraqis, was a Yemeni enthusiast, supposedly financed by the Ministry of Culture, who danced all over Sanaa with his dagger and a flag-belt in the socket of which was set a pole with a “boom-box” cassette-player, • . A History of Modern Yemen
The Yemeni riyal had fallen in the I98os from 4.~ A History of Modern Yemen
If the party had a centre of gravity, numerically, it was in regions once contested by the NDF — from Raymah through Tacizz towards al-Bayda~ — and three tendencies were widely recognised within Isläh, each denoted by a leading figure: the tribalists (Shaykh cAbdullah of Häshid), the Muslim Brothers of traditional stamp (Yäsin al-Quball, from near Tacizz) and the Brothers of more radical inclina- tion (CAbd al-Majid al-Zindani). A History of Modern Yemen
Shaykh cAbdullAh had enormous influence north of Sanaa, and from there down through Tacizz, IslAIi was often hard to distinguish from the GPC. A History of Modern Yemen
The poor around Aden and Mukalla formed part of this constituency; such figures as Tariq al-FaçllI (son of Fadll’s ex-ruler from British times and himself a veteran of the Afghan wars, newly returned from exile) formed quite another. A History of Modern Yemen
This in no sense disqualified them from acting within the previous form of pol- itics, and the style was nicely caught by a newspaper cartoon where the Yemen as a single state 189 190 A history of modern Yemen first man asks the other which party he belongs to: “I’ve told you twenty times,” replies the second, “I belong to the GPC.” A History of Modern Yemen
of hi~b) and somehow not to be “political” (s~ydsi), the exception being the YSP. A History of Modern Yemen
Remittances had all but disappeared with the Gulf War, the riyal fell against the US dollar, and the effect was particularly marked in the South where subsidies for staple goods had been withdrawn: a medium- sized tin of powdered milk thus went from YD i (YR 26) to YD 7 or 8 in the space of two years. A History of Modern Yemen
cAll Na~ir, the president of the PDRY until 1986, had left North Yemen as one of the YSP’s conditions for unification, and the chance of him returning was never great. A History of Modern Yemen
Large elements of YSP bureaucracy moved to Sanaa where many seemed to live as extrav- agantly as their counterparts in the GPC, and in December 1992, when the riyal slipped from 30 to 42 against the US dollar, riots broke out not least at Tacizz where the crowds turned often on expensive cars. A History of Modern Yemen
By late 1992 new bank-notes were appearing which many feared were backed by nothing and the prime minister of the time, ~aydar al-’Attas (a Southerner from Hadramawt), threatened to resign, for with the two major parties at odds no decisions were possible and the State seemed to be disintegrating. A History of Modern Yemen
Other forms of organisation, unattached to the State, became prominent. A History of Modern Yemen
The Palestinian entrepreneurs Ilasib al-~abbagh and Sacid Khurl estab- lished a huge contracting firm to work on a pipeline from Masllah (the big new oilfield in Uadramawt) to the coast and their commercial agent was said to be Shaykh cAbdullah of Hashid; the French company, Elf, al-Ilada’s voice is a lion’s roar, making clear to me how things are. A History of Modern Yemen
We won’t be a family legacy like Saudi or Kuwait.’6 A History of Modern Yemen
Muhsin a!- A History of Modern Yemen
Unstated realignments of troops were made. A History of Modern Yemen
Some twenty to thirty people died in the latter process, but this was not just a “military” event: cAbdullah Shalil, an old CA]j Nasir loyalist from before ig86, would seem to have supported al- BId, who in ig86 had overthrown cAll Nasir, and ShaM had now mis- judged the balance of likely power. A History of Modern Yemen
Fighting started on 27 April 1994 at CAJfl_23 and the President’s forces elsewhere slowly ground down the YSP’s troops, who proved thin on the ground in many regions.24 A History of Modern Yemen
In a few cases Islamist auxiliaries were important and a Southern commander at Shabwah spoke of them “advancing like ants as if blind in the face of heavy fire”. A History of Modern Yemen
Although the war was not North versus South but rather between parties, the effect was felt by Southerners to be a Northern invasion: “from hurried unity to internal colonialism” runs the title of a famous pamphlet.27 A History of Modern Yemen
The dominant presence, however, was the Northern-controlled military Hadramawt was controlled by Muhammad Isma~i1 of Sanhan, for instance, the governor in this case was a Northerner also (cAbbad al- Khawläni), and the head of political security was from Nihm, northeast of Sanaa. A History of Modern Yemen
Almost from the moment of unification (May 1990) Southerners com- plained of “retribalisation”. A History of Modern Yemen
Immediately after the fighting of 1994, a son of perhaps the most famous of Northern shaykhs asserted rights over property on the Aden waterfront: having built a rough breakwater he trucked in sand and gravel from elsewhere to extend this seaward, a curious example of what diplomats or lawyers in other contexts might speak of as “creating facts”. A History of Modern Yemen
The imagery to be managed, however, is surely different from that of the Cold War. A History of Modern Yemen
From at least 1990 — in some cases earlier — Islamic charities were evident whose affiliations to activist groups were various but whose sponsors were extremely wealthy. A History of Modern Yemen
The returnees of the Gulf crisis provided a large field of action (return- ees from the Tihamah were often not reintegrated easily; those from the highlands went largely to swell the number of city-dwellers)33 and increased poverty more generally encouraged charity. A History of Modern Yemen
The style of pious care for those less fortunate is familiar from the record of Imam Yaliya’s reign, but the setting in which such piety may thrive is different. A History of Modern Yemen
From 1995, when the programme of “structural adjustment” began, Islamic banks became prominent. A History of Modern Yemen
~ To generate a more active financial system, central government withdrew state accounts from commercial banks, raised base interest rates, and allowed commercial banks to set their own rates. A History of Modern Yemen
Through the literature on modern Yemen run such categories as merchant, shaykh, ~officer, modernist, all of which derive from local rhetoric but were never quite mutually exclusive (shaykhs of Bayt Ruwayshan from Khawlan, for instance, have been “merchants” since the ig6os) and reading back through Yemen’s history these categories provide a shadow-theatre of how the country works. A History of Modern Yemen
On visits to rural areas he was mobbed by crowds trying usually to present a mass of personal petitions and requests, and often would announce as largesse to the region some governmental project not previously planned or declared officially. A History of Modern Yemen
The aim of repatriating emigrant capital or drawing large-scale investment from foreign sources made less progress than domestic finance, for security still depended, or appeared to, on connections with a very few power-brokers. A History of Modern Yemen
Nabil al-Khamiri, a famous merchant whose family is from Hugariyyah and who himself owns, among much else, the Haddah Hotel, is married 203Yemen as a single state 204 A history of modern Yemen to a daughter of Shaykh cAbdullah of Ilashid; but he was still held up in his Sanaa office, in early 1998, by tribesmen from Khawlan. A History of Modern Yemen
Embezzlement remained widespread, however. A History of Modern Yemen
The President expressed concern and sent troops, whose presence al- Khamiri found himself paying for. A History of Modern Yemen
Far from restricting illicit wealth to small circles of kin or colleagues, the government proved ecumenical, and a man caught simply plundering the petrol company at home (on a massive scale) was not jailed or even forced to pay back his gains but appointed ambassa- dor to a European capital. A History of Modern Yemen
and for the moment the Yemenis had more to lose from uncertainty than did their neighbours. A History of Modern Yemen
but where’s the money to come from? As for selling land, I’d never think of it. A History of Modern Yemen
when there’s no cash? I want to fix the land that the wash destroyed, but where’s the money to come from (mm ayn al-fulus)?” Another man, better off and able to recite in its entirety the Holy Qur’an, echoed the same idea: “If I had any money I’d buy land for my children because it’s security for their future.” A History of Modern Yemen
In early igg6 a stand-by credit of $US igo million was secured from the IMF, and in the following month $US 8o million from the World Bank: Yemen as a single state 207 208 A history of modern Yemen both were in support of “structural readjustment”. A History of Modern Yemen
Close to $70 million followed from Europe and as much from the Arab Monetary Fund, and another $6o million followed from the World Bank in January 1997 specifically to help establish a financial market. A History of Modern Yemen
Of 301 seats, the GPC took i88, compared with 123 four years earlier, and Islah’s share dropped from 62 to 53. A History of Modern Yemen
per cent of all the votes cast and thus to be Yemen’s unquestioned ruler. A History of Modern Yemen
In 1993, elections had been thought to matter; in 1997, the outcome was assumed to be broadly known in advance and adjustments in parliamentary seats were judged to make little difference. A History of Modern Yemen
The rem- nants of the YSP boycotted the process. A History of Modern Yemen
Islah, the main “opposition” party, also nominated cAll cAbdullah Salih. A History of Modern Yemen
When Imam Ya~iya claimed dominion over Yemen, near the start of the fourteenth Muslim century (A1 1906, All 1324), he invoked the fact that Zaydl Imams had ruled “all or part of it” for a thousand years. A History of Modern Yemen
The country remains singular. A History of Modern Yemen
But “Ramaçlan tents” are no different in essence from, for instance, ifim or radio. A History of Modern Yemen
For years now, young women in Yemen have been acquiring fragments of Egyptian and Levantine speech from television; generations ago, frag- ments of Turkish strayed into Sanaani usage, while Aden gave part of the population, mainly male, such English derivatives as mukartasin (mer- chants, people who put things in cartons) and the verb damfala (to act as a damned fool). A History of Modern Yemen
All over the world — or, most easily, from within the Arab World — one could flip through the stations and find Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
The most striking feature was still the parliament. A History of Modern Yemen
They gave the appearance of people very much at home in their own country These are not the power-brokers — by their own estimation they achieve fairly little, although they do enjoy a certain status. A History of Modern Yemen
Islamic charities have recently promoted mass weddings, on the model of those found in Egypt and in the Gulf states alike: the aim in part is to avoid expensive rivalries over bride-price and to demonstrate an ideal solidarity. A History of Modern Yemen
APPENDIX I 215 Asked to summarise the modern history of Yemen, a friend from IJuga- riyyah began with a list of villages and their specialities in migrant labour; for example, a1~CAbtis, photographers; al-Maqatirah, construc- tion work; BanT Ghazi, gold and silver jewellery; al~cAruq, commerce (Hayl Sa~id Ancam and Abd al-Ghanj Mutahhar were both from near here); al~Macamirah, restaurants and hotels. A History of Modern Yemen
He then went on to list the major party figures and where they came from; for example, al~CAbüs, Sultan cUmar (MAN); al-Aghabirah, cAbd al-Fattali Isma~i1 (NLF) and CAbd al-Qadir Sadid (MAN); al~cArtiq, cAbd al~cAzTz cAbd al-Ghani; al-Sharjab, Qasim Saläm (Badth). A History of Modern Yemen
APPENDIX 2 A djfferent history 216 ca~mi1 amir badu Bacth bayt dawlah diwdn faç!l A History of Modern Yemen
Used inter a/ia of provincial governors under the last Imams. A History of Modern Yemen
In North Yemen usually an inherited title held by non- sayyid families with some history of learning Glossary 217 218 Glossary Qaramitah the Qarmatians or Carmartians, an early movement in Islam, probably akin to the Kharijites and later Ibadrs but whose history is almost impossible to trace qät a mildly narcotic shrub which, when chewed in company, stimu- lates conversation Salafls those in pursuit of the Prophet’s “ancestral” practice. A History of Modern Yemen
The Faqih Sadid marches against Aden. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemenis expelled from Saudi Arabia. A History of Modern Yemen
9 al-Wasi’i 1928: 203. A History of Modern Yemen
i6 Dresch 1996: 64—6; cf. Zabarah 1956, II~ 253. A History of Modern Yemen
Treaties of protection kept being signed until ~ The last was with “the Bu’si Shaykh of Upper Yafic~~ and took precisely the form of those signed with his neighbours fifty years before (CO 1015/985). A History of Modern Yemen
23 The great geographers such as al-Muqaddasr (circa 990) are one obvious locus of tradition. A History of Modern Yemen
26 The same phenomenon recurs on a smaller scale. A History of Modern Yemen
Probably, however, the dominance of the Shafi’i school around Ta’izz comes later, in Ayyiibid and Rasülid times, from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries. A History of Modern Yemen
His family came, in fact, from ~A- further north, at the time of the Saudi—Yemeni war in 1934. A History of Modern Yemen
Sufi “brotherhoods” were important but in Lower Yemen they seem not to have acted as political units in the manner reported from, for example, Morocco. A History of Modern Yemen
w al-Akwa’ 1995, ii: 817—54 for Abmad’s biography Something of his charac- ter emerges also from Aponte 1948:112—13; Shamalui 1972. A History of Modern Yemen
From 1930 to ig6o there is no sign at all 12 13 14 of them acting that way Shamahi 1972: 172—4; al-Akwa’ 1995, II~ 819—20. A History of Modern Yemen
quoted al-Jirafi 1951: 239. A History of Modern Yemen
When the British bombed Tacizz local people17 abandoned the Imam’s currency and demanded Zaydi troops be withdrawn (al-Wazir 1987: 269—70). A History of Modern Yemen
The original ‘Alawi-Irshadi dispute is covered by Ho (forthcoming); Bakr~i (1936) gives much of the correspondence. A History of Modern Yemen
For eastern Yemen and theJawf before this,33 al-’Azm 1937, ii; al-’Amri igg6. A History of Modern Yemen
Also al-Wasi’i 1928: 295—6; al-’Azm 1937, 1:180—2.41 A History of Modern Yemen
While Indians remained in Aden, Yemenis were forced home from India (CO 1015/322, 325), and as Bujra (1970: rg6) and Gavin (1975:351) both point out, it was Indians threatening jobs of the new middle class who attracted prej- udice, not Somalis who competed for jobs with labourers. A History of Modern Yemen
Bin ‘Abdat gets a poor press in British writing (not least from Ingrams, whom he once locked up) as a “mediaeval” figure. A History of Modern Yemen
The family’s money came largely from Indonesia. A History of Modern Yemen
That this one is from AI~mad is sug- gested by hostile mention of ‘Abdullah al-Hakimi, a Free Yemeni based first in Cardiff. A History of Modern Yemen
When Yahya was murdered, said Almad in the22 1953 version of Victory Day, “people lost security as if the garment which had protected them had suddenly been snatched from them. A History of Modern Yemen
3! Douglas 1987:198. A History of Modern Yemen
Janal?i 1992) derives not from their detailed strat- egy but from the fact that in 1959 they concluded an alliance with the 45 46 ~7 48 49 Records ii: gg, 169—71. A History of Modern Yemen
For al- ~Arnri, Records II: 49—50. A History of Modern Yemen
For the comments following, Records r~: 751 if Two themes run throughJibril’s account (1962): government administration of Ijadrami migration and loathing of Indian migrants moving the other way. A History of Modern Yemen
Also Dubba~ 1978; Sarflri 1987:123 fl~Juzaylan 1995; Alimad M. 1992; and the interviews in Markaz 1982a. A History of Modern Yemen
Worse yet, the UK may be at least covertly encouraging the Saudis and the royalists.” A History of Modern Yemen
28 Trevaskis to Secretary of State for Colonies, 20 Apr. 1964, CO 1055/194. A History of Modern Yemen
62 I~IamId al-Alimar had known many Liberals when a hostage, been taught at one time by Al~imad Nucman, and accompanied the 1956 delegation which concluded the Jiddah Pact with cAbd al-N~sir (al~AkwaC 1995, I: 435—6, ii: 702—3, 850). A History of Modern Yemen
For the quote from Prince Mukiammad Ismadil, below Deifarge and Troeller ig6g: 263. A History of Modern Yemen
Though written from a very differeni viewpoint, the account fits neatly on this score with that of Butül (1994: 4~ if, 97, 100—3, 117). A History of Modern Yemen
cUmar al-Jawl and his colleagues hoped to provoke a limited crisis and extract from it political advantage. A History of Modern Yemen
For a lyrical account of revolution, see Stork 1973 (from which comes the phrase “socialism in half a country”). A History of Modern Yemen
“Politics in command” is from al-Ashtal 1976. A History of Modern Yemen
Lefort 1971: 4 (from which also the cAbd al-Fattah quote just above); Bidwellii 1983: 256—7; Lackner ig8~: ~g. A History of Modern Yemen
For parties,cUmar 1970: i8g; al-Janahi 1992: 5i4if I am indebted to Fred Halliday for documents from the period. A History of Modern Yemen
20 From a family of Zayd.i A History of Modern Yemen
This pamphlet and ‘Abd al-Ralman Nu’man’s from Lower Yemen (Hugariyyah 1973) bear an identical slogan in the same type- script: “on the road to progress in Yemen”. A History of Modern Yemen
24 I am indebted to Engseng Ho for information from interviews. A History of Modern Yemen
In Upper Yemen people often slipped into Saudi Arabia for short periods of work; in the Tihamah, by contrast, many were permanent Saudi residents. A History of Modern Yemen
By convention such verse is anonymous, but all those quoted here are from al-Sinnatayan near Khamir. A History of Modern Yemen
“Tournament of value” is from Meneley 1996. A History of Modern Yemen
Lackner (1985: 110, 114—18) suggests practical change beyond the towns was limited, which is much what one gathers from Southern women. A History of Modern Yemen
~8 Na~ir executed Sayyid Qutb, the Brothers’ ideologue, in 1965 and certain Yemenis were expelled from Cairo: ‘Abduh Mukiammad al-Mikhlafi, ‘Abd al-Salam Khalid and Yasin Qubali, for instance, all from the same part of Lower Yemen. A History of Modern Yemen
Many Yemenis of note think Zindani a little disconnected from reality 6o Ismadil 1978: 66—7. A History of Modern Yemen
‘Abd al-Fattab was widely known as “thefaqTh”, a village preacher — a theoretician “aloof from. A History of Modern Yemen
His prose, one has to say, was deathly: but the poet Adonis, from whose interview this quote is taken, declared him an Arab genius. A History of Modern Yemen
Zaycli plotters from important tribes were quietly packed off abroad. A History of Modern Yemen
For the quote on centralised government, below, ibid.: 62—3. A History of Modern Yemen
Official development aid to the North stood at about $1 billion per annum in ig8o; by 1985 it had halved and by ig88 was a tenth of what it had been (Carapico igg8: 43). A History of Modern Yemen
For import figures, below, el-Daher and Geissler 1990: For the Northern economy, Destremau 1991.532. A History of Modern Yemen
Elections to the Consultative Council were held in19 July: the GPC elections ended in December. A History of Modern Yemen
This was a small and not untypical operation; it was also not untypical that the farmer, in al- ‘U~aymat, drew about YR 3,500 from army sources. A History of Modern Yemen
But he was far from wealthy. A History of Modern Yemen
Private transfers rose from YD 112 million to YD 140 million between ig8o and ig8~ (CSO 1987: 201), but no figures are given for intervening years; in ig86 they dropped back to YD g6 million (CSO ig88: 219). A History of Modern Yemen
For continuing “liberali- sation” of the South’s economy after the coup see, for example, Middle East Economic Digest 20 Dec. ig86 and 3Jan. A History of Modern Yemen
49 For the rise of the Islamists and sundry reactions to them, Grosgurin 1994, Haykel ~ Weir 1997, vom Bruck iggg. A History of Modern Yemen
For the practice of soldiers and policemen charging for their services, ibid.: ~54. A History of Modern Yemen
Detalle (I997a: 23) mentions also a “wedding present of some tens of mil- lions of dollars” from the Iraqi ruler. A History of Modern Yemen
Also Dresch Igg5a: 51 and passim. A History of Modern Yemen
Yemen had already absorbed a great many Somali refugees from fighting in Africa, and received little help supporting them. A History of Modern Yemen
The only exception is that when ‘All ~alib fell from favour in ~994 his son tried to force himself on the President’s attention and was shot. A History of Modern Yemen
For the quote above, by an author less suspicious of the phrase, Carapico 1998: 195. A History of Modern Yemen
From 1989, CSO. A History of Modern Yemen
CSO (Central Statistical Organisation) various years, Statistical Yearbooks, Aden (and Sanaa, from 1989). A History of Modern Yemen
1990 North Yemen: from farming to foreign funding, Food Policy 15/6, 531—5. A History of Modern Yemen
1996 A letter from Imam Yahya concerning the Idrisi, J’/ew Arabian Studies 3, 58—68. A History of Modern Yemen
1982b Thawrah 1948, Sanaa: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Yamaniyyah. A History of Modern Yemen
1982 South Yemen: a Marxist republic in Arabia, Boulder: Westview Press. A History of Modern Yemen
Documents at the Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, are cited under PRO hand-list numbers: e.g. GO 725, GO 1015, GO 1055, FO 371. A History of Modern Yemen
4 IMF (International Monetary Fund), 134, 198, 207, 212 structural adjustment, ‘98, 200 India, 12, 15, 21, 54, ~ 6o, 236 n.6~ Indians in Aden, 10, 54, ~8, 232 n.2 Nizam of Hyderabad, 19, 21, 39 Indonesia, 12, ,5, 27, 37, 39, 46, 50, 59, 6o, 112 infant mortality, 23, ii8, ,86, 207 Ingrams, Doreen, 37 Ingrams, Harold, 36, 37, 39, ~ 6o, 67 Ingrams’ peace, 37, 41, 59—60 International Monetary Fund, see IMF Iraq, 48, 93, 101, 114, 150, i8~ aid to North, 152, ‘79 invades Kuwait (‘990), 185—6 mission to Yemen, views of, 46, 69 war with Iran, 179, i8i Yemeni missions to, 51, 54, 89 Irshadi movement (Hadramawt), 27, 39, 50, 59 Iryan, ~,i al-Iryani, Dr. ‘Abd al-Karim (head of CPO, secretary general of GPC), 163, 194, 196, 203, 212, 248 fl.12, A History of Modern Yemen
state (i7th—igth centuries), 4, 15, 20, 204 and dynastic rule, 4—5, 43, 44, 68 theology, 141, 173—4 qat, 16—17, 23, 73, 8o, ‘47, 165, i68, 179, 197 as social occasion, 17, 131, 163, 202 economic importance, 139, 165, 167, 207 extent of, 131 see also agriculture Qa’tabah, 6, 34, 62, 76, 96, 119, 152 al-Qayfah (tribe), 90, 117, i8o Qu’ayli Sultanate, 21, 33, 59, 109, III, 113, 120 Ingrams’ peace, 36—7, 41, 59, 6o nationalist politics, 59—60, 77, 8~, 111—12 see also Hadramawt Qubatl, Yasin (Muslim Brother), 187, 246 n.58 al-Quhall, Mujahid (shaykh), ‘35 Quhra (tribe), i6, 28 Qur’an, Holy, 1, 43, 53, 98, 126, 141, 162, 173, 207 Qu~aybTs (tribe), 28, 38, 55, ~ 62, 75, 97 Rada’, 8, 55, 122, 242 fl.9 A History of Modern Yemen
payments, covert, 124, 142, 146, 173, 196, 201 payments, overt, 124, 126, ~ 179—80 relations with Egypt, 79, 8o, 83, 87, 91, 103, 105, 114 relations with united Yemen, [84—6, 205, 211 support for South (iç~~), 192, 196 Yemenis workmg rn, 70, ,o8, 112, ,r8, 131, 136, 153, 173, 185 see also borders Saudis (before Kingdom formed): and Imam Yahya, 32, 34—5 protection of Idrisi, 31, 32, 34 war of 1934, 34—5, 46, 47, 51 see also Ibn Sa’ud; Wahhabis al-Sayaghi, Ahmad (governor of Ibb), 68, 8~i, 84, 86, 94 say))ZeLs,5, 15,18,38,89,125 displaced by qd~/ll, 68, 102, 123 Hadrami, 36—7, 39—41, 5°, 59, 112, 122, 123 Northern, 31, 44—5, 177—8 perceived as rulers, 6, ~3, 47, 102 status of; 27, 46—7 Sayyun, 26, 41, 59, 8~, 112, 144 schools, 37, 51, 55, 70, 140, 193, 206 in North, 129, 174, 175 in South, 140, [72—3 Islamic (religious institutes), 142, 173, 175, 200 textbooks, 143, 172—3, under British, 54, ~8, 6o, 63, 74, 8~, iii, 112 under Imam Ahmad, 6~, 76, 83 under Imam Ya~ya, 30, 50, 51—3 al-Sha’bi, Qahtan (president in South), 74, 77, 91, g6, 97, 107, 120-I Shabwah, 41—2, ,6i, 169, 196 Shafi’rs, 3, 9, 32, 34, 68, 69, 129, 153, 176 and commerce, 47, 53, 104, 123, 159, 164 discontents and history, 15, 20—I, 164 during civil war, 90, 96, 104, 114—17 regions of Yemen, 5, 7—8, 9, 26, 71, 79—80 separatism, 28—9, 104 vs. ZaydIs, ~—6, i~, 46—7, 64, 69, 103, [17, 163, 191 Shaharah, 6, 26, 29, 47, 95, 203 al-Shamahi, Qa~i ‘Abdullah (writer), 143 al-Shami, Qadi Muhammad (governor of al- Bayda’), 68, 236 n.~6 al-Shami, Sayyid Ahmad (nationalist and author), 65 al-Shami, Sayyid Ahrnad (judge and political figure), 190 Sharaf al-Din family (Kawkaban), 20 Sayyid Ahmad (historian), 102 Sayyid ‘AlT Hamud, 45 Index share-cropping, see agriculture s/zarzJl, 19, 32, 41, 229 n.32 see also BayI~an; sayyzds al-Sharjabi, Ahmad (sociologist), 93, i6~, 207 Shawkani, Muhammad ‘Air (judge and reformer c.i8oo), 44, 102, 174 al-Shayif family (Dhu Husayn), 31, 32, 38, 57, 93 Shaykh ‘Uthman (suburb of Aden), 74, 114, 121—2 shaykhs, 17, 20, 24, 26, 98, 135, 193 and Imams’ administration, 29—30, 32, 38—9, 71, 8o, 84 and Northern government, [03, 123, 124—5, 128—9, 130, 154, ,6o, r8o and Southern government, 107—8, 121, 125, [28 and Turkish administration, ~—6 contrast between Upper and Lower Yemen, 6, 24, 32, 38 Saudi payments to, 124, 146, 147, 201 Shibam, 26, 128 Shihr, 21, 144, 194 Shu’ayb, 28, 33, 98, 113 Shulaq, Abduh (merchant inJiddah), 70, 131 Siyayli, Salih Munassir (governor of Hadramawt), 170, 196, 243 n.24 slavery, 27, 6~, 233 n.,8 social life, entertainment, etc. A History of Modern Yemen
239 fl.41 A History of Modern Yemen
military support to North ~ ~o relations with Yemen Republic, 198, 208, 212 views of Yemen, 93, 99, 169 United Yemeni Association, 78 unity of Yemen, 149, 150, 152, 154, i8i, i86, 192, 209—10 achieved politically (1990), 181—2, 183—4, i86 contrasted with secession, 193—4 cultural, 142—3 imagined historically, i, 6, II, 49—50, 184, 209—10 invoked by ‘Abd al-Fattah Isma’rl, 123, 149 invoked by al-A~naj, 73 invoked by al-Hamdi and Salmayn, 130, 143 invoked by Imam Ahmad, 62 invoked by Imam Yahya, 6, II, 32, 43 urbanisation, 8~, 137—8, 167, [76, 206—7 al-’U~aymat (tribe), 29, 135, ,6o, 212 ‘Uthman, Muhammad ‘All, see Muhammad ‘All ‘Uthman Vietnam, 46, 130 village associations, ~6, 74, 95, 129 Voice of the Arabs, see Cairo, radio al-Wada’i, Muqbil (Islamist “guide”), 200 Wadi’Amd,5g, iii Wadi Hadramawt, see Hadramawt WadiJawf; seeJawf Wadi Mawr, 69, ,66 Wadi Surdud, 69 Wahhabis, 3, 32, 39, 41, 83, 141, 226 n.41 see also Saudis Wa’ilah (tribe), 34 Index war in North (1962—70), 90-6, 103—5 aid from South, 90, 91, io8, 114 Egyptian role in, 90, 91—6, 102, 105—6, 114 Khamir conference (1965), 103—4, ~o8 “seventy days” (1967), 114—15 Yemeni military forces, 90, 96, 115, 117, 238 fl.17 A History of Modern Yemen
contrast between Upper and Lower, ~—6, 13—14, economy, 119, i86, 191—2, 203, 207 extent, 11—12, 32, 43, 205 “Greater Yemen”, 33, 49, ~6, 62, 64 imagined past, I, 3—4, 49—50, 83, 102—3, 104, 184, 205 Lower, 9, 12—13, 15, 19, 20-I, 26, 29—30, 45—6, 44—54, 56—7, i~8, 121, 214 24, 68, 117 g6, 104—5, 145, 153—4, 164 Index Upper, 14, 20, 26, 146 see also North Yemen; South Yemen; unity of Yemen Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), see North Yemen Yemen Economic Corporation, see MECO Yemen Republic (May 1990 onwards), 183—4, 198, 204, 208 administration, 202, 203, 208, 211 and Gulf Crisis (~ggo), 185—6 army, 191, 192, 195, 197, 208 civil war (1994), [95—7 revenue and finance, 191—2, 198, 203, 205, 207—8, unity accords (ig~o), i86 YSP (Yemeni Socialist Party), 149, 169, 170, i86, 187—9, 196—7, 209, 242 15.2 A History of Modern Yemen
in the hope that she will be freed from fear FOR FARAH Readers of this book will recognize the debt I owe to a large number of Palestinian, Arab, Western, and Israeli informants. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
CHILDHOOD TRAUMAS 4. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE SPONSORS 7. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS London, October 1991 CONTENTS 1. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A BLACK SEPTEMBER 5. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE GREAT PURGE 14. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
DUEL TO THE DEATH 15. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For close on twenty years, Arafat’s PLO has been caught between two fires—heavy broadsides from Israel and murderous sniping from Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But every month or so, driving his own car and casually dressed in shirt and slacks, he puts in an appearance unannounced, and invariably upsets the camp, from the commander to the new re- cruits, who tremble in his presence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal, the son of a Jaffa orange grower, loves to see things grow, takes great pride in his well-ordered farm and sees to it that its choicest fruits reach his own table. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was on the lookout for lively students, preferably very young ones, who were eager to get ahead and who also wanted to strike a blow for the Palestinian cause. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He also provided them with the thrill of belonging to a militant secret organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Who was a patriot and who a traitor? No one could be certain. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
which to write the story of his life. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This first document in the recruit’s personal ifie was the touchstone against which later information would be tested as it came to light. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was the last standard-bearer of the true cause. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
With money begged from Abdallah in Kuwait, he bought an air ticket to Barcelona and boarded an Iberia flight, with no visa for Spain and no passport save for a Lebanese laissez-passer, such as is issued to Palestinians. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was a short, stocky man in his late twenties, with a bull ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 9 10 / PATRICK SEALE had landed at about the same time as his own and its passengers were filing into the arrivals hail a few feet away from those on his international flight. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He robbed those less sharp-witted than himself, stole food from supermarkets, and made friends with petty criminals, until one night he was picked up by the Spanish police in Plaza Catalonia and, after interroga- tion, deported to Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Roused at dawn, the men were sent out to jog for an hour, returning to a light breakfast and a long, hard shift of building work from 7:30 A.M. to 1 P.M. This was followed by a break for a spartan lunch and a short rest until 3 P.M., before the start of another shift of work until six o’clock. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Complaints were utterly forbidden, on pain of being hauled away to Station 16, from which men emerged scarcely able to walk. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When they had been at the camp for about a month, Jorde’s section was told that it would shortly be receiving a visit from a “comrade” to whom every man could open his heart. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He heard it had an office in the Mar Elias refugee camp, and he knocked on the door and asked to volunteer. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Within days Jorde had signed on, been given a code name and a mattress on the first floor of the building, and written a twenty- seven-page life story in which, to make himself sound important, he told a lot of fibs. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He wrote that he had murdered a Jew in Spain, that he had played football for a famous team in Algeria, that he had worked as an interpreter in a travel agency in Pamplona. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Jorde discovered to his agony that if one was five minutes late for meals, one would not be allowed into the canteen at all. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If one didn’t get up on time in the morning, one’s mattress would be turned over or one would be doused by a pail of cold water. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
his family, he used to buy small quantities of hashish from his neighbor, a petty smuggler. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He wanted to know about smug- glers, then he asked Jorde to keep an eye on student agitators in the town, and finally, when Abu Nidal opened an office in Algiers, which it was feared might be used to plan attacks on visiting Pales- tinians, Jorde was sent to Spain and from there to Beirut to pene- trate the organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Have you been trussed up like a chicken and forced to sit on a broken bottle? We will cut out your tongue. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I swear I told you the whole truth in the kitchen. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Take him to Station 16,” he said. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Confess it!” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
me.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He reached into his pocket and gave Jorde a handful of sweets. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Loose talk was strictly forbidden and, in any event, each man lived in fear of being reported. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Nevertheless, rumors of executions spread around the camp. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The tactics ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 19 20 / PATRICK SEALE you’ve used with us you can now try out on others. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Their training courses usually lasted two or three weeks, and during their stay, the camp commander himself saw to their needs, bringing them meals and changes of clothing. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Jorde noticed that his passport was not stamped. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A second priority was transferring weapons to for- eign countries, or obtaining them there, and then hiding them for future use. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He gave Jorde half the load to carry in his suitcase and arranged to meet him at the airport in the afternoon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Ali said he had paid the man $300 to take them through, but Jorde suspected he wasn’t telling the truth. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Jorde was not sure whether it was a promotion or a punish- ment when, a short while later, Harb issued him a Tunisian pass- port in the name of Sha’ban Abd al-Majid Belqassim and sent him to photograph and report on Jewish synagogues in Istanbul. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Indeed, Abu Nidal’s first operation, even before his split from Fatah, had been an assault on the Saudi embassy in Paris, in September 1973, in which two Saudi diplomats had been taken hostage. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, from 1985 onward, when Libya became his main patron, such a prohibition was lifted and Abu Nidal started issuing threats against the Saudis, who, in his paranoid way, he believed were the source of all the plots against him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His view was that since they contributed vast sums to the PLO, he too should have his share. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But ever wary of plots against him and perhaps fearing an in-flight mishap, he re- quested that a Saudi prince accompany him on the flight. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Each member of the team would know the others only by their code names and would not know under what names they were traveling. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, he made one mistake, which was to torpedo the budding relationship: He accepted a Saudi offer of a private plane to take him back to Algiers, believing that such red-carpet treat- ment would boost his stock with the Algerians. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He would have shadowy partners in Thailand, although he could only guess at their identity and location. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal did not aspire to Within three weeks, Jorde was back in Tripoli with a full ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 27 PATRICK SEALE / a political relationship with Riyadh—their differences were too ludicrously great for that to be discussible—but he did expect the Saudis to buy him off. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal’s rage knew no bounds. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Bent on revenge, he attacked “soft” Saudi targets. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Two months later, on De- cember 27, it was the turn of Hasan al-Amri, Saudi vice-consul in Karachi. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On the pretext of wanting to take a tissue from a box inside the car, Hamza threw open the door of Abu lyad’s Mercedes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hamza then bet him that the bullets from his Kalashnikov could penetrate the car’s armor plating, and Au Qasim dared him to try. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Iyad’s chief bodyguard, Fu’ad al-Najjar, had not arrived with his master but came an hour or so later, as he had gone to settle some problem with his landlord. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Then he drove off again to see a man about a BMW he had his eye on and once more left to fetch a take-out dinner for the other guards. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Zaid, sauntered out of the guardroom and started to pick a quarrel with Ali Qasim, the man posted at the front door of the villa. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
She heard Hamza scream again and again: “Let Atif Abu Bakr help you now!” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Then she heard her husband cry, “What have you done, Hamza? What have you done?” And then another burst of gunfire and another. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“The Israelis are here,” he shouted. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
We want nothing else from you.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hamza took more pills from his envelope. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They said they had to get permission from a higher authority. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When they returned, they said they needed some identification from him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
She later discovered that he had been knocked out by gas, which the police had sprayed into the hall from the outside. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As recorded in a PLO ifie, his “permanent address” was: Mustafa Salim’s shop, Behind the girls’ school, Wahdat refugee camp, Jordan nineteen years there. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It reveals as much about the workings of the PLO as it does about Hamza himself. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Suspecting that he worked for a hostile outfit, local PLO officials kept him away. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Manila he moved in with some Palestinian students, borrowing small sums from them to keep alive. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1985, he was sent to Cyprus as a security guard in the PLO office. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But once again he proved quarrelsome and unreliable. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
into an almost feminine drawing room, crowded with sofas and gilt armchairs and little tables on top of which sat vases of flowers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Ask him to explain himself, and then make up your own mind.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I confess this now. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Why don’t you write something about it?” he said. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I thought it was prepos- terous. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal an Israeli agent? The extravagance of the charge made me think that I had stumbled on yet another Palestinian feud. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
While the War of the Spooks was raging in the early 1970s, Egypt’s President Sadat was pleading with the Americans to bring Israel to the nego- tiating table. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
By 1973 Arafat was trying to disassociate himself and the PLO from terror and counterterror. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Kissinger shied brusquely away. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For him, as for many Israelis, the PLO was not the advocate of a legitimate na- tional claim but a “terrorist group,” “unacceptable as a negotiating partner.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
1974, he persuaded Arab leaders to recognize the PLO as “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
198 1—Majid Abu Sharar, a prominent Fatah April 10, 1983—Dr. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In great secrecy, he ar- ranged for me to interview Atif Abu Bakr, the most prominent defector from Abu Nidal’s organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From there, one source led to another. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But after Jorde had told his story to PLO intelligence, Abu lyad no longer trusted him and suspected that he was a plant. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was about this time that I met him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After his adventures in Thailand, he had wandered about southern Europe ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 53 PATRICK SEALE / for a few months, getting by as best he could. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was anxious to please and yet was edgy, like a man on probation, suspended between the organization he had fled from, which he feared was pursuing him, and the organization he hoped to join, which was wary of him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Each year he supervised as his citrus crop was packed in wooden crates and shipped to Europe, on a shipping line from Jaffa to Liverpool that had been opened in the l890s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
By his first wife, he had had eleven ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 57 58 / PATRICK SEALE World War). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was named Sabri. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Worse still, when his father died in 1945, his mother was even- tually turned out of the house and so he lost her too. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A half-sister lives in Nablus, on the West Bank; he sends her money from time to time in various roundabout ways. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Dispossessed Palestinians, who had enjoyed almost uninterrupted tenure of their land for thirteen hundred years, suf- fered a great shock from which they have been unable or unwilling to recover. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
al-Banna, was brought up on tales of heroic deeds by Arab fighters who tried to stem the remorseless tide of foreign immigrants who were buying Palestinian land from Arab landowners, dispersing the Arab tenants and laborers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestinian protest at the influx of Jews was crushed for a genera- tion. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When the Arabs rejected the 1947 UN partition plan and civil war broke out between the Arabs and Jews, Jaffa found itself under siege. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Surrounded by Jewish territory, it was an Arab enclave that the Jewish high command was determined to capture. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Jaffa, the fighting shut down schools, factories, the bus service, and the citrus industry, the Banna orange groves and packing plant included. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Jaffa, where he grew up, had a tradition of militancy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He scraped by on charity from his half-brothers, them- selves struggling to survive. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His mentally ill son Talal From a profound sense of grievance, an obsession with re- The Ba’ath in Jordan was an offshoot, in fact the first such ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 63 PATRICK SEALE / succeeded him but was soon deposed as unfit to rule. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In April 1957, a group of nationalist officers tried to seize power in Amman but were faced down by Hussein and his loyalist Bedouin troops. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In his early twenties, already conscious of his latent abilities, he saw himself as something of a leader, seeking to impress others by spinning yarns about his own achievements. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But distance from Palestine did not blunt Abu Nidal’s feelings. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On a visit to Nablus, he met and married a girl, Hiyam al-Bitar, from a good Jaffa family exiled like his own. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal did not join Fatah as a humble foot soldier. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal often drove down to the Jordan valley to visit Abu lyad at Karameh, a village where Fatah had set up a military base and from which it attempted, somewhat incompetently, to infiltrate men across the river into the occupied West Bank. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abandoning his trading company, Impex, and his Fatah comrades, he ducked out just when the guer- rillas in Jordan were coming under intense pressure from both Israel and King Hussein—a move that later earned him the charge of cowardice. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ideas seem to have taken shape gradually between 1968 and 1973, by which time Abu Nidal had developed the tactics and the meth- ods—in a word, the terrorism—for which he was to become infa- mous. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal was also struck by the Irgun’s more extreme offshoot, the Stern Gang, which under Shamir and others played a crucial role in unnerving both the Arabs and the British in the struggle for the Jewish state. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His former comrades told me that in the late sixties, Abu Nidal was forever brooding over the lessons to be learned from the loss of Palestine. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
How- ever, the guerrillas fought back bravely and, with help from the Jordanian army, managed to inflict significant casualties on the Israelis. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A second decisive event was the hijacking in July 1968 of an El Al passenger plane on a scheduled flight from Rome to Tel Aviv ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 73 74 / PATRICK SEALE and its diversion to Algiers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This was the first terrorist operation of its kind, the prototype for many others to come, and its mastermind was Wadi Haddad, a Palestinian revolutionary from Safad who had graduated as a medi- cal doctor from the American University of Beirut. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Had the first hijacked plane not been Israeli, such piracy might have been rejected by the Palestinians themselves from the very beginning. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It needs to be recalled that in the twenty years from 1948 to 1968, the Palestinians had never considered attacking an Israeli, still less a Jew, outside Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From 1965 onward, Fatah’s “armed struggle” was directed at such targets as Israeli water pipelines and railway tracks. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For example, two international airlines paid Haddad $1 million a month each, monies that he turned over to his organization and that allowed the PFLP to acquire a measure of independence from its Arab sponsors. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At a stroke, the guerrillas lost their vital sanctuary in Jordan, from which they had dreamed of pushing Israel back from the Jordan River—and so liberating Palestine inch by inch. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From distant Khartoum, Abu Nidal followed the unfolding drama as best he could. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Politically, the Palestinian resistance was far from a disciplined or cohesive movement. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Envious of the bigger and more solidly implanted Fatah, and unable to match Fatah’s operations on the ground, the PFLP resorted instead to terrorist spectaculars, such as the El Al hijacking, which won it immense prestige among Arabs and set the pace for the resistance as a whole. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After this first “success,” Wadi Haddad went on to hijack planes of other nations and to establish relations with European and Japanese terrorist groups. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Excited by the precedent of Aden, where armed irregu- lars affiliated with MAN had forced the British out, then routed their local rivals and seized power, some guerrillas believed that power in Jordan, too, was theirs for the taking. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Immedi- ately after the September carnage, Abu Nidal began to attack them over the Voice of Palestine, their own radio station in Baghdad, accusing them of cowardice in battle and condemning them for having agreed to a cease-fire with King Hussein. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad told me that, in retrospect, he had come to believe that something important had happened to Abu Nidal in 1969 or 1970 to set him on this new and suspect course. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He wondered whether Abu Nidal had been recruited in Khartoum by Iraqi intelli- gence or by the Mossad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
bly with Abd al-Khaliq Samirra’i, the man who had promised them that Iraqi troops would intervene on their behalf and who was understandably embarrassed because the promise had not been kept. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
the way there he tried to prepare us for what to expect. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Spirits that had been downcast were now raised and a great impetus was given to violence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
There were prolonged curfews, demolition of homes, torture, summary executions, mass detention of families of wanted men, and the destruction of or- chards, the only means of subsistence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
No one, it seemed, was ready to accept the Palestinian resistance movement as a serious political force. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Their inability to hit the enemy on his home ground had convinced them that their only option was to seek targets abroad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Characteristically, Israel responded two days later with a one-hour commando raid on the Beirut airport in which thirteen Lebanese civilian planes, more or less Lebanon’s entire fleet, were destroyed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They did not want him to participate in their operations even though several of them were actually planned and launched from Baghdad, where he was based. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ans’ catastrophic defeat in Jordan and the subsequent dirty war with Israel, which, as is clear from the list I drew up at the start, took a heavy toll of Palestinian lives. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal had already emerged as a leading radical at Fatah’s Third Congress, the first big Palestinian postmortem on events in Jordan, which was held late in 1971 at Hammuriya, in the leafy outskirts of Damascus, some six months before Black September first made itself known when it hijacked the Sabena flight from Vienna to Tel Aviv. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Within the resistance move- ment, radicals and moderates were quarreling over what had gone wrong and how to proceed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As the mainstream Palestinian leader, Arafat tried to steady his reeling followers at the congress by pleading for political realism and defending his cease-fire with King Hussein. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Fatah was used to being racked by fierce disputes over policy and also over what were known, in the jargon, as “organizational questions,” in other words disputes over how power was to be exercised. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As has already been suggested, Arafat’s closest colleagues were not unhappy to hear these criticisms, be- cause they felt that they served as a healthy brake on Arafat’s natural authoritarianism. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad, himself on the left of Fatah, had considerable sympathy for the rebels. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Not knowing any English, he could not follow the pilot’s explanation. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Palestinian delegation posed for photographs with Mao Shortly afterward, his radicalism and personal ambition were Cut off from the world and still in the throes of its “cultural ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 87 88 / PATRICK SEALE Tse-tung and Chou En-lai before flying on to North Korea for talks, and more photographs, with Kim Il-Sung. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But following the expulsion of the guerrillas from Jordan, the Iraqi job had become somewhat more important than the others. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Iraq was a thorough- fare to the Persian Gulf and the place where Palestinian volunteers from the Gulf came for training in camps put at their disposal by the Iraqi authorities. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Dona- tions flowed in from ordinary Iraqis. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“I knew from the look in his eye that he was going to betray me. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Mustafa must have alerted the Jordanians first, because Abu Dawud was arrested on his way back from seeing him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Dawud was lying slumped on the floor, where he had fainted from pain. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Meanwhile, from the boy’s con- fession the Jordanians managed to round up all the members of the team, who had been waiting at various hotels for the signal to move. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Dawud never let his captors know that Mustafa Jabr had betrayed him, and pretended not to know him at all. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was seized there by Fatah and smuggled out to Libya, where he was imprisoned. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On September 5, 1973, just two weeks before Abu Dawud’s release, five armed Palestinians seized the Saudi embassy in Paris. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ABU NIDAL’S FIRST TERRORIST ACT This operation was Abu Nidal’s first act of terror, planned and directed by him from Baghdad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At the time of writing, he was living in Libya. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was now clear to Arafat and his colleagues that their man in Baghdad had put himself wholly at Iraq’s service. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This vote by the parliament-in-exile is widely considered the first formal signal that the Palestinians were ready to give up their maximalist demands to retake Israel and make do with a “mini-state” in the West Bank and Gaza. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At the appropriate moment, Abu lyad tipped off the Moroccan police and the team was rounded up, having served its purpose. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
My sources told me that the man MADE IN BAGHDAD After lengthy negotiations, the guerrillas agreed to fly out to chapter 5 A 92 / PATRICK SEALE in operational control was Samir Muhammad al-Abbasi (code- named Amjad Ata), Abu Nidal’s aide whom Jorde had caught sight of at the Libyan camp. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Terrorism was out of fashion as Arafat and his lieutenants sought to muzzle the hotheads and prepare the PLO for a diplomatic role. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On September 5, the day of the attack on the Saudi embassy, fifty-six heads of state had assembled in Algiers for the Fourth Non-Aligned Conference, which was opened that day by the Al- gerian leader Houari Boumédienne, in the presence of UN Secre- tary-General Kurt Waldheim. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Iraq’s president, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, jealous of Algeria for hosting it, disapproved of the Algiers conference. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Fatah insiders knew that Abu Nidal was the agent and Iraq the sponsor. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Why are you attacking Abu Nidal?” he asked. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“It was as blunt as that,” Abu lyad said. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal, the alleged mastermind behind the attempted assassination, was sentenced to death in absentia. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Fearing a trap, he insisted throughout his visit that Abu Dawud never leave his side. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But still not giving up, Abu Dawud pleaded that Abu Nidal be given a last chance to put his case. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was decided to invite him to Beirut for questioning, with Abu Dawud personally vouching for his safety. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal was a very careful man. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal was no longer willing to humble himself. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It had the effect of driving him out of Fatah alto- gether and of making him cling ever more closely to Iraq. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Then, in 1974, to Fatah’s even greater alarm, word reached it that Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur and Abu Nidal were working more closely together and were considering merging their two organiza- Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur (code-named Abu Mahmud), a fervent But like many others, he was shattered by the slaughter of the In 1972, Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur broke away from Black Sep- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 101 102 / PATRICK SEALE lions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
One of his disci- ples, a Palestinian named Abu Mustafa Qaddura, took over his group and, with backing from both Libya and Abu Nidal, orga- nized the hijack of a British Airways VC-10 at Dubai when it landed there on November 22, 1974, on a flight from London to Brunei. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Their most pressing demand was for the release from Egyptian jails of the five comrades who had staged the attack on the Pan Am plane at Fiumicino in December 1973 and who were awaiting trial by the PLO. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad recounted to me that when he first spoke to the gunmen from the control tower, they were violent and abusive, but he was gradually able to influence each one of them in turn, including their leader, who called himself Tony. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
‘Take it from me: He’s a wolf in sheep’s clothing.’ Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the meantime, President Sadat agreed to release the five prisoners held in Egypt, who were flown to Tunis to join the gun- men on board the plane. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Qaddafi was clearly settling a few scores of his own—against Tunisia. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad thought the whole thing a scandal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He summoned them and scolded them in a schoolboy manner, with lots of giggles. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
contrary to the agreement, the gunmen had been allowed to go on to Benghazi, where, in protest at the handling of the affair by the Tunisian government, they had actually been allowed to take over the Tunisian consulate. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
who on the Libyan side was responsible for the blunder. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When they chose Libya, Abu lyad got President Bourguiba to agree to the transaction. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
not honored our agreement to hand the gunmen over to the PLO? I had, after all, saved his reputation by resolving the crisis peace- fully. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Once the passengers had been freed and the gunmen, their comrades, and the crew were alone on board, Abu lyad persuaded them to give themselves up in exchange for free passage to a country of their choice. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They laughed, nodded, and left. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For more than a decade, from 1968 to 1979, Bakr and Saddam Living in Iraq from 1970 onward, Abu Nidal had a ringside The mid-to-late 1970s were the high noon of Abu Nidal’s Iraqi But in 1978—79, following a change in Iraq’s political climate, ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 111 112 / PATRICK SEALE Abu Nidal suddenly fell out of favor. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Is it our support for Abu Nidal that angers you? I can tell you at once that we will sanction no further operations against you mounted from Baghdad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But just when he expected to be expelled from Baghdad, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, in September 1980, gave him a reprieve. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
war meant that Iraq needed international support more than ever, especially from the West and the rich Gulf states, and therefore ought to have gotten rid of Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He offered to assassinate members of the Iraqi opposition abroad; he put himself forward as a covert channel of communication with Syria; internally, he kept an eye on potentially subversive enemies; and he involved himself as a middle- man in the arms trade, from which he hoped to profit personally. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From these tapes I learned that Abu Nidal had in 1980 or 1981 promised the Iraqis that he could obtain T72 tanks from Poland, where he had good contacts: “Saddam Hussein considered this a tremendous service,” Isa told Abu lyad, “a service that in fact delayed our eviction from Baghdad by two to three years!” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal could not help there, but according to Isa, he never returned the money, which was another reason for his eventual departure from Baghdad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
to a Palestinian attack that month on its Mediterranean coast, when a small force of guerrillas landed from two rubber dinghies and hijacked two civilian buses. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was to come out of it harsher, more secretive, and still more violent. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Israelis left three months later, but only after creating a buffer zone of their own inside Lebanon under a local Christian proxy, Major Sa’d Haddad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Abu Nidal took his refusal to cooperate as confirma- tion that Abu Dawud had deliberately led his men into a trap. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 115 116 / PATRICK SEALE “If you’re convinced I should die, then shoot me.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Like many self-taught people, he had an exaggerated respect for intellectuals. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
So Allush became the organization’s figurehead. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, Allush’s real ambitions lay in Lebanon, where he When Abu Nidal fell ill, Allush moved from Beirut to Bagh- These orders appear to have greatly exasperated Allush. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They had informed him that from January 1, 1981, they would no longer issue Iraqi passports to his members, with the result that some 120 men whose passports had expired found themselves in difficulty. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At the same Calling himself Dr. Sa’id, Abu Nidal posed as an international Abu Nidal’s relationship with Poland dated back to contacts He had settled in Poland in 1981 because he no longer felt safe ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 119 120 / PATRICK SEALE time, Iraqi intelligence started monitoring conversations at Abu Nidal’s Baghdad offices, forcing him and his colleagues to go to the Ramadi training camp, outside Baghdad, when they wished to escape this irksome surveillance. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Between January and May 1981, Isa went five times to Damascus at the head of a small delegation for discreet talks with General Au Duba, head of military intelligence; General Muhammad al-Khuly, head of air force intelligence; and Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For his part, Abd al-Rahman Isa took the Syrians to task for their intervention against the Palestinians in Lebanon and for standing by while Maronite militias besieged the Palestinian camp of Ta! a!-Za’tar and then massacred many of its inhabitants. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
businessman, and for the first year of his stay the Polish authorities did not know who he was. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Iraqi authorities had signaled their changing attitude toward him in a number of unfriendly moves. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was very probably these developments that, early in 1981, caused Abu Nidal to instruct his close aide Abd al-Rahman Isa to sound out the Syrians about the possibility of a move to Damascus. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Terrorists of the Muslim Brotherhood had started their campaign of bombings, as- sassinations, and attempted insurrection in Syria in 1977 and were to pursue it ruthlessly until 1982, when, in a gory finale, the regime rooted them out and crushed them, together with thousands of innocent civilians, in the central Syrian city of Hama, which the rebels had made their stronghold. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
which to deter King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser Arafat from private dealings with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His cover was a Warsaw-based company called SAS, which had branches in East Berlin and London and through which he traded with Polish state companies. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
he had made with the Polish embassy in Baghdad in 1974. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
in Iraq. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Assad had for years been sparring with the two men on this issue. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Assad had been angered by the support—in the shape of funds, training facili- ties, and safe haven—that Jordan had given terrorists of the Mus- lim Brotherhood in their war against Damascus from 1977 to 1982. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From then on, Syria’s concern was to prevent Israel from picking off the lesser players and bringing them into its orbit. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Sixteen Palestinians, most of them members of his organization, were expelled from Turkey. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
unleashed his hit men against Jordan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After all, it was his job to sniff out whom the Syrians hated most at any given moment. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In May, his colleague in Rabat was shot, while in June a bomb was defused outside the Syrian embassy in London. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Syria in turn did not escape retaliation, almost certainly by ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 127 PATRICK SEALE / Syrian Arab News Agency and the ministry of the interior, causing dozens of casualties. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, by 1983—85, his main subject of disagreement with Hus- sein was over strategy vis-à-vis Israel, and in particular a dispute over how to recover the Arab territories Israel had conquered in 1967. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This particular argument had a long history. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Of course, neither Assad nor Hussein would admit that they were waging a terrorist war against each other, but as their differences were well aired, it was public knowledge. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The mutineers were suspicious of Arafat’s flirtation with “peace plans” and of his talks with King Hussein to establish a common negotiat- ing stance. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When, in May—June 1983, the rebels attacked Fatah’s arms depots in the eastern Bekaa and seized supply lines from Syria, Arafat hurried to rally his supporters. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Screaming foul, Arafat accused Syria of taking sides, whereupon he was unceremoniously expelled from Syria on June 24, 1983—a move that dramatized the Assad-Arafat breach, underlining Assad’s ambition to wrest the key to a solution of the Palestine problem from an independent PLO. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Inside the organization, the link with this intelligence service was described as the “central relation- ship” and was given very special attention. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If someone refused to go quietly, he would be drugged and carried to Lebanon in the trunk of a car. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Cars returning from Lebanon were used to smuggle weapons back into Syria in secret compartments. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Three Fatah At first, this had to be done in small numbers and with very Israel’s second invasion of Lebanon, of June 1982, was a great ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 131 132 / PATRICK SEALE colonels—Abu Musa, Abu Salih, and Abu Khalid al-Amli—had been outraged by Arafat’s decision to evacuate Beirut in September 1982 rather than carry on the fight against Israel, and they resented the protection he had given to a number of cowardly officers who had failed the test of battle. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They wanted Arafat to sack the cowardly officers; to share power with them in a “collective leadership”; to smuggle back into Lebanon the Palestinian fighters who had been dispersed abroad; and to opt unequivocally for armed struggle rather than political compromise. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Syria’s President Assad, who had no love for him and no confidence in the plans he was cooking up with King Hussein, threw his weight behind the rebels. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal appointed one of his nephews, Abd al-Karim al-Banna (code name Husam Mustafa), a graduate of the Baghdad College of Law and Politics, to take charge of it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They were used to transport to Leba- non, against their will and without the Syrians’ knowledge, dozens of people arrested or kidnapped by the organization in Damascus. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A MEETING OF MINDS In May 1984, accompanied by the faithful Isa, Abu Nidal traveled from Warsaw to Tripoli, the Libyan capital, for his first encounter with Qaddafi. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A few weeks earlier, one of his security men inside the Libyan People’s Bureau in London’s St. James’s Square had crazily opened fire from a first-floor window on a crowd of anti-Qaddafi demonstrators, killing a young British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
tion was focused on the small pockets of Libyan exiles—defectors from his Free Officers movement and from his diplomatic service, students who failed to return home, and the like—most of whom had taken shelter in the United States, Britain, Egypt, Morocco, or the Sudan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
There and elsewhere, they had formed opposition move- ments, ranging from the democratic to the Islamic, all largely inef- fective, with names like the National Front for the Salvation of Libya; the Libyan Constitutional Union; the Libyan Democratic National Rally; and the Islamic Association of Libya. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From time to time, Qaddafi sent hit men to disrupt and intimidate them and, Qaddafi’s paranoia, his sense of being under siege, was more In security matters, Qaddafi’s mind was parochial: His atten- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 137 l~I III Ii II~ 138 / PATRICK SEALE between 1980 and 1984, managed to have no fewer than fifteen exiles murdered. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
To accommodate the new recruits who had flooded in after the collapse of the Fatah mutiny—to feed, clothe, house, and arm them—his organization had created a Peo- ple’s Army Directorate, with branches all over Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
~ Ith i~o / PATRICK SEALE and character, presenting him with a number of critical choices: What sort of movement did he wish to command and what sort of leader did he wish to be? The main impetus for the organization’s transformation was the so-called War of the Camps, a pitiless struggle between Pales- tinians and Shi’ites, which lasted from 1985 to 1987, leaving count- less thousands dead, wounded, or uprooted from their homes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Shi’ites and Palestini- ans believed their very survival was at stake. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was also anxious to show that the PLO was still a force to be reckoned with and that Israel’s attempt to smash it had failed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
in Lebanon: Should it side with its Syrian patron against the Pales- tinians? Or should it defend the Palestinian refugee camps besieged by the Syrian-backed Shi’ites? already dictated its position. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the Israelis soon outstayed their welcome. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
And when they sought to impose Maronite rule on the country, the Shi’ites moved into outright opposition. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
new recruits, the People’s Army formed five regional commands, covering Lebanon from far north to far south. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His move- ments to and from Syria were undertaken with Libyan aid and approval, with Libya supplying the carrier, the money, and the A parallel change took place on the military side. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
What Abu Nidal always looked for was a secure base in an Arab country and, with it, the protection of an Arab intelligence service to complement his own elaborate arrangements. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
was the Syrians’ refusal to recognize that he had any political legiti- macy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Why, he wrote on one occasion, is so-and-so spending so much on apples? The return to Damascus of the weekly messenger was an anxious moment for members of the leadership as they wondered what further importunate demands their chief might make on them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He moved his wife and children to Damascus and took a ground-floor apartment in the same building as his chief military colleague, Abu Nizar. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Tiring at last of the argu- ments, Abu Nidal decided to resolve the matter once and for all— by killing his brother-in-law. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
patched up, he thought it wiser to mount the operation from Ku- wait rather than from Damascus. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
During Israel’s siege of Beirut, when the Palestinians were holding out under intense bombard- ment, Qaddafi sent Arafat a now famous telegram in which he urged him to commit suicide rather than allow Israel to expel him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Acidly, he added that his pre- sent circumstances would not have been so desperate had Qaddafi delivered the weapons he had promised. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
was done properly. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
and hospitality of all sorts, putting up in hotels or private villas members who were passing through. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
organization transport weapons into Libya to store them there; also, to transport weapons out of Libya and hide them in caches in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal himself posed as the supreme rejectionist, a diehard opponent of the negotiated settlement with Israel that the “capitu- lationist” Arafat had been angling for since 1974. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But a second opinion put forward by some of my sources was more sensational—and more in line with Abu lyad’s allegations: Abu Nidal was a tool of the Israelis, either because his organization had been penetrated by the Mossad (much as the Mossad had penetrated every other Palestinian faction, at one time or another, over the past twenty-five years) or because he himself had been recruited. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hard evidence remained scant, but as I discovered, the subject was gossiped about a good deal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Widening the scope of my inquiries, I left Tunis and its hot- house politics of defectors and guerrilla fighters to consult sources in Europe and the Middle East. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Much of this man’s career had been spent liaising with Israeli intelligence and running agents against Palestinian organizations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was not surprising that Hussein should look to Israel as a counterweight to Syria during the crisis itself, and afterward coordi- nate with it the intelligence war against the fedayeen. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A German security officer engaged in counterterrorism, whom I interviewed in London in April 1990, told me, “Israel needs to control men such as Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The letter was written in the hand of his younger brother, a boy “Your family is in our power,” Haddad told him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was, he said, an unequal struggle. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If he could be encouraged to kill Arafat loyalists, so much the better. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In more than forty years of bloodletting, Palestinians have died in the 1947—48 war that led to the creation of Israel; the 1967 war, in which Israel conquered the rest of Palestine; the showdown with King Hussein of Jordan and the “pacification” of Gaza by General Ariel Sharon, both in 1970—71; the battles in Lebanon against the Maronites and against Syria in 1975—77; Israel’s two invasions of Lebanon, in 1978 and 1982; the intra-Palestinian fighting at the time of the Fatah mutiny of 1983; the War of the Camps between Palestinians and Shi’ites in 1986—87; Israel’s repression of the intifada from 1987 onward and its repeated bombing of Palestinian settlements and positions up to the present time; and of course, the punishment inflicted on the Palestinians, in Kuwait and elsewhere, for their stance in favor of Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf war. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As was clear from the list I drew up at the start, many of its brightest people have been gunned down or blown up in cold blood either by Israel or by Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Yasser Arafat had persuaded Arab leaders to recognize the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people; he had tamed Black September activists and largely put an end to PLO terrorism; he had gone on to address the UN General Assembly and won observer status for his organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If there is any hope for arrangements that will solve this problem, then the prior condition must be to destroy the PLO from its roots in this region. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If some of these mod- erates had not been abused and vilified in Abu Nidal’s own maga- zine as traitors to the Palestinian revolution, killing them, if the killings were indeed manipulated from outside, could not have been justified by Abu Nidal as the apt response to treachery. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This fitted in well with the Israeli view that the PLO should never be allowed to escape from the terrorist stigma or be accepted as a partner in the peace process. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From I reflected that in the murders of the Palestinian moderates, It could be argued, however, that the successful manipulation Moreover, Abu Nidal’s violence made it easier for Israel to Hammami was one of the most eloquent Palestinian advocates 1975 onward, he had held a series of meetings with Israeli peace campaigners, notably with the editor and writer Un Avnery, whose book My Friend, the Enemy (1986) gives a moving account of these furtive but unfruitful encounters. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I learned from Abu Bakr that in the months before Hammami’s death, Abu Nidal’s organization had demanded that he call a press conference to denounce Arafat. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Both Arab and Israeli rejectionists had reason to want Ham- On February 18, 1978, a few days after the service for Ham- Defectors from Abu Nidal’s organization told me in Tunis that Once they had killed Siba’i, the gunmen seized hostages at the THE KILLINGS OF YASSIN AND QALAQ A few months later, three more prominent PLO “ambassadors” were attacked. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Yassin had been everyone’s friend—he had been Abu Nidal’s friend, too, and had even kept him supplied in Baghdad with cars and gifts of electrical appliances from Kuwait. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Early in Bakr gave a reception at his home for the visiting Arab delega- It is hard to see what Bakr would have had to gain from lying. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Within a few weeks of the Baghdad summit, on January 22, 1979, an Israeli car bomb in a Beirut street killed Fatah’s security chief, Au Hassan Salameh (also known as Abu Hassan), together with four of his bodyguards and five passersby. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
sort of writer at all: He enlisted the Canadian writer Claire Hoy to help him with the writing. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
al-Rashidi was Ostrovsky’s Mossad hit man depended too much on hearsay evidence and was far from watertight. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He may have known then that he was doomed— alone, out in the open without protection or political cover, and pursued by killers from both camps. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A few months before his death, Sartawi had received a letter from Abu Nidal asking when he planned to meet his Israeli contacts in Vienna. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1948, his family had fled from Acre, near Haifa, to Iraq, where he began his medical studies, later becoming a heart surgeon in the In great agitation, Sartawi repeated this charge to me when I To make matters worse for him, at the PNC meeting Arafat On April 10, 1983, as Sartawi was chatting in the lobby of a Whether or not Israel had had a hand in his murder, there was Sartawi had not always been a dove. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1969, Sartawi broke from Fatah and set up a group that he called the Action Committee for the Liberation of Palestine, with funding first from Iraq and then from Egypt, which led some Pales- tinians to believe that he had sold out to Arab intelligence services. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I discovered this from my Tunisian and Moroccan members. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I learned about this school from several intelligence sources, both Arab and Western. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He later learned that the Poles had arrested his would-be assassin but had released him a day later on receiving a payment of $200,000 from Abu Nidal’s Polish company, Zibado. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His first shot went through my hand. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But ii seemed relevant to my inquiries. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Tunis in 1990, he gave me his account of the incident. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He had been Abu Nidal’s friend, he told me, since their early days in Saudi Arabia but had broken with him over the killing of Yassin and the other PLO representatives. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Committee, Dr. Ghassan is a lean, dark chain-smoker of maniacal From defectors and other sources, I have been able to identify All this activity generates a great deal of paper—most of it The present head of the Secretariat is none other than Sulai- Based in Lebanon with the title of first secretary of the Central ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / i~i IC~I’ ~ q;~ IIINIIIN i~l~ ~ ~ .~LiI~ Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was a good student and was sent to study in Britain, where he graduated with a B.A. in chemistry and later was awarded an M.A. Although he calls himself Doctor, he has no such degree. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The true cause of death was not given. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Syria in the 1980s, he headed Abu Nidal’s private office before being put in charge of the Libyan end of the Secretariat once Abu Nidal settled there in 1987. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
What made matters worse was that he was a nephew of Abu Nidal’s wife—a member of the family. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE From the moment of Abu Nidal’s breach with Fatah in 1974, his “special operations” were in the hands of a secret core organization known as the Military Committee, staffed by men who had under- gone special training, had worked clandestinely, and were commit- ted to violence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was headed from 1979 to 1982 by an explosives expert, Naji Abu al-Fawaris, who had lost a hand and an eye in an accident in 1973. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When the organization moved from Iraq to Syria in 1982—83, the Military Committee changed its name and became known as the Committee for Special Missions, directed in the mid-1980s, as has been mentioned, by Dr. Ghassan al-Ali, who oversaw most of the murderous operations of those years. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
These were: • the Committee for Special Missions, which was now ab- sorbed into the new directorate; • the Foreign Intelligence Committee; • the Counterespionage Committee; • the Lebanon Committee From the start, this directorate was by far the most important in the whole organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hailing from the village of Amin, near Jenin in the West Bank, he was consumed, like many Palestinians of similar To an outside observer, there seemed to be periods when the This directorate was the object of Abu Nidal’s special atten- At the beginning, when the directorate was first founded, in When the organization planned to move to Syria in the early Although physically ugly, unshaven, and shabbily dressed, Isa But Isa was restless. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Any information of a security nature gleaned by other directorates or committees was immediately passed to it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the organization’s history, there have been two main phases of arms distribution: the Iraqi phase, in which arms dumps were primarily established in Greece, Turkey, and France; and then the Syrian phase, when Cyprus, Italy, and West Germany were added to the list. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Without hesitation, he declared the full amount. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A bigger change occurred in 1985, when the Intelligence Direc- torate was formed, with four subdivisions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
it dealt with Palestinian students at foreign colleges and universi- ties, who from the very beginning were the bedrock of Abu Nidal’s whole structure. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Most were country boys from one of the six hundred or so villages of pre-1948 Palestine. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The organization’s technique, much like that of other Palestinian factions, was to approach young people who had just left school and did not know what to do next. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Here is a scholarship to Poland or East Ger- The first of these committees was the important one, because Some students joined Abu Nidal because they needed money; ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 191 192 / PATRICK SEALE many!” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Of course, he gave his scholarships to young men he considered politically loyal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Western Europe, Abu Nidal was even more successful, be- cause he could afford to meet all the expenses of his students—rent, board, fares, pocket money—which allowed them to settle down into big-city European life and to be ready for action when he needed them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After its departure from Iraq and Syria, the organiza- tion maintained a small underground presence in these two coun- tries. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But in most other places it was a matter of a few individuals living a shadowy existence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Until 1986, the head of the Organization Directorate had been But in 1986, Suffarini could no longer cope psychologically ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 193 194 / PATRICK SEALE would have ordered Suffarini’s execution there and then and de- nounced him as a spy for the “traitor king,” his standard phrase for King Hussein. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But clearly things had gone badly wrong in the organization if a man of Suffarini’s seniority felt that his only way out was to escape to Jordan—a country that was his enemy, against which he had mounted lethal operations, but from which he now felt he could expect more mercy than from Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nizar was a large, energetic man, popular with the rank and file, many of whom he had trained, but politically something of a simpleton. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
features that endeared him to Abu Nidal: He was the husband of his wife’s niece, and therefore part of the family; and he was slav- ishly loyal to Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1974 he sided with Abu Nidal and went to work in the Military Committee. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal made every effort to keep this committee hermeti- cally sealed off from the rest of the organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In fact, each directorate and committee is involved in poach- ing and recruitment—from the street, from refugee camps, from villages, from other organizations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It administers two committees, the Publications Committee Once accepted into the organization, a member may still have The committee will also pronounce on where in the organiza- Most members join the organization on the recommendation A good deal of poaching takes place from other Palestinian ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 197 i9~ / PATRICK SEALE and the Political Relations Committee; and like some of its sister institutions, its activities are divided between Lebanon and Libya, with the Libyan end known as the Bureau of the Political Director- ate Abroad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
(Its name is the same as the PLO’s magazine, another example of Abu Nidal’s wish to pre- sent himself as a rival and alternative to Yasser Arafat’s move- ment.) Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Dr. Matar has left the organiza- tion but has not wholly escaped Abu Nidal’s attentions: Since 1989, a number of attempts have been made to abduct him to Lebanon, presumably to kill him there. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Manara Press, which bought material from free-lance writers and sold it to news agencies and newspapers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The orga- nization’s answer was to try to kill her. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
About twelve thousand copies a week are printed and distributed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When the organization was in Syria, an attempt was made to publish an English-language edition of the magazine, but only two issues appeared. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Its editorial department was housed in two Damascus apartments, while the computers, elec- tronic typesetting, and German press (which had been purchased in 1984 for 22 million Syrian lira) were housed in a works outside the city. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1987, rebelling against his dictatorial methods, she decided to resign and claim statutory compensation. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Political Directorate’s second committee was the Political AtifAbu Bakr was head of the Political Directorate from 1985 ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 201 202 / PATRICK SEALE THE FINANCE DIRECTORATE The headquarters of this directorate were situated wherever Abu Nidal happened to be—in Iraq, Poland, Syria, or Libya—and the men who ran it were never anything more than employees, with full allegiance to him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
One was Dirar Abd al-Fattah al-Silwani, a member of the command of the Finance Directorate, who, from offices in East Berlin, ran one of the organization’s companies, called Zibado. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
(code name Abu Nabil), who, from a base in Warsaw, ran the SAS Foreign Trade and Investment Company, a large corporation with several branches and interests, ranging from property development to arms trading. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the 1980s, two men were largely responsible for the foreign A second important overseas manager was Samir Najm al-Din Samir Najm al-Din was a Palestinian from Iraq with a head for When Abu Nidal first thought of branching out on his own in ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 203 204 / PATRICK SEALE He made a lot of money from blackmail and extortion, adding substantially to his assets. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From blackmailing the Saudis and lesser Gulf rulers, he is estimated to have collected some $50 million in the twelve years from 1976 to 1988. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
More money came from arms trading. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He also bought cut-price copies of Western weapons from Bulgarian state corporations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He made money from these deals, but more importantly, he used these East- bloc countries as safe havens for his various operations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The big money came in the 1980s, most of it from selling East-bloc weapons. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Its main base is in the village of Bqasta, in the southern Shuf Mountains of Lebanon, a location leased by Abu Nidal from the Druze leader Walid Jumblat. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
One member of the Technical Committee is Isma’il Abd at- Latif Yusuf (code name Hamdi Abu Yusuf), a Palestinian from Gaza, who has concerned himself with forgeries over many years. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE PEOPLE’S ARMY (SOMETIMES KNOWN AS THE MILITARY DIRECTORATE) Wholly separate from the organization’s other directorates and committees, the People’s Army is a regular militia closely resem- bling those of other Palestinian factions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As has been mentioned, it benefited from the 1983 mutiny in Fatah, when large numbers of fighters came over to Abu Nidal from Abu Salih. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The role played by the People’s Army in the War of the Camps increased its visibility and contributed to the organi- zation’s transformation from a purely secret network. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Originally from Anabta, in the West Bank, Hannun completed his studies at Mosul, in Iraq. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He started with Fatah but joined Abu Nidal from the very start in 1974. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When Tamim and his wife were arrested, his wife’s mother, accompanied by her youngest daughter, came to Damascus from Jordan to see what had happened. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The experience of killing his mother-in-law and sister-in-law to From my investigations, I concluded that real power in Leba- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 209 The case for suspecting a possible link between Israel and Abu Nidal rests on a body of evidence, much of it inferential and conjec- tural, some of it more substantial. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
IMMUNITY FROM ATTACK A curious aspect of Abu Nidal’s activities, especially in Lebanon, also attracted my attention and fed my suspicions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It controls the skies over Lebanon, and even on the ground in the south, there is little to stop it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
INVISIBLE STRINGS chapter 10 A punitive missions north of its self-styled security zone, established in southern Lebanon in 1978. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
on the El Al counters at airports in Rome and Vienna, his murder- ous assaults on synagogues in Istanbul and several European cities, and other anti-Jewish crimes, his organization in Lebanon and Libya has never seriously been hit by the Mossad’s assassination squads or by the Israeli air force, which has so extensively bombed other Palestinian positions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A German expert on counterterrorism told me in London in 1990, “Those that the Israelis want to destroy, they destroy, even if it means sending in assassins. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
OPERATIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES Another aspect of Abu Nidal’s activities puzzled me. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Yet he has not thrown a stone in the occupied territories, either before or during the int~fada. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal does nothing. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
behavior seemed to me suspect. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestinian On August 20, 1983, a hot summer’s day, in a coastal suburb But the Russians did not let the matter rest. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Despite his attacks Abu Nidal’s large establishment near the village of Bqasta, Before a split within Abu Nidal’s ranks that would make them ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 211 There have been no victims of Israeli reprisals among i 212 / PATRICK SEALE Nidal’s top leadership. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), the umbrella organization running the int?fada, was set up in 1988, Abu Nidal’s publications considered it an extension of Arafat’s PLO and ig- nored it completely. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Col. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
of Athens, a gunman riding pillion on a motorcycle came abreast Mraish’s car and killed him outright with a burst of machine-gun fire. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Eight-year-old children throw stones at Israeli troops. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal sabotaged the meeting by discussing such trivia as whose wife had been seen at the hairdresser’s? Who had lunched at a fancy restau- rant in Switzerland instead of making do with a sandwich? And who had thrown away a kilo of perfectly edible tomatoes at the training camp? interfered with it, as, for example in the case of the mysterious Lt. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
sources say that he had excellent contacts with the Soviets and had given them information, and even sensitive technical equipment, which he was well placed to acquire. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They investigated the case for several months and concluded that Mraish had been killed by Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestinian nationalists from the socialist left to the Islamic right regard the intifada in the occupied territories as the great national battle, a unique effort, after years of passivity, to liberate the territories. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal has struck targets in nearly all parts of the world—Bangkok, Australia, Peru. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The CIA must therefore have been on his trail as well. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Mraish their man and wanted his killer. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Since the 1970s, Israel has also regularly sent ground forces on Abu Nidal has very largely been left alone. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal’s inattention to the Palestinian cause is reflected in the structure of his organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1988, Atif Abu Bakr called for a special session of the leadership to see what could be done to help the int~fada. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Intelligence Directorate’s Committee for Special Missions—which mounts assassinations— employs dozens of cadres and has unlimited funds. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Organiza- tion Directorate’s Palestine/Jordan Committee has almost no funds or facilities and was for a long time manned by only two persons—Samir Darwish, who was sent on a mission to Peru, where he was arrested, and Fadil al-Qaisi, who died in London after undergoing heart surgery. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But he made it clear, Abu Bakr added, that he did not want his part in the affair to come out. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Throughout the entire int~[ada, Abu Nidal has given no additional resources to the Palestine/Jordan Committee and mounted no operations in southern Lebanon, like those by other Palestinian organizations, to harass the Israelis. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The PLO concluded that either the Mossad or the CIA was responsible. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When, in Algiers in 1987, Abu lyad asked Abu Nidal about the In any case, the provocation that Haig said was necessary had From the earliest days of the Israeli state, the techniques of Against this background, I thought it not inconceivable that ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 227 Abu Nidal’s reputation as a terrorist rests largely on the bonfire of violence he lit in the mid-1980s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
OPERATION TERROR Yet only a year earlier, skulking in Poland and virtually absent from the scene, he had seemed ready to retire from his terrorist career. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The point was that he did not want to be seen to run away from Syria: He wanted Syria to evict him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Expelled from Syria, he could then regain control of a movement that, in Lebanon, had grown too big—and too overt— for his liking. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Iraq’s government under the Ba’ath was based on terror, as Samir al-Khalil detailed in Republic of Fear Certainly, many of his operations at this time were carried out Abu Nidal knew that if he hit at Western targets while he was ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 229 230 / PATRICK SEALE (1989). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Shi’ite fighters harried the Israeli army, blew up the American embassy, slaughtered Amer- ican marines, took Western hostages. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This was the notorious Lavon affair, named after Israel’s defense minister at the time. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Moreover, Israel has bombed, shelled, and dynamited Lebanese towns and villages, intercepted vessels in international waters and aircraft in international airspace, launched long-range raids against Baghdad and Tunis, and kid- napped, tortured, and imprisoned many suspected opponents. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
TANGLED THREADS OF VIOLENCE At this stage in my researches I decided to make another list—this time focusing on international acts of violence that were related to But whereas Israel’s terror always served long-term political His claim that he wanted to prevent a compromise between the ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 231 232 / PATRICK SEALE Middle Eastern players—to see if I could discern a pattern as I had been able to do from the earlier list. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
shells Beirut from air, land, and sea. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
non’s Shuf Mountains, whereupon Syrian-backed Druze and Shi’ite forces expel Israel’s Maronite allies from the area and lay siege to the presidential palace. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hundreds of civilians are massacred and tens of thousands displaced from their homes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
wage a terrorist war on Jordan to deter King Hussein from entering into separate negotiations with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
nald Reagan declares: “We must not be driven from our objec- tives for peace in Lebanon by state-sponsored terrorism.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He identified Syria as the key terrorist state whose “worldwide intelligence apparatus” made use of Palestinians, Armenians, Japanese, and even Thais! Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
March 1984-William Buckley, CIA station chief in Bei- rut, is kidnapped and killed in June. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
May 23, 1984-Israel’s state attorney’s office indicts Palestinian fighters “terrorists” so as to deny them legitimacy, greatly expanded its exploitation of this issue, aiming to shape American attitudes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Edited by Israel’s UN twenty-five Israeli settlers for involvement in a Jewish terrorist underground. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Like Claire Sterling’s The Terror Network in the early Reagan years, the conference papers became the master text of America’s obsession with terrorism in Reagan’s second term. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
*November 27, 1984-Percy Norris, Britain’s deputy high commissioner in Bombay, is shot dead. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
*November 29, 1984-The British Airways office in Bei- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 235 PATRICK SEALE / rut is bombed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Pin- pointing Syria, Libya, and Iran, George Shultz declares that “state-sponsored terrorism is in fact a form of war,” a view echoed by Vice President George Bush and CIA director Wil- liam Casey. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
secretary of state George Shultz December—January 1983—84—American war planes and December 4, 1983—Eight more U.S. Marines are killed in January 26, 1984—In his state of the union address, Ro- February 29, 1984-The Israel-Lebanon accord of May ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 233 234 / PATRICK SEALE 17, 1983, is abrogated. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal claims responsibility. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
President Amin Gemayel travels to Damascus to pay homage to President Assad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Several other Westerners are taken hostage in Lebanon by Shi’ite militants between 1985 and 1988. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Britain breaks off diplomatic relations with Libya. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
used by Ronald Reagan and George Shultz and echoed by Vice President George Bush and CIA director William Casey. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the summer of 1984, Israel, which had for years labeled all The new focus was on “state-sponsored terrorism,” the phrase President Reagan was apparently greatly influenced, at this ambassador, Benjamin Netanyahu, these proceedings were later published in a book titled Terrorism: How the West Can Win. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Part of an elaborate cam- paign of psychological warfare directed against the PLO, Syria, and Libya, the book helped persuade American opinion that Israel’s enemies were also America’s, that Arabs in dispute with Israel were terrorists, and that brute force against them was legitimate and desirable. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The blow fell at precisely this moment, and it was inevitable that the PLO would assume that the object of the attack had been to force Italy and Austria, undei pressure from their own public opinion, to sever their ties with the PLO. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They had been told, I later learned, that the people they saw standing at the counters were Israeli pilots in civilian clothes, returning home from a training mission—the same pilots who had bombed their families in South Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Tunisian passports used by the gunmen were passports that Libya had confiscated from Tunisian workers expelled from Libya in 1985. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His colleague Alaa directed the operations on the ground and was in Vienna at the time, watching things from afar. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Only Israel stood to gain from such outrages, he said. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel would not massacre Jews, whatever political or propaganda advantages could be derived from such an operation. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But before the bus set off, news broke that a bomb had been discovered at Heathrow. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I had investigated this terrorist incident, which implicated the Syrians, when I was researching my biography of President Assad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He had promised to join her in Israel, where they were to be married. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
What I did not know then, but what I learned in 1990 from a well-placed defector in Tunis, was that Abu Nidal’s Technical Committee had manufactured the suitcase bomb and had delivered it to Syrian air force intelligence, the outfit that sponsored Abu Nidal in Syria. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was widely supposed that Khuly’s motive was revenge for an incident two months earlier, when Israel, hoping to capture Pales- tinian guerrilla leaders, had intercepted and forced down in Israel the executive jet returning Syrian officials to Damascus. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On his return to Damascus, Sa’id had shown him the suitcase bomb and told him how to prime it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From defectors, I learned that the strategist of the operation The team had been trained on a model of the plane at a camp In Damascus, Abbas had second thoughts about his mission, ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 253 PATRICK SEALE / At a crucial moment in the hijackers’ negotiations with the control tower, Abbas pushed one of the American stewardesses into the lavatory and began to fondle her—evidently, an attempt to abort the operation. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
EXPULSION FROM SYRIA From the summer of 1986, Abu Nidal started quietly moving his organization out of Syria. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In any event, a large cache of weapons, some seventy sub- machine guns, mainly Polish Scorpions and Israeli Uzis, had been walled in and plastered over in the basement of a house owned by At the same time, a number of offices and apartments were But as efficiently as the move was planned, an arms cache was ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 255 256 / PATRICK SEALE the Intelligence Directorate. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Bajis had joined the organization in Iraq when he was very young and had worked in intelligence almost since childhood. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His wealth gave him a sense of omnipotence; he had found in Qaddafi a congenial sponsor who shared his own pleasure in violence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The timid Ham- muda asked whether Abu Nidal had approved the purchase. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“You donkey!” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Because of his long years underground, he no longer seemed to know how to live normally. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
UNDERMINING THE INTIFADA A few months after the start of the int~fada in December 1987, Abu Nidal mounted three operations that would gravely damage the Palestinian cause—consistent with the pattern of anti-Palestinian activity evident from the start of his career. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
To his own people, Abu Nidal claimed that the plan had been to blow up the Israeli embassy, but the car exploded two hundred yards from the embassy building, which was undamaged. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
claiming they were directed at places from which Falasha Jews, escaping from Ethiopia, were taken to Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Sudanese government and the opposition, embarrassed the Pales- tinians in the Sudan, robbed the int?fada of Sudanese popular sup- port, and caused considerable problems with the authorities for Palestinian fighters who had taken refuge in the Sudan after their expulsion from Lebanon in 1982. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“I have to protect you and the organization!” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the wake of this, Cypriot opinion turned against the Palestinians, the island authorities tightened their controls over Palestinians coming in and out, and several resident Palestinians were thrown out. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In simultaneous attacks at 8 P.M. local time on May 15, 1988, a five-man hit team attacked two “soft” targets in Khartoum—the Sudan Club, reserved for British and Commonwealth citizens, which they machine-gunned, and the Akropole Hotel, an old Greek-run establishment, where they hurled a rucksack full of grenades into the restaurant, killing a Sudanese waiter, a Sudanese general, and five Britons: Sally Rock- ett, a thirty-two-year-old teacher, and a family of four, Christopher and Clare Rolfe, both in their mid-thirties, and their two children, aged three and one. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the communiqué, several pages long, went on to discuss political and economic conditions in the Sudan as if to imply that the Suda- nese opposition had been involved in the attacks. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On January 7, 1991, to the dismay of the British and American governments, all five Abu Nidal terrorists were released, after “blood money” was paid to the families of the Sudanese victims and a pardon allegedly secured from the families of the British victims. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They were two Belgian brothers, Emmanuel and Fernand Houtekins; Emmanuel’s wife, Godelieve, and their teenage children, Laurent and Valerie; and Fernand’s French girlfriend, Jacqueline Valente, and her two young daughters by another man, Marie-Laure and Virginie, whom, it later emerged, she had abducted from her former husband, Pascal Bétille, just So began one of the more extraordinary Middle East hostage By this time, the two couples and their children had settled into ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 267 268 / PATRICK SEALE before going on the cruise. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Qaddafi, embarrassed and fearful of French opinion, did not dare announce the capture of the Silco. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
So he asked Abu Nidal to provide a cover story, and the latter was glad to oblige. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Suppression of the truth about the Silco may have been part of the price Abu Nidal had extracted from the French in return for his cooperation. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
There was a curious postscript to the Silco affair. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But he was swiftly released when it was discovered that he had actually been given a visa by the authorities to come to Belgium for talks with Jan Hollants Van Loocke, direc- tor of political affairs at the foreign ministry. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal had sent Khalid to Brussels to see what more could Apart from the abduction of Belgian citizens aboard the Silco, It later emerged that Abu Nidal had demanded from Belgian The families on board the Silco were not Mossad agents; they Abu Nidal has had a long clandestine relationship with ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 269 II 270 / PATRICK SEALE France. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal has tried to establish more of a presence in Western In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Abu Nidal made Istanbul the Another is Britain. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Portugal, Muhammad Hussein Rashid, a member of the hit team sent to kill Isam Sartawi in Portugal, guffawed in court when he heard that he had been sentenced to only three years. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Palestinian circles he was known as Muja- hid. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ber of Wadi Haddad’s militant wing of the PFLP and had in fact been shot and very nearly killed in Beirut in 1976 by another PFLF member, whom he had denounced as a KGB agent. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But de- spite the PLO’s overtures, some European intelligence services (and particularly the British) continue to ignore it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
With the Mafia, he had had some small dealings over arms and forged passports, but little else. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The evidence from Palestinian and Western intelli- gence sources suggests a more ambivalent relationship, though Abu Nidal made Poland his home for several years in the early 1980s and professed great admiration for Erich Honecker’s East Germany. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The argument he habitually used was that a relationship with him would give a state immunity from his operations, a form of blackmail he used against Western European states as well. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
To intelligence and security officers from the East, like their West- In the late 1980s, Abu Nidal and Fatah fought over the rem- First, needing secure places of residence for himself and some Second, trading in East-bloc arms was an important source of Third, he wanted to undermine the close relations that the Several Eastern European states concluded agreements with ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 275 276 / PATRICK SEALE em counterparts, Abu Nidal was a terrorist who had to be con- tained. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He liked to portray himself as a Palestinian nationalist who had been influenced by the theories of Marx, but he detested the Soviet Union and frequently attacked it in his publications. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But in Eastern Europe, he found the best way to make friends was less by professing Marxism than by distribut- ing “gifts”—an expensive watch here, a present for someone’s wife there, or simply quantities of cash all around (in dollar bills). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal’s oldest relationship in Eastern Europe was with Yugoslavia, where Palestinians had been going to study in large numbers since the 1960s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When Abu Nidal broke from Fatah in 1974, he managed to poach some of Fatah’s students in Yugoslavia and used them to start recruiting in earnest, causing violent clashes between his supporters and Fatah’s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From 1980 onward, he kept a secret representative in Bel- grade: first Ali al-Farra (Dr. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
With Marxists, he was one of them; with Arab nationalists, he claimed to be a nationalist; with Islamic fundamentalists, he would profess himself a strict Muslim; with Shi’ites, he swore by the Imam Ali and in South Lebanon even went so far as to alter the code names of his cadres so as to make them sound more attractive to the local Shi’ite population. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Not wanting further headaches of this sort, Yugoslav intelligence decided to open a line to Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From the moment he was evicted from Iraq in 1983, Abu Nidal wanted a link with Iran. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
And whenever the press reported that Iran was secretly buying arms from Israel, Abu Nidal’s magazine rushed to refute the charge, as if he himself had stood accused. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
up wooing Iran and was seeking to benefit from the crisis by in- gratiating himself with members of the anti-Iraq coalition. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
EARLY BRUTALITIES From the early 1970s, Abu Nidal built his organization on brutality and fear. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the cadre with whom they had been rash enough to go shopping had recently been to Beirut, where he had met some Fatah people—enough to arouse Abu Nidal’s suspicions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For this, all three had to die. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The man who had buried the weapons had himself been buried. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal told his members that Abd al-Fattah hailed from Nablus, a major West Bank city, but in fact little was known about him as he had had no background in Fatah or in any other Palestinian organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But no one dared ask Abu Nidal where he had found this man and why he had promoted him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They are usually executed anyway, to make sure word of such methods doesn’t leak—but enough has leaked for a sordid picture to emerge. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Nor would I. I would take his word for it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Another method was to heat oil in a frying pan and then, while holding the prisoner steady, fry his male member. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
committee waited for its leader in Libya to confirm a death sen- tence, a prisoner might be placed in a freshly dug grave and have earth shoveled over him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
INTERNAL MASSACRES With the passage of years, the blood shed by Abu Nidal swelled into a torrent. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On June 26, 1990, If Abu Nidal’s prisons happened to be full, and while the ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 287 PATRICK SEALE / prisoners being held in a jail at Aita, in the Bekaa Valley, could not be transported when the organization moved from there to South Lebanon, so they were killed en masse in 1987, without even having been interrogated. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
About 120 men then fled the People’s Army and sought refuge in the Bekaa Valley with Abu Ahmad Fu’ad, the military com- mander of George Habash’s PFLP. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Over the years, Abu Musa had trained many of his recruits. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abd may have known too much about these funds, as did another cadre from the Finance Directorate, killed at about the same time, named Musa Rashid, who had run a finance company in Kuwait belonging to the organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Maraqa then said bluntly that they had confessed to plotting Basil replied angrily that he considered himself one of the Many men then started disappearing from the units. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At the time, Abu Nidal was reorganizing his Swiss bank accounts to bring them more tightly under his family’s control. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was summoned to Libya and shot as a Jordanian spy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
So Nur Muharib was charged with being an agent of four intelligence services. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Nur Muharib had an uncle called Mustafa Umran, a Pales- tinian writer and poet from Gaza, with an M.A. in Arabic literature from Cairo University. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
These two men, respectively in the Political Relations Commit- tee and the Publications Committee, had climbed to well-placed jobs. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He tried to run his organization from afar with his weekly stream of peremptory memos, chiding his hard-pressed associates, criticizing them, setting them against one another. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
These early years of the 1980s were the time when, from its Syrian base, the organization developed rapidly, expanding almost tenfold into Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Drifting from one master to another in search of security and political direction, rough and untutored, politically inexperienced, prone to mutiny, they had had a checkered history. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
These steps included: • iii 1985, replacing Abu Nizar and Abd al-Rahman Isa by members of his own family as signatories of the organiza- tion’s bank accounts in Switzerland and elsewhere; • in August 1986, ousting Abu Nizar from his position as deputy chief and replacing him with the young, slavishly loyal Isam Maraqa (Abu Nizar, as we have seen, was given colleagues, with few exceptions, fell victim to Abu Nidal’s superior strategy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
colleagues were plotting to overthrow him in the autumn of 1987’~ What is certain is that from 1985 onward, he met more resistance from them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They also felt the time had come to distance themselves from terrorism and demanded more of a say in policy making. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Like Habash’s PFLP or Jibril’s PFLP—General Command or the myriad Lebanese resistance groups, they wanted to join the struggle against Israel, which, apart from its repression of Palestini- ans in the occupied territories, still occupied a substantial slice of South Lebanon, from which it regularly mounted raids northward. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
who had entered his high command from Fatah in 1985—and chief among them AtifAbu Bakr, the ideologue of the new “nationalist” trend. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Strikingly cadaverous in face and body, with a stern, inward- the much less powerful job of head of the Organization Directorate); • engineering the organization’s expulsion from Syria in June 1987 by mounting terrorist attacks in Rome, Vienna, Kara- chi, and Istanbul without the Syrians’ knowledge or ap- proval; • splitting the organization between Lebanon and Libya, the better to control it; • demoting Abd al-Rahman Isa in 1987 from head of the Intelligence Directorate to junior cadre and replacing him by Mustafa Awad (Alaa) in Lebanon and Au al-Farra (Dr. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This could have been why he placed in key posts men who shared his vision of a wholly clandestine outfit, living by its own savage laws, and then, with their help, massacred the officers and men who alone could have given his opponents the muscle they needed to mount a serious challenge. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Atif Abu Bakr was determined to expose the whole macabre setup. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nizar accepted the suggestion in good faith, managed to get Libyan passports for his family, and at the end of August 1988, sent them back to Syria. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
error, this time a fatal one. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
And now, he went on, Abu Nidal had become a psychopath! Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
All that day, October 18, Atif expected Abu Nizar to ring or At lunchtime that day, Atif telephoned Abu Nizar’s house in “I sensed that something was up,” Atif Abu Bakr told me in “A few days later, a telegram arrived from Lebanon to say that Atif Abu Bakr had to go to Aden at this time and returned to As there was still no proof that Abu Nizar was dead, his The meeting took place at night in the Andalus quarter of ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 299 300 / PATRICK SEALE Tripoli, in one of the safe houses Abu Nidal sometimes used. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
There was no way out. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Even supposing I managed to reach the street alive, I would not be able to get very far. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But each adversary feared the other’s hidden agenda: Abu Nidal suspected that Abu lyad was scheming to split his organization; Abu lyad was convinced that Abu Nidal was plotting, with encouragement from Israel, to pene- trate the PLO, brand it as a terrorist organization, and destroy it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They sometimes fed him information, but he was trying to liquidate them one by one. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Con- vinced more than ever that the Mossad was directing Abu Nidal’s moves, Abu lyad sought to penetrate his organization and encour- age defections. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Some cadres escaped to Jor- dan, others to the Gulf, to Europe, and to Canada. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
a halt to all propaganda wars between us; “2. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At the second meeting, at a seaside villa closely guarded by Algerian intelligence, Abu Nidal put on a great show of anger: “What sort of an agreement is this?” he asked querulously. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
You want me to shut up and not meddle in anything. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
planted Atif Abu Bakr, an old and crafty Fatah loyalist, on Abu Nidal as an agent provocateur as early as 1985, to provoke an internal explosion in his ranks. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He put up some resistance, but they attacked him with an ax, shot him twice, and made their escape, leaving him for dead. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
These included a prominent Egyptian soldier, General Sa’d al-Din Shazli, who had been President Sadat’s chief of staff during the 1973 October War but, having fallen out with him, had taken refuge in Algeria. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Airport officials, probably Meanwhile, in Algiers, Atif Abu Bakr decided not to meet the “Speaking in Czech, I said to her, ‘Follow my instructions “‘In the meantime, you must leave tonight by road for Tu- So Abu Bakr’s wife left by car with her daughter and their ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 309 310 / PATRICK SEALE refused. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Isa knew the real identity of the cadres; the location of the secret arms caches and bank accounts; the contents of letters Abu Nidal had exchanged with foreign governments and intelli- gence services. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE EMERGENCY LEADERSHIP Abu Bakr was a commanding figure in Palestinian circles, and his defection was a serious blow to Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Anxious to limit the damage, he sent a delegation to Algiers in October 1989 to offer Abu Bakr Swiss visas for himself and his family, full expenses, and a cash bonus of half a million dollars if he would agree to end their quarrel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Abu Bakr But a disappointment awaited her. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Their agenda stated: no to intra-Palestinian killings; no to the language of blood and to futile foreign operations; yes to the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians; yes to full support for the in- tifada. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But this was to misread Abu Nidal, who was too shrewd to back a loser; nor would he choose the same side the PLO chose. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Iraq set him up; Syria took him over; Libya inherited him; whether or not Israel manipulated and exploited him—and at the very least the evidence suggests there is a case to answer—it has certainly benefited from his attacks on the moderate PLO and has The disaster suffered by the PLO and by the Emergency Lead- Arafat’s misfortune was Abu Nidal’s good fortune, although ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 319 320 / PATRICK SEALE done nothing to stop him despite his attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arab leaders have publicly supported the Palestinian cause, but they have, almost without exception, distrusted the PLO, which has often challenged their authority in their own countries, at- tracted Israeli reprisals, and even threatened to drag them into war. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The PLO must share part of the blame for this Arab hostility. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The next Abu Nidal who emerges may not so easily be turned against his own people. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ans, and perhaps all Arabs, will never live in peace with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Many of these problems—Israeli occupation, guerrilla resist- ance, civilian suffering, terror—stem from Israel’s victory in 1967 over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, when it seized great tracts of terri- tory and emerged as an imperial power immeasurably stronger than all its neighbors put together. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Just a few days after the Six-Day War, Deutscher, a Jew and a distinguished anti-Stalinist, told an interviewer (New Left Review, June 23, 1967): “It was only with disgust that I could watch on television the scenes from Israel in those days; the displays of the conquerors’ pride and brutality; the outbursts of chauvinism; and the wild celebrations of the inglorious triumph, all contrasting sharply with the pictures of Arab suffering and desolation, the treks of Jordanian refugees and the bodies of Egyptian soldiers killed by thirst in the desert. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Over the years, I have come to believe that Israel’s long-term security lies not in crushing Palestinian nationalism and the PLO but in coming to terms with them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This book describes a case of dementia. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I have written it to show what bloodstained lunacy goes on behind the scenes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arafat and the PLO, 96, 166, 313—16; and Argov affair, 224-25; Ba’ath party in, 95—97, 109—11, 229—30; Fatah in, 77—80, 84, 85, 88—108, 203, 207, 283; and Gulf War, 32—33, 110, 159, 268, 281, 313—16, 319; Hussein’s rise to power in, 111—13; Abu Nidal’s expulsion from, 123—24; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 77—80, 84, 85, 88—108, 109, 111—24, 148, 151, 164—66, 184, 186, 193, 200—204, 207, 280—81, 282—84, 287; Syrian relations with, 96—97, 106—108, 109, 111, 120—22, 166, 223—25, 242; U.S. relations with, 112 Irgun, 51, 71—72 Irish Republican Army, 229, 254, 271, 272 Isa, Abd al-Rahman, 45, 53, 113, 120—23, 125, 128, 131, 136—37, 145, 243, 255—58, 266—67, 273, 282—83, 286, 294—300, 309—11; in Intelligence Directorate, 187—88 Islamic Association of Libya, 137 Islamic Jihad, 31, 280 Isma’il, Colonel, 132 Israel, 5 and n., 21, 26, 33, 36, 37—42, 50, 102, 104—105, 106, 109, 110, 121, 155, 230; active self-defense policy of, 83, 210—11; and Argov affair, 222—27, 232; Camp David accords, 112, 166, 169; future of, 322—24; and Gulf War (1991), 3 14-16; invasions of Lebanon, 113—16, 131—32, INDEX / 333 140, 148, 159, 189, 222—27, 232, 234, 262, 273; Jordanian relations with, 126—28, 152—53, 251; lists of attacks on Palestinians, 46—50, 232—42; negotiations with Arabs, 50—52, 93—94, 121, 126—28, 132, 142, 152, 160—63, 166—67, 169, 174, 315—16, 320—24; Abu Nidal’s connections with, 43—53, 55, 78, 152—80, 183, 206, 210—27, 246, 257, 264—67, 290, 293, 304, 307, 314, 316—24; 1980s relations with Lebanon, 169, 210—15, 230—42; October War of 1973, 50, 84, 90, 93, 94, 126; penetration of Palestinian groups, 155—59, 210—27; and the PLO, 43—53, 114—16, 142, 152, 155—58, 160—78, 189, 210, 222—27, 231—42, 315—23; Six-Day War (1967), 66, 68, 72, 73, 93, 155, 159, 315, 321; statehood of, 59—63, 68, 159; terrorist and counterterrorist activities with Palestinian groups, 7 1—85, 88, 230—42; U.S. relations with, 83, 94, 111, 114, 223, 232—42; see also Mossad Istanbul, 107, 271; synagogue attacks in, 26, 46, 183, 211, 228, 241, 271 Italy, 32, 54, 105, 187, 206, 271; terrorist attacks in, 46—49, 73, 83, 101, 102, 107, 127, 129, 157, 183, 211, 219, 228, 237—39, 243—47, 271 lyad, Abu, 32—55, 77—80, 84, 90, 93, 95, 101—104, 112, 130, 165, 166, 179, 281, 297—98; and Arafat, 114-16; and Emergency Leadership, 309—12; murder of, 33—35, 36, 38, 39, 312—18; and Abu Nidal, 33—53, 69—71, 77, 78—80, 86, 97—99, 104, 114—16, 166, 174, 227, 246—47, 302—17; and Qaddafi, 147—48, 313—14, 323 lyad, Abu Ali, 81—82, 85 Jabotinsky, Vladimir, 71 Jabr, Mustafa, 89, 90 Jallud, Abd al-Salem, 148 Japanese Red Army, 261, 272 Jarallãh, Ahmad al-, 170 334 / INDEX Jerusalem, 52, 62, 72, 287 Jibril, Ahmad, 41, 44, 76—77, 95, 97, 125, 139, 150, 244, 298, 308 Jihad, Abu, 34, 38, 39, 40-42, 49, 79, 102, 175, 213; murder of, 219 and n., 220n., Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Maliki, Salah al-, 31 Malta, 22, 49, 54, 201, 219, 238, 242, 267 Manara Press, 199—200 Mao Tse-tung, 87—88 Maraqa, Isam, 182, 195, 277, 288, 290—91, 294, 301 Maronites, 106, 140, 159, 224, 230, 233 Marxism, 276 Masri, Zafir al-, 254 Matar, Ahmad Abu, 198—99 Mazin, Abu, 48, 79, 92, 97—98; attempted m Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal, 5, 69—70, 79, 85—86, 92, 96, 97, 99—100, 114—16, 132—35, 151—54, 158, 159—78, 198, 200, 224, 271—72, 302—23; penetration of, 155—78, 210—27; and Qaddafi, 148—49, 313—14; U.S. relations with, 77, 94, 167—68 Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee, 76, 96, 304 Palestine National Charter, 76 Palestine National Council (PNC), 40—41, 43, 76, 93—94, 96, 304; 1974 Cairo meeting, 93; 1983 Algiers meeting, 173; 1984 Amman meeting, 142; 1987 Algiers meeting, 302—307 Palestine National Salvation Front, 303 Palestine Secret Organization, 65, 66 Palestinian resistance movement, 66—90; assassinations in, 46—50, 159—79, 210; internal quarrels, 31, 75—77, 82, 83, 85—86, 94—104, 109, 142, 155, 159—63, 214; Israeli penetration of, 154—78, 210—27; mid-1980s reconciliation in, 142—43; Abu Nidal’s development in, 66—80; terrorist and counterterrorist activities with Israel, 71—85, 88, 230—42; Third Fatah Congress, 85—87, 99; see also specy’ic organizations Pan Am Airline terrorism: flight 103 bombing (Lockerbie), 44, 254—55; 19,76—77,93, 102, 111, 121, 139, 243—47, 271—79; future of, 319; internal quarrels, 31, Karachi hijacking (1986), 183, 192, 228, 241, 252—55, 265; Rome attack (1973), 101, 102 Papandreou, Andreas, 265—66 Paris, 21, 25, 27, 44, 54, 129, 178, 184; terrorist attacks in, 47, 48, 49, 91—92, 106, 129, 157, 159, 165, 184, 270—72, 274 Party of Socialist Action, 131 passports and visas, 21—24, 25, 26, 30, 119, 144, 184, 187, 206—207, 259, 270, 308 People’s Army, 4, 139, 143, 181, 207—209, 214—15, structure and workings of, 207—209 Peres, Shimon, 26, 238, 239, 240, 251 Philippines, 37—38, 94, 190, 192, 261 Poland, 113, 176—78, 204; Abu Nidal in, 119, 125, 134—35, 139, 142—46, 195, 227, 275, 278, 294 Political Bureau, 142, 180—81, 189, 208, 259, 262, 296 Political Directorate, 45, 142, 181, 197—201, 208, 213, 220, 264, 292; structure and workings of, 197—201 Political Relations Committee, 198, 201, 259, 277, 292 Pollard, Jonathan Jay, 238 Popular Arab Movement, 118 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), 7, 41, 47, 48, 74—77, 83, 86, 95, 97, 131, 139, 176, 199, 210, 238, 254, 273, 288, 295 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command, 76—77, 95, 97, 125, 139, 176, 210, 216, 244, 295 Portugal, 49, 158—59, 170, 173, 271—72 Prague, 37, 53, 134, 279 press, 7, 78—80, 85, 98, 117, 122, 125, 182, 197—201, 228—29, 241, 254, 261; see also spec jfic publications Publications Committee, 197—201, 292 Qaddafi, Muammar al-, 3, 5—6, 39, 100, 103, 109, 144, 201, 238—41, 243, 289, 298; and Fatah, 139, 147-49; Green Book, 136—37, 147-48; and killing of Abu lyad, 3 13—14; and Abu Nidal, 136—39, 258, 261—69, 313; and the PLO, 148—49, 313—14; and Silco affair, 267—69; terrorist attacks on, 240, 247 Qaddumi, Faruq, 173 Qaddura, Abu Mustafa, 102 Qadir, Khalid Abd al-, 260 Qaisi, Fadil al-, 212 Qalaq, Izz al-Din, 44, 49, 159, 270, 272; murder of, 165—67, 175, 179 Qasim, All, 33 Qasim, Ghassan Ahmad, 204—205 226, 259, 284, 288, 290, 295; 147—50, 201, 229, 238—39, 245, Qassam, Sheikh Izz al-Din, 60 Qubaisi, Basil al-, 48 Qubrusli, Abir, 189 Rabin, Yitzhak, 160 Rafsanjani, All Akbar, 280 Ramadi training camp, 100, 120, 123, 124 Rashid, Muhammad Hussein, 272 Rashidi, Adnan al-, 170 Rashidiya camp, 269, 311—12 Reagan, Ronald, 52, 223, 229, 232—39 Red Army Faction (Germany), 229 Red Front, 157 Rejection Front, 95 refugee camps, 6, 60—61 and n., 62, 140—42, INDEX / 337 214, 215, 224, 232, 244, 249, 287, 288—89, 311—12; Naji al-All (Libya), 3—3 1, 184, 289; see also spec~fic camps Revolutionary Command Council (Iraq), 77—78, 111 Revolutionary Council, 10, 97, 98, 107, 180; formed by Abu Nidal, 99—100 Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, 235—36, 237, 240, 254 Rimawi, Abdallah, 64, 65 Riyadh, 28, 64, 65, 68—69, 91, 128, 222 Romania, 279 Rome, 21, 184; terrorist attacks in, 46, 47, 48, 49, 73, 83, 101, 102, 107, 127, 129, 157, 183, 211, 219, 228, 237—39, 243—47, 254, 271 Rosan, Nawaf, 223 Roumis, Victor, 24 Sabena jet hijacking (1972), 85 Sabra camp, 232, 244, 245 Sa’d, Mustafa, 214, 312 Sadat, Anwar, 50, 102, 107, 111, 126, 162, 164,253, 311 Sadiq, Dr., 203 Sadr, Imam Musa al-, 140, 313 Sa’id, Ahmad, 33 Sa’id, Haitham, 249, 252, 274 Sa’id, Hisham, 243 Sa’id, Hussein, 223 Sa’id, Nasir al-, 268—69 Sa’iqa, al-, 77, 97, 293 Salahat, Muhammad Khudr, 185 Salameh, All Hasan, 47, 48, 49, 167—68 Salem, Arif, 185 Salih, Abu, 132, 134, 208 Salih, Ali Abdallah, 39 Salih, Mabmud, 49 Samirra’i, Abd al-Khaliq, 77, 79 Sammur, Hani, 243 Samrin, Sulaiman, see Ghassan al-All, Dr. Sanduqa, Mustafa Ibrahim, 206, 209, 217—19, 221, 286, 288 338 / INDEX Sanussi, Abdallah al-, 144, 261 Saqr, Hisham Muhammad, 311 Saqr, Ra’id, 20 Sartawi, Isam, 49, 159, 172—76, 272 SAS, 119, 203 Saudi Arabia, 27, 48, 64—66, 88, 91, 112, 168, 236, 315; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 27—31, 91—92, 106, 128, 184, 204, 222, 280 Sayigh, Anis al-, 47 Schiff, Ze’ev, 155 Scientific Committee, 181, 182—83, 207, 217, 218 Secretariat, 181—85, 209, 218, 259, 261; structure and workings of, 181—85 Shachori, Ami, 47 Shahin, Abu Mi, 66, 154 Shakir, Sa’dun, 80, 100, 111, 166 Shamir, Yitzhak, 71, 160—61, 230, 251, 322 Sharah, Faisal Abu, 237 Sharar, Majid Abu, 49, 219 Sharif, Bassam Abu, 41, 47 Sharon, Ariel, 37—38, 82, 159, 172, 222—23, 227, 322 Shatila camp, 232, 244, 245 Shazli, Sa’d al-Din, 311 Shevardnaze, Eduard, 324 Shin Bet, 155 Sh’ites, 7, 58, 140—44, 210, 214, 226, 230, 233—37, 276, 313 Shultz, George, 233, 234 Shuquairy, Ahmad, 76 Siba’i, Yusuf al-, 164, 253, 266 Sidon, 8, 11, 106, 139, 181, 189, 196, 206, 214, 226, 236, 271, 293, 312 Silco affair, 201, 222, 267—72 Silwani, Dirar Abd al-Fattah al-, 203, 270, 278 Sinai, 48, 66, 72 Six-Day War (1967), 66, 68, 72, 73, 93, 155, 159, 315, 321 Southeast Asian operations of Abu Nidal, 27—31, South Lebanon, 8, 213—15, 236, 281, 285—90, invasions of, 113—14, 132, 226—27, 233; and War of the Camps, 140 Soviet Union, 52, 87, 90, 111, 168, 213, 230, 276, 279, 315 Spain, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 29, 48, 118, 127, 178, 191, 318; Fatah in, 156—58, 191; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 192, 204, 237, 271 Stasi, 277—78 Stern Gang, 60, 71—72, 230 Sudan, 70, 110, 137, 154, 206, 222, 230; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 263—65 Suez War of 1956, 64, 73 192 315; ASALA in, 272—75; Israeli Suffarini, Fu’ad al-, 107, 193—94, 253, 277 Sufyan, 215—17, 218 Sughayyir, Azmi al-, 102 Suwaidi, Muhammad al-, 129—30 Sweden, 271 Switzerland, 187, 204; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 205, 270-7 1, 291, 294 synagogue attacks: in Istanbul, 26, 46, 183, 211, 228, 241, 271; in Vienna, 170, 171 Syria, 16, 27, 36, 39—40, 42, 45, 50, 51, 52, 57—58, 64, 66, 72—73, 75, 77, 93, 112, 140, 155, 157, 169, 214, 222, 315, 320; and Argov affair, 222—27; Ba’ath party in, 109, 120; Fatah in, 88, 96—97, 122, 131, 132; and Hindawi affair, 247—52, 256—57; Iraqi relations with, 96—97, 106—108, 109, 111, 120—22, 166, 223—25, 242; Jordanian relations with, 120—22, 125—28, 145, 147, 151, 153, 223, 250—51; and list of 1980s terrorism, 232—42; Abu Nidal’s expulsion from, 255—57; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 106—109, 111, 112, 119—35, 139, 143—47, 150, 151, 180, 184, 186, 187, 193—98, 201, 220, 224—25, 229, 248—57, 284—85, 287, 293—97, 303; relations with Arafat and the PLO, 132, 134, 223—24 Syrian Airlines, 91, 248; terrorist attacks on, 107, 127, 247—52 Syrian Arab News Agency, 128 Syrian-Egyptian Union (1958), 65 Syrian-Jordanian war, 126—28 Syrian Social Nationalist Party, 226 Takriti, Hardan al-, 78 Tal, Wasfi al-, 81—82, 84, 85, 86, 153 Tamim, Mahmud, 208-209 Tamimi, Ibrahim al-, 200 Tariq, Abu, 49 Tariq, al- (magazine), 26, 182, 259 Technical Committee, 23, 181, 206—207, 248 Tehran, 52, 101, 280—81 Tel Aviv, 46, 47, 60, 61, 73, 77, 83, 85, 157 terrorist and counterterrorist activities, Israeli-Palestinian, 71—85, 88, 230—42 Thailand, 27—31, 192 Thatcher, Margaret, 229, 238, 249, 251, 254 Third Fatah Congress (1971), 85—87, 99 Tlas, Mustafa, 145 torture methods, 286—87 Trieste, 47, 167 Tripoli, 3, 5—6, 8, 20, 21, 22, 27, 30, 31, 38, 103, 132, 137, 143, 147, 235, 239, 240, 242, 278; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 147—SO, 165, 180, 181, 190, 219, 229, 255, 259, 298—301, 303, 308 Tunis, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 49, 53, 54, 102, 160, 175, 219, 231, 237—38, 3 18—19 Tunisia, 3, 26—27, 35, 38—39, 45, 103, 219, 320 Turk, Muhammad Harb al-, 253, 284 Turkey, 57, 94, 105, 107, 127, 186—87, 191, 192, 207, 230, 271, 273—74, 279, 292 TWA jet bombing (1986), 240 Tyre, 9, 232, 236, 311 Ubaid, Abd al-Karim, 226 Udwan, Kamal, 48 Umari, Fakhri al-, 33, 34, 35 UNIFIL, 114 United Arab Emirates, 123, 129—30, 193, 216, 245 United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), 212 United Nations, 51, 224, 226, 236; 1947 partition plan for Palestine, 59—63, 68; 1991 ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, 32, 316 United Nations General Assembly, 94; 1974 Arafat address to, 94, 160; Resolution 181, 59 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 9,236 United Nations Security Council: Resolution 242, 106; Resolution 425, 114 United States, 28, 48, 101, 110, 137, 145, 203, 230; Camp David accords, 112, 166; in Gulf War (1991), 32, 50, 268, 281, 313—16, 319; Irangate scandal, 241—42; Libya attacked by, 149, 238—40, 246—47, 251, 267; Middle East policies of, 40, 50—52, 64, 75, 77, 83, 94, 111, 114, 126, 149, 161, 167—68, 223, 230—42, 257, 267, 313—16 U.S. Marine Corps, 230; attacks on, in Lebanon, 226, 233, 234 Uthman, Faruq and Nabil, 219 Vanunu, Morechai, 241 Vienna, 30, 85, 173, 294; terrorist attacks in, 46, 170, 171, 183, 186, 211, 228, 238—39, 243—47, 254, 278 Vietnam, 73, 94, 117, 315 Voice of Palestine, 78—80 WAFA (Palestinian news agency), 98 Waldheim, Kurt, 92, 114 Walters, Vernon, 50 War of the Camps, 140—44, 159, 195, 208. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
DS119.7.N346 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Many Israelis do not view the Stern and Irgun militias that assassinated and bombed civilians in the 1940s as terrorists, but as soldiers or commandos who often sacrificed their lives for the creation of a homeland and saved Jews from further persecution. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Commandos, guerrillas, terrorists—the names are used interchangeably—are different from criminals since they purportedly seek political change, not financial gain.5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Moreover, terrorism, like war, does not spring from a vacuum but has dis- tinct political causes, and it is unfair to discuss the Irgun’s terrorism against the British without considering the plight of Jews in Europe, or to discuss Palestinian plane hijackings without considering Israel’s treatment of Pales- tinian civilians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From there, perhaps we will be able to conclude whether bombings, assassination, the tak- ing of hostages, and other attacks on civilians advanced or hurt the terrorists’ cause. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Palestine then belonged to the crumbling Ottoman Empire, but toward the end of World War I the British and French made plans to exercise con- trol over the Middle East.’2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Colonial Department appointed Sir Herbert Samuel, a Zionist Jew who helped draft the Balfour Declaration, as governor to Palestine, raising Arab suspicion even though he seemed genuinely concerned for the welfare of the Arab residents, which also earned him resentment from radical Jews.2’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The disturbances of 1920—21 stemmed from spontaneous riots which pit- ted Zionists against anti—Zionists. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The demonstrators demanded control of the Wall, and shouted that the Harem al-Sharif should be destroyed so they could rebuild the Jew- ish Temple. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Passions were inflamed, for Muslims view the Harem al-Sharif as their third holiest shrine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The next day, a Friday and the eve of the Prophet’s birthday, Islamic clerics at al-Aqsa mosque preached fire. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The British authorities had been oblivious to the simmering conflict, declaring just before the fighting that Palestine was “an island of peace.”4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During the 1920 riots the British had kept him from marching—their sole responsible action—then imprisoned him along with the Arab agitators and rapists, arousing his greatest resentment at being treated equally with Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
We will see similar examples of such deception in the Middle East conflict. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In October 1933, Palestinians staged a large demon- stration after Friday prayers in the nationalist town ofJaffa. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Journalists and poets built a romantic mythology about him, inspiring other young men to become guerrillas and continue his war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Violence erupted in Jaffa, already tense from vociferous complaints that new immigrants were taking jobs and lowering Arab salaries. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Although the Arab strike was mainly nonviolent, radical groups began throwing bombs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In Jerusalem and Haifa the city governments ran under a coalition. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Beginning with the 1936 strike, they blew up houses, arrested en masse, executed suspects after sham trials, imposed excessive fines, fired into crowds, and bombed from the air in order to break the strike. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the airport fire the British blew up a row of nearby houses. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Under the guise of a beautification program, the British blew up 220 houses inJaffa and partly destroyed others, making 10,000 people homeless.3’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the Nazis marched across the Polish frontier and war was declared, the Arabs officially ended their revolt and were unable to generate a similar uprising until 1987. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There is no reason to duplicate their work here except to highlight central themes. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Individual officers had wide powers; one officer ordered 1. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The killers confessed that they were sent from Palestine and were hanged on March 22, 1945. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Churchill was furious, and it took a lot of placating from the Jewish community and Dr. Chaim Weizmann to win back British support for a Jewish homeland.15 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Working from Europe between 1946 and 1947, Zionist underground leaders sent over 70 mail bombs in British government envelopes to heads of the government and soldiers who had served in Palestine.’8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
No one else in the hotel knew what was going on. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
My Palestinian father relates the story of how, when he was living in Nazareth, his brother came and told him that since he was a respected man in the community he should buy a rifle to show the people in the neighborhood that they were protected. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was a public relations gesture directed at the neighborhood. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A few months later, he and my mother joined the mass of terrorized Palestinians who were fleeing their homes for safety in Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The massacre was carried out not to destroy the village, which had been peaceful, but to scare other Palestinians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The villagers had made a modest living from the local rock quarry, and when a Palestinian militia had asked to use their village as a base, the villagers had refused. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The gun could have done nothing to forestall the conquering Zionist armies, who by this time had heavy weapons from Czechoslovakia. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
To justify their takeover they had to dehumanize the Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On the eve of statehood, the United Nations appointed a committee to investigate the sit- uation in Palestine, selecting a member of the Swedish royal family, Count Folke Bernadotte, as its head. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli leaders often used disguise: Golda Meir dressed as an Arab woman when she went to meet King Abdullah,’° and Menachem Begin went disguised as an Arab or Rabbi.11 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Although Iraq appeared the most belligerent Arab state, outlawing Zionism and being the only country to refuse to sign the ceasefire treaty, Israelis probably struck deals with Iraqi officials who made it legal and easy for the Jews to emigrate.’7 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Responding to a published letter from an angry Israeli settler, journalist Robert I. Friedman writes, “Israel radio, quoting Israel’s northern district police spokesman Gideon Arbel, reported that the set- tlers, pretending to be marauding Arabs, had attacked Israeli settlers and hurled a firebomb on an Israeli-owned car as a pretext to launch ‘counterat- tacks’ against Arab villages.”24 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The operations against the British were timed to coincide with Anglo-Egyptian negotiations concerning British evacuation from Suez, which Israel opposed, and those against Amer- ican facilities were aimed at destroying the growing friendly relations between Egypt and the United States (President Gamal Abdel Nasser had not yet become the West’s ogre), which included a $50 million aid program and $500 million arms deal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Bombs of nitroglycerin surrounded by acid were put in books and placed on shelves of the United States Information Service and British libraries in Cairo and Alexandria just before closing time. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By chance during the early stage of the operation, 3. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Avraham Seidenberg, who had been court-martialed for stealing from Israeli Arabs, was the group’s supervisor. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As mentioned, the Iraqi agents used in the operation were brought to Israel for training, and by their actions we can guess that they received weapons and combat ~ We know also that Israel brought Jews from Morocco, Yemen, Argentina, and Ethiopia for training and sent them back to their countries. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Raviv and Melman also say that the Mossad brought “young Jewish activists from Argentina and nearby countries to Israel to receive intensive training in self- defense. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
3. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Other areas of possible disguise activity need investigation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As Stew- art Steven says of the Mossad, “The finger which pulled the trigger had been superbly camouflaged.”41 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Jim Muir adds that the Israelis helped fuel the Christian-Druze conflict; Noam Chomsky notes that Israeli soldiers shot into Palestinian camps from Christian areas to incite the Pales- tinians against the Christians, and Israeli patrols forced Christians and Mus- lims at gunpoint to punch one another.51 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abundant oral reports speak of Israel’s fueling the civil war by having agents in a Christian area, disguised as a militia, fire at Druze positions from the tops of buildings, while other agents fired at Christians from Muslim West Beirut. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel’s purpose has been to radicalize and divide the opposition, as is clear from its clandestine and overt activities in Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Passive infiltration focuses on informa- tion collection, while active infiltration involves manipulation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Infiltrating such a group would have been the first priority of the Mossad and one of the most simple tasks. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This is not a diatribe against violence, but invading enemy territory or taking enemy hostages to negotiate the release of prisoners is a world apart from blazing a friendly European air- port. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It is well known that Israel helped arm various factions in Lebanon and gave support to Hamas and radicals in the occupied territories during the 1980s in order to create divisions among Palestinians.60 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
We will see that Israel assassinated moderate leaders, leaving militants alone. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By bombing villages and approaching the Middle East with warlike vengeance, dropping a hundred bombs when one would do, Israel instigated a policy designed to radicalize the region.61 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
fledgling Fatah group, who aimed to blow up a canal that was diverting water from the River Jordan, an issue which had developed into an international dis- pute that Arab countries were too impotent to address. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1963, however, the Arabs discovered that the project had been restarted, and Egypt’s President Nasser, who dominated the Arab world, convened a special meeting of the Arab League to deal with the issue. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Abu Nidal poster of “Military Commu- nique Number One” and the Palestinians who demonstrate on Fatah Day do not discuss the outcome of the heroic act. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All leaders spoke eloquently; Fatah wanted to show the Arab world that unlike the old guard, they were doers, not talkers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The communique, full of Arabic hyperbole, was adopted by the Abu Nidal group a decade later, as was the name al-Ass~fa, without giving credit to its authors. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was news to the Israeli authorities. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By 1956 raids were begun from the West Bank. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His aim was clear: “By early 1955 the growing pres- sure from the paratroop raids was edging Egypt toward a crisis.”’7 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
regaining their homeland, young idealists who rebelled against the passivity of the older generation24 and were later inspired by the July 1962 FLN victory in Algeria that won independence from France through guerrilla war,25 as well Egyptian officers spent six months training 700 Palestinians,’4 from Another major Sharon operation took place against Syria on December When Israel occupied Gaza in 1956, it gave the future Palestinian activists The original group consisted of two dozen with a philosophical idea of Arab and Israeli Terrorism as by the liberation movements in Asia and Africa. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
activities, but Kuwait was too far from Palestine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From the beginning the group invested well and turned over every stonefaced Arab leader to collect money. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By the June 1967 war, Fatah claimed 300 raids, at least twice the actual number, from bases in Lebanon, Syria, and Jor- dan.27 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During that summer these incursions killed or wounded 200 Israelis.16 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Pales- tinians say that the first Fatah casualty was killed not by Israeli soldiers but by a Jordanian border guard, who shot Ahmed Musa in the back after the first raid when he crossed the border back to Jordan, which was hostile to Fatah from the beginning. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The story is often repeated, but its authenticity is ques- tionable; it nevertheless illustrates the level of friction between the Palestin- ian organizations and Arab governments, who continually saw the guerrillas as a threat to their own power but were at the same time trying to glean polit- ical benefit from their cause. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Since its founding in 1866 by Protestant minister Daniel Bliss, the AUB has been fertile ground for liberal, often anti—American, intellectualism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, two men who had left with Jabril, Abu Abbas and Talat Yaqub, broke from the GC in 1977 to form the Palestine Liberation Front (formed March 11, 1978), which was responsible for three grand failures: in summer 1980, 80 PLF men tried to raid Israel in an Aerostat, but it burned shortly after takeoff since it was painted with flamma- ble varnish; in 1985 the PLF was in charge of the Achille Lauro episode, and after the Intifada a large number of PLF men tried to raid Israel in boats but were intercepted. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Thus the guerrillas, unable to work in the occupied territories, massed themselves in Jordan. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Using Jordan as a base, the guerrillas began attacking Israel within months of the 1967 war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Although they suffered heavy casualties—some 125 dead—Fatah killed 25 soldiers and forced the army to turn back, a major victory to Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
With them came two problems that the Palestinians were unable to handle: corruption, and a large number of col- laborators or Israeli agents. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Fatah paid its men $20-SO a month, depending on rank and family, while the PFLP could only afford half that amount. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
John Laffin notes that while from June 1967 to June 1971 the fedayeen claimed to have killed 8619 sol- diers and civilians and destroyed 351 tanks, 88 aircraft, 5331 vehicles and 312 bridges, the Beirut newspaper al-Jarida noted cynically that Israel does not have 312 bridges.36 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Except for isolated incidents, the Israeli Palestinians remained silent and sep- arated from those who fled, and although Fatah and the PFLP tried many times to form cells within Israel with the intention of instigating disruptive operations against the government, they were never successful. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Haddad discovered that he was from a Christian family in Jeru- salem. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He wore a drab, ill- fitting suit and spoke from under a mustache with a thick accent. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Robert Kennedy, like the other candidates, upheld the tradition. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He discussed this with other PFLP leaders, including future terrorist sponsor Ahmed al-Ghafour. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After traveling to and from several European capitals, Haddad decided on the Rome—Tel Aviv route. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They forced the plane to Algiers, as planned, but it received little coverage, far less than the news from Viet- nam. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All the passengers except Israelis were put on flights to Paris and Southern France. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The damage was estimated at $70 million,7 but the tab was picked up by British and American insurance companies. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As well as fighting the Zionist-imperialist enemy, the PFLP was warring against the reactionary Arab states and their society, and involving women was part of that rebellion. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On February 21,1970, a Swissair flight from Zurich to Tel Aviv exploded 15 minutes after taking off, killing 47 people, and another bomb exploded on an Austrian Caravelle, forcing it to turn back for an emergency landing. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel arrested 440 prominent Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (Ha’aretz called the arrests counter-hostages19), at the same time mounting one of its largest invasions into South Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The rebel fighters were located in the villages and refugee camps in north- eastern Jordan, and they were counting on help from Iraq, which had made oral promises of military support to fight the monarchy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Keep- ing them away from battle was a complicated operation involving many fighters who had to be taken away from other duties to protect the passengers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They transported the hostages from the heat of the desert to the Whahdat Refugee Camp near Amman and the Intercontinental. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The conference took place in their Amman office, a bare lightbulb hanging from the ceiling and pic- tures of Ché Guevara and Lenin on the walls. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Only Lebanon provided them refuge—a government too weak to stop them— and the PLO had evidently learned nothing from the Jordanian experience, for their own arrogance began creating the same problems for the organiza- tion in Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They and the other Palestinian groups continued raiding Israel, attacking both military targets and civilians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Joseph Kennedy (son of Robert) was on board, and Lufthansa paid $5 million for the release, the money being divided with South Yemen for their services. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Such profiles tend to be either racist or inaccurate. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Thereafter, hijackings and attacks on airports became more difficult, requiring well-funded, well-organized groups. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From Jordan the ftdayeen carried out hundreds of raids against Israel from their bases. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terrorism did, however, give Palestinians the dark, fearsome image from which they have never been able to escape. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The studies that describe the Black Septem- ber command structure are not accurate since it changed from operation to operation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When discussing terrorism with the Israelis, Nixon startled his hosts by leaping from his seat and declaring that there was only one way to deal with terrorists. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A friend steered Hassan away from the hotel, and when Wasfi arrived a short time later, the gunmen opened fire as soon as he got out of his car. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A few Palestinians had worked on the At least two groups of assassins were waiting for the premier (Abu lyad The action occurred just after the War of Attrition when Egypt and Israel In May 1972 two men and two women took control of a Sabena jet from Black September’s biggest operation was against the 1972 Munich 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was followed by an unsuccessful attempt to kill Jordan’s ambassador to London and a failed hijacking of a Jordanian jet. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The hijackers had time to throw their grenades, but they did not. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Since there was no sign of the gunmen giving up without at least a partial satisfaction of their demands, bloodshed seemed inevitable. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By the time the Israeli guards responded and killed two of the Japanese and wounded the third, the terrorists had killed 27 people, including 16 Catholic pilgrims from Puerto Rico and Aharon Katzir, a physicist in charge of Israel’s nuclear weapons program.’2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A Black September atrocity matching Munich came on March 1, 1973, from a group of gunmen led by Rizig Abu Ghassan, and it also ended in 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It showed how the Palestinian mentality had degenerated, killing others to release a friend. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal often took credit for operations in the name of Black September. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At about the same time, Black September was held responsible for attacks in the United States. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A search of the car revealed stationery containing Black September let- terhead.24 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
David Kimche, an Israeli leader who would later be involved in the Iran-Contra affair, also conducted letter-bomb campaigns on Israel’s behalf, but during the early 1970s covert war fought in Europe and Lebanon, the Mossad aimed at PLO leaders who they claimed were involved in terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Lebanese had formed a committee to investigate Ghassan’s assas- sination. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Everyone in the bar noticed a man and woman having a loud argu- ment in what turned out to be the getaway car parked across the street from the bar. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Only the inefficiency of the local police pre- vented them from getting caught. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
That afternoon Prime Minister Meir told her parliament that Israel would use all methods to defend itself from Arab terrorism abroad.36 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Police thought it was a young group ideologically associated with the Jewish Defense League, almost certainly receiving help from the Mossad for the action.38 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Hamshari was also unguarded. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
We touched on this incident earlier. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
was at the time working on an elegy for Issa Nakha, a colleague who had died a few days before: “The Israeli bullets 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After following their victim for two days, the Israelis decided to attack one night as he and his very pregnant Norwegian wife were walking home from a film. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Two women were part of the team: Sylvia Rafael from South Africa, whom terrorist writers regard as one of the Mossad’s slickest agents—we will meet her again—and Marianne Gladnikoff, a large woman ofjoint Swedish- Israeli citizenship, who had no similar experience. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As he was being questioned by the police he not only told them about the team that killed Benamane, but also bragged that he was part of the group that had stolen 200 tons of enriched uranium from a ship in 1968. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel never apologized and never paid compensation to Benamane’s widow. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In jargon, Mossad operated dirty, and perhaps Lillehammer was not their first mistake; luck and inefficient police kept them from getting caught before. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A month after Lillehammer two Israeli fighter jets grabbed an Iraqi Airways flight as soon as it took off from Beirut and forced it to Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After a four-hour battle, moving from floor to floor, all the hostages, gunmen, and two commandos were killed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They seized 90 children from a nearby school for Israeli cadets in the Gadna community, demanding the release of 26 prisoners, one for each year since statehood, including two Jews convicted of working with the fedayeen. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His father, Khalil, was a middle-class landowner from a normal family of merchants and farmers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sabri’s mother was Khalil’s second wife, much younger than Khalil, a woman of the Alawite sect from Syria’s north coast, and he married her secretly against the wishes of his family. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Other friends doubt Sabri’s Palestin- ian origin, saying that the family came from Egypt. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Khalil owned an orchard in Jaffa (which became a suburb of Tel Aviv), where he grew what became known as Jaffa oranges. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This con- tradicts reports of him being a university graduate.3 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sabri began working as a laborer, specializing as an electrician, and became moderately successful. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
No doubt his desire for gossip partly stemmed from an unhealthy attitude towards sex, seeing it as something dirty. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From this office he was able to meet the essential peo- ple of the Palestinian movement. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He was influenced by the Baath ideology and made several friends in the local underground Baath party. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After Karameh the guerrillas moved their bases away from the Israeli border, making it hard for Israel to hit them, and they operated semi-openly in Jordan—even King Hussein declared that he was a guerrilla. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From those early days, as soon as he proved his organizational ability, he began speaking disparag- ingly about Arafat, whom he had met a few times, as if his aim was to accel- erate a schism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From then on his friends called him Abu Nidal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This qual- ity raises suspicion about Abu Nidal’s real motives from the beginning of his career in the Palestinian movement. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When Abu Daoud took over the office from Abu Nidal— and Abu Daoud was his closest friend—Abu Nidal would not let him see his own file, and took all the files with him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He worked like a petty security officer, unearthing tidbits of gossip that could later be used to threaten or blackmail. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Frank and serious, he Arab and Israeli Terrorism rarely smiled, and he began verbally abusing Abu lyad, Arafat, and Hassan, calling them cowards. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Rise ofAbu Nidal adventures, what they called armed struggle, or pursuing the path of diplo- in conquering all of Palestine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terror attacks on Israel were planned from South Lebanon by Dalan Moghrabi and Abu Jihad, who divided Pales- tine into three regions: the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel proper (what they called inside the 1948 boundaries), with a separate office handling each area. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Without the ability to launch guer- rilla raids, Arafat and his colleagues were forced to change from revolutionar- ies to diplomats. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They instigated more actions than the Israelis reported, but far fewer than the Palestinians boasted. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He compromised, speaking in front of the General Assembly with an empty holster. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The records of the plane and the accident had disappeared from military archives. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
High-ranking Ital- ian officials from the secret service and the defense department—including General Gianadelio Maletti, who fled to South Africa in 1981 after being implicated in another scandal, and Vito Miceli, the head of security—covered up the affair, possibly on orders from government ministers who wanted to avoid more problems for the already troubled government. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Rejectionists * 88 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Moreover, the evidence surrounding the surface-to-air missiles is incom- plete. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The missiles, which disappeared before they could be traced, were assumed to be left over from a failed operation earlier that year in which Pales- tinians were going to shoot down Golda Meir’s plane. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They again demanded the release not only of Abu Daoud from Jordan, but also of the gunmen who took part in the Khartoum operation to free Abu Daoud, plus two of their members imprisoned in Holland and the five gunmen who took part in the Christmas 1973 attack on the Rome airport, all spectacular events. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The gunmen demanded the release of Abu Daoud from Amman. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Identifying themselves as al-Iqab (“punishment”), they held hostage everyone they found. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He jumped from idea to idea, sometimes talking calmly and persuasively, and at other times acting awkward and intro- verted. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was during the Cultural Revolution, and the Chinese promised them a bigger shipment of weapons—$17 million worth—which arrived October 1973 at the port of Basra, too late to be of immediate use in the Yom Kippur War. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Like the Chinese shipment that had arrived too late for the Black September war, they had to be stored in Fatah’s warehouse, located in its training camp an hour’s drive from Baghdad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Fatah kept most weapons in Iraq, even though Abu Nidal was openly rebelling, allowing the weapons to fall under his control as a way of asserting his independence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Iraq also gave Abu Nidal a large piece of wasteland about 10 km from the town of Heet, less than 250 km from Baghdad, on the Euphrates (al-Farat) River, and he made it his center. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
FRC also used an Iraqi military training camp near the city of a!- Arab and Israeli Terrorism
An excellent physical organizer, Abu Nidal began an importing business. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Another interesting per- son who joined the band was Dr. Ghassan, who eventually became the polit- ical director. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He came from a Palestinian family that wanted to think of them- selves more as European than Arab. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They pulled out their weapons, began shooting, and rounded up 150 Western and Arab hostages, taking them to the top floor of the build- ing. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At that time the FRC were calling themselves BlackJune in honor of the Syrian attack on Palestinian positions earlier that year, and they were rebelling against the Riyadh and Cairo Arab League conferences that sanctioned the Syrian intervention in Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The gunmen could have killed many of their hostages, but they chose to fight the attacking army that had turned the luxury hotel into a battlefield. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The possibility of an Iraq-Syria alliance posed a serious threat to Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When Foreign Minister Khaddam came into the airport at the head of a group of dignitaries, including United Arab Emi- rates deputy foreign minister Sayf bin Said al-Ghabash, Khaled pulled out a machine gun from under his robe and fired 15 shots, all of which missed the Syrian minister and killed instead Ghabash.’° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He was new to the FRC but had been a fighter in Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All 300 rooms of the hotel were occupied at the time of the attack. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The gunmen had no time to dictate their demands; orders from the gov- ernment, probably directly from the king’s mouth, came immediately. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A 19-year-old Palestinian, Salah Mohammed Khaled, who had recently Semiramis Hotel, Damascus, raided by FRC gunmen. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He received his weapon from his contact in Abu Dhabi in the usual FRC manner. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal’s doctor also recommended that he stay away from hot weather, During Abu Nidal’s time in hospital the differences in his own organi- Shortly after, the FRC engineered a mini-war between the PLO and 9. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
If it had not been for the massive airlift of military hardware from the United States as well as the bullheaded determination of Sadat not to return armor units to attack a Sharon counter-offensive, Israel might have suffered significant territorial losses. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It means collecting information about a country’s finances, personal histories of leaders, imports and exports, ethnic divisions, migration between city and country, standards of military training, relations with other countries, past hostilities, and potentials for social unrest. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Tedious work, involving graphs and statistics, reports about social and political conditions, military invasion and defense plans: that is good intelli- gence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Obtaining recruits is a science that Israel has developed extensively. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A PLO military leader told me the story of a young man arrested by Israel in the West Bank when he was about 17. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But collaborating with an enemy is like an addictive drug, and the fellow continued stumbling. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His interrogators dis- covered that he was clever, the leader of the group of boys, and they recruited him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Since then he was on the pay of the Deuxième Bureau, according to his confession, taking 1500 Lebanese pounds ($500) a month. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The killing happened shortly after the introduction of a Middle East peace initiative.3 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In June 1976 the PLO helped the United States evacuate 263 Western- ers from Beirut, and President Gerald Ford publicly expressed his gratitude, an unusual acknowledgment.4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A flamboyant man with an I.Q of 180, he was educated in the Sorbonne. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel was trying to form an alliance with the Christians againsi the PLO, and a close relation with the CIA was exclusively Israel’s territory. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Some came into Beirut with Canadian and British passports.6 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
button on the powerful bomb. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After Asad’s coup succeeded, Mohsin anxiously expected his reward. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The government treated Palestinians with suspicion, often arresting and torturing activists who did not openly profess the party line and display Asad’s photo. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Although the PFLP and DFLP kept their headquarters in Damascus, they had strong differences with the government, and many of their people have been jailed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mohsin’s brother, Majeed, who was appointed by the PLO to investigate the killing of his brother, came to no conclusion, although the PLO blamed Israel as they always do. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It seems that an Egyptian followed Mohsin from Liberia and tipped off the Mossad on his whereabouts. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sadat had taken al-Abram’s Sebai with him to Jerusalem. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Khadar, Zayeed, and their captives were put on the Cyprus Airlines plane, but after flying to neighboring Arab countries they discovered no one ready to accept them. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israelis could at any time blackmail Rashid by threatening to expose him as a traitor who received his towjehi from the enemy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A Palestinian who understood the West—he had lived in Belgium since before the 1967 war and married a Belgium woman— he became friends with journalists and government officials. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He grew up among a family of priests, but he went into pol- itics, taking his Ph.D. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In early 1981 the leftist Khader met Arafat in Beirut to try again to start negotiations with Israel, and he was shot just after he made an appointment with prominent Israelis.2’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the summer of 1978 a lone FRC gunman assassinated the PLO rep- resentative in Kuwait, Ali Nasser Yassine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
El Al security men took out their weapons and returned the fire, stopping the gunmen from throwing their grenades. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Toward the end of 1979 Arabs attacked the Israeli ambassador in Portu- gal as he was arriving from work. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They use an array of hiding places, from caves in forests to closets in apartments. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Gunmen think they will die as martyrs, or that the group will protect them from harm. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He then ran down the street with his machine gun until the police leapt on top of him and disarmed him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Both organizations were able to operate quite freely, recruiting Palestinian and North African students who were having difficulties. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Someone called a newspaper and said that it was an action of the PFLP. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Austria. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One of the businessmen attend- ing the service had an armed bodyguard who ran out and wounded one of the Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The other two were both arrested, and the one from Iraq confessed that he had also killed Nittal.1’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Some terrorism experts believed that Nasser did act on his own, but individuals cannot obtain grenades in a foreign country, know the location of their targets from abroad, and buy fake passports. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Europe, stirring up anti—Semitism and showing the Palestinians as uncivilized and cruel, the neo—Nazis. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They provided opposing militias with weapons, and from the tops of buildings agents disguised as militias would fire rockets at opposing areas in order to provoke a response and violate a ceasefire. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The gunmen had an informer at the airport telling them when the El Al flight from New York arrived. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The second walked away coolly, but the third, Fahad Muhil al-Din, a Jerusalem-born Palestinian, was caught running from the scene and given a life sentence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Fifty thousand Palestini- ans and 175,000 Lebanese fled from the south; thousands were killed.”12 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
William Polk believes that this need “resulted from Israeli fears that the United States was on the brink of a peace initiative” after the withdrawal from Sinai in April.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Shortly after the Paris killing and two weeks before the complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (April 25, 1982) United States satellite photos showed Israel massing troops on its northern border. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sharon passed the plan to United States secretary of state Alexan- der Haig for his approval, which he gave on the condition that Israel attack only when it had a clear provocation, stating that an attack from Jordan would not be justified.’9 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In February the Syrians brutally put down a revolt in the city of Hama by the Muslim Brothers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the late afternoon of June 3, 1982, Argov, back in London, accepted an invitation to attend a reception of ambassadors given that evening at the Dorcester Hotel by the De La Due textile company. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
politics. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The recruiter asked nothing of him, just helped him out of a tight situation, and in Sep- tember arranged for him to go to London. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Rosan told Said that his duty as a brave Palestinian was to shoot the man that got into a certain car. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The 1956 Sinai invasion was timed during the Hungarian revolt and came at the 13. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They felt that they had permission from the United States and kept their army near the border, waiting for a pretext. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The FRC sent him on two visits to Baghdad, then gave him the job of keeping weapons in his apartment. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Several people, possibly agents, were speaking against Arafat, influenc- ing Said, prodding him to make some action to liberate Palestine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As the Israeli army was surrounding Beirut, the world’s press suddenly begun depicting the Israelis as ruthless aggressors, not valiant pioneers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the aftermath of the Lebanon invasion a few more Palestinian leaders who were effectively presenting their case before the world were killed by the FRC and Mossad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Two PLO leaders were assassinated in Rome by the JDL operating from the information and assistance of the Mossad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Either Dani’s car was booby-trapped or a bomb was thrown at it. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
No one could tell Sartawi anything different from what he believed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
war, stating his position for recognition and negotiation, but especially after the brutality of Israel’s war, Sartawi’s position outraged most PNC members, who used a technicality to prevent him from formally addressing the PNC. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Many world lead- ers were there, heads of socialist parties around the world, including Israeli leader Shimon Peres, who told the delegates that they should not allow ter- rorists a stage and successfully prevented Sartawi from addressing the confer- ence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He knew the West; he had graduated from Ohio State Medical School and become a competent heart surgeon, a founder of the Palestine Red Crescent, Sartawi made a habit of angering people. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It is difficult to believe that the FRC could know that Sartawi was going to attend the Socialist convention in Lisbon and then gather detailed information about the best assassination plan without outside help. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
13. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It is a large flat in one of the best districts of Damascus near al-Umaeen Square, not far from the main embassy area. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He’s dressed in a dark casual suit imported from France. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The sun is beginning to give off its light from behind the bare brown mountains east of the city. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They walked from opposite directions after small yellow taxis dropped them off at intersections a couple of blocks away; then they walked down the street to the house. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Most The sixteenth person to arrive from the 27-member body is Dr. Ghassan It’s the end of deadtime. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Bakr, a short, small-framed man, wears dark-rimmed glasses that make his long, thin face seem gloomy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They always met during deadtime, early in the morning or late at night, when few people notice who walks the streets. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Those bodies never met at one of Abu Nidal’s two villas in Zabadany, 30 km from Damascus, but the Politburo did meet in one of Abu Nidal’s four flats in the city. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The group will continue to work from Damascus until former United States president Jimmy Carter on a private visit presents Syrian president Assad a confidential report from Pakistani president Zia al-Haq about FRC’s murderous 1986 attack on a Pan American Jumbo. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He’s going to pursue this one to find out if there is a possibility of truth to the rumor, and if there is, Abu Nidal will exploit it. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
People shuffle papers, though no one looks as nervous as the leader, who feels uncomfortably trapped. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The technical aspects of the operation were left to Murad, head of the intelligence department responsible for outside opera- tions, but the idea for the operation came from either Abu Nidal or Dr. Ghas- san. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In both Rome and Athens the gunmen received their arms from non—Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Murad would have picked the gunmen to send to Rome and Athens as well as their handlers or liaisons. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A couple of people add short, pointed com- ments on the theoretical reasons for the Amal blockade and the Syrian posi- tion, and the others nod their heads. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
figures or practical news about the group’s many investments. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
he remains visibly upset most of the morning. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1985 and 1986 the well-orchestrated Middle East terrorism scare would The terrorism scare received impetus from a host of terrorism experts who This was the only period since the Wadi Haddad hijackings when other Many of the terrorist attacks of this period were directed against Jordan. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
FRC concentrated its attacks on Rome and Athens where they had active cells and stores of arms, the one in Rome being administered by a non—Arab. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In a coordinated attack on March 21, 1985, the offices of the Royal Jor- danian Airlines (Alia) in Rome, Athens, and Nicosia were rocked by small explosions. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Callers to news agencies again announced the work of Black September, promising more bombs.1’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
For- mer members speculate that Abu Nidal’s hatred for women is also responsi- ble for this policy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
in Lebanon, ripe areas for bringing in the dissatisfied, the poor, the weary. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During the attack on Alia in Madrid just mentioned, FRC terrorists simultaneously bombed the British Airways office, killing one Spanish woman and injuring 26.’~ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During that month bombs were beginning to explode in Amman, and on November 7 the FRC tried to storm the Jordan- ian embassy in Athens, killing a security guard and wounding a diplomat. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The large device threw metal fragments into the bodies of about two dozen British, German, Brazilian, and Argentinean tourists.20 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The attack received far more publicity than the Israeli expulsion a day earlier of 18 ex-prisoners released in an exchange, contrary to the exchange’s terms.2’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Another of the Lebanese recruits who was trained in the use of an AK- 47 before he could shave was sent to Rome. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The other two, Khaled al-Khatib and Abd al-Khalim al- Khalifa, came from Beirut refugee camps and had joined Force 17 a few years before. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel had been planning to bomb the PLO for months, allegedly using information that Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard pilfered from his job as United States Navy analyst to arrange the attack.33 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This followed another major Haddad mistake when his men were stopped at a border because their forged French passports had Swiss visas. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The gunmen, today in prison near Genova, believed this to be the case as well. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli inspectors with walkie talkies usually come onto the ship from a small boat as it is entering the port, and they screen passengers on the ship. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The public relations fallout from Achille Lauro nullified all the sympathy that the Palestinians had gained during the Lebanon invasion. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States government requested that the hijackers be turned over to them, but the Egyptian gov- ernment issued a statement the next day that they had left the country. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The second mes- sage said that the hijackers plus Abu Abbas were going to be on an Air Egypt flight to Algeria.40 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Other European countries felt that the use of a NATO base for American revenge was uncalled for: NATO bases should be run by NATO for the defense of Europe, not by the Americans for their private war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Italians freed Abu Abbas, to the outrage of the Americans. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was a masterful, multimillion-dollar operation to capture four gunmen from the Abu Abbas organization, involving the president, state department, and Pentagon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
These operations were planned by Mustafa Murad and Samir Khader, with help from Abd al-Rahman. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The liaisons told the Rome attackers that the terminal would be full of Israeli pilots, passing through Rome on their way home from training in the United States, and that it was their duty to kill them all since pilots kill Palestinians in the refugee camps. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Everyone in the United States government declined to comment. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel immediately gave the Germans intelligence informa- tion on how the bombing was a Syrian plot for which a Syrian air force intel- ligence deputy, Lieutenant-Colonel Haitham Said, was responsible, and West Germany temporarily withdrew its ambassador in Damascus over the incident. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger said that American MPs had been minutes away from saving La Belle since they were going around clearing Berlin bars of American servicemen. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In reality the raid was a sham, a grudge killing resulting from an irrational hatred that gen- erated more Arab-Western friction, later avenged by the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.9 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
North sent a letter to Congress about the Abu Nidal threat, which he cited as justification for using thousands of dollars from weapon sales to Iran to install a home security system.~ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Murphy, unwittingly tried to sneak a bomb aboard an El Al flight from Heathrow to Tel Aviv. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It is not possible to see how the bombing or attempted bombing of an El Al jet would help Syria. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1983 Abu Musa’s chief political thinker, Abu Khalid al-Amleh, began negotiating secretly in the Bakaa Valley with Abu Nidal leaders Dr. Ghassan and Mustafa Murad, plan- ning the anti—Arafat takeover. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He became an extremist, suspected by many to be a Mossad agent. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
sion, and in 1986 the Soviet bloc countries tried to heal the rift by arranging meetings of the different factions in various East European capitals. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Finally, in early 1987 the PLO looked as if it would again be united. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All the main characters of the Executive Committee and a few other leaders are standing close together and smiling, with Arafat in the middle surrounded by Abu Jihad and Abu lyad, Habash and so forth. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His family had been collaborators and done well for themselves. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They came from the town of Silwan just outside Jerusalem and thought the Arabs were a backward lot. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They gave him an apartment in Beirut and put money in his pocket so he could spend it in front of other people. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Force 17 personnel sit in offices pretending to be central to the struggle to liberate Pal- estine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Police thought they were going to kill PLO representative Aweida, but they were actually being cultivated for a Jordanian target. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But the PLO had already been burned by that trick, and after a couple of cold showers Usta admitted that the Mossad had given him the line about wanting to confess, with bits of unimportant information to spill, in order to win the confidence The Mossad sent Sowan to other cities, including Paris in 1982. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He came to London and tried to become active with other Palestinians, helping the PLO office whenever he could. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Finally, he arranged a dia- logue between Abu lyad and Abu Nidal, and they are said to have talked for 20 hours (perhaps an Arab exaggeration). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
PLO representative Fiasal Aweida claims he also knew Sowan was a spy the first time he met him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There is a revealing picture of the PLO leadership taken in a hotel lobby during the conference. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He is a big man, standing with the pack and smil- ing. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He wanted to study abroad and have a good time, meet women. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Another brother also passed information, sometimes making up stories for extra pay. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Questionable 1980s 171 172 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Three PLO officials killed by car bomb in Limassol, Cyprus, February 1988. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Nine died in that attack. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
I talked to people who knew Abu Nidal as a young man, and to those who left The Business of the FRC The Terrorist and the policeman both come from the same bas- ket. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Other gov- ernments benefit from the work of Abu Nidal, since he helped avoid the cre- ation of a Palestinian state. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Any time there is a massacre or an assassination, people instinctively turn away from what is frightening and insecure and toward what is safe: the status quo. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Everyone believes one or the other; I have never met anyone apart from members who believes FRC is clean,10 and no one dis- putes that his power comes from his money. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Where did he get this money? Ostensible sources would include sponsorship, first from Iraq, then Syria, then Libya. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal is thought to have tens of millions of dollars, perhaps up to $200 million. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Business of the FRC 177 178 Arab and Israeli Terrorism sales. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, it is impossible that he should have amassed such a fortune from those means. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal told members who left that he received more than a mil- lion dollars a month from Iraq, but 50,000 dinars is probably accurate, and he may have not gotten it every month; the PLO generally had to chase down Arab heads of state in an often unsuccessful attempt to translate their pledges into cash, and FRC likely met with the same sort of difficulty. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A monthly 50,000 dinars was barely enough to meet Abu Nidal’s expenses, even though the FRC had been a streamlined organization from the beginning, and his expenses were low (unlike the PFLP or Fatah, which have thousands of men on their payroll and need to maintain hundreds of build- ings and vehicles). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He built an import-export business in several cities, deal- ing with everything from cans of green beans to crates of hand grenades. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The branch was run by a man named Musa Mohammed Mufeed, a Palestinian who 17. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Warsaw office was the most important, apart from Baghdad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As head of the Polish branch called SAS (the Arabs pro- nounce it “Sash”), which operated in the Intraco building on Stawski Street in Warsaw and had a branch in London, he traveled throughout Europe on busi- ness, largely dealing in weapons.13 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After in-depth scrutiny by journalists covering the Iran-Contra affair, we know many of the channels of weapons sales, the principal arms dealers, the shipping routes where arms were directed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Defectors say that Saudi Arabia made only one payment of $5 million. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
For example, in addition to government contributions and invest- ments, the PLO collects a tax from Palestinian workers in Arab countries. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ahmed Jabril receives money from Syria, but the Syrians are intelligent enough not to give the group more than it needs to cover expenses. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They would not want Jabril to act inde- pendently. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After Saddam Hussein seized power in Iraq, Abu Nidal stopped receiv- ing money from the Iraqi government. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Because of the strict rent control laws in Lebanon coupled with an extreme deflation of the Lebanese pound, the apart- ments in Lebanon proved to be sour investments. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was also responsible for taking over (from the political department) secret relations with other countries and groups if those relations reached a stage of cooperation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A person could be chosen by the intelligence department, at which point he would be isolated from the military department and then transferred. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All information from the Politburo, Central Committee, and Rev- olutionary Council passed through this department, making it a store of infor- mation that served as an internal security net. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
With the organization divided so strictly, it would be possible to work next to someone for 10 years and not know anything about him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The FRC membership roll varied from period to period. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the group was in Iraq, from 1974 to the 1978 split, it had between 300 and 400 members. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From Hollywood, dark-skinned, masked Arabs mounted an onscreen cam- paign of destruction against the Western world but were stopped by methodical and dedicated American and Israeli agents who ridded the world of their menace. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Because the soldiers encircled the plane and came at it from all sides, they also killed each other as they attacked. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Surely, during this frenzy it was difficult to think straight. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mean- while, as the ship was under the control of the gunmen, the JDL planted a bomb at the Los Angeles office of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, killing a 41-year-old Arab American, Alex Odeh. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The shells from these guns are as heavy as a small car, and because they are fired from such a distance, they have little accuracy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
thing on their plate by threatening, “The New Jersey will get you if you don’t.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Secretary of State George Shultz claimed that the New Jersey was protecting United States citizens. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Who was more effective? about the Marine bombing beforehand.26 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At the time, the ship was happily sailing a couple of miles off the island of Aegina, about 90 minutes from its home port at the Trocadero Marina near Piraeus, the spot where the ship was about to land and where the car blew up. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Their most sophisticated function had been handling fishing disputes from their impressive office at the head of the port, where a few well-mean- ing, pot-bellied, middle-aged men pass their days reading newspapers, drink- ing coffee, and occasionally filling in forms—a low-anxiety job, even by Greek standards—but they welcomed this new opportunity to demonstrate their abil- ity. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The FRC was involved in this, but Greek sources say that at least two A search ofJaballa’s hotel near the marina found traces of plastic explo- 19. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Guns and gossip flew through Athens. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
terrorist activity in Greece. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Assad staged by the Syrian military, resulting in the execution of 21 Syrian air force officers and the arrest of 300 Palestinians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A lone FRC gunman,Jihad al-Amari, a member of the Revolutionary Council, shot Nimri and ran away. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
attacks against Palestinian military leaders rather than activate the cumbersome and unreliable FRC. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In June 1986 they got word from informers in the Greek government that a PLO chief of military operations in the occupied territories was in town. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Because of either police incompetence or a desire to avoid a complicated diplo- matic incident, the man disappeared. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Local crime reporters say that he was taken to the airport and shipped away by Mossad agents working with Greek security, the ones who originally found out from immigration that he had come into the country.4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The style was similar to the Mossad killing ofMajed Abu Sharara in 1981, but the motive was similar to the August 1983 killing of Mamoun Mreich. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The new Abu Ghazalah had the mentality of a farmer, trusting and polite, lacking Despite security incompetence, Abu Ghazalah was in a position that Mreich, working for Abu Jihad, was also in Athens, posing as a Moroc- 19. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But there seems to be no doubt that he was being followed by the Mossad, prob- ably trailed from Tunis, and this killing seems to have involved direct coordi- nation between FRC and Mossad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
I was the only one who had rela- tions with Eastern European countries. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Greece 199 200 Arab and Israeli Terrorism The Mossad had FRC agents in the city, and according to Abu Bakr and the United States State Department, Mreich was killed by Abu Nidal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
I didn’t have the idea of destroying them from the beginning, but I became convinced that they are one of the main obstacles and dangers to the Pales- tinians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
T Bakr—issued a statement saying that they were beginning a corrective move- ment of the FRC because of Abu Nidal’s role in crimes and terrorism, because he made all the decisions by himself, and because he kept money in Swiss banks under his name and the names of his family.’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The next day, after a 9-hour battle, 40 FRC men surrendered to Fatah. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal, however, continued to 20. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Departure ofAbu Bakr and the Death ofAbu lyad 203 204 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Abu Iyad, PLO’S number-two man, killed on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One of those who defected was 28-year-old Hamza Abu Zeid, who went to Abu Bakr in Tunis and said that he wanted to join him in eliminating Abu Nidal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the assassination of Abu Jihad, the two most well-guarded officials in Tunis were Arafat and Abu Iyad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In April 1980 an FRC member named Samir Najib threw a bomb at a Mercedes in which Abu lyad was riding in Belgrade4 (Najib left the FRC during the 1989 split, escaping to Jordan). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The wars they instigated led to further disappointment and further lost territory. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Because of infighting and Israeli security measures, the Palestinians turned to terrorist attacks abroad, and it is debatable whether this helped the Arabs by keeping their cause alive or hurt them by giving them a bad reputation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Regarding post—1974 Arab terrorism, the principal actor has been Abu Nidal, and after studying his group and its activities, there should be no ques- tion that it was run by the Mossad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Hijacking planes, taking hostages, planting bombs, or launch- ing cross-border raids with a half-dozen men are the forms of war open to them, and during the past decades we have seen many such activities from groups fighting for their causes: the Basques, Kurds, Northern Irish, Corsicans, and Sikhs, to mention only a few of the parties to confficts which have ethnic origins. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Regarding the late 1960s, Chaliand observes, “For the Palestinians ... the use of transna- tional terrorism was also an admission of powerlessness.”7 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As a cheap form of war, terrorists have concentrated on easy targets such as unguarded leaders. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Equally, military attacks by legitimate armies cannot be considered in the same light as terrorist actions. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Refusing to negotiate has not diminished the amount of violence, and there is no evidence that “giving in” in hostage situ- ations encourages more terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
210 Arab and Israeli Terrorism West Bank woman who had part of her house sealed by the Israeli military when hex son was imprisoned on security charges. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the Middle East, terrorism became a form of war for the less power- ful, and it cannot be properly discussed without considering the military actions of the enemy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
lowing behind it. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Hacker adds: “The terms ‘criminal’ and ‘crazy’ are labels that Robert 0. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
T.E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Doubleday, 1926). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
18. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The actual number of killed and injured varies slightly from source to 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
from 1957 Hebrew edition by H.A.G. Shucklev (London: Robert Hale, 1964), p. 75. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Shlomo Hillel, Operation Babylon: The Story of the Rescue of the Jews oflraq (New Yoric Doubleday, 1987, pp. 8—9, claims that the Struma was probably sunk by a torpedo from a Soviet submarine, and in the case of the Patria, “someone mis- calculated” the amount of explosives. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
from the Swedish by Joan Bul- man (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), p. 208: “The Arabs are still Enemy No. 1. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Hirst, pp. 151—52; Howard M. Suchar, A History oflsrael: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976), pp. 336—38. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
(Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 184—86. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
from the Hebrew (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win- ston, 1966), p. 116; Gurion, pp. 65, 87, 137. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Tad Szulc, The SecretAiiance: The Extraordinary Story of the Rescue of the ward corrupt Imman Ahmed li-din Allah of Yemen, who would send his army to stop a school from opening before he would defend his palace, almost certainly received money from Israel, and all emigrants’ property was confiscated. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Payne, p. 81, says that between 1967 and 1970 wars there were 5840 raids launched from Jordan, resulting in the killing of 141 Israelis and the wounding of 800. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Georges Corm, Fragmentation of the Middle East, trans. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
10. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This, I believe, is the only time Israel, who is thought to have been responsible, targeted a radical Palestinian. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
See Raymond Palmer, The Making of a Spy (Crescent, 1977), p. 121; Deacon, pp. 162-67; Intelligence Newslet- ter no. 122, 7 June 1989, p. 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chapter 8 1. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
(London: Hod- 2. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On 17 September 1982 two men from Black March again tossed a grenade at Zaventem Airport, wounding six. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They are at the heart of international terrorism, a thing that will destroy civilization if it is not stopped.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Posner, P. 213, says a Norwegian newspaper broke the story citing an Israeli government source, but Posner claims to have had a lettert from Rafael since then. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This book suffers from strong anti—Israeli propaganda. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The F-14s came from the Saratoga. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chapter 17 1. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Norman Antokol and Mayer Nudell, No One a Neutral: Political Hostage- Taking in the Modern World(Ohio: Alpha Publications, 1990), P. 25. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Corriera della Sera, 7 September 1989, p. 8: One of Abu Nidal’s men, identified by the false name Khalid Hassan Tamer Birawi, was arrested by Italian police along with members of the PCC (Fighting Communist Party), showing a link between the groups. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
214—20, discusses accounts from the Abu Bakr camp United States, Department of State, Factsheet, “Abu Nidal Organization Reader’s Digest, October 1986, p. 204. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
court in Jerusalem ruled that Manning and his wife, Rachel, must be extradited to the United States to face charges of murdering Patricia Wilkerson, who died from a 1980 letter bomb. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
United States, Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1988,” To use an example from International Affairs (an English version of a This is described in Meade. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
from Swedish by Joan Bulman. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terrorism: From Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
from French. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
from Hebrew. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
from German by Martha Humphreys. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Middle East from the Iran-Contra Affair to the Int~fada. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New York: Praeger, 1987. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Operation Moses: The Story of the Exodus of the Falasha Jews from Ethiopia. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
For Lust of Knowing: Memoirs of an Intelligence Officer. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New Rudolph, Harold. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Khomeini and Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Papers from a symposium held in July 1983 by Exeter University’s Centre for Arab Gulf Studies. Comtemporary Yemen
The 1962 revolution which set up the YAR and the withdrawal in 1967 of the British colonial authorities from what became the PDRY are rightly treated throughout this book as having an importance beyond mere national boundaries. Comtemporary Yemen
But the Yemeni point of view has been even less heard in the English- speaking world, and the symposium was the first of its kind in having official participation from North and South. Comtemporary Yemen
The opportu- nity was not lost; there are in this book accounts and analyses of events which are radically different from the customary treatment in Western (especially British) publications and they illustrate the great ix x Preface value of first-hand experience and involvement. Comtemporary Yemen
In the nature of things the two volumes cannot claim to provide a systematic coverage of all aspects of contemporary Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
The editor’s role has therefore been minimal; the contributions are basically in the form in which they were presented and no attempt has been made to modify one in the light of another. Comtemporary Yemen
For successfully gathering together from many countries so much expertise on the Yemen and harnessing it to a well-conceived spread of subjects my thanks go to Professor M. A. Shaban, the Director of the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, who chaired the symposium, and to Mr H. G. Balfour-Paul, who organised it from first to last. Comtemporary Yemen
We are fortunate that Yemen offers us such a wealth of textual materials from both its pre-Islamic and Islamic periods; materials that permit us to construct fairly accurately throughout its history a detailed and well-documented sociology of Islam, and especially the Islamic sects that settled in Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
The evidence is overwhelming, in fact, that Yemen’s initial allegiance to Islam was at best only superficial. Comtemporary Yemen
When we examine Yemen in its Islamic period, more than thirteen centuries, it can indeed be said that the severe geographical con- straints of Yemen’s physical geography are for all intents and pur- poses immutable. Comtemporary Yemen
Allied with this society was that of TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF THE ISLAM ISATION OF YEMEN D. Thomas Gochenour ii ne reste pas moms que la doctrine elle-méme apparait I 2 Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen the traditional Northern Arab nomadic tribes. Comtemporary Yemen
Neither of these two societies was well established in any part of Yemen in the early seventh century AD. Comtemporary Yemen
We have to look to the concurrent arrivals of the Zaidi and the Isma’ili-Fatimid da ‘was in the late ninth century AD (third century hijra) to find the true beginnings of the thorough Islamisation of Yemeni society. Comtemporary Yemen
But we first must understand the nature of that society before we can assume the processes by which Islam became the dominant social determinant of all or most of Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
In pre-modern societies, such as Yemen’s until just a few years ago, geographical determi- nants often play the greatest part in shaping the character, organisa- tion and potentiality of a society. Comtemporary Yemen
They are as easily perceptible today as they are from recent historical commentary or from our oldest historical descriptions of the country. Comtemporary Yemen
In the first three centuries of Islam, after the Arab conquests and after the great caliphates moved the centre of Islamic activity far from Yemen, it can be fairly said that Yemen became a backwater and that Islam and Islamic instruction were restricted to a handful of key towns and cities, such as San’a’, Janad, Aden and Zabid. Comtemporary Yemen
It is my assumption that the last major change in the geographical features that imprinted a dis- tinct shape on Yemeni society was the collapse of the irrigation systems around Ma’rib with the subsequent demise of a large, sedentary, agricultural society on the Eastern Slope of Yemen some 1,500 years ago. Comtemporary Yemen
Nomadic tribes entered the Tihama, pillaging and dis- rupting its trade routes, from at least the year AD 500,2 and they remained an important, albeit unstable, part of the population until Imam Ahmad was finally able to crush the nomadic tribes called the Zaraniq in the 1950s.~ Comtemporary Yemen
The Eastern Slope conforms to what in antiquity has been called the Sayhad basin,6 that is those areas lying east and north of a line that is equivalent to the 1,700-metre line, including the eastern Jawf. Comtemporary Yemen
Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen 5 6 Towards a Sociology of the Islam isation of Yemen The Northern Highlands is an area of high, rocky plateaus and basins that is interrupted by many peaks and occasional volcanism. Comtemporary Yemen
The entire area is on average more than 2,000 metres above sea level. Comtemporary Yemen
In general, in the medieval period, Yemen consisted of five distinct ecological zones; regions defined as much by landscape and topography as they are by factors such as soil fertility, average annual rainfall and its distribution, or the length of growing seasons. Comtemporary Yemen
These zones are: the Eastern Slope and Desert, the Northern Highlands, the Southern Highlands and wadi bottoms, the Western Mountains and wadis, and the Tihama. Comtemporary Yemen
Figure 1 1: Yemen’s Ecological Zones Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen 3 4 Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen Figure 1 .2: Comtemporary Yemen
Medieval Yemen The Tihama or coastal plain running from AsirtoAbyan is familiar to everyone for its torrid climate, humid yet nearly rainless weather, its fertile soils and its drab topography. Comtemporary Yemen
The ease of transport due to the flat terrain and the two chief entrepôts of Aden and Zabid — the latter with its port of al-Ghulaifiqa — ensured the area a secure and lucrative income from the transit trade. Comtemporary Yemen
They of course tried to settle in places other than the tribal hijras outside the Northern Highlands, most notably in San’a’, but outside of the tribal lands they were never able to live in as much security and freedom from persecution. Comtemporary Yemen
In addition, Imam al-Hadi and other Imams after him had the assistance of other groups of immigrants who were adherents of the Zaidi cause: Tabaristanis, Dailamites, shi’ites seeking refuge from Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen 9 ~~____ 10 Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen the persecution of the Abbasid regime and scholars who had studied Mu’tazilite thought in Kufa or Basra and wanted to continue their studies with Zaidi scholars in Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
From their ranks came the Zaidis’ most loyal soldiers and as a group these people played a crucial role in teaching Islam and Zaidi doctrine. Comtemporary Yemen
But unlike the sayyids, the Zaidis from this group of immigrants had to assimilate into Yemeni society however they could. Comtemporary Yemen
In other words Zaidism con- verted tribal society from the bottom up. Comtemporary Yemen
Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen 11 Shortly before the Zaidi Yahya bin al-Husain was invited to Yemen in the late ninth century, the Isma’ili-Fatimid da’wa in Iraq, a secret organisation proselytising for the imamate of a descendant of Isma’il bin Ja’far al-Sadiq, recruited, trained and despatched to Yemen two highly talented and inspiring missionaries, da ‘is; one, Abu al-Qasim Hasan bin Faraj bin Hawshab, an Iranian from Kufa, later often known as Mansur al-Yaman; and the other, Ali bin FadI, a Yemeni shi’ite originally from Jaisan in Ma’afir of the Southern Highlands. Comtemporary Yemen
Ali bin Fadl, supported as he was by tribesmen from Yafi’ and Madhhij, won spectacular successes throughout Yemen, but his influence and success in spreading the Fatimid mission and attracting converts and adherents were vitiated by the radicalism of his personal regime. Comtemporary Yemen
His initial supporters came from the baronial families who were leaders within their own small communities — such as the Himyarities Al Zawahi of Hababa, J. Dila’ and J. Masani’, or the Banu Siba’ of J. Miswar, or the Hamdanid Banu Shawir on J. Maytak — but who had been disenfranchised and enthralled to the Yu’firid state by the Yu’firid clients who ruled those districts.’2 Comtemporary Yemen
c. AD 930), and Qadi Ja’far bin Ahmad bin Abd al-Salam al- Tamimi (d. Comtemporary Yemen
AD 1177). Comtemporary Yemen
It was amongst the jiran, the non-tribal people living within a tribe’s territory and under the tribe’s protection, that these Zaidis first found the greatest number of converts. Comtemporary Yemen
Musallim al-Lahji, writing in the mid-twelfth century, describes for us just what kind of people were Zaidis; they were shoemakers, bloodletters, polishers, chamberlains, poets and the landless. Comtemporary Yemen
In other words, the conversion to Zaidism of the tribes of the Northern Highlands began amongst the lowest strata of tribal society. Comtemporary Yemen
Throughout the early and middle medi- eval period (i.e. Comtemporary Yemen
Tribes, through their shaikhs, contracted alli- ances with the Imams and felt obliged to maintain good relations with the Zaidis only in accordance with how the Imams dealt with their enemies. Comtemporary Yemen
Not surprisingly, in return the sayyids of the hijra often became greater advocates of the interests of their hosts than they were of the Zaidi da’wa as represented by a reigning Imam. Comtemporary Yemen
It was only at the turn of the tenth century that the two openly announced their mission, and simultaneously they launched a vigorous campaign of conquest that shattered the two chief Himyarite baronies of the time, the Yu’firid and Manakhi states. Comtemporary Yemen
He appealed to the tra- ditional elites, both Himyarite and Hamdanid, who lived in the mixed societies of the mountain tops in the Western Mountains region. Comtemporary Yemen
When Ibn Hawshab’s con- quests began to challenge the tribal domains of the Northern High- lands the Zaidis joined their natural allies in the tribes to conduct a holy war,jihad, that succeeded in containing the Fatimid da’wa in the Western Mountains. Comtemporary Yemen
Even after Ibn Hawshab died (AD 913) and the Fatimid armies suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Zaidi and tribal army at Nughash (AD 920), this coaljtion of Fatimid supporters — disenfranchised elites of the Western Mountains, and the Yam tribes in the far north-eastern parts of Yemen — sustained the Fatimid da’wa ever afterwards. Comtemporary Yemen
Au was sent as a youth to Kawkaban to study with the chief Fatimid da’i of the day, Sulaiman bin Abdallah al-Zawahi, who recognised in the young man the right materials for reviving the the Fatimid movement in Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
One of al-Sulaihi’s first acts in fact was raising funds from the devout Fatimid supporters who rallied to his appeal. Comtemporary Yemen
But in the final analysis the Fatimid movement was doomed to become an insignifi- cant, isolated minority community, because it never won extensive popular support. Comtemporary Yemen
The rapid demise of the Fatimids, especially in the Southern High- lands around their capital of Dhu Jibla and their citadel atop J. Ta’kar, was primarily the result of the proselytisation of a then newly introduced sect, the Shafi’i school of sunni Islam. Comtemporary Yemen
Furthermore, when the Sulaihid war- lord al-Mufaddal tried to recapture the fortress the Khawlan al-Tiyal came to the assistance of the rebels. Comtemporary Yemen
Al-Khazraji, writing at the beginning of the fifteenth century,20 documents the con- tinued spread of Shafi’i teachings into the northern Tihama and the societies of the Western Mountains. Comtemporary Yemen
Their warriors assisted the Zaidi da’wa most frequently only when there was some immediate advantage or profit for them. Comtemporary Yemen
The tribes accommodated the Zaidi sayyids because they desperately needed their services, and because the presence of a sayyid in their ter- ritory lent the entire tribe greater prestige and baraka. Comtemporary Yemen
From the point of view of Ottoman officialdom in Constan- tinople, a broad spectrum of reform programmes and economic projects were needed to bring Yemen upto the level of development already reached in other provinces of the empire. Comtemporary Yemen
Military forces were to be concentrated on the Zaidi tribes and regions influenced by the Imam. Comtemporary Yemen
Then the occupation should be extended from Jizan up to Sa’da and neigh- bouring territories. Comtemporary Yemen
To carry this out it was recommended that more troops should be sent, more barracks and hospitals built, pharma- ceuticals and clothing sent, more transport animals — mules — sent. Comtemporary Yemen
The Memduh Commission of 1904 represents the beginning of a shift of policy. Comtemporary Yemen
The sources reviewed by the Commission in compiling its report offer a useful survey of the main points of concern raised over the period 1898 to 1904. Comtemporary Yemen
(1) Documents presented to the Council of State by the Reform Commission of 1898 detailing the need to build a railroad between Hodaida and San’a’, the Yemeni perceptions of criminal law procedure and how the present-day shari’a courts ought to be organised, and steps needed to establish peace and law and order. Comtemporary Yemen
(2) A telegraphed report of 1898 received from the Governor of Yemen discussing a proposal for the restructuring of Yemen into four provinces. Comtemporary Yemen
Con- sequently, the 1899 proposal for a 300-kilometre Hodaida-San’a’ railroad by way of Hujaila was revived and strongly recommended: training experts was proposed. Comtemporary Yemen
It would include an agriculture based on intelligence reports concerning progress on administrative reform in Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
(5) Despatches to the Palace from Yemen in response to queries from Sultan Abd al-Hamid concerning delays in settling Yemen’s problems. Comtemporary Yemen
To supple- ment their experience, testimony was obtained from two Yemeni leaders who had been exiled to Cyprus some months earlier: the Shaikh of Bani Dhi Husain, Naqib Salih bin Yahya, and al-Sayyid Yahya bin Ahmad al-Qibsi.8 Comtemporary Yemen
The Memduh Commission was quick to recognise that most of the problems of government arose from the general poverty of the population, and therefore that the primary need was for economic development. Comtemporary Yemen
An expert in its cultivation was to be appointed and seeds imported from Egypt, America,Izmir and Adana for free distribu- tion. Comtemporary Yemen
According to it, all education, from primary schools up to the secondary level, was to be provided free to all children. Comtemporary Yemen
The education budget, derived from 5 per cent of the zakat, paid the school maintenance and teachers’ salaries (including those of teachers of religion) for the rest of the pri- mary and secondary schools and teachers’ institutes.’2 Comtemporary Yemen
This procedure represented a significant departure from that of the traditional shari’a court in Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
Already by 1871 commercial codes drawn almost entirely from French codes and thoroughly secular in nature had been instituted. Comtemporary Yemen
Both, however, by the same token directly undermined the basis of the legitimacy of the Zaidi imamate. Comtemporary Yemen
No thought was given to devising a code of administration specific to Yemen, only to creating the conditions needed for the successful implementation of the administrative system already in effect. Comtemporary Yemen
The key to that work was seen as economic development, which in turn would produce on the one hand sufficient taxes to run the government effectively, and on the other sufficient prosperity to eliminate most of the basis of support for rebellion. Comtemporary Yemen
Memduh Pasha with- drew from further activity on Yemen affairs in protest against the apparent lack of action by the Prime Minister on the Commission’s recommendations.23 Comtemporary Yemen
Jizan, the seat of kaza government, was itself but tenuously held, while Jizan port business was conducted from Farasan Island.36 Comtemporary Yemen
He copied into his notebook the decrees of 1899 concerning educational funding, and maintained detailed accounts of the education budgets of Hodaida. Comtemporary Yemen
Less immediately obvious, but implicit in all of the projects, new taxes and battles, there was the inexorable movement of Yemen towards a market economy, with all the social changes which followed from ~ Already the development of Aden had its effect on the economic patterns in the south. Comtemporary Yemen
At the same time, pres- sure from tax collectors for cash payments further encouraged the planting of cash crops. Comtemporary Yemen
It might be compared with the average 273,000 kurul collected for education from the coffee tax in Hodaida township: Aziz MS, fos. Comtemporary Yemen
The court records of Yemen dating from this period show the success of this system under both Turkish and Yemeni judges. Comtemporary Yemen
One only has to reflect on the role of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), the Ba’th, the Nasserists and the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in the politics of Egypt, Syria and Iraq to appreciate this. Comtemporary Yemen
Rare exceptions are the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt under Hasan al-Banna’s leader- ship, Ahmad Husain’s Young Egypt Party (Misr Fata), and the Ba’th parties of Syria and Iraq, which have adopted fairly rigid party structures with a clearly defined membership, chain of com- mand and unifying ideology (or ‘party line’). Comtemporary Yemen
The Free Yemeni Movement (FYM) (Harakat al-Ahrar al-Yamaniyin) did not share any of these characteristics. Comtemporary Yemen
For much of this period it represented the only opposition to Imams Yahya and Ahmad Hamid al-Din who ruled the Mutawakkilite Kingdom (as North Yemen was then known) from 1918 until 1962. Comtemporary Yemen
It was founded by Sayyid Ahmad al-Muta’ and was a secret movement dedicated to the introduction of reforms. Comtemporary Yemen
Al-Fulaihi was a mosque/madrasa in San’a’ which attracted scholars from all over Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
1935—?) Contemporaneous with the Hai’a was Fatat al-Fulaihi (the Youth of al-Fulaihi). Comtemporary Yemen
One book in particular — Taha Husain’s Ma’ a!- Comtemporary Yemen
The Shabab al-Amr advocated a Yemeni nahda (renaissance) and, like the Muslim Brotherhood, saw Islam as the vanguard of that renaissance and as the means of raising Yemen from its state of chronic backwardness. Comtemporary Yemen
Nu’man, al-Zubairi, Ahmad al-Shami and Zaid al-Mawshki and others who had been associated with the FYM gathered at his court to try and impress upon him their views on the need to introduce reforms since they felt that he was likely to become the Imam after Yahya’s death. Comtemporary Yemen
Following al-Zubairi’s return to Yemen the former members of Hai’at al-Nidal, Fatat al-Fulaihi and those who had been associated with Maj al/at al-Hikma a!- Comtemporary Yemen
However, Imam Yahya was not so enthusiastic and imprisoned all those associated with the Movement in December 1941, again fearing that it challenged the nature of his rule. Comtemporary Yemen
It was not a formal organisation and, as its name suggests, involved little more than exchanging opinions on literature, poetry and ideas for reform through the post. Comtemporary Yemen
However, he was given little The Free Yemeni Movement: 1935-62 41 42 The Free Yemeni Movement: 1935-62 al-Akwa’, Abdullah al-Sallal, Hamud al-Ja’ifi and Ahmad al- Mu’allimi.’8 Comtemporary Yemen
Al-Ittihad al-Yamani (1952—62) Bereft of leaders following the 1948 al-Wazir coup, the FYM went into abeyance. Comtemporary Yemen
However, despite strong personal ties such as this, formal links between the Yemeni Union and the village associations remained weak and the Union was a ‘higher council’ of the associations in spirit only. Comtemporary Yemen
Reluctant to involve itself in Yemeni politics while the leaders of the FYM remained incarcerated in Imam Ahmad’s prisons in Hajja, the Yemeni Union concentrated on sending students on educational scholarships to Cairo for the first few years of its existence. Comtemporary Yemen
This chapter is extracted from a study of the Free Yemeni Movement sub- Rudolf Heberle, Social Movement: An Introduction to Political Sociology A. al-Shamahi, Al-Yaman:Al-Insan wal-Hadara(Dar al-Huna, Cairo, 1972), The Free Yemeni Movement: 1935-62 43 44 The Free Yemeni Movement: 1935-62 p. 176. Comtemporary Yemen
Nevertheless, some sort of organisation existed at this time and to avoid possible confusion I have retained al-Shamahi’s name for it. Comtemporary Yemen
A. al-Thawwar, Thawrat a!- Yaman (Dar al-Huna, Cairo, n.d.), p. 47. Comtemporary Yemen
As a result of these contradictory divisions within the YU, the organisation virtually ceased to exist as a political organisation in the late l950s and the impetus for heralding change in Yemen switched to the military, who successfully overthrew the imamate on 26 September 1962 and established the Yemen Arab Republic. Comtemporary Yemen
Notes 1. Comtemporary Yemen
7. Comtemporary Yemen
In line with Nasser’s aims of ridding the Arab World of the ‘twin evils’ of reaction and imperialism, al-Zubairi’s broadcasts denounced both the Hamid al-Din and the Yemeni imamate, which predictably upset those Free Yemenis who supported its continua- tion.23 Comtemporary Yemen
5. Comtemporary Yemen
At that early stage in its development, the NLF as a whole had no particular ideology beyond its commitment to armed struggle and it accepted anyone committed to armed struggle to gain full indepen- dence from Britain. Comtemporary Yemen
The creation of the NLF marked the beginning of a serious decline in support for the politically oriented Adeni- based organisations like the Aden Trade Union Congress and its political adjunct, the recently formed People’s Socialist Party, which opposed armed struggle and called for political means to achieve their ends. Comtemporary Yemen
The NLF was also significantly different from existing political organisations in the social composition of its supporting groups and of its leadership. Comtemporary Yemen
Both included social strata which had not previously been integrated into any political tendency, mainly the tribesmen who had emigrated to Aden and further afield in search of work and thus developed a social and political consciousness while working in the Gulf or Saudi Arabia in construction, or even the armed forces, as well as those who had stayed at home or returned there. Comtemporary Yemen
Being essentially tribesmen, they did not come from the top strata of society, but rather from the social group which included the majority of the population and whose economic circumstances varied from poverty to comparative comfort. Comtemporary Yemen
The fact that the Imam was alive and rallied tribal support to join battle with the republicans had a con- siderable effect on the early days, and indeed on the entire nature, of the republican regime. Comtemporary Yemen
The Radfan campaign has been described in detail elsewhere,’° mainly from the British point of view, and will not be discussed here. Comtemporary Yemen
What distinguished these clashes from the The Rise of the National Liberation Front 51 52 The Rise of the National Liberation Front earlier tribal revolts and attacks on the British in Aden was the organisation behind them. Comtemporary Yemen
The creation of OLOS, and, more important, the developing differences within the MAN at the Arab level, led to the need for the NLF’s First Congress which was held in June 1965 in Ta’izz, almost two years after the founding of the Front. Comtemporary Yemen
As no agreement was reached the Movement was thereafter divided, in fact if not in name. Comtemporary Yemen
Unsurprisingly, given that the document was The Rise of the National Liberation Front 53 54 The 1(ise of the National Liberation Front published after the revolution in the North and that Yemeni nation- alists had called for unity since the 1950s, the Charter states: The Arab people in the Yemeni area, north and south, are part of the Arab nation. Comtemporary Yemen
The restoration of unity of our Arab people in the Yemeni area, north and south, on the road towards free Arab unity, is a popular demand and a necessity imposed by the revolution. Comtemporary Yemen
The Charter’s social programme concentrates on the problem of the rural-urban gap and proposes to close it by bringing electricity to the rural areas, developing modern agricultural machinery, pro- cessing agricultural products, planning villages, building houses, schools and health units and providing clean water supplies. Comtemporary Yemen
The sections of society which are expected to support its aims and fight for them are ‘the popular forces of workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals and students’ and in particular the workers and peasants who are to form an alliance which is the guarantor of social progress. Comtemporary Yemen
Thus the UAR continues to provide the fundamental support for the Arab revolutionary movement, for unity and progress. Comtemporary Yemen
By contrast, the right favoured continued close relations with Nasser and internally wanted more authoritarian structures within the NLF which would leave the leadership unchallenged and prevent the rank and file from gaining power. Comtemporary Yemen
This led to a number of smaller meetings which would probably have led to a split had not more urgent problems arisen in the form of the Egyptians’ efforts to force a merger between the NLF and OLOS. Comtemporary Yemen
Ideologically, OLOS was much closer to the Egyptians and its formation came at a time when, as we have seen, substantial elements of the NLF were rapidly drifting away from Nasserism. Comtemporary Yemen
Despite this clear rejection of the merger, the Egyptians did not give up and continued putting pressure on the NLF, thus leading to a new agreement in August signed in Mexandria; this was made by Qahtan al-Sha’bi, Faisal Abdul-Latif and Abdul-Fattah Isma’il. Comtemporary Yemen
They ceased to relate to their central office and started co-ordinating their activities amongst themselves, and also considered other sources of finance and supplies. Comtemporary Yemen
With the approach of the third anniversary of the launching of armed struggle in October 1966, all the NLF’s organisations in Aden threatened to split unless the merger with OLOS was formally ended. Comtemporary Yemen
They won the argument and the NLF held a Third Congress in November 1966 in Khamr, where it totally disassociated itself from FLOSY, which thereafter was nothing Ii more than the armed branch of the PSP. Comtemporary Yemen
The congress also added another ten people to the previously elected Executive Committee, most of whom were leaders from the interior who were involved in armed struggle. Comtemporary Yemen
Thereafter, the relationship between the NLF and FLOSY was to be one of open hostility and conflict for another year, until the final victory of the NLF and independence. Comtemporary Yemen
The conflict with FLOSY did not prevent the NLF from con- tinuing the struggle in the hinterland in 1966 and 1967; this mainly involved the political mobilisation of the people, but in Hadramawt a significant left-wing political movement took place in that period, and made socialist reforms in land tenure and social organisation. Comtemporary Yemen
The NLF’s most important activities were, however, the gradual takeover of the sultanates of the Federation as it collapsed, the British withdrew their forces and the former sultans escaped abroad. Comtemporary Yemen
Two months of intensive discussions failed to solve the problem and in March the Egyptians invited the NLF leaders to Cairo, supposedly for discussions. Comtemporary Yemen
The sociology of the South Arabian League and other Aden-oriented political The Alawi-Irshadi conflict and its repercussions in Hadramawt are fully dis- F. Stark, The Southern Gates of Arabia (John Murray, London, 1936), Here I am presenting nothing more than a very crude summary of the MAN, Al-Hurriya, 2 May 1960, quoted in Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation, Fathi Abdul-Fattah, Tajribat al-thawra fil- Yaman al-Dimuqratiya (Beirut, This account of the formation of the NLF has benefited mainly from the British policies are thoroughly discussed in F. Halliday, Arabia without Sul- Quoted in Halliday, Arabia, p. 192. Comtemporary Yemen
Translation of this quote from Halliday, Arabia, p. 194. Comtemporary Yemen
p. 217. Comtemporary Yemen
On 28 March 1961 Q. al-Sha’bi presented a paper requested by the periodical Ahrar al-Yaman affirming that there was a pressing need to found a national front for the whole Yemeni region, to shoulder the task of liquidating the Imam’s regime and liberating South Yemen from the yoke of colonialism.6 Comtemporary Yemen
The Arab Nationalist Movement from the beginning of 1961 had elaborated its plan for armed revolution and was merely awaiting appropriate conditions: such favourable circumstances were created by the success of the 26 September revolution in North Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
A few days after the beginning of the 26 September revolution thousands of workers, tribesmen, soldiers and officers from South Yemen gathered in San’a’ ready to protect the emerging Republic. Comtemporary Yemen
These nationalists, filled with new ideas and new feelings, began to discuss the political situation in South Yemen and the means of liberating it from colonialism. Comtemporary Yemen
From the day of that historic event armed struggle in South Yemen did not cease until the achievement of independence in 1967. Comtemporary Yemen
The immediate cause The PDR Y: Three Designs for Independence 65 66 The PDR Y: Three Designs for Independence was the attempt to put Radfan under the rule of the Dhal’a Amir and force it to join the South Arabian Federation.” Comtemporary Yemen
The British dealt with the armed revolution in a tradi- tional-style punitive campaign — burning villages and fields, demolishing houses, killing livestock and using prolonged siege tac- tics. Comtemporary Yemen
For the British, the first impact of the 14 October revolution was violent. Comtemporary Yemen
The congress has its own internal con- tradictions: the Protectorates, dreading any social or political change, however insignificant it might be, called for highly centralised, oligarchical rule; the Aden representatives called for democratic, liberal rule securing more freedom and autonomy for Aden within the Federation. Comtemporary Yemen
The traditional policy of retaining the base in Aden was still filling the background but new measures had to be taken to secure its success. Comtemporary Yemen
All these measures were taken in order to make certain social strata in urban and rural areas tightly connected with Britain. Comtemporary Yemen
Anthony Green- wood, visiting Aden in November 1964, met representatives of all legal political parties and during this meeting leaders of parties in the Colony agreed to attend the coming congress to be held in London on 27 August 1965. Comtemporary Yemen
The National Charter described fully the local design — South Yemen would be an independent country without the British rulers and their base, without sultans, with means of production owned by The PDR Y: Three Designs for Independence 73 Nasser’s Egypt: Abdul Nasser’s call for an anti-colonialist The Algerian Revolution: the armed struggle of the Algerian Experience of national liberation movements: particularly The theory of scientific socialism and socialist construction in Experience accumulated from the revolutionary struggle 74 The PDR Y: Three Designs for Independence workers and land distributed amongst poor peasants. Comtemporary Yemen
Documents of the Second Congress of NLF held in Jibla from 7 to 11 June 1966, General Report, p. 4 (unpublished). Comtemporary Yemen
Concepts Defined Revolutions have as their primary objectives the transformation of society. Comtemporary Yemen
In such a system, tradi- tional values were to be maintained and promoted. Comtemporary Yemen
The rulers were called imams, hence the term imamate. Comtemporary Yemen
The policy of isolationism was meant to safeguard Yemen’s hard- won independence and to keep the religious purity of the state from being corrupted by outsiders. Comtemporary Yemen
New schools and hospitals were being built in Hodaida, Ta’izz and San’a’. Comtemporary Yemen
However, although the policy of isolationism served Yemen well in the short run, it became a detri- ment to the development of the state in the long run. Comtemporary Yemen
The British occupation of Aden was construed by the political regime in Yemen as the gravest outside invasion to have occurred, because it was perceived to be a direct threat to the independence and security of Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
The system seemed inert, lacking in mobility or motion. Comtemporary Yemen
The Civil War Years and the Changing Social Patterns When the Yemeni revolution of 1962 erupted there were many Yemenis who wanted to make fundamental changes in their society. Comtemporary Yemen
All too often, though, control over sunni areas was maintained through measures of extraction and repression. Comtemporary Yemen
Some of these resulted from innovations introduced by the Ottomans, others from the experiences of Yemenis abroad and in Aden, and still others from the broader horizons introduced through books, newspapers and the radio. Comtemporary Yemen
Gradually, these efforts transformed the imamate from a traditional state to a less effective neo-traditional one, resulting in a marked diminution of legitimacy.2 Comtemporary Yemen
While the inability of these Imams to dislodge the Saudis from the northern territories or the British from the Nation-building and Political Development 87 88 Nation-building and Political Development South hampered their standing as nationalists, they were successful in nation-building in so far as the incipient right — if not the capability — of the YAR to sovereignty over all the territory of the old imamate has been widely accepted. Comtemporary Yemen
Later there was Ahmad’s effort to parry the threat of radical pan-Arabism by accepting membership in Abdul Nasser’s United Arab States. Comtemporary Yemen
The result was increasing frustration and the emergence of active political dissidence. Comtemporary Yemen
While this new source of political opposition was allied with long-standing rivals of the Hamid al-Din in the abortive revolution of 1948, it was not until 1962 that the forces of change succeeded in toppling the thousand-year-old imamate. Comtemporary Yemen
The British eventually consolidated their position by estab- lishing a Crown Colony in Aden from where the Protectorate con- tinued to be administered. Comtemporary Yemen
The imamate’s ability to advance the process of state-building, however, had little permanent impact. Comtemporary Yemen
Paradoxically, the attempt to exercise greater control in order to halt change actually resulted in less control. Comtemporary Yemen
The Present Republics The first stages of political change in Yemen, i.e. neo-traditionalism in the North and colonialism in the South, can be very clearly distin- guished from more recent developments by the key dates of 26 September 1962 and 30 November 1967. Comtemporary Yemen
But the official adoption of a modernising course of action is, of course, clearly distinct from the actual establishment of an environment conducive to its accom- plishment. Comtemporary Yemen
The latter leaders suffered from severe personal limitations: they were uneducated, unsophisticated, inexperienced army tank-corps officers with narrow horizons. Comtemporary Yemen
Their backgrounds were far less likely to appeal to the great majority of Yemenis, since they were both Zaidi tribesmen from minor tribes. Comtemporary Yemen
Differences were apparent over such issues as: whether the government or the party should consti- tute the ultimate decision-making authority; whether Soviet-style ‘scientific socialism’ or a Maoist approach was the proper path for the country to follow (attitudes reflected in the alliances struck by individual politicians with Moscow and Peking); and whether it was proper to accept financial assistance from the Arab Gulf states or to remain poor but ideologically pure. Comtemporary Yemen
Salim Rubai’a Ali served as President, deriving his authority from con- trol of the government and army. Comtemporary Yemen
He was a more doctrinaire Marxist, closer to Moscow and a hard-liner in foreign affairs, being opposed to rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, firmer on solidarity with neighbouring Marxist Ethiopia and, being from a North Yemeni family, more determined to force unity. Comtemporary Yemen
Aden grew more isolated from the rest of the Arab world and the fragile link to Riyadh was severed. Comtemporary Yemen
In large part these obstacles derive from the existing nature of centre and periphery and the wide schism between the two poles. Comtemporary Yemen
In the North, basic disagreements over the shape of the state and society and the ordering of priorities range from arch-conservative approaches to progressive, even Marxist, outlooks, especially if the dissident NDF is considered. Comtemporary Yemen
The above assessment of changes already occurring raises specu- lation over the future direction of Yemeni politics. Comtemporary Yemen
In some ways, this approach is not all that far removed from the ideal ‘traditional’ system. Comtemporary Yemen
(5) To what extent does this policy fit in with Lawrence’s famous quotation, ‘a ring-wall around Arabia, a country which must be reserved as an area of Arabian individualism. Comtemporary Yemen
Secondary education and teachers’ training started in the 1960s and were limited to one college of each, situated in Aden. Comtemporary Yemen
When we study all these laws and regulations, we should not forget that scientific socialism is the philosophy behind them, and that democratic centralism is the principle governing all relations in the Ministry, and between the Ministry and the schools. Comtemporary Yemen
Administrative Principles in the Management of Education As we have previously stated, the magnitude of work is great and it cannot be completed overnight. Comtemporary Yemen
From the beginning of the academic year 1973/4, directorates of education were estab- lished in the governorates with full financial and administrative powers. Comtemporary Yemen
The essence of this principle is that consultation with colleagues in the Ministry usually leads to a ripe Education for Nation-building 111 112 Education for Nation-building and useful result. Comtemporary Yemen
Because education was not developed earlier, heavy investments were poured into this sector — some as part of the government’s annual budget for recurrent expenditure — while investments on capital expenditure have been found from the resources of the socio- economic development plans. Comtemporary Yemen
(for 1969) 1 2.6 Comtemporary Yemen
(for 1971) — — — 1980 6 10.5 Comtemporary Yemen
We will discuss this in some detail as we progress in our discussion of participation by governorates. Comtemporary Yemen
From 1956 a GCE Advanced Level class was started for some of the best students who completed secondary school with more than six passes in the GCE 0 Level. Comtemporary Yemen
Higher education was never thought of except for a handful of bright students of the privileged classes or those children from other social classes with very sharp and intelligent faculties. Comtemporary Yemen
However, the sharp selectivity trait coincided with another characteristic inherent in tbi~ biased structure, i.e. no outlet for those drop-outs from schools to train them in craft schools and make them good productive citizens. Comtemporary Yemen
(4) Because the structure did not respond to social and economic needs, the monopolist companies and the British themselves had to contract top-level managerial atid second-class officers from the Commonwealth; this leads us to the conclusion that the structure did not prepare for a level of citizenship capable of taking over full responsibilities. Comtemporary Yemen
(5) From the above we may sum up that the structure was not by any means designed to prepare its output for nation-building. Comtemporary Yemen
The new structure is dependent on the integrated nature of the educational system from kindergarten to university where a rational balance between the different levels is sought — this is what Law 26 of 1972 emphasised. Comtemporary Yemen
Those most concerned are the economic sectors which must work hard to gene- rate and increase job opportunities for the new output from schools. Comtemporary Yemen
However, the realisation of this sought-after balance needs much effort, and it also needs the co-operation of many sectors to attain good results. Comtemporary Yemen
Future fore- casts are also not yet reliable. Comtemporary Yemen
Unfortunately no studies of this phenomenon have yet been made. Comtemporary Yemen
The above university courses lead to the first degree from the University of Aden, and the new regulations which were adopted after the First Higher Educational Conference (1981) have intro- duced the Special Degree which is a twelve-month graduate course comparable to the Master’s Degree. Comtemporary Yemen
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen: Education Pyramid, 1979/80 Notes: a. Includes bedouins, teacher training, vocational and technical enrolments in MOE institutions. Comtemporary Yemen
9 SOUTH YEMEN SINCE INDEPENDENCE: AN ARAB POLITICAL MAVERICK Manfred Wenner Introduction The southern rim of the Arabian Peninsula has been of politico- economic, and therefore military, interest for as long as we have any records of human activity in the area. Comtemporary Yemen
In part, however, this is because the political ownership of the port of Aden has historically been associated with control over two other strategically placed items: (1) the island of Socotra, about 120 miles south-east of Aden and therefore capable of exercising some influence over access from the Indian Ocean to the Strait of Bab al- Mandab; and, (2) the island of Perim, located in the Bab al-Mandab Strait itself. Comtemporary Yemen
It derives its strategic role from being the southern access point to the Red Sea, and therefore is a potential ‘choke point’ for Red Sea traffic with its origins to the East (and therefore presumably bound for ports in the Red Sea or wishing to transit it on the way to Europe). Comtemporary Yemen
In the past two centuries, two powers have been of exceptional importance: the Ottoman Empire, whose re- emergence as a power in the southern Red Sea was directly related to the opening of the Suez Canal; and Britain, whose interest stemmed directly from its interests in Asia in general, and India in particular. Comtemporary Yemen
Just as inevitably, the leadership of these organi- sations tended to devolve into the hands of the far more politically sophisticated people of Aden, whose leaders came from the trade unions and political parties which had sprung up in the more cosmo- politan and urban tradition which characterised the port and its complex of military, berthing and bunkering facilities and petro- leum refinery, as well as the extensive commercial and business communities. Comtemporary Yemen
By 1967, the cost of the pacification efforts in South Arabia, combined with the decision to retreat from ‘East of Suez’ led the British to decide to withdraw completely. Comtemporary Yemen
The National Liberation Front and Independence The total withdrawal of the British was an economic blow to the new state: not only was the extensive set of British subsidy payments eliminated, there was also the loss of the indirect income from the British-operated military and maritime facilities. Comtemporary Yemen
Under its new leadership, the South Yemeni government sought to obtain economic assistance to cover operating expenditures, and, in addition, some economic development and assistance grants and loans from the major providers of such financing — the United States and the major Western states. Comtemporary Yemen
In fact, it is possible rather easily to treat the development of the NLF and South Yemeni foreign policy — from its accession to power to the present day — as well as some major internal policies as, at the very least, closely related to if not dependent upon events and developments elsewhere.8 Comtemporary Yemen
The Bases of Politics in South Yemen and the NLF Politics in South Yemen is a complex and constantly changing com- bination of a number of elements, many of which are characteristic of other developing states and/or the Arab states, among which at least the following are important: (1) personal origins: essentially we are here concerned with whether or not the individual is from North or South Yemen; for example, Mi Nasir Muhammad is the first major political figure in the NLF in some time to be of South Yemeni origin. Comtemporary Yemen
Never- theless, a couple of additional comments are in order: (a) the South Yemeni government has made some inroads into the rele- vance of tribal affiliation as a result of its administrative restructuring of the country and its determinedly secular pro- grammes; on the other hand, long-time observers of South Yemen would not be too surprised to learn that Mi Nasir Muhammad, for example, is from the old Dathina state, whose members have played a particularly important role in the South Yemen since Independence 135 136 South Yemen since Independence military ever since the departure of the British.’5 Comtemporary Yemen
(2) ‘tribal’ affiliation: although this may also be of importance to those of North Yemeni origins, the concern here is only with those of South Yemeni origins. Comtemporary Yemen
(3) personal loyalty, usually the result of previous associations ir political, economic, or social endeavours of various kinds, a~ well as the links created by the patrimonial system which char- acterises nearly all Middle Eastern politics, and which even thc NLF has not been able to eliminate completely from South Yemeni affairs. Comtemporary Yemen
The issue which has been raised — by the press and some academics, as well as by some government — is whether South Yemen today represents another case of the Soviet Union expanding its influence beyond its ‘tradi- tional’ post-war limits (by ‘leap-frogging’ the southern rim states); whether it represents a part of a deliberate Soviet effort to create a ring of ‘satellites’ in major strategic areas (e.g. Comtemporary Yemen
One possibility would be to tally such items as the presence of ‘bloc’ technicians and advisers in various fields; the number of indigenous military personnel sent for training to ‘bloc’ states; the number of economic and development-project advisers from ‘bloc’ states providing assistance and direction; the number of students sent to ‘bloc’ universities — all these and related quantitative mea- sures (whether on an absolute or per capita basis) might help to distinguish between states, but will remain unsatisfactory because they do not discriminate effectively between countries we generally do not consider to be ‘satellites’, such as India, and those we do, such as Poland.’9 Comtemporary Yemen
the United States) with regard to the status of a region; (2) actively seeking to decrease the influence and prestige of the United States and its allies (in the military and economic sense); (3) obtaining a long-term and reliable lease on a maritime facility from which naval operations and trade relations could be maintained. Comtemporary Yemen
Someone with this view of Soviet objectives would be able to sup- port this viewpoint by citing Soviet support for South Yemen since 1970, and suggesting that the level of such support was quite South Yemen since Independence 139 140 South Yemen since Independence minimal in comparison with the potential gain. Comtemporary Yemen
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that such preconceived notions are going to be subject to easy (and publicly admitted) change. Comtemporary Yemen
South Yemeni Objectives Much of what has been said concerning Soviet motives and actiom holds for the analysis of South Yemeni motives and actions. Comtemporary Yemen
Theoretical Implications Since the terminology which is used to describe an event, a person or a relationship can per se influence the perceptions of those being South Yemen since Independence 143 144 South Yemen since Independence informed, it would seem to be of some importance to be clear on what is meant by certain key terms. Comtemporary Yemen
1979), p. 5, the figure went from 6,000 yearly to 1,500 yearly in the mid-l960s. Comtemporary Yemen
The following summary of events and developments between 1967 and 1981 draws largely from the following sources: Wenner, ‘The People’s Republic of South Yemen’; Anthony, The Red Sea; Halliday, ‘Yemen’s Unfinished Revolution; Joe Stork, ‘Socialist Revolution in Arabia: A Report from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen’, Merip Reports, no. 13 (Mar. Comtemporary Yemen
A brief overview of the popular press’s coverage, easily gleaned from the major bibliographical references, makes clear the fervour which surrounded the American government’s ‘decisive action’ in this instance: ‘How the West is Losing a Strategic Mideast Crossroads’ (Business Week); ‘Making a Stand in Yemen’ (Wall Street Journal); ‘More than Just a Border Clash: Saudi Fears about Subversion’ (Time); ‘Yemen’s War: Big Meaning for the US’ (US News and WorldReport). Comtemporary Yemen
17. Comtemporary Yemen
24. Comtemporary Yemen
Among the more recent writers who have, at least indirectly, acknowledged the relevance of such designations and affiliations, see Halliday, ‘Yemen’s Unfinished Revolution’ and Abir, Oil, Powe, and Politics. Comtemporary Yemen
In short, there was a very primitive founda- tion of public administration in terms of structure, functions or procedures. Comtemporary Yemen
(3) The new institutions set about performing the new functions by utilising the groups of people who were employed before the revolution, and most of them continued to occupy high leader- ship positions after it. Comtemporary Yemen
Data of this kind have been collected and tabulated by such organisations as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State in the United States, the International Institute of Strategic Studies in Britain and the Peace Research Institute in Stockholm. Comtemporary Yemen
20. Comtemporary Yemen
See Anthony, The Red Sea, as well as Shirreff, ‘South Yemen Leadership’~ and Kutschera, ‘South Yemen’. Comtemporary Yemen
23. Comtemporary Yemen
S. Kovalev, the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ is today understood to cover such matters as damage to the fundamental interests of other socialist countries; damage to socialism; threats to the defence capabilities of the Soviet Union, etc. Comtemporary Yemen
1967), pp. 9-13, is an appropriate example. Comtemporary Yemen
New York Times, 4 Mar. 1982. Comtemporary Yemen
There was no structure or organisation which could be called a government, in spite of the fact that he retained some Ottoman officials to assist in building an administrative machinery to run the government. Comtemporary Yemen
15. Comtemporary Yemen
Apparently formulated by one Prof. Comtemporary Yemen
Unfortunately, there is no consistency in the data, in their method of presentation, in the subjects covered, in the dollar values assigned, etc. Comtemporary Yemen
Although dated, the article by Stanko Guldescu, ‘Marxism Comes tc Yemen’, Communist Affairs, vol. Comtemporary Yemen
In 1931 a Cabinet was set up, albeit without ministries with the sole exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Comtemporary Yemen
1971), pp. 35—47; and Stephen Page, The USSR and Arabia (Central Asian Research Centre, London, 1971). Comtemporary Yemen
Page, The USSR and Arabia, and Shahram Chubin, Soviet Policy towards Iran and the Gulf (International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1980). Comtemporary Yemen
21. Comtemporary Yemen
22. Comtemporary Yemen
Public administration as a concept and as an approach had been put into practice only after the revolution of 1962, when the theocratic regime was replaced by a revolutionary and constitu- tional government. Comtemporary Yemen
With the establishment of the new organisations and the new functions, the problem of public administration started to manifest itself as follows: (1) The organisational structures were designed by Egyptian experts who had no background or knowledge about the Yemeni environment; they merely transferred a duplicate of the Egyptian organisational structures and by-laws which did not fit the needs of Yemeni institutions. Comtemporary Yemen
(4) Despite the enthusiasm of the government in establishing the new administrative institutions, it could not reach its goal of modernising the administration since it faced one important and urgent task that had to be completed, i.e. to win the civil war, 1962-9, and preserve the Republic. Comtemporary Yemen
That does not mean that the government had neglected mod- ernising the administration as an important goal; a great deal of attention was paid to developing the Civil Service Commission and the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) as impor- tant organisations carrying out the responsibility of modernising the administration, even during this critical period. Comtemporary Yemen
Major recent works which have discussed this subject are: Adeed Dawisha, Saudi Arabia’s Search for Security (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1980); Christopher Lee, ‘Soviet and Chinese Interests in Southern Arabia’, Mizan (Aug. Comtemporary Yemen
V (Sept./Oct. Comtemporary Yemen
‘Karmati’, Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edn (Brill, Leiden, continuing). Comtemporary Yemen
under British rule) see South Yemen since Independence 145 146 South Yemen since Independence Wenner, ‘The People’s Republic of South Yemen’. Comtemporary Yemen
That is why, in the early months of 1963, eleven ministries were established. Comtemporary Yemen
These bodies, which participated in laying the foundations of financial and banking systems, and rules governing imports and exports, were established during this period. Comtemporary Yemen
Additional international assis- tance was solicited from the World Bank and friendly governments and this attempt at seeking expert assistance from abroad through international and bilateral aid speeded up the transformation and led to a more modern and effective government machinery. Comtemporary Yemen
The court had appellate juris- diction as well, and that involved looking into appeals and applica- tions for revision from the judgements and orders of magistrates’ courts, including the Chief Magistrate’s Court, in civil as well as criminal matters. Comtemporary Yemen
So also did habeas corpus applications. Comtemporary Yemen
7) of 1961. Comtemporary Yemen
The Chief Justice granted licences for all those legally qualified persons to become advocates, and that function of the Chief Justice was provided for under the Courts’ Ordinance, 1961. Comtemporary Yemen
The jurisdiction of the provincial courts: (1) In criminal matters they deal with all the serious crimes under the Penal Code — which include murder, manslaughter, rape, gross indecency, arson, sabotage of communications, etc. Comtemporary Yemen
(2) In civil matters any claim which exceeds 1,000 Yemeni dinars (no matter what the amount) comes within their jurisdiction, as do appeals against the Commissioner of Income Tax and cases involving ships and aeroplanes. Comtemporary Yemen
The above-mentioned procedure was only applied in Aden, because the Criminal Procedure Ordinance was in force from 1955, i.e. before independence in 1967, and continued to be effective by virtue of Republican Decree No. 5 of 1967. Comtemporary Yemen
The pro- cedure for inquests was made to apply to the rest of the country. Comtemporary Yemen
evidence in criminal cases (where all principles of evidence are included, for example witnesses, experts, accused’s evidence including confes- sion, exhibits and presumptions). Comtemporary Yemen
This takes three main forms; first, by assessors or lay magistrates,’9 where two should be present in every case, and their presence is for two years at the rate of two to three weeks every year, with compulsory training in the beginning; second, by the presence of representatives of mass asso- ciations, such as trade unions, local councils and women’s unions, in trials where the accused is a member of that body; and third, by setting up voluntary bodies called ‘Social Justice Organisations’2° in the residential areas or estates to deal with petty offences, such as affray, simple grievous bodily harm and causing damage (not serious) to private, personal or public property. Comtemporary Yemen
Under the reorgamsation plan, the pro- fession consists of three main branches: (1) Advocates who can do all sorts of legal work, who are legally qualified, and have the right of audience before all courts. Comtemporary Yemen
In civil cases there was a system of assistance in drafting and in exemption from court fees. Comtemporary Yemen
They have to obtain licences in order to be enrolled on the register of advocates: licences are granted by the Minister of Justice, and are renewed every year on payment of a fixed fee. Comtemporary Yemen
19. Comtemporary Yemen
Indeed it has done so on several occasions in the past, and continues to do so, by reaching out and developing close relationships with other states in the Arab world and beyond, to create a balance against its more powerful neighbours to the north. Comtemporary Yemen
The majority do menial tasks, but their remittance of 195. Comtemporary Yemen
196 Aspects of North Yemen’s Relations with Saudi Arabia about $1 billion annually has helped to ease the YAR balance of payments deficit.’ Comtemporary Yemen
To allay Saudi fears YAR leaders have found it necessary — every time there is a change in leadership in San’a’ — to rush to Riyadh and reaffirm the continuation of ‘eternal’ and ‘historical’ relations between the two countries that are based on ‘good neigh- bourliness and blood ties’. Comtemporary Yemen
More- over, in 1974 Saudi Arabia obliged the Yemeni Prime Minister Abd al-Rahman al-Hajri to sign an agreement renewing the 1934 treaty but this agreement was never ratified because of the strong opposi- tion it engendered from all political strata in North Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
He concluded that the current President Ali Abdullah Salih ‘wants it to be ratified by an elected [consultative assembly], and not by an appointed one; no government would take this responsibility’ •2 Be that as it may, it is not inconceivable that this issue might cause serious problems in the future. Comtemporary Yemen
Ibid. 20. Comtemporary Yemen
14. Comtemporary Yemen
Article 126 of the constitution; sections 19—20 and 328 to 332 of the Criminal 194 The Judicial System in Democratic Yemen Procedure; sections of the Civil Procedure. Comtemporary Yemen
16. Comtemporary Yemen
million in 1980; annual growth rate 3 per cent) and strategically located at Saudi Arabia’s back door, North Yemen occupies a key position that affects the safety of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and the oilfields. Comtemporary Yemen
It is this strategic reality that makes YAR-Saudi relations — as I will show in the following pages — loom so large for the YAR that her relations with any of the other Arab states pale by comparison and, to a very large extent, Riyadh sets the parameters as to how far San’a’ can steer an independent foreign policy. Comtemporary Yemen
Ibid. Penal Code, sections 41 and 42. Comtemporary Yemen
There are similar bodies in the Soviet Union and East Germany (called Comrades’ Courts and Social Courts, respectively). Comtemporary Yemen
Articles 116 to Article 68 of the constitution and 62 in the 1970 constitution. Comtemporary Yemen
Law No. 4 of 1969 which stated that Arabic shall be the official language. Comtemporary Yemen
Courts Law No. 7 of 1980, sections 13 (8) and 23. Comtemporary Yemen
This is not to say that San’a’ has not sought indepen- dence from Riyadh. Comtemporary Yemen
As early as 1971 King Faisal began what have become two permanent features of Riyadh’s financial assistance to North Yemen: first, annual budget support to maintain the central government by paying its functionaries and armed forces personnel; second, direct subsidies to the tribes, thus aiding the three most important groups for the political and physical survival of the regime in the YAR.6 Comtemporary Yemen
Soon this policy of financial dependence was institutionalised and in 1975 a joint Saudi-YAR council was created to review periodically (every six months) the relations between the two countries in all fields. Comtemporary Yemen
The North Yemeni President learned his lesson from the 1979 débâcle, and since then has been determined to keep a balance between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
Therefore he appears to be playing a dual political game by keeping the unification talks and related schemes going with South Yemen while simultaneously maintaining a mili- tary stalemate against the NDF.’5 Comtemporary Yemen
Aspects of North Yemen’s Relations with Saudi Arabia 201 US-Saudi-YAR Triangle An important part of the Saudi design to ensure the safety of the Kingdom’s southern border is its goal of supplanting a long- established arms supply relationship between the YAR and the Soviet Union. Comtemporary Yemen
The French purchase consisted of armoured cars and communication equipment.’7 Comtemporary Yemen
In short, the whole experience was very frustrating to both the Yemenis and the Americans, and no doubt the former resented the Saudis’ heavy-handedness throughout the whole affair. Comtemporary Yemen
From a US perspective, this trilateral relationship with the YAR and Saudi Arabia, although it proved cumbersome, was hoped to be 202 Aspects of North Yemen’s Relations with SaudiArabia the beginning of a regional military arrangement which would leave the United States in the background assisting Arab allies who would take a larger military role. Comtemporary Yemen
The history of this Soviet involvement with the radical Arab states is not one that can have brought the Russians much satisfaction.9 Comtemporary Yemen
The communists were never given substantial authority, especially in matters of security, and on several occasions they were imprisoned or even executed by military regimes that were officially favoured by the Soviet Union (e.g. Comtemporary Yemen
Iraq, although maintaining out- wardly friendly relations with Moscow, also began to improve its relations with the West and to criticise Soviet policy on such issues as the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan. Comtemporary Yemen
Three substantial countries were still allied to the Soviet Union but each presented difficulties. Comtemporary Yemen
The lessons which the Russians would appear to have drawn from this experience suggest that they have developed a cooler, in their view more ‘realistic’, assessment of the Middle East, and of the Arab countries in particular. Comtemporary Yemen
Russian writings tend to skirt round the irreducible difference between Arab and Soviet views of the Palestine question, and to focus instead on the class character, or apparent lack thereof, within Arab nationalism. Comtemporary Yemen
(1) From the mid-1970s onwards Soviet writers began to advance a new theory of Third World development, the theory of ‘States. Comtemporary Yemen
In much of the literature South Yemen is seen as a possible case of such a ‘socialist-oriented’ state: but, as will be shown, South Yemen also embodies some of the limitations to which the theory draws attention. Comtemporary Yemen
But some connections do exist. Comtemporary Yemen
In the post-independence period, direct relations were established with the NLF and its ‘left’ faction, and the ensuing decade was one in which the Soviet Union welcomed the triumph of this left, and its consoli- dation. Comtemporary Yemen
The NLF left returned to power as a result of an internal conflict in June 1969, a date later celebrated as an important occasion, ‘The Corrective Move’. Comtemporary Yemen
The left’s programme was put through in various fields of social policy: all banks and insurance companies were nationalised in October 1969; the country was renamed the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen; in 1970 a land reform limited hold- ings to 20 acres of irrigated land, or 40 of unirrigated, and laid the basis for a system of co-operatives and state farms that was to encompass most of the countryside by the late 1970s; most industry was nationalised; foreign trade was brought under state control; the free-port status of Aden was abolished. Comtemporary Yemen
A number of innovations derived from the Cuban experience were introduced: a militia, local Popular Defence Committees, a literacy campaign. Comtemporary Yemen
The NLF was by this time receiving substantial ideological assis- tance from the Soviet Union and party delegations were visiting each other’s countries.’8 Comtemporary Yemen
In October 1978 the process of transformation was formally completed: the NLF dissolved and became instead the Yemeni Socialist Party, with a structure and programme of the conventional Soviet type.2° Comtemporary Yemen
The President then tried to secure aid from another source, namely Saudi Arabia, Soviet Relations with South Yemen 219 220 Soviet Relations with South Yemen and he used Saudi aid to fund his own economic projects in which h relied on politically sound, but untrained, cadres, in preference tc what he saw as the ‘bureaucratic’ elements favoured by the parts leadership. Comtemporary Yemen
The issues surrounding the fall of Salim Rubai’a Au are comparable to those which have rent other post-revolutionary regimes — in China and Cuba. Comtemporary Yemen
Central to this process has been the introduction of a planning mechanism covering the first three-year plan (1972—4) and the two subsequent five-year plans (1974-8, 198 1-5). Comtemporary Yemen
Yet South Yemen has remained an extremely poor country, among the most indigent in the Arab world. Comtemporary Yemen
Most of South Yemen’s exports — fish, cotton, processed oil — went to the West, or south-east Asia and Japan. Comtemporary Yemen
Soviet economic aid has involved assistance with irrigation pro- jects, a joint fishing fleet, constructing a thermal plant in Aden, and the training of personnel. Comtemporary Yemen
It has, however, been limited, in com- parison with the Cuban case or South Yemen’s needs. Comtemporary Yemen
Bulgarian aid has also been criticised: Bulgarian officials working on a major agrarian project in the Third Governorate east of Aden abandoned the project after three years. Comtemporary Yemen
Western sources give the number of Soviet advisers as 600.~° Comtemporary Yemen
Yet neither side wanted a complete break — the Russians because they hoped to keep some influence in an important country, the North Yemenis because they were trained on Soviet equipment and did not want to switch suddenly to the West’s sup- plies. Comtemporary Yemen
Soviet support for the South in the 1972 and 1979 wars greatly disturbed the North Yemenis. Comtemporary Yemen
The result was that the long-latent Soviet commitment to San’a’ bore fruit: the Soviet Union agreed to supply up to $600 million worth of equipment on better terms, including Mig-2l planes, helicopters and T-55 tanks, and by 1981 the Soviet military mission had risen to 600 men, with another 1,500 North Yemenis being trained in the Soviet Union itself. Comtemporary Yemen
Although the radical republican opposition groups in the YAR were supporters of the PDRY and of Soviet foreign policy generally, the Soviet Union refused to recognise them or alter their diplomatic positions to take account of the civil war that continued sporadically until June 1982; the irony was that the 1982 defeat of the National Democratic Front guerrillas in the YAR was carried out by an army equipped with Soviet weapons. Comtemporary Yemen
The Russians were also cool about the guerrilla movement in Dhofar, partly because they considered it had little chance of success, and partly because of the movement’s earlier espousal of a Chinese policy. Comtemporary Yemen
In the late 1970s some increase in the number of Soviet military personnel was brought about by transferring of training programmes from the Soviet Union back to the PDRY. Comtemporary Yemen
In addition, party representatives sit in the non-party 111-member Supreme People’s Council, which serves as a consulta- tive body and debating forum for the government. Comtemporary Yemen
It has always been led by one of three sons of the Ba Dhib family, which comes from the Hadramawt region in eastern PDRY. Comtemporary Yemen
Regarded from the outset as a communist organisation, the PDU supported a variety of groups that sought to cater to the needs of labourers and students. Comtemporary Yemen
Involved in PDU affairs from the beginning, and long identified with the The Communist Party of the PDR Y 233 234 The Communist Party of the PDR Y Shabiba, Ali Ba Dhib brought his own impressive credentials to the post of party leader. Comtemporary Yemen
Of even greater significance, however, were events on the domestic front. Comtemporary Yemen
In October 1978, for example, Isma’il and his sup- porters oriented the UPONF more directly along the path of ‘scien- tific socialism’. Comtemporary Yemen
All Ba Dhib has since remained active as a senior government official, YSP member and lecturer at the PDU-dominated Higher Institute for Scientific Socialism in Aden (also known as the Party School), but in recognition of the electoral results he was dropped from the YSP Politburo. Comtemporary Yemen
Another factor dates from the pre-independence period. Comtemporary Yemen
Many YSP members have remarked that it is difficult for them, in policy matters, to accord PDU leaders and members the kind of respect that others receive for the roles they played in liberating Aden from colonial rule. Comtemporary Yemen
Others, however, are considered to have deliberately avoided the armed struggle that, from 1963 to 1967, was waged against the British and other groups in Aden and against the traditional, tribal-oriented rulers in the interior. Comtemporary Yemen
Not the least of the PDU’s roles, however, have been those of obtaining scholarships for South Yemeni students seeking further training abroad and in obtaining medical help from socialist-bloc countries for government and other PDRY leaders, The PDU, in short, has played the role of agent and broker — material, ideo- logical, cultural, educational, political — for both the Soviet Union and an important segment of the South Yemeni people. Comtemporary Yemen
The pragmatic tone to YSP and PDRY government policy that these initiatives implied was evidence of a national need for financial assistance from the country’s more economically endowed neigh- bours to the north. Comtemporary Yemen
It was indicative, as well, of the force of two other factors: (I) an awareness, even among YSP and PDU stalwarts, The Communist Party of the PDR Y 237 238 The Communist Party of the PDR Y of the relatively limited political and diplomatic dividends produced by their more doctrinaire approach to international relations during the previous half-decade; and (2) Soviet encouragement of such overtures to the PDRY’s wealthier Arab neighbours. Comtemporary Yemen
The event of most tangible relevance to the PDRY’s pressing economic needs, however, was the third annual meeting in Aden on 6 April 1982 of the Soviet-PDRY Standing Committee on Economic Co-operation. Comtemporary Yemen
The level of mutual interest and involvement that these visits manifested demonstrated how little in the PDRY’s general foreign policy orientation had changed in terms of its rela- tionship with Moscow. Comtemporary Yemen
Some 1,500 Soviet military and technical personnel remained in the country alongside a similar number of East Germans in the state security apparatus and a comparable con- tingent of Cubans working as advisers in the popular militias and as physicians and paramedics at health centres throughout the country. Comtemporary Yemen
The final dismemberment of Ottoman power at the end of the First World War enabled North Yemen to become independent and the Anglo-Turkish Convention was rejected by Imam Yahya from the outset. Comtemporary Yemen
By the status quo the British meant that the actual situation on the frontier, roughly established by the Anglo-Turkish Convention separating British Protectorate territory from the Imam’s territory north of it, should be established for forty years. Comtemporary Yemen
His claims continued unabated, for example, in a brief prepared for the Minister of State for his conversation with Prince Saif al-Islam Abdullah who was in London about one month before the assassination of Imam Yahya to discuss the issue: the British Under-Secretary told his Minister that the Imain’s attitude remained adamant and that he still regarded the whole southern area ‘as indivisible from the Yemen’.8 Comtemporary Yemen
In another set of minutes written about one month after the 1948 coup d’etat to the Secretary of State, who had asked for a full account of the situation in the Yemen, Cable’s last paragraph reads: ‘The Yemen’s importance to us is derived mainly from the nuisance value of Yemeni claims on the Aden Protectorate and on Aden itself.”° Comtemporary Yemen
Where are the Arab teachers? Oh, I know that you will answer that we must be patient and that we have none in Aden, but they can be brought from other Arab countries, and until we have competent Arabic-speaking teachers of our own language we shall make no progress . Comtemporary Yemen
The picture was not better, if not worse, at the end of the 1940s. Comtemporary Yemen
The British official concluded, ‘I began to under- stand how deeply and multiply divided society in Aden was, how barely one man in five living there cared a fig for its future. Comtemporary Yemen
Important Arabic books on political thought used to be smuggled into Yahya’s ‘closed’ kingdom from Aden. Comtemporary Yemen
Luqman’s Fatat al-Jazira willingly sponsored the exiles’ cause. Comtemporary Yemen
In his highly analy- tical and critical series on ‘the means for the advancement of South Arabia’ and the ‘future of Yemen’, he discusses the problems of the area as a whole. Comtemporary Yemen
He mentioned that some of the Yemeni exiles in Aden were already talking of a united South-West Arabia which should comprise Yemen, the Aden Protectorate and Aden itself.25 Comtemporary Yemen
Is there any difference between a San’ani, a Rada’i, an Adeni or a Hadrami with regard to affilation to the homeland? All of them are from Yemen, by which I mean ‘Natural Yemen’, with its fixed and known boundaries. Comtemporary Yemen
Politics has nothing to do with this fact because we know that Hadramawt and other parts are now politi- cally separated [from the homeland] but history and geography are different from politics! Comtemporary Yemen
Barraq went on to say, ‘My dear Mr Frank, you are a Yemeni no matter how much you fled from your greater homeland or how much you disavowed your Yemeni forefathers. Comtemporary Yemen
It was willing to co-operate with British authorities for peaceful constitutional advance in the Colony.3’ Comtemporary Yemen
The party was set up by the first generation of university graduates who had just returned from Egypt, Iraq and Sudan. Comtemporary Yemen
When SAL’s President, al-Jifri, went to Cairo in August 1956 the Governor of Aden issued an order expelling him from the Colony. Comtemporary Yemen
On a personal plea from Sultan Ali, al-Jifri was allowed, the next year, to return to Lahej with the proviso that he would not engage in politics. Comtemporary Yemen
Au had previously succeeded in sabotaging the first British proposals for a Federation of Sultanates and Amirates. Comtemporary Yemen
‘Similar acts of harassment also took place elsewhere. Comtemporary Yemen
Sultan Ali was soon to follow suit and live in exile in Cairo with the SAL leader. Comtemporary Yemen
he said in a flurry of passion. Comtemporary Yemen
“Do you think we want to become a colony of yours?” ~ He wanted true South Arabian unity and independence.36 Comtemporary Yemen
Both categories, who by the definition of the colonial authorities were not ‘Adenese’, were excluded from participation in the Colony’s political system. Comtemporary Yemen
SAL’s Adenese candidate for the Legco election, Abdul Rahman Girgirah, failed outright. Comtemporary Yemen
Although the Front’s programme was not a feasible one for immediate action it was quite at odds with British long-term thinking at that time. Comtemporary Yemen
The radical young UNF Adenese leaders were behind the organisation of almost all unions set up in 1955. Comtemporary Yemen
In Britain the Labour Party ‘had been brought into being by the trade union movement as its political complement. Comtemporary Yemen
did not exist. Comtemporary Yemen
Its verdict was that the strikes were ‘basically industrial in origin’ 50 The most direct non-material benefit the young Adenese leader- ship of the ATUC was able to achieve for its comrade workers and brethren, the Northern and Protectorate Yemenis, was an acknowledged labour or professsional status by being registered as trade unionists in the Colony that had previously regarded them as aliens. Comtemporary Yemen
By 1958 the ATUC was the strongest nationalist force in Aden: it had virtually taken over the political stage from its moribund partner, the UNF. Comtemporary Yemen
During that year it conducted a vigorous campaign including a general strike against immigration from Commonwealth countries and the enfranchisement of non-Arabs in the Colony. Comtemporary Yemen
Sir Charles Johnston (from the Foreign Office) was appointed Governor in order to conduct negotiations between the Sultans and Ministers of the Colony. Comtemporary Yemen
Present North Yemen was twice occupied by the Turks (1539- 1630 and again from 1849 until the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1918). Comtemporary Yemen
Both developments were closely interlinked: Yemenis from the South fought with the republicans in the North against the royalists whereas North Yemen offered sanctuaries and logistical support for the liberation movements in the South. Comtemporary Yemen
In the course of 1968, talks on unity started and delegations from Aden visited San’a’. Comtemporary Yemen
Yet mistrust dominated relations from the outset. Comtemporary Yemen
In addition, refugees from the South organised attempts to overthrow the regime in Aden with support from Saudi Arabia and North Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
Although the new constitutions of both countries expressed the will to strive for unity, from 1970 onwards events went in diametrically opposed directions. Comtemporary Yemen
Instead, armed clashes occurred between the government in Aden and oppo- sition forces in the former amirates in Aden’s hinterland; the latter were joined by South Yemeni exiles from the territory of North Yemen and from Saudi Arabia, with the support of both countries. Comtemporary Yemen
Various ‘progressive’ groups had united in March 1976 in the ‘National Democratic Front’ (NDF). Comtemporary Yemen
Opposition to unity in North Yemen comes partly from the Zaidi tribes who fear becoming a minority in a united Yemen dominated by Shafi’is.3 Comtemporary Yemen
Here it is only of interest to note that, with modernisation, new organisational pat- terns are developing, with the possible effects that conservative forces might lose ground and influence, and that newly evolving social structures might lead to a degree of convergence between both Yemens. Comtemporary Yemen
From declarations by members of both governments it can be concluded that time is not a factor. Comtemporary Yemen
Tradi- tional structures in North Yemen might change, as mentioned above; a considerable part of the population would, however, not be prepared to abandon its way of life or its values for the sake of unity. Comtemporary Yemen
At the same time it buys the bulk of its armaments in the Soviet Union, so a policy of neutrality and real non-alignment is vital for San’a’. Comtemporary Yemen
secular ruler or administrator. Comtemporary Yemen
one of the four rites or schools of ‘orthodox’ or sunni Islam. Comtemporary Yemen
Oxford, and has conducted extensive field-work in the tribal areas north of San’a’. Comtemporary Yemen
In this he drew not only from his own rich professional experience in Israel but also from his insights gleaned from a vast network of contacts with ACKNOWLEDGMENTS V anti-terror authorities in many lands, examples of which I have used liberally throughout these pages. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Acknowledgments (Ii Preface I The Plague of Domestic Terrorism II The Question of Civil Liberties III The l980s: Successes Against International Terrorism IV The l990s: The Rise of Militant Islam in America and the World V The Gaza Syndrome VI The Specter of Nuclear Terrorism VII What Is to Be Done Notes CONTENTS liii 3 7 27 51 75 99 121 129 149 I FIGHTING TERRORISM How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists Terrorism is back—with a vengeance. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After being sub- dued internationally and within most Western countries in the late 1980s, it has returned in ferocious and fearful new forms. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Admittedly, the modus operandi of this new wave of terrorism is usually different from that of the earlier ter- rorism that afflicted the world for two decades beginning Preface 3 in the 1960s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet it is a fact that today’s domestic and in- ternational terrorists may be identified fairly easily, and it is therefore possible to deter and prevent them from pursuing the policies of terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The growth of terrorism has been accompanied by a steady escalation in the means of violence, from small arms used to assassinate individ- uals, to automatic weapons used to mow down groups, to car bombs now capable of bringing down entire build- ings, to lethal chemicals that (as in Japan) can threaten entire cities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Today’s tragedies can either be the harbingers of much greater calamities yet to come or the turning point in which free societies-once again mobilize their resources, their inge- nuity, and their will to wipe out this evil from our midst. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Showing how this battle can be won is the purpose of this book. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This gets to the heart of what terrorism is, and how it differs from other kinds of violence. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The effect of fear is offset by an equal and of- ten more powerful effect of revulsion and anger from the citizenry. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
By its very nature, the inhuman method chosen by the terrorists to achieve their aim disqualifies the aim from the start as one worthy of moral support. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Far from being fighters for freedom, terrorists are the forerunners of tyranny. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
That is why the terrorists’ message has limited sway in capturing a broad following from among the democratic citizenry of the society they attack. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Such ideological inoculation can be seen in an example gleaned from a different field: Two former KGB agents said on the CBS program 60 Minutes’ that they worked for twenty years out of the Soviet embassy in Washington, yet failed to recruit even a single Amen- Fighting Terrorism 11 can citizen to spy against the United States. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The investigation into the back- Benjamin Netanyahu 14 grounds of the suspects in the Oklahoma City bombing has led American law enforcement officials and jour- nalists into a bewildering thicket of far-right, white su- premacist and anti-federalist groups, often heavily armed, who in recent years have begun organizing themselves into local “militias”—in many cases actively planning to fight a civil war against the federal govern- ment. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In 1958, the John Birch Society was formed around the claims that the government was becoming dominated by Communist sympathizers, and arguing for limitations on the power of the federal government, the dismantling of the Fed- era! Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Reserve System, and withdrawal from the United Nations. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The fringes of the American right have always offered a certain support to anti- government groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, Posse Comitatus, and the Aryan Nations. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
These can and must be distinguished from the tiny splinters at the absolute fringes of democratic society, which may endorse many similar ideas but use them as a pretext to step outside the rubric of the democratic system to resort to violence and terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The intellectual bulwarks of a free society, like all aspects of freedom, have to be constantly nurtured and protected. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In its long and unfinished march from barbarism to civilization, humanity has tried to deline- ate limits to conflict. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This means ac- tively identifying the “puddles” from which terrorist ac- tivity is likely to emerge, monitoring the activities of Benjamin Netanyahu 28 groups and individuals which advocate violence, analyz- ing and pooling intelligence on their nature, goals, and technical capacity for violence, and employing preemp- tive surveillance, search and seizure, interrogations, de- tentions, and prosecutions when it becomes apparent that planning for terrorist violence is taking place. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Just how far the con- cern with free speech has gone was driven home to me in a recent conversation with a security expert who ex- plained the constraints imposed on the FBI by the At- torney General’s guidelines which govern monitoring activities: They prohibit law enforcement officials from using government funds to so much as buy a newsletter by a militant group in order to examine it for threats of terrorist activity—and if an official were to pay for the newsletter out of his own pocket, he would be prohibited from storing the clippings in a government office, be- cause such rudimentary intelligence gathering is consid- Benjamin Netanyahu 30 ered an “infringement” on the liberties of the groups involved. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At present, the FBI is not allowed to per- form the most basic intelligence activities required for piecing together the puzzle of political ideology, incite- ment, infrastructure, and paramilitary organization which, once assembled, could lead to an understanding of where the most deadly terrorism is likely to come from. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Lochte reports that at first the se- curity services were baffled by the attacks, since they seemed to be part of the neo-Nazi terrorism which had spawned attacks like the 1980 bombing of the Munich Oktoberfest, which had claimed thirteen lives. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The key to the mystery was found in an ideological tract published in 1982 by two West German radicals, Walter Hexel and Odfried Hepp, en- titled Farewell to Hitlerism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From the days of Robespierre’s infamous Committee for Public Safety, Benjamin Netanyahu 32 democracies have had to guard against this danger, couched in terms of national security, which unduly in- vades the privacy of each citizen in the name of national security. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Japan’s Red Army withered as the pro- Soviet terror axis of which it was a part disintegrated, eventually all but disappearing under less than over- whelming pressure from the Japanese government. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
One was his arsenal of Scud missiles and chemical-weapons stockpiles, which he claimed to be willing to use to “incinerate half of Israel,” thereby hoping to shift the focus of the war to an Arab— Israeli confrontation and splitting the Arab partners in the international coalition arrayed against him; the other was terror, which he threatened to loose against the United States and its allies in the event of a counter- offensive in Kuwait. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While most people are aware of the results of Sad- dam’s missile attacks against Israel—thirty-nine barrages against Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities resulted in only a single death from the actual bombardment—less is re- membered about the terrorist front of the war against Saddam. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A grisly postscript to this story took place in Greece, where students expelled from the country on suspicion of being a security threat were allowed to return the month after the end of the war—only to blow themselves up in a post office in the college town of Patras, while trying to mail a package bomb to the British legation. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The fact is that both the primary co-conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing entered the United States as po- litical refugees—one from Iraq and the other claiming he had been oppressed in Israel (both would have most likely received political asylum had they not spoiled their chances by blowing up a building). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Still more disturbing is the utterly excessive American gen- erosity in interpreting the “right” to bear arms as in- cluding freedom from practically any kind of licensing and government supervision, a freedom well abused by David Koresh’s militaristic messianic Branch Davidian cult in its incendiary confrontation with federal agents in Waco, Texas, in 1993, leaving scores dead. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Rahman was allowed into the United States in 1990 from Sudan, after a history of perfidy in his native land, which included serving time for recruiting members for the Islamic terrorist fac- tion that had assassinated President Anwar Sadat. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Thus Bishop notes that the Supreme Court, which is responsible for ensuring that the government of the United States conforms to the standards set out in the Constitution, stood aloof as Abraham Lincoln dramati- cally curtailed civil liberties during the Civil War. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As these examples strongly suggest, the American ju- dicial system is ready and able to distinguish normal, peaceful circumstances from those in which the security of American citizens is being threatened by organized Benjamin Netanyahu 44 violence from without or within. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
the globe from the common calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the govern- ment of a single weapon, which in any possible con- [The powers to ensure security] ought to exist As I know nothing to exempt this portion of Fighting Terrorism 45 tingency might be usefully employed for the general defense and security [emphasis mine]. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Whai distinguishes Lincoln’s case from our case today, in which the idea of curtailing freedom of speech in order to pro- tect the United States is so difficult for many to accept? According to Berns, the answer is that Lincoln truly be- lieved that the survival of the society he deeply cherished was in jeopardy. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The British model, which dates back to 1973 and the beginning of intensified terrorism by the new Irish Republican Army (IRA), controls the activities of the security services by requiring that they annually receive a new legislative mandate from Parlia- ment. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
An alien, non-democratic society may be able to provide the depth of support for terrorist ideas to spawn a genuine terrorist army; it can offer professional training and equipment for covert operations, as well as diplomatic cover and other crucial logistical aid; it can make available virtually unlimited funds; and most important of all, it can ensure a safe haven to which the terrorists may escape and from which they can then emerge anew. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Thus, with the support of a terrorist state, the terrorist is no longer a lonely and hunted fugitive from society. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As has by now been re- vealed in the wake of the collapse of Soviet Communism in 1989, most of the international terror that plagued the world from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s was the product of an ad hoc alliance between the Soviet bloc and dictatorial Arab regimes. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
When Soviet Commu- nism finally emerged as an international power in 1945, after the defeat of Germany, it was these indelible mem- ories which became one of the underlying motifs of So- viet foreign policy. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
When Secchia’s group disintegrated in 1953, he and many of his followers fled to the Czech capital of Prague. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The graduates of such courses were often sent to Cuba, Bulgaria, and North Ko- rea. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Jewish communities in mandatory Palestine were subjected to campaigns of terror from the 1920s on. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The avowed goal of both of these organizations was the “liberation of Palestine,” which in practice meant liber- ating it from both the Israeli and the Jordanian states. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Egyptian President Nasser’s fulminations notwithstanding, Shu- keiri had never been permitted to launch extensive at- tacks from Egyptian soil for fear of triggering an unplanned Israeli response; Arafat himself had been kept on a short leash in Syria, and his gunmen had run into trouble with Jordanian troops from the very first. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
(In September 1970, King Hussein expelled the PLO from Jordan in a bloody stroke that left ten thousand dead.) Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
One of his first encounters was with Fidel Castro, who had repeatedly welcomed him to Havana from 1965 on. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Like Lenin before him observing the destabilization of czarist Russia at the hands of the SR, Brezhnev could benefit from the destabilization of the capitalist societies under pressure of the terrorist weapon, while being able to keep his hands relatively clean. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The full extent of the Soviet-Arab terrorist network— indeed, the fact that it was a network—was throughout the traumatic years ~of international terrorism obscured by successful efforts to “delegate” much of the violence to other Eastern bloc and Arab regimes that could be blamed for these activities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
(After the collapse of the Soviet Union, I had the oppor- tunity to discuss this incredulity with a number of offi- cials of the former Soviet bloc, and they expressed astonishment at the naïveté of Western journalists and government figures in this regard.) Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From the beginning of my involvement with the Jon- athan Institute, and later in my tenure as a diplomat, I believed that the key to the elimination of international terror was having the United States lead the battle, and that this American leadership would harness the coun- tries of the free world into line, much as a powerful locomotive pulls the cars of a train. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Since the view that prevailed in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s held that terrorism was the result of political and social oppression, the inescapable conclusion was that terror could not be eliminated without first bringing these conditions to an end. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The refusal of successive Israeli gov- ernments to capitulate to terrorist demands—a refusal that found expression in the repeated assaults by the Is- rael Defense Forces against terrorists in hostage situations from Maalot to Entebbe—and the Israeli policy of ac- tive military pursuit of terrorists into their strongholds, showed other nations that it was possible to fight terror- ism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
“These terror- ists aren’t human beings,” he said. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From a practical standpoint, a purely passive defense does not provide enough of a deterrent to terrorism and the states that sponsor it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In order to sharpen their demand for the release of terrorists jailed in Kuwait and Lebanese Shiites being held by Israel, the gunmen murdered an American pas- senger in cold blood and threw his body on the tarmac. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
(He was referring to Terrorism: How the West Can Win, which, according to Shultz, President Reagan had read on the way to the Tokyo summit on terrorism.) Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Equally, the all-out effort to deter naked aggression in the Gulf War convinced some in the West that they had resolutely defused the potential for aggression from the Middle East. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The results of the Gulf War were hardly decisive in discouraging terror from the Middle East. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fourth, Iraq’s enemy to the west, Syria, another classic terrorist state, also benefited enormously from the war. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Since the Madrid Peace Conference convened by the United States and Russia after the war, the Western countries have seldom, if ever, demanded that Syria clearly cease its sponsorship of terror or that it dismantle the headquarters of the dozen terrorist movements based in Damascus, lest such “upsetting” efforts drive the Syr- ian dictator, Hafez Assad, away from the Western orbit. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fifth, after the Gulf War, a new base was added to the roster of terrorist havens in the form of PLO- controlled Gaza, which quickly became a safe haven for several Islamic terrorist movements. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A hint of the potential power of this policy was provided by the convening of a special Islamic conference called by Iran and held in Teheran in October 1991, on the eve of the Madrid Peace Conference between Israel and its Arab neighbors; the Teheran conference was attended by rad- ical Islamic movements and terrorist groups from forty countries, and declared itself to be against making any kind of peace with the Jewish state. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After all, the Iranians are mainly Shiites, and they therefore do not command the automatic attention and allegiance of Sunni militants, who stem from the other great branch of Islam. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in a dra- matic inpouring of volunteers into the ranks of the Af- ghani Mujahdeen fighting the Soviet occupation, a Whos Who of zealots from throughout the world of Sunni Is- lam. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Soviet Union com- pleted its withdrawal from Kabul in 1989, and the Is- lamic resistance forces have since dispersed. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But while many people are aware of this Iranian prac- tice, few have yet recognized that the Iranian-sponsored terrorist web is not the only source of militant Islamic terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Practically, changing circumstances have forced it to adopt new laws taken directly from foreign codes .. . Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From virtually the beginning of the contemporary Jewish resettlement in the land of Israel, parts of the Arab world saw Zionism as an expression and represen- tation of Western civilization, an alien implantation that split the realm of Islam down the middle. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
That in this larger anti-Western context, militant Arabs understand Israel as a mere tool of the West to be used against them can be seen in the constant references made by Saddam, Assad, and Arafat to Saladin—the great Muslim general who liberated Je- rusalem from the European Crusaders in 1187, after having signed a treaty avowing peace. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Until recently, then, the dominant anti-Western ide- ology emanating from the Middle East was Pan- 87 1 I• 1 I 1 Arabism, rooted in an abiding hatred of the West, and of Israel as its principal local manifestation. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But a few of them have come under Fighting Terrorism 89 the sway of a perverse and primitive interpretation of the faith, which moves them to fanaticism and vio- lence. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Turkey too has recently experienced a rash of Islamic terrorist attacks, quite apart from its lingering battle with the Syrian-sponsored terrorism of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Much of this new anti-Turkish terrorism Fighting Terrorism 91 emanates from enclaves of ‘Turkish Islamic radicals based in Germany. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Nosair was found guilty of related charges and sent to prison. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What matters is the willpower that springs from our religious belief.”7 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As we have seen, a similar process is well underway in Europe. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
How did the deal between Israel and the PLO come about? Shortly after Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, it had begun to dawn on portions of the Arab world that there was no possibility of destroying the Jew- ish state by conventional means. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
That war had pushed Israel’s borders from the outskirts of Tel Aviv to the Jordan Valley forty miles to the east, and from the de- velopment towns of the Negev to the Suez Canal one hundred miles to the west. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the chief patron of the Arab dictatorships, and the Allied victory in the Gulf War created international conditions con- ducive to reaching an Arab-Israeli peace on this basis— and it was from this consensual position that Israel opened negotiations with all its neighbors at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu The first step in the Israeli withdrawal was the evacuation of the Israeli administration and military pres- ence from Gaza. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
When Gaza fell into Israel’s hands 102 during the 1967 Six-Day War, the city was in a state of appalling underdevelopment, and continued to be one of the principal centers of terrorist activity until 1970, when a concerted action by Israel uprooted most of the active terrorist cells from the area. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While Gaza’s economy grew over 400 percent in the subsequent years of Israeli ad- ministration,2 the most ambitious Israeli efforts to dis- mantle the refugee camps and move the residents into modern and permanent housing projects met with fero- cious resistance from the PLO, which relied on the sys- tem of refugee camps to foster anti-Israel hatred and provide the organization with a steady stream of recruits for its terrorist activities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Under these accords, Israel was to with- draw in stages from all the populated areas in the West Bank and Gaza, and the PLO would set up a regime ostensibly called “autonomy,” but which in effect would have nearly all the trappings and attributes of a sovereign state: its own army (called a “police force”); its own ex- ecutive, legislative, and judicial branches (all of them con- trolled by Arafat); its own flag, passports, stamps, and border authorities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The PLO in turn promised to annul the PLO Covenant, which calls for Israel’s destruction, and to act resolutely to quell any terrorist attacks ema- nating from PLO-controlled areas. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Shortly after Israel withdrew from Gaza, it became abundantly clear that the PLO had no intention of ful- filling any of its commitments under the Oslo agreement. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Within a year and a half after Oslo, the agreement heralded by the Labor government as “the end to terror,” acts of terror against Israel had reached unprecedented dimensions. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Several days before the signing of the Oslo accords in Washington, Arafat gave an interview in which he in- terpreted the event for his followers, telling them that the Oslo accord was the implementation of the Phased Plan decided upon in 1974: “[The agreement] will be a basis for an independent Palestinian state in accordance with the Palestine National Council [of the PLO] reso- lution issued in 1974.”~ Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The overly blunt Zaki was discounted as having fallen from grace with Arafat. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But to no avail. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Downtown Jerusalem and central Tel Aviv became the scenes of horrible carnage as buses exploded and crowds of pedestrians were mowed down by machine-gun fire. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Not coincidentally, this immunity facilitated an expan- sion of an Islamic fundamentalist specialty—the suicide attack. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But what of Arafat’s promise to uproot these terrorists from their strongholds? For nearly two years following the Oslo accords he did not apprehend a single perpe- Benjamin Netanyahu 108 trator of terrorist acts, even though some of the known murderers were serving in his own “police.” Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The utter moral obtuseness of the decision to grant Arafat this honor caused the resignation from the Nobel committee of one of its five members, Norwegian Member of Parliament Kaare Kristiansen—the first per- son on the Nobel committee ever to leave it in protest over an impending award. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From 1993 on, the Israeli government committed many of the mistakes that a state could commit in the war against terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Seeking relief from PLO Benjamin Netanyahu 110 terrorism by giving the PLO land, it directly encouraged and emboldened a renewed rash of Islamic terrorism un- der the PLO umbrella aimed at obtaining even more land. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It promised safe passage for terrorists by exempting PLO VIPs from inspection at the border crossings from Egypt and Jordan, thus enabling the smuggling Fighting Terrorism 111 of terrorists into Gaza and Jericho, and from there into Israel itself.’6 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Equally, the Israeli government severely impaired its operational capacity to fight terrorism by committing no fewer than six classic blunders: 1. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After increasingly bloody and savage attacks emanat- ing from Gaza began to turn Israeli public opinion against further Israeli withdrawals, and after Israel’s clo- sure of its cities to Gazan workers imposed economic hardship on his regime, Arafat had to show Israel that he was doing something against terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Brushing aside demands that he take forceful action against terrorists from Gaza, he staged instead mock detentions of a cadre of regular Islamic detainees, releasing most of them within days, all the while offering feeble circumlocutions to pass as condemnations of terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After some internal scuffling between the PLO and these groups threatened to explode into full-scale conflict, Arafat quickly shifted gears and proceeded instead to seek a strategic alliance with the militants, pleading with them that a tactical pause in their terrorist activities would enable the Rabin government to hand over more territory to the PLO, from which the Islamic groups could resume even more intense attacks at a later date.’7 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fighting Terrorism 113 A momentary suspension of terrorist attacks is not to be confounded with actual dismantling of terrorist ca- pacities, and many Israelis, familiar as they are with the endless stratagems of the terrorist organizations, do not confuse the two. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
When the Oslo deal was signed, my party and I re- peated this warning, but much of the public at first dis- missed our arguments. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A senior Israeli military officer described thi5 suspension of violence as a “temporary respite” aimed at “consolidating political gains.” Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Only a year and a half later did the situation become so intolerable that even Israel’s pres- ident, Ezer Weizman, and leading commentators of the Benjamin Netanyahu 114 Israeli left were ready to declare that at the very least Israel should suspend the next phase of the Oslo accord5 and rethink the wisdom of handing over parts of the West Bank, ten minutes away from the outskirts of Tel Aviv, to a PLO army and to the Islamic terrorists. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
ticism which threatened the continued implementation of the Oslo accords. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In 1992, before Oslo, the govern- ment of Yitzhak Rabin expelled four hundred Hamas Sunni activists from Gaza to south Lebanon. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Such a base would threaten Syria from the south and Saudi Arabia from the north; through Gaza’s geo- graphic contiguity with Egypt on the east, it will have a physical bridge to North Africa, which is already being assaulted by Islamic fundamentalism from the west. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It will take some time for the rest of the world to understand what many in Israel now know: that far from producing the durable peace all Israelis yearn for, the continued expansion of an armed, independent Palestinian domain is merely a stepping-stone to the eventual escalation of conflict and the continued march of Islamic militancy in the Middle East and beyond. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu 120 The Specter of Nuclear Yet there is one other potential development that could overshadow all this. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Stability may be achieved and terror- ism put on the defensive if Israel reassumes responsibility for its own security and asserts a policy of local autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs instead of the independent terror-free zones now being built. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
There is no way of knowing whether Iran can be de- terred from using its nuclear arsenal, as the Soviet Union was for more than four decades, or whether it would actually be willing to one day plunge the world into the abyss. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
States such as Algeria, which are in any case tottering on the brink of Islamic revolution, would sud- denly find themselves facing a dramatically more pow- erful domestic threat from their Muslim fanatics. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It could instead resort to indirect intimida- tion of nuclear holocaust, dissociating itself from the threat by using any one of a number of shadowy Islamic Benjamin Netanyahu 124 terrorist groups that it controls. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
One does not have to be an expert in international terrorism to sense that this rising tide of Islamic terrorism is qualitatively different from the terrorism which the West has had to face up until now. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For it derives from a highly irrational cultural source, militant Islam, which differs profoundly from that other anti-Western doctri- Fighting Terrorism 125 naire militancy, Communism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The rapidly increasing use of suicide bombings by Islamic terrorists of the Hiz- ballah and Hamas suggests that at least some of the peo- ple involved have no qualms about blowing themselves up in the service of their ideology (a phenomenon Amer- icans will remember from the Japanese kamikazes of World War II). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This pathology—I can use no other term—manifests itself in the glee with which mothers offer their sons for the greater glory of the faith, or in the ritualistic drinking from fountains of blood by Ira- Benjamin Netanyahu 126 nian soldiers during the Iran—Iraq war. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu 128 What Is to Be Done by now nearly everyone understands, “history” did not end with the collapse of Soviet Communism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The leaders of the democracies must solicit the understanding and sup- port of the public and its elected representatives for vig- orous policies against terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
I begin with actions which must be taken on the in- ternational level, because, as I have repeatedly stressed throughout, this is where the main danger comes from. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While such action under UN supervision has been taken against Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War, little or no action was taken until recently against the Iranian nuclear program. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Those regimes have consciously backed off from the energetic sponsorship of terrorism that characterized their conduct in the 1970s and 1980s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While military measures should not be the first option, they should never be excluded from the ros- ter of possibilities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The idea that one of the most unrelenting of terrorist regimes should be ex- empted from sanctions so as not to “offend” its leader and harm the “prospects of peace” is an absurdity. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The ten- dency to try and bribe Syria to desist from its support Fighting Terrorism 135 for terrorism—with American aid and Israeli concessions on the Golan Heights—is the exact opposite of what is needed. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It is not enough any- more that Syria merely continues to appear on Washing- ton’s list of states sponsoring terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Both the Soviet Union’s Iron Curtain and South Africa’s odi- ous system of racial laws were eventually brought down by a firm Western policy of linking sanctions to an im- provement in Soviet and South African policies, and there is no reason that a much less powerful state such as Syria should be any less responsive when faced with determined pressure over a protracted period. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As in the case of the PLO in Gaza, the most that can be hoped for from buying off Syria is a tactical cessation of its proxy terrorism aimed at extracting the latest round of concessions; in this case, the terror inev- itably resumes once these concessions have been digested and it looks like the next round is to be had. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The ces- sation of terrorism must therefore be a clear-cut demand, backed up by sanctions and with no prizes attached. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As with all international efforts, the vigorous application of sanctions to terrorist states must be led by the United States, whose leaders must choose the correct sequence, timing, and circumstances for these actions. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu Neutralize terrorist enclaves. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In countries repeatedly assaulted by terrorism, a thorough review of the legal measures gov- erning the battle against terrorism may become a neces- sity from time to time. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
If the security services cannot research which groups may be dangerous be- fore they strike, there is little hope of being able to Benjamin Netanyahu following measures in all or degree of the terrorist threat its particular culture and legal 140 prevent terrorism from springing up again and again. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Outlaw fund-raising and channeling offunds to terrorist groups. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Permit investigation of groups preaching terror and planning the violent overthrow of the government. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Rooting out terrorist groups must become a top priority for elected officials of all parties—and one that cannot be allowed to slide from political relevance after a few cases have been cracked. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In an age in which the power of the weap- ons which individuals may obtain grows incredibly from one year to the next, and in which information about how to obtain and use such weapons can be instantly transmitted by electronic mail from any part of the world, an active internal-security policy and aggressive counter-terrorism actions are becoming a crucial part of the mandate of every government, and officials must learn to rise to this challenge. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
important policies which must be adopted in the face of terrorism is the refusal to release convicted terrorists from prisons. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Worse, by leading terrorists to think such demands are likely to be met, they encourage precisely the kind of terrorist blackmail which they are supposed to defuse: All that Timothy McVeigh’s compatriots need to know is that the United States government is susceptible to releasing him in exchange for the lives of innocent hostages in order to get the terrorists to make just such a demand; only the most unrelenting refusal to ever give in to such blackmail can prevent most such situations from arising. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Both were forced away from their beloved city, Bethlehem. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Throughout the successive phases of writing both the Arabic and Eng- lish volumes, I have received generous help and assistance from many indi- viduals and institutions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
At the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, I thank Sophie Delfolie in the library and Jonathan Stevenson, who used to be my next desk neighbor, for their kind assistance. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In particular, there are two dear teachers/friends whom I would like to thank, although they bear no responsibility for the conclusions of this work, as they have not seen any part of this English translation before publication. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Dr Yezid Sayigh, supervisor of my doctoral dissertation and friend at the Centre of International Studies of Cambridge University, has been supervising the final drafts of this volume indirectly; that is, my learning from his rigorous research methods has been transferred from my doc- toral work to this book. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is the first opportunity for me to thank properly Mark Legui who was the man from “Del Monte” who said “yes,” as we used to joke later on. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The final word of gratitude goes for the dearest person. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To her and to our two won- derful children, Laith and Mayce, I extend my love and ask their forgive- ness for all those long days and nights I stayed in my study at the expense of our family time. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
(Response printed in Jerusalem Post [International edition], 14 March 1998.) HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the aftermath of the 1982 exodus of the Palestine Liberation Orga- nization (PLO) from Lebanon to Tunis, the Palestinian resistance movement to Israeli occupation underwent a major transformation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Regarding the nature of struggle, the extreme employment of pure political means, futile and stripped of any military capability after the resistance groups were forced to leave their bases in Lebanon in 1982, was replaced by the extreme of a costly but fruitful means of struggle—a widespread popular uprising throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Within this context, the transformation of the Palestinian struggle and the emergence of (Palestinian) Islamism, this study examines Hamas’s political thought and practice. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
‘Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, one of the founders of the movement, says that “Hamas has the widest popular base in the world because Hamas’ actions resonate with Muslims from South Africa to India, Pakistan, and China; and from Latin America to the United States and to Europe; all Muslims support what Hamas is doing.”5 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It provides a view from the inside, insofar as this is feasible, by making use of primary sources—Hamas’s own literature and documents, as well as interviews with senior figures in the movement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas thus is a response, a link in the chain of cause and effect arising from the cruel circumstances of life under occupation to which the Palestinian people have been subjected since the beginning of the twentieth century. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the case of the Palestinians, resistance to occu- pation and to colonialism gave rise to rebellions, such as the uprisings against the British during their Mandate over Palestine, the most notable of which was the revolt led by ‘Izzidin al-Qassam in the 1 930s. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The continuation of the brutal and repressive Israeli occupation led to the popular uprising or intifada and to the birth of Hamas in late 1987. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this respect, they are just like the “leftism” of many Palestinian resistance organizations in the 1 960s and 1 970s, which were a reflection of international ideological trends sweeping the Middle East. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From that point on, resistance to the Israeli occupation was given precedence over the long-standing goal of trans- forming and Islamicizing Palestinian society as a prelude to engagement in resistance activities. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The latter include the movement’s understanding of the nature of the conflict as a doctrinal, cultural, and political one, its perspective on the parties to the conflict (Zionism, Judaism, the Arabs, Muslims, and the West), and the bic], a series of documents from the third year of the intifada, issued by the Hamas information office, but with no publisher or date of publication listed. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The third chapter discusses the political relations of Hamas with other Palestinian groups and how the movement’s ideology and theory were translated into practice. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Chapter four concerns the relations of Hamas with Arab, Islamic, and other states. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The establishment of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was moti- vated by the distinct concern of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, founded in 1928, with occurrences in Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Brotherhood received simi- lar letters from ‘Awni Abdel Hadi, the Secretary General of the Higher Arab Committee in Jerusalem.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These activities of the Brotherhood were welcome by the Palestinians It is evident from the above that the Arab and Islamic dimensions of 7. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
erhood with the liberation of Palestine was sincere and based on deeç religious conviction” that was translated into significant active participa- tion.’3 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Later, the Brotherhood’s branches in Gaza grew to four: one belonging to the administrative office, another in al-Rimal, a third in Harat al-Zaitunah, and a fourth in Harat al-Daraj. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
pp. 441—43. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Saleh, AI-Tayyar al-Islami, p. 440; see also ‘Awad Khalil, “Judhour al-Islam al-siyasi 6 For a copy of the inauguration program for the headquarters of the Muslim Brothers How ItAilBegan 15 16 HAMAS a whole, these resolutions indicate that there had been a consolidation of the activities of the branches in the years preceding 1946. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The conference itself, which was attended by delegates of the Brotherhood’s Palestinian branches, was called by members of the Jerusalem branch to debate how best to uni& the efforts of the Brotherhood’s members and to establish a central office in Palestine.20 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The influence and scope of the Brotherhood’s involvement at the time can be gleaned from the records kept by some veteran members. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For exam- ple, a letter from the Brotherhood to the then Egyptian foreign minister, dated 3 April 1946, protested the presence of the Egyptian deputy consul general in Palestine at a ball to aid a Zionist society. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, this situation did not last long, as the British authorities expelled him from Palestine soon thereafter.26 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ahmed Khalifa, translator from Hebrew, Harb Filastin 1947—1948: AI-riwaya al-isra’ihzya ab-rasmiyya [Palestine War 1947—1948: The official Israeli version] (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986), p. 14. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
‘Aref al-’Aref mentions that the Jews tried to blow up the Brotherhood’s headquarters in Jerusalem in retaliation; he adds that the Brotherhood lent the Higher Arab Committee money for the purchase of arms, with contributions coming from a fund the Brotherhood had estab- lished to build a stately house for itself in Jerusalem.3’ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, Al-Mu’tamar ab-Islami al-’aam bait al-maqdis [The General Islamic Conference of Jerusalem], (Jerusalem, 1989), p. 21. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Brotherhood used the opportunity to secure agreement among the participants for an annual conference in Jerusalem. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The conference met several times in Jerusalem and Damascus for two consecutive years, and it attracted Islamic delegates from China, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, and Pakistan, as well as from the Arab countries. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The government prevented the conference from meeting in 1955 and closed down its permanent office in Jerusalem in July of the same year.39 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
We stood by the king out of self defense. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
43. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The rapid reversal in the influence of the Brotherhood in Egypt resulted from its conflict with Nasir. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibid., pp. 74, 76. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
49. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
All members of the Battalion of Justice later joined Fateh, as did most members of the Youth for Vengeance.5’ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Brotherhood and Fateh: Reform versus Liberation (1957—67) After Nasir outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1954, the Pales- tinian branch experienced a devastating blow and almost disappeared. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This development represented a setback in the effort to resist Israeli occupation and liberate Palestine, which was the main objective in the Brotherhood’s platform. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
under the name of the Muslim Brotherhood) would be extremely difficult if not impossible, particularly since the conflict in Egypt between the Brother- hood and Nasir was escalating. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
According to Abu 51. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This turn of events naturally had an impact on the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip, which was under Egyptian rule. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Al-Madhoon, “Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya,” p. 20 How ItAliBegan 23 24 HAMAS al-Qishawi, Zuhdi Saqallah, Sulaiman Abu Karsh, and Kamal al-Wahidi. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Youth for Vengeance included Salah Khalaf, As’ad al-Saftawi, Sa’id al-Muzaiyin, Omar Abu al-Khair, Isma’il Suwairjo, and Muhammad Isma’il al-Nunu. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is noteworthy that the Brotherhood’s later writings pass over rather glibly this phase of the emergence of Fateh from under its wing. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In fact, the Brotherhood’s failure to assess seriously the 1960 decision to oppose the formation of Fateh and to distance itself from it represents an implicit con- demnation of that decision. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Many Brotherhood texts offer a justification for refraining from engagement in the struggle for liberation during the 1 960s and 1970s on the basis of preparing the liberation generation.58 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From Khalil al-Wazir’s memorandum of 1957, which the Brotherhood ignored, until the early 1 980s, when the founda- tion for the 1987 emergence of Hamas was laid, the Brotherhood withdrew from the political-national effort to liberate the homeland. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Brotherhood’s priority was to win adherents and to shape their religious beliefs and conduct so as to create a generation of Palestinians that could carry out the task of liberation and rally the Islamic umma behind the effort. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Meanwhile, Nasir’s offen- sive against the Muslim Brotherhood escalated, not only in Egypt but throughout the region. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Palestinian Brotherhood continued to maintain that mobilization for the war of liberation had to have a proper Islamic foundation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A gen- eration of Muslims committed to their faith and prepared for sacrifice had to be raised by shaping the character of the individual members of that generation in a true Islamic mold. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
anyone who called for a return to Islam was accused of being a reactionary and a conspirator and an agent [of Arab reactionary forces].”62 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Never- theless, the Brethren, overshadowed by the war and its result, were trapped by the dilemma of mixed feelings and thoughts. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
cit., HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This was the Brotherhood’s position. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Brotherhood avoided such activities until the early 1 980s and busied itself with recruiting new members from among students and youth, still under the conviction that they were preparing a new generation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
it was the absence of the Islamic movement from the field that allowed revolutionary organizations to outstrip it, organizations which the Brotherhood berates for their leftist leanings, their deviation, their bungling and for brainwashing the youth.”68 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Thus, the years from 1967 to 1975 represented, according to Palestinian Islamists, the phase of mosque building. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Islamic Jihad was formed in the Gaza Strip by Brother- hood leaders who broke off from the organization in protest against its unwillingness to take on the Israeli occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This appeared to be a replay of the discourse launched by the founders of Fateh at the time they had split from the Brotherhood. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Fathi al-Shikaki, one of the founders of Islamic Jihad, wrote about the Iranian revolution, as did other early figures close to the move- ment, drawing inspiration from it and recommending a similar approach in Palestine.72 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They downplayed the organizational affiliation of Jihad members who were killed in military operations and stressed a wider loyalty to the Islamic movement, in which “they are the natural end-product of the Islamist movement.”77 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
the Islamic movement in Palestine perceives a great challenge stemming from two factors: 81. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
1982—83, which resulted in tempestuous demonstrations flowing out of the mosques in the wake of inflammatory Israeli actions, such as the incursion into the al-Aqsa Mosque. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Then there was the decision of the Brotherhood in the summer of 1985 to revolutionize the masses and to create or seize opportunities for a general popular uprising.83 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the light of these two retreats, and the accumulation of the negative effects of the tyrannical and repressive Zionist occupation of the Palestinian people, and the fact that the Palestinian people inside Pales- tine, but not outside it, were ripe for resistance, there arose the need for a Palestinian solution based on Islamic jihad, the first manifestations of which are found in Usrat al-Jihad in 1981, and Sheikh Ahmad Yassin’s group in 1983.82 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
On the same day, mass demon- strations broke out in Jabaliya, from which three of the workers originated. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
84. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This vacillation was seen in another way as a dilemma 1.See, HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
According to this view, impe- rialism seeks to establish its hegemony over the region in order to serve its own political and economic interests and to nip in the bud threats to its hegemonic position emanating from cultural aspects of the Arab national- ist movement and from a potential cultural renaissance in the region.8 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Seen from this perspective, the conflict with Israel is due to acts of aggression, not to differences in religious ideology. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The belligerent Zionist settler movement complements the Western design to separate the Islamic umma from its cultural roots and to impose Zionist-Western hegemony over it through the realization of the Greater Israel plan, so that it then can dom- inate our entire umma politically and economically. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
That is, “world Zionism and the forces of imperialism cleverly are causing one Arab country after the other to drop out of the bat- tle with Zionism so that in the end the Palestinian people will be isolated from their allies. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Some writings that convey Hamas’s perspectives offer a romanticized account of the complementar- ity of the Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic roles in standing up to Zionist and Western plans, as can be seen in the following quotation: Based on an understanding of the organic relationship between the two projects, which amounts to the fact that the conflict in its general context is one between the entire Islamic umma with its Islamic cultural program and the forces of world imperialism with its agenda of Westernization, the Islamists in Palestine took their point of departure from this dichotomy and used it to define their raison d’être, their purpose, func- 10. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is to be achieved by attacking the Zionist entity, which is the bridge- head of imperialism in the region, while drawing external support from the main body of Jihad forces, the entire umma.. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The theory of linking the struggle for the liberation of Palestine and the umma indicates that this struggle should be done in tandem with the liberation of neighboring ~urts of the Islamic umma from either direct or indirect imperialism (in the sense of dependency on the West). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Following this portrayal of the distribution of tasks for the “the liberation of Palestine,” the theory takes up tactical details of activities by Islamic countries in connection with “liberation,” from the perspective of a com- prehensive jihad. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
THE STRATEGY OF HAMAS The literature produced by Hamas reveals the broad lines of the move- ment’s strategy for conducting the struggle. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Arab and Islamic countries are regions from which our Palestinian people can draw support, particularly political, informational, and financial support; but the bloody confrontation with our Zionist enemy must take place on the sacred soil of Palestine 3. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They prepared for the establishment of their state; they ordered that the United Nations be formed, along with the Security Council, in place of the League of Nations, so that they could rule the world through them.”9 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
American and Western pressures, Israeli diplomacy, and Israel’s offers of technical aid, especially to developing countries—all this in the absence of any Arab or Islamic counteroffensive to halt the slide—had their effect. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
surge of international support for the Palestinian cause resulting from the intifada of 1987 and after. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Islamic thought addresses this unyielding political reality from the perspective of the “model” of ethics, virtue, and truth. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In fact, Hamas protected the PA from public anger on extraordinary occasions, such as during the Palestine Mosque incident in November 1994, when the police shot and killed 14 Palestinians. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Quoted from an internal Hamas document, untitled and undated, dealing with inter- action with others, seen by the author in Amman, 10 April 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This state of affairs has tended to become well established because of the constant emphasis placed on consultation by the founder and s~piritual leader of the movement, Sheikh Yassin. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, Sheikh Yassin has stressed in his letters from prison to the leaders and members of Hamas that they should stick to the principle of collective decision making: “It is impermissible for any individual or group to monopolize the right to make decisions that would determine the future course of our movement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Any decision adopted by the majority will be binding on everyone.”33 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Abu Marzouq interview, 21 April 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, it is useful to Hamas at other times, because it protects the move- ment from the consequences of ad-hoc and ill-considered decisions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, the intifada “is not the final stage of confrontation with Israel but only a phase. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is noteworthy, for instance, that the mode of expression chosen by Sheikh Yassin in making known his rejection of the Oslo Agreement was calm and moderate. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To put the best face on it, let us say that they tried and failed, but let them not saddle us with this error and its attendant calamities.42 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Our political and informational discourse must focus on the fact that the Zionists are both our foremost and our only enemies, that the central purpose of our people is to resist the Zionist occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To its credit, it kept its pledge, since the date it was established, to stay away from political assas- sinations ~ This conscious attempt to appear moderate even while declaring its opposition to the settlement with Israel is the same attitude that Hamas adopted toward various Arab-Israeli agreements and the multilateral and bilateral tracks in the peace talks. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is aware that the mere declaration of its posi- tion was sufficient to create reservations among most parties. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Its actions also have been consistent with the policy of not carrying the battle with Israel beyond the occupied land. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
[TI his has gained it a lot of credibility, and made it difficult for Arab states to pick a fight with the movement, seeing as it had been con- ciliatory towards their policies.”47 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas has learned from the lessons of the rev- olutionary Palestinian left in the 1960s and 1970s. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This attitude furthermore was consistent with Hamas’s general policy of mobilizing Arab and Islamic resources. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
We are not advocates of isolationism from reality. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
That does not mean, however, that we are going to be preoccupied byanyfait accompli manufactured by others; nor are we going to follow in their footsteps wherever they may lead, not deviating from their path while forgetting the true path to our goal. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
We will be sure to be informed about and participate in the making of laws by the elected coun- cil under which civil society will be governed.”5’ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“Siyasat Hamas al-marhaliyya fil-’alaqat al-siyasiyya.’ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
57. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
All quotes in this paragraph are from Marzouq interview with author, 21 April 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
THE HISTORIC SOLUTION AND THE INTERIM SOLUTION The following analysis focuses on Hamas’s position(s) on the liberation of “all Palestine” from Israeli occupation and whether this liberation has to be total or can be partial. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
First, there is the long-term solution—or what can be called the historic solution—for the Palestine problem. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, one can find discussion of an interim solution, of a Palestinian state, and even of an armistice in the first year of the intifada, a time when Hamas was at its zenith and the struggle was being waged under the slogan of liber- ating Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Later, in Hamas’s tenth year, one also can find an insistence on the historic solution and adherence to the idea of Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Historic Solution: Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River The Hamas Charter refers to Palestine as Islamic waqf (religious trust land). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
No Arab state nor all Arab states combined, no king or president nor all kings and presidents, and no organization nor all organizations, whether Palestinian or Arab, have the right to dispose of it or relinquish or cede any part of it, because Palestine is Islamic land that has been entrusted to generations of Mus- lims until the Day of Judgement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
~ This “historic solution” position remained constant for years after the Charter was issued. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It was restated from time to time, particularly in speeches designed to mobilize opinion against the PLO policy of accepting agreements that recognized the existence of Israel, as well as in Hamas’s literature directed at the Arab and Islamic hinterland. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas found itself obliged to reaffirm this position on several occasions when it was accused of having retreated from it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The most significant instance came in the wake of political speculation occasioned by the April 1994 initiative from its Political Bureau, which some interpreted to mean that Hamas had opted for an interim solution and abandoned its old position. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is clear that this position has remained central to Hamas even as its political position evolved. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This position was based on several considerations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas drew some reassurance from sticking to a position based on principle, reiter- ating the call for the liberation of all Palestine, and repeating continu- ously that the intifada was a step on the road to liberation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This change would have to come from outside Pales- tine, such as military action from a state surrounding Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These developments offered Hamas a glimmer of hope on an otherwise bleak horizon, and the progress achieved by the Islamists in the Middle East encouraged it.6’ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Related to Hamas’s call for the “historic solution” was the failure of the movement’s leaders to offer a convincing answer to the question of what was to become of the millions of Jewish colonial settlers in Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This idea, however, was not developed in terms of the right to self-determination, elections, and other civil rights measures that could have earned it international legitimacy. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nor did it constitute a cohesive view that Hamas could put forward, even as an abstract solution, which would have allowed the movement some room for maneuver and offered it some protection from the aggressive Israeli information campaign portraying the Arabs and Hamas as being bent on the destruction of Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
times the historic solution took the lead, particularly during periods of great vigor as when the movement was launched, but it fell behind at other times, notably in the post-Oslo period, when Hamas came under attack. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Broadly speaking, Pales- tinian resistance discourse in the Occupied Territories, as enunciated by the movements’ leaders and central figures, has focused on terminating the occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, the movement’s representative in Jordan, Muhammad Nazzal, stated in January 1993 that Hamas was prepared to accept a peaceful solution in return for Israel’s withdrawal from the terri- tories it had occupied in 1967, so long as this was not conditioned on Hamas recognizing Israel.67 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, the movement was unable or unwill- ing to resolve the ambiguities that emanated from remaining faithful to its fundamental historic position and accepting an interim solution. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nev- ertheless, it did reap political dividends by taking advantage of the maneu- verability gained from the ambiguities in its position, creating a dual and contradictory image of a pragmatic and principled movement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas made its acceptance of an interim solution contingent on a number of ideological and factual conditions that helped to differentiate its position from that adopted by the PLO several years earlier. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This differs from a peace agreement in that the armistice has a set duration, and it does not require acceptance of the usurpation of [our] rights by the enemy. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This legitimate elected leadership alone shall have the right to speak for our people’s will and aspirations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Thus, the April 1994 initiative received far greater attention than al-Zahhar’s 1988 proposal had gotten. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Simply stated, the movement had become a major political force, and considerable 68. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
70. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
attention was attached to the positions it adopted in view of the changing political context and developments at the Palestinian level and in Israel and the region. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These guidelines will be discussed separately in order to place them in the context of the span of Hamas’s existence, to explain how they have developed, and to show how they have been put into practice. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
What if Israel were to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza? Q HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Interview aired on Israeli television, 10 September 1988, and cited inAl-Nahar, 11 Sep- tember 1988. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
PoliticalPerspective on the Conflict I 80 HAMAS statements after his arrest, indictment, and trial for forming Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
According to the text of the Quran, “Praise be to the Lord who took His servant, whom We have blessed, on a midnight journey from the Holy Mosque to the al-Aqsa Mosque.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
And is jihad the path to that? Q: Y: Because we no longer have the means, we cannot get our rights either through peace or otherwise. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Thus, Hamas’s ideology requires it to force Israel to pull out its forces through an intifada and armed struggle. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Force is what convinced the enemy, following the years of the blessed intifada, to withdraw from every bit of our territory, which we turned into hell for him, his soldiers and his settlers. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If that defeatist group which is in charge of the PLO leadership had put its energies in this direction, instead of wast- ing its efforts and its funds pursuing the path of defeat, then the enemy would have withdrawn under the blows of the mujahidin.”76 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
their vanguard. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin, in reply to a question concerning what he hoped to achieve through the intifada, said: “In the first place, I want a total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, then to have these territories placed under the supervision of the United Nations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin, Filastin al-Muslima, March 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The letters include a dialogue with Talab al-Sane’, one of the Arab members of the Israeli Knesset. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin set a time limit on it, namely ten years, which is consistent with the Hudaibah truce and is not inconsistent with religious law.”8’ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Among the leaders of Hamas outside the Occupied Territories, the April 1994 statement by Abu Marzouq is the most significant indicator of the adoption of the armistice principle: “As a resistance movement, it is our opinion that if the enemy’s government wishes to extricate itself from this impasse, it should not seek to impose surrender on the Palestinian people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He proposed a cessation of attacks by Hamas for ten years on condition that Israel agree to democra- tic elections in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; it withdraw from those territories, including East Jerusalem; and it evacuate the Jewish settlers.83 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
PoliticalPerspective on the Conflict I 83 84 I HAMAS Yassin invoked the possibility of “renewing” the armistice. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“86 The armistice concept also assumed special importance for the al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, particularly after the operations of 1994—95, which elicited widespread condemnation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As Hamas sees it, a referendum is the only mechanism that reasonably can lead to a national consensus or even a quasi-consensus on the issues that will determine the fate of the Palestinian people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
New factions keep emerging, older ones splinter, and alliances and mergers occur. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With respect to the PLO, three principal options were available: to join the PLO and work from within the organization, in hope eventually of taking it over; to work out- side the PLO in the expectation of creating a credible alternative and replacing the organization in the long run; or to remain outside the PLO but not set itself up as a viable alternative, in effect to remain torn between the first two alternatives. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With respect to Fateh, the general tenor of rela- tions from the beginning of Hamas’s existence—and even before Hamas was formed as a distinct organization—has been virtually continuous com- petition and a high degree of tension. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The competition has historic roots dating back to the l950s when Fateh split from the Muslim Brotherhood; that split cre- ated a bitter feeling among both the leadership and rank and file mem- bers of the Brotherhood, as discussed in chapter 1. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The initial position, which is made explicit in the Hamas Charter, was an amicable one: The PLO was spoken of in glowing and positive terms, and its departure from the Islamic position was treated with deli- cacy. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this process, we also shall analyze the PLO’s position on Hamas and how it has evolved with time. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s position on that issue is portrayed more accurately elsewhere, particularly in the “Inter- view with Hamas Leaders,” published in Muslim Palestine magazine (in Arabic) less than a year after the publication of the Charter. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, now that the PLO has distanced itself permanently from those objectives—selling them out completely by signing the Oslo and Cairo agreements—and considering that new forces have appeared on the scene, mainly Islamic ones, which are more com- mitted to our people’s national aspirations, it is no longer reasonable or rational to adhere to the image of the PLO as the sole legitimate represen- tative, particularly in the case of the clique that now exercises hegemony over the organization. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is particularly true because the PLO never enjoyed a prior electoral mandate; had there been such a popular man- date stemming from free and democratic legislative elections to give it legit- imacy, the evaluation of this matter would have differed.9 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The PLO’S View of Hamas The PLO’s view of Hamas has to be deciphered from a number of posi- tions—some of which complement each other, and others which are 7. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Political Relations of Hamas with Palestinian Groups 91 92 HAMAS directly contradictory—that were formulated at different stages. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, Arafat has charged that Hamas was established with the direct or indirect support of Israel and has reiterated this accusation since the for- mation of Hamas, although the occurrence of such accusations seems to correlate with the amount of tension between Hamas and the PLO at any given time. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas, however, declined this invitation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Following the establishment of the PA in May 1994, the tactics of co-optation changed from offering to share power with 10. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Quoted from the extended lead editorial in Filastin al-Thawra, “Likai la tadhi al-haqiqa: See, for example, Arafat’s statements in Al-Quds al-A rabi, 24 September 1992; Al-Sharq Al-Watan al-A rabi (Paris), 31 April 1989. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Interview, Al-Hayat, 6 February 1996. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, there were fights between PLO and Hamas members inside the prisons of the Occupied Territories during the first three years of the intifada.’7 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas and Islamic Jihad prisoners generally chose to join the cell blocs containing inmates affiliated with Fateh because this group was perceived as being ideologically closest to Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These incidents are discussed in more detail below in the section “Relations with Fateh.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
By monitoring the discourse and the practice of Hamas in this regard, it is possible to group these perspectives under the three major choices mentioned earlier: set itself up as an alternative to the PLO, work from within the PLO, or do nothing.’9 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These condi- tions included most notably the PNC’s adherence to the principle that Palestine from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River belongs to the Palestinian people by right. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It would be best to discuss each of these approaches in the light of Hamas’s treatment of the possibility of its joining the PLO as laid out in the memorandum addressed to the PNC in April 1990. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Arabic version of this book, Appendix, document no. 4, pp. 318—21. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In addition, there are doubts as to whether the PLO in fact has exhausted its potential and whether the historical analogy is exact. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In view of this hard reality, hypothetically the only option for Hamas was to agree to join the PLO while not endorsing the peace process and then to work from within the PLO to change things. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This scenario encoun- tered very complex objections that pushed the internal Hamas debate into considering the possibility of setting up Hamas as an alternative or rival to the PLO from the outset and then trying to replace it instead of join- ing it (see Option 2 below). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The second largest organization is the PFLP, which has 15 seats. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The seats reserved for the popular organizations, such as student and women’s unions and professional organizations, are held by groups located in the Palestinian diaspora, where there are no organizations affiliated with Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This response put a swift end to the only serious attempt by Hamas to join the PLO and undermined the option of working from within the PLO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A number of the organizations, particularly those belonging to the PLO, expressed reservations about Hamas’s proposal, seeing such a committee as representing an encroachment on the prerogatives of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Quoted inAl-Hadaf 17 May 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas believes that once the PLO responded positively to all the U.S. terms for a political settle- ment, the existence of the organization became necessary for the balance of power and for the policies and interests of the major powers in the region, which ultimately corresponded to Israel’s interests.30 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In addition, the middle-of- the-road option of not adopting one or the other position allowed Hamas to maintain a modicum of relations and keep channels open to all parties, including the PLO itself. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Most impor- tantly, the middle-of-the-road position amounted to taking the easy way out, and Hamas did not gain any new political experience as a result. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In contrast, the PLO has moved forward with the peace process and achieved a cumulative build-up of changes favoring its program, including the gaining of international and regional support for the line it has been pursuing. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In brief, Hamas undertook not to use violence against the self- governing authority but instead to engage in opposition through peaceful means and to direct its military effort against Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In that short “honeymoon,” Hamas leaders heaped praise on the police, in the hope that this unexpected welcome would establish good will among the rank and file of security forces whose first task was expected to be to check Hamas’s policy of armed attacks. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This option, too, almost certainly would have limited the room for political maneuver. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In effect, the movement is standing still, if not frozen in place. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas did not use physical violence against the newly created PA in the Gaza Strip, nor did it exploit the weakness of the PA in its early days to undermine or impose its own conditions on it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “Tasrih sahafi howl al-hiwar ma’al-sulta al-filastiniyya” [Press release The Political Relations ofHamas with Palestinian Groups I io~ 106 HAMAS bring to the table a clear and specific political agenda, apart from demand- ing the release of Hamas detainees and a condemnation of repressive mea- sures used by Palestinian security forces. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Apart from these generalities, both sides made a few commitments. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In brief, 1996 was a very bad year for Hamas in view of the blows it received from Israel and the PA. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Although the assassi- nation produced a charged atmosphere once again, and unknown dangers loomed, it seemed briefly that developments were headed in a new direction. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the wake of these bombings, relations between the two sides reached their nadir. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In an unprecedented incident, the Palestinian police raided al-Najah University in Nablus on 3 March 1996 and arrested the student 38. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Another approach that the PA used against Hamas was to try to split the movement by encouraging some of its members to form an indepen- dent Islamic political party which would attract religious elements from Hamas itself as well as its supporters. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It also blamed Hamas for the delay in the withdrawal of Israeli troops from, or their redeploy- ment in, the West Bank. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The resistance organizations, for their part, viewed the participation of the Islamists in the resistance effort with some misgiving. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ideological enthusiasm for the entry of the Islamists into the arena of direct resistance thus varied from one resistance organization to the other, ranging across a spectrum from warm welcome to a cool political response to acceptance of the fact with reservations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Recalling the prior absence of Islamists from the resistance arena, George Habash, secretary general of the PFLP, spoke with notable enthusiasm about Hamas: From the ideological position of total confrontation, I welcome Hamas joining the swell of total resistance to the Zionist enemy. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In view of their performance compared with Hamas in opposing the Oslo Agree- ment, it became clear to Hamas that opposition to stop or undermine the agreement was ineffectual because many of the opposition forces had been transformed into organizations with complex motives.48 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin said as much in describing the opposition, stirring up strong criticism from Palestinian resistance organizations allied with Hamas in the ten fasa’il grouping. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
11 November 1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In contrast, Hamas defied the harsh reality of occupa- tion by raising the slogan of not surrendering a single inch of the territory of historic Palestine, from the Mediterranean to the Jordan, and calling for the total condemnation of the legitimization of Israel’s presence in the territories occupied in 1948. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
No one expected relations between Hamas and Fateh to take a differ- ent course, given the sources of conflict between them. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Fateh was kept under close scrutiny. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These charges and countercharges strained relations on an almost permanent basis. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Recognition here does not entail simply a question of legitimacy. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
representative from every organization. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For details on the Hamas-Fateh talks, see Khaled Hroub, “Sijill bi-tarikh al-liqa’at The Political Relations of Hamas with Palestinian Groups I 115 116 HAMAS would include all resistance organizations participating in the intifada. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
53. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These accusations, which included such charges as that Hamas had been created by Yitzhak Rabin, that it owed allegiance to Iran, and that it had deviated from the unity of Palestinian ranks just like the Zulu tribes who opposed Nelson Mandela in South Africa, were an obstacle to a rapprochement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel also went out of its way to torpedo any potential rap- prochement by preventing Hamas leaders or prominent figures close to the movement from travelling abroad for meetings with Fateh and PLO leaders.57 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
from travelling to Jordan to meet the “outside” leadership of Fateh; see Al-Quafs (Jerusalem), 20 August 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
After the PA began to operate in the Gaza Strip and Jericho in mid- 1994, the tensions between Hamas and Fateh abated. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Opposition to the Madrid Conference was the common denominator among these organizations and the subject of the first communique released by the TRO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The absence of any organizational structure undermined the effectiveness of the TRO; coordination among the members remained minimal and was limited to issuing joint commu- niques. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The loose structure of the TRO, which allowed for only minimal coor- dination among the fasa’il, made it ineffectual in coping with the situa- 61. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
63. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As mentioned previously, some resistance organization leaders reacted negatively to this proposal because they believed it was being offered as an alternative to the PLO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
the post-Oslo period included the following: rejecting the agreement; boycotting the elections for the PA council (or participation in the coun- cil by appointment); boycotting all organizations derived from the Oslo Agreement or charged with its implementation; affirming the inalienable, historic rights of the Palestinian people to liberate its land, return to its homeland, and practice full national self-determination; and adhering to armed struggle as the principal means of liberation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For the Arabic text of the modified proposal, see ibid., pp. 334—36. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In practical terms, due to the major dispute over the leadership struc- ture of the alliance, the original formula for representation that had been in force under the TRO survived unchanged. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It tried to avoid the pitfalls that had led to the failure of previous proposals and focused this time on including a large number of independent Palestinian personalities. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Aside from a limited number of successes, the coordinated efforts of the alliance/fasa’iI amounted to little more than the issuing of joint com- muniques concerning significant developments pertaining to the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Agreement or issuing releases expressing solidar- ity with each other. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the absence of military coordination among these organizations inside the Occupied Territories, there was only one communique from the ‘Izzidin al-Qassam Brigades, issued after the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier in October 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Apart from one case in Bir Zeit, these organizations put up detailed lists of candidates who competed with each other as well as with Fateh’s strong candidates. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It also opposed acceptance of an interim solution to the Palestine problem. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It also demanded that the mechanism of direct elections be used to choose any legitimate Palestinian leadership.69 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From the perspective of Hamas, these proposals represented a compromise between thosefasa’il in the rejec- tion front that wanted an alternative to the PLO in the form of a different national liberation organization and those such as the PFLP and the DFLP that wanted alternative leaders for the PLO while keeping the organization as a national institution. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In that case, Hamas would bear the lion’s share of the cost of such a battle, which would sap our efforts and divert them from the battle with the enemy. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Fourth Pillar: We in Hamas, because of our powerful presence inside the Occupied Territories, must bear the consequences of any col- lective decision by the tenfasdil [TRO], whereas the effect of such a deci- sion on the otherfasa’ilwould be limited because of the limited nature of their presence and influence in the Occupied Territories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Despite this theoretical tolerance, in practice aloofness characterized the political relationship between the two movements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Assessment A number of general observations regarding relations between Hamas and the fasa’il are worth mentioning. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Although the trend among Islamists had been to avoid alliances across ideological divisions—and they have suffered from an inability to separate their ideological stands from their political ones—as far as Hamas is concerned the movement has been able to a great extent to overcome numerous ideological obstacles that have served as con- straints on the activities of Islamists in general and on their alliances with secular and non-Islamist parties sharing a common political position. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This shall not weaken the move- ment, nor deviate it from its course; it only will make it stronger, more credible and realistic, and will instill greater confidence in the Palestinian people with all their leanings. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It will dismantle barriers isolating it from others and will foster understanding and a coming together with others, which will serve [the general] interest. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There is no harm in this for Hamas, particularly considering that it is the The Political Relations of Hamas with Palestinian Groups 129 130 HAMAS biggest and strongest party; and the closest one to the realities and lean- ings of the Palestinian people.75 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This dis- parity in the level of cooperation with the fasa’il inside and outside the Occupied Territories did not escape severe criticism from the fasa’il. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
First, Hamas leaders adopted the unchallenged or unanalyzed assumption that their movement is the natural leader of an opposition Pales- tinian alliance that seriously could challenge the legitimacy of the PLO 75. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
‘Isa al-Nashshar, who was a member of the administrative bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood on the eve of the formation of Hamas (it was the administrative bureau that decided at the beginning of December 1987 to create the movement), has said: [I] n this period when the movement was expanding, acquiring grass- roots support, and was embracing the causes and concerns of the Pales- tinian people, it was obligated to admit all groups belonging to the Palestinian people and to acknowledge all the forces that were operating and had influence in that arena .. . HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Charter seeks inspiration from the history of reli- gious coexistence in Palestine and the region as a whole, stating that Islam had the best record in the practice of tolerance; according to Hamas, the adherents of the three monotheistic religions—Islam, Christianity, and Judaism—can coexist in peace and security under Islam; security and trust only can prevail under the rule of Islam. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Aside from looking to the position of Omar toward the Christians for inspiration, Hamas’s other point of departure in formulating its perspective on the religious Other, particularly the Jewish Other, is the history of the usurpation of Palestine by the Zionists. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas considers those immigrants from abroad generally to be “occupying invaders,” or “enemies engaged in com- bat,” and treats them accordingly.82 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this regard, there is a pos- itive record that involves positions adopted and concerns expressed that are consistent with the image which Hamas projects of itself: It is a Palestin- ian nationalist Islamic movement with a program for all Palestinians from a collective perspective. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas has been very alert and has distanced itself from and condemned anything that could harm that relationship. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Such a response came from Bishop Lutfi al-Lahham, pastor of the Orthodox bishopric in Jerusalem, during a sit-in in front of the Knesset gion and faith of Islam—then we are all fundamentalists.”87 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
which coincided with the emergence of Hamas, has been their increased The situation has been particularly sensitive because most of the immi- grants have been from Jerusalem, where the demographic struggle over the status of the city is most intense. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In its statements, Hamas reiterated that Palestinians were immigrating because of the constant pressure on them from the Israeli occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nevertheless, the relationship remains confined to declarations of sol- Quote is taken from the video tape, “Inna baqoon” [We are staying], which was made by the Islamic Movement in Israel to support the Palestinians whom Israel deported to south Lebanon in December 1992; see also Abdul Salam Ibrahim, “Al-Muslim wal Masihi ma’an fi khandaq al-wihda al-wataniyya” [The Muslim and the Christian are together in the trench of national unity], Filastin al-Muslima, May 1993, p. 23. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Some of the leaders and prominent figures in Hamas maintain that there is no fundamental reason preventing any Pales- tinian, regardless of his religion, from joining Hamas.89 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Abu Marzouq, interview with author, 21 April 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A basic differ- ence characterizing the ideology and practices of the two movements is their position on armed struggle. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Islamic movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip made a transition from proselytizing and educational activ- ities in the days of the Muslim Brotherhood to armed struggle after Hamas came on the scene, gaining wide support, new adherents, and significant influence. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In contrast, the Islamic movement in Israel widened its support and influence by effecting a transition from a brief period of armed strug- gle in the early 1980s to contesting political campaigns, proselytizing, and offering educational services. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
After his release, Sheikh Darwish adopted peaceful means of spreading his message, based on a realistic vision that the objective of Islamists in Israel should be: to consolidate an Arab-Islamic identity; to defend the rights ol deepening Palestinian nationalism among the Arabs in Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
the minority by engaging in political struggles; to contest municipal elec- tions; and even to run for the Knesset. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Islamists in Israel were the first to realize that establishing relations with Hamas would be playing with fire; would place their social, cultural, and civil insti- tutions in jeopardy; and would nullify their growing achievements at the municipal and political levels. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas clearly applied very heavy moral pressure on the Islamic move- ment to prevent it from taking part in the Knesset elections.96 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It became clear that Hamas had lost any political cover it had, either from the Administrative Council in the self-rule area or from any state in the region—on the contrary, it was condemned from virtually all sides. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Political Relations of Hamas with Palestinian Groups 143 RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES movement was founded in December 1987 to the end of 1990, Hamas had no official representation or spokesmen outside the Occupied Territories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Although these time periods are not exact in terms of establishing clear demarcation lines in the substance of Hamas’s political discourse, the division does explain a change in the free- dom with which Hamas expressed itself. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There is no difficulty in finding outspoken statements by Hamas between 1987 and 1990 that unabashedly indict (and openly antagonize) a number of Arab regimes for llamas’s Political Hamas s political thinking and discourse about the Arab regimes can be divided into two periods. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This relative moderation in expression—which on several occasions led to accusations that Hamas was collaborating with Arab regimes—can be attributed to Hamas having learned from the PLO’s experience. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The second difficulty was the uncertainty in the minds of Arab regimes with regard to the precise nature of the relationship between Hamas and the Brotherhood and the extent to which Hamas’s position would be based on that of the Brotherhood. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s difficulty in liberating itself from the legacy of the Brother- hood’s relationship with Arab regimes was more of a psychological than a practical impediment. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Even though Hamas did not declare openly to the Palestinian people that it was an alternative to the PLO, its discourse placed it in an intense compe- tition with the PLO for the right of representation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This was no mean obstacle, as Hamas discovered, because the years in which the Palestinian Islamists had been absent from the arena of political and military action had enabled the PLO to take command of the Pales- tinian national struggle. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Even the government of Sudan, which is the closest Arab state to Hamas in politi- cal and ideological terms, has suggested repeatedly that Hamas join the PLO in order to change it from within. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The third obstacle to Hamas developing relations with Arab regimes has been the general Arab consensus to accept a peace settlement, which Hamas has refused to do. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
On the one hand, this anti-Islamist campaign escalated just as Hamas’s influence and power were expanding. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas also contributed to the list of obstacles impeding develop- 6. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The lessons learned from the clashes in Jordan in 1970 and in Lebanon during the second half of the 1970s were clear. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Furthermore, the argument goes, there is a pressing need for Hamas to step in and fill the vacuum created in the political and information area when the PLO vacated a number of positions it used to hold following its agreements with Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Also, there is a pressing need to increase contacts with the millions of Palestinians outside who have been virtually forgot- Hamas’s PoliticalRelations 151 152 HAMAS ten at the official level, not to mention the hundreds of millions of Arabs and Muslims. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For others, this facile acceptance of the status quo in the Arab world and the absence of any dedication to change are negative aspects, particularly because Hamas considers itself a pan-Islamic movement supporting change. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The former head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, Abu Marzouq, adds that Hamas has learned several lessons from the PLO’s experience in forging relations with Arab partners. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These four reasons are taken from an undated internal Hamas document, “Siyasat Ibid. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The most intensive period of meetings followed the release from prison of Sheikh Yassin, who then embarked on a major tour of Arab countries from February to June 1998. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Foreign Minister of Kuwait, Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber as-Sabah, said there was U.S. pressure on Kuwait not to meet with Sheikh Yassin, Al-Hayat, 28 May 1998; concerning U.S. chagrin with the Arabs for hosting Sheikh Yassin, see Henry Siegman, “Peacemaking Needs Help from Arab Governments, too,” International Herald Tribune, 8 June 1998. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Apart from Libya, the countries of the Maghreb (Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) remained closed to Hamas and were not on the list of countries visited, which might work to the disadvantage of Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It repeated the pattern observed in the first period [from the outbreak of the intifada to the Gulf War], when Hamas’s discourse gradu- ally toned down from initial zealotry to moderation and less condemna- tion. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
support or expressions of moral support for the intifada emanating from the Arab League or the Arab foreign ministers’ meetings. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the second period, emphasis is on the deed, the signature, and the treaty, rather than on the doer of the deed, the signatory of the treaty. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Syria, however, was singled out for rare praise, in partic- ular during the deportee crisis from December 1992 to December 1993.24 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “Press Conference Release by the Islamic Resistance Movement See, for example, the Hamas leaflet, “Release Concerning the Termination of the See, for example, the letter from ‘Abdul ‘Aziz al-Rantisi, a prominent Hamas figure Hamas’s Political Relations I 159 160 HAMAS larly in locations within the Arab world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, Hamas has mounted a strong defense of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and sharply denounced efforts to expel Palestinians from that country,26 where Palestinians “have suffered more calamities, slaughter, and torture than anywhere else.”27 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One press release in the midst of the crisis announced that Hamas “condemns the expulsion and deportation of Palestinian students and residents from Egypt and some states in the Gulf and deems such action to be a stab in the back of the Palestinian cause and the blessed intifada.”33 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The second and larger-scale incident resulted from President Qaddafi’s September 1995 order to deport Palestinians residing in Libya to the area controlled by the PA. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Initially, Hamas attempted to stay within the general rhetoric of con- demning the intervention of Western forces in the region, while avoiding any clash with the popular mood that could result from any direct criticism of Iraq. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hence, its position evolved so that in its 17 August press release Hamas distanced itself further from the Iraqi position. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It added that the solution “has to be based first of all on the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region and Iraqi forces from Kuwait; that an Arab or an Islamic force should be stationed in the hotly disputed border areas; that the peo- ple of Kuwait should have the right of determining the future of their country; and that disputes should be settled in an Arab or Islamic frame- work which will ensure that Iraq’s demands concerning the drawing of bor- ders or the repayment of debts arising from the war with Iran and other [debts] will receive due consideration.”39 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet dated 17 August 1990. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In order to appreciate the courage it took to adopt such a position, one has to consider the context. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In brief, Hamas tried to hedge its bets in the crisis. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Although the offer to mediate over the issue of prisoners was not taken seriously, the intervention to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinians in Kuwait did have some effect. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
His offer was accepted by Kuwait but rejected by Iraq.46 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Thus, it has issued calls for dialogue and for the settlement of disputes within a fraternal climate. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Apart from the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, Hamas has not been affected Hamas also tried to steer clear of alliance politics and to maintain a rel- 45. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Most cases involved clashes between governments and their political opposition. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is evident in the reiteration by Hamas of its concern not to undermine the democratic experiment in Jordan.5° HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One Hamas bulletin expressed solidarity with Tunisian Islamist prisoners and called on the government to rescind sentences passed on the Islamists, notably Rashid al-Ghannoushi, the leader of the Tunisian Islamic movement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas believed that any attack on Sudan, such as those by Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudanese rebels, was an assault on the security of the Arab nation as a whole.59 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas, Periodic statement no. 90 of 5 September 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
58. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
the conflict from metamorphosing into a conflict between Israel and the Palestinians alone. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibid. Hamas’s Political Relations 169 170 HAMAS to them constituted an evolution in its thinking, compared with the cate- gorical censure of all Arab summits and conferences during the first two years of the movement’s life. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
66. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas shall avoid involvement in disputes and rivalries among Islamic movements or institutions working in the same sector or in the same geographic area; and it shall not align itself with one faction against any other. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibid. different possible interpretations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first point that can be made is that one can detect in the text a measure of palpable political realism, gained after three years of experience. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In both Arab and Islamic states, Hamas has relied from the beginning on the complemen- tarity and solidarity of local Islamic movements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For instance, rather than Hamas organizing its own meetings of support and solidarity, the country-based groups themselves organize such meetings. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Yet, that suc- cess has been achieved at the expense of Hamas’s direct contacts with the Arab public, which have become rare. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, it participated in the Arab Islamic Popular Congress that used to meet in Khartoum, at the invita- tion of its secretary general, Hassan al-Turabi. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas was given a seat on the general secretariat and attended subsequent meetings of the convention. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To cite some less important grass-roots activities, Hamas takes part in popular festivals and party conventions in support of the Palestinian cause or the resistance in south Lebanon. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas received many letters of support from Jordanian, Lebanese, and other parties 75. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
have observer status) in the organizations and institutions established by the Islamic countries. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These relations justif,r devoting a special section in this chapter to Iran. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Relations with Tehran entered a cold freeze as the PLO drifted away from Iran to restore some bal- ance in its relations with Arab states, a process exacerbated by Iran’s disap- pointment in the un-Islamic conduct of members of the Palestinian delegation.78 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For a well-balanced and in-depth interpretation of the relationship between revolu- tionary Iran and the Palestinians in this period, see the chapter “The Palestinians between Dream and Reality,” pp. 363—405 in Fahmi Huwaidi, Iran minald.akhil HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ever since Hamas opened its office in Tehran, PLO leaders constantly have accused it of owing allegiance to a foreign power. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Meanwhile, on an altogether different tack, the U.S. and Western powers have mounted ver- bal attacks on Iran and Hamas for working together to undermine the peace process. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Al-’Alami denies that Hamas receives direct support from the Iranian gov- ernment, although “there are certain ways in which the Iranian people sup- port the Palestinian people so as to foster their steadfastness in the Occupied Territories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibid. Hamas’s Political Relations 179 180 distanced itself from Iran but has drawn relatively close to it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin underlined Hamas’s appreciation for Iran’s posi- tion and the movement’s support for Iran after his release from jail in June Iran on several occasions.87 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This was the period during which national liberation movements emerged in many Third World nations in Africa, southeast Asia, and Latin America, a wave that received direct aid from the former Soviet Union and China. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Allowing for the difference in ideology, Hamas also saw itself as part of a global movement (albeit Islamic) trying to bring about a historic trans- formation, first in the Islamic world and then in the entire world, just like other Islamic movements from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Apart from the case of Iran, it can be said that the movement did not succeed in establishing real political rela- tions with the regimes of the Islamic world, putting aside courtesy calls and messages of solidarity dutifully dispatched on appropriate occasions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Among the more significant studies that claim that Islamic movements in the Muslim Hamas’s PoliticalRelations 181 182 J HAMAS The most striking aspect of Hamas’s discourse on Islamic issues is the vigorous attack on Western double standards in dealing with Islamic as opposed to other issues that are consistent with Western interests. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas assigned special importance to a number of recurring issues covered in “At the External Level;” four such issues are reviewed briefly below. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Afghanistan Hamas gave unreserved support to the Afghan jihad to terminate the Soviet presence in that country. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The letters of congrat- ulations sent by Hamas represented the movement’s last significant state- ment on the issue of Afghanistan.94 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nor did Hamas consider that the vic- tory of the mujahidin never would have been possible without the direct support they received from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, either through Pakistan or Washington’s Arab allies. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It has supported the right of Muslims in Kashmir to self- determination. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Occasionally, Hamas has condemned incidents in which Muslims were victimized, such as in October 1993 when “the Indian army in Kashmir indiscriminately opened fire on Muslims who were demon- strating against the siege of their mosques.”95 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s dealing with these problems was simply a question of media policy, no more than declarations of solidarity from afar. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With respect to Hamas’s position on issues relating to the official order in the Islamic world, one ought to mention the repeated calls from Hamas to Islamic governments “to let God’s law [shariah] govern” and to “realize the aspirations of their people and to cut the apron strings of dependence on the arrogant, colonial West, to liberate themselves from it, and to become one with their peoples who yearn for the might of Islam which will allow them to achieve dignity.”°° HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The objective was one of “mobilizing moral and material support for the Palestinian people and consolidating the Islamic dimension of the issue.”°2 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
On that basis Hamas established relations with politi- cal parties, movements, and social groups in the Islamic world, the vast majority being Islamic movements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
weakness of the Muslims, thus countering the view behind which Hamas had tried to rally the ‘ulama. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s statements and public appeals continued to solicit support from Islamic movements in the world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A letter addressed to the heads of Islamic centers, organizations, groups, and movements illustrates the kind of support that Hamas sought from these meetings: on the United States in the form of letters and embassy contacts so the lat- ter would ease its hostility to Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“Letter from the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) to the Heads of Islamic 111. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See the reports of the International Committee in Solidarity with Dr. Musa Abu Through its ardent and emotional rhetoric, Hamas managed to retain a modicum of moral and material support that allowed it to continue and to retain considerable independence from official sources. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
115. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With time then, Hamas’s appreciation of international relations became more sophisticated and its discourse more nuanced. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He differentiated between Western governments that support Israel and the people of those states.’16 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas also welcomes any international aid that will improve the health and economic conditions of the Palestinian people under occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For examples, see Hamas, Periodic statement no. 9 of 4 March 1988; no. 31 of 7 Octo- ber 1988; and no. 32 of 25 November 1988. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There was a network of relations between states, inter- national norms, and international law that constitute the foundations for interaction between states and the inevitable basis for international legiti- macy, political rights and conduct, the redress of grievances, and recourse against aggression. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This awareness was reflected in the emergence of a new kind of political discourse for Hamas, a discourse that relied on interna- tional law, along with its Islamic ideology, to justify and legitimate its struggle. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
First was the rise in the power of the move- ment, which attracted international attention from politicians and the media and which in turn required a response from Hamas in a language that could be understood and acceptable. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s recognition of this multifaceted reality forced it on several occasions to observe the principles of democratic pluralism, the rights of minorities, and other such terms it had borrowed from mod- ern, politically correct international relations jargon. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The talks were suspended because of the incident, and the center of attention in the Middle East and the focus for the United States shifted temporarily to resolving the problem, securing the return of the deportees, and then resuming the peace talks. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In addition, Hamas felt that it had become an effective force in the Palestinian arena and that it had to introduce itself to the relevant parties.’2° HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
According to prominent Hamas figures, this belief was the driving force for Hamas to make contact with the West. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Muhammad Nazzal interview in Filastin Al-Muslima, April 1993, p. 16. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the course of their talks, the United States tried to steer Hamas away from armed activities and to obtain a commitment from it not to do anything that would interfere with the peace process.’24 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Americans ended the two-month contacts in early March due to pressure from Israel and because they felt no progress had been achieved to justify their continuation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They argued that doing so weakened the U.S. ability to get a full picture of the political situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, particularly since the information obtained about Hamas no longer came from direct sources. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas statement, entitled “A memorandum from the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) regarding recent developments,” dated 8 February 1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is particularly interesting because Hamas refrained from conducting attacks against American or Western interests inside or outside Israel and had limited its operations to Israeli military targets. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the following July, U.S. authorities arrested Abu Marzouq, then the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, when he landed in New York on a private visit. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “An Important Statement on the American-Israeli Collusion in the Abu See for example a letter sent from Hamas spokesman Ghosheh “To His Excellency Abu Marzouq, interview with author, 21 April 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
‘Israel’s Position on the Palestinian Islamist Phenomenon Israeli assessments and interpretations of the Islamic phenomenon in the Occupied Territories are contradictory. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
My assessment derives from the five factors that are discussed below. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
First, Israel’s position toward Islamic institutions or toward the social and educational aspects of the Islamic awakening was no different from its established position toward other nonmilitary phenomena that accom- panied the Palestinian national movement and factions of the PLO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Beyond the immediate neighborhood, the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the evolution of the Islamic movement in Sudan, and the increasing growth of political Islam in Alge- ria all had important influences on Palestinian Islam in the Occupied Ter- ritories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s Political Relations I 203 204 I HAMAS was different from that of the PLO, whose known leaders were always outside the Occupied Territories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The task was all the more difficult because Hamas vanguards and its political leaders distanced themselves from military work and denied even belonging to Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, after the intifada gradually shifted gears from mass Israel and Dialogue with Hamas The importance of the topic of an Israel-Hamas dialogue derives from two angles. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
demonstrations and stone throwing to the use of fire arms and Molotov cocktails, the occupation authorities on many occasions issued directives prohibiting the summoning of any Islamic personalities from Hamas or close to it for the purpose of discussions or establishing liaison.’43 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Even before Oslo, Shimon Peres, who at the time was foreign minister, declared that Israel was “ready to negotiate with extremists from Hamas if they were freely elected in the Occupied Terri- tories.”46 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With respect to [the proposal] for self-government, Bahar expressed his opposition because it consolidates the occupation and does not fulfill people’s demands; see his interview with the author published in Khaled Hroub, “Harakat Hamas bain al-sulta al-filastiniyya wa-Isra’il: Mm muthallath al-quwa ila al-mitraqa wal-sindan,” [Hamas Between the PA and Israel: From the triangle of power to the anvil and hammer], MajalLit al-dirasat al-fiI.astiniyya, HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “Clarification from Hamas spokesman, Ibrahim Ghosheh,” 7 Novem- 153. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
154. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One can speculate as to whether this acknowledgement has been driven by genuine conviction, by organizational interests, or by devotion to the general interest. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, Mahmoud al- Zahhar said in response to a question from the press: “Hamas respects the opinion of the Palestinian public even if it runs against its wishes. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Al-Nahar: If it becomes clear from the elections that the Palestinian Sheikh Yassin [in exasperation, according to the newspaper]: By In light of Hamas’s participation in student and trade union elections, 5. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See for example Hamas leaflet dated 22 September 1993; Periodic statement no. 108 of See leaflet, “The Hamas Movement Condemns the Assassination of al-Saftawi as a See letter from Hamas in Roznamet Pakistan, 16 April 1997. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This manifestation took the form of involve- ment in electoral contests against the PLO lists of candidates. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Then they tell of the Brethren enlisting in the camps for resistance fighters set up by Fateh in the Jordan Valley dur- ing 1968-70. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See Hamas leaflet, “A Memorandum from the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 19. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
percent, or 48,971 peo- ple, voted for the National Bloc (which supports the resistance organiza- tions belonging to the PLO), whereas 45.8 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
percent, or 18,016, cast their ballots for the National Bloc, while 42.62 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
‘When rumors circulated that the occupa- tion authorities wanted to resort to this practice, one of Hamas’s press releases declared: “We oppose appointment in principle, because it comes from the power of the occupation and not from our people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sub- sequently, the Israeli and international media showed interest in Hamas’s position on the holding of elections. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The main lines of that position are that Hamas welcomes the idea of elections because “there is no other way to choose representatives of the people except by electing them.”25 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas realized that the idea of elec- tions had become inseparable from a settlement, which in essence did not differ much from the Camp David formula for self-rule. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In October 1993, Sheikh Yassin sent letters to the movement from prison; these were published in the press and showed new flexibility on the entire issue. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Because we express our opposition by going out into the street, why shouldn’t we express our opposition from within the heart of the legislative institution which, in the future, will assume the right to represent the Palestinian people and to pass laws and regulations that suit its fancy and its leanings?33 Sheikh Yassin then addressed the practice of the issuing offatwas ban- ning participation in the elections. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, “Letter from Kfar Yona Prison to the Movement’s Leaders and Followers,” dated 3 October 1993 and published in Al-Wasat, 11 November 1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nevertheless, the media brouhaha made by Israel and its extortionist tactics in the Cairo negotiations concerning the details of the elections were designed to pre- vent Hamas and the Palestinian opposition from taking part in the elec- tions, despite various assertions to the contrary.38 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The movement therefore wanted to benefit positively from diverse elections. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These included ‘Imad al-Faluji, who subsequently was expelled, and Isma’il Haniyah, Khaled al-Hindi, and Sa’id al-Namruti, who regis- tered as independent candidates but had to withdraw their names as a result of pressure from Hamas, which feared that their candidacy would 39. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Prior to the elections Hamas put out a statement to explain once more the five main reasons for the position it had adopted: the Council whose members were to be elected derived from Oslo, and it would be limited by the ceiling set by Oslo; Israel would retain the right to abrogate any Council resolution that it did not like; holding these elections meant abrogating the rights of four million Palestinians living in the diaspora because they were not permitted to participate; the man- ner in which the elections were to be conducted would consolidate the annexation of Jerusalem by Israel, given that the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem would be required to send in their ballots by mail, confirm- ing their status as foreigners residing on foreign soil; and ultimately what is required of the Council is to legitimize Oslo. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas issued a statement prior to the elections concerning the candidacy of these prominent figures, explaining that their decision was an individual one and that they did not rep- resent Hamas; see Hamas leaflet, “A Statement of Clarification from the Islamic Resistance Move- ment (Hamas),” dated 31 December 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In a written response to the author on 9 March 1996, al-Zahhar avoided a question about his view of Hamas’s decision not to participate in the election by saying: “My personal opinion differs from the opinion of the movement, and I do not wish to state it.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “An Important Statement from the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Concerning the Elections for Limited Self-Rule,” dated 19 November 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is up to the Palestinian Authority, through its actions, to alleviate the fears, doubts and suspicions of the opposition, and to prove in prac- tice that it seeks fair elections in the service of the general interest of the Palestinian people.”39 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Some prominent figures in Hamas also have alleged that the polls are conducted on Fridays during the noon prayers when Hamas supporters are at the mosque; they have alleged that the poli takers are instructed to avoid universities and mosques, organizational headquarters, the offices of lawyers, doctors, and engineers, and other places of support for Hamas.52 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Therefore, I use a tentative estimate that derives from my own close study of the move- ment and its position in Palestinian politics since 1987. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Reviewing the various estimates of Hamas’s public support (the CPRS estimate of 18 percent and Hamas’s own estimate of 40 to 50 percent), the results of the 1996 Legislative Council elections, and the frequent Hamas victories in professional and student associations can be confus- ing. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Funding sources were private contributions, from both inside the occupied territo- ries and outside, notably the Arab oil-producing states of the Gulf. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
for administering justice.64 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ziad Abu ‘Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Bloomington: Indi- ana University Press, 1994), p. 70. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas differed from the PLO-affiliated Unified strikes affecting schools. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Unified National Leadership insisted on the participation of all students in the general strike, which led to the closing down of schools, whereas Hamas exempted educational establishments from general strikes and called on students to attend classes.67 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The num- ber of detainees, wounded, and martyred from among the student mem- bers of Islamic blocs, the students, faculty, and employees of the Islamic University, the mosque-going faithful—young and old, the imams, and the young heroes are absolute proof that the launching of the intifada was the result of that preparation and development. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas brought this composite perspective to bear on the significant issues arising from resis- tance to the occupation, the most serious of which was that of [Israeli] agents. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The independence of Islamic institutions that either directly or indirectly were associated with Hamas was a major concern for the move- ment. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
73. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The independent status of mosques came to an end in March 1996, when the PA Hamas leaflet, “The Independence of Mosques Is the Buttress of Our Civil Society; It Sheikh Yassin’s letters from prison, Al-Wasat, 11 November 1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In theory, interest in the military option and its exercise emerged nat- urally from the movement’s view of the best methods and tools to fight occupation, namely, the view that armed struggle, or “force,” is necessary for the liberation of Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
responsible for any attacks against Israelis carried out from areas under its control. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
By adopting this position, as pointed out earlier, Hamas undoubtedly tried to learn from the experience of some PLO fac- tions and to avoid being categorized as a “terrorist” organization. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Thus, military action from conception to execution was to remain within the occupied land; Hamas can be credited both for its ability to conduct its operations under occupation and for not letting them spill outside the bor- ders of historic (pre-1948) Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the first place, it should be remembered that the goal and strat- egy of Hamas are long-term, and theoretically, point toward “liberating Palestine from the river to the sea.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s goal has been to transform Israel from a land that attracts world Jews to a land that repels them by making its residents insecure. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Along the same line, Ibrahim Ghosheh explains that among the results of such operations are [negative] “impacts on the structure of Zionist society, on immigration programs from abroad, and on various other activities including tourism. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“~ From a broader perspective, it should be stated that the matter of strik- ing at Israeli civilians is an indirect extension of views and modes of oper- ation that occupied an important place in Palestinian military strategy generally, and specifically in PLO strategy in the 1970s and 1980s. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It might seem somewhat overdrawn to quote, even if extensively, from the writings of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to demonstrate this point, especially because Abu Mazen is the one who negotiated the Oslo Accord and renounced all military actions against Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibrahim Ghosheh, Al-Quds Press, 2 October 1997. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
\ size; it constitutes the Achilles heel of the Zionist projeèt. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This would erase what little sense of security remains from the hearts of settlers and plant doubt in their psyches about their future ... The first and last duty of every Palestinian gun is to head toward the occupied land to expel its Zionists from the battlefield with all available, legitimate, and possible means and to target the human being, then the human being, then the human being. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel was always ready to give this possible erosion a push by means of its policy of collective punishment against the Palestinian people for the actions of Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Thus, although Hamas had been unresponsive to all international requests to stop its military operations, the erosion of popu- lar backing for such action is sufficient to twist its arm to do just that. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This was in addition to calls for a sus- pension of military operations in areas under the PA’s control or the launching of operations from those areas.97 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These campaigns persisted in spite of Hamas’s protestations that armed resistance to occupation is legit- imate under all laws, human and divine, and notwithstanding the dis- Undoubtedly, fast-moving events, set in motion by Hamas’s spectacu- There are several statements by Hamas officials to the same effect; see for example a statement made by Ghazi Hamad, a Hamas official from Gaza, who declared: “The majority in the movement are for suspending military operations temporarily” inAl-Hayat (London), 31 Jan- uary 1996. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See, for example, the statement by Sufian Abu Zaydeh, a Fateh official in Gaza, to Israeli radio on 12 October 1994, commenting on a Hamas kidnapping of an Israeli soldier: “The Pales- tinian street is with the demands of the kidnappers and with the release of the [5,000] Palestin- ian prisoners.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The greater danger threatening Hamas’s position is, of course, the possibility of erosion of popular support for its operations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For instance, the unfolding of events up to the tenth year of Hamas’s existence (1998)—in other words, five years after Oslo—pointed to a became a distinct possibility, and when popular support for its armed oper- ations began to ebb in response to Israel’s policy of sealing off Gaza after every operation and preventing Palestinian workers from going to their the entire policy of armed action. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
98. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas was not far from such an impasse itself. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It fortuitously escaped the Gulf War imbroglio by adopting a middle-of-the-road position to the right of the PLO, coming out in favor of the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Gulf. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It did this at a time when no popular movements or parties in Palestine or Jordan—the two areas where Hamas’s popular base is concentrated—dared to call for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In its relations with non-Arab states (other than Iran) and interna- tional organizations, Hamas suffered from a serious handicap in that it was unable to gain the support of any major power. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Its numerous appeals, memoranda, and explanations that resistance to occu- pation was legitimate from the perspective of the United Nations and international law were of no avail in altering the overall Western per- Condusion I 257 258 HAMAS ment’s activities. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In fact, Hamas was burdened with international condemnation because of its continued use of armed operations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Under a scenario whereby Hamas would try to outflank maneuvers to cut it off from its grass-roots base by abandoning armed operations even temporarily and adopting a program of political and social action, it is quite likely that a group of angry young men belonging to its military arm and not guided by a moderate political agenda may split from the movement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This would prevent peace negotiations from moving for- ward. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, such an eventuality is unlikely in view of the nature of the Oslo Agreement, unless it is revised entirely and reformulated in such a way that it does not simply recreate the occupation in a new guise. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Let the world know that the Jews are committing Nazi crimes against our people and that they will drink from the same cup. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If the Peo- ple of the Book had believed, it would be better for them; some among them have faith, but most of them are sinners. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
0, people, from the center of events, from the depth of suffering; from the hearts of believers, immaculate arms; upon realizing the duty, respond- ing to the call of God, we meet and join together with discipline based on the path of God. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Thus it was that the seed was formed and began to chart its path in the tempestuous sea of hopes and dreams, dangers and difficulties, and pains and challenges from within and without. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
When the idea matured, the seed grew, and the plant took root in real- ity detached from the temporary emotional outburst and unwelcome haste, the Islamic Resistance Movement came forth to perform its role of mujahi- d,ah (struggle) for the sake of its Lord. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From Islam, it reaches for its ideology, fundamental percepts, and view of life, the world, and humanity. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They raised the banner of Jihad in the face of the oppressors in order to free the country and the people from the [oppressors’] desecration, impurity, and evil. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Islamic Resistance Movement welcomes all Muslims who share its beliefs and ideology, enact its program, keep its secrets, and desire to join its ranks to carry out the duty and receive their reward from God. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Upon this basis it should be considered, given a fair evaluation, and acceptance of its role. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Thus, it See thou not how God sets forth aparable?A goodly word is like a goodly tree, whose root is firmly fixed and whose branches reach to the heavens. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
conquered Iraq and Syria, sent to the Muslim’s Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khatab, a question concerning the conquered lands: Shall they divide up the land among the army or leave the land to the original owners? And after discussion and consultation between the Caliph of the Mus- lims, Umar ibn al-Khatab, and the companions of the Prophet (peace be upon him), they decided that the land should remain in the hands of its owners to benefit from it and its wealth; but the control of the land and the land itself ought to be endowed as a Waqf [in perpetuity] for all generations of Muslims until the Day of Resurrection. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nation and Nationalism from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement ARTICLE 12: Nationalism from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part and parcel of religious ideology. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From time to time an invitation for an international conference is made to search for a solution to the problem. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Fundamental changes must be made in the educational system to liberate it from the effects of the ideological invasion that was brought by the Orientalists and missionaries. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
That paved the way for the imperialist attack in which rance to neglect a single one of these circles, because Palestine is an Islamic land accommodating the first qibla [direction to face during prayer] and the third holiest sanctuary, from whence the ascent of the Prophet (may peace be upon him) took place. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Glory to God who did take His servant for a journey by night from the might show him some of Our signs: for He is the One who hears and sees all. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Because of such, its [Palestine’s] liberation is obligatory on every Mus- When the problem begins to be resolved on this basis, where all the Ofa truth you are stronger because there is terror in their hearts from God. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It must be solved on this basis because Pales- tine contains the Islamic holy sanctuaries of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Haram Mosque, which are inexorably linked, as long as the heavens and earth exist, to the night journey (isra) of the Prophet of God (may peace be upon him), who ascended to the heavens (miraj) from there. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To guard Muslims from infidels for one day in God’s cause is better than the world and all that exists on its surface. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Training the Muslim Generation ARTICLE 16: We must train the Muslim generation in our area, an Islamic training based on performing religious duties, studying God’s book very well, and study- ing Prophetic tradition (sunnah), Islamic history and heritage from its authenticated sources with the guidance of experts and scholars, and using a curriculum that will provide the Muslim with the correct world view in ideology and thought. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In addition, it is necessary to study carefully the enemy’s material and human potential, to know his weaknesses and strengths, and to know the powers that support him and stand by his side. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
While these organizations play their role, Islam is absent from the arena and alienated from its people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
ARTICLE 18: The woman in the house of the Mujahid and the striving family, be she a mother or sister, has the most important role in caring for the home and raising the children with the ethical character and understanding that comes from Islam, as well as training her children to perform their religious obligations and preparing them for their contribution to the Jihad that awaits them. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From this perspective, it is necessary to take care that the schools and curricula educate the Muslim girl in order to become O my son, if there be but the weight of a mustard seed, and it were in a rock, or in the heavens, or in the earth, God will bring it forth. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nothing corrects the soul if it is deliberating than a change from state to state. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Depor- tation from one’s homeland is a form of murder. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They must avoid, without resorting to foul play, whatever might harm future generations or cause damage to their society because they come from the masses; their power and their future is [the movement’s] power and future. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
ARTICLE 26: Although the Islamic Resistance Movement has a positive view toward the Palestinian Nationalist Movements that do not owe their loyalty to the East or West, that does not prevent it from discussing the options in the local or international arenas with respect to the Palestinian problem. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is an objective discussion, from an Islamic perspective, clarifying the extent to which they [the options] serve the national interest. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Arab states surrounding Israel are requested to open their borders to ease the movement of mujahidin to and from it, and that is the least they could do. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With regard to those who do not fight you for faith or to drive you out of your home, God does not forbid you from dealing kindly andjustly with them; for God loves those who are just. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Effort to Isolate the Palestinian People ARTICLE 32: World Zionism and the forces of imperialism are following a clever plan to cause one Arab country after the other to drop out of the battle with Zionism so that in the end the Palestinian people will be isolated from their allies. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Islamic Resistance Movement calls on the Arab and Islamic people to work seriously and constructively in order not to allow that dreadful scheme to be carried out and to educate the masses about the dangers of withdrawal from the struggle with Zionism. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Today it is Palestine and tomorrow it may be another country and then other countries, because the In the shade of Islam it is possible for the followers of the three reli- They will not fight you together, except infort~fied towns or from behind Surah 60 (al-Mumtahinah), v. 8 Surah 59 (al-Hashr), v. 14 Appendix I 28; 288 I HAMAS Zionist scheme has no bounds; after Palestine they want to expand from the Nile River to the Euphrates. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Withdrawal from the circle of struggle is high treason and a curse on those who do it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It should be, as God has wished, a supporter and helper, spreading out its hand to assist and provide support until God’s decision is manifested. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From Al-A rish to the Euphrates, its men, women, and children will be steadfast until the day of resurrection. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
ARTICLE 35: The Islamic Resistance Movement considers the lesson and wisdom to be learned from the defeat of the Crusaders at the hands of Salahdin and the world’s rescue from the destructive onslaught of the Tartars, who were destroying all traces of human civilization. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The current Zionist inva- sion had been preceded by the many invasions of the crusading West and others, such as the Tartars from the east. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is not difficult for God if our intentions are pure, our efforts are truthful, Muslims have benefited from past experiences and been freed from the vestiges of the ideological inva- sion, and they follow the way of their predecessors. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There were signs from the Palestinian camp signaling the possibility of accepting compromises that were contrary to provisions of the Palestinian National Charter. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This resulted in further weakening the PLO and its departure from Lebanon. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The settlement proposals included making concessions on two grave points that the Palestinian masses, in conformity with Palestine’s long his- tory since the conquest by Omar, vowed never to do: • • Under circumstances wherein these proposals found favorable responses from the PLO, the strategy of armed struggle retreated, as did the interest of other Arabs in the question of Palestine, which became just another routine item on the agendas of their meetings and conferences. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Wittingly or unwittingly, Arab countries now started to work separately, shifting the focus from larger national issues to more provincial ones hav- ing to do with the meaning and implications of their identity as individ- ual entities. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
On the international scene, the United States surged ahead of the Soviet Union in the power game, thus imposing its will and spreading its hegemony, not only on the area, but worldwide. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As for the subject of Islamic awakening, Palestine, like other Arab countries, witnessed a clear and noticeable evolution on this front. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Third: The Political Identity of Hamas Hamas is a popular struggle movement that seeks to liberate Palestine in its entirety from the Mediterranean Sea to the River Jordan. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the shadow of these retreats, and with the maturing of resistance among the Palestinians inside Palestine—not outside it—a project of Islamic struggle was inevitable. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
B. Hamas harbors no hostility toward anyone on the basis of religiow belief or race. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
C. Hamas respects the decisions of international organizations as long as they do not contradict our people’s legitimate rights in its homeland and its right to struggle until liberation and self- determination. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas believes that the most dangerous of the settlement proposals proffered to date is the self-rule proposal now under discussion in Washington. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Its danger stems not only from its implicit affirmation of the legality of Zionist sovereignty over all of Palestine, the normalization of Zionist-Arab relations, and granting Zionist hege- mony a free hand over the region. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Such acceptance also would mean the closing of the Palestinian file and depriving the Palestinian people of the right to seek its legitimate rights or to use legitimate means to obtain them. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For Palestine is a sacred Islamic land that has been forcibly seized by the Zionists, and it is the duty of Muslims to conduct a holy strug- gle to regain it and to expel the invader from it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Working to unite the Palestinian forces that reject this pro- posal and to articulate its stand on the matter on the Palestin- ian, Arab, and international stages; 3. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Demanding that the negotiating team and the effective leader- ship in the PLO withdraw from the negotiations; 4. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Movement also transformed Palestinian society into an effective, activist society, a participant in the activities of the intifada, and it trans- formed the resistance from a narrow, segmented effort into a broad mass effort. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Truly, Rabin and the members of his criminal government know with certainty that the Qassam Brigades planned, executed, and announced the operation entirely from within our occupied lands. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To shift attention from the true nature and the failure of his strict and repressive security measures to end either the heroic suicide missions by the Qassam Brigades or other popular resis- tance operations carried out by our people in all parts of our holy land. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Complete Zionist withdrawal from our Palestinian land and the dismantling and elimination of its settlements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 5 Dhul Qi’da 1414 AH/16 April 1994 AD Appendix 305 The Political Bureau 306 HAMAS An Important Memorandum from the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) to the Kings, Presidents, and Ministers In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful: Sheikh: the Islamic Resistance Movement and clarifying the imperatives that gov- ern its political and military work, we present to you this memorandum to explain our goals and policies, hoping that it will gain your careful attention. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In particular, UN Security Council Resolution No. 242 called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories that were occu- pied in 1967, but the Israeli authorities still refuse to comply with the text and spirit of this resolution. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The fundamental cause of instability in the Middle East derives from continuous Israeli aggression against the rights of the Palestinian people, aggression that began with usurping its land and exiling its people to vari- ous corners of the world under the bayonets of terrorism and intimidation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In addition, it maintains complete control of Palestinian natural resources, arrogating to itself the right to dispose of private and public property as it sees fit, and facilitat- ing the settlement of Jews migrating from Russia, eastern Europe, and other places. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this context, it is worth mentioning the Israeli “death squads” that belong to the Ministry of Defense and operate in the Occupied Territories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is considered the same as self-defense. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The children were victimized even while playing inno- cently in the streets; the women were victimized while on peaceful protest marches, while doing their household chores, or as they passed by a demonstration on some street. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
We would welcome any evenhanded mediation you might offer. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“Hamas wa itifaq ghazza-ariha awwalan: al-mawaqifwal- _____ “Hanakat Hamas bayn al-sulta al-filastiniyya wa Israel: mm muthal- _____ Hamas: Al-Fekr wal mamarasa al-siyasiyya [Hamas: Ideology and Huwaidi, Fahmi, Iran minal dakhil [Iran from the Inside], third ed. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
lath al-quwa ila al-mitraqa Wal sindan” [The Hamas movement between the Palestinian authority and Israel: From the triad of power to the hammer and anvil], Majallat al-dirasat al-fl lastiniyya, no. 18 (Spring 1994): 24—37. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
nihayat ‘aam 1991 [Proposals for the settlement of the Palestine ques- tion from 1920 to 1991]. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Paper presented at symposium on Palestinian self-rule elections, Center for Middle East Studies, Amman, 17—18 August, 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Mi’ari, Mahmoud. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
48 Mashhur, Mustafa, 174 Middle East, 53, 54, 72, 129, 170, 176, 193, 255, 257 mosques. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
-Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From her modest home in Beirut, Maha, a small, pretty woman, recalled the last few days of her husband’s life. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They are refugees from South Introduction 1 Lebanon who fled in the wake of Israel’s invasions and subsequent occupation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Above the streets hangs a great web of cables, strung like spaghetti from pole to pole and building to building, forming the neighbourhood’s makeshift power supply. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Black flags of mourning and the green and yellow flags of Islam and Hezbollah flutter from almost every street corner and balcony. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
But Salah had been determined and had argued that if Hezbollah limited such missions to bachelors, and disqualified candidates because of their marital status, they would in effect be discouraging many of their male followers, who believe in self-sacrifice, from carrying out a principle command of Islam, that of marriage and having children. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
I remember then going to my room to perform the afternoon prayers and, while I was doing so, officials from Hezbollah rang our doorbell and came in to break the news to us. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
But this was not the case. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
a.m. on 6 June 1982, a group of Dutch UN soldiers on guard duty at the Hamra bridge in South Lebanon saw thirteen Israeli centurion tanks come roaring towards them. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its stated aim was to drive the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from Israel’s northern border.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
1 Surat al-Hajj, 39, The Quran 7 Israelis called their campaign ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’, an Orweffian code-name which concealed Sharon’s ambitious plan to destroy the PLO’s power base and impose Israel’s political will on the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
After the First World War, the Maronites put in a bid to expand their territory. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Thanks to his efforts, the government set up the Council of the South to develop the neglected Shiite regions. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In 1968, the PLO began making raids into Israel from South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A refugee population of Palestinians had lived in Lebanon since the * See The Vanished Imam, Fouad Ajami, p. 174 TFm SHITTES STEJKE BACK 11 establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Palestinians became deeply involved in the internal politics of Lebanon and the question of the PLO became the hottest issue on the agenda, further polarising the Lebanese community. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
cataclysmic succession of events — civil war, Israel’s 1978 invasion and Sadr’s disappearance — was capped by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Ama!, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The weariness of the southerners from the years of suffering under their Palestinian masters was reflected in their show of welcome and gratitude to those who had freed them of their tormentors. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Refugees returned home to their villages and the construction industry boomed as many visualised personal economic benefits from contact with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The change in attitude occurred slowly as the Shiites became aware that Israel was reluctant to leave Lebanon and appeared set on staying for a long period of time, despite having achieved its main objective of driving the Palestinians from the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In Lebanon, these committees were backed by a newly formed militia, recruited by the IDF from the residents. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From this point onwards, in the view of most Shiites, those same Israelis who had earlier been seen as liberators were now regarded as occupiers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Some Lebanese officials have claimed that Israel is taking water from the Litani for its own purposes, although there in no hard evidence. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In 1948, David Ben-Gurion, the founder of the state of Israel, spoke of creating a Christian state in Lebanon which would form an alliance with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Although the Shiites had suffered problems from the presence of the Palestinians in South Lebanon, they had never stopped sympathising with their plight. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Most had also received their first taste of military training from the Palestinian experts who ran scores of military camps in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
If the Shiites had learnt anything from the Palestinian experience, it was that fighting was the only way to prevent Israel or anyone else from taking their land. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
And so the resistance began. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Initially it was a limited number See Israel’s Lebanon War, p. 18* THE SHIITES STRIKE BACK 17 of people engaging in small-scale protests, from boycotting the Israeli products which had poured into the Lebanese markets to attacking the homes of Lebanese collaborators and planting home-made roadside bombs against the Israeli patrols. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
reprisals raffled further support for the resistance and drove larger numbers of people to join its ranks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
During the following year, the Israeli forces isolated South Lebanon from the rest of the country by limiting passage from Beirut to only one point of entry. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It became common to see truckloads of prisoners, as hundreds of people were rounded up from their homes and detained without charge in Ansar prison. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini had begun appearing in some villages, including Maarakeh and Jibsheet, announcing the arrival of a movement which derived its influence from Iran and not from the secular path of Amal. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
movement’s adherents included Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who defected from Ama! Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s initial goal was to launch a revolt against the Israeli occupation, which would eventually grow to embrace the task of ridding Lebanon from the presence of Western forces and * See The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, John L. Esposito, p. 147 ** Ibid. Hezbollah 20 influence. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Religious leaders were deported from the area and some were assassinated. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Under his supervision, Jibsheet was transformed from an insignificant, sleepy village into one of the fiercest Resistance strongholds facing the Israelis to this day. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Harb is said to have received scores of death threats and warnings from the Israeli forces who arrested him on 18 March 1983. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As newly trained fighters infiltrated the South from Beirut and the Bekaa, the circle of violence rapidly increased between the Israelis and the Lebanese. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Khalil Jarradi, a local theology teacher, led the operations from the Husseiiyah of his village, Maarakeh. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hundreds of men, some as young as thirteen or as old as sixty, were arrested and detained from these villages and consistently asked about Jarradi’s habits, hideouts and companions. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It is rightfully ours and we have the right to defend and liberate it from the occupiers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
No one might believe us, but it emanates from our faith — that wondrous weapon, which no armaments in the world can destroy, united our town’s residents, despite the fact that they had belonged to different political parties and affiliations before the invasion.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Six days after Jarradi’s murder, on 10 March 1985, a young man drove a red pick-up Chevrolet, containing 900 kilograms of explosives, into a military Israeli convoy just two miles away from Israel’s settlement Metullah, north of Galilee.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
convoy was taking soldiers back from leave in Israel to their military bases in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The bomber, who was identified only by his alias ‘Abu Zeinab’, and believed to be from Israel’s ‘security zone’, killed twelve soldiers and wounded fourteen others. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It confirmed Israel’s worst fear — that the spirit of the Resistance had extended to the ‘security zone’, where Israel had believed itself to be safe and in the least danger from its Shiite foes. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel Defence Forces came under increasing attack from the Shiite Resistance fighters, who played a significant role in forcing Israel’s retreat. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was here that Amal’s founder, Musa Sadr, built a religious school which had hosted some of the men who would be key players in the Iranian Revolution. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The day after the Israelis pulled out from Sidon, truckloads of Hezbollah members began arriving in the area. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel Defence Forces’ new regulations banned motorists from driving their cars alone, in an attempt to prevent human bomb attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Cars parked on roadsides were blown up and an indefinite curfew was imposed from sunset to sunrise. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
To emphasise their seriousness, the Israeli forces launched mass raids on most villages, rounding up hundreds, killing some in the process, and deporting many from the area. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Western news agencies and journalists in Beirut received telexes from the Israel Defence Forces warning them against visiting the region from the Lebanese side.Those Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
wishing to do so had to apply to the military which would escort them from the Israeli border. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Nearly all those covering the war from Beirut refused Hezbollah 26 to comply, deciding to take the risk and travel South, rather than undergo Israeli censorship and face limitations of access. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From the Bekaa Valley, where it first came into being, it had moved to Beirut where it based its central headquarters. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He was expelled from the party the following year because of his Hezbollah 28 affiliations with Iran and his differences with Amal’s secular line. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In addition to its military losses, Hezbollah had also begun to alienate itself from the people whose support it needed most: the residents of South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Lebanese boycotted the restaurants and went in search of places without restrictions, where alcohol could be served with- out fear of harassment from the Islamic militants. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The region had become a war-like state severed from the rest of the country.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was the first confrontation between the two and a clear message from the Syrian government that it would not hesitate to use force to impose its will and curtail Hezbollah’s political aspirations in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
and Hezbollah’s differences had first come into the open when Israel withdrew its troops from most of the South and retreated to the ‘security zone’ in June 1985. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Amal’s more moderate policy differed sharply from Hezbollah’s determina- tion to fight the occupation under the banners of Islam and Iran until all Lebanese soil was liberated. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The main objective was to prevent Higgins from being smuggled out of the area to Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut or the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Amal, with military support from Syria, instigated the war on the basis that it was foiling Hezbollah’s attempts to take over its territory in South Lebanon and transform the area into an Islamic state. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Party of God was expelled from the South and its fighters banned from carrying out attacks against Israeli or South Lebanon Army targets. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Only the intervention of Iran stopped the militant group from liquidating Amal altogether in its few remaining strongholds in Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At the end of 1988, Hezbollah recuperated from its earlier defeat and launched an offensive against Amal in South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
• Nearly two hours after the deadline expired, an international news agency received a statement from the group claiming to have hanged Higgins. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The communiqué was accompanied by a chilling video-tape showing him dangling from a makeshift scaffold. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘The trend lately has been in a gradual increase in the number of operations launched from South Lebanon.They Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Sheikh Nabil Qaouq, Hezbollah’s main military leader in South Lebanon, claims that the Islamic Resistance is in some respects more advanced than the Israelis: We have acquired a level of technology which, for example, prevents even their state-of-the-art technology from locating and diffusing our roadside bombs. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
There are various ways of blowing up roadside bombs, but there are certain occasions whereby we have to do so electronically from a distance, for security reasons. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He is not dressed in military fatigues, as one might expect, but in the turban and cloak of a cleric. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In other words we have all the ingredients of a regular army. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Islamic Resistance’s major operations have to be cleared by Hezbollah’s leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and the group’s council. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
come in with their own plan and gather their followers from the villages concerned. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
These guys come from other areas and are the elite force. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Having done so the group has not only laid the usual roadside bomb, but has initiated attacks against Israeli positions using heavy-calibre weapons ranging from artillery tank fire to surface-to-air missiles and heavy machine-gun fire. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From the beginning, the Resistance’s experts spent much time concentrating on studying and analysing the ways and means of changing the calibre of the fight.They Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
the militant guerrifias launch their raids and attacks, a hidden cameraman films them from a distance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On at least two significant occasions, Israeli efforts to distance the Lebanese public from the Islamic Resistance and Hezbollah have failed. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Even reports from Israel suggested that the assassination of Musawi might have been a misjudgernent on their behalf. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For Israel, South Lebanon became a quagmire from which its army never returned in glory. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Between 1982 and 1985, Israel withdrew from a large sector of the land which it occupied. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
This inspired these men to establish relations with the Revolution and to benefit from its experiences. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
So, from 1979 until 1982, there was only a general desire to create something that would translate the interests of our Islamic proposals. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
There was a need to develop a force which would also enjoy a popular political extension, something that was not available from any of Hezbollah 48 the organisations and personalities on the ground. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
first being the banding together of young men, training and organising them into small groups and then dispatching them to the occupied areas from where they were instructed to carry out attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Iranian Revolutionary Guards took charge of Hezbollah’s security and resistance operations. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They fed on Israel’s mistakes, the Lebanese government’s impotence and the West’s blunders. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Over the next two years, Hezbollah continued to operate underground from its main base, Baalbeck, in the eastern Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From the very beginning, the United States and Israel searched in vain for the individuals within the new movement who were responsible for the group’s attacks.They Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The majority of the suburb’s Muslims were Shiite refugees from South Lebanon and Hezbollah was now ready to plant its seeds amongst them. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
During the Muslims’ holy month of Ramadan the bar was emptied of all its stock apart from soft drinks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Islamic Amal had been started by Hussein Musawi in 1982, following Musawi’s objections to Nabih Bern’s political stance towards the Israeli invasion. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Dawa party’s members were the first to volunteer for the fight against Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On 16 February 1985, Hezbollah made its public debut to the world. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From here, what befalls the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines or anywhere else verily afflicts the body of our Islamic nation of which we are an inseparable part, and we move to confront it on the basis of our main legal obligation and in the light of a political view decided by our leader the Wilayat al-Faqih [Ayatollah Khomeini]. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As for our learning, this is primarily derived from the Holy Quran, and the infallible Sunnah [model of the ways of the Prophet], as well as the laws and edicts emanating from the Faqih. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For we do not have a separate military wing which is independent from the parts of our bodies. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah associates the West with European imperialism and the struggle for independence from colonial rule. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It traces the antagonism between Christendom and Islam back to the Crusades: Hezbollah believes that the West’s opposition to its vision springs from this ancient religious rivalry. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
aimed at removing the Western presence from Lebanon and the group incited war against Western targets, both locally and abroad.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When they speak of economic markets, they do so according to their outlook on things. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It perceives its presence in the region as an attempt to control the area’s economic infrastructure and it condemns the Arab world, especially Saudi Arabia and the oil-rich Gulf states, for having fallen under Western influence.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The bombs that flattened whole residential neighbourhoods and the war planes which blitzed Beirut were made in America. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Over the years, the United States has attacked Hezbollah’s Islamic Resistance for carrying out raids against Israel’s occupying forces in Lebanon, while failing to call on Israel to adhere to the United Nations Resolution 425, which calls for Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah is unyielding in its hatred towards Israel, which it sees as a Western conspiracy planted in the Middle East to ensure instability in the region. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its manifesto describes Israel as ‘America’s spearhead in our Islamic world’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The manifesto stated: Hezbollah 58 Our struggle with Israel stems from an ideological and historic understanding to the effect that this Zionist entity is an aggressor in its development and formation and is existing on a land usurped at the cost of the rights of the Muslim people. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
And so our confrontation with this entity should end only when and after it has totally been eliminated from existence. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From reading and analysing their history and politics we conclude that these people, despite their talk of peace and security, which is only aimed at making us feel safe, strive to occupy much more than they already have and are willing to admit. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
We cannot see Israel as a legal presence, considering that it is a conglomeration of people who came from all parts of the world to live in Palestine on the ruins of another people.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It is a religious obligation that falls within their concept ofjihad and they are determined to continue the fight until Lebanese soil is liberated and every Israeli soldier has withdrawn from the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A verse from the Quran is often quoted in Hezbollah’s propaganda campaign against the occupation: Certainly you will find the most violent of people in enmity for those who believe are the Jews and those who are polytheists, and you will certainly find the nearest in friendship to those who believe are those who say: ‘We are Christians’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
move indicated that Hezbollah’s fighters had broken away from the Lebanese National Resistance and was suggestive of Hezbollah’s dispute with Ama! Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The only noticeable move on the ground that the Party of God did take at the time of its public debut was to declare the birth of its military wing, the Islamic Resistance, al-Mu qawama al-Islamiyah.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
So, naturally, we remained closed within ourselves and kept a distance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The nature of our formation required clandestine behaviour. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He is elected by the members of his council from among their number. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From an intellectual point of view, Fadlallah owes little to Iran or Khomeini, even though he preaches a similar message. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He had perhaps learnt from the tragic fate Ti-rn PARTY OF GOD 67 of Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, Iraq’s most important Shiite leader, who was executed by Saddam Hussein in 1 980.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘All the Islamic views and principles that Hezbollah embraces are shared by Fadlallah,’ says Naiim Qassem. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Woodward draws from the memoirs of William Casey, the head of the CIA agency, reporting that Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington at the time, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan AbdelAziz, financed the American agency with the sum of three million dollars to carry out the attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Entrusting religious authority to someone in Shiite Islam entails giving that person the power to determine every religious aspect of life, from details as basic as how to pray, to contem- porary moral issues such as test-tube babies. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His wisdom derives from God and the family of the Prophet, and he approaches the divine.. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The group has, however, shown an ability to learn from its past experiences and to adapt to the political climate. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Taif Accord of 1989 proposed to address the political imbalance in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Unlike other parties in Lebanon the group is always careful to maintain a united front; from the secretary- general to the bodyguards at the doors of Hezbollah’s offices, its officials all keep to the party line.Tufeili Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah now argues that working from the inside allows it to influence change and monitor events. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While there is some truth in this, the initiative for Hezbollah’s entry into political participation sprang from the negotiated settlement between Tehran and Syria. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel seized Syria’s Golan Heights during the Six Day War in 1967 and annexed them in 1981. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It is the only group to have remained armed since the militias were disarmed at the end of the civil war. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Witnesses in the area saw the car approach the headquarters and then, from a distance of 20 metres, furiously accelerate towards its target.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At the assailant’s own request, his identity was only revealed two and a half years later: he had believed that South Lebanon would be liberated from Israeli occupation by then and had wanted to protect his family from reprisals. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The inspiration for the new strategy came from Iran. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Nevertheless, Washington reasserted its commitment to Lebanon and President Reagan declared: ‘This criminal attack against our diplomatic mission will not deter us from continuing with our goal to achieve peace in the area and we shall carry on with what we know to be right.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The multinational forces (MNF) had come to Lebanon as peace-keepers to oversee the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut in August 1982, but they had ended up taking sides in the conflict. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Among the victims were Lebanese Shiites who were refugees from the south and had taken shelter in the Palestinians’ refugee camps. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He also used the army to drive the southern Shiite refugees from the shantytowns in which they were squatting. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The US hoped to bring about the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli troops from Lebanon as part of a comprehensive peace Hezbollah 78 initiative, but neither the Syrians nor the Lebanese wished to see Israel rewarded for its invasion. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In Septem- ber, Israel abruptly withdrew from the area and full-scale battles erupted between the Druze and the Christians.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They identified themselves as Lebanese Muslims and ‘soldiers of God who yearn for martyr- * See Beirut Outtakes, Larry Pintack HuM~ Bor~~rns 79 dom’.Their Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It did not take long for the United States to come to the conclusion that Hezbollah was behind the attacks and that Islamic Jihad was merely a name or a wing of the group, dedicated to killing Americans and threatening Western interests in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The plan would also culminate in the US decision to withdraw the multinational forces from Lebanon in February 1984, thus allowing Syria to regain its authority in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Syrians had been tipped off by intelligence from their regional backers, the Soviet Union, of the CIA’s scheduled top-level meeting at the US embassy in Beirut on 23 October. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Americans had just confirmed the Shiites’ belief that they harboured bad intentions towards the Muslim population when they had ordered ships from their flotilla, off the shores of Lebanon’s Mediterranean coast, to open fire.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When the multinational forces were attacked in October, Syria and Iran did not in fact specify a target. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He knew from all the preaching and talks he had received that the instant he died he would be met by Hour al-Ayn, a nymph of unimaginable beauty and serenity. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Not far away from the scene of the explosion, on the roof top of a nearby building, Mughniyeh and Badredeen smiled with satisfaction as they calmly watched the execution of their plan through binoculars. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Ali was murdered in 661 and the dominant Sunnis again chose a leader from outside his family. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Processions are held in which recitations of Hussein’s death from religious texts are read to wailing women and weeping men.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s human bombs have taken the same message to heart. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From his office in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Naiim Qassem explained the terms of the jihad: If the nation is not brought up on the principles of being prepared and willing to struggle or wage a jihad, then it cannot ever win against its enemies. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From here we regard martyrdom as a Muslim’s choice of the manner in which he seeks to die. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Since we believe that our moment of death is recorded and determined by God, it follows that whether one hides in a shelter, is crossing the road or is fighting the enemy, he will die when his time arrives. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Children are drified in the merits of self-sacrifice from an early age, even though Hezbollah admits that the philosophy of martyrdom might be beyond their comprehension. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Islamic religious studies, which are obligatory in all the curricula of Hezbollah schools, start introducing the tenet to the young by teaching them that paradise is their reward for death in battle. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Contrary to the general belief that the group’s military branch attracts only the minds and souls of the troubled, impoverished and uneducated, the Islamic Resistance delights in listing the range of its membership — from the unemployed to doctors and engineers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Rima Fakhri, a graduate in agriculture from the American University in Beirut, is planning to table a proposal for Hezbollah to recant a decree which prevents women from becoming human bombs. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
We believe that such a person has transferred himself from this temporary world to what we regard as the everlasting and eternal world. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
I I know a woman whose husband was one of Hezbollah’s I have not died, but am moving alive among you. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hassan was speaking from one of the front lines of South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
to us, is worth all the oil in the world. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They were important men: Ahmad Motevaselian, EXPORT OF A REVOLUTION 99 commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Bekaa, Mohsen Musavi, Iran’s chargé d’affaires in Lebanon and Kazem AkhavanAllaf, a journalist for fran’s official news agency.Their Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Dodge was abducted initially by the Lebanese. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Dodge was only a means for us to make our political grievances known and to try and achieve something from the Americans. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Many other homes may hold similar souvenirs. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The sofa would be placed with other pieces of furniture in a station wagon and it would look like someone was moving house rather than smuggling a hostage out. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
With Dodge safely tucked away in the Bekaa and far away from the reach of the Israelis and Palestinians, his kidnappers set about making their demands. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
We would give Abu Jihad information on his well-being and progress to pass on to the Americans in return for arms and money from the PLO that we needed in order to reorganise ourselves and prepare ourselves for carrying on with the struggle against the Israelis after the PLO’s withdrawal. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From there, he flew first class to Syria. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At Damascus airport his escort handed him over to a waiting car and from there he was taken to the home of President Assad’s brother. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They had learnt the hard way that harbouring hostages in their country would not be to their political advantage, even if it was on behalf of their staunchest allies.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Baalbeck and its surrounding vicinity became a no-man’s-land, cut off from the rest of the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Free from official Lebanese control in the area, the Guards’ Hezbollah 108 contingent turned Baalbeck into a base for launching its extreme anti-American ideological campaign. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A staunch supporter of the concept of exporting the revolution, he took every opportunity to explain the programme to the Iranians as well as to foreign delegates and Muslims overseas, and, he declared: * See The Warriors of Islam, Kenneth Katzman, p. 7 EXPORT OF A REVOLUTION 109 Had the aim of the Islamic Revolution of Iran been merely to overthrow the Shah of fran, it would have been confined within the borders of Iran. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
If it had intended only to fight the US, it would possibly have penetrated the countries dominated by the US. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Guards did not create a separate division to export the revolution; they trained and armed militant surrogates and * Montazeri’s quotes cited in Extracts from Speeches of Ayatollah Montazeri, ed: Mustafa Izadi Hezbollah 110 agents at many camps and locations throughout Iran. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The State Department and the CIA claims that Iran has been behind 1,000 deaths in 200 terrorist strikes since 1 979** French targets were being attacked from as early as 1980 by the Guards’ apparatus. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When Israel invaded Lebanon, Montazeri told the Lebanese clerics who were visiting Iran in August 1982 that they should draw inspiration from the Islamic Revolution. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Militants both in Tehran and abroad considered that Montazeri’s orders emanated from Khomeini himself. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah was just one of the Guards’ protégés in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The youngest victim of Operation Grapes of Wrath: four-day-old Nour, smaller at her death than the 155mm howitzer shell that killed her in Nabatiyeh. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
This, more than any other single factor, has sustained Hezbollah’s resistance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At least ten hostages perished in captivity: some were murdered and others died from illnesses which did not receive adequate medical auention.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In a macabre turn of events, news agencies began to receive hoax phone calls from individuals claiming to be members of Islamic Jihad. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
News agencies which failed to make the distinction would receive threats from Islamic Jihad’s spokesmen who were not happy to find their name being used in vain. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Since the postal service in Lebanon during those days of the civil war was almost non-existent, mail would generally arrive at the news agencies from a number of different sources, so it was not possible to distinguish Islamic Jihad’s messengers from others. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On one occasion, however, a news agency took delivery of only one piece of mail all night and it turned out to be a message from Islamic Jihad. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the summer of 1982, Mughniyeh had seen his village occupied by the Israeli troops, his Palestinian comrades killed and evicted from Lebanon and their families later massacred in cold blood while the Arab leaders watched from a distance and the Western world and the US issued lame condemnations. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the early years of the crusade, the phantom was at its most secret and no one was privy to such information aside from perhaps the leadership of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards themselves. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It is from such experts that it is possible to come closer to the course of events. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Shortly after the PLO’s eviction from Beirut in August 1982, Mughniyeh was injured when the Israeli-backed Christians unleashed an artillery offensive against the Muslim population of the southern suburbs in full view of the multinational peace- keeping forces and with the support of America’s warships. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They included members of the Hamiyeh clan from the Bekaa, the Musawis, the Aqeels, Shehadehs and the Ezzedeens. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘This was the extent that the Iranians went to and it is from these pasted documents that they got EXPORT OF A RIw0LUTI0N 117 hold of the identity and status of William Buckley,’ claimed a source. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Fellow hostages, however, claimed on their release that Buckley had died several months earlier from lack of medical attention after his torture. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The same sources who revealed that Buckley’s name and position in the agency were first discovered during the Iranian siege of the embassy inTehran disclosed that while ‘volumes’ of details were indeed elicited, Buckley’s confessions were never made public as the CIA managed to save their inteffigence by purchasing his disclosures from the Iranians with the help of mediators. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He claimed that a faction within the Fatah Revolutionary Council still had possession of Collett’s body and that the faction could be persuaded to give up Collett if letters were secured from his widow and daughter. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His name was Ahmad Shouker, a Shiite Muslim from the village of Nabi Sheet in the Bekaa Valley, where his father was mayor. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
also came from Nabi Sheet and was implicated in the kidnapping of the four professors at Beirut University College. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Most believe that Molinari was mistaken for a Lebanese and was kidnapped while crossing from the eastern sector in a tit- for-tat kidnapping operation between rival militias. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Really it only ended when our captors became convinced that there was nothing further they could gain from us.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For aside from Lebanon’s local newspapers, known to be the best and most open in the Arab world, none of the Arab states’ writers or photographers had dared come to the country during the civil war. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Most had stayed in the safety of their own countries, replicating from afar the stories of journalists like Anderson. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Tufeili recounted that Hezbollah brought its influence to bear and received word from the kidnappers that they were prepared to release the hostages. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He met with little enthusiasm from the Iranian side who appeared uninterested and unwilling to help him with his mission. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He then asked me if I could delay any release prospects of the hostages [until after the elections] in order to prevent Mitterrand from benefiting during the election campaign. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Thanks to the mediation of an Ama! Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Iran was ensuring that it also gained from its operatives’ schemes. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
During the six-week trial, the word ‘terrorism’ was omitted Hezbollah 128 from the indictments and the Iranian connection was disregarded. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Tehran Radio meanwhile broadcast regular warnings from the al-Dawa, threatening grave consequences should the defendants be harmed.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
I don’t know, but it seems to me a reasonable surmise because if I had had good backing from America, particularly with Kuwait, they would have said well, yes, okay, let him come along. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From my side, my principal reason was to stand by the hostages, to maintain my integrity and the integrity of those who sent me. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They sent him to the doctor, who had letters from Jacobsen which the kidnappers had delivered. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Mughniyeh had heard all the declarations from the Kuwaitis regarding Waite’s attempts to visit their country and their refusal to deal with him or submit to pressure and he had come to accept that Waite would not be able to resolve the problem. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He did not believe that Waite’s alleged high-level contact with the Kuwaitis would bear any fruit and regarded the envoy’s trip to Beirut, and his claim that he was bringing them some new development, as a mere publicity stunt aimed at exonerating himself from any involvement in the Iran—Contra affair. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
p.m., the kidnappers telephoned the doctor: they had decided to collect Waite in the evening since they would then not have to blindfold him to prevent him from identifying the location and they would not have to worry about anyone recognising him. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘When I came back from the hospital, I noticed that the lights were still switched on in the clinic and the door was locked. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Mughniyeh had not only EXPORT OF A REVOLUTION 135 succeeded in conning everyone, he had also dealt a direct blow to the militia leader Walid Jumblatt, who had become the leader of the Druze after his father Kamal’s assassination in 1977. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
• The doctor has been haunted for years by the results of his mediation: I feel I was used by the people who brought me the letters [from Jacobsen] in the first place. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He went to seek the help and advice of Ghazi Kanaan, Syria’s chief of military intelligence in Lebanon, who confirmed Fadlallah’s words: ‘Doctor, these are hunting dogs who are asked to bring targets and they obey and go out and hunt their prey which they bring back.They Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In one of history’s more ironic moments, it was none other than Saddam Hussein who succeeded where Terry Waite had failed: when the Iraqis invaded Kuwait in 1990, they unwittingly released the Kuwait 17 from prison. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When that happened, half the job was done and anyone knowing the situation would have jumped on that, which I did. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
So I think the lesson to be drawn from the Beirut hostages and the various other hostage situations in the world is for governments to get engaged much more in what I term basic diplomacy and for voluntary agents to become engaged in this... Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Our view was why should we pay the price and for whose sake would we be paying this price, as well as who would benefit from us doing so?The arena was loose then and just as we had people in the arena so did others who also did nothing about this issue. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In this case, the higher interest of Islam amounts to Khomeini’s Islamic Republic and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was once a middle-class, residential district, but as the numbers of refugees grew, the population expanded into areas that were not designed for living.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Sunni Muslims also resented the newcomers from the South, as Beirut was historically their patch. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They came from a handful of wealthy families, whose sole interest revolved around protecting their privileges and barring other Shiites from social advance- ment. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In addition, the Relief Committee is qualified to initiate investments from which all proceeds must be returned to fund its activities. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Some families are provided with equipment or livestock to start their own businesses, which can range from knitting machines to herds of cattle and beehives. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From the beginning, the Relief Committee researched the areas it would cover in order to identify the families and individuals in need of its help. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Those seeking its services are thoroughly investigated for proof of their neediness since the organisation insists that only those who are poor, orphaned, needy, destitute, widowed, divorced, sick or handicapped benefit from its services. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A team of representatives from the organisation personally visits the families concerned and hands them their monthly payments. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In 1992, the Relief Committee distributed 1,988,670.87 Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah financed its enterprises without any contributions from the official Lebanese authorities. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Despite Tufeii’s frankness, Hezbollah is coy about revealing the sums it has received from Iran. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Only a few senior Hezbollah officials and a handful of their financial advisers know the exact amounts that were received from Tehran in the early years. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Reports have spoken of figures ranging from five to ten million dollars per month, but it is possible that Hezbollah received larger sums. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah receives considerable sums from these ‘legal rights or alms’, as they are known. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Between the money pouring in from Iran and those from the legal alms which are specifically allocated to the group’s personal use, Hezbollah has succeeded in investing in enterprises and businesses beyond its charitable organisations. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It has revenue coming in from school fees, as well as bookshops, stationers, farms, fisheries, factories and bakeries. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah also has direct contacts with Muslim Shiite businessmen in Europe, who are sympathetic to the Party of God’s work. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Islamic bankers have, however, taken great pains to create a system which fulfils the religious injunctions. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The group was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna when Egypt was still struggling for freedom from British domination. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While the Palestinian and Egyptian groups are Sunni Muslim, like Hezbollah they were facing occupation when they launched their institutions and all share an Islamic vision, founded on the belief that Islam is a comprehensive system embracing every aspect of existence, from religion and social welfare to politics and economics. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Like Hezbollah, the Mujama was funded by alms, in addition to receiving outside support from the Gulf states, Jordan and expatriate Palestinians in America. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In a country where the government was powerless against the reign of the warring militiamen and where the most basic services needed for survival were absent, the organisation found itself inundated. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Even at the height of the water shortage in Beirut, the Lebanese government failed to provide practical assistance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel claims that Hezbollah launches its attacks from the villages and that its reprisals are aimed at Hezbollah strongholds, but the damage inflicted on the villages suggests that Israel has targeted civilians in an attempt to turn them against the Islamic Resistance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
One of Jihad al-Binaa’s first large-scale projects was to rebuild the village of Maydoun, which had been abandoned by its vifiagers in 1985 after a major Israeli ground and air assault. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Even families who had disliked Hezbollah’s policies and had distanced themselves from the group have accepted their aid. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In one example, a resident of Nabatiyeh, who lives in London, received a telephone call from his vifiage in South Lebanon shortly after the 1996 Israeli offensive. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s leaders vehemently refute charges that their welfare system was largely developed to recruit people to their party and deny any suggestion that they impose conditions on families benefiting from their social assistance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The group had, after all, bitterly learnt from past mistakes that imposing conditions only served to alienate the community. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The houses are legally registered in Hezbollah’s name, which releases the widows from their in- laws’ control. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It introduces its pupils to the Quran and Islam from an early age in a bid to start them on what it believes to be the right path. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Many Lebanese, especially from the Christian community, are wary of the group’s Islamic ideology. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was from such mosques that Hezbollah first made itself known.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A huge fence separates the compound from the outside world. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Jihad al-Binaa and all Hezbollah’s charitable organisations and volunteers were mobiised to help in the immediate crisis. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
During Israel’s sixteen-day air, land and sea offensive against Lebanon inApril 1996, the Lebanese government became more involved from the start and extended considerable assistance both to the refugees and to the families who insisted on re- maining in their homes in the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its work has made a significant impact on the Lebanese public, many of whom had long feared the group and had shrunk from its extremist image. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Despite Harini’s efforts, the gap between the rich and poor in Lebanon has continued to grow and there is concern that his government is failing to convince the Shiites that it is addressing the imbalance.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanese who were previously un- willing to accept that Hezbollah was becoming a fact of life in Lebanon now discuss the group’s achievements with open praise. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Other UN soldiers lined up behind the barbed wire that separated the base from the cemetery, in a show of solidarity with the thousands of mourners who had poured into the tiny village, where the Bible recounts that Christ conducted his first miracle of changing water into wine. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As the funeral cortege wound its way into the vifiage, from a distance it looked like a traffic jam of coffins. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A band played the national anthem while the mosques broadcast recitations from the Quran. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
was sprayed over the crowd to cool them from the heat of the sun. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The attack on Qana was a particularly bloody moment from a grim historical repetition that had enveloped the South of Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The group emerged from the assault with more popular support than it had ever enjoyed. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Labour government of Rabin and Peres not only faced violent opposition from Israeli extremists, but from Palestinians. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Investors would think twice about making a financial commitment to a country which was clearly under constant threat of future attacks from Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Arieh O’Sullivan, the distinguished defence analyst of the right-wing Jerusalem Post, made the same point when he wrote: ‘Despite all its bravado and state-of-the-art weapons systems, the IDF’s attempts to stop Hezbollah from firing Katyushas into northern Israel is like a tiger trying to catch a mosquito in his teeth.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The onslaught sought to alienate the Lebanese civilian population from the Resistance in the hope of ending their support for Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The campaign also raised questions about the accuracy oJ Israel’s intelligence and its supply of aerial maps, which had been plotted with the information gathered from years of daily reconnaissance flights over Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On the first day of the offensive, at 4.30 Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At 10.30 Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘The American stand is far from having the credibility which a superpower should maintain as a peace sponsor in the world.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He pledged that the Katyusha attacks would stop once Israel ended its occupation and withdrew its troops from the South of the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Further air raids, backed by artillery bombardment, were delivered against the South and the Bekaa Valley as Israel gave civilians ultimatums to leave their homes and villages or face the consequences. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’ continued into its second day, Israel laid siege to the ports of Lebanon alleging that it was blocking Hezbollah’s shipments of weapons from getting through. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Most of the group’s weapons in fact come overland from Iran, its main supplier, via Syria. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
There was to be no remorse from the Israelis who later said: ‘If other individuals in the vehicle were hit they were being used by the Hezbollah as cover.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Abbas’s youngest daughter, the three-month-old baby he was seen carrying out of the ambulance, died later that evening from severe head injuries as she was being transferred from Tyre to Beirut for more specialised neurological treatment. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The neighbours heard her scream of pain from the shocks and rushed to her aid. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The two massacres inspired a chilling response from Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah appealed to the Muslims for a general mobiisation, a call which had in the past drawn thousands of young men and fighters from other parties and Hezbollah 186 militias to support the Party of God’s regular army. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
After four hours of discussion and debate, the Council issued a five-line statement agreeing that the fighting should end in Lebanon: The one conclusion I think I can draw as President of the Council from this debate is that all who have spoken are concerned that the fighting, violence and bloodshed should cease once and for all, that the humanitarian needs of the civilian population should be addressed and that the peace process must be sustained. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel is facing a very substantial terrorist threat from Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israeli officials claimed that the naval blockade along the coastal highway was aimed at obstructing Hezbollah’s supply lines and deterring it from sending reinforcements South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The argument did not convince the Lebanese: the Islamic Resistance, which was mainly based in South Lebanon, did not depend on daily supplies from Beirut Hezbollah 190 and would not have used the Beirut—Sidon highway in any case. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Baby Nour was only four days old and the youngest victim of Israel’s campaign. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hassan had moved his wife, six children and new born baby from their home the previous day. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
But Thursday 18 April had worse in store. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Lebanese and the Syrians were initially dismayed to find that the US proposals made no reference to the 1978 UN Resolution 425 which called on Israel to withdraw from all Lebanese territory.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Provided that no attacks took place for nine months, Israel would then commence discussions on its military withdrawal from Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The French proposals, on the other hand, mentioned the UN Resolution 425 and considered that any truce to end the current crisis would be a preliminary step towards a later withdrawal of Israeli troops from the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Twenty-four-hour radio chat shows were inundated with telephone calls from residents of Lebanon’s northern and eastern Christian-dominated areas, wishing to relay messages of support and solidarity with the Islamic Resistance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His demand amused Hezbollah’s officials who said that they had a difficult time convincing him that they could not follow his instructions to the letter: Imagine, he wanted us to buy these rockets and then fire them in salvoes of five, fired consecutively at a specific time each day and to announce later that they had been fired. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Schoolchildren, teenagers and university students flooded the streets of Beirut carrying donation boxes labelled: ‘Help the Islamic Resistance’ and ‘Help the Resistance be steadfast’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s image, meanwhile, was fixed as an aggressor and occupier. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Perhaps the most striking denunciation came in a live message from an old Muslim Lebanese woman who said she had fled Hezbollah 200 her village in South Lebanon with no money in hand and walked for three days to get to Beirut, where, seething with anger, she had headed for a radio station to broadcast ‘a message to President Clinton who accuses us of terrorism’ on its live talk show. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
I am from the South of Lebanon and I have walked for I say how can you accept what has happened and how Ti-rn GRAPES OF WRATH 201 us? They are fighting Hezbollah? Hezbollah is defending its land and its integrity. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s objectives were no longer attainable and Peres needed a cease-fire deal that would extricate him from Lebanon without damaging his credibility any further. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Although he had paid a heavy political price by alienating the countries who only a month earlier had convened in Sharm el-Sheikh to show solidarity with his country, he had not incurred any military or civilian losses in the whole operation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Both sides agreed not to attack civilian targets and a committee of representatives from the US, Syria, Israel, Lebanon and France was to be formed to supervise any violations across the border. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s occupation of Lebanon continued: no reference was made in the agreement to the UN Resolution 425 which calls on Israel to withdraw from the Lebanese territory it occupies. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In 1993, the PLO and Israel’s Labour government had achieved the unimaginable. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
According to the terms of the deal, Israel would be prepared to withdraw from Lebanon once Hezbollah has been disbanded and the Lebanese army deployed in the ‘security zone’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon demands that Israel adhere to UN Resolution 425 and withdraw from its territory, while Israel attaches conditions to its withdrawal. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah has mounted a campaign to woo Shiite members of the SLA away from the militia and back into the fold and makes daily broadcasts on its television station, ‘Al-Manar’, calling on the militia’s members to repent before any peace settlement is reached or face the consequences in the future. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He has been sentenced to death in absentia for treason and collaboration with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Will Hezbollah ever accept peace with Israel? In public, Hezbollah’s leaders have not softened their position. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While Lebanon remains unable to effect Israel’s withdrawal, it has however begun to take action against the SLA. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A number of SLA members have already deserted and the Party of God claims that Shiite deserters are in the process of being rehabilitated. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It is not possible to confirm, as yet, whether Hezbollah is in fact truly Hezbollah 206 prepared to integrate the SLA renegades into its community or whether it plans to exact punishment. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The leadership of Hezbollah has in fact departed from its manifesto by declaring that the goals of liberating South Lebanon and al-Quds, Jerusalem, are two different enterprises. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The atmosphere at this time is charged as Shiites collectively mourn their supreme martyr, Hussein. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Military supplies from Iran come into Lebanon via Syria and if Assad decides that the time for peace has come, Hezbollah may have no choice but to lay down its arms. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It [Hezbollah] * See May Chartouni-Dubarry, ‘Hizballah: From militia to political party’ in Lebanon on Hold, eds. Rosemary Hollis and Nadim Shehadi, London, 1966, p. 61 Hezbollah 210 is distinguished from other parties in the fact that its dealings with people are in general morally upright. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In its first four years in parliament, Hezbollah established a significant voice. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s officials ultimately walked away from the argument and its representatives did not appear at the funeral. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel can continue to deny Hezbollah’s cause any legitimacy by branding the Resistance as ‘terrorists’ and it can conceal its illegal occupation of South Lebanon under the euphemism ‘security zone’, but as long as Israel continues to defy the international decree which calls for the end of its presence in South Lebanon, there is very little hope that the circle of violence will end. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hassan, Tahaddi al-Mamnua, Beirut, 1992 BIBuoG1~P1~w 217 1920 1943 1948 1958 1959 1967 1968 1970—71 1975 Chronology France receives the mandate for Lebanon and expands the boundaries to include the Bekaa Valley, South Lebanon and part of the coastal region. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon gains independence from France. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
resistance begins against Israeli occupation; Hezbollah is conceived; Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrive in Lebanon; four Iranians abducted by Lebanese Forces; David Dodge is kidnapped; multinational forces arrive; PLO evacuated from Beirut; massacre of Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Chatila. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s council. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
THE MAKING OF THE GEORGIAN NATION THE MAKING OF THE GEORGIAN NATION Second Edition Ronald INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS Bloomington and Indianapolis Grigor Syny © 1988, 1994 by Ronald Grigor Suny All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Talking about nationality, that is to say nationalism, was central to the generation of nationality from thousands of individual experiences and understandings. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Even as nationalists insisted on the primordial and irreducible nature of the na- tional, scholars moved in precisely the opposite direction. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Understandings of ethnic and social differences, themselves always in the process of construction and contestation, were available to the intellectuals and activists who, in turn, privileged a particular perception of x Preface to the Second Edition society and history and worked to consolidate a social formation or politi. The Making of the Georgian Nation
cal movement for the ends they considered desirable. The Making of the Georgian Nation
However “modern” the nation is now seen to be by most scholars, the dominant practice of histori- cal writing on nations until quite recently has been to reproduce what is taken to be a continuous revealing of an ethnic, cultural, perhaps religious, essence. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This study of the Georgian nation was influenced by what might now be described as the first “turn” in the historiography of nationalism, the turn from the ideal and the essentialist toward the social constructivist interpretation of nation making. The Making of the Georgian Nation
My own approach to the problem of nation making attempts to employ both the new appreciation of the importance of discourse and the contribu- tions of the older social analysis. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The consequent synthesis will primarily be meaningful to the inhabitants of that cultural space, either as a contribution to self-knowledge or as advertisement for the outside world. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Bolshevik troops invaded the Menshevik republic, and a radical transformation of Georgia’s social and political life was imposed from above, this time by a Soviet government. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Part I is the most derivative, based as it is on the expert knowledge of those working in that field and on advice received from friends and teachers. The Making of the Georgian Nation
During the three research trips I made to Georgia under the auspices of IREX, I benefited from consultation with Soviet scholars, most notably Akaki Nestorovich Surguladze. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Of the few colleagues in Georgian studies in the West, the most important sources of advice were David Barrett of the Wardrop Collection in the Bodleian Library, L. Hamilton (“Tony”) A work of this sort, spanning the history of a people from the “primeval Aside from a handful of Soviet works and collections of documents, Preface xv Prefacexvi Rhinelander, and David Marshall Lang. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Special thanks are due to Peter Golden and to my teacher of Armenian history, Nina G. Garsoian, for their learned readings of the early chapters. The Making of the Georgian Nation
All their com- ments improved the text in innumerable ways. The Making of the Georgian Nation
I would like to express my gratitude to Oberlin College, the National Endow- ment for the Humanities, the Harriman Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of Columbia University the Russian Research Center of Harvard University~ the University of Michigan and its Center for Russian and East European Studies, and the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In a sense the Georgian nation was remade, this time in a Soviet mold. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As a historian of modern Transcaucasia, I am particularly indebted to those scholars who have written on the period before the Russian annexation— Cyril Toumanoff, G. A. Melikishvili, N. A. Berdzenishvili, Sh. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Many institutions have supported my research over the last decade. The Making of the Georgian Nation
During the Hittite period Georgia entered the Bronze Age (the Middle Bronze Age in Transcaucasia is dated from 2000 B.C. to 1200 B.C.), and there is evidence of considerable economic development and increased commerce among the tribes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In west- ern Georgia and Abkhazeti, a unique culture known as Coichidic developed between 1800 and 700 B.C., and in eastern Georgia the kurgan (tumulus) culture of Trialeti reached its zenith around 1500 B.C. The earliest written records of people living in Armenia come from Hittite tablets, which tell of wars fought by two Hittite kings, Suppiluliumas (1388?—1347 B.C.) and his son Marsilis I (1347?—1320 B.C.), against tribes inhabiting the Armenian plateau.1° The Making of the Georgian Nation
After the fall of the Hittites, the Mushki formed their own state in east-central Anatolia, a relatively strong formation, known in the Bible as Mosoch.13 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Diauehi coalition was powerful enough to resist attacks by Assyria, although in 1112 B.C. their king was captured by Tiglath-pileser I. In the ninth and early eighth centuries B.C., Diauehi was the nucleus around which many tribes of southern Transcaucasia gathered, and it was therefore the target not only of Assyria but also of the rulers of the newly emerging state of Urartu. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Sasperi merged with the Urartians in their lands, and, Melikishvili con- jectures, borrowed Urartian words that found their way into the Georgian language.22 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The political center of the kingdom of Egrisi, as it was known to eastern Georgians, was on the Rioni River. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Herodotus tells us: Gifts were also required from the Colchians and their neighbors as far as the Caucasian mountains (which is as far as the Persian rule reaches, the country north of the Caucasus paying no regard to the Persians); these were rendered every five years and are still so rendered, namely, one hundred boys and as many maidens.3° The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the time Xenophon marched through Asia Minor to the Black Sea (401—400 B.C.), the Colchians and other Georgian tribes had freed them- selves from Achaemenid rule. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Greeks attacked the defenders of the pass from above, drove them off, and then “descended into the plain on the farther side and reached villages full of many good things.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Once the fortress was taken, “then came a dreadful spectacle: the women threw their little children down from the rocks and then threw themselves down after them, and the men did likewise.”33 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Their dwellings were in strongholds, and therein they had stored away all their provisions; hence the Greeks could get nothing in this country, but they subsisted on the cattle they had taken from the Taochians.34 The Making of the Georgian Nation
From Xenophon’s Anabasis it is possible to piece together a picture of the western Georgian tribes at the end of the fifth century B.C. Free from Persian authority (except for the Mossynoeci), they lived in hostile relations with the Greek merchant ports. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Through thetwo centuries of Achaemenid dominion over eastern Ana- tolia and Transcaucasia (546—33 1 B.C.), several proto-Georgian tribes had migrated north from Anatolia into the Pontic regions along the Black Sea coast, where Xenophon found them, and to the east into the Kura valley. The Making of the Georgian Nation
To the Greeks they were known as Iberoi (Iberians), a name that Melikishvili believes came from the land from which they had migrated, Speri. The Making of the Georgian Nation
D. M. Lang mentions the hypothesis that the root Tibar in Yibareni (Tibal) gave rise to the form Iber from which the Greeks derived their name for the eastern Georgians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the Mushki (Meskhi, Moskhi) came the name of the chief city of ancient Iberia, Mtskheta. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Even more important, the Mushki brought with them from the west the pantheon of Hittite gods, headed by Armazi, the moon god, and Zaden, the god of fruitfulness.38 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The chronicles state that Parnavazi united Georgians of the east with those of Colchis~Egrisi to drive the “Greeks” from Mtskheta. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian chronicles, kartlis tskhovreba, provide the tradition of the first king of Kartli-Iberia, Parnavazi (Farnavazi, Pharnabazus), who, they claim, was a descendant of Kartlosi, the eponymous ancestor of the Georgians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The weakened Persians were unable to offer opposi- tion when the Armenian kings, Artashes (Artaxias; 189—161 B.C.) of Greater Armenia and Zareh (Zariadres) of Sophene, declared their autonomy from the Seleucid empire. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In commercial and cultural contact with Colchis and Pontus, Greater Armenia benefited from the Hellenistic currents from the west. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 66 B.C. Tigran was forced to make peace, and Pompey turned north to deal with the Georgians, who had allied themselves with the Armenians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Pompey marched first into Colchis, where he was attacked in the rear by Iberians and Caucasian Albanians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Roman power was never very firm in eastern Georgia, and by the second half of the first century B.C. the growing strength of the Parthian successors to the Persian Seleucids was being felt throughout Transcaucasia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Rather than an undiluted and consistent struggle for national independence or religious integrity, as is often proposed by modern historians, the struggles of the Armenian, Georgian, and Albanian kings and princes should be seen as a series of constantly changing political orientations. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In a treacherous and precarious situation, their lodestar was survival. The Making of the Georgian Nation
of Iberia, an ally of the Romans, defeated the Parthian king of Armenia and placed his brother Mithradates (A.D. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Armenia was taken by the Parthians, who gave the crown to Trdat, the founder of the Parthian Arsacid dynasty in Armenia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Iberia and Rome fought Parthia and Armenia until the Peace of Rhandeia (A.D. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But even as Arsacids triumphed in the Caucasian kingdoms, that dynasty fell from power in its original home- land, Persia, when the dynamic Ardashir overthrew the Parthian dynasty and founded the four-hundred-year empire of the Sassanids (224—651). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Although there was some trade between Kartli-Iberia and neighboring countries, the major transit route of Roman times “ran from Southern Russia along the eastern shore of the Black Sea through Colchis and Artaxata- Arta~at to Media and thence to the East.”63 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Caught between the Roman and Persian worlds, Armenia and Kartli-Iberia were clearly influenced culturally by both, but in the formation of their societies Persian norms played the dominant Formation of the Georgian Nation 17 18 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES role.6’5 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The king of Iberia stood at the summit of the two orders, dynasticist and feudal, both as the superdynast and as the theoretical sole source of sovereignty.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
A mixture of dynasticism and feudalism emerged in eastern Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In each province an eristavi or pitiaskhshi governed (the two terms were interchangeable).68 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Below the provincial governors were the spasalarni (generals) and the khliarkhfli (atasistavni), who collected taxes and gathered troops. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As warfare increasingly became a matter for mounted warriors (tskhentartsani) rather than common foot soldiers (mkvirtskhlebi), military estates were required to support these cavalrymen. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the fourth to the eighth centuries, both Kartli-Iberia and Armenia, as well as Colchis- Egrisi and Albania, were divided territorially into “lands” that reflected the ancient tribes and clans that had migrated and merged to form the local nationalities.1 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The close ties with Greek Christianity can be seen from the Georgian borrowing of Greek clerical terms: ekklesia, evangele, diakon, episkop, and others. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But the Roman defeat at Adrianople in 378 restored all of Kartli-Iberia to Iranian control. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By this treaty the Byzantine empire finally admitted the loss of Kartli-Iberia to Iran. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the years of revolt and war with Iran (482—485), Vakhtang formed an alliance with Byzantium, which was sealed by his marriage to Helena, “daughter” (relative) of Emperor Zeno (474—491). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Iran invaded Lazica several times in the sixth century, but Emperor Justinian (527—565) maintained Roman sovereignty over the western Caucasus. The Making of the Georgian Nation
About the year 540, an Iranian viceroy was again reported living in Tbilisi, though the government was being run by local princes, the catholicos, and Grigoli, the kartlisa mamasakhlisi (prince-regnant) of Kartli-Iberia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This was accomplished without resis- tance from the Iberian aristocrats; the great eristavni acquiesced. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Thus a ruling prince appointed from Byzantium replaced the hereditary monarchy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Iberian aristocrats soon had reason to regret their collusion with the Iranians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
His ally, Guaram (588—602?), filled the role. The Making of the Georgian Nation
‘With the Byzantine armies engaged in a difficult struggle against the Avars, a Turko-Mongol horde that was raiding Byzantium, Stepanoz switched his allegiance to Iran and reunited Kartli-Iberia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He made his capital in Tbilisi and from the fortress above the Kura he defied the Roman empire. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When Guaram’s son, Stepanoz, switched from a pro-Byzantine position to cooperation with Iran, his religious posi- tion shifted toward Monophysitism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the early seventh century, then, the Iberian church conformed to the orthodoxy of the Byzantine church, while the Armenian, despite occasional lapses, maintained its own brand of moder- ately Monophysite Christianity. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But the Arabs made no attempt to colonize Arminiya. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Byzantium did not give up, however, and early in the eighth century the empire aided Armenian rebels under Smbat VI Bagratuni against the Arab viceroy, Marwan ibn Muhammad. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Elsewhere, in the mountains of Kartli, and in Abkhazeti, Imereti, and the highlands of the Chorokhi, local lords main- tained a degree of freedom from Arab interference. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From these lands the Georgian Bagratunis (Bagratids) emerged as the most eminent noble family in Kartli. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Finally, in 853, the caliph sent an Arab army under a Turkic officer, Bogha al-Kabir, to put down a rebellion in Armenia and to deal with Tbilisi. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Arab dominion over Caucasia had weakened considerably by the second half of the ninth century, and the developing buffer states in Georgia and Armenia were emerging as a potent bulwark against Byzantine encroach- ments. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The former Arab province of Arminiya fragmented into small kingdoms and principalities, and from this new political mosaic eastern Georgia was to emerge as the most powerful state in Caucasia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 961 the Armenian Bagratid king moved his capital from Kars to Ani, and that same year a separate kingdom was created in Kars. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Civil war raged within the empire from 976 to 979, and in his desperate search for allies Basil turned to David, the young Bagratid prince of Tao, who sent twelve thousand cavalry troops. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From Bagrat’s capital at Kutaisi, his son, Giorgi I (10 11-1027), launched a cam- paign to restore the lands of David of Tao to Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As Georges Charachidzé notes, “This mobile character of a fief conceded by the king seems well established by the tenth century and would no longer be put into question until the end of the fifteenth century.”41 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Christian Georgia 33 34 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES Despite internal problems, Georgia was by the reign of Bagrat IV the major indigenous power in Caucasia, standing between the Byzantine empire and the emerging Turkish power in Iran. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Cultivated land became pasture for the nomads, and peasant farmers were pushed into the mountains. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian king had no choice but to make the trek to Isfahan, just as his contemporaries, Catholicos Vassel of Armenia and King Kvirike of Lori- Tashir, had done. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The didi turkoba greatly weakened Geor- gian royal power and promoted centrifugal tendencies in the country. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Nobles built fortresses and resisted control from the capital. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The renewed force of the monarchy bore down on the most independent eristavni, who were either reconciled to the king’s new power or were driven from their patrimonies. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In each margravate David appointed a marzpan (viceroy) who over time took on the title monapire (from the Georgian napiri [borderland]).47 The Making of the Georgian Nation
To build up his army and increase the population of his country, David II invited foreigners to join his forces and to settle depopulated areas in Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
David worked to maintain peaceful relations with Byzantium, and in 1118 his daughter Kata married Isaac, the younger son of Emperor Alexius Comnenus. The Making of the Georgian Nation
That same year he defeated the Turks at Trialeti and occupied the town of Gandja. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1115 Giorgi Chqondideli captured Rustavi, and the following year the king campaigned in Tao and Klarjeti. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Thus in the last years of his reign David the Rebuilder ruled over a multinational empire of Abkhazians, Georgians, Armenians, and various Muslim peoples, extending from the Black Sea and the Caucasus south to Greater Armenia and east to the Caspian. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But as Speros Vryonis notes, this new state, created by years of fighting, was far from a flourishing economic order: “By the time of his death, David had conquered Tiflis and Ani and extirpated the Turkmen settlements from most of his lands. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The king had also established new towns, like Gori, in which he settled merchants emigrating from Armenia, and he had promoted learning and culture by founding an academy at Gelati in western Georgia.57 The Making of the Georgian Nation
David III (IV) dethroned Demetre I briefly, but when his father regained the throne he crowned his youngest son, Giorgi III (IV), bypassing both the rebel son David and another son, Demetre (Demna). The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1174—1177 a group of Georgian and Armenian nobles, the Orbeliani and the Torelis, gathered around Demna and attempted to seize the throne, but Giorgi managed to defeat them and Demna was executed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The “capital,” Tbilisi, was held for centuries by Muslims, and Georgian monarchs had no single place of residence. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Describing this period, Christian Georgia 39 40 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES Toumanoff writes: “Possessed of great commercial and industrial centres—.-. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Tiflis, Artanuji, Dmanisi, Samshvilde, Ani, Kars, Dvin, Ganja—Georgia succeeded to Armenia’s prosperity. The Making of the Georgian Nation
King Giorgi Lasha, wounded in battle, died in 1223 and was succeeded by his sister, Rusudan (1223—1245). The Making of the Georgian Nation
With the death of Queen Rusudan in 1245, an interregnum began during which the Mongols divided Caucasia into eight provinces or dumafls.66 The Making of the Georgian Nation
David IV, the bastard son of Giorgi Lasha, and David V, the son of Queen Rusudan, were both cultivated by the Mongols— the former known by the Mongols as Ulu David (“the Elder”), the latter known as Narin David (“the Slender”). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Ulu David decided to join his cousin in rebellion but was unable to rally many of his vassals. The Making of the Georgian Nation
While western Georgia maintained a precarious independence from the Mongols, eastern Georgia suffered both the fiscal burdens imposed by the agents of the khan and their direct political interference in the affairs of Kartli. The Making of the Georgian Nation
epic poem, vepkhistqaosani (“The Knight in the Panther’s Skin”). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Throughout the second period, land gradually changed from con- ditional to hereditary tenure, a process completed only at the end of the fifteenth century. The Making of the Georgian Nation
However, the transmission of a holding from father to son was never an absolute right of the vassal but always depended on the vassal’s relationship with his lord. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In his careful study of feudalism in Georgia, Charachidzé distinguishes Georgian patron qmoba from French feodalite, noting that the aznaurni were much more subject to the will of their lords than the French vassals. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Whereas earlier, in the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, Georgian monarchs and vassals had fought as adversaries within a feudal hierarchy of dependence, from the fifteenth century on the breakdown of ties of dependence changed the conflict into a struggle between a weak state and increasingly independent princes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Princes and nobles broke with their sovereign and became kings of their provinces. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Aleksandre imposed a building tax on his impoverished subjects from 1425 to 1440, but despite the king’s efforts many villages were left in ruin and overgrown by forest. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the course of the fifteenth century Georgia was the victim of great changes in economic and political life that extended far beyond Trans- caucasia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Kakhetian kings, together with their nobles, were able to participate in this trade which had attained an interna- tional character. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This local prosperity encouraged the movement of popula- tion from the harassed lands of Kartli.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Of the three Georgian kingdoms, Imereti suffered most from political disintegration. The Making of the Georgian Nation
King Bagrat III (15 10—1565) not only faced repeated assaults from the Ottoman Turks but had to contend with ostensible vassals who were joining the enemy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
After escaping from Bagrat’s prison in Gelati monastery, Levan hid in Akhaltsikhe and later sided with the Turks, even traveling to Istanbul, where he received gifts and assurances of protection.2° The Making of the Georgian Nation
He captured fortresses in Kartli, established his garrisons there, and took Tbilisi again in 1548. The Making of the Georgian Nation
After exchanging ambassadors in 1586—1587, Tsar Fedor Ivanovich told the envoys from Kakheti that he was prepared to take their king under his protection (1589). The Making of the Georgian Nation
His major concern was the potential interference of Russia in Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Before his death Giorgi X, Luarsab’s father, had sworn fealty to the tsar and discussed marriage alliances with Russia.27 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Bagrat VII (1614— 1619), son of Da’ud Khan, received the throne of Kartli, and lese Khan, grandson of Aleksandre II, took the throne of Kakheti. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The population of Kakheti dropped by two-thirds. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In order to obtain a divorce so that he might marry his uncle’s wife, Levan accused his wife of infidelity, cut off her ears and nose, and drove her from his court. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The request was repeated in 1624, but Russia, recovering from its Time of Troubles, was not prepared to intervene in the Caucasian maelstrom. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The result of this chaos was the decline of the economy, a fall in trade, and a collapse of urban life. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In appreciation for his service, the new shah gave his loyal Georgian the title Rustam Khan and installed him as vali (viceroy) of Tbilisi, from which city Taimuraz had been expelled. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Then sixty-seven years old, Rustam, known in Georgia as King Rostom (1632—1658), ruled Kartli (and from 1648 to 1656 ruled Kakheti as well) and brought relative peace and prosperity to the country. The Making of the Georgian Nation
To his people Rostom left a legacy of cooperation with the Iranians and the benefits to be derived from acceptance of the status quo, but it was not an example that his successors were willing to follow. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Much more successful were those princes and nobles of Kartli-Kakheti who found positions in the Safavid civil and military service, even as the empire was threatened by invasions from the east. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Chardin reported that “the greatest part of the Georgian lords Twilight of the Georgian Kingdoms 53 I 54 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES are outwardly Mahometan; some professing that religion to obtain prefer- ment at court and pensions of state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But nothing came of the mission, and Vakhtang reluctantly converted in 1716. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Taimuraz and Erekle were faced by three sources of opposi- tion to the expansion of their authority: Georgian rivals, particularly the exiled Mukhranian Bagratids; ambitious Muslim khans of eastern Trans- caucasia; and mountaineers from the North Caucasus, who raided the Georgian valleys. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1748, Erekle recaptured the Tbilisi citadel from the rebel 55Twilight of the Georgian Kingdoms 56 THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES Georgian prince, Archil, son of lese, a convert to Islam who had made a desperate attempt to rally the Muslim elements in Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
At its height eastern Georgia became the nucleus of a large, though fragile, Caucasian empire. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Already in 1743, the saeristavo of Aragvi had been abolished, and in 1777 that of Ksani was eliminated. The Making of the Georgian Nation
King Solomon I of Imereti (1752—1765, 1768—1784), only recently restored to his throne, was more enthusiastic than most about Russian intervention, since the Turks were a much more immediate danger to him. The Making of the Georgian Nation
After receiving reports about her commander, Catherine replaced him, but Russian aid remained too meager to allow the Georgians to win a decisive victory over the Turks. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The request came at an inopportune moment, for Catherine was faced with the massive rebellion led by Pugachev and was anxiously looking for ways to end the war with Turkey. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On July 24, 1783, Georgian and Russian plenipotentiaries signed the Treaty of Georgievsk, which placed the kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti under Russian protection. The Making of the Georgian Nation
After some hesitation, Paul’s son, Tsar Alexander I (1801—1825), de- cided that Russia’s interests and Georgia’s future could best be guaranteed by outright incorporation into the empire, and in 1801 the young emperor declared that the kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti had been abolished. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Prince Garsevan Chavchavadze wrote to his relatives in Tbilisi that the Russians had “not fulfilled [even] one of King Giorgi’s requirements. The Making of the Georgian Nation
64 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE Georgian history before the Russian occupation had been a complex story of division (political and territorial) and periodic attempts at unifica. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The highest circles of society were occupied by the royal princes and princesses, members of the Bagratid family, which had ruled in Georgia for over a thousand years and still claimed descent from King David of Israel. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Many aznaurni were quite poor and lived no better than peasants, but their status carried certain privileges and exemp- tions from obligations. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The highest official appointed by the king to govern the towns and countryside, the mouravi, was almost always a noble from the upper ranks and often held the position as a hereditary privilege. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1805, for example, General Tsitsianov recommended that local police officers, formerly elected by the nobility, be appointed by the commander in chief.7 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The princes steadily lost ground, first as hereditary political and police authorities in their districts and later as rulers of their own vassal gentry, the aznaurni. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the Russian point of view Georgian society was peculiar in that the princes held ordinary nobles in subordinate, vassal relations, and held many clergymen as simple serfs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The aznaurni were released from obligations to the princes but were required to prove title to their land; if they could not, they lost the land to their former lords and themselves become state peasants.9 The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the same time nobles were prohibited from enserfing freemen, a previously common practice. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the early 1830s a Georgian Russian Rule and Georgian Society 67 68 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE nobleman faced an alien bureaucracy that at one and the same time de- manded that he prove he was of noble status and that he owned his serfs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgian nobles were even permitted to enroll their children in the Russian cadet corps. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From 1816 to 1827 General Aleksei Petrovich Ermolov, a hero of the Battle of Borodino, ruled the Caucasus as chief administrator while con- tinuing the Russian expansion against the Iranians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In light of the dismal present the past took on the features of a golden age, and it remained only for the noble leaders to articulate the discontents of their estate and lead it to attempt to separate from Russia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian nobility was from the beginning divided in its attitude toward the Russian occupation.19 The Making of the Georgian Nation
From their days as schoolboys these young nobles found it difficult to tolerate the arbitrariness of their Russian overlords, manifested most imme- diately by the behavior of their teachers. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Inspired by the French revolution of 1830 and the Polish insurrection of 1830-183 1, the conspirators were united in their anti-Russian sentiment but divided in their program. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On December 10, 1832, a mere ten days before the planned murders, the conspirators were arrested. The Making of the Georgian Nation
They reported that Hahn’s “institutions were trans- posed here from Russian provinces and did not correspond to the level of citizenship of the inhabitants, who have totally different conceptions, beliefs, customs, and ways of life.”28 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Under the patronage of Count Vorontsov and his wife, the social life of Russian officers stationed in the Caucasus and the Georgian nobility under- went a significant transformation. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian nobility, which fifteen years earlier had plotted to murder Russian officials and separate Georgia from the empire, made its peace with the tsarist autocracy during the viceroyalty of Vorontsov. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The lower nobles had been freed from depen- dence on the princes and the church, and all nobles were being integrated into imperial society, adopting a Western cultural veneer and serving with distinction in the military and civil service. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In western Georgia popular militia were formed to fight the invading Turks, and when Russian troops were withdrawn from Guria to defend Kutaisi, the Gurian peasants and nobles engaged in partisan warfare. The Making of the Georgian Nation
It had survived the first half-century of Russian occupation by being transformed from a divided political elite in conflict with its own monarch into a united corporation devoted to its new sovereign, the Romanov tsar. The Making of the Georgian Nation
It shared power with Russian of- ficialdom and increasingly defined itself as a service nobility, or dvorianstvo, whose identity stemmed as much from its members’ performance as state servants as it did from possession of land and serfs. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In practice, however, the lord’s powers were absolute. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgia in the days before reform was a country recovering from the ravages of war, plague, and civil disorder. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1828 a Russian official, General Sipiagin, noted the lack of an entrepreneurial attitude among the Georgians: From the time of my arrival in Georgia, I turned much attention to the economic activities of the inhabitants . The Making of the Georgian Nation
Consistently distressed by the Georgians’ attitude toward work, econ- omy, and self-improvement, noble officers from the north or travelers from the West found their own explanations in racial, climatic, or educational factors. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Surpluses would have provoked either thiev- ery or increased dues from local lords. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Men and women in the village had separate and distinct roles in work and family life. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As long as obligations were mutual and sanctioned by time and custom, the peasants did not resist. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The serfs knew exactly what they had to pay to their owners, the lords what they could demand from their serfs, and both sides without fail fulfilled their mutual obligations. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The populist Soprom Mgaloblishvili, writing about life in Imereti in the 1 850s, remembered that villagers looked disapprovingly at quarrels in large families or at a brother’s attempt to separate from his household. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The shetsiruli qma was a serf who had been “sacrificed” by a lord to the church and in that way became a clerical serf. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Often skilled peasants were bought and sold in their capacity as craftsmen, and their obligations to their lord consisted of performing that craft.5° The Making of the Georgian Nation
In western Georgia some unlucky prisoners were sold to the Ottoman Turks despite the anathema of the Georgian church and the efforts of Solomon I to end the slave trade.51 The Making of the Georgian Nation
At the top of peasant society was the usually unobligated msakhuri, the domestic servant or bodyguard of a powerful lord or of the king himself. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Immediately below the msakhuri was the azati, a peasant freed by his lord either for past service or for payment. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He was therefore free from duties to his seigneur but not from royal taxes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He paid no taxes to the king and lived as a hired hand, receiving payment in kind.53 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The lowest category of peasant, found primarily in western Georgia, was the mojalabe, a near-slave who lived in the home of his lord usually with no land of his own. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As conditions worsened, the number of msakhurebi declined, and the ranks of the poorer peasants—the boganebi, khizanebi, and the mojalabebi—swelled. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In western Georgia agriculture was even less developed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
For many peasant households agriculture alone was not sufficient to maintain the family and had to be supplemented by other kinds of work. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The most unfortunate serf was the sheudzlebeli movale, a peasant sold into serfdom in order to pay off a debt, either his own or that of a close relative, and the tkve, a captive from another land. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The dualistic policy of the Russian authorities toward the Georgian noble elite, which at one and the same time eliminated nobles from tradi- tional political posts and attempted to draw loyal elements into state service, offered no compensating advantages for the peasantry. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Thus, the division of labor be- tween city and countryside was in Georgia accented by the divisions of religion, language, and culture of two different peoples. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Georgia, as in Russia and Western Europe, towns could be distinguished from villages by their size, density of population, and by the fact that in a town, unlike a village, the majority lived from nonagricultural production. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But they differed from European towns in one vivid way: Georgia’s urban dwellers were, for the most part, unfree. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The famous phrase from medieval Ger- many—Stadtluft macht frei—simply did not apply in Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The most influential urban dwellers in Georgia were the mokalakebi. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But they remained unfree men—serfs to their monarch. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In this way, a wealthy merchant might realize his greatest social ambition—not to mention his liberation from bondage and taxation.73 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The local merchants and craftsmen were largely serfs of the king, his nobles, and the church; their guilds (amkarebi) were under royal control; and no middle- class cohesion or independence from the government had developed.74 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Most urban craftsmen and merchants were distinguished from the rest of Georgia’s population not only by ‘their distinct economic position and commensurate political power but also by their ethnic and religious profile. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The treaties of Gulistan (1812) and Turkmenchai (1828) inaugurated periods of relative peace with Russia’s neighbors; the Russian military pres- ence also put an end to the most abusive treatment of merchants and craftsmen by the Georgian nobility. The Making of the Georgian Nation
General Lazarev, who arrived in Tiflis in 1799, reported to St. Petersburg on the violence and exploitation of the urban population: Often one sees people who have no means of defending themselves being completely looted. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Not until 1840 was the Russian Rule and Georgian Society 89 90 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE guilds’ influence in urban affairs officially recognized in a municipal statute. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Akhverdov, a spokesman for the guilds, and the viceroy concluded that the development of industry, trade, communications, and a more enlightened bourgeoisie would eventually bring a natural death to these essentially medieval institutions. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the first years of Russian rule, competition flared up between local and outside merchants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Kankrin stated bluntly in 1827 that “the Transcaucasian provinces not without reason could be termed our colony, which should bring the state rather significant profits from the products of southern climes.”85 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Such a colonial relationship would keep Transcaucasia somewhat apart from the empire’s political system: “Calling the Transcauca- Russian Rule and Georgian Society 91 92 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE sian territory a colony means that it is not the object of the government to join it to the general state system, that it is not hoped to make of this part of Russia and the Russian people in the moral sense, but to leave this territory as an Asian province, although better governed.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
When Nicholas I visited Erevan in 1837, Rozen presented nine Armenian merchants who petitioned the tsar for permission to open the European trade once again.88 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Golovinskii Prospekt (today Rustaveli) was laid out from the reconstructed Erivan Square, site of a new theater, army headquarters, and central police station.91 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Across the river, on the left bank, Mikhailovskii Prospekt (now Plekhanov) was extended from the square of the same name (now Karl Marx). The Making of the Georgian Nation
When two Russian “trading depots” were opened in Tiflis in 1847—1848, Armenian merchants complained to Vorontsov that the Russians were being given an unfair advantage. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“Your activities,” he told the Russian merchants, “beneficial at first to local consumers because they destroyed the monopoly of Armenian merchants, merely continue the harm you have done them without bringing any benefits to the local producers, industrialists, or craftsmen.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the economic cocoon of the Georgian kingdom, the enserfed mokalake was being reborn as a free mer- chant ready to compete with his commercial rivals in Russia and Europe. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Thanks largely to the efforts of the merchants, imports of foreign goods into Transcaucasia rose ninefold from 1821 to 1864 and exports of locally produced goods increased twofold. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By entering the estate of pochetnye grazhdane, which had been established by Nicholas I in 1832, the mokalakebi were freed from military recruitment, the soul tax, and corporal punishment.97 The Making of the Georgian Nation
But at the same time that this pacification and integration was taking place, the stage was being set for a dual confrontation that would mature in the next half-century: between the two leading social and ethnic communities—the Georgian nobility and the Armenian bourgeoisie—and between the Russian autocracy and the intellec- tual elements emerging from these two classes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By the end of the first half-century of Russian rule, Transcaucasia had been administratively integrated into the tsarist empire, and the social elites among the Georgians and Armenians had metamorphosed into estates (sosloviia) of the Russian type. The Making of the Georgian Nation
We cannot forget that each of our shots in Mingrelia against a native—in a coastal country filled with newcomers from Turkey—will have echoes in Constantinople, in Europe and in London at some kind of meeting listening to a drunk orator straining his voice against the inhumanity of Russia.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
The primary beneficiaries of Russian rulership were the large landhold- ing aristocrats, the princely Orbeliani, Eristavi, Bagration-Mukhranskii, and Chavchavadze families. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Tiflis province there was also a sizable number of middle gentry, who stood economically between the large magnates and the smallest landholders. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Central to his conception was the notion that the Russian monarchy was obligated by treaty with the Georgian kings to preserve all rights and privileges of the Georgian nobility, including those specified in the law code of Vakhtang VI, which clearly stated that the nobles had full authority over everything the peasants had. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The lord was obliged to help the peasant in times of need, and the peasant to supply the lord with produce and labor because the lord owned both the peasant himself and the land he tilled. The Making of the Georgian Nation
His program for reform in hand, Dmitri Kipiani traveled from district tc district explaining his position to the nobles of Sighnaghi, Telavi, Gori, Dusheti, and Tiflis. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Threatened by a blow to their status, the great majority of the Georgian nobles unhesitatingly threw off their traditional leaders from the noblesse d’epée and rallied around Kipiani, the articulate representative of the small and middle nobility.23 The Making of the Georgian Nation
A message in Georgian from the viceroy was read to the peasants, announcing the beginning of a “new life” for them. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Sighnaghi a peasant thanked the tsar and proposed a toast to his health, and one of the local nobles complained publicly that the gentry had just lost the ability to educate its children without aid from the state.30 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Instead of repeating the lengthy process of soliciting opinions from the nobility, the viceroy proposed formation of a noble committee, chaired by the marshal of the provincial nobility, to which each uezd would send four representatives, two from the tavadebi (princes), two from the aznaurni (gentry). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Emancipation meant first and foremost that the former landlord peas- ants received personal liberation from their dependency on the nobles. The Making of the Georgian Nation
No longer could peasants be involuntarily moved from place to place or sent by will of the landlord into exile. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Peasants were free to marry without permis- sion from their lords, engage in business, participate in government and educational institutions, and enter other social orders, such as the townspeo- pie. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The boundaries of the household plots were to be determined by voluntary agreement between the peasant and his lord or, if they could not agree, by a mirovoi posrednik (peace arbitrator).32 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The committee recognized that the allotments for the peasants would be insuffi- cient “but in its determination to save the nobility, supposedly from ruin, the committee had sacrificed the peasants’ interests.”33 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Petty landlords whose property did not come up to these minimum standards were freed from any obligation to give their peasants arable field allotments. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The dues for the rest of the peasant lands were paid in kind: kulukhi (one-fourth of the wine produced); gala (one-fourth of the harvest of the fields); and one-third of the mowed hay from the meadows. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The traditional obligations of gala and kulukhi had varied from district to district, but they had ranged upward from one-tenth of the harvest, rarely exceeding one-fifth. The Making of the Georgian Nation
To acquire full title to the land the peasant had to conclude a redemption agreement (vykupnaia sdelka) with his lord and pay off the loan that the government had made to the landlord for loss of land: a process which was to take an estimated forty-nine years. The Making of the Georgian Nation
For the nobles it was more advantageous to maintain the “temporarily obligated’ status of their peasants and continue to receive payments from them than unilaterally to abrogate this status and force them to redeem the land. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Although estimates are hard to come by, Soviet historians suggest that about four hundred households in western Georgia received no land, and for Tiflis province estimates run from 9 to 13 percent—at least 1,444 peasant households left without land.45 The Making of the Georgian Nation
desiatinas. The Making of the Georgian Nation
And in Ozurgeti uezd in western Georgia the average allotment was 1.3 The Making of the Georgian Nation
‘46 Emancipation led to a new system of self-government. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The process of emancipating the serfs of Georgia continued through the 1860s into the early 1870s. The Making of the Georgian Nation
With the formal abolition of serfdom in Abkhazeti nearly everyone from noble to slave received some land. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The nobles received money payments from the state for the loss of their rights over the peasants, as well as much of the land. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian nobles lost much in the reform—part of the lands they had owned for centuries, labor obligations from their serfs, the dues from the serfs—but they also retained much. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The tsar also preserved the nobles’ police powers over the peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Yet in the 1860s their opposition to emancipation was contained within legal bounds, and once the tsar’s will was announced, they took no further action. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This was not merely psychological or cultural. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The corporate solidarity of the Georgian nobles had paid off in important concessions, though they were much further from the govern- ment’s position on emancipation than many Russian nobles were. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In a sense, then, the eman- cipation in Georgia stands at the opposite extreme from the reform in the Polish and western provinces where the peasants received a relatively favor- able settlement and the nobles, because of their participation in the rebellion of 1863, were treated more harshly than elsewhere in the empire. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Acquisition of personal freedom in formal, legal terms was more than offset by the continuing economic dependence on the nobility, a new form of bondage from which they were unable to emancipate themselves. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In the first year of the reform the administration in Tiflis province received almost two thousand complaints from landlords about “tem- porarily obligated” peasants refusing to pay dues or work for the lords. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Georgian peasantry did not at first understand fully the implications of the reform. The Making of the Georgian Nation
No significant group within Georgia was satisfied with the reform. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In time much of the resentment of peasants and nobles alike would be turned against the state, which had attempted in its own interest to transform agrarian relations. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Ultimately national and social discontent would converge in a massive revolutionary peasant movement under socialist direction in the early twentieth century. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Responding to a few “agitators,” peas- ants would refuse to pay their dues or do begara (labor obligations) for their landlords. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Giving up half the land to the nobles proved especially painful to many peasants, and they hesitated to formulate and sign the agreements on land partition (ustavnye gramoty). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Now noble authority, however slightly, was compromised, and peasants, however incompletely, gained a degree of freedom. The Making of the Georgian Nation
After the emancipation of the serfs, however, and until the revolution, the principal blows to the status of the nobility no longer came from the state but from the changing economic environment, which increased the wealth and influence of the Armenian middle class. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Capitalist concepts of production for market, profitability, and economic efficiency were completely foreign to the vast majority of Georgian nobles, who were accustomed to the free labor and, obligatory payments that they had for centuries received from their peasants. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The serfs were taken away from us; there were no free workers; workers’ hands became expensive; we fell into debt, and because we were not able to pay them off in time we lost our estates.”1 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The shortage of capital was met by mortgaging or renting their lands, but little effort was made to change from relying on peasant payments to improving productivity. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Nobles were im- mediately faced with new demands on their capital—hiring workers, buying tools and draft animals—while attempting to pay off old debts incurred during serfdom. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Taking little interest in their estates, the nobles were in general satisfied to receive their dues or rents and borrow from moneylenders in the towns. The Making of the Georgian Nation
percent of the city’s 159,000 inhabitants and Georgians 26.3 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Between 1865 and 1897, the number of Russians grew by 190 percent (from 12,462 to 36,113); the number of Georgians rose 158 percent (from 14,878 to 38,357); while the Armenians rose by only 88 percent (28,488 to 55,553).4 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Tiflis was the portal through which raw silk and silk goods passed from Iran and eastern Transcaucasia to Russia and Europe. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1821—1831, 1846, and 1864, low tariffs encouraged transit trade from Europe and Iran to cross Russian Trans- caucasia rather than go through Turkish Trebizond. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The great bulk of this trade went through Armenian hands, and Russians often referred to goods from Iran as armianskie tovary (Armenian goods). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Until the end of the nineteenth century, manufacture was carried out either in the more than four thousand artisanal workshops in cities and towns or in individual village households where women used time free from field and housework to make by hand the necessities of life. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Figures from 1888 show that 78 percent of workshops in Georgia were either occupied by a single craftsman or run with one assistant.8 The Making of the Georgian Nation
The economy of Tiflis gradually shifted from transit trade and small 117Emergence of Political Society 118 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE craft production to larger-scale industrial production, bringing new oppor- tunities for enterprising people to build their fortunes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Some capital invest- ment came from eager Russian merchants and even from foreigners, but the bulk of the new workshops and factories was built with local Armenian capital. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In 1870 the Russian tariff was introduced in the Caucasus, replacing the lower duties imposed six years earlier and creating a protected area in which infant industries could grow without serious competition from cheaper European goods. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When the fraud is very apparent, the Armenian often pays for his greed with all the blood that can be extracted from his jugular vein.12 The Making of the Georgian Nation
When one considers only the city of Tiflis, the Armenian presence is even more striking; about one-half of large enterprises and most of the largest were Armenian. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A Russian observer, S. Mak- simov, early in the 1870s echoed many other visitors: Trade in the Caucasus is entirely in the hands of clever and calculating Armenians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The law of 1866 represented the nadir of Armenian power in Tiflis in the nineteenth century and the most concerted attempt to shift municipal power from the Armenian merchants to the Georgian nobility. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The preponderance of power in the new duma lay with the few richest businessmen, who chose one-third of the assembly and from whose number the mayor was likely to emerge. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The “bourgeois” principle of representation based on economic status rather than on birth and soslovie helped the Armenian mokalake maintain his paramount place in the city even as demographic movements were reducing his relative weight in popula- tion. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From this perspective nationality does not possess an a priori, natural existence, but is the product of a particular cultural interven- tion by grammarians and philologists, historians and novelists, school- teachers and journalists. The Making of the Georgian Nation
“In distinction from the tendencies of the time of Vakhtang VI, when all attention was on the careful gathering of the legacy of centuries, on the preservation of traditions as they had come down to that time, the basic motif Emergence of Political Society 123 124 GEORGIA IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE of the epoch of Teimuraz and Iraklii was the restoration of ancient Georgian traditions and the establishment and purging from them of foreign influences and distortions. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The poetry of Chavchavadze lamented the lost past of Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The romantic themes of patriotism and nostalgia for a lost past were reflected in Baratashvili’s poem “bedi kartlisa” (Fate of Georgia), in which the poet reproduced the debate of Erekle II, penultimate king of Georgia, with an advisor who opposed the union with Russia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From this newly expanding educated group, with its close contact with Russia proper, a rival tendency emerged within the intelligentsia, soon to distinguish themselves as the “sons.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
After the heavy oppression imposed after 1848, here and there flashed the glow of dawn.”23 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Numbering about thirty in the early 1 860s, the Georgian students in St. Petersburg lived separately from the Russians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The majority, however, were convinced by the young writer Ilia Chavchavadze (1837—1907) to form separate Georgian, Armenian, Russian, and “Lezgin” organizations with strong ties among them.24 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Sympathizing with the views of the leaflet K molodomu pokoleniiu (To the Young Generation), Nikoladze and his friends joined other students in the demonstrations of September— October 1861. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As a child he had learned to love Georgian literature from his mother and to read his native language from a village clergyman. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He and his contemporary; poet Akaki Tsereteli, were the first important Georgian poets to shift from the patriotic romanticism of Orbeliani and Baratashvili to a less rhetorical, more critical realism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The way that commitment was manifested—whether in practical application of the princi- ples of reform or in alliance with the fledgling revolutionary opposition— deeply divided the Georgian intelligentsia during the years from the eman- cipation to the revolution. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But their energies were turned away from specifically political and economic activity to culture and education, journalism and literature. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Despite the first stirrings of romantic literature and the promotion I do not learn from the birds in flight, I listen to another voice. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But language—the knowledge of Georgian and the degree of fluency in Rus- sian—was a key to social and political mobility and to the degree of identity with one’s own people or the dominant nationality. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the result of state policy and legal discriminations, the percentage of schools that taught a local Caucasian language steadily declined and those that taught all subjects in Russian increased.29 The Making of the Georgian Nation
As early as 1860 Niko Nikoladze discerned this tendency in his first published article, “Do We Need the Georgian Lan- guage?” This painful question was addressed in the first influential and long-lived Georgian journal, tsiskani (Dawn), which appeared briefly from 1852 to 1853 under the editorship of playwright Giorgi Eristavi (1811—1864) and enjoyed a longer run (1857—1875) under Ivane Kereselidze (1829—1883). The Making of the Georgian Nation
From St. Petersburg Akaki Tsereteli, Giorgi Tsereteli (1842—1900), and Kiril Lordkipanidze wrote in support of Chavchavadze, signing their letters “tergdaleuli.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
From Chavchavadze’s journal I first learned of the existence of Belinskii, Dobroliubov, Proudhon, and Bastiat. The Making of the Georgian Nation
But the attraction of Western ideas and joint political action with the Russian intelligentsia proved divisive to the Caucasians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
After leaving St. Petersburg he went to study in Western Europe and became the first Georgian to receive a doctorate (in law) from a European university. The Making of the Georgian Nation
More radical than most of the tergdaleulni from which they had arisen, they were later referred to as the meore dasi, or “second generation,” of the Georgian intelligentsia. The Making of the Georgian Nation