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"U.S. Chopper Crashes in Afghanistan"

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Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Inside Bin Laden
Jihad vs. McWorld
Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Taliban
The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Terrorists
Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War

Opposed to the PDPA
regime are a number of mujahidin.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

American response was initially lukewarm. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Neumann prepared a policy review for the State Department in June 1971. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In this review he said, For the United States, Afghanistan has at the present limited direct interesr, it is not an important trading partner, it is not an access route for US trade with History and Political Traditions: The Monarch/ 15 16 Afghanistan others; it is not presently. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He told an American author that Daoud’s foreign policy did not cause any anxiety in Moscow and was not a factor in the latter’s downfalL This was also the view of Eliot’s political counsellor, Bruce Flatin. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The confrontational strategy began with the election ofJimmy Carter as American President, its principal architect was his national security adviser, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Developments in the area around Afghanistan particularly were taken into account by the Soviet leaders as they arrived at the decision to intervene. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Cyrus Vance wrote in his memoirs: ‘There were background news stories coming out of Washington to the effect that there was a possibility of some form of US military action against Iran.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Vance realized that ‘US military presence in the area would make a collapse of the Kabul regime more dangerous for the Soviets and thus enhance the possibility of Soviet intervention.’7 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Coming back to the specific point of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, it is significant that in the last week of December 1979, the Soviets were as apprehensive of an imminent American move into Iran as were the Americans of a probable Soviet push into Pakistan or iran from the vantage point of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The burden of Moscow’s carefully orchestrated articulations was that the United States was turning Nelson’s blind eye on the changes that had occurred to the global balance, that it was determined to take the world back to the wasted epoch of cold war, and that this exercise in muscle- flexing would fail because the Soviet Union had emerged as an equal of America and could not be cowed by threats of military superiority. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
More relevant to the situation immediately created by the Soviet military push into Afghanistan were the firmness and precision with which the Soviets reiterated their determination to defend the legiti- mate interests of national security and a fraternal revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘Nobody will intimidate the Soviet Union’, he declared. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This requires us, on the one hand, to remain firm in our resolve not to accept unprincipled compromises under pressure of military threats and violations, and, on the other hand, not to allow ourselves to be provoked into retaliatory measures which could harm the prospects of a peaceful solution.24 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘In the past two years’, stated the annual plan document, sixteen big projects ‘which have a major role in the growth of the national economy of the DRA~, were built with Soviet assistance and were now in operation. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Brezhnev declared in his first major statement after the military intervention that ‘the USSR will withdraw its military contingents from Afghanistan as soon as the reasons that caused their presence there disappear and the Afghan government decides that their presence is no longer necessary.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As Andropov told a Western interviewer on 1 April 1984, ‘We have a long common border, and it does make a difference to us what kind of Afghanistan it will be. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He received a cool reception. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On May 25, the Pakistan Foreign Minister was in Washington to obtain from the United States its concurrence with the principal outlines of the settlement. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It is known that there is an element within the Reagan administration that advocates US backing for a negotiated settlement. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
During the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives inJuly 1983, Selig Harrison declared that the USA appears to share some of the responsibility for the present slowdown in the negotiations. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
While the Government of Pakistan seemed to be bereft of new ideas and initiatives for settling the Afghan issue, its former foreign minister, Agha Shahi, suggested a quid pro quo between the two superpowers as a means of getting Soviet troops out of Afghanist2.n. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Begum Bhutto said that what was happening in Afghanistan was an internal affair of that country, Pakistan had no right to interfere. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Once we have accepted the British in principle as solicitors with the Amir till our political interests in Middle Asia do not clash with those of the British, the stronger is the authority of the Government of India in Kabul the easier it would be for us to achieve the safety of our interests and ful- filment of our demands. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
291.] Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
New York Times, loJune 1978.11. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
3. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
5)is mostly about the Panjsher Valley fighting. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Kabul New Times, 2-8 February 1983. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
93—36111 CIP To Sayd Bahauddin Ma/rub, Ghulam Ghaus Shujaee, Abdur Rahim Chinzay, Naheed Azadab, Aziz ur Rahman Ulfat, Ghulam Shah Sarshar Shamali, Sa’adat Shigaywal, Mohammad Wali Karokhel, and other Afghans who died for us in defending freedom and independence. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I acknowledge my special indebtedness to Kent Obee, director of the United States Information Service in the American embassy in Islamabad; Richard Hoagland, head of the American Center in Pes- hawar; and John Dixon, director of Afghan Section at the U.S. Informa- tion Agency in Washington, D.C. These three men made the Fuibright grant possible. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Pre- L mier Daoud had set as one of his principal tasks the settlement of the Pashtunistan issue. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He intended to ask the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev “whether Soviet subversive actions in Afghani- stan had received his sanction or were carried out without his knowl- edge.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
While addressing a group of university professors whom he had invited to dine with him, he assured them, “You professors may or may not be with us, but as long as I am alive I will never allow any foreign power to dominate our fatherland.”29 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The military regime in Pakistan, led by General Zia al-Haq, who came to power in 1977, and the religious regime in Iran, led by the Ayatullah Khomeini, who came to power in 1979, were grappling with serious problems. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Another “reason” was given more prominence in the Soviet official declarations. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On 14 February 1979 four followers of Baw’ess kidnapped U.S. Am- bassador Adolph Dubs and took him hostage in a hotel to pressure the government to release their leader. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Following the death of his mother, he left home and lived with his widowed mater- nal aunt. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Similarly, Rabbani states, “For us Islam is a driving force, which concerns every aspect of our life.”3’ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
While Afghanistan harbored the Pashtun and Baluch dissidents of Pakistan, the latter incited Afghan Islamists. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Olivier Roy states that Afghan Islamists decided to wage an armed struggle against the government of Daoud, but on this they were divided, and while the younger members stood for it with the support of Pakistan, Rabbani was against it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The patronized coalition did not prove effective in coordinating mili- tary activities. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Khalili says of himself, “I do not know what part of Afghanistan I am from; my father and grandfather would tell us we are from Ghazni. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Their attitude was changed not only toward the regime but also toward modern education and local leaders. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To forestall disturbances and to collect intelligence, KhAD directed a network of spies. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For Kabul, Logar and Shamali (districts south and north of Kabul, respectively) are important strategic regions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But,” added the minister, “if you really want to live in peace, cooperate with us, expel the rebels from your region, and pay your taxes, for which you will be granted local autonomy.”4 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
One further village we saw destroyed virtually before our eyes. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
When not allowed to do so, they would attack the village or residential forts. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet officer warned him that if he did not carry out the order, then he would be killed instead. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Hurriedly we left the village, but left one man behind us; he was wounded and we could not carry him out. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I have already commented on the fact that areas surrounding military garrisons and military posts had been mined. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and the Soviet Union’s Foreign Minister Edward Shevard- nadze were present as the coguarantors of the accords. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
President Najibullah was, however, unable to enjoy the fruits of vic- tory for long. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Let us turn now to the internal aspect of the coalition. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The economic deterioration is still more phenomenal. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Robert Oakley, the former U.S. ambassa- dor to Pakistan who was also concerned with Afghan affairs, holds that “the political future of Afghanistan is no longer of interest to the U.S.”133 This may or may not be the official line, but since the dissolution of the Soviet Union the U.S. administrations have shown no evidence to the contrar~ The United States and other powers have even forgotten about the part that Afghanistan played in the dissolution of the “evil empire” and the end of the cold war, events that made it possible for world gov- ernments to improve their economies for the first time in four decades.134 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
It is doubtful whether the United States and other major powers will effectively back the UN plan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Thus, the legacy of the Soviet war and the Western response to it is not only a ravaged Afghanistan without a functioning national govern- 300 ment but also a culture of guns, drugs, and terrorism that is as poison- ous to others as it is to Afghans. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
With the help of his followers he occupied the district of Darwaz for a while in 1975. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
K0sYGIN. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Iran and Pakistan have a common plan against us. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I ask you to help us. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
What political actions or statements would you like us to make? Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
KOSYGIN. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
TAiwu. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
34. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
29. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
arm and kill followers of the rival group. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Russians are in great difficulty; don’t shun resisting them” (Zadran, History of Afghanistan, 709—I z). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
103. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
135. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A Nation Is Dying, 1979—87. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
B. The Political Language of Islam. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Chicago: University of Chicago ~5S, 1988. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
U.S. Depart- ment of State Special Report no. 104, 1982. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
323, 324, 315 USSR. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to numerous friends, fellow journalists and observers for their views, suggestions and help. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Only a few weeks before, on 14 September, Hafizullah Amin, then prime minister, had deposed President Nur Mohammad Taraki following a bloody shoot-out at the Presidential Palace. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Too many people Introduction ‘7 Introduction are in jail for us to forget now’, a respected Afghan university lecturer told me. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Then he smiled and waved us on. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Searching for weapons, they frisked the passengers in a cursory manner but did not bother with us. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Astonished at the lack of a Soviet presence, we asked about their whereabouts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
We found a relatively modern but empty hotel that had obviously seen better days during the pre-1978 tourist boom which had provided Afghanistan with one of its main sources of hard currency. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Build-UP US satellite surveillance indicated abnormal Soviet military activity in the Central Asian republics bordering Afghanistan towards the end of November. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As suggested by the four to six Soviet divisions reportedly positioned in Western Afghanistan, as well as the 20-24 divisions along the southern Soviet border with Iran, it is against this country that the Soviet focus appears to be directed rather than against Pakistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It has also begun to assert greater influence among resistance organisations and may play a leading role in the years to come. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As compared with the US experience in Vietnam, the Kremlin has been much more restrained militarily and has only permitted a limited escalation of the war by raising its troop commitment from 85,000 men during the early stages to the present estimates. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But at dawn, some 300 armoured vehicles rumbled into the valley and surrounded the settlement of Dehe Sallah. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In one minor but revealing incident, Dupaigne’s bus overtook a Russian truck along the Salang Highway. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘They treat us like dogs rather than comrades’, remarked a disenchanted Khalqi army officer who fled in late 1983. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Now and again, one of his lieutenants would venture up to him. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The chief, his hands planted firmly on his knees, would listen gravely before bellowing forth yet another command. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In typical Afghan fashion, they immediately offered us cushions and the best positions on the worn but beautifully woven rugs before serving us with tea, sweets and cakes. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Observers who have travelled to the interior question claims by US officials that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is running a highly effective and ‘daring’ military assistance programme to the resistance, estimated at $325 million in early 1984. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
They have caused us some serious problems, but we have learned to cope with them. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Failing to crush us by force, as they have said they would with each offensive, they have turned their wrath on defenceless people, killing old men, women and children, destroying houses, and burning crops. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Once there, he and his fellow guerrillas sought to persuade the local inhabitants to take up arms against the Kabul regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
rocket launchers, each capable of firing 122mm projectiles in devastating salvos or ‘ripples’ totalling four and a half tonnes of explosives, had been positioned on the edge of the camp. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
hazard relationship that had existed in the region between the British and the Russians came to an end. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to John Evarts Homer, the US deputy chief of mission in Kabul from 1951 to 1953, the State Department showed ‘absolutely no interest in East- West relations’ in Afghanistan during this period. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
US-Soviet Competition Overall, the Russians had adopted a far more effective, and subtle, long- term approach than their American counterparts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Apart from major road construction in the south, many US develop- ment projects were less evident to the public eye: health programmes, education, Peace Corps volunteer work and agricultural reclamation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Some of these projects were also in conjunction with international aid programmes, thus displaying UN rather than US insignia. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Former US ambassador Robert Neuman noted that, although this co-operation was completely unofficial, it was good and effective. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Moscow was absorbing roughly 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s exports. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At any rate, in 1956, he was hired by the US embassy and AID mission in Kabul as a translator, but then established his own agency, the Nur Translations Bureau, while still pursuing a literary career. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Abdul Hadi, another teacher, recalled: ‘They were particularly angry because the governor of Kunar had previously called on us all to take up arms against the rebels, but we flatly refused.’ Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nabi turned away anyway and started to hurry toward the mosque. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
When, at the end of land distribution ceremonies, government officials invited farmers to spit on their expropriated landlords, many refused. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Those who plot against us in the dark will vanish in the dark’, maintained Taraki. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘We used to be questioned (by Afghans) but then they would take their papers with our answers into the next room where there were Russian advisers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
God is Great. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Join us. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
An inhuman The Communist Overlay regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
ents on th e e from the army. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Seventeen and eighteen year old pupils often complain to their teachers that there is little point in learning if they can be called up at any moment or can enter university without examinations if they join the announced that all 10th grade high school drop-outs who for grade certificates, while se from t ith rade could ent uni. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Only by doing this, they told us, could we evolve like the Soviets and emerge from our misery’, said a former high school student from Ghazni. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At one point, the Kremlin tried with UNESCO acquiescence to swamp one of its adult education programmes by sending 18 Soviet instructors to fill the salaried posts of six teachers designated by the Paris agency. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At one gathering in December 1983 outside the US embassy which was elaborately ‘guarded’ by visored riot police, shouting party mili- tants carried uniformly painted signs (all carefully collected at the end of the demonstration) with anti-American slogans condemning Washin- ton’s ‘imperialist occupation’ of Grenada. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘They only told us what they thought we needed to know’, said one senior engineer, who joined the resistance at the end of 1981. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
We thanked the women and bent down to pick up their offerings. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Even in war people must continue living’, noted one resistance commander from Kabul, ‘If the mujahideen 165 166 The Afghan Struggle can offer nothing, there is no doubt that the communists will do every- thing to fill the gap if they know it will break us. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Hekmatyar disclaims all responsibility for such attacks, either dis- owning them completely or maintaining that his supporters are not involved. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But this time armed Parchami militants, many of them students, blocked their path. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghan police accom- panied them but did not intervene. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, despite the gunning down of demonstrators, the Parchami authorities seemed to be making an effort not to act in the same manner as the Khalqis. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For over three hours, the chief and his lieutenants patiently explained their position. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Then the Afghan commander turned to us and said: ‘Now, you have asked your questions, let me ask mine.’ Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Meeting, sometimes secretly, with numerous commanders from the interior and refugee leaders, they claimed that local reaction was far beyond what they had expected. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
groups who regard the move as an effort to reassert Pushtun dominance, there appears to be increasingly widespread support for his The Afghan Struggle return. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In the summer of 1984 a group of Afghan resistance represent- atives arrived in Peshawar to test out the idea. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As de Bretagne recounted: As the Soviets advanced, we moved from one village to another, people carrying the medication and patients behind us. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
isation’ of the situation through complete suppression of the ‘counter- revolution’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Soviet refusal to consider a withdrawal so long as the present regime in Kabul cannot survive on its own also spells doom, at least for the time being, for the peace talks. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
239 240 Perspectives During the early 1980s, the search for a peaceful solution in the Middle East, US involvement in Central America, the Libyan interven- tion in Chad and even the invasion of Grenada tended to dominate America’s outlook in the world. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As a nation of immigrants, it also has the habit of responding to foreign policy along the lines of ethnic identities, be they Irish, Jewish or Pol~ _M..w” Afghanistan: The Soviet War
He has written mainly on refugees, politics, development and guerrilla movements, but has also collaborated on documentary films/news shows for European and American television on Angola, Ethiopia, the Iran-Iraq war, Afghani- stan and other issues. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
47,74, 75,101,104,108-10, ll5-l8passim, 122,123,125, 130, 136,138, 139, 149,226, 227,236 Afghan Information Centre, Peshawar 141 Afghan Millat 50 agreements, A.-Soviet 26, 104, 132-3, 152, 154-5, 157; Red Cross- Soviet 230 agriculture 34, 36, 49, 86, 87, 112, 154,160-1,165,185,242 AGSA 117, 118,121,122 Ahrnad, Col Sayed Gui 118 Ahmadzai, Gen. Shahpur Khan 106 AICF 224 aid 7,10,66-7,101,184,203~12, 2404; Soviet 22-3, 88-90,93-5, 104, 153-6, 158-60,242; US 8, 66-7,94-5,101,114,190,240-1, 244 airbases 25,40,44,61,73,93,94; see also Individual headings air bombardments 5, 6, 30,33-5 passlm, 37,42,44,45,60,81, 83-5,114,116,118,126.7164 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
6,16-17,25,28,32-5,40,42, 236 Sovietisation 135-61, 236-8 SSD 120, 122, 123 Stalin, Josef 89 strikes 176-8 passlm students 89, 91,92, 141-5, 147,151, 166, 177-80,218 subversion, Soviet 5,25,28, 35-6, 41-2, 187, 233, 243 Sultani Valley 9 Sunnis 10, 27,54, 196 supply routes 37-8, 634; see also caravans Sweden 211,216,242 Switzerland 229-32 passlm Tadjikistan, Soviet 116,156 Tadjiks 10, 54, 57,58, 66, 68, 133, 199,203; Soviet 145 Takhax province 2,42,66 talks, Geneva 82, 139,193,234,235; Soviet-mujahldeen 86 Tanaki, President Nun Mohammad 8,22,23,24,31,52,96-8,102, 103,105,106,110,116,117, 119,121,143,153,203 TASS 245 taxation 62,185-6, 198 Technoexport 154 Termez 15, 158, 159 Thiebolt, Mlchel 160 Third World 236,239 Tigré Relief CommIttee 212 torture 7, 117, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 170, 179,223 trade 159,207 traditionalist elements 55, 129, 1834 trail, Jihad 634 trainIng 66,68,76,78,79,93, 138, 225; in Soviet Union 63, 76, 93, 124, 130, 138, 141, 142, 147-8, 154,236,237 treaty, Afghan-SovIet (1921) 88, (1978) 26, 104,244; Afghan-US 90 trials, show 125 tribal elements 5, 10, 36, 54, 58, 69-70,78,97,131-3, 141,183, 184; MInistry of 124, 131-3 truces 132-3; Soviet-mujahIdeen 85-7 Tudeh party 29, 129, 20~ Turkestan 30 Turkey 92,93,208 209 Turkmens 46, 54, 133, 203, 208 TV 148,149,151,239 UNDP 120,147 UNESCO 7,146 UNHCR 7,203-5,208-10 passlm UNITA 68, 183,212,225 United Front for the Liberation of A. United Nations 8, 82, 94, 116, 139, 146-7, 153, 192, 193, 210, 238, 239, 243,244 United States 6,21, 22,25, 28, 29, 32, 34,42,66-7, 68,90,92,93, 94, 114, 120, 151, 184, 189, 190, 208,211,223,235,23940, 242-4 passlm , 248; and aid 8, 66-7, 94-5, 101, 114, 190,240-1; and Soviet Union 8,26,28,94, 235; American Centre 145; American Aid for A. 190 uranium 29, 154 urban warfare 59-60, 72-6, 125, 180,234 University, Free Afghan 242 Uzbeks 54,57, 66, 133, 203, 208; Soviet 145,156 Vachentko, Yourl 230 Venice summIt (1980) 40 Verstakov, Victor 247 Viet Cong 53 Vietnam 6,9,25, 34, 38,42, 53, 104, 110,208,223,225, 244 visits, to Soviet Union 138-9 194 Index Voice of America (VOA) 81, 148, 188, 189, 246 volunteer agencies 7, 10, 205-6, 242 Wakhan corridor 208-9 ‘Waltan Palanzaj’ 148 war: Indochina 225; Indo-Pakistan 100; Iraq-Iran 29, 201; World II 90 Wardak province 55, 172, 184 Wardak, Col Abdul Rahim 65 Wardak, Mohammed Amin 55, 172, 196 water, irrigation 152, 154-5 Wazinstan, Northern 39 Western interest 23841 wheat 160 Wikh-e-Zalmaiyan (Enlightened Youth) 91, 92, 98 withdrawal, Soviet 6, 40, 235, 240 women 164, 218-19; Democratic — Organisation of A. 140; education of 115; rights of 106 World Bank I53-Spassim, 158 World Food Programme 205 World Health Organization 146, 210, 217 Writers and Poets, Union of 140 Yemen, South 27, 120 Yepishev, Gen. Alexei 22 ‘Young Afghans’ 90, 91, 99 Young Muslims 166 youth 147-8, 237; see also students; Democratic Organisation of A. Youth 140 Yugoslavia 192 Zabiullab (mujahed commander) 54, 55, 156, 233 Zabul province 171, 229 Zahir Shah, King 90-1, 95, 100, 158, 166, 172, 194-5, 244 zakat 185-6 Zalmai (nephew of Amin) 14 Zariffar, Ahmed Kasim 147 Zia, Ahmad (Massoud’s brother) 78 Zia uI-Haq, President, 36, 206 259 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
BIN The Man Who Declared War on America YOSSEF BODANSKY An Imprint of Prima Publishing FORUM E 1(1 J%~I?’~I’~ Copyright © 1999, zooi by Yossef Bodansky All rights reserved. Inside Bin Laden
HV643o.B55B63 Inside Bin Laden
The U.S. Embassy Bombings 10. Inside Bin Laden
Contemporary terrorism has become a direct threat to all Americans as it casts its ominous shadow worldwide. Inside Bin Laden
Additional details of Islamist networks in the Horn of Africa and East Africa reveal how terrorist-sponsoring nations made inevitable the armed clash with American forces in Somalia. Inside Bin Laden
Successful, the terrorist groups continued their ways and expanded their efforts from the Balkans to the Philippines—with the continued support of Tehran, Khartoum, and Islamabad. Inside Bin Laden
His reports were prescient in anticipating terrorist activities and threats against America and its allies. Inside Bin Laden
The Task Force has been an independent voice in alerting the U.S. government to these threats. Inside Bin Laden
. Inside Bin Laden
In this book Bodansky breaks new ground in the study of international terrorism’. Inside Bin Laden
The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, were neither the first nor the most lethal Islamist terrorist strikes aimed at America and Americans. Inside Bin Laden
Ix • INTRODUCTION: THE INEVITABLE STRUGGLE x being the source of all crises and trouble afflicting the Muslim world. Inside Bin Laden
The Islamists’ criticism of the American way of life has been scathing. Inside Bin Laden
For a while, it seemed that triumph was at hand. Inside Bin Laden
And in the pursuit of their righteous goals, they are ready to punish the U.S.-led West for constituting an insurmountable challenge, for standing in their way by the mere existence of its values and affluence. Inside Bin Laden
Osama bin Laden continues to top the U.S. government’s list of terror- ism and security threats, as CIA director George Tenet stressed in testi- mony on February z, 1999, to the Senate. Inside Bin Laden
Director Tenet stated, “First, there is not the slightest doubt that Osama bin Laden, his worldwide allies, and his sympathizers are planning further attacks against us. Inside Bin Laden
Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America is largely based on extensive indigenous source material I obtained from the Islamists, XX “Afghans,” and terrorist organizations. Inside Bin Laden
These dedicated commanders in turn lead thousands of terrorists in a relentless and uncompromising holy war against the United States and the West as a whole. Inside Bin Laden
In November 1979, after the Iranian revolution, a group of Iran’s unofficial intelligence service, with the support of the country’s elite and the KGB, had seized the U.S. Embassy and taken sixty-three Amer- icans hostage, demanding U.S. disengagement and withdrawal from the re- gion and the return of frozen funds for the hostages’ release. Inside Bin Laden
If the Arab world entertained any hopes after the Soviets invaded Af- ghanistan that the United States would save it in case of further Soviet en- croachment, these hopes were soon dispelled. Inside Bin Laden
The United States’ aborted rescue attempt in Iran on the night of April 24 to 25, 1980, demonstrated Arab vulnerability. Inside Bin Laden
Elite U.S. forces attempted to rescue the American hostages, held by Iranian militants in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Inside Bin Laden
The same approach was used to transform the nationalist insurgency in Kashmir, India, into an ISI-dominated Islamist force. Inside Bin Laden
This was a deliberate, carefully consid- ered policy that we steadfastly refused to change despite mounting pressure from the CIA, and later from the U.S. Defense Department, to allow them to take over.” Inside Bin Laden
Enjoying massive support from the highest levels of government in Islamabad, the ISI was even able to unilaterally impose limitations and other restrictions on visits by CIA and other U.S. officials to mujahideen training camps although the U.S. govern- ment was financing them through the CIA. Inside Bin Laden
Brigadier Yousaf emphasized that the ISI was the sole provider of training in Pakistan and Afghanistan and that “no American or Chinese in- structor was ever involved in giving training on any kind of weapon or equipment to the mujahideen. Inside Bin Laden
THE RADICALIZATION OF AN ENGINEER I~ i8 . Inside Bin Laden
The reason Pakistan and the IS! Inside Bin Laden
“He was a hero to us because he was always on the front line, always moving ahead of everyone else,” recalled Hamza Muhammad, a Palestinian volunteer in Afghanistan who now manages one of bin Laden’s construction projects in Sudan. Inside Bin Laden
On August 17, 1988, Pakistani president Zia-ul-Haq, along with U.S. ambassador Arnold Raphel, the U.S. military attaché, ISI chief General Akhtar Abdul Rahman, and twenty-eight others were killed when the C- I3oB Hercules they had just taken off in suddenly crashed. Inside Bin Laden
An infuriated Azzam began speaking up. Inside Bin Laden
But Osama bin Laden was ignored. Inside Bin Laden
A coherent strategy for the Islamist struggle for Somalia was emerging. Inside Bin Laden
VIII . Jihad vs. McWorld
Neither race nor soul offers us a future that is other than bleak, neither promises a polity that is remotely democratic. Jihad vs. McWorld
When the Hilton came to the Hills of Buda, a local architect grafted the new structure onto a thirteenth-century monastery. Jihad vs. McWorld
Yet however American cars are in concept, they are hardly Amer- ican in their manufacture whether measured by parts, design, or even labor. Jihad vs. McWorld
Leave us alone! Jihad vs. McWorld
Let us do what producers and consumers do: sell, buy, produce, consume. Jihad vs. McWorld
The Resource Imperative As recently as 1960, the United States imported only a handful of minerals such as aluminum, manganese, nickel, and tin. Jihad vs. McWorld
The sharp and sudden deterioration in America’s resource inde- pendence produced by this juxtaposition is evident from U.S. baux- ite figures. Jihad vs. McWorld
Bauxite is the source of aluminum and a crucial element in industrialization, not least of all in its war-making moment. Jihad vs. McWorld
That is the irony of mod- ernization, described by modernity’s first incisive critic, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Jihad vs. McWorld
Rousseau had seen that the power given us by science and technology to gratify our needs actually compounds and multiplies them so that as our power increases our satisfaction diminishes. Jihad vs. McWorld
The only non-European, non—Pacific Rim countries among the top twenty-five U.S. export markets are its Latin American neighbors (with whom America also runs trade deficits): Brazil at number 17 and Venezuela at number 20. Jihad vs. McWorld
There may be radical The Industrial Sector and the Rise of the East • Ranking as Supplier (US. Jihad vs. McWorld
importsftom,) 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 I0 Ranking as Export Market (US. Jihad vs. McWorld
Among the top twenty-five U.S. companies (for 1992) with the largest non-U.S. Jihad vs. McWorld
Merchandising is as much about symbols as about goods and sells not life’s necessities but life’s styles—which is the modern pathway that takes us from the body to the soul. Jihad vs. McWorld
Brand names are tiphers for associations and images carefully cul- tivated by advertising and marketing because they are what generate market demand. Jihad vs. McWorld
Nike is not trying to export sneakers (a limited market, the corporation acknowledges), it is trying to export Michael Jordan who, Chairman Knight assures us, is tied for first place in 66 THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD China as the world’s greatest man with Chou En-lai (an astonishing comparison that, from the viewpoint of sales, is apparently nonethe- less worth flaunting!). Jihad vs. McWorld
By 1980, the U.S. share had fallen to ~6 percent while Japan’s share had risen to 40 percent. Jihad vs. McWorld
They say they don’t have any artistic or cultural inputs. Jihad vs. McWorld
The table for McWorld has been set by Hollywood. Jihad vs. McWorld
There are apparent exceptions to the growing American hege- mony. Jihad vs. McWorld
Yet only these latter envi- ronments elicit active and engaged public behavior and ask us to define ourselves as autonomous members of civic communities Hollyworid: Mc World’s Videology 97 marked by culture or religion or other public values. Jihad vs. McWorld
McWorld calls on us to see ourselves as private and solitary, inter- acting primarily via commercial transactions where “me” displaces “we”; and it permits private corporations whose only interest is their revenue stream to define by default the public goods of the individu- als and communities they serve. Jihad vs. McWorld
Hollyworld: McWorld~s Videology . Jihad vs. McWorld
To create the cultural values necessary to material consumption is McWorld’s first operating imperative. Jihad vs. McWorld
The supposed explosion of media outlets via cable and fiber optics has created an incentive for government to excuse itself from the messy business of regulation. Jihad vs. McWorld
Consumption takes us as it fmds us, the more impulsive and greedy, the better. Jihad vs. McWorld
Government, federal and local, with responsibility for public education once took it upon itself (back when “itself” was “us”) to even up the market and lend a hand to our better selves. Jihad vs. McWorld
ground, a community center, a museum of living facts, and a showplace of beauty and magic. Jihad vs. McWorld
McWorld as Marketland is, however, not a natural entity imagi- neered by some benevolent deity It is fabricated and it is owned, and how it is owned tells us a great deal about its nature. Jihad vs. McWorld
Margo L. Vignola, a media ai4alyst at Salomon Brothers, smartly noticed that it was a “paucity of creative talent and product available and an enormous amount of technology chasing it” that ultimately 140 THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD Date 1966 1982 1985 1985 1986 1988 1989 1989 1990 Who Owns Mc World? The Media Merger Frenzy ‘4’ Paramount (first round) Columbia Pictures Fox Broadcasting MGM/United Artists NBC Network (RCA) CBS Records Columbia Pictures Warner Communications (Warner Bros. Jihad vs. McWorld
Everyone wants it.”6 Jihad vs. McWorld
This lugubrious conclusion brings us back to the same questions raised in the previous section by the impact of economic markets generally in McWorld. Jihad vs. McWorld
I0 H UMAN BEINGS are so psychologically needy, so dependent on community, so full of yearning for a blood brotherhood com- brings us to the crucial question of nationalism, and its role in the struggle of Jihad versus McWorld. Jihad vs. McWorld
Market liberals of Milton Friedman’s or Jeffrey Sachs’s persuasion have assured us that the two cannot be uncoupled in the long run, but the long run here may be several lifetimes—far too long to sustain the credibility of their argument.’ Jihad vs. McWorld
Pat Buchanan tells the Republican National Convention in 1992 that the country faces a cultural war for its very survival and victori,çus Republicans following the 1994 elec- tions accuse Preskdent Clinton of countercultural and un-American attitudes. Jihad vs. McWorld
But as McWorld is “other” to Jihad, so jihad is “other” to McWorld. Jihad vs. McWorld
It is the job of civil society and democratic government and not of the market to look after common interests and make sure that those who profit from the common planet pay its common proprietors their fair share. Jihad vs. McWorld
Multinationals cannot be blamed for promoting high profits at the price of high unemployment or sacrificing the local environment to the economic benefits of free trade. Jihad vs. McWorld
When I choose to buy a car, I choose to get from here to there efficiently and perhaps pleasantly; however, among the consequences of my choice may be air pollution, resource depletion, the disadvantaging of public trans- portation, pressure on hospital facilities, and the despoilation of the natural environment by a highway system. Jihad vs. McWorld
Even within nation-states, we are eschewing the tools we have. Jihad vs. McWorld
The dogmas of laissez-faire capitalism that have suffused the politics of America and Europe in the last few decades have been reinforced by the resentments of an alienated electorate that has lost confidence in its own democratic institutions; together, they have persuaded us that our democratic governments neither belong to us nor function usefully either to limit markets or to help them work. Jihad vs. McWorld
If laissez-faire ideology has made it this difficult to conjure up a noncollectivist democracy, how can a transnational democratic polity ever be imagined? Even if we could overcome our political dif- fidence, which mechanisms might afford us the chance as citizens to undo the inadvertent evils of global markets? The eclipse of the national “we” in the shadows of both Jihad and McWorld is trouble enough. Jihad vs. McWorld
256 JIHAD VS. Jihad vs. McWorld
The old Baconian dictum that knowledge is power and that through science we can command the world, the belief that the improvement of men’s minds and the improvement of his lot are finally the very same thing, was at the heart of the Enlightenment’s conviction that reason embodied in science and technology could liberate the human race from prejudice, ignorance, and injustice-- could eventually liberate all women and men and democratize their social institutions. Jihad vs. McWorld
The history of science and technology is at best a history of ambiva- lence. Jihad vs. McWorld
Their aim is to stay competitive with infotainment companies like Time Warner. Jihad vs. McWorld
Not so long ago, the prescient historian J. G. A. Pocock suggested that [today we find] ourselves in a post-industrial and post-modern world in which more and more of us were consumers of informa- tion and fewer and fewer of us producers or possessors of any- thing, including our own identities.’When Jihad vs. McWorld
These include traditionalist advocates of the moral Jihad against the West’s consumer culture, like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn or his more militant Islamic brethren as well as some of Jihad’s harshest critics like Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has blamed the temptations of tribalism on the West’s “permissive cornucopia” that breeds materialist self-gratification and a “dominant cultural reality” defmed by the “dyn~mic escal~ttion of desire for sensual and material pleasure.”9 Jihad vs. McWorld
Civil society, or civic space, occupies the middle ground between government and the private sector. Jihad vs. McWorld
Their first priority surely must be the reconstruction of civil society as a framework for the reinven- tion of democratic citizenship, a mediating third domain between the overgrown but increasingly ineffective state governmental and the metastasizing private market sectors. Jihad vs. McWorld
Civil society offers us a single civic identity that, belonging neither to state bureaucrats nor private consumers but to citizens alone, recouples rights and responsibilities and allows us to take control of our gov- ernments and our markets. Jihad vs. McWorld
Technology may permit us to reconstruct electronic wards and teleassemblies linking together distant neighbors. Jihad vs. McWorld
Admirers of Milton Friedman’s version of unrestrained capitalism would like us to think that markets are surrogates for democratic sovereignty because they permit us to “vote” with our dollars or D-Marks or yen.9 Jihad vs. McWorld
McWorld has virtues then, but they scarcely warrant permitting the market to become sovereign over politics, culture, and civil soci- ety Jihad too has virtues which, I acknowledge, may be less than easily discernible in light of my harsh criticism of parochialism’s abuses. Jihad vs. McWorld
Nonetheless, as Robert Bellah and his colleagues demon- strate in their study of America’s yearning for community (Habits of the Heart), and as Michael Sandel shows with acute historical insight in his recent tribute to Democracy’s Discontents, the alienating material forces of McWorld leave us seeking forms of conm!union Jihad vs. McWorld
I have much less sympathy for those who read only one or another section of the book and concluded, lazily, that I must be writing either about McWorld alone or Jihad alone. Jihad vs. McWorld
5. Jihad vs. McWorld
For 1985—88, Argentina’s spending averaged $27.5 Jihad vs. McWorld
tics, ~D. Jihad vs. McWorld
West Germany with 102 deals was the chief culprit, but the US., Jihad vs. McWorld
American farms employ less than 2.5 Jihad vs. McWorld
Recycling can make a difference. Jihad vs. McWorld
Chapter3. Jihad vs. McWorld
27. Jihad vs. McWorld
Figures from Anthony de Palma, “Mexico’s Hunger for US. Jihad vs. McWorld
Roger Cohen, “Europeans Back French Curbs on U.S. Movies,” The Yew2. Jihad vs. McWorld
I will not try here to rehearse the thoughtful critique of television that has been offered by social critics such as Marshall McLuhan, Neil Postman, or Todd Gitlin. Jihad vs. McWorld
McDonald’s 1992 U.S. sales were $13.2 Jihad vs. McWorld
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Yationalism (London: Verso, 1991). Jihad vs. McWorld
We are not facing the global, social, ecological and cultural challenges that confront us. Jihad vs. McWorld
Cited by Nicholas D. Kristof, “China Sees ‘Market-Leninism’ a Way to2. Jihad vs. McWorld
There are, Greenfeld reminds us, 25 mil- lion Japanese between the ages of fifteen and thirty They are “the chil- dren of the industrialists, executives and laborers who built Japan Inc.” and they are “as accustomed to hamburgers as to rice balls and are often more adept at folding a bundle of cocaine or heroin than creasing an origami crane.” Jihad vs. McWorld
Chapter 15. Jihad vs. McWorld
Kuttner notices, of course, that “oddly enough, for a decade the US. Jihad vs. McWorld
Supporters played on Kohl’s name, which means both cabbage and cash in German, by shouting “Keine Kohl ohne Kohl”—no cash without Kohl. Jihad vs. McWorld
Municipalities are left with only those programs that run at a loss. Jihad vs. McWorld
Geographia Ltd., Jihad vs. McWorld
I05~ Jihad in, ig6, 197, 198, 202 Huntington, Samuel P, 299 hydroelectric power, 39 IBM, 27, 74, 126 Ignatiefl Michael, 165, 167, 171 IKEA, 57—58 Iliescu, Ion, 202 images: and advertising, 61—63, 67, 69 imperialism, 167 India, i8, 184, 191; advertising in, 62; and confederalism, 289; and economic issues, 35, 55; infotain- ment in, 90, 94, 103, 405, io8; and resources, 43, 44, 47, 48 Indonesia, 70, 90, 91, i8~, 187, 191 industrialism, 50—58 infantilism, 93 infomercials, 64—65, 8~—86, 146 information superhighway: access to, 448; aims of, ioo—Ioi; and con- glomerates, 273; and democracy, iso; and hard goods-service sector interaction, 74; and mergers, 149, iso; power on, 74; public voice in development of, 272; and televi- sion, ioi; “universal service” on, 449; uses of, 269—70 infotainment: American domination of, 76, 82—83; and consumption, i~ and defeat of Jihad, 82—83; and democracy, 268, 273, 291—92; and hard goods, 72; impact of, 32, 82—83; and mergers, 85—87, 137—51; and narrowing ownership Index • of telesector, 297; as part of ser- vice sector; 79—87; and postmod- em capitalism, 59—60; power of, 8~8i; and religion, 83; and soul, 79. Jihad vs. McWorld
See also QVC Hong Kong, ~, io8 Horkheimer, 297 Houston Industries, 273 Howe, Irving, 296 Huizenga, H. Wayne, 132—33, 145, 146 Hungary, 162, 266; economic issues in, 240, 248; infotainment in, 90—9!, Jihad vs. McWorld
See also Soviet Union Rutgers University; 6i, 6g Rwanda, 8, 17—18 Saatchi & Saatchi, 6, Sachs, Jeffrey, 239—40, 248 Said, Edward W, 209 Samuelson, Robert J., 28 Saroyan, William, 162—63 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 123 satellite transmissions: and Ameri- canization of global television, 102—4; banning of, 82—83, i88—8g, 207, 227, 270; in China, i88—8g, 207; and defeat of Jihad, 82—83; and infotainment, 9!, Jihad vs. McWorld
See also spec~fic topic Universal City Studios, 142 Universal Pictures, 141 University of Chicago, 234 US West, 142, 273 USA network, 144 USA Today, 89 Uzbekistan, 44, 46, 48 values. Jihad vs. McWorld
M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 12 No. 6 had any originality. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
I say, because history and daily events show us very clearly that those Muslim countries and nations who are brought under the sway of the rule of unbeievers and have lost their national and territorial independence to the oppressive colonialists have no free- dom of religion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It has brought us together. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Afghan people fear both communism and the Soviets. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
First, the mujahidin leadership has been accused of con- nections with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and there- fore of representing Western imperialist interests.t Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
the importance of the “revolution” and rebellions will become more evident to the West. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Daoud had been prime minister from 1953 to 1963 (pp. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
MARXIST REGIMES AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE REVOLUTION 61 major changes in his government), when Mir Akbar Khaybar, a well- known Parcham ideologue (and former high-ranking police officer), was murdered by persons unknown.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
A joke in Moscow among intellectuals in 1981: Probably the Soviets planned a Dominican Republic-type opera- The Soviets have never been completely successful in the “Rus- Question: “Why are we still in Afghanistan?” Answer: “We’re still looking for the people who invited us in.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Although a number of men in Darra-i Nur were potential leaders Second, highland leaders were skillful at negotiating village Finally, during the Muhammadzai period highland leaders had a In contrast, politics in the lower valley had been confrontational THE REBELLION IN DARRA-I NUR 133 not more important questions stand out: (1) What can an understand- ing of the rebellion in Darra-i Nur tell us about rebellions in other areas of Afghanistan? (2) What relevancy does such an understanding have for theoretical issues in political anthropology? and (3) What are the implications of the rebellion in Darra-i Nur for the current theoret- ical debate among social scientists concerning the nature and causes of peasant insurrections in agrarian societies? Answering such questions in detail would take us beyond the limits of this essay, but I feel that the analysis developed here makes a start. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
a village in Jurm district. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Confusion was clearly felt especially among peasants who owned land; for many of them the weakening of ethnic loyalties paralleled a breakup of family ties and a general decline in religiosity and seemed to forecast the end of the world. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghan identifications with Islam have obscurities for observers who frequently, sometimes explicitly, attribute the obscurity to Afghans themselves as insincere or fana- tical or both by highlighting the more accessible fact that Afghans make such charges against each other. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The honor of the nation would be lost. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Conservative aversion in- creased as Habibullah’s son, King Amanullah (1919-29), attempted to institutionalize reforms for women. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
MOBILIZING AFGHAN WOMEN AFTER THE SAUR REVOLUTION: the new government. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
“No one shall engage a girl or give her in marriage in NANCY HATCH DUPREE 322 change, the issue of prestige cannot be discounted when considering the well-being of brides. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Babrak, but Dr. Anahita was the main speaker. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Stork, Joe. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Price and C. G. Rosberg. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustra- tions, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Taliban
10 9 U.S. office sales.press@yale.edu Taliban
Since late 1995, Washington had strongly backed the US company Unocal to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan across Tali- ban-controlled Afghanistan. Taliban
For a year I had been trying to discover what Interests an Argentinean company, unknown in this part of the world, had in investing in such a high-risk place as Afghanistan. Taliban
From 1956 to 78 the Soviet Union gave a total of US$1.26 Taliban
The Afghan Mujaheddin were to become the US-backed, anti-Soviet shock troops. Taliban
million people and devastated the country. Taliban
‘We would sit for a long time to discuss how to change the terrible situation. Taliban
He was the first amongst equals and we gave him the power to lead us and he has given us the power and authority to deal with people’s problems,’ said Mullah Hassan. Taliban
‘We took up arms to achieve the aims of the Afghan jihad and save our people from further suffering at the hands of the so-called Mujaheddin. Taliban
As success came, another tin trunk was added — this one containing US dollars. Taliban
to funnel US arms to the Mujaheddin, left Quetta with 80 Pakistani ex-army drivers. Taliban
Iran developed an air bridge from Meshad in eastern Iran to Bagram, where it flew in arms supplies. Taliban
The US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel arrived in Islaniabad to review US policy towards Afghanistan. Taliban
Starting on 19 April 1996, Raphel visited the three power centres of Kabul, Kand- ahar and Mazar-e-Sharif and later three Central Asian capitals. Taliban
The US moved on other fronts. Taliban
The US Congress had authorised a covert US$20 million budget for the CIA to destabilize Iran, and Tehran had accused Wash- ington of funnelling some of these funds to the Taliban - a charge that was always denied by Washington. Taliban
Moreover the US remained sceptical that the Taliban would conquer Kabul in the near future. Taliban
Washington also courted the other warlords. Taliban
US reluctance to support the Taliban was also influenced by Pakistan’s failure in creating an anti-Rabbani alliance. Taliban
He became one of the young Islamic opponents of the regime of President Daud and fled to Pakistan in 1975, after he led a failed uprising in the Panjshir. Taliban
‘The Taliban took five months to capture one province but then six provinces fell to us in only ten days. Taliban
On the way to Termez on the Uzbekistan-.Afghanistan Taliban
Powerful US feminist groups lobbied Washington on behalf of Afghan women. Taliban
It was now becoming difficult for the Clinton administration to main- tain its initial sympathy for the Taliban. Taliban
They had been instrumental in defeating the Taliban in Mazar in May and again in October 1997. Taliban
A hearing in the US Senate on the Afghan gender issue attracted widespread publicity, as did condem- nation of the Taliban’s policies by such luminaries as Hillary Clinton. Taliban
For several months they squabbled with each other as to who qualified to be an ulema. Taliban
The UN mustered the help of the US. Taliban
Both sides were trying to woo the US and the flamboyant Richardson received a rapturous reception. Taliban
In Kabul the Taliban allowed the accompanying US TV crews to film their leaders for the first time and, as a courtesy to Richardson, they postponed their regular Friday public spectacle of lash- ings and amputations in the city’s football stadium. Taliban
‘This is an organization that hands out edicts to us that prevents us from doing our job,’ he said. Taliban
The Taliban must know that not only is there a limit to what you can stand but that there are growing pressures on us — in particular from the donor community to say that there’s a limit.” Taliban
Mullah Niazi, the commander who had ordered Najibullah’s murder was appointed Gov- ernor of Mazar and within hours of taking the city, Taliban mullahs were proclaiming from the city’s mosques that the city’s Shia had three cho- ices — convert to Sunni Islam, leave for Shia Iran or die. Taliban
All prayer ser- vices conducted by the Shia in mosques were banned. Taliban
It was the Taliban victory, their control over most of Afghanistan and their expectation, fuelled by Pakistani officials that they would now receive international recognition, which partly prompted their guest, the Saudi dissident Osama Bin Laden, to become bolder in his declared jihad against the US and the Saudi Royal family. Taliban
On 7 August 1998, Bin Laden’s sympathizers blew up the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people and wounding 4,500. Taliban
This prompted the US to launch missile strikes on Bin Laden’s training camps in north-eastern Afghanis- tan on 20 August 1998. Taliban
The US claimed that Bin Laden had been present but escaped the attack. Taliban
The Taliban were outraged and organized demonstrations in Afghan cities to protest against the attacks. Taliban
The Taliban offensive, the massacre of Hazaras and the confrontation with Iran, along with the US cruise-missile attack dramatically under- mined the fragile balance of power in the region. Taliban
The consequences of the regional escalation were enormous: there was the danger of a war between Iran and the Taliban, which could also suck in Pakistan on the side of the Taliban; Western investors and oil compan- ies became wary of further investments in the oil-rich Caspian nations; the danger of Islamic fundamentalism spreading to the already economic- ally impoverished Central Asian states increased and anti-US feeling across the region escalated; Pakistan became more deeply polarized as Islamic parties demanded Islamicization. Taliban
The Resolution threatened unspecified sanctions against the Taliban for har- bouring international terrorists, violating human rights, promoting drugs trafficking and refusing to accept a cease-fire. Taliban
Increasing pressure by the UN, the US and other states forced both sides back to the negotiating table in early 1999. Taliban
The money market shut down in protest for several days as the ‘Afghani’ plummeted against the US dollar. Taliban
International efforts by the US, Russia and the regional states to coor- dinate anti-terrorism measures were stepped up. Taliban
When the government launched a crackdown against the SSP in 1998 after hundreds of Shia had been massacred by the SSP, their leaders fled to Kabul where they were offered sanctuary. Taliban
For the first time, the JUl developed international prestige and influence as a major patron of Islamic radicalism. Taliban
For us consultation is not necessary. Taliban
The Kabul Supreme Court handles about 40 cases a week and comprises eight departments which deal with laws related to commerce, business, criminal and public law, but it clearly does not have the same powers as the Kanda- bar Supreme Court. Taliban
‘The Taliban had promised peace, instead they have given us nothing but war,’ said one village elder.8 Taliban
Meanwhile the simmering differences between the Shuras in Kandahar and Kabul escalated dramatically in April 1998 after the visit of the US envoy Bill Richardson to Kabul. Taliban
Like so many mullahs and despite his size, he is surprisingly soft-spoken and I strained to catch his words. Taliban
Children were caught up in the war on a greater scale than in any other civil conflict in the world. Taliban
They insisted that it was up to the West to moderate their position and accommodate the Taliban, rather than that the Taliban recognize univer- sal human rights. Taliban
In May 1997 the religious police beat up five female staff of the US NGO Care International and then demanded that all aid projects receive clearance from not just the relevant ministry, but also from the Ministeries of Interior, Public Health, Police and the Department of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Taliban
‘The Taliban have brought us secur- ity so we can grow our poppy in peace. Taliban
‘Drugs are evil and we would like to substitute poppies with another cash crop, but it’s not possible at the moment, because we do not have international recognition.’ Taliban
When they first captured Kandahar they had declared they would eliminate all drugs and US diplomats were encouraged enough by the announcement to make immediate contact with the Taliban. Taliban
per cent remained in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the hands of dealers, while 5 per cent was spent in the countries through which the heroin passed while en route to the West. Taliban
By 1997, UNDCP and the US HIGH ON HEROIN: DRUGS AND THE TALIBAN ECONOMY 119 120 estimated that 96 per cent of Afghan heroin came from areas under Tali- ban co~itrol. Taliban
The explosion in heroin production began ironically not in Afghanis- tan but in Pakistan. Taliban
The US street value of just these two caches was US$600 million dollars, equivalent to the total amount of US aid to Pakistan that year. Taliban
The US Drugs Enforcement Administration (DEA) had 17 full-time officers in Pakistan during the 1980s, who identified 40 major heroin syn- dicates, including some headed by top government officials. Taliban
It was only after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that US and Western pressure began to mount on Islamabad to curtail the production of opium in Pakistan. Taliban
In February 1998 the Clin- ton administration accused Islamabad of doing little to curb production and exports of heroin. Taliban
Pakistan was slipping back into bad habits. Taliban
The Taliban’s appetite for foreign investment had been first wetted by the competition between two oil companies, Bridas of Argentina and the US company Unocal, who were competing for influence with the Taliban in order to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan across southern Afghanistan (see Chapters 12 and 13). Taliban
In 1998 the economic situation visibly worsened. Taliban
million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and 1.4 Taliban
This reflected the improved law and order in rural areas under Taliban control, the lack of fighting and the return of refugees to farm their lands. Taliban
Although there are still 1.2 Taliban
In camps near Peshawar and in Afghanistan, these radicals met each other for the first time and studied, trained and fought together. Taliban
A decade later the Makhtab would emerge at the centre of a web of radical organizations that helped carry out the World Trade Centre bombing and the bombings of US Embassies in Africa in 1998. Taliban
Ahmed Shah Masud later criticized the Arab-Afghans. Taliban
When my faction entered Kabul in 1992, the Arab-Afghans fought in the ranks of Hikmetyar’s TALIBAN forces against us. Taliban
‘My jihad fac- tion did not have good relations with the Arab-Afghans during the years of jihad. Taliban
In contrast they had very good relations with the factions of Abdul Rasul Say’yef and Gulbuddin Hikmetyar. Taliban
The US activity in Peshawar helped persuade Bin Laden to move to the safer confines of Kandahar. Taliban
The Americans enlisted Afghans and Pakistanis to help them but aborted the operation. Taliban
However, it was the bombings in August 1998 of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 220 people which made Bin Laden a household name in the Muslim world and the West. Taliban
TALIBAN Laden’s capture. Taliban
The Americans were further galvanized when Bin Laden claimed that it was his Islamic duty to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons to use against the USA. Taliban
Bin Laden’s former associates describe him as deeply impressionable, always in the need for mentors — men who knew more about both Islam and the modem world than he did. Taliban
After the Africa bombings the US launched a truely global operation. Taliban
More than 80 Islamic militants were arrested in a dozen different coun- tries. Taliban
The US was Pakistan’s closest ally with deep links to the military and the IS!. Taliban
The Saudi conundrum was even worse. Taliban
After the August 1998 Africa bombings, US pressure on the Saudis increased. Taliban
In their meeting, Mullah Omar refuse to d~ so and then insulted Prince Turki by abusing the Saudi Rova Family. Taliban
Prince Turki visited Kandabar again, this time to persuade the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden. Taliban
The US State Department opened a satellite telephone connection to speak to Mullah Omar directly. Taliban
The Afghanistan desk officers, helped by a Pushto translator, held lengthy conversations with Omar in which both sides explored various options, but to no avail.25 Taliban
They began to hold talks with Western oil companies, on the back of ongoing negotiations between Kazakhstan and the US company Chevron. Taliban
billion. Taliban
That pipeline never got built and subsequently saw several variations as the US tried to block any route through Iran. Taliban
On the drawing boards in 1994 were plans for a 5,000-mile-long oil and gas pipeline eastwards to China that would cost over US$20 bil- lion, but the project is still only in the feasibility stage.’3 Taliban
By 1998 it was clear that US plans to develop the Afghanistan route would be delayed and so the Baku-Ceyhan corridor became the main plank of Washington’s policy towards the Caspian region. Taliban
The controversy over Baku-Ceyhan raged on for two years until late 153DICTATORS AND OIL BARONS 154 TALIBAN 1998 when international oil prices crashed because of the slump in demand due to the Asian economic crisis. Taliban
Turkey and Israel had developed close military and strategic ties after the 1993 Oslo Accords. Taliban
But as US policy towards the Taliban shifted so did Israel’s, as the Taliban gave refuge to Bin Laden and encouraged the drugs trade. Taliban
In exchange Iran allowed companies to lift oil from Iranian ports on the Gulf. Taliban
Since 1998 crude from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan has been transported across the Caspian Sea to Iran’s Casp- ian port of Neka, where it is refined and consumed in Iran. Taliban
In the first phase of its programme, Iran proposed swapping its crude oil with Central Asian crude. Taliban
The USA now wants stability, for it is concerned about the repercus- sions of the continuing Afghan war on its own policies in Central Asia. Taliban
By February 1996 Bulghreoni reported to Bhutto and Niyazov that ‘agreements have been reached and signed with the warlords which assure us a right of way’.5 Taliban
Niyazov was a communist-style dictator who had little understanding or interest in international law and contracts. Taliban
But there were other reasons for Niyazov to turn the screws on Bridas at that precise moment. Taliban
Looking on at the signing ceremony was Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State and then a consultant for Unocal. Taliban
It was preceded by a significant change in US policy towards Central Asia. Taliban
The Clinton administration and Unocal’s sudden interest in Turkmeni- stan and Afghanistan was not accidental. Taliban
During this period (1991—95) the USA ignored Tajikistan which was Involved in a civil war, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, ruled by two dictators, were considered beyond the pale by the US State Department. Taliban
Moreover, with the Russo-centric Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Tat- bott in the driving seat of US policy towards the FSU, Washington was not keen to antagonize Moscow and challenge its abiding interests in Central Asia. Taliban
However, as Russia slipped into chaos, Talbott’s pro-Russian policy 161ROMANCiNG THE TALIBAN 1 162 TALIBAN came under bitter attack from within the US foreign policy establishment, the Jewish and Israeli lobbies in Washington and US oil companies, who all wanted the US to embrace a more multi-dimensional foreign policy towards the FSU. Taliban
One that would allow them to exploit the Caspian’s resources, help the Caspian states assert their independence from Russia and enlist them in the Western camp. Taliban
In early 1995, major US oil companies formed a private Foreign Oil Companies group in Washington to further their interests in the Caspian. Taliban
The strategic interest of Washington and the US oil companies in the Caspian was growing and Washington began to snub Russia. Taliban
Washington had scotched one attempt by US lobbyists to promote Niyazov. Taliban
The immedi- ate beneficiaries were Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Taliban
The US must recognize that Central Asia will remain within the “near abroad” — Russia’s sphere of influence,’ an angr’~ Russian diplomat told me in Asbkhabad in 1997.’~ Taliban
US companies tooL an interest in Uzbekistan’s mineral deposits, and trade between Uzbekis- tan and the USA suddenly blossomed, increasing by eight times betweer 1995 and 1997. Taliban
Both cautiously wooed each other. Taliban
The US lining up alongside Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan and encouraging its allies — Israel, Turkey and Pakistan — to invest there, while Russia retained its grip on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.. Taliban
Thus there were the makings of two coalitions emerging in the region. Taliban
Unocal was a huge corporation which hired executives to run its global oil business. Taliban
Unocal tended to depend more on the US Embassy in Islamabad, and Pakistani and Turkmen intelligence for information on what was happen- ing or about to happen, rather than gathering their own information. Taliban
As my stones were published on the Bndas—Unocal nvalry and the twists and turns of the new Great Game, both companies at first thought I was a spy, secretly working for the other company. Taliban
‘Unocal came to this region because we invited them. Taliban
In March 1996 the US Ambassador to Pakistan Tom Simmons had a major row with Bhutto when be asked her to switch Pakistan’s support from Bridas to Unocal. Taliban
During two trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan in April and August 1996, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 1 ~- 165 166 TALIBAN also spoke in favour of the Unocal project. Taliban
Open US support for the Unocal project aroused an already suspicious Russia and Iran, which became even more convinced that the CIA was backing the Taliban. Taliban
Then, within hours of Kabul’s capture by the Taliban, the US State Department announced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sending an official to Kabul — an announcement it also quickly retracted. Taliban
State Department spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found ‘nothing objectionable’ in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law. Taliban
US Congressmen weighed in on the side of the Taliban. Taliban
Embarrassed US diplomats later explained to me that the over-hasty US statement was made without consulting the US Embassy in Islamabad. Taliban
But the damage done was enormous. Taliban
Even the ever- neutral wire agencies weighed in with their suspicions. Taliban
Its gas and oil fields in Turkmenistan were blocked. Taliban
On the other hand, Unocal’s position was closely linked to US policy on Afghanistan — that it would not construct the pipeline or discuss com- mercial terms with the Taliban, until there was a recognized government in Kabul so that the World Bank and others could lend money for the project. Taliban
We made it clear to all parties from the beginning that the ability to obtain financing for the project was critical, that the Afghan factions would have to get together and develop a functioning government that was recognized by lending institutions before the project could succeed,’ said John Imle.25 Taliban
After the dismissal of the Bhutto government in 1996, the newly elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, his Oil Minister Chaudry Nisar Au Khan, the army and the IS! fully backed Unocal. Taliban
The USA and Unocal had also won over Pakistan. Taliban
Apart from wanting US recognition for the Taliban, Pakistan also des- perately needed new sources of gas supply. Taliban
Niyazov’s wooing of the US began to pay dividends. Taliban
In January 1997, Turkmenistan signed an agreement with the US oil giant Mobil and Monument Oil of Britain to explore for oil over a large tract of western Turkmenistan. Taliban
Privately several Taliban leaders said that they preferred Briclas, because Bridas made no demands upon them while Unocal was urging them to improve their human rights image and to open talks with the anti-Taliban alliance — the main plank of US policy. Taliban
Moreover, Unocal was facing the growing feminist movement in the US which demanded that the USA and Unocal suspend negotiations with the Taliban. Taliban
At the same time, another Taliban delegation was experiencing a dif ferent kind of culture shock They were in Washmgton where they met with State Department officials and Unocal and lobbied for US recogni- tion for their government. Taliban
Bridas actually began to negotiate a contract with the Taliban. Taliban
Delta’s role also increased external suspicions. Taliban
It hired Robert Oakley, the former ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 2: 1997-99 -~ 171 T he attractive mini-skirted Argentinian secretaries at Bridas head- quarters in Buenos Aires had been told to cover up — long dresses and long-sleeved blouses to show as little of their limbs as possible. Taliban
172 -~ TAUBAN US Ambassador to Pakistan and later the US Special Envoy to Somalia. Taliban
For a US corporation to hire ex-US government officials or academics was not unusual. Taliban
All the US oil companies playing the Great Game were doing the same in order to lobby Washington and they were hiring even bigger names from the Reagan and Bush administrations than Unocal was. Taliban
Despite these problems Unocal pushed ahead. Taliban
In a dramatic reversal of policy the USA announced in July 1997 that it would not object to a Turkmenistan—Turkey gas pipeline which would cross Iran. Taliban
By now, there was growing scepticism in Washington that Pakistan and the Taliban could deliver a unified Afghanistan. Taliban
Washington’s decision came as a blow to Unocal and a sharp reminder to Islamabad that US support was fickle at the best of times and that time was running out for the Taliban to unify the country through conquest. Taliban
Although 10 per cent shares in CentGas were reserved for Gazprom, the Russian gas giant refused to sign as Moscow criticized US sponsorship of the Taliban and the undermining of Russian influence in Central Asia.8 Taliban
US officials had already made their anti-Russia policy clear. Taliban
‘US policy was to promote the rapid development of Caspian energy... Taliban
In September 1997 Brida sold 60 per cent of its company’s stake in Latin America to the US 01 giant Amoco, raising the possibility that Amoco could influence Niyazo~ to ease off on Bridas’s frozen assets in Turkmenistan. Taliban
Bridas invited Taliban delegation headed by Mullah Abmad Jan, the former carpe dealer and now Minister for Industries, to Buenos Aires for a second visit in September. Taliban
Throughout 1998 the feminist pressure on Unocal intensified. Taliban
The US bombing of Bin Laden’s camps in August 1998 forced Unocal to pull out its staff from Pakistan and Kandahar and finally, in December 1998, it formally withdrew from the CentOas consortium, which it bad struggled so hard to set up. Taliban
It was clear that no US company could build an Afghan pipeline with issues such as the Taliban’s gender policy, Bin Laden and the continuing fighting. Taliban
US strategy in Central Asia was ‘a cluster of confusions’ according to Paul Starobin and ‘arrogant, muddled, naive and dangerous’ according to Martha Brill Olcott. Taliban
For ordinary Afghans the US withdrawal from the scene ROMANCING ThE TALIBAN 2:1997-99 175 176 constituted a major betrayal, while Washington’s refusal to harness inter- national pressure to help broker a settlement between the warlords was considered a double betrayal. Taliban
Washington allowed its allies in the region, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, free rein to sort out the ensuing Afghan civil war. Taliban
That walk became a run in 1992 after the fall of Kabul. Taliban
There are several distinct phases of US policy towards the Taliban, which were driven by domestic American politics or attempted quick-fix solutions rather than a strategic policy. Taliban
The USA conveniently ignored the Taliban’s own Islamic fundamentalist agenda, its supression of women and the consternation they created in Central Asia largely because Washington was not interested in the larger picture. Taliban
The US policy turnaround from late 1997 to today was first driven exclusively by the effective campaign of American feminists against the Taliban. Taliban
US policy has been too preoccupied with wrong assumptions. Taliban
When I first spoke to diplomats at the US Embassy in Islamabad after the Taliban emerged in 1994, they were enthusiastic. Taliban
There was not a word of US criticism after the Taliban captured Herat in 1995 and threw out thousands of girls from schools. Taliban
In fact the USA, along with Pakistan’s IS!, Taliban
Some US diplomats, concerned with the lack of direction in Wash- ington on Afghanistan, have admitted that there was no coherent US policy, except to go along with what Pakistan and Saudi Arabia wanted. Taliban
In such a situation, the State Department surmised, the USA could not ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 2:1997-99 -~ 177 178 TALIBAN hope to have a coherent policy towards Afghanistan. Taliban
Few in Washington were interested in Afghanistan. Taliban
There was another problem. Taliban
In May 1996 she told the US Senate, ‘Afghanistan has become a conduit for drugs, crime and terrorism that can undermine Pakistan, the neighbouring Central Asian states and have an impact beyond Europe and Russia.’ Taliban
Raphel recognized the dangers emanating from Afghanistan. Taliban
The USA was silent on the Taliban’s repression of Kabul’s women and the dramatic escalation in fighting and in November Raphael urged all states to engage the Taliban and not isolate them. Taliban
Several concerned American commentators noted the inconsistency of US policy at the time. Taliban
‘The US, although vocal against the ongoin~ human rights violations, has not spelled out a clear policy towards thc country and has not taken a strong and forthright public stand againsi the interference in Afghanistan by its friends and erstwhile allies — Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, whose aid — financial and otherwise — enabled ~“ Taliba~i to capture Kabul.”9 Taliban
The US and Unocal wanted to believe that the Taliban would win and went along with Pakistan’s analysis that they would. Taliban
The most naive US policy-makers hoped that the Taliban would emulate US—Saudi Arabia relations in the 1920s. Taliban
We can live with that,’ said one US diplomat.20 Taliban
The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis did. Taliban
Unocal neither admitted nor denied receiving State Department sup- port, as any US company would have in a foreign country, but it denied links with the CIA. Taliban
‘Since Unocal was the only US company involved in the CentGas consortium, State Department support for that route became, de facto, support for CentGas and Unocal. Taliban
At the same time, Unocal’s policy of political neutrality was well known to the US Govern- ment,’ Unocal President John Imle told me.22 Taliban
Until July 1997 when Strobe Talbott made his speech in Washington, the USA had no strategic plan for accessing Central Asia’s energy. Taliban
It was in the interests of Iran and Russia to keep the region unstable by arming the anti-Taliban alliance, so that US pipeline plans could never succeed. Taliban
‘The US acquiesced in supporting the Taliban because of our links to the Pakistan and Saudi governments who backed them. Taliban
But we no longer do so and we have told them categorically that we need a settlement,’ the highest ranking US diplomat dealing with Afghanistan said in 1998.l~ Taliban
US officials began to voice fears that the drugs, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalist threat which the Taliban posed could overwhelm its old and now decidedly fragile ally Pakistan. Taliban
The first public expression of the US change was made by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright when she visited Islamabad in November 1997. Taliban
Inside, she warned Pakistani officials that Pakistan was becoming isolated in Central Asia - which weakened US leverage in the region. Taliban
The shift in US policy was also because of major changes in Wash- ington. Taliban
The dour, hapless Warren Christopher was replaced by Albright as Secretary of State in early 1997. Taliban
Aibright’s private criticism of Pakistan’s policies and public criticism of the Taliban was followed up by the visit of the US Ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, to Islarnabad and Kabul in April 1998. Taliban
The Pakistanis realized this weakness and tried to negate US pressure. Taliban
US tensions with Pakistan increased substantially after Bin Laden’s attacks against US Embassies in Africa in August 1998. Taliban
The fact that the IS! Taliban
Even US Con- gressmen were now raising the self-defeating contradictions in US policy. Taliban
US policy was again a one-track agenda, solely focused on getting Bin Laden, rather than tackling the wider problems of Afghanistan-based terrorism and peace-making. Taliban
The US rejection of the Taliban was largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement at home. Taliban
Afghan women activists such as Zieba Shorish-Shamley had persuaded the Feminist Majority to spear- head a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghan women and force Clinton to take a tougher stance against the Taliban. Taliban
Tibet is out. Taliban
In September 1997 Bridas sold 60 per cent of its company’s stake in Latin America to the US oil giant Amoco, raising the possibility that Amoco could influence Niyazov to ease off on Bridas’s frozen assets in Turkmenistan. Taliban
Bridas invited a Taliban delegation headed by Mullah Abmad Jan, the former carpet dealer and now Minister for Industries, to Buenos Aires for a second visit in September. Taliban
In Sep. Taliban
The US bombing of Bin Laden’s camps in August 1998 forced Unocal to pull out its staff from Pakistan and Kandahar and finally, in December 1998, it formally withdrew from the CentGas consortium, which it had struggled so hard to set up. Taliban
In such a situation, the State Department surmised, the USA could not ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 2: 1997-99 -~ 177 178 TALIBAN hope to have a coherent policy towards Afghanistan. Taliban
‘The US, although vocal against the ongoing human rights violations, has not spelled out a clear policy towards the country and has not taken a strong and forthright public stand against the interference in Afghanistan by its friends and erstwhile allies — Saudi Arabia and Pakigtan, whose aid — financial and otherwise — enabled the Taliba~i to capture Kabul.”9 Taliban
had handled the billions of US dollars which had poured in from the West and Arab states to help the Mujaheddin. Taliban
During his visit to Kabul in April 1998, US Ambassador Bill Richardson had already signalled that the USA saw Iran as a dialogue partner to help resolve the Afghan crisis. Taliban
In the twentieth century the long war between revolutionary Iran and Iraq (1981—88), which led to some 1.5 Taliban
They strongly opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanis- tan, supported the Mujaheddin and backed international measures to isol- ate the Afghan regime and the Soviet Union. Taliban
Dollar for dollar, Saudi aid matched the funds given to the Mujaheddin by the US. Taliban
Iran moved swiftly into Central Asia with a path-breaking trip by Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayti in November 1991, who signed an agreement to build a railway line between Turkmenistan and Iran. Taliban
The ulema play a leading advisory role to the Saudi monarch in the Council of the Assembly of Senior Ulema and four other state organizations. Taliban
King Fahd expressed happi- ness at the good measures taken by the Taliban and over the imposition of Sharia in our country,’ Rabbani said.’3 Taliban
SHIA VERSUS SUNNI: IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA 201 202 TALIBAN Taliban leader MuIIah Rabbani met with King Fahd in Riyadh and praised the Saudis effusively. Taliban
US Secretary of State Madeleine Aibright had said in June 1998, the critical role that Iran plays in the region, ‘makes the question of USA—Iran relations a topic of great interest and importance to this Secretary of State.24’ Taliban
The Iranians had been encouraged that the USA was taking them seriously for the first time. Taliban
‘We brought Afghanistan with us — in our souls, in our hearts, in our memory, in our customs, in everything and at every level,’ said Alexander Lebed, who served as a major in the Soviet army in Afghanistan and is now a presidential candid- ate. Taliban
Regional powers took advantage of the political vacuum the US retreat created, saw an opportunity to wield influence and jumped into the fray. Taliban
The abortive Unocal project should have taught many lessons to US policy-makers, but there appear to be no signs of it as US diplomats scurry across Central Asia trying to persuade oil companies and governments to commit to building a main export pipeline from Baku to~y~. Taliban
The lessons from the Unocal project are several. Taliban
It seems that the only effective Afghan NGO is based on organized smuggling and the drugs trade. Taliban
7 March. Taliban
26 May. Taliban
20 July. Taliban
NOOs pull out of Kabul. Taliban
US FBI places Bin Laden on top of ten most wanted fugitives. Taliban
Fears of US attack on Bin Laden increase. Taliban
billion STATUS OF PIPELINES IN 1999 I. Contract for a Turkmenistan-Turkey pipeline under the Caspian Sea signed in 1999 by consortium made up of Bechtel Group and US General Electric. Taliban
Former US National Security Adviser Alexander Haig hired by President Niyazov to head campaign to encourage US invest- ment in Turkmenistan and soften US position on pipelines via Iran. Taliban
President Niyazov visits USA. Taliban
USA sets up working group including National Security Council, State Department and CIA to study US oil and gas interests in Caspian region. Taliban
US tells Turkmenistan it will oppose financing for pipe- lines through Iran and urges it look to the west. Taliban
US Ambassador Tom Simmons urges PM Bhutto to give exclusive rights to Unocal. Taliban
US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel visits Kabul and Kandahar. Taliban
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Paid- stan and Afghanistan sign agreeement giving Turk- menistan the right to nominate the consortium to build the pipeline. Taliban
APPENDIX 4 239 240 -~ TALIBAN May 14 May 24 4 June 8 June 9 June 22 July 23 July 27 July 14 August 28 August 1 September 5 September 12 September 15 September~Pakistan concludes a 30-year gas pricing agreement Unocal to setup new headquarters for Asia in Kuala Lumpur. Taliban
APPENDIX 4 -~ 241 242 -~ TALIBAN 1999 24 January June 21 August 10 September 5 October 23 November 4 December 22 December Unocal announces a 40-per-cent drop in capital February 3 March March 29 April 12 May At Unocal’s annual meeting, some shareholders object to company’s plans for an Afghan pipeline because of human rights abuses by the Taliban. Taliban
Bennigsen, Alexandre and Wimbush, Enders, Mystics arid Corn- missars, SufIsm in the Soviet Union, University of California Press, Berkeley 1985. Taliban
Hurst, London 1998. Taliban
US aid began with US$30 million in 1980, nsing to US$80 million in 1983, to US$250 million in 1985, to US$470 million in 1986, to US$630 million in 1987 until 1989. Taliban
6. Taliban
7. Taliban
8. Taliban
10. Taliban
Chapter 8 1. Taliban
Chapter 9 1. Taliban
Chapter 10 1. Taliban
2. Taliban
Chapter 11 1. Taliban
Chapter 12 1. Taliban
Both times we spoke extens- ively on and off the record. Taliban
Both companies had built up lobbies within the Taliban. Taliban
Chapter 13 1. Taliban
We have still not decided which company we will accept, but we prefer Bridas. Taliban
Chapter 14 1. Taliban
18. Taliban
NOTES -~ 263 264 NOTES For a discussion of Wahabbism in Central Asia between 1991—94 see, Rashid, Ahmed: The Resurgence of Central Asia, Islam or Nationalism? 9. Taliban
NOTES ~- 265 Abbas, Mulla Mohammed 22, 61, 100 Abdali, Ahmad Shah 10-11 Abdullah, Crown Prince 168 Abu, Dhabi 120 Achakzai, Mansur 28 Afghan, Abdullah 3—4 Afganistan 1—7, 9, 11, 147, 207—8 conflict 21,31, 175, 196—7, 209, 211 ethnic groups 61, 180, 203, 207—8, future of 207—16 history 93, 185, 211—12 international terrorism 209 Islamicists 86—7 jihad 130, 185—7 Marxists 86 Mujaheddin 7, 13,89, 120, 195, 198, Pashtuns 32, 54,200,211 Persians and Arabs conflict 197 pro-Pakistan Pashtuns Mujaheddin radical Islam 188 reconstruction 210 refugees 60 Shins 35,44, 198, 200, 214 Soviet invasion (1979) 11,84—5, 197, 208 with4rawal of troops 175,208 212,215 201,208 government 186 Index Trade Development Cell 184—5 Transit Trade (ATT) 189—94 Turkic peoples 215 Turkmen 61 women 105—16, 174, 182 Afghans 208 Afridi, Major Zahooruddin 120 Agha, Mohammed 34 Agha, Mullah Syed Ghayasuddin 51 Ahmad, Eqbal 187 Ahmad, MulIah Wakil25, 39 Ahmadzai, Shahpur 4. Taliban
Peters, Gretchen 2 pipelines 6, 157—69, 173, 175, 179, 201,209,215 Polo, Marco 7 Primakov, Yevgeny 60—1 Prophet Mohammed 6, 10,23,32, 42—3, 57,86-7, 107 Cloak of 19—20,42 Qadeer, Haji Abdul 48 Qaderiyah (Suffi order) 84—5 Qais 10 Qalamuddin, Maulvi 105-7 Qazil Abad 63 Qila-e-Jhangi 55 Quetta, Pakistan 18,21—2, 27—9,50, 120 mafia 190—3 Rabbani, Mullah Mohammed 22,26, 34,50—2, 93, 103, 159 meeting with King Fahd 202 Rabbani, Burhanuddin 13,26,29,33, 36,43—4, 52,61,64,97, 159, 169 Iran 200,204 Masud troops 21,34—5,40 Pakistan’s rivals 188 Radio Afghanistan 185 Kabul 50 Pakistan 185 Shariat 50—1, 107, 185 Rafsanjani, President AkbarAli 202 Rahi, Dr Humera 69 opment 171 INDEX — 275 INDEX — 276 Rakhmanov, Imomall (President of Tajikistan) 123 Baphel, Robin 46-6, 165—6, 178, 181 Rashid, Abdul 118—19 Rashid, Mullah Abdul 125—6 Razaq, Mullah Abdul49, 51,59 Razzak, Mullah Abdul 100 Reagan, President 172 Red Cross, International Committe (ICRC) 18, 50, 59, 74, 126, 207 Rehami, Mullah Mohammed 17 Rebman, Amir Abdul ‘Iron Amir’ (1880—1901)12 Rehman, Dr Abdur 43 Rebman, Faslur 44 Rehman, Flight-Lieutenant Khalilur Rehman, King Abdul68 Rehman, Maulana Fazlur 26,90,201 Rehmen, General Akhtar Abdur 120 Reuters 167 Richardson, Bill (US Ambassador to Rishkor army garrison 139 Rohrabacher, Dana 181-2 Roman Empire 68 Rostam, Sobrab 63 Rouzi, Majid 58 Roy, Olivier 87, 130, 187 Rubin, Barnett 108,177 Rukh, Shah (son of Taimur)37-8 Rumi (Persian poet) 57 Russia 1—5,44, 53, 56, 60—1,66, 72, 77 arms supplies 76 and Britain treaties 209 Central Asian 44,209 Revolution (1917) 147 Tashkent meeting 77 troops 60 Unocal 171 Safavid dynasty 9—10,197 Sabar, General Saleem 63 Salang Highway/tunnel 47, 52—3, 59 Salim 75 Samangan province 59 Samarkand9,38, 147 Saneos, q~arles 171 121 UN) 71, 181, 196 Sarbanar (son of Qais) 10 Sari Pu! Taliban
UNESCO 9, 113 UNICEF 108, 113 United Arab Emirates 58 United Islamic and National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan 61 United Nations (UN) 50,54,61,67, 74, 111, 114, 126—7, 139, 169 Afghanistan 189 agencies 59, 64, 71, 103, 113, 123—4, aid agencies 2, 62, 70, 72, 77, 101, Aid programmes 69 Charter 64,76 Drugs Control Programme (UNDCP) Group of Concerned Countries 66 High Commissioner for Refugees humanitarian aid agencies 65, 71, 93, investigations 63 Islamabad 49 mediation 177 officials, Kabul 75 peace-making 49, 214 Security Council 45—6,64,66,76—9, Special Representative for staff 70-1 United States (US) 66 Afghan policy 178 Agency for International Develop- Assistant Secretary of State for South h Taliban
Chapter outlines the nature of the creed, largely as defined by the Taliban in their public statements. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
This brings us, in Chapter to the dialogue with the human- itarian agencies. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The war between the Soviet forces and the Mujahidin went through several phases. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In Herat, the Jamiat resistance leader, Ismail Khan, took control’ as soon as the Najibullah govern- ment fell in April 1992. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In the meantime, Masoud’s forces had succeeded in taking Jabal-us-Seraj, at the southern entrance of the Salang Pass, from the Taliban on 29 May. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
We are therefore given a diet of, for example, Iran-backed terrorist groups killing civilians in Israel, of Islamic terrorists bombing the World Trade Center in New York and of the Islamic opposition committing daily atrocities in Algeria. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Taliban spokes- man Mullah Wakil Ahmed, speaking to the Arabic magazine Al- Majallah on 23 October and responding to a question as to how decisions were taken within the Taliban movement, said: They are based on the advice of the Amir Al-Mu’minin. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
This coincided with a dramatic increase in US military support to the Mujahidin. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It argued that a single government there would bring stability and improve the prospects of proceeding with plans to build oil and gas pipelines through Afghan- istan from Central Asia. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Earlier in the Afghan conflict, Iran took a strong position against the USA following the assumption of power by the Ayatollah Khom- eini in 1979, and was alarmed by the growing US and Saudi involve- ment in Afghanistan as the war progressed. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
This ambivalence is also evident with regard to terrorism. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The USA’s possible interest in promoting the Taliban has also been linked with its opposition to Iran. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Certainly, the opposition leaders have been frequent visitors to Tehran and the Iranian government’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Alauddin Borujerdi, has visited the northern leaders on many occasions, as well as holding some discussions with the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
We therefore have a situation where Pakistan and Iran appear to be backing opposing ‘43 To what extent does the USA bear responsibility for the present The Taliban sides in a civil war, with the CIS states, with the exception of Turkmenistan, periodically lending support. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Iran’s paranoia at the presence of a radical Sunni movement on its borders may well have led it to lend support to the northern opposition. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
146 Where, then, does all this take us? We have identified the primary purposes of the Taliban, and have been made aware of the extreme puritanism of the movement and of their willingness to enforce compliance with detailed regulations governing dress and behaviour. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Bibliography ‘54 Abdur-Rahman Khan, Amir, i8, 19, 31, 143 Abdur-Rahman, King, 8o adultery under Shari’a law, 85 Afghan Interim Government, 36, 42, 105 Afghan National Liberation Front, 32 afghani currency, collapse of, 51 Afghanistan: as conduit for gas and oil, 2 nature of, 8—26; relations with Pakistan, 22 Mshar, massacre of, 39 agriculture in Afghanistan, 8—9, 103 Ahmed Shah Durrani, 15, 16 Ahmed, Mullah Wakil, 6o, 65 aid, 8; provision of, 103, 104, 108, 151 (women’s access to, 105) aid agencies, 37, 40, 47, 49, 70, 96, 98, 99, 147, 149, 150, 151; and employment of women, 108, 110; attacks on, 96; dialogue with Taliban, 102—13; possible closure of programmes, 111 Akhund, Haji Mawlawi Mohammed Ghaus, 110 Alexander the Great, military campaigns of, 12—13 Algeria, 97, 100 Amanullah, 24, 8z Amanullah, grandson of Abdur- Rahman Khan, 20, 24, 81, 98; overthrow of, 21 Amanullah, King, 8o, 85, 93; Amin, Hafizullah, 26 Amnesty International, 52 Andropov, Yuri, 35 Index ‘55 Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1921), 20 Anglo-Russian Agreement (1872), 17 arms supplies, 43, 46; negotiated end to, 36; US provision of Stinger missiles, 35, 141 Ashraf, cousin of Mir Mahmoud, Auckland, Lord, i6, 17 Ayala-Lasso, José, 115 Babar, Moghul ruler, i4 Babar, Naseerullah, 128, 132 Babar, Qari, 41 Bacha-e-Saqqao, 21, 39, 8o, 8i, 86, 94 Bagram, 13; airbase, taking of, 55 Balkh, 12, 13, 16 Baluch population, 10 Bamyan, 13 Barelvi, Sayyad Ahmed, 79 Barkley-Brown, Elsa, 152 beards, requirement to wear, 46, 51, 63, 89, 92, 93, 99 Bellamy, Carol, 115 Bhutto, Benazir, 129 Bhutto, Zulfihar, 28; hanging of, 29 blood vengeance, 85 Bonino, Emma, 115 Borujerdi, Alauddin, 135, 143 Bosnia, fighting in, 84 Brezhnev, Leonid, 35 Bridas oil company, 139, 140 brideprice, limiting of, 24 Buddhism, 78 Bukhara, Amir of, i6, 17 burqa, requirement to wear, 51, 6o, 63, 89, 91, 93, g6, 97 15 The Taliban Catholic church, 58, 70 Central Asia, 126, 129, 130, 134, 147 Central Asian Republics, 127, 128, 133, 135, 136, 137, 148 chador, wearing of, 63 Charasyab, 46, 47 Charikar, taking of, 55 Chernenko, Konstantin, 35 Chernomyrdin, Victor, 131 children, working in the streets, 89 China, i8, 135 Christianity, 58, 59; conversion to, 37, 96; evangelism of, 137 see also Islam, and Christianity complex emergencies, 59 corruption, 45, 46, 6i, 71, 73, 92, 139 Cyrus the Great, 12 dance, restrictions on, 72, 73 Daoud Khan, Muhammad, 22, 23, 24, 28, 30, 31, 32, 94, 98; overthrow of, 24 Dan dialect, 9 Darius the Great, 12 debt, rural, 24 Delta Oil company, ‘40 democracy, ii6 Deoband school of Islamic Studies, 79, 8, Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, 45, 63, 73, 77, 8g, 110, 122 Dost Muhammad, i6, 17 Dostam, Rashid, 36, 38, 40, 4!, The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
That leads us to the chief use and justification of terrorism: it is the means taken by militant minorities who feel themselves driven at last to have recourse to violence in the service of their cause, where the inequality of forces as between themselves and the government they seek to or constrain o Uifferent policies is such ory for themselves in open warfare is• The militant minority using terrorism always has one im- mediate object: to weaken both the hold and the will of the tenants of political power. The Terrorists
Let us take the common-sense arguments first: that denial of the right to use violence against the State would lead to the conclusion that whereas Adolf Hitler had a right to use violence against millions of German citizens and against other states, by virtue of his office as Chancellor of the Third Reich, no group of German dissidents could possibly have the right to use terrorism —literally the only means of changing the government of their 14 has a right to defend himself against the aggressor: at the time of writing the following governments are using force without country which was open to Germans between 1933 and 1944— to get rid of him and his Nazis. The Terrorists
St Thomas Aquinas held that an individual (and, a plus forte raison, a group of individuals) has a ‘natural law’right to resist tyranny, even by the use of assassination.’ The Terrorists
Samuel Johnson advises us to clear our minds of cant; it is even less likely that Stirner had read Boswell than that Nechayev ever read Stirner; but he certainly cleared his mind of all that seemed to him to be cant, with the result that he got down to the single remaining brass tack: Me. The Terrorists
Let us put our trust in the eternal spirit which destroys and annihilates only because it is the unsearchable and eternally creative source of all life. The Terrorists
And how, alas, waterfront and bidding Europe ‘Send us your poor...’ The Terrorists
Most’s influence in America began to show itself during the strikes and lockouts in Chicago in 1886, over the Central Labor Union’s attempt to win an eight-hour day for some sixty or seventy thousand workers. The Terrorists
As for Johann Most, he was not discouraged: he managed to keep Die Freiheit going until he himself died in 1906. The Terrorists
I suppose that there is no point in feeling retrospectively ashamed: Aristo- phanes would not have written The Knights had not democracies been apt to find the honour and decency of the ordinary citizen sacrificed by demagogues to the basest passions of political man, during the last couple of thousand years. The Terrorists
Segregated by us, the RIC became a spent force—our pressure made it so. The Terrorists
If you join us you must bring money to buy arms and ammuni- tion. The Terrorists
We have no organization behind us, no political party, no one to help us, no one to back us but ourselves. The Terrorists
Then comes: As was ordered us by our forefathers in our Holy Scriptures, we came to you with peace. The Terrorists
This leads us to a consideration of what, if anything, the terrorists achieved: to my mind there is not much doubt about the answer, though it is one which most people, Jews and Gentiles, will reject with all the honourable and decent disgust of respectable burgesses confronted with the proposition that nations are founded in robbery, arson, rape and slaughter, the objective truth of which can be denied only by carefully avoiding any knowledge of the facts of history. The Terrorists
Let us take two cases and compare results, still bearing in mind that we are considering not what is ‘right’ or ‘moral’ or ‘lawful’ or ‘decent’ or ‘honourable’, but what is expedient for the cause, whatever that happens to be. The Terrorists
Their campaign of property sabotage by massive bombings, of attacks on the army and police, both accompanied by heavy loss of life among unengaged bystanders, has shocked and horrified people all over the world. The Terrorists
Cánovas del Castillo, Antonio (Spanish Prime Minister), 112, 113 Carbonari society, 56—7, 58, 62 Carders Society, 82 Carey, James (Irish assassin), 90, 92—3 Carnot, M. F. Sadi(FrenchPresident), 113 Carson, Edward, 94 Casement, Roger, 95—6 Castioni (Swiss assassin), 17 Catherine the Great, 38 Catholic Emancipation, 83 Cavendish, Lord Frederick, 44,91—2, 93 Central Intelligence Agency, 9, 164, 168 Central Labor Union, 46 Chaikovsky, N. V. (Populist), 72, 76 Charles I, King of England, 184, 185 121 Index 191 Index Chemins de la Liberté, Les, 165 Chernoe Znamla (Russian Black Flag), 134 Chernov ,Victor (Russian revolution- ary), 125, 134 Chernyshevsky, Nikolai, 68, 69 Chesterton, G. K., 63, 122 Chia Ch’ing, Emperor, 53 Chicago, 46—7, 154, 156 Chicanos-Mexican-Americans, 177 Childers, Erskine, 95 Chile, 16, 177 fn. The Terrorists
Orsini (Italian terrorist), 16, 58 Osinsky, Valerian (Russian Anarch- ist), 73, 74 OSPAAAL: see Tricontinental Oufkir, Mohamed (Arab terrorist), 167 Owen, Robert, 69 Pacifism, 15 PAIG() (African anti-Portuguese movement), 168 Palestine, 12—13, 143—63, 174—6 — Arab-Israeli war, 174 —, Balfour Declaration on, 147 —, British in, 146—63, 175 —, 175British Mandate for, 13, 144, —, —, — White Paper, 147, 162 163, 175Jewish terrorism in, 12—13, 147— —, —, terrorism in, 144, 169refugees in, 175—6 Palestine Liberation Organization, 171 Palestine Police Force, 144, 171 Palestinian hijackers, 174, 177 Palestinian New Left Nationalists, 169 Pallas (Spanish terrorist), 112 Palmerston, Loid, 16 Parnell, Charles, 90—1 Parsons, Albert (U.S. The Terrorists
86 Pijemont (Serbian Black Hand jour- nal), quoted, 62—3 Pinkerton Agency, 46, 47, 48 Plekhanov, Georgi, 74, 122 Plunkett, Joseph (Irish militant), 96 Pogroms, 124, 129, 130 Poland, Anarchism in, 127 —, revolt against Russia, 33, 37, 68 Political refugees, 16—17 ——and the law, 16—17 — offences and the law, 165 Popular Front for Armed Struggle: see FPAS Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 176 Populists, 10, 12, 15, 17, 22—3, 68—78 passim, 122, 123, 165, 171 Portuguese Africa, 167-8 Powell, Enoch, 186 Price, General (U.S.) The Terrorists
CONTENTS List of Figures Figure ii. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
For me there has been an additional benefit to this quest. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In that same year, Matthew had become involved in investigating U.S. allegations that the Soviet Union aided Laotians in attacking Hmong tribes with dangerous trichothecene mycotoxins—known as Yellow Rain. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I immediately joined in that inquiry and interviewed Hmong refugees in Rhode Island and Minnesota, as well as officials from the United Nations and the U.S. and other governments who played a part in the controversy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A Joseph Conrad figure who had spent years in Southeast Asia, he claimed to have killed several men with his big, bare hands.) Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The inquiry eventually revealed that harmless bee feces, not mycotoxins, were misinterpreted by the U.S. government as evidence of Yellow Rain attacks. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It has been a privilege to work with them both, and a special bonus to be included on the team that went to Russia to investigate the 1979 anthrax outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Many people played a part in the ultimate success of our investiga- tion. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Faina Abramova, Irma Belaeva, Sergei Borisov, Lev Grinberg, Mar- garita Ilyenko, Larissa Mishustina, Ilona Popova, Vladimir Shepetkin, Paragoriy Suetin, Alexey Yablokov, and Olga Yampolskaya all helped keep the 1979 Sverdlovsk victims from being forgotten. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In 1969, after review- ing the extensive U.S. investment in offensive BW, President Richard Nixon categorically renounced biological weapons. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Nixon limited U.S. BW activities to strictly defined defensive purposes: “techniques of immunization, safety mea- sures, and the control and prevention of the spread of disease.”19 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
All U.S. programs were then dismantled or converted to protective or other peace- flu defensive uses. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the same time, President Nixon declared U.S. support for a British proposal for an international treaty banning biological weapons. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In March 1980, during the first review session of the BWC in Geneva, the U.S. State De- partment raised its initial concern that the Sverdlovsk outbreak signaled 7 8 ANTHRAX: ACCURSED FIRE, BIOLOGICAL WEAPON a Soviet violation of the convention. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Taken by surprise, the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow at first de- nied the outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. intelligence analyst~ believed otherwise. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the spring of 1980 the U.S. government formed a working group on the Sverdlovsk outbreak, consisting of rep- resentatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Coun- cil, the State Department, the CIA, and other agencies, to consider the incident. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
During the 198os, as Cold War tensions heightened, the U.S. invest- ment in weapons systems (including renewed production of chemical weapons) quadrupled, and American press reports about alleged Soviet treaty violations, in Sverdlovsk and elsewhere, filled the news.22 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Yet dur- ing this time no formal complaint about the 1979 epidemic was lodged against the Soviet Union at the United Nations Security Council by the United States or any other nation. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In 1990, he wrote, “On the Soviet side there needs to be a political decision to allow qualified US officials freely to examine what remains of the relevant evidence and to meet with sur- viving patients and local medical, public health, and veterinary person- nel in Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
There is a sixth member of our team, Dr. Olga Yampolskaya, a spe- cialist in infectious diseases at Moscow’s Botkin Hospital, who joins us for dinner. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This morning, June 3, the six of us go to the Institute of Mo- lecular Genetics, our Moscow host organization, where we have two sep- arate appointments, each with someone who has promised to bring us important evidence about the 1979 outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Before flying to Yekaterinburg, our group has business to take care of in Moscow. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Although he died in September 1986, the infected-meat explanation based on evidence he compiled lives on. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
An expanded version of this graph was included in a summary document by the three physicians, which was given to the U.S. State Department after Burgasov and Niki- forov’s 1988 visit (see Figure i). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Burgasov, the only survivor of the three key figures, is now retired from his post as Deputy Minister of Health and lives at his dacha on the Moscow River. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In late 1988, the Soviet Foreign Min- istry presented to the U.S. government the official version of the outbreak (with Bezdenezhnikh, Burgasov, and Nikiforov listed as authors, in that order). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It included a detailed description of gastrointestinal anthrax in- fection, apparently summarized from Nikiforov’s records, along with epi- demiological data from Dr. Bezdenezhnikh. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Olga Yampolskaya has warned us that the two men might come to blows if they meet. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Slightly built, in his forties, the young Nikiforov strongly resembles his father, except his manner is hardly hesitant. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In anthrax, the bacteria themselves are not the killers. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Shortly after, he told the U.S. National Academy of Sci- ences delegation that he had seen cases of inhalation anthrax in Albania, with hemorrhagic edema as their main, most telling characteristic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
MOSCOW: FRAGMENTS OF EVIDENCE MOSCOW: Knowing what Dr. Nikiforov perceived or believed is by now impos- sible, and in fairness, the diagnosis remains problematic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
From 1939 on, the framework for investigating the disease was weapons, which meant no research was done on gastrointestinal anthrax, just on the in- halatory form. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In it, Burgasov tells us, the elder Nikiforov wrote a descriptive section with two of the Sverdlovsk pathologists (Faina Abra- mova and Lev Grinberg) who perforn~’ed autopsies of victims in 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the presentation at the Na- tional Academy in Washington, it was Shelokov who stood up in the au- dience and corrected a serious mistake the interpreter, unfamiliar with biological terms, had made, a confusion of pneumonia with influenza. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The more fundamental source of the outbreak, as Burgasov argues (and MOSCOW: CONFLICTING VISIONS MOSCOW: as is described in the Soviet explanation given to the U.S. State De- partment in 1988), lies in the food industry. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Nothing is terribly amiss with Burgasov’s argument, but a few aspects of it are puzzling. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The combined feed was simply mixed there. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
First of all, from the point of view of evidence, the statement from the Aramil factory director tells us nothing about an- 25CONFLICTING VISIONS 26 thrax contamination. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
MOSCOW: CONFLICTING VISIONS MOSCOW: 90 5 FIGURE 1. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I have neither the home addresses to confirm that the victims were dispersed throughout the city nor the interview information for estimating what common circumstances the victims might have shared outside their homes. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the conclusion of the interview, Dr. Burgasov invites us to visit him at his dacha once we have finished our work in Yekaterinburg. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Young Dr. Nikiforov joins us for lunch at the Presidium of the Rus- sian Academy of Sciences. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The main restaurant, with a ceiling as high as an airplane hangar, is nearly empty. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In addition to the autopsy slides he is willing to share, Nikiforov says he also has at home copies of hospital records for some of the survivors of the 1979 epidemic, which he might allow us to peruse. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That evening, the team convenes for the first of the nightly discus- sions we plan to have throughout this research. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The next morning we go to Domodevedo Airport to fly to Yekate- rinburg. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Why then should the responsible civic or milita~ry personnel wax confessional for us? They would have to be willing to repudiate the Soviet Union’s public health sector or its army. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But the government is letting us in; we have been told that a good number of officials in Yekaterinburg are will- MOSCOW: CONFLICTING VISIONS MOSCOW: ing to speak to us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
And yet the invasion of infected meat into a populous ur- ban area might do that much damage. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The arrangement was made only a month before our arrival, and not without difficulty. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In a remnant of the exchange programs that had flourished during the Nixon administration, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Sci- ences supported Ellis, his wife, and two small children for two months in Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Instead of Director Semyonov, however, a young doctor named Vikton Romanenko greets us; he is the assistant chief sanitary inspectoi~ filling in for his boss. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“We have no records from the 1979 epidemic,” he begins, and then quickly assures us that all current records—on diphtheria, tuberculosis, influenza, as well as animal anthrax and other outbreaks—are comput- erized and in good order. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Romanenko was employed at SES as a junior physician at the time of the outbreak, so he is able to give us his perspective on what had hap- pened. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Were Burgasov’s documents about animal deaths valid or forgeries? Was Dr. Babich aware of Romanenko’s account of epizootics? Could he tell us about any late-occurring epizootic? Alexis Shelokov refuses to translate any confrontational questions, saying that they would be insulting and might get us in trouble. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On hearing two different stories, first that there was an epizootic be- fore the human anthrax cases and then that there was none, we begin exchanging worried glances. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At that mo- ment, Professor Borisov also appears, ready to drive us to lunch at the university. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At this juncture, Dr. Semyonov, the current chief of SES, comes briskly into the office and joins our little crowd. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Romanenko and he exchange glares. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Why did Babich suddenly blush when asked about animal deaths in March? Is he just an old man suffering memory loss? Why was Romanenko so definite about the timing of the epizootic? Is he just a young man suffering memory loss? Shelokov, who did most of the interpreting, has no explanation for the contradictions, nor does Yampolskaya. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Tall and hefty, with tinted glasses and a black beard, and wearing a white laboratory coat, Grinberg makes it clear from the beginning that he will dominate this meeting. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Instead, they were allowed no opportunity to speak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Grin- berg then announces he will give a presentation of the material that will illustrate inhalation anthrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They did, how- ever, take the precaution of closing off the floor drains, and they tried not to spill blood. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It is much more coherent than the one I saw in Moscow. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Grinberg’s review reminds us that, while weapons experts might think of anthrax spores as uniform little bullets, they are organic entities with a definite life cycle, just as Robert Koch demonstrated more than a cen- tury ago (see Chapter i). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I am struck by how far all this detail takes us from actual victims, from human beings. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Grinberg wants to hammer out the details of the intellectual property rights issue. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But this is no time to ask for more. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Grinberg has been so quick to answer our questions, at times interrupting Shelokov’s interpreting, that we are sure he understands English. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That evening our group mulls over the question of whether an ani- mal outbreak of anthrax did occur in 1979, before the human deaths. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our shy biologist from the university, Dr. Vladimir She- petkin, has for us five names of victims, with their addresses and snip- pets of information on hospital admission. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A little after ~ P.M., these meanderings are interrupted by a surprise telephone call. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the darkness, an old memory surfaces. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Walker, without any review of the autopsy data, was adamant that the mystery was solved. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It’s Saturday and the morning has been set aside for a visit to the cemetery while Walker and Yampolskaya work with the two pathologists at the Pulmonary Unit. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Awake at dawn, I am worried about exactly when and how I can get to the five addresses we now have. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
If the tainted-meat hypothesis is true, then the whereabouts of the victims might be widely scattered, with links back to where the meat was obtained, for example at the ceramics fac- tory. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
AUTOPSY VISIONS AUTOPSY VISIONS The person who has been most enthusiastic about these family inter- views is Dr. Alexander Langmuir, the epidemiologist who in 1949 founded and then ran the Epidemic Intelligence Division at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Unable to join us on this expedition, he nonetheless remains close to our efforts; we have been sending him e-mails of our daily ex- ploits, such as they have been. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Nikolay offers to guide us toward the special sector where the anthrax victims’ bodies were buried. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Around us, most of the graves, some with 60 THE COMMUNITY OF THE DEAD low iron fences, bear black-and-white photoengravings of the deceased, women and men, the old and the young, that are typical of Russian and other European cultures. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Thirteen years have passed since the epidemic, and he himself is a fairly recent employee. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They give us the age of each person and, in the aggregate, the age and sex distribution of the victims. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They reveal the generation of each victim, the phases of Soviet history each experienced. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As we move from one site to another, the photographs on the monu- ments take us past biographical facts to the individual personalities of the victims. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
These other sites and their portraits have an innocent air, simply by their place in the social topology of the cemetery. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As the rest of us are still reading tombstones, Shelokov strikes up a conversation with three people hovering at the edge of Sector i ~. He is innately gregarious, and being in a new Russian environment seems to make him more so. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Since our arrival, he has kept us up to date on hazardous radiation levels south of the city, about increased rates of theft and as- sault, about Russian mafia gangs, about a Chinese student with a knife who yesterday went berserk in the elevator of our dormitory building, about our concierge’s suspicions of foul play concerning our several ex- ploding light bulbs. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He talks easily with almost anyone, at restaurants, at the dormitory, in corridors at the university or city offices—and his brief translations of these conversations are like reports from a civic dis- aster center. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
All the Russians assisting us, Professor Borisov and Sasha Tiu- tiunnik, Rector Suetin and his fellow administrators, the public health officials at SES, Nikolay and the two young grave diggers, and even She- lokov, an American citizen for decades, always act as though they would like to help, but we shouldn’t expect much. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He believes the naushiki, the “earphones” or informers of the Soviet era, remain a decided influence in Yekaterinberg, making people afraid to talk to us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Standing in the middle of Vostochniy Cemetery I write in my notebook: I see propped against a grave two broken spades, the handles gone; they are rusted. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
After lunch, my next stop is the pathology laboratory. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Revived, I am trying to look on the bright side. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This work gained him a Nobel Prize in 1908. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They want their findings broadcast to the world of science and have been mak- ing efforts in that direction. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
By around four o’clock, after Walker has reviewed the first ten cases, Grinberg again suddenly calls a halt to the process. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As the former, he warns us that this autopsy information could “make difficulties” for his superiors, so Matthew should offer bona fides that this data is unique and valuable. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In an about-face, Grinberg then proposes tea. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The notebooks and ma- terials are put away, and, as we convene around a marble work bench, the mood lightens. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The necessary names and addresses of owners are listed in the documents Burgasov gave us in Moscow, which Shelokov and Matthew have spent this afternoon trans- lating and transcribing. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our goal is to interview the families who owned the anthrax-infected animals and to speak with local veterinarians. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The cemetery grave markers suggest that the first human deaths oc- curred April 9, the earliest date we found. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
To calculate back in time to when victims were exposed, we need the dates for the onset of the vic- tims’ symptoms. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Demographics, too, count; Dr. Ro- manenko at SES has promised to give us 1979 statistics for the city. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With no work scheduled at the Pulmonary Unit, Yampolskaya and I can start hunting for the five addresses passed on to us last night. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Shelokov cautions us not to be disruptive or we will be detained and ousted. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Unlike the natives of a neighborhood, whose understanding of their space is complex, visitors like us see only unfamiliar and unconnected locations.1 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He seems to know exactly what we are interested in and has no hesitation in speaking. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He wants to show us the ceramics factory, but we are looking for the home of Anna Komina, on Ulitsa Lyapustina, the street named for a lo- cal but now almost forgotten Soviet hero called Lyapustin, who in the 196os was killed defending citizens set upon by hooligans. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The worker points us in the general direction and we move on, searching in vain for street signs and trying to find order in the house numbers. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
After circling sev- eral blocks, we again encounter the man in overalls and take up his of- fer to see the ceramics factory, which is close by, due south of us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our guide leads us past the gate, explaining that this plant, which has a Sunday shift, is where industrial pipes, bathroom fixtures, tiles, dishes, and teapots have been made for decades. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our guide pushes open a side door and leads us to the enormous com- pany cafeteria, now empty. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
TO CHKALOVSKIY RAYON TO CHKALOVSKIY RAYON -J Our guide sees us beyond the factory gates and takes his leave. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He is trying to tell us that we are where we want to be, on Ulitsa Lyapustina. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the far end of the block, Sergei Borisov appears in his car and waves jubilantly. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He reckons back six days from when his mother died and gives us the date of April ~ for the onset. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our technologies have improved and prolonged our lives with efficient sanitation, farming, manufacture, and transportation. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Perhaps that sufficed. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But my thoughts are leaping forward. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On her tombstone, he tells us, the family put the Soviet star, not a cross, because Anna Komina was a patriot, not at all religious. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Without our asking, he tells us what happened to his father: crushed by his wife’s death, he died shortly after her, of a broken heart. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Both of us ar~ familiar with tragic deaths, she, as an active clinician, much r~ore than I. During the 1979 epidemic, she also cared for dozens of patients, nearly all of them fatalities. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“Khudyakov? Never heard of him. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Markov’s brother Nikolay and sister-in-law Prosovia still live there. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At the time of the epidemic they shared the cottage with Mikhail, whom they call Misha, and his wife, and they are willing to talk to us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“They wanted a new sheet from us instead,” his sister-in-law complains. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We have com- pleted only two interviews, and our leads are exhausted. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It is nearly two o’clock when we leave the Markovs. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
None of us is par- ticularly a team player, and except for Matthew’s and my earlier efforts, the members of this group have not worked together before. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In July 1983, for example, after ongoing CONSTRAINTS, FEARS, FRUSTRATIONS Moscow, Matthew wrote Dr. Pyotr Burgasov to report that, as they had discussed, he had organized a small group to visit Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Matthew contacted Lown and convinced him of the importance of investigating the 1979 outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Among the present recruits, everyone (except Yampolskaya) wants to do it their way and is ready to tell the rest of us how the trip arrange- ments could be better. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
All this food came out of a closet-sized kitchen. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Why not! Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I have more questions for Abramova, but Lev Grinberg interrupts. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When we get back to our dormitory, Yam- polskaya gives me the bad news that she and Walker will fly back to Moscow early Friday morning. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The elation is short-lived. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Arrangements have been made for us as a respected group of experts, and we have to stay with our schedule. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That afternoon, D. N. Ponomaryev, a short, dapper man who was chief epidemiologist of the Oblast SES (Sanitary Epidemiological Station) in 1979, meets with us to present an hour-long account of the outbreak, which he tells us will be the first of two parts. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But he assures us he will resist fiction. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Abramova told us her first autopsy was April io and the samples sent to the laboratory then; laboratory results confirming the anthrax diagnosis were communicated on April i i. Dr. Ponomaryev has placed the confirmation of anthrax a week earlier, with an epizootic preceding the human cases. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
These dates sound off. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It affected ten settlements, he says, including the area’s largest town, Sy- serts, and resulted in sixty-eight animal cases, with sixty of these ani- mals belonging to private owners. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His overview is compli- cated: animals die of anthrax in March and then in a second wave in April anthrax strikes both humans and animals. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This idea may have merit, but that speculation doesn’t help us now. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
CONSTRAINTS, FEARS, FRUSTRATIONS Knocking on Doors As Sasha Tiutiunnik drives us toward Chkalovskiy, we are caught in a traffic jam south of the university. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Men and women pass by us with shopping bags and briefcases. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She was fifty when she died on April iz, 1979, at the peak of the epidemic, and her name was one of the first five our mysterious source provided. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Olga M., now in her fifties, shows us the death certificate; “infectious pneumonia” is given as the cause of death. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Sasha drives us back again to the worker’s hostel on Military Street in search of someone who knew Nikolay Khudyakov. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As we walk the streets of Chkalovskiy this afternoon, we have no qualms about asking passersby for directions, and they have little hesi- tancy asking us what we are doing in the district. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On Ulitsa Lyapustina, near Anna Komina’s house, two neighbors of the widow of Timofiev T. direct us down the street to her home. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Both Timofiev and his wife were vaccinated later in April. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She insists that a neighbor’s small pig alsc died during the outbreak, that dogs in the neighborhood died from an- thrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The chief vet- erinarian for the oblast called that afternoon to cancel his meeting with us the ‘next morning. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This is a disappointment. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Borisov also tells us that officials at Compound 19 have received no orders from Moscow about our study plan, although the university con- veyed our request to visit there three weeks ago. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Therefore, I wish to invite you or a member of your sci- entific staff to meet with us, to hear our findings at this state of our study and to exchange information and views regarding scientific aspects of this matter. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This general has been quoted in a Moscow paper, denying any Compound 19 involvement in the 1979 outbreak: “The rumors. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Afterward, the lethally contaminated air in the chamber would have to be expelled through a filtration system. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Although she now re- lays case names to us, Dr. Abramova has only two addresses to add to the ten we have received from the mysterious source, who we suspect may have other names. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It might have been that the military com- pound was the source of the epidemic, but through the sale of infected meat. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This same burden of risk was carried by the little communities near U.S. and British BW facilities during World War II and after, in places like Vigo, Indiana; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Fred- erick, Maryland; and the Scottish village across from Gruinard Island.4 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Tests “challenging” monkeys with deadly aerosols might have been going on at Compound 19 in 1979, just as they continue to go on wherever anthrax vaccines are being developed. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Very few, it seems. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the new Russia, the military is undergoing tremendous reorganization and quickly casting off the past. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN “She asked a Sverdlovsk relative to help with the skinning,” Arenskiy tells us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Both these cases are familiar—they are described in the documents Burgasov has given us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The rayon’s local veterinarian at the time is on our list of appointments for Thursday and, with happy nods all around, we are sure he will fill out the details of these events for us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our hope is that the KGB cleanup bypassed its records, but luck is not with us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the second two offices, we arrive without prior appointments, as people off the street investigating the outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Hugh-Jones and Matthew are waiting outside in a park for us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His mother, a large, imposing woman\ sits with us at their kitchen table and takes charge of answering our questions, while her husband and daugh- ter hover behind her. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But our two hours yield only one interview, with the parents and sister of Yuriy Sysikov, who lived on Predelnaya (Limit) Street. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The family’s cottage has the same somber aura as the Komins’ home. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The four of us return to the dormitory at 9 P.M. and, having skipped dinner, resort again to peanut butter on crackers. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
At 7:45 the next morning, pandemonium breaks out in our dormi- tory suite. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As Walker and Yampolskaya leave for another day at the Pulmonary Unit, the rest of us have an ominous sense of doors closing. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN The Unnatural Steals the Natural Unable to travel outside the city, we have before us an open and poten- tially wasted day. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
No appointments are scheduled; reception to us has reportedly cooled because we are not official visitors, just a band of for- eigners. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Ponomaryev will not be giving us part two of his presenta- tion. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Professor Borisov gives us a lift to the old- est part of Yekaterinburg, literally to the high ground, to the Church of the Ascension, the city’s only remaining example of early classic nine- teenth-century architecture. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We revert to tourist mode. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She just knows about us from television. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“America should just take us over.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“What right had they to do that?” “To rob us of that beautiful piece of nature!” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They tell us where the old meat plant is located, in this same neigh- borhood of Vtorchmet. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I disagree. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This leads us to considering New York’s Brighton Beach, a community he knows all about, and he marvels that such a reproduction of Russian life is pos- sible in America. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In her book on innovations in military organization, Kimberly Zisk argues that the Soviet general staff maintained a consistent Cold War pat- tern of reacting to U.S. advances in military technology with upgrades of its own weapons.3 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He stayed at home the next day, but on the morning of May 6 he was taken by ambulance to Hospital 40, where he was diagnosed with bilateral pneumonia. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
THE UNNATURAL STEALS THE NATURAL THE UNNATURAL STEALS THE NATURAL Although they could not touch, the couple wrote messages back and forth to each other. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She shows us a newspaper article about pensions that may be coming to the families of victims of the 1979 outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We leave Dayanova to crisscross the district, returning to several of our dud addresses in the hope someone can give us an interview. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We return to an address given to us Monday, our first day in Chkalovskiy, by a couple whose door we knocked on by mistake. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We pause here, all four of us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We push on from here, still searching for good addresses. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
No matter. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Across the courtyard is Hos- pital 24, which remains just as it was in 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Before that, the early victims were not autopsied. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
By then, around April ,i—,z, when the diagnosis of anthrax was confirmed, he called a meeting of all involved physicians to tell them. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On top of all this response came the vaccination campaign. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She describes being stopped by police as she drove to a May ii celebration and told that there were ten new anthrax cases. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The easiest way is to ask and I do. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I tell her that for the sake of the families, I want to find out the cause of the epidemic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It’s time for our team to meet with Dr. Bolshakov, the veterinarian al the rayon SES. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
crats in any nation might be just as cautious with outsiders. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“We arrived at Bolshakov’s office and when we were all seated, he announced that he had orders not to speak to us and that we had to leave.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That evening, Shelokov tells us that there were men waiting outside Dr. Bolshakov’s office who were, according to Dr. Shepetkin, ready to get rough if our group did not leave quietly. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Bolshakov apparently also said that Dr. Romanenko at SES has refused to see us again. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His widow, whose own poor health keeps her homebound, told us that her husband used to help their niece, who lives near Compound 19, with her garden. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The pity of it, she told us, is that he had fought in the Great Patriotic War, and because he had survived that, they counted themselves lucky. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Abramova’s autopsy notes, which Yampolskaya copied and translated in their entirety before she left, also give us glim- merings of who the victims were. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The new Russian government has declared the day a holiday, in its own honor. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
There is no good time, she tells us, and begins. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But his family has moved, a neigh- bor tells us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We find them at the address, but they have nothing to tell us except that an old woman, maybe the victim’s mother, lived there alone until she died four years ago. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The death certificate Vershinin’s son shows us indicates “sepsis” as the cause of his father’s death. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The community may not be cohesive, but there were obviously friendships among residents. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
No one answers at the former home of Natalya Lyakhova on Pold- nevaya Street. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Aleksandra Volkova, age sixty-five, a pensioner, lived in a third floor apartment on the boulevard Selkorovskaya, where electric trol- leys run. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We then move north in the neighborhood to another story of grief and distress. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But she tells us that Korsayev’s sister lives somewhere over on Lyapustina. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When we knock at the door of the cottage where Tatyana Kosheleva once lived, a girl answers and tells us that her family has recently bought it. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The ever-ready neighbor, a woman passing by, fills us in. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The woman who opens the door greets our request with astonishment—and in turn astonishes us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our list from Dr. Ilyenko locates the former home of Valentina Mar- kova on Lyapustina Street. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As Korsayev’s sister talks, the victim whose family we expected to find, Valentina Markova, drifts away from us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Nearly every- one worked, even the pensioners, and they all apparently lived by the clock. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our salvation might be if Supreme Soviet deputy Larissa Mishustina, who we believe has access to the alleged official list of victims, returns to Yekaterinburg and shares that information with us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Meanwhile, this trip to Yekaterinburg is almost over, and we have learned that, unfortunately, no meeting at Compound 19 will be possi- ble. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The rock band is loud. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Without fanfare Larissa Mishustina presents us with an envelope con- taining a list of the victims of the 1979 anthrax epidemic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A reckoning was made and then wrapped in secrecy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Mishustina’s spirited optimism is encour- aging. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Matthew comes with us to scout the territory while Professor Bo- risov takes Shelokov and Hugh-Jones on a day trip to the Asian-Euro- pean border, where one can stand with a foot on each continent. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She was sixty- seven when she died in late April, 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Admission to Hospital 40 followed on April zz, and her mother’s death occurred on April 30. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The whole family, Spirina included, was ¶~accinated, she said, at the nearby rubber factory. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Leaving Spirina’s daughter, we take advantage of the proximity of other apartment buildings where victims once lived. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In his cemetery portrait he looked like a war-weary soldier, with kind eyes. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This last night, the sun refuses to set and let us rest. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I come back again to Giddens: it is the consciousness of jeopardy, not any numerical calcula- tion, that stays with us and shapes our reflections.6 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
These calculations of risk bring me no comfort. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Matthew, as usual, sleeps soundly, and at 6 A.M. he is ready for the airport while the rest of us are still stuffing clothes in our suitcases and searching for our plane tickets. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The family of the writer Alexey Tolstoy, among other celebrities, has a home on one of the rustic streets, where high fences separate the houses. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Matthew has us do this as a courtesy but also because it is an efficient way to communicate with government officials: Washington will soon receive a cablegram reporting about our trip. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
That evening we dine at the Nikiforov home. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The elegant apartment, MOSCOW REDUX MOSCOW REDUX full of stuffed furniture and bric-a-brac, also looks like a comfortable scene from the 1930S. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Such strong light comes from the high windows that I can see almost nothing but the glare off the top of the councilor’s desk and off the table. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When Matthew asks him why he believes this, he tells us that the only thing Revina’s research unearthed was an empty KGB folder concerning Sverdlovsk, labeled, “Order to Confiscate All Documents Connected with Military Activity.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In December 1990, Yablokov tells us, the contents were destroyed by a top secret order of the Council of Ministers. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His final words to us are, “It is time to close the book on this event.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Either way, no one is taking responsibility for the victims’ deaths. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Wednesday afternoon, June 17, we depart for the United States via Finland. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Unknown to us, on May 2.7, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Alex’s concern about biological weapons goes back to the Korean War, when the U.S. army sought his advice on detection tactics and he publicly advocated civil de- fense measures against biological weapons. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He was also a member of the Chemical Corps Advisory Council, which oversaw the development of U.S. biological weapons (BW) programs. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In the years following the end of World War II, as information about U.S. and British BW programs became public, the news media and members of the gov- ernment were caught up in a frenzy that led, for example, to members of a congressional committee telling the press that a “germ proposition” sprayed from airplanes could “wipe out all life in a large city.”1 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A large man with a great domed forehead, Alex acquired a reputation throughout his career at CDC, as well as at Harvard and Johns Hopkins, as a fierce and ready critic who brooks no fools, and as a distinguished researcher. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The three of us spend hours reviewing the photographic slides from Nikiforov and Abramova and Grinberg, which Matthew had copied. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The autopsy data, though, is not enough by itself to tell us the source of the 1979 outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
To begin, we turn to the criteria for a case definition: who shall be in- cluded as an anthrax victim? We start with the KGB list that we received from Larissa Mishustina, and immediately find independent verification of it in the lists of patients that Dr. Ilyenko gave us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Alex, Matthew, and I begin buildingstwo spot maps. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In late July, Ilona sends us a packet of material, brought to the United States by a relative of Professor Gubanov, the physicist who facilitated our invitation from the Ural State University. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Ilona also returned to the former home of Anna Komina and inter- viewed her daughter-in-law, which gives us more information on this early 169 170 victim. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
According to the daughter-in-law, Anna first fell sick on April ~ (as her son described to us). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We have sent Ilona the names and addresses of the five survivors from the Hospital 40 records that young Dr. Nikiforov let us copy just before we left Moscow. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The important role of friends who were also coworkers is frequently evident. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The eleven partial interviews leave us with only traces of those vic- 171 172 tims. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Ilona soon informs us by e-mail that MSD stands for the Motor- strelkoraya Diviziya (Motorized Rifle Division) located within Com- pound 32.. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The city’s topology has changed in thirteen years, as some areas disintegrate and others emerge. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Not all the missing streets can be found. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The offensive intent of the U.S. BW program against civilians was made explicit when its retired commander, GeneralJ. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Earlier, during the period from January to September 1953, the U.S. St. Jo Program tested versions of this attack scenario in and near three cities—Minneapolis, Minnesota; St. Louis, Missouri; and Winnipeg, Canada. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
177 178 Should the targeting of civilians as if they were “logs,” in the termi- nology of the Japanese during World War II, surprise us? Military tech- nology in the twentieth century seems at times like nothing more than the relentless development of ways to attack defenseless populations. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
NAMES GO TO PLACES Biological Weapons and Political Outbreaks On July 2—too soon after we are back, I feel—Matthew and I travel to the Brookings Institution, a think tank in Washington, D.C., for a pre- sentation on our work. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In his address to the U.S. Congress in June 1992, President Boris Yeltsin expressed a deep commitment to getting rid of both programs. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Later, he affirmed, these products will be used for peaceful purposes (e.g., Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“But were all suspicions about us groundless?” he asks. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In 1969 President Nixon renounced biological weapons, and by the time the Biological Weapons Convention entered into force in 1975, U.S. BW laboratories were shut down or converted to defensive research (for example, on vaccines), and stockpiles were destroyed by autoclaving and burning. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In 1992, another Russian defector, this one formerly a high official at Biopreparat, confirms General Yevstigneyev’s statement about Soviet competition with what they believed was an ongoing U.S. biological weapons program. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
187 Manifestation Back in Cambridge, Matthew and I continue building our spot map of the daytime locations of anthrax victims just before the outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We also continue to corroborate the public health response as de- scribed to us by officials. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We have garnered information from thirty-five death certificates and find that those for early cases (April 9—Il) were signed either at Hospital zo or at Hospital 24. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In early November, Alex Langmuir is with us when~we first see the outline of a discernible band of cases stretching southeast across Chkalov- skiy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Matthew, who has been meticulous about placing the red dots, fixes us drinks, and we sit in the living room, slightly stunned, somewhat satisfied, but not what anyone could call joyous. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The problem of the animal outbreaks, to which more than one offi- cial in Yekaterinburg bore witness, continues to trouble us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Spirina, after all, reportedly had infected meat in her refrigerator. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Behind the scenes, Russian defector Ken Alibek is telling U.S. intel- ligence that, even after the 1972. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They consider how best to MANIFESTATIONMANIFESTATION calculate the amount: whether it should be measured in kilograms, as U.S. intelligence still insists, or whether it was considerably less. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The U.S. government sn~pects that other hostile states, such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea, are also invested in CBW. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In this atmosphere of potential hostility, loose ends about the 1979 outbreak continue to frustrate us, especially concerning Compound 19. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Soon he sends us news that one of our out- liers, Klaudia Spirina, may not have died of anthrax and should not be plotted on our map. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Loose ends still abound. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
197 Mirage THE ANIMAL OUTBREAK The second trip to Yekaterinburg goes more smoothly than the first, al- though it begins with an exercise in calamity. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Yet life goes on. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We have a simple request, that he look at the five pages of veterinary documents Dr. Burgasov gave us and tell us if, to the best of his knowledge, they are authentic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He seems to chide us for the fourteen- year gap between the event and our present inquiry, to want it impress upon us the uselessness of our questions. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The person who could have helped us, he says, was another SES veterinarian, a man who died last November. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He reminds us that this past May, former SES Director Babich also passed away, taking with him to the grave the full account of his ex- periences in 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He tells us that he recognizes the names and signatures of the veterinarians in the doc- uments: the city’s chief veterinarian at that time, another man who was the meat factory’s veterinarian and another who worked for the city SES. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As we walk the road in search of the documented addresses, a drunken man, his jovial face aglow with sweat, introduces himself as Mikhail and bares his broad hairless chest to show us the tattoo of a crow, the artwork of a fellow soldier. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It should have been an eagle, he tells us cheerfully, but his army superiors interrupted the process, taking away the equipment, even the chair he’d been sitting on. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The village is quiet. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His wife answers and agrees to talk with us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We park the car on a pleasant rise overlooking the quiet village. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
To vaccinate villagers suggests there was a connec- tion between the vaccination program Dr. Nikiforov ordered in the city and the busloads of Moscovites that descended on Abramovo. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We could be back in April 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With no shepherd in sight, a ram with a bell around his neck confidently leads the rest across the road. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Map 1. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Though we have made some progress tracking the outliers, the loca- tions of at least six will probably always elude us for lack of detailed in- formation. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With the sixth of these outliers, a survivor, Aleksandr R., we have reached a complete impasse. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Another mysterious outlier is Vitaliy Fyodosov, who lived north, near the university, on the street named for astronaut Yuriy Gagarin. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Everything else Viktor tells us about the outbreak is according to form: the apartment was disinfected, Fyodosov’s body was never returned home, he was buried at Vostichniy Cemetery with a police escort. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We show them our list, pointing out the five names of victims who resided here at M5D34: Pave! Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
I try to concentrate on the facts. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
We carry with us a letter of introduction from Peoples Deputy Larissa Mishustina. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Waving our letter aside, he leads us downstairs to the factory clinic to meet Dr. Tamara Chernich, the clinic’s head, who was at her post during the 1979 outbreak. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She has some busi- ness to attend to before she can meet with us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Eighteen workers here died of anthrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Feisty and bright-eyed, Dr. Chernich greets us with impatience, as if we should have come sooner to ask about the epidemic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She begins her story by telling us that at first she and others thought the anthrax had come from burning infected animal carcasses in pits. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
But Compound 19 was also suspected. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As Dr. Chernich goes over other names with us, she muses on the in- dividual victims: Dimitriy Vinogradov, Anna Komina, Vera Kozlova, Pytor Gayda, Mikhail Burmistrov, Valeriy Poletaev, the pensioner Lazar Kor- sayev. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She says she would like to give us more precise information about the antibiotics and about vaccinations, but in 1979 the KGB took away the workers’ records. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The director has arranged a tour of the factory for us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The two women stop to talk to us, but Anatoliy S. keeps on a straight path toward his home. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
In her tidy yard, a small white dog, the kind one might see in a circus, greets us with tail-wagging. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Nina, now sixty-three, has deep-set eyes and high cheekbones and, though she sits down to talk with us, she gives the impression of being in perpetual motion. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
His response, she tells us, was “What does it matter? You are going to die anyway.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
217THE FINAL PIECES 218 This evening, we have dinner with the Borisov and Belaev families. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
the last morning of our second trip to Yekaterin- burg, he drives us to Koltsovo airport for our flight to Moscow. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With no help from government, what would we have done without the assistance that the university provided us? Now our work in Yekaterinburg is done. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Bela is just back from a visit to a friend in Germany, and though she assures us all is well with her job at a Moscow patent office, we sense her life is not easy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He told us that Moscow has turned openly antisemitic. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
They have just made the decision to move to Australia and were too upset by the planned uprooting to dine with us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
What interests him most about our visit, he tells us, is any opportu- nity it might foster for professional exchange, the chance to visit and study at an American research institute. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The general tells us he himself has worked as a pathologist and feels that this exception should have been empha- sized. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
For example, the first victims might have expired from eating bad meat and the later cases from inhalati~n anthrax caused by the burning of in- fected carcasses. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
To substantiate the epizootic, Yevstigneyev shows us file photographs from Sysertskiy rayon in April 1979, pictures of dumps where dead live- stock are piled one on another, with legs and necks at awkward angles. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It can- not stand alone—and it doesn’t. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When we press for further details, the’general balks. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
A typical experiment in this chamber would be done with a spray of five milliliters of an anthrax sus- pension containing a total of five billion spores. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He tells us that in 1979 the military sus- pected sabotage and investigated a “deviant individual” not in the mil- itary, but nothing came of it. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Despite a reputation for being overbearing in Russian-U.S. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He has left the Kremlin and his government post, and works instead as head of a consulting group that reports to President Yeltsin on the environment. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He reviews with us the communications that led to the presidential de- cree for pensions to the Sverdiovsk victims’ families. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Following Lanissa Mishustina’s letter to Yeltsin urging recompense, Yablokov and his staff investigated the files and found the empty KGB folder. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Military technology also imposes risks for the environment, in its manufacture, in its potential deployment, and above all in its technological develop- ment. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
It is understandable that in 1990 the Sverdlovsk file was destroyed by the Soviet Council of Ministers. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Certainly he is not up to date. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Burgasov counters that the veterinary documents he gave us are incomplete, that animal deaths caused by anthrax happened earlier among private own- ers and were not well recorded. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Gorbachev’s glasnost, which allowed Burgasov to appear as its emis- sary to the U.S. in 1988, is as onerous to him as the free market econ- omy his country has adopted. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
According to the paper given by the Soviet government to the U.S. State Department in 1988, the total num- ber of anthrax cases was ninety-six: eleven pure cutaneous, six cutaneous that became systemic, and seventy-nine gastrointestinal cases. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Still left out of these reckonings is the problem of individual suscep- tibility to anthrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Our trip to Russia is done. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The fireworks in Gorky Park are over. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Professor Borisov has also provided us with confirming data from two smaller airports reporting at the same time from Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Mer- cifully, no research has been done on this for humans. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Instead, we have to assume that the dose-response for a human population will resemble what has been determined experimentally with nonhuman primates. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Using the old army model gives the smallest estimate of the quantity of spores that might have been released as aerosol at Compound 19—an almost unbelievable two to four milligrams, hardly enough to see, but containing billions of spores. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Dr. Burgasov was right when, in reference to biolog- ical weapons proliferation, he said there were more countries in the world than Russia and the United States. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When a bomb exploded m47ebruary 1993 at New York’s World Trade Center, killing six and injuring a thousand, American citizens realized their vulnerability to the free-floating politi- cal violence that ignores national boundaries. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This time the fanatic hostility against the U.S. government was home-grown, from within. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Modern Western science, grounded in individual rationality, is sup- posed to protect us against the great plagues that afflicted our ancestors or that afflict the underprivileged in far-away countries. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
How can such random collective death assault us when we are so intelligent and our society is so advanced? But emerging diseases like AIDS and reemerg- ing ones like tuberculosis and plague have invaded our modern world. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The drum- beats began with a sequence of three reports that proclaimed biological weapons as the new, central threat to national security and laid the groundwork—reinforced by Congressional hearings and other public statements—for a whole new series of defensive programs against the threat of BW.9 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
million members of the military, including reservists. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. cities, virtually every large metropolis in the country. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
An improved U.S. public health system might be able to better cope with infectious disease outbreaks, but could it reasonably contain the ef- fects of a deployed biological weapon? A typical American city, large, impersonal, and culturally diverse, is a far cry from the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
One 1998 committee report, with John Deutch, former Direc- tor of U.S. Central Intelligence, as cochair~, recommends a federal consolidation of bioterrorism intelligence and the creation of decentral- ized Catastrophic Terrorism Response Offices (CTROS).17 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wil- davsky warn us, “Risk aversion is a preoccupation with anticipating dan- ger that leads to large-scale organization and centralization of power in order to mobilize massive resources against possible evils.”18 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The U.S. Department of Defense and the media have worked in syn- chrony to promote bioterrorism as a national security threat. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Defensive measures aside, we should be asking whether U.S. leader- ship in world arms control is all it should be. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The economic “shock therapy” begun in 1991 was applied to an already debilitated post-Soviet economy. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The Russian population, with its high literacy and educational levels, was required to forego the security of full employ- ment and guaranteed pensions and throw itself into high-risk “byzniz” opportunities in a global world. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
As the U.S. Depart- ment of Defense embarked on its biodefense campaign, the 1979 Sverd- lovsk outbreak unexpectedly reemerged in the headlines, via a scientific article. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The article reported the genetic modification of an anthrax strain RETURN TO YEKATERINBURG RETURN TO YEKATERINBURO that made it possible to infect hamsters which had been immunized with the standard Russian STI vaccine. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Great contingents of Russian army generals, scientists, and ad- ministrators have been circulating through official Washington and other U.S. cities. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Russia is in such a profound crisis that the West is predicting that any day Boris Yeltsin will fall from power. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
257 258 The Ural State University, where we go on our first day, has dropped the name “Gorky”—all over Russia, the author’s name has disappeared, even from Moscow’s famous park. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The Pulmonary Unit, where Yampolskaya and I meet with Grinberg and Abramova, looks unchanged. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Irma’s hair is fashionably cut, with blonde streaks; she is wearing a chic suit and scarf. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The two of us have an appointment with Dr. Romanenko at SES. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
The once shaggy-haired physician now occupies the spacious deputy direc- tor’s office, which has a potted lime tree near the window. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
RETURN TOYEKATERINBURG El “The World Is Global” Irma has found a driver with a car, a young man named Kostya, who can take us down to Chkalovskiy rayon. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
With no trouble, he drives us first to the ceramics factory. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Push- ing aside a brown-and-black puppy, he invites us into the house, which is exactly as I remember it, sparsely furnished, with the little bedroom off the living room. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
He has a life to live. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Before we can blink, she has us sitting at her table with two steaming cups of tea before us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Atound the corner, we knock on Nina T.’s gate. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
She watches us attentively and eats her food in small bites. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
When she gave us a copy of the KGB list of victims in June 1992, she meant what she said, that it was no longer a secret. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Obviously, I have a personal stake in the KGB retraction of the list. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Instead, the risks of poverty and re- pression fall hardest on those already deprived, while wealthier nations try to barricade themselves against instabilities generated by the ebb and flow of world capital. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
14. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
23. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
24. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
This is up to them to do, the ball is in their court” (Meselson 199 ia, 3). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
See also Meselson i99ib, ii. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Further corroboration of this scientific skepticism and ef~prts to effect an inquiry are found in U.S. State Department cables suipmarizing Meselson debriefings (Washing- ton, August z6, 1986, 267418; Moscow, August 29, 1986, 14971; Washington, September 17, 1986, 2674,8; Washington, January zi, 1988 i8i~i; Moscow, February i, 1988, 01894). Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Chapter 5 i. V. V. Nikiforov, alludes to infection of the thoracic lymph nodes. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
12. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. Senate 1995, 4 1—44. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Meselson et al., Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
25. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
1959. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
295 296 Alibek, K., with S. Handelman. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Soviet Response to U.S. Regarding Information on Sverdlovsk, i9~9. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. Department of State translation. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
1982.. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
1997. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
“Russia Fails to Detail Germ Arms: US and Britain Fear Program Continues in Violation of Treaty.” Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. Army. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. Senate. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
U.S. War Department. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
53, 54, 55, 196; author’s dream about, 56, 97; autopsy notes of, 109, 140; collaboration and, 69, 76—77, 140; controversy between Burgasov and, 96; gathering of autopsy material and, 127; identification of disease by, 132; life of, 96; professional findings of, 20, 73—74, 130, 22.2, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
6, 7, ,o8, 167, 252; bioterrorism and, 24 5—48; offensive intent of, 176—78, 287n4 biological weapons threat: American public and, 248—So; anti-bioweapons ,6,, 163, 192—95, 226, 242 programs and, 245—48; hoaxes and, 249—50; importance of, 243—50; Iraq and, 194; media exploitation of, 248; strategic problems and, 183; Sverdlovsk outbreak calculations and, 240—43; targeting of civilians and, 177—78; terrorism and, 24 5—48, 249 Biopreparat, 184, i86, 221 bioterrorism, 245—48, 249, 292fl23 “Black Maria” (U.S. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
179—82 Bubenshikov, Viktor (victim), z66 Buchelnikov, Vitaliy (victim), i88 Bulgakov, Mikhail, 223 Burgasov, Dimitriy (son of Pyotr), 21 Burgasov, Pyotr, 43, 6z, 93, 106; Abra- mova and Grinberg data and, 96, 158; as authority on epidemics, 29—30; hospitality and, 30, 157—58; infected- meat explanation and, 15, 22, 23—30, 64, 256; missing anthrax manuscript and, 15—16, 20; response to study results, 229—3 3, 238; role during out- break and, 13, 99, 234, 235; Soviet mission to the U.S. and, 20, 21, 3O~ So- viet system and, 182, 23 1—32; veter- inary documents and, 203—4; work at Compound 19, 29—30; Yeltsin and, 231 Burmistrov, Mikhail (victim), 143, 213, 214 BWC. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
See also Russian names naushiki (informers), 68 Nazarov, Vasiliy (victim), z66 Nazi Germany, 7 New York World Trade Center bombing, 244 Nikiforov, Vladimir (elder), 43, 46—47, 106; ability to distinguish forms of anthrax and, 18—19, 32; on anthrax strains in outbreak, ~ autopsy slides and, , 6—zo, 52, 260; course of out- break and, 133; missing manuscript by, 15—16, 20, 158; old Soviet order and, 21, 23 1—32; role during outbreak, 13, 14—15, 43, z6~ Soviet mission to U.S. and, 15, 20, 3I~ vaccine program and, 109 Nikiforov, Vladimir (younger), 16—20, 21, 31, 158—59 Nikolaev, Fyodor (victim), 65, 109, 153—54, Nikonova, Ilona, 139, 140, 145, 146, 151, 153, 155, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, i88, 199, 207, 259, z6o Nixon, Richard M., 7, ,86 official accounts of outbreak, 13—14, 45— 46, 97—99, 150—5 I, 222; alliance be- tween scientists and the state, 13, 231— 33; conflicts among experts and, II, 21, 47—48. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
See Nikonova, Ilona population dose-response relation, 24 1—42 portal of entry, 5, 19, 70—71. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
See also public health response to outbreak Russian scientists: infected-meat expla- nation and, i~~’; the military and, 31, 221; motivations of, 176; state au- thority and, 159, 231—33, 232—33; U.S. and Russian cooperation and, 187, 199. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Third International Workshop on Anthrax, 253—54 Thomas, Lewis, 93 timing, 168; of animal outbreaks, ~ 97—98, 231, 234; of anthrax emission, 217; of disease onset, 77—78, 86, 108—9 Tischenko, Valentina (victim), 173, z66 tissue samples, 70—76, 130, 196—97; U.S. analysis of, 252, 259. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
See also autopsy materials Tiutiunnik, Sasha, 42, 67, 101, 103, 122, 124, 125 transparency, 18 2—84, 194, 242, 250 Tretnikov, Vasiliy (victim), 65, 153 Tretnikova, Lydia, 89 Tretyakov, Y. E., 43, z6i Turner, Stansfield, 9 United Nations, 9, 184—8 5, 190, 194, 244 United States: anti-bioweapons programs ifl, 245—48; antigovernment cult groups in, ‘95; arms control policy in, 250; Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 253; Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 59, 179; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 15, ,94—95; civil defense and, 246, 247, 249; Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 9, 15, 242; Department of Defense, 245, 246, 248; emergency preparedness programs in, 246; mili- tary vaccination program, 246. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
On September 25, in the midst of the second wave, the state sought help from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, based in Atlanta, and its Epidemic Intelligence Service, seventy mostly young doctors who learned epidemiology firsthand by investigating suspicious disease outbreaks throughout the country. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Why would anyone want to harm innocent people in a remote small town in Oregon? “Call us naïve,” Lutgens said years later, “but we never imagined people could have done such a thing. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
They also discovered a series of other plots in 1984 and 1985 to kill or sicken people on an eleven-person enemies list, among them Charles Turner, the U.S. attorney; several county officials; a former disciple who had won a lawsuit against the cult; and a journalist from the Oregonian newspaper. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
U.S. Army scientists in the 1 950s had turned F tularensis into a weapon, and it still remains on the nation’s list of germs a foe might use in a biological-warfare attack. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
ON Sunday, October 27, 1985, Dave Frohnmayer received a call at home from Charles Turner, the U.S. attorney in Portland whom Sheela and her gang had targeted and nearly killed that year. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
On the American side, a main problem solver was Bill Patrick. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
President Franklin D. Roosevelt publicly denounced the ex- otic arms of America’s foes as “terrible arTd inhumane,” even while preparing to retaliate in kind. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Gordon Gray, the president’s national security adviser, noted that under current U.S. policy, the use of either chemical and biological weapons required the president’s approval. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Under Kennedy, he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The military officials, he added, “were very good at keeping us in- formed,” while he and his colleagues, in turn, helped the officers judge “the potential for success.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Its in- cubation period varied from one to five days, followed by the sudden onset of the nausea and diarrhea often associated with serious infec- tion, as well as spiking fever up to 105 degrees. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“The U.S.,” he said, “shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It argued that classing the toxins produced by germs as chemical weapons was a technical distinction that undermined the administration’s policy goals, as well as the president’s credibility. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“Most of the people I worked with—the chief of the pilot plant division, the chief of munitions—all these people thought, ‘Jeez, it’s going to come around to bite us,’ “he recalled. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
His studies alternated with spells of duty at the U.S. Naval Hospital at Saint Albans, on Long Island. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A~ congressional investigators probed the American germ program, the U.S. intelligence community disagreed on whether the Soviet Union was secretly forging ahead on biological weapons. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
U.S. intelligence analysts had noticed nothing unusual that previous April. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Its annual assessment of the threat posed by Moscow, Soviet Mili- tary Power, said the Soviet Union was conducting gene engineering aimed at developing new weapons. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“That was good enough for us.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
CIA analysts quoted Saddam Hussein as telling a delegation of U.S. senators earlier in the year that he would use chemical weapons in re- taliation for a chemical or nuclear attack on Iraq. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Briefed in late November abdut the lack of biological detectors, General Carl Vuono, the army chief of staff, was stunned that American troops would be used as canaries in a po- tentially lethal coal mine. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“Course of Action #1” was to begin vaccinating U.S. troops as quickly as possible. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“We were really pushing the Soviet leadership very hard to deal with this problem’ Gates recalled. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The memo noted that “U.S. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
As early as 1993, a Connecticut company had notified the U.S. Cus- toms Service that a Japanese publishing company called Aum Shin- rikyo was trying to buy an interferometer, a device used to make very accurate measurements ofsmall objects. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The Americans were livid. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The calculations sounded impressive. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“The world is full of very crazy organizations that have designs against the U.S.,” he said. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Owens recruited an important ally in his campaign against the an- thrax vaccinations: his boss, General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
American soldiers, the auditors wrote, “face many of the same problems thel confronted during the Persian Gulf conflict in 1990 and ~1991 .“ Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
By the fall of 1996, the chiefs had turned around and endorsed the recommendation to vaccinate the entire force. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Breakthrough 201 THE proposal to vaccinate the entire U.S. military against anthrax came before John P. White, the deputy secretary of defense, in January 1997. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
He believed that the United States had to be bolder. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Yes, they were grateful for the money to study liver flukes, they told Weber and a small group of U.S. Army sci- entists. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
But while the projects launched under the auspices of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences had helped open once closed Biopreparat institutes, the Russians said, they wanted to work directly with their American military colleagues on more scientifi- cally challenging work. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Meanwhile, U.S. government scientists were having trouble secur- ing full access to Vector, Obolensk, and other key institutes where American intelligence officials claimed secret military research was still being conducted. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The 444-day-long hostage episode—the kidnapping an’d detention of American diplo- mats at the U.S. embassy in Teheran during the Carter administra- tion—had scarred America’s psyche, Weber said. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Miller, a longtime champion of the small threat-reduction program and a seasoned bureaucrat, liked Weber’s proposal for how to open up Russia’s closed military labs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
They shared his frustration, Weber and Harrington wrote, with the pace of U.S.-Russian exchanges and the scope of assistance to Vector. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“I know of no expert opinion,” he said, “that would say that those of us that are essentially in the civilian population of the United States should be vaccinated.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A~ the Pentagon prepared to vaccinate soldiers, new evidence of the biological threat—and even graver questions about the wisdom of the U.S. vaccination program—emerged in the I~ecember 1997 issue of Vaccine. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Andy Weber had been encountering resistahce from Kalinin since their first meeting in September 199~. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Again and again he would say, What if the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City had been a biological or chemical event?” Clinton was a hands-on editor of his own speeches, and Clarke said the germ references were his idea. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The U.S. effort to engage the Russians was working. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The so-called gentlemen’s agreement, negotiated by a towel—clad Vector scientist and U.S. officials in the institute’s banya, proscribed cooperation that had military uses with Teheran. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Compared with health care in other economically developed states, the U.S. public-health system was a disaster. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
To be sure, Clinton’s rhetoric changed measurably. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The results of the presidential audience were somewhat less than the experts had hoped. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A little more than 25 percent of the ftinds Young requested was initially approved for the first year. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“We don’t believe we have primary respon- sibility, but within minutes of an event, people are going to turn to us,” The President 245 246 GERMS Hamre said. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The proposal alarmed civil liberties experts. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
He had clearly studied the biological issue and, echoing the views of Venter and Lederberg, said he saw germ weapons as posing a unique threat to the nation’s security. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Once the secrets of the human genome were unlocked, Clinton predicted that one day scien- tists would be able to “take a blood sample, and there would be a com- puter program which would show us if we had—let’s say we had a variant of anthrax.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
While the bulk of the $10 billion request would be spent strength- ening security at U.S. embassies and at other American facilities, public-health officials were delighted. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
lation. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Public-health officials in New York later noted that she did not contact the public-health task force, some of whose members were also uneasy with the initial diagnosis. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Because no flavivirus had ever been known t~ cause disease in animals, neither the Ames lab nor any other veterinary lab in the country had the testing material needed to pin down a specific di- agnosis. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Aum’s 1995 sarin-gas attack in the Tokyo subway and the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa helped the administration push huge budget increases through Congress to prevent terrorism and deal with its consequences. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Even so, Smithson and some of the government’s auditors felt that some of the initiatives were notably wasteful. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Johnson was eager to analyze the properties of the Soviet bio- bomblet, and CIA headquarters directed American intelligence officers overseas to obtain one, perhaps in one of the former Soviet republics. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The project could produce tabloid headlines: U.S. Makes Killer Superbug. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
U.S. intelligence officials said that they un- derstood the significance of the step they were contemplating, and that this was the only genetic manipulation the Pentagon had even considered. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Lederberg faulted Bill Cohen’s performance with the bag of sugar. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Feb. 28, 1985,131, no. 23. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
to poison Judge Hulse: Ava Kay Avalos interrogation, p. 16. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
contingency plans to “snatch” the Bhagwan: Interviews, law-enforcement officials. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
324 Notes to pages 34—39 viewees included Herbert E York, Robert S. McNamara, Philip D. Zelikow, Leonard A. Cole, Susan Wright, Riley D. Housewright, and Matthew S. Meselson. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
All but three survived: Norman M. Covert, Cutting Edge:A History of Fort Detrick,35 Maryland (Fort Detrick: U.S. Army, 1997), p.41. 37 Germs and walare are old allies: Erhard Geissler andJohn Ellis van Cortland Moon, editors, Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, l999),pp. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Our thanks to the provider of this tape, who was not Bill Patrick and who shared it with us on the condition of anonymity 48 Georgi Zhukov, told: Sidell et al., Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
32—38,111—12. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
186, 198; William C. Patrick III, “A History of Biological and Toxin Warfare’ in Kathleen C. Bailey, editor, Director’s Series on Pro1 jferation, vol. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
54 President Kennedy ordered: Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: US. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
57 According to a once secret report of 1962: U.S. Department of Defense, “United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962,” undated. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
58 its own supply: U.S. Senate, “Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents:’ Hearings of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st sess.,vol. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
59 lyophilization, orfreeze-drying: Postgate, Microbes and Man, pp. 125—26. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
54—56. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
23—46. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
72 planned to kill Patrice Lumumba: Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The History of America’s Secret Germ Wa!fare Project (New York: Holt, 1999), pp. 182—85. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
1, Sept. 16, 17, and 18, l975,pp. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
74 The chosen toxin: U.S. Senate, “Examination of Serious Deficiencies:’ p. 246. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
For example, John Ellis van Courtland Moon, “US Biological Warfare Planning and Preparedness: The Dilemmas of Policy:’ in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research Development and Usefrom the MiddleAges to 1945, edited by Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon (New York: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), pp. 239—42, 244—47. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
77 closed ranks around this scenario: Leslie H. Gelb, “Keeping an Eye on Russia:’ New York Times Magazine, Nov. 29, 1981, p. 31; see also Guillemin, Anthrax, p.9. “a successful operation”: U.S. Senate, “Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents,” “to prevent his appearance”: U.S. Senate, “Examination of Serious Deficiencies,” 78 lack of corresponding evidence on intestinal anthrax “cast doubt”: Interview, Matthew S. Meselson. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
78 Alexander M. HaigJr. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Between fifteen thousand and seventeen thousand doses: U.S. Army Medical Ma-87 teriel Development Activity, Memorandum for: Commander, U.S. Army Med- ical Research, Subject: Minutes of Source Selection Board for Request for Proposal, (RFP) DAMD17-88-R-0149, Sept. 8, 1988, p. 1. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
87 the army signed its first-ever contract: U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity, Fort Detrick, Maryland, Contract with Michigan Department of Pub- lic Health, September 30, 1988, to September 29, 1993. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
87 “certainly not state-of-the-art”: U.S. Army, “Minutes of Source Selection Board:’ p.4. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
92 Yamamoto testified: U.S. Senate, “Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons,” pp. 204—5. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
90 “Nature isn’t benign”: Laurie Garrett, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Dis- eases in a World out of Balance (New York: Penguin, 1995), p. 6. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The document comes from the files of the U.S. Army Medical Research Ac- quisition Activity. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
General Carl Vuono: Vuono’s anger at the lack ofbiodefenses is described in U.S. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
They were quoted in: U.S. Air Force, “Oral History Interview of Lt. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
American officials continue to insist that it was a “backup” plant that could have been pressed into service. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Notes to pages 118—122 339 340 Notes to pages 123—127 123 filed onJanuary 23,1991. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“sensitive BW topic in the public eye”: U.S. Army, Biodefense Concept Briefing, Apr. 8,1991. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Notes to pages 128—134 341 342 Notes to pages 134—141 134 cials; Mangold and Goldberg, Plague Wars, p. 165. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
134 Anthrax on Germ Warfare Efforts,” Washington Post, June 16, 1992, p. Al. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
58,Jan. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Alibek, too, hadfeui doubts: Alibek, Biohazard, pp. 70—86. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It was called the Nuclear Emergency Search Team: U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the154 Permanent Subcommittee of Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
So we have been on top of this from the beginning.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Stephen Labaton, “Threat to Disneyland, Mentioned by Clinton, Is Termed a Hoax:’ New York Times, Apr. 23, 1995, p. A36. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Cult 164 This chapter is based on interviews conducted in Washington, D.C., and during more than half a dozen trips to the former Soviet Union—Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan—thatJudjth Miller made between 1998 and mid 2001. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
184 185 185 185 185 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 77—105. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Russ Zajtchuk. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
29, 1999, pp. 9—38. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
David R. Franz, William C. Patrick III, Ken Alibek, Stephen C.Joseph, Richard A. Clarke, RichardJ. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
David Danley, Lt. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
$322 million, ten-year contract: William J. Broad and Judith Miller, “Thwarting Terror: A Special Report; Germ Defense Plan in Peril as Its Flaws Are Re- vealed,” New York Times, Aug. 7, 1998, p. Al. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
In an interview: Interview, Nikolai A. Staritsin, Obolensk, Russia. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
223 the Executive Chairman on the Activities of the Special Commission Estab- lished by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 9(b)(I) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1998/920, New York, Oct. 1998. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Judith Miller, “U.S. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
233 “You could make such a virus today”: Interviews, William A. Haseltine. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
233 The hybrid weapon: Miller and Broad, “Exercise Finds U.S. Unable.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
234 “We can return to the StoneAge”: Federal Document Clearing House, “Secretary of Defense Delivers Remarks at the National Press Club,” Mar. 17, 1998, p.9. 234 The story behind Cohen’s announcement: Former senior Pentagon officials de- scribed the origins of the National Guard program and the SAIC study of the issue. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Unable to Handle Germ War Threat,” New York Times, Apr. 26, 1998, p. Al. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
President Clinton discussed the threat:Judith Miller and WilliamJ. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
99,122,166. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The “One Day Policy” of March 30, 1999, they said, required anthrax immunization for anyone serving more than a single day in the “high threat areas,” p. 7. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
266 65, notes that he was trained in the U.S. army’s Chemical Corps. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
266 A later version: U.S. Army, Secretary of the Army, Memorandum of Decision, September 3, 1998, Subject: Authority Under Public Law 85-804 to Include an Indemnification Clause in Contract DAMD17-91-C1086 with Michigan Biologic Products Institute. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
269 Only 8 of 260,000 people: Ibid., p. 70. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
269 “early step”: Ibid., p.6. tiny number of serious adverse reactions: Centers for Disease Control, Epidemiology and Prevention of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 6th ed., Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
TopOff had been very expensive: The uncertainty over cost isjust one of the many unanswered questions about TopOff. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
285 At the Stepnogorsk complex: Michael Dobbs, “Soviet-Era Work on Bioweapons Still Worrisome; Stall in U.S. Dismantling Effort Could Pose Proliferation Threat,” Washington Post, Sept. 12,2000, p. Al. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Our thanks to the provider of this tape, who was not Bill Patrick and who shared it with us on the condition of anonymity. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
294 asked for a more detailed briefing: In interviews, U.S. intelligence officials main- tained that it was their usual practice to brief NSC officials and other officials who needed to know about such sensitive intelligence activities. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
295 really need rockets?: U.S. intelligence officials, in interviews, denied that the agency ever proposed to build a Soviet-style rocket to test. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
300 impasse, see Michael R. Gordon and Judith Miller, “U.S. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
300 talk about what he had done: Although Popov has been in the United States since terview, Popov said that neither the British nor American intelligence services had seemed interested in his germ warfare research in the Soviet Union, be- cause “not a single person” came to discuss his work with him until “much later in Dallas?’ Even then, according to one well-informed U.S. source, the in- telligence analyst who interviewed Popov asked only about the transfer of sen- sitive germ technology to Iran, Iraq, and other unfriendly states, and virtually nothing about his recombinant work. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
7, 1997), pp. 744—46. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Try DARPA,” Science (Feb. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
U.S. Army, 1997. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
New York: Holt, 1999. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
James E. Brooks of the public affairs office of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Queenie A. M. Byars of Defense Department public affairs; Leonard A. Cole of Rutgers University; Chuck Dacey of Fort Detrick; Cob. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
For help with the Rajneeshee story, we would like to thank Jeanie Senior (and her husband and film journalist, Tom) who not only provided on-the-ground ad- vice and support in Oregon but also shared with us her enormous knowledge and insight into the cult and the reactions of fellow Oregonians to it. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Many experts, some in government, helped us grapple with the thorny public policy issues inherent in germ defense. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
We benefited enormously from authors who went before us, most especially Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars; Seymour M. Hersh, Against All Enemies; Charles Piller and Keith R.Yamamoto, Gene Wars; and Ed Regis, The Biology’of Doom. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
We are also grateful to Times colleagues who gave us continuing support over the years, especially Raymond Bonner, Diane Ceribeffi, Cornelia Dean, Michael R. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Many experts, some who wish to remain anonymous, have been kind enough to read parts of the manuscript and help us root out errors. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It goes without saying that any mistakes that may re- main belong to us alone. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Finally, we would like to acknowledge one another. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Kennedy,John F., 52—57,72—73,244 Khattab, “Emir,” 211 kidney disease, 181 kill ratios, 215 Kissinger, Henry, 62 Kistiakowsky, George B., 5 1—52 Knapp, David Berry (Krishna Dcvi; K.D.), 26, Korean War, 41 Krulak, Charles, 154—55 Kuwait, Iraqi invasion, 98, 101, 111, 116, 185, Laden, Osama bin, 138,248,287—88 Lake, Anthony, 142—43,250 Laos, 57, 80 Lassa fever, 211 Lauder,John A., 289-90,294 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Layton, Marcelle, 256,261 LD-50, 110 LeBreton, Karen, 22 Lederberg,Joshua, 79—82,96, 139, 198,219, 157—59,196-97 203,204,270 Anti-Plague Institute, 231 Stepnogorsk plant, 165—66, 170—75, 180, 182,210,285—86,292—93 Vozrozhdeniye Island (Renaissance Island), 171,176-82,208,228—29,231,291 28—30 186 yellow rain, 78,93 284,297 242,248,293,303,312—14 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack, 151—54, 194 background, 67—69 briefing to Clinton, 238,240—41 civilian vulnerabilities and, 142—43,156-57, 163,236,250-53 as consultant to Cetus Corporation, 71—72 dangers of recombinant technology, 80—82 Iraqi biological threat, 111—12 microbial dangers in U.S., 89—91 Marine Corps, Chemical Biological Incident “Marshall Plan” for Cuba, 53—57 Matsumoto gassings (Japan), 161—62, 192 Maxygen, 306—8 McNamara, Robert 5., Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
George E., 116 Libby, I. Lewis, 109-11,156 Libya, 89,150,198 line-source disseminator, 52 Lipkin, Ian, 260 Litton Systems, 52 liver fluke infection, 207 Lockheed-Martin, 52,283 Los Alainos National Laboratory; 120 Los Angeles, 167 Lugar, Richard, 140, 198,206-7,279 Lumumba, Patrice, 72 lupus, 301 Lutgens, Dave, 15,17—18,22,25,32 Lutgens, Sandy, 15,18 lyophilization, 59—60 MacEachin, DouglasJ., Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
82,96-97 Major,John, 126 malaria, 67—68 malathion, 258 Mandela, Nelson, 150 Manhattan Project, 68, 182 Marburg virus, 93, 150, 173,211,228,232—33, 254,255 Response Force (CBLRF), 155—57 77—80,82,93—94, 312—14 150 134—35, 141, 143—44, Index Michigan Department of Public Health, 86—87,101,103,10611614218889 199,201,203~4,213,218,235,245, 266—67,308 microbial food, 147—48, 149, 183 Microcystis aeruginosa toxin (intestinal flu), 73 Mid-Columbia Medical Center (Oregon), 18, 19—20 Military Industrialization Corporation, 128—29 Miller, Frank, 211—12 Minneapolis, 42—43 Monath, Thomas P., 236,239—40,241,263, 290,312 monkeypox, 140—41 Monsanto, 52 Morris, Ralph D., 236—37 Moser, Greg, 275 mosquitoes encephalitis and, 50 West Nile virus and, 256—64,275 mousepox, 310-11 multivalent vaccines, 158, 198,305 Myatt,James M., 119 Mycobacterium tuberculosis (tuberculosis), 37, 72—73, 89, 181,207 mycotoxins, 78,93 myelin, 301—2,304 Myers, Robert, 268 myxomatosis, 44—45 National Academy of Sciences, 83, 139—40, 150,205,207,250-51,253,269 National Crime Information Center, 17 National Guard, 24,233-35,246,280-82 National Institutes of Health (NIH), 90,305 National Security Agency, 289 National Security Council, 50-51,271, 294—95,299,310,312 natural gene exchange, 209 Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 171, 172 Nazism, 204 negative air pressure, 99, 144, 147 Neisseria gonorrhoeae, 27 nerve gas, 199—200 Nevada Test Site, 297—98 New York City, 42 Aum Shinrikyo cult headquarters, 152—53 biological terrorism and, 138—39, 142, 143, 163,167 Civex ‘93 exercise, 138—39 Office of Emergency Management, 257, 258 population density, 257 377 378 Index New York City (cont.) Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
52,54 McNamara, Tracey S., 258—60,263 measles, 38 measles vaccine, 270 Medidi,Anijr, 149—50 Mendez, Enrique, 105 Merck, George W, 38 Merck & Company, 189 Meselson, Matthew S., 57—58,61,62,63,64, National Academy of Sciences committee, 139—43, Pentagon connections, 156—57 Sverdlovsk and yellow rain controversies, 79—80,93 vaccination of servicemen, 200,201 Lederle, 108 Lee,James, 271 Legionella (Legionnaire’s disease), 302 Lemnitzer, Lyman, 51,54 leprosy, 37 Lepyoshitin, Gennady L., 172—8 1, 293 Lewinsky, Monica, 247—48,250 Lewis, Col. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
A Very Select Personal Bibliography 199 Index Abdullah, S. 19 Action Programme 53-4,56 Afghan National Liberation Front see ANLF Afghan refugees 1, 110, 131—3, 138—42, 153, 156, 165—8, 171 Agha, A. 130 agriculture 33, 118 Ahmadzai, S. 47—8 Akbar, M. A. A. 47—8 Alexiev, A. 139 Amanullah, King ofAfghanistan 6-8, 35, 50-1, 39 America see USA Amin, H. 30-1,44 and PDPA 27—8, 29, 46—8 as Deputy Prime Minister 43 as President 82—4, 85, 87 as Prime Minister 69, 78, 79—80, 81—2, 172 Andropov, Y. 88, 121, 145, 149-50 ANLF 62,64 Anwar, M. 72 April revolution see Saur revolution Aqsa see secret police armed forces xi, 126—7, 163 conscription 115 desertion 102, 106~ PDPA cadres 27—3 1 mutiny 28, 83, 115 training 35, 115, 124, 163 Aya, R. 32 Badakhshi, T. 75 Bangladesh 22 Barfield, T. J. 76 Baryalay, M. 47 Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties ... see reform programme Beattie, H. 77—8 Beg, M. 73 Bhutto, B. 169—70 Bhutto, N. 169—70 Bhutto, Z. A. 17, 21—5, 41, 79 Brezhnev, L 87 and Daoud 20, 21 and Iran 95 and Karmal 103 and Soviet intervention 93-4, 99, 100-1, 133—4 and Taraki 80 brideprice see marriage customs Britain see Great Britain Brzezinski, Z. K. 21,88 Cabral, A. 160 Carter,J. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Middleton, D. 96, 139—40 military aid I from USA 10, 15—16 from USSR 8, 12, 16, 35,82—3,87 Mohammed Daoud Khan see Daoud Khan, M. monarchy 13—16 money lending 38-9,49—50 Muhammad, G. 72 Muhammadi, M. M. N. 63 Muhammed Zahir Shah see Zahir Shah Mujahidi, S. 63 Muslim, A. 130 Muslim League 169 Muslim Youth 61, 75 mutinies 28, 83, 115 Mydans, S. 136 Nadir Khan, King ofAfghanistan 8,34,35,59— Naim, M. 19,29 National Awami League 79 National Fatherland Front see NFF National Liberation Front 63 National Revolutionary Party 17, 19, 26 NATO 88, 100 natural resources xii, 11, 33, 124 Neumann, R. G. 15-16, 18,21 newspapers see press and television NFF 119-20, 121 Noor, A. N. 125—6 60 Indo/ 203 204 Afghanistan North Atlantic Treaty Organizacion see NATO Nur, N. M. 47-8 Pakistan 4, 25, 66, 75 Afghan refugees I, 106, 110, 131-3, 138—42, 153, 156, 165—8, 171 and Afghan monarchy 9—11 and Daoud 17, 21, 23 and india 97, 142 and iran 22 and resistance movements 95, 110—11, 124, 128, 132, 156 and revolutionary government 79, 83-4, 128—9, and Saur revolution 41,65 and lISA 10-11, 15, 103, 130, 153, 171—2 and USSR 100, 110— 11, 142, 170—4 religious policies 65 Pakistan People’s Party 79 Parcham group 27, 47—8 and Daoud 19, 26 in coalition 41 leaders 18 origin of 14 Parcham 14-15 Pavlovskii, I. G. 87 PDPA Action Programme 53-4, 56 and NFF 119-20 and USSR 3, 41, 46,66, 157 as governing party 41—55, 66—84, 157—9, 162—74 constitution’46 factions 47—8,67,68, 98, 115, 163 founding of 13—14 national conference 120-1 organization 71, 72, 73, 76-7,80, 126 party membership 120, 121, 126, 128, 157 rebirth 25—6, 27—31 reform programme 48-55 reports by 120, 121, 122—4, 125—30 repression by 71, 75, 78—9 resistance to 56—65, 70—84 split in 14 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan see PDPA Ikiland 92 131—55, 168—71 political developmnt 12—16 political system ix—x, 32—40, 54—5, 120, 125 population census 3 ethnic distribution 2-3 statistics ix, xii-xiv Press Law, 1965 13 press and television xiii, 12—15, 128 Primakov, E 94 public health xi, 32, 128 Pushtunistan 35, 165 history 10-11 Daoud’s suppot fur 13, 17, 23, 36 Puzanov, A. M. 82 Qader-Nuristani, A. arrest of 47-8 in Daoud republic 19-20 in Saur revolution 27, 28, 29, 30 Rabbani, B. 63, 75, 105 Rasul, G. 123 Rasuli, G. H. 19 Ratebzad, A. 47-8 Reagan, R. 90, 91, 103, 140-1 rebellion see resistance movements reform programme 48—55 religious freedom 56, 115—6 religious politics see Islam religious war 58—9, 60~-5, 72 resistance movements 87, 127, 129-30, 164 American support 1, 103, 104, 119, 131, 137— 40 and Soviet forces 85, 98, 104- 10 and Zahir Shah 144-5 by refugees 1, 106, 110,131—3,139—42, 153, 156, 165-8, 171 Chinese support 69 CIA support 138, 147, 152 islamic influence 56—65,72,80,83,95, 104, 162 motivation 70—84 negotiations with 122 Pakistani support 95, 110—11, 124, 128, 132, 156 strike action 118—19 to PDPA 56—65, 70-84 training of 1, 128 Reston,J. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
137 Russia see USSR Saadabad Pact 8 Safronchuk, V. 70, 78 Sarwari, A. 81, 114—5 Saudi Arabia 75, 157, 159 and Afghanistan 21, 23, 61 and Iran 22 Saur revolution I, 26—31, 156—9 and Islam 56—65. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Amin also moved to negotiate with Afghan opponents. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
4 road, which runs close and parallel to the Panjsher Valley. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But I nom- inate celluloid and its baby cousin videotape: for more than anything else this has been the Movie Century, an epoch in which film and video and the images they mediate have replaced print and books and the words they once brokered as the chief instrumentalities of human communication, persuasion, and entertainment. Jihad vs. McWorld
By the time Paramount was in play at the end of 1993, by then itself the target of a bidding battle between friendly (and ultimately victorious) suitor Viacom and unfriendly raider QVC, its properties also included the Trans-Lux Theater Corpora- tion, USA network, Famous Music Corporation, the Miss Universe organization, and Paramount Theme Parks. Jihad vs. McWorld
1.00 Jihad vs. McWorld
5.20 Jihad vs. McWorld
billion for a total of nearly $22 billion. Jihad vs. McWorld
A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Taliban
Packed in with 200 journalists I was fortunate enough to be privy to~y of the internal stand-offs between diplomats from the UN, the USA, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Taliban
Within a few short, dramatic months Afghanistan had been catapulted into the centre of the intensified Cold War between the Soviet Union and the USA. Taliban
For commanders in the south party loyalty depended on which Pesh- awar leader would provide money and arms. Taliban
A USA-based group provided the Taliban with a mobile telephone network between Kabul and Kandahar in 1999. Taliban
So while the USA saw the collapse of the Soviet state as the failure of the communist system, many Muslims saw it solely as a victory for Islam. Taliban
Just 13 days later, after accusing Bin Laden of perpetrating the attack, the USA retaliated by firing 70 cruise missiles against Bin Laden’s camps around Khost and Jalalabad. Taliban
From being mere appendages to the Afghan jihad and the Cold War in the 1980s they had taken centre stage for the Afghans, neighbouring countries and the West in the 1990s. Taliban
In the early 1990s the USA estimated that Caspian oil reserves were between 100 to 150 billion barrels (bb). Taliban
The Caspian region’s proven oil reserves are between 16 and 32 bb, which compares to 22 bb for the USA and 17 bb for the North Sea, giving the Caspian 10-45 times less than the total reserves of the Middle East. Taliban
Proven gas reserves in the Caspian region are estimated at 236—337 trillion cubic feet (tcf), compared to reserves of 300 tcf in the USA. Taliban
Big powers such as Russia, China and the USA; the neighbours Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey; the Central Asian states themselves and the most powerful players of all, the oil companies, compete in what I called in a 1997 seminal magazine article, ‘The New Great Game’. Taliban
Today’s Great Game is also between expanding and contracting empires. Taliban
These rebels were called Basmachis by the Bolsheviks, a derogative term meaning bandit. Taliban
Turkmenistan’s dilemma was that it was sandwiched between Iran which was unacceptable to the USA as a pipeline route; Afghanistan which was trapped in civil war and Russia which wanted to limit Turk- menistan’s gas exports to the West because they competed with Russia’s own exports of Siberian gas. Taliban
Although the USA was determined to isolate Iran, Turkmenistan could not afford to do so, as Iran offered the nearest and most accessible outlet to the south and the sea. Taliban
Adroitly Niyazov wooed the USA while seeking Tebran’s help in developing road and rail links. Taliban
In 1997, the EU’s rejection of Turkey’s membership angered the Turks, but also pushed them into forging closer ties with the USA, Russia, Israel and Central Asia. Taliban
Its need for energy and desire to expand its influence prompted successive Turkish governments to push for becoming the principal route for Central Asian energy exports. Taliban
The USA also urged Kazakhstan to commit to building a similar under- the-sea Caspian oil pipeline, so that Ka.zakh Taliban
Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad developed a dialogue with the Tali- ban through Taliban liason offices in the USA and with the oil compan- ies. Taliban
Despite declining oil prices and Russia’s desperate economic plight, the battle of wills between the USA and Russia will dominate future pipeline competition. Taliban
Russia remains adamant in keeping the USA out of its DICTATORS AND OIL BARONS 155 156 Central Asian backyard. Taliban
That month, Bulgheroni signed a 30-year agreement with the Afghan government, then headed by President Burhanuddin Rabbani, for the construction and operation of a gas pipeline by Bridas and an international consortium which it would create. Taliban
The visit was a failure and Niyazov was unable to meet US leaders. Taliban
The USA could not develop strategic clout in Central Asia without Uzbekistan, the largest and most powerful state and the only one capable of standing up to Russia. Taliban
I did not begin to investigate this unfolding story until the summer of 1996. Taliban
In December 1996, a senior Iranian diplomat told me in hushed tones that the Saudis and the CIA had channelled US$2 million dollars to the Taliban — even though there was no evidence for such suspicions. Taliban
In May 1997 at an annual regional summit in Ashkhabad, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Unocal signed an agreement, which committed Unocal to raising the finances and reaching financial closure for the project by December 1997, starting construction by early 1998. Taliban
As a result, the USA began to explore other options to help Turkmenistan deliver its gas. Taliban
With the USA now preoccupied with capturing Bin Laden, it seemed for the moment that one phase of the Great Game was now over. Taliban
Yet the USA, now fervently rooting for the Baku- Ceyhan pipeline despite crashing oil prices and a refusal by oil companies to invest, persisted in the belief that pipelines could be built without a strategic vision or conflict resolution in the region. Taliban
After providing billions of dollars’ worth of arms and ammunition to the Mujaheddin, the USA began to walk away from the Afghan issue after Soviet troops completed their withdrawal in 1989. Taliban
The USA dealt with issues as they came up, in a haphaz- ard, piecemeal fashion, rather than applying a coherent, strategic vision to the region. Taliban
Between 1994 and 1996 the USA supported the Taliban politically through its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, essentially because Wash- ington viewed the Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia and pro-Western. Taliban
In 1998 and 1999 the Taliban’s support for Bin Laden, their refusal tc endorse the Un~al project or compromise with their opponents and thi new moderate government in iran provided additional reasons for thi TALIBAN T USA to get tough with the Taliban. Taliban
Nevertheless, late as it was, for the first time the USA was genuinely on the peace train and gave full support to UN medi- ation efforts to end the war. Taliban
In a confidential 1996 State Department memo written just before the Taliban captured Kabul, parts of which I read, analysts wrote that, if the Taliban expanded, Russia, India and Iran would support the anti-Taliban alliance and the war would continue; that the USA would be torn between supporting its old ally Pakistan and trying to prevent arttagoniz- ing India and Russia with whom the USA was trying to improve relations. Taliban
There was a bigger problem. Taliban
Even today the USA is muddled on the critical question of whether it wants to save Central Asia’s depressed economies by letting them export energy any way they like or to keep Iran and Russia under blockade as far as pipelines are concerned. Taliban
The USA and Unocal were essentially faced with a simple question in Afghanistan. Taliban
Although there was no CIA budget for providing arms and ammunition to the Taliban and Unocal did not channel military support to the Tali- ban, the USA did support the Taliban through its traditional allies Pakis- tan and Saudi Arabia, accepting their provision of arms and funding to the Taliban. Taliban
The only positive spin from the trip was that it convinced Iran that the USA now saw Tehran as a dia- logue partner in future Afghan peace talks, thereby reducing US—Iranian tensions over Afghanistan. Taliban
As with Raphel’s initiatives in 1996, the USA appeared to be dipping its fingers into the Afghan quagmire, but wanted no real responsibility. Taliban
The USA wished to avoid taking sides or getting involved in the nuts and bolts of peace-making. Taliban
Washington appeared to have a Bin Laden policy but not an Afghanistan policy. Taliban
In 1998 and 1999 the Taliban’s support for Bin Laden, their refusal to endorse the Un~al project or compromise with their opponents and the new moderate government in iran provided additional reasons for the j TALIBAN T USA to get tough with the Taliban. Taliban
In a confidential 1996 State Department memo written just before the Taliban captured Kabul, parts of which I read, analysts wrote that, if the Taliban expanded, Russia, India and Iran would support the anti-Taliban alliance and the war would continue; that the USA would be torn between supporting its old ally Pakistan and trying to prevent antagoniz- ing India and Russia with whom the USA was trying to improve relations. Taliban
In 1992—93, under Indian pressure, the USA had come close to declar- ing Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, as Kashmiri militants based in Pakistan carried out guerrilla attacks in Indian Kashmir. Taliban
Khatami’s victory created an immediate thaw in Iran’s relations with the outside world as it opened up to the West, wooed its old enemy the USA with the need for ‘a dialogue between civilizations’ and sought an improvement in relations with the Arab world. Taliban
Afghanistan was to become the primary issue in helping thaw relations between Iran, the USA and the Arab world. Taliban
Due to the estranged relations between Iran and the USA, the Afghan Mujaheddin groups based in Iran received no international military assist- ance. Taliban
Tehran’s own support to the Mujaheddin was limited on account of budgetary constraints because of the Iraq—Iran war. Taliban
Thus throughout the 1980s, the USA effectively blocked off Iran from the out- side world on Afghanistan. Taliban
But when Riyadh asked these Islamic groups for a payback and to lend support to Saudi Arabia and the USA led coalition against Iraq, the majority of them backed Saddam Hussein, including Hikmetyar and most Afghan groups. Taliban
The Saudis and the Pakistanis made fre- quent attempts to bring all the factions together. Taliban
Riyadh’s support for the Taliban made them extremely reluctant to exert any pressure on the Taliban to deport Osama Bin Laden, even though the USA was urging them to do so. Taliban
Saudi Arabia’s initial support for the Taliban convinced Iran that the USA was also backing them in an intensification of its 1980s policies to surround Iran with hostile forces and isolate it. Taliban
The USA, according to Tehran, had a new aim to promote oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia which would bypass Iran. Taliban
The Iranians were also furious that the Taliban actions had endangered its growing rap- prochenient with the USA. Taliban
USA—Iran co-operation on Afghanistan, ‘cer- tainly can be an exemplary case and shows that the US has a better understanding of the reality in this region and the role that Iran can play for the promotion of peace and security,’ Kamal Kharrazi told me. Taliban
If President Khatami were to push forward his reform agenda at home, the Iranian regime would increasingly desire and need a peace settlement SHIA VERSUS SUNNI: IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA 205 206 TAUBAN in Afghanistan - to end the drain on its resources from funding the anti- Taliban alliance, stop the drugs, weapons and sectarian spillover from Afghanistan and move towards a further rapprochement with the USA. Taliban
By walking away from Afghanistan as early as it did, the USA faced within a few years dead diplomats, destroyed embassies, bombs in New York and cheap heroin on its streets, as Afghanistan became a sanctuary for international terrorism and the drugs mafia. Taliban
Afghans today remain deeply bitter about their abandonment by the USA, for whom they fought the Cold War. Taliban
In the 1980s the USA was prepared ‘to fight till the last Afghan’ to get even with the Soviet Union, but when the Soviets left, Washington was not prepared to help bring peace or feed a hungry people. Taliban
Today the USA, by picking up single issues and creating entire policies around them, whether it be oil pipelines, the treatment of women or terrorism, is only demonstrating that it has learnt little. Taliban
The USA is the only world power which has the ability to influence all the neighbouring states to stop interfering in Afghanistan. Taliban
Pakistan, weakened by the demise of its strategic partnership with the USA after the end of the Cold War and in the throes of a deep economic crisis, was nevertheless determined to extend its zone of influence by trying to nominate the next government in Kabul. Taliban
Oil and gas pipelines crossing Afghanistan would link the country into the region and speed up foreign assistance for its reconstruction. Taliban
1996 APPENDIX3 227 228 ~- TALIBAN 11 July. Taliban
28 February. Taliban
APPENDIX 3 233 234 -~ TALIBAN 8 June. Taliban
~ Delta and Turkmenistan’s Turkmenrosgaz for pipe- 1997 20 January September 27 September 1 October 26 October November 9 December 29 December Iran, Turkey, Turkmenistan sign agreement for Tur- January February March April 8 line project. Taliban
ECO summit in Asbkhabad. Taliban
Seward, Desmond, The Monks of War, the Military Religious Orders, Penguin, London 1972. Taliban
Notes 4. Taliban
Chapter 6 1. Taliban
Politics in Contemporary Asia series I 1 ‘S The Taliban: War, religion and the new order in Afghanistan KARACHI LAHORE ISLAMABAD Peter Marsden Oxford University Press Zed Books Ltd LONDON & NEW YORK w 0 The Taliban: War, religion and the new order in Afghanistan was first published by Zed Books Ltd, 7 Cynthia Street, London NI 9JF, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, rw 10010, USA in 1998. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Published in South Asia by Oxford University Press, 5 Bangalore Town, Sharae Faisal, P0 Box 13033, Karachi-7535o. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Chapter II considers the apparent support for the Taliban by elements within Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and, possibly, the USA, noting the often conflicting agendas in operation. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Although it was successful in reversing an initial defeat, Britain had no taste for further fighting and agreed, through the ‘919 Treaty of Rawal- pindi, that Afghanistan was free to conduct its own foreign affairs. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Afghanistan thus increasingly looked to the Soviet Union as a trading partner and source of support. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
A $ioom loan followed in 1955 and the first major consignment of arms arrived a year later, after several failed attempts on the part of the Afghan government to obtain arms from the USA. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The process of rapprochement with the USSR and the USA was accelerated during the period in office of Muhammad Daoud Khan, who served as prime minister from 1953 to 1963. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 17 April 1978 Daoud was overthrown and killed in a military coup orchestrated by the PDPA, with possible Soviet backing. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Indications that the USA might strengthen the Islamic resistance, and fears that it might have ambi- tions to establish a military presence there if conditions allowed, combined with a growing rapprochement between Washington and Peking to create an acute sense of paranoia in the Kremlin. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Zia was, however, wary of the Pushtun tribes, whose tradition of fierce independence made them unlikely partners in a defensive coalition. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The USA was assumed to be aware of this imbalance but was said to have condoned it on the basis of Hisb-e-Islami’s apparently greater organ- isational capacity. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
From 1987, the Soviet Union demonstrated an increasing commit- ( on throughout the war, involving Pakistan, the USA and the Afghan / / ment to the UN-sponsored peace negotiations that had been going government, but excluding the Mujahidin parties. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In its dying months, the USSR finally reached agreement with the USA that both sides would halt arms supplies to their respective proteges, the Najibullah government and the Mujahidin. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, it is thought likely that they were seen by elements outside Afghanistan as being potentially useful in promoting their various interests, and that these elements decided it was worthwhile to pro- vide them with some backing. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In the ‘New World Order’ of the post-Soviet period the Islamic world is fast taking on the role of the new enemy, with Iran, until recently, assuming the symbolic lead in the eyes of the USA, at least. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The leading ideologue of the Iranian revolution was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Islam therefore became the binding force of the resistance movement and a jihad was called against the invaders, whence the resistance fighters took on the name of the Mujahidin. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
I0I The benefits of the economic assistance provided by the Soviet Union, the USA and Europe during the post-war years were quickly lost as the Soviet forces reduced highways to pot-holed obstacle courses and devastated agriculture through sustained bombing cam- paigns. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The same day, the USA warned the Taliban administration that it would not secure international recognition or aid unless it respected the rights of women. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It is primarily the USA and Europe that are giving serious consideration to the issue of recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Many cases of executions, imprisonment arian agencies and their own tortuous negotiations with the Taliban and violation of human rights can be seen in these countries. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 8 May 1997, the Taliban Voice of Shari’a radio station issued a statement on this point: There are dozens and even hundreds of states in the world that do The Taliban not comply in any way with genuine standards of human rights fol- conditions on any possible way forward. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The presence of humanit- lowed by people in the West. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The same arguments apply to the European Union. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the justification for the USA to continue its programme of support to Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, rumours have continued to persist that it has, for example, provided military training and supplies, thus supporting the onward march of the Taliban to take the eastern provinces of Afghan- istan over the winter of 1994—95 and to capture Herat and the west of the country in September 1995. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Rumours that the USA was sympathetic to the Taliban were in part fuelled by a statement on 2 October by the American oil com- pany, UNOCAL, that it regarded the Taliban’s new dominance in Afghanistan as a ‘positive development’. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Such rumours were also generated by the more active diplomacy of the USA in Afghanistan over the previous year or so and by early indications, following the takeover of Kabul, 129 The Taliban that the USA would seek a meeting with the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
By contrast, Iran was vociferous in its criticism of the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In a statement published by the Iranian News Agency on 15 October, Mr Velayati referred to ‘recent remarks by Pakistani officials admitting that the USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sup- ported the Taliban’, and said that ‘followers of a specific religious or ethnic group cannot impose their will on other groups’. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Specula- tion about possible CIA backing for the Taliban has been partly fuelled by enthusiastic reports in the Taliban press of seizures of American Stinger missiles in the midst of other arms seizures (Voice of Shari’a issued a series of announcements regarding such seizures over the winter of 1996—p7). The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Until the election, in mid- 1997, of a relatively moderate Iranian president, the USA was in- evitably concerned at the prospect of Iran acting as the major conduit for Central Asian oil supplies. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In addition, by seeking to keep its initial military assistance to the Mujahidin parties covert, the USA allowed Pakistan to act as the conduit for supplies and so to influence how those supplies were distributed. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Pakistan has therefore been strengthened by the USA in pursuing its own strategic interests, which have included a wish to control whoever holds power in Kabul and also to keep the independent-minded traditional leaders under rein. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The USA also has an interest in the creation of stability in the region. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
With the former Soviet Union in a fragile political and economic state, the USA is inevitably concerned not to have a country on the southern border of the CIS where there are no real controls and where drug production and smuggling, terrorism and the arms trade can be organised with a minimum of constraint. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Taliban movement can be seen as a product of the conifict that originated in the 1978 socialist coup and the subsequent Soviet invasion, of people’s weariness with continued fighting and their disappointment with resistance leaders who failed to unite and form a stable government. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The issue of international responsibility is therefore a factor. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The failure of these movements to form a government created the conditions for a genuine mass move- ment to emerge. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
We have, therefore, two simultaneous and contradictory processes. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
44, 52, 6i, 64, 65, 66, 70, 76, 86, ‘5° opium, production of, 124, 140—I Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 135 orphanages, 142; role of, 84 Ottoman empire, 15 Pakistan, 7, 22, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 40, 43, 53, 8~, 84, 121, 123, 126, 127, t28, 130, 131, !35, The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
But in 1900 King Umberto of Italy had been assassinated by an Anarchist,’ and a year later President McKinley of the U.S.A. by another. The Terrorists
The terrorists who undertook this execution belonged to an Anarchist cell in Patterson, New Jersey, U.S.A. They were Italian immigrants working in the silk-weaving industry estab- lished in that city of seventy thousand inhabitants and twelve thousand looms. The Terrorists
The Palestine Liberation Organization (El Fatah et alia) fathered the Black September terrorists (see Chapter 13). The Terrorists
Enough has been said about this to make the point. The Terrorists
Alarm, 46 Albania, repression in, 15 Alexander, King of Yugoslavia, 17 Alexander II, Tsar, 17, 23, 35, 43, 48, 70—2, Alexander III, 48, 122 Alexander Obrenova~, King of Serbia, 58—60 Algeria, 13, 169, 179, 181 American Civil War, 65, 84—5, 86, 87, 88 Amin, President Idi, 187 Anarchism, Bakunin’s, 33 — in Austria, 43 — in Britain, 43 — in France, 39, 63—4, 112—13 — in Germany, 42 —, International Alliance of Social Democracy, 36, 46 — in Italy, 10, 40, 116—21 — in Poland, 127 —, Proudhon’s, 33 — in Russia, 10, 33—79, 110-42 passim — in Spain, 10, 40, 110—16 in U.S.A., 40, 44-9, 118 —, Woodcock’s history of, 25 Anarchism (Woodcock’s), 25 fn. The Terrorists
Anarchist), 47 Patriotism, 151—2 Pearse, Padraic, 96 People’s Revolutionary Army (Latin American), 177 ‘People’s Will’, 10, 43, 75, 76, 77, 78, 165, 171 Perier, Casimir, 58 Perovskaya, Sophia, 43, 76—9, 121, 171 Peru, 16, 166 Peter-Paul prison, 23, 30, 34, 69 Phiippino Marxist-Leninist guerril- las, 176 Phoenix, the, 86 Phoenix National and Literary Society, 86 Phoenix Park assassinations, 90,93 PIDE (Portuguese political police in Africa), 168 fn. The Terrorists
War and terrorism compared, 13, 14, 184—5 Weathermen (U.S.A.), The Terrorists
FBI agents were eager to conduct a covert search of the group’s apartment. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
“Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruc- tion:’ part 3, Mar.27, 1996, prepared testimony of Bill Richardson, p. 81. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
As the distant chop-chop heralded the machine’s approach, they would urge me to hurry as we trekked through badly rocket-scarred villages. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The invaders had looted or destroyed food stocks, ruptured irrigation channels, chopped down fruit trees and machine... Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It has also persuaded them to see in privatization not merely a paring knife to trim the fat from overindul- gent state bureaucracies but a cleaver with which democracy can be chopped into pieces and then pulverized. Jihad vs. McWorld
Meanwhile, the Grinbergs offer a delightful respite. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
While Cowboy Weber was willing to incur Washing- ton’s anger over the unauthorized rental of a chopper, he was taking no chances with the germs. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Most of them neither par- ticipate in its fledgling politics nor feel anything like a European civic identity to match their well-felt transnational commercial and com- modity identities, let alone their identity as Bavarians or Walloons or Basques or Lombardians. Jihad vs. McWorld
In his Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton:25. Jihad vs. McWorld
But Pakistan, like the Soviet Union, had a view of its own on the subject that was well known until the death of President Zia al-Haq and General Akhtar Abdur Rahman in a mysterious plane crash in August 1988. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Another drawback is the poor training of recruits and the lack of qualified officers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
I0 ISBN:O—345 —38304 -4 To the Memory of Judith ~ S/zklar I was given extraordinary support by two research assistants. Jihad vs. McWorld
Internationally, much the same thing is occurring. Jihad vs. McWorld
But if the war in Afghanistan continues to be ignored we can only CONCLUSION: THE R.TFURE OF AFGHANISTAN 215 216 TALIBAN expect the worst. Taliban
18 February. Taliban
It warned that germ at- tacks on the United States “might be disastrous” and urgently recom- mended crash programs of “home defense, involving collaborate efforts of federal, state and private agencies.” Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Robert S. McNamara, the new secretary of defense, did a sweeping review of military programs, in- cluding biological weapons. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
The two men produced a crash paper that recommended the stockpiling of enough anthrax and botulinum vaccine to inoculate two million soldiers against attack. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It wasn’t even clear that there woulU be any detectors. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
On December 17, 1990, Powell finally delivered his recommenda- tions to Secretary Cheney, calling for inoculations to begin immedi- ately. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
It would conceal all evidence of the germ operations and of the crash nuclear program, which had come much closer to building a crude nuclear bomb than Western intelligence officials suspected. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Iraqi officials admitted that they had produced an ex- tensive array of germ weapons for use on the battlefield, from missiles to bombs to jet-mounted aerosol tanks. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
105 Warfare in Support of Operation Desert Shield:’ Sept. 24, 1990. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Despite guerrilla claims of shooting down helicopters, a considerable number are known to have crashed or been forced to land for technical reasons. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But then Russians are curiously like Americans, impulsive risk-takers and ambivalent about authority. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
1997 24 May. Taliban
Its outlines were known from news articles and such books as Theodor Rosebury’s Peace or Pestilence. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
Once the parts feel justified in jettisoning the whole, the logic of Jihad does not necessarily stop with the first and primary layer of fragments. Jihad vs. McWorld
With oil prices crashing in 1999, Iran remained the wild card in the new Great Game. Taliban
The victory of the dollar over every other conceivable interest, public or private, entails not just a crass commercialism in the place where quality information and diversified entertainment should be, but also a monopoly antipathetic to democratic society and free civ- ilization, if not also to capitalism itself That “creative geniuses” like Spielberg, Katzenberg, and Geffen join up gives their rivals night- mares, but will not necessarily enhance competition—or even cre- ativity, though observers will once again celebrate synergy Yet how can an Edgar Bronfman (Seagram) take on a Matsushita/MCA/ Universal Pictures without creating his own megamonopoly? What- ever else McWorld’s mergers may serve in the vital infotainment tele- sector, they serve neither culture nor liberty nor democracy. Jihad vs. McWorld
Pitiful streams of men, women and children, clutching blankets, tea kettles, chickens, carpets and other family belongings, made their way to Pakistan on foot or by truck or camel. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In August 1984, I witnessed a raid by MJG.27 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
AFGHANISTAN Marxist Regimes Series Series editor: Bogdan Szajkowski, Department of Sociology, University College, Cardiff Afghanistan Bhabani Sen Gupta Ethiopia Peter Schwab Grenada Tony Thorndike Guyana Henry B. Jeffrey and Cohn Baber Romania Michael Shafir Soviet Union RonaldJ. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
948 North Street Boulder, Colorado 80302 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sen Gupta, Bhabani Afghanistan: politics, economics, and society. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This series does not aim at assigning authenticity or authority to any single one of the political systems included in it. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Ethnic distribution Guerrilla and terrorist activity4. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Soviet prescence5. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
< List of Tables< Size, ownership and distribution of privately-ownedI. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Marxist regime in Afghanistan is far from stabilized. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In writing this volume, I have drawn upon the knowledge and expertise of many students of Afghanistan and international com- munism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
I have gained from my participation in an international conference on Afghanistan held in February 1985 at Columbia, North Carolina, under the auspices of the Department of International Relations of the University of North Carolina. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
I must thank the Director of the Centre for Policy Research, New xii Preface Delhi, Dr V. A. Pai Panandikar, for giving me research and secretarial facilities for writing this volume; the information and cultural affairs ministry of the Afghan government and the Afghan embassy in New Delhi for making available a lot ofofficial reports; an Indian friend in the United States (who does not wish to be identified) for sending me a num- ber of the latest books on Afghanistan; and MrM. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Population distribution Life expectancy Infant death rate (per 1,000) Ethnic groups Capital Major cities Land area Land boundaries Official languages State and government Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Central Asia, bounded by USSR (N), Iran (W), Pakistan (E & S), China (NE). Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Land- locked. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
14.2 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karmal has been trying to build an insti- tutionalized mass base for the PDPA regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
18.0% Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Monarchy 2 Afghanistan In the middle of 1985, as this book is being written, everything about Afghanistan is controversial. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan is a landlocked country roughly the size of Texas. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Arid, economically backward, it has a strategic location at the conjunction of Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the subcontinent. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The first-ever census, taken in 1979, placed the total population of Afghanistan at 15.5 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
million. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghans are a gaggle of ethnic nationalities. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan’s total land area is 652,090 sq. km. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan's most convenient access to the sea lies through Pakistan, or alternatively on the road and rail container route through the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
of new road were planned to be constructed by 1984. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
All-weather high- ways link Kabul with Kandahar and Herat in the south and east, Jalalabad in the west and Mazar-i-Sharif and the Oxus, on which there is water traffic. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A feasibility study for the country’s first railway, linking Kabul to Pakistan and Iran, was completed in 1977. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A network of asphalted highways connecting the main towns has been built with Soviet and American help; 1,060 km. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Great Game of nineteenth-century geopolitics was played by British imperial power expanding northward frnm the Indian sub-< continent and Russian imperial power pushing southward through Central Asi . Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Britannia ruled the seas. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The two imperial powers never did actually collide over Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, a clash did occur between Afghans and Russians in March 1885 at Pul- i-Khatum, near Panjdeh, along the Afghan frontier. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan force had to retire with heavy losses, leaving Panjdeh to the Russians. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was the British rather than the Russians who wanted to annex Afghanistan to their empire. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
More than a hundred years ago, in the 1870s, the Russians wanted Britain to concede Afghanistan as a buffer state between the two empires. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The British refused. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Fearing an expansion of Russian influence to Afghanistan, the British invaded the country twice as pre-emptive measures, but both expeditions failed, and the British forces had to retreat. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Kipling, poet of the British Indian empire, warned his countrymen: When you're wounded an’ left on Afghanistan’s plains, An’ the women come out to cut up your remains, Just roll to your rifle an’ blow out your brains, An’ go to your Gawd like a soldier. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan only succeeded to some extent in easing out of the British sphere of influence after World War I. The process began with the coming of Amanullah to the throne in KabuL with his declaration that Afghanistan was no one’s puppet, but a fully independent sovereign state. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
His demand that this status for Afghanistan be formally recognized by the British Government and the Viceroy of India was rejected by both. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Lenin recognized Afghanistan as a sovereign independent/state and received a friendly communication from Amanullah. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In less than a month the British declared war on Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The armistice, signed on 3 June 1919, led to a peace treaty on 8 August, but in neither did the British formally recognize Afghanistan as a sovereign state. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
(Afghanistan, however, signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union on 28 February 1921 Lenin, in a letter to Amanullah, observed that the treaty gave ‘formal consolidation to the friendship and mutual sympathy between Afghanistan and Russia which have grown and strengthened in the past two years.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
But support came immediately from a newly-born state: the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Even then victory eluded the British. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There are no issues between Afghanistan and Russia likely to lead to differences, or even cast a shadow on Russo— Afghan friendship.’7 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1929, Amir Amanullah fell from power because of intensified opposition in Afghanistan to his drive for reform and modernization. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
After Habibullah was deposed and executed on 15 October 1929, Nadir Khan became King of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He tried to reduce Soviet influence in Afghanistan but at the same time concluded several treaties with the USSR, including the neutrality treatyof 1926, renegotiated in 1931, a postal accord in 1932 and an agreement to appoint officials to study frontier disputes, also in 1932;10 and a trade agreement/During Nadir Khan’s rule, Soviet—Afghan relations improved considerably, even if they were not entirely free of strain. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
(The British had a hand in the Amir’s fall.) Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Neither Britain nor the Soviets recognized a short-lived government set up by the rebel leader, Amir Habibullah. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan improved its relations with Germany in the 1930s and in October 1936 concluded a protocol with Germany under which German arms were to be supplied to Kabul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan maintained its friendly relations with Germany through World War IL This was not liked by Britain and the USSR but neither wanted to take punitive act on against Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This balanced relationship policy was pursued from 1946 to 1953. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Then came a ten- year period when Afghanistan tilted towards the Soviet Union in view of a sharp deterioration in its relations with Pakistan./After Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
1963 Afghanistan appeared to be trying to normalize its relationship with all its neighbours, including Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the period 1946-53 Afghanistan tried to maintain this balanced relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States, engaging both in its economic and infrastructural development. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The situation, however, changed in the late 1940s after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine which brought Turkey and Greece under American protec- tion. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As the British withdrew from the Indian subcontinent and the two conflict-locked sovereign states of India and Pakistan were born, Afghanistan proceeded to improve and stabilize its relations with the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1954 the Soviets voiced support for Pushtunistan, thus trying to draw Afghanistan toward its influence as the United States brought.Pakistan Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets began to extend economic aid to Afghanistan, which had the distinction of becoming the first country with which the Soviets started experiment- ing with their post-Stalin Third World diplomacy. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Khrushchev visited Afghanistan in December 1955/shortly after his and Bulganin’s highly successful visit to India. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A boundary agreement was concluded in 1948. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was followed in 1950 with a four-year trade agreement. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It’s my strong feeling that the capital we invested in Afghanistan hasn’t been wasted. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
We have earned the Afghans’ trust and friendship, and it hasn’t fallen into the Americans’ trap; it hasn’t been caught on the hook baited with American money.18 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the first decade of Daoud’s prime ministership, 1953—63, a funda- mental contradiction tore across Afghanistan’s political economy. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
King Zahir Shah had tried in the late forties and early fifties to introduce elections to the people of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A ‘liberal parliament’ was formed in 1952 through ‘relatively free elec- tions [by Afghan standards]20 and the result was the election of fifty leftist candidates in a House of 120, and several newspapers sprang up suddenly, flaunting titles that unnerved the King and his royal kinsmen—Nida-yi-Khalq (Voice of the People), Watan (Homeland), Angar (Burning Embers). Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A partly elected and partly nominated loya jirgah was convened to approve a constitution which the King promulgated in October 1964. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The full name of the political party was the People’s Democratic History and Political Traditions: The Monarchy 13 14 Afganistan P of Afghanistan (PDPA). Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Predictably, the ruling family and the 300,000 mullahs of Afghani- stan were alarmed. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Daoud, who had been waiting for his chance to return to the helm of power, and who had built up contacts with leftist elements in the political factions as well as in the army, now took an extraordinarily bold step. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the last decade of the Afghan monarchy, the United States conducted a reappraisal of the prospects for and the need for influence-building in Afghanistan, and came to the conclusion that the landlocked country was not of great importance to the United States nor was the United States in a position to dislodge the Soviet Union from the vantage point it had achieved since the early fifties. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Robert G. Neumann, who was United States ambassador to Afghanistan from 1966 to 1973, has recorded that John Foster Dulles had turned down Afghan requests for military aid because of the ‘location and poor communications’ of Afghanistan, which would require the United J States to undertake ‘an enormous logistics effort’, risking an escalation of the cold war with the USSR26 Neumann’s successor, Theodore L. Eliot, jnr., Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The first was the close relations the United States had built up with Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
a source of oil or scarce strategic metals;.. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Neumann listed additional factors that worked in favour of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan was dependent on Soviet arms. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets were Kabul’s largest trade partner. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As already noted, King Zahir Shah’s flirtation with the concept of a 18 Afghanistan constitutional monarchy created a political-intellectual ferment in Kabul and other cities. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There was a clause in the constitution which Zahir Shah gave his people which forbade any member of the royal family from becoming Afghanistan’s prime minister. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The ‘pseudo-democracy’ of Zahir Shah, he told the people of Afghanistan, was a ‘corrupt system’ that rested ‘on personal and class interests, intrigues and demagogy’ The reforms Daoud actually introduced proved to be half-way measures, sharpen- ing discontent in most political groups. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Within two years Daoud tried to reduce the influence of the left. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In foreign policy, Daoud gave an appearance of distancing Afghanistan somewhat from the Soviet Union without being actually able or willing to do so. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On the contrary, they were pleased with Daoud’s support for the Brezhnev concept of Asian collective security—they gave Afghanistan $437m. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Wa/l street Journal perceived Soviet influence in Afghanistan in September 1977 to be greater than that of any other power.8 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
in economic aid in 1975; while, in the following year, a new Afghan—Soviet trade treaty envisaged a 65 per cent increase in two-way trade by 1980. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Ambassador Eliot agreed with Neumann’s assessment. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For a year and more of his presidency, Daoud kept close to the USSR and increased his support to the Pushtunistan movement, so much so that in 1975 Pakistan’s Bhutto accused him of training 15,000 Pushtuns and Balochs in Afghanistan for infiltration into the two Pakistani provinces of the North-west Frontier andBaluchistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The National Security Council, headed by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, devised the concept of regional influence and identified the Shah of Iran as the first of that newly labelled cluster of heads of state with which the United States could do a lot of business. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Shah simultaneously sought to build bridges of friendship with Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He wanted the Persian Gulf and South Asian regions to be less polarized between the two superpowers, and wanted countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India to draw a little distant from their respective superpower friend or patron. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At the superpower level, the Soviet Union was trying to persuade the Shah to be less dependent on the United States, while the United States pleaded with India and Afghanistan to be ‘genuinely non-aligned’ between Washington and Moscow. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
to Pakistan $750 m., and to Afghanistan $50 m. between 1973 and 1975. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The same dislike of polarization has been manifest in Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Ambassador Eliot was advising Daoud to cultivate closer ties with Iran and countries of the Middle East. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Washington also asked Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Japan to give more economic assistance to Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
An American specialist on Afghanistan claimed that in 1974 the Shah of Iran promised to provide Afghanistan with $2 b. in economic aid over ten years, of which $50 m. was actually given in that year. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This project, if completed, would have significantly reduced Afghanistan’s trade dependencies on the Soviet Union.’3 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the last two years of his reign, and of his republic’s life, Daoud did appear to be cautiously but systematically asserting Afghanistan’s independence and ‘genuine non-alignment’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He was sending his Afghanistan as a Republic 23 24 Afghanistan soldiers to Egypt, India and the United States in larger numbers than before. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In March 1978 Afghanistan and China concluded a trade protocol which provided for increased trade between the two, and a credit of 100 in. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On the contrary, as already noted, the Soviets continued to befriend Afghanistan and Moscow’s rhetoric did not betray visible irritation with Daoud’s tentative search for ‘genuine non-alignment’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the geopolitical region in which Afghanistan is located, profound political change took place in 1977—8. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In India and in Afghanistan warring communist factions came together in response to changing realities in the two countries’ respective domestic politics. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Thus was reborn the PDPA, with Nur Mohammed Taraki and Babrak Karma! as its first two front-rank leaders. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the humble universe of South Asian commumsm, two significant developments took place in 1977. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fortunes of the Marxists in Afghanistan took a quantum leap in April 1978 for which neither they nor the Soviets were prepared. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Louis Dupree noted con- siderable economic vigour and diversity in Afghanistan in 1976-77, and a ‘remarkable improvement in Afghanistan’s econqmic status’.’6 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Before the newly-formed PDPA could build its organization as a strong rallying point of the urban middle class, even before it could come to grips with political and social change in Afghanistan, and certainly before it could sort out the power equations between its two long-feuding, suddenly reunited partners, it found itself catapulted to power in a revolution whose actual leadership, crucial direction, decision-making apparatus, and class character were all highly controversial, and remain still to be documented with complete cre- dibility. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the next few days, Taraki, Amin, Karma! Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At 7.05 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Cyrus Vance, who was Secretary of Afghanistan asa Republic 29 30 Afghanistan State in the Carter administration when the revolution took place, said in his memoirs, ‘We had no evidence of Soviet complicity in the coup.’22 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The communist movement in Afghanistan was weak It was not even listed in the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs until 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan revolution was described by Americans and others as a coup, or even a palace or an army coup rather than a revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was, however, not a military take—over. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The military officers acted on instructions from Hafizullah Aniin, who, this writer was told by authoritative sources in Kabul, issued his ‘orders’ on behalf of the PDPA, not on behalf of himself.24 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the next chapter we take a close look at Afghanistan’s political economy—the nature of the state—at the time of the Saur (April) revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan as a Republic 31 3 With all its disadvantages—no revolutionary base of its own, no experi- ence of a long political struggle, the PDPA membership of no more than 5,000 (most, if not all of them, recruited from Kabul and the provincial towns)—what kind of a state did the Saur revolution inherit or seize on 27 April 1978? What was the state. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The dramatic and surprising success of the Afghan revolution betrays the fundamental weakness of modernizing regimes in the Third World not based on sound and developing political systems linked to the masses. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Energy consumption, at 47 kg. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Only 16 per cent of GDP came from exports, which was 13 per cent lower than average exports of the forty-two least developed countries in the world. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Soviet scholars and commentators have described Afghanistan at the time of the April revolution in the same vein. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In an article in the journal Asia and Africa Today in 1980, a Soviet scholar remarked that the Nadir Shah dynasty had ‘personified the most brutal form of class and national oppression of the working people and seriously impeded Afghanistan’s econothic, social and cultural development.’5 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘Capitalism in Afghanistan developed in specific conditions’, wrote an analyst in New Times, and echoed the same obser\rations: ‘The workers were ruthlessly exploited, working conditions were extremely hard. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
American political and social anthropologists who have specialized in Afghanistan speak of a far more complex political society than is visible in Soviet-Afghan Marxist analyses. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In April 1978, Afghanistan was not an entirely tribal society. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘In cases where tribal ideology exists, as among the Pashai and Nuristani, its role in the political processes is considerably different. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There was no uniform popular attitude to central authority in Afghanistan when the communists captured state power. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
When Nadir Shah founded the Musahiban dynasty in 1929, after crushing the reformist regime of. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the modernizing period of the Musahiban rule, as well as during Daoud’s republican leadership, three major political forces emerged in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The form of local-level politics was determined by economic reali- ties. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In most of Afghanistan two power structures were in existence at the time of the Saur revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Land, as noted, was the source of power all over Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Table 1. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Source: V. Glukhodcd, ‘Economy of independent Afghanistan’, Social &iences Today, Moscow, Table 2. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Size, ownership and distribution of privately-owned land in Afghanistan (Soviet figures)* Number % 420,000— 670,000* 470,000 450,000 230,000 51,600 1981, pp. 241—2. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Size, ownership and distribution of privately-owned land in Afghanistan (Indian flgures) Number NA 805,000 161,000 125,000 109,000 0 39.0 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
44.4 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
No non-Marxist political group was given a berth in the government. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was a youthful council of ministers. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The President and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was Taraki, who was also the General Secretary of the PDPA. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This was a time of political change in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Amin was narrowly defeated in the 1965 election. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A spellbinding orator, Babrak closely identified himself with those intellectuals who spoke Dan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
After proclaiming Afghanistan a Democratic Republic, the leaders of the revolution sought to reassure their countrymen as well as the out- side world that they were not communists and that the Government was not Marxist. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Only an openly and uncompromisingly revolutionary line could polarize Afghanistan along the desired class lines, he argued. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It was in this revolution- ary council that the strategic—tactical issues were fought out. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
If this was a tactical move on the part of Taraki, it worked well for a few months in terms of external, especially American responses to his regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
But a bitter political struggle started among the leaders of the regime immediately after the revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Doctrinal contradictions haunted the PDPA from the time it was created. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Taraki and Amin were prompter to reveal the external affiliation and orientation of their regime than its domestic role. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The first few months of the PDPA regime went off relatively well. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Prominent among them were Major-General Qader—Army Chief of Staff—Lt.-Gen. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Then came the turn of the ‘nationalist’ faction that had turned down Karmal’s overtures. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In July, Karmal and most other Parcham members of the govern- ment were exiled to ambassadorships, some to East European capitals. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan was already short of trained and experienced personnel. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The thirty- point programme, which was called ‘Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’, had been announced on 9 May, less than two weeks after the revolu- tion. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
After getting rid of the Parcham and ‘nationalist’ elements in the government and party leadership, the Khalq faction, now in complete control of the regime, launched its controversial reforms. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Even if land reforms and equal rights for women had been tried by previous Afghan regimes without success, as some American specialists on Afghanistan claim,’8 there is no doubt that the abolition of rural indebtedness and usury was entirely new in Afghanistan’s history~ Poverty and its twin brother indebtedness were widespread in the Revolution: the Khalq Phase 49 50 Afghanistan Afghan villages, as we have already noted. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
7, entitled ‘Democratic Rights of Women’, was pro- mulgated in October 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Decree ‘No. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Land reform in Afghanistan had first been attempted by Amanullah in the 1920s by selling off large tracts of public land mostly to large proprie- tors, thereby favouring large ownerships.28 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Decree No. 8—land reforms—was issued in December 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The radical reforms promulgated by the PDPA Government in the latter half of 1978 were significantly in advance of the party’s First Programme adopted in 1966. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the Marxist-Leninist perception of the PDPA, Afghanistan is a country whose society is composed of toiling peoples and nationalities who have different cultures and languages. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In building a National Democratic State, the PDPA Government announced a nationality policy that was not only politically novel but that also had great potential for making an impact on neighbouring Pakistan and Iran if it could be successfully implemented. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Some of the reforms were undertaken without scientific studies of the macro and micro aspects of the prevailing social and cultural realities. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At the same time, there were drives against high prices and rampant corruption. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Between July and December, and right through the summer of 1979, there was a drive to implement all the above reforms simul- taneously. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
With the proclamation of the Democratic Afghan Republic, the PDPA took care to assure the Afghan people that the State would protect their religious faith and that they would be free to observe their religious rites and customs. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The regime appeared to be sensitive to the key role played by Islam in Afghan society and politics, and far from itching for a confrontation with Islam, the regime’s propaganda machinery seçmed to be anxious to placate the religious leaders and to reassure them that their traditional role was secure in the new dispensation. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Nevertheless, as the radical reforms began to be implemented in October 1978, the clergy rose in protest, and byjanu- ary 1979, the traditional ruling elements—the property-holders and the clergy—joined together to mobilize large segments of the urban—rural people in all Afghanistan to offer armed resistance to the Marxist regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Early in 1982, a Soviet reporter recorded after a journey through the Balkh province of Afghanistan, Mullahs and ulems have always played an important part in the country’s life, and this is not to be disregarded. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The ulema organisation of Mazar-i—Sharif includes 120 persons. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Taraki—Amin regime did not realize, or else refused to recog- nize, the constant and dynamic role that Islam and the ideals of jihad (religious war) had played in the history of Afghanistan since the eigh- teenth century. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1919, soon after becoming king, Amir Amanullah declared jihad against the British in order to gain complete independence for Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
When he won his political battle, Amanullah, now a national hero, sought to project his image within and outside Afghanistan as a defender of Islam, both in the temporal and the religious sense. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, his efforts to establish a modern, secular state brought him into conflict, first with the vested interests in rural-urban Afghanistan, particularly the khans, and later, in 1928, with powerful ruhani, or Sufi spiritual leaders of Kabul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Nadir Khan came to power after the overthrow of Amanullah as founder of the Musahiban dynasty riding the crest of a conservative, even reactionary counter—revolution spearheaded by Islamic leaders, and this fundamental reality governed the politics of Afghanistan for the next forty years. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Their association with government and often spatial isolation from their communities resulted in the gradual weakening of their ties and Islam and the SaurRevolution 59 60 Afghanistan credibility as community leaders, creating a parallel structure to deal with community concerns. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However fragmented the rural power structure of Afghanistan— fragmented by tribal, linguistic, social, economic and even religious divisions—the tenuous links between government and community increased the importance of traditional leaders. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This was known to all rulers of Afghanistan from Nadir Shah to Daoud, and it should have been known to Taraki and Amin, although they were Marxists. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1979, the PDPA regime confronted two Islamic rebellions. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A fundamentalist Islamic movement had existed in Afghanistan since the sixties; its manifestation in Kabul was in the Jawanan-i-Musulman—Muslim Youth—which had sprung up in 1965 as a prompt response to the emergence of the PDPA. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The other Islamic rebellion was fundamentalist in political perspec- tive and ideology. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Islamic fundamentalists are revolutionaries of a different hue from the Marxists of the PDPA. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They want to eliminate ethnic distinctions between Pushcuns and the non-Pushtun tribes or national groups because they believe these distinctions are un-Islamic and only weaken the Afghan state by Islam and the Saur Revolution 61 62 Afghanistan keeping its population divided and at war with itself. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
ANLF will fight against ethnic discrimination, class distinction, economic exploitation in Afghanistan, and will strive for establishment of an economic and social order consistent with the Islamic concept of social justice. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
ANLF will fight all elements of imperialism and feudalism which hinder the establishment of a politically independent, economically prosperous, and socially progressive Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
ANLF.. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For the lslafnic fundamentalists, then, it is not enough to liberate Afghanistan from Soviet occupation and to defend Islam; it is equally important to establish an Islamic political and social order. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They hold the Musahiban dynasty directly responsible for the plight of Afghani- stan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As one of their leaders put it, ‘The Afghan mujahidin are now well aware that imperialism and communism are like the two blades of a pair of scissors for the purpose of cutting the roots of our beloved religion: Islam.10 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The four fundamentalist or revolutionary Islamic rebel organi- zations are the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (JIA) led by Burnha- nuddin Rabbani; the Islamic Party of Gulbudin Hikmatyar, a second Islamic Party, formed after a split, of which the leader is Mawlawi M. Yunus Khalis; and the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghani- stan, led by Abdur Rabbur Rasul Sayyaf. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Islam perse has not been an insuperable barrier to communism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan’s Islamic factor proved to be particularly difficult for the leaders of DRA because Islam had for centuries been a popular political-religious ideology of the people of that country, it had been woven into the emotional and symbolic myths of Afghan nationalism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fundamentalism of the Iranian revolution had a strong impact on the Islamic fundamentalists of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As Fred Halliday put it, As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the Shah’s regime would have been less menacing than that of Khomeini; although the organizational ability of the previous ~regime to assist the counter-revolution might well have been greater, the power of ideological mobilization would have been much less, especially if it is remembered how much the Shah’s previous interference in Afghan affairs had been resented.13 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fundamentalist Islamic upsurge against the Saur revolution in 1978-9 in Afghanistan was not without its own weakness, however. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Apart from the four main fundamentalist groups, there were dozens of smaller ones, including the Afghan National Liberation Front, a part of whose political programme was quoted earlier (pp. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Its greatest weakness, as noted, lay in the failure of the several funda- mentalist groups to unite and offer a credible political alternative to DRA. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, the Soviet military intervention and the presence of over 100,000 Russian troops in Afghanistan armed the rebels with an emotive nationalist cause; they were now fighting to rid Afghanistan of foreign invaders, they told the masses. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan peasant was busy in his fields. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Fred Halliday, in a Marxist critique of the Saur revolution, has identified four aspects of the rural structure of Afghanistan that gravely complicated the programme of social transformation.3 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Tribal, ethnic and religious factors intersected ~ Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘Any attempt to reform such a Revolution on the Verge of Collapse 67 68 Afghanistan system by appealing to the class interests of the poor and landless peasants was bound to run into considerable difficulties.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The second vital aspect of rural Afghanistan that, in Halliday's analysis, created considerable problems for the Saur revolution/was the ‘traditional independence of the mountain tribes/Fhese tribes had in the past been paid subsidies by the Government in Kabul; among them ‘the bearing of arms was a natural feature of adult life’.4 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘Afghanistan is a country where political and social issues have tended to be settled by the gun and where the room for peacefully handling conflicts within the state, or between the state and its subjects, is extremely limited.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Not only did the Khalq and Parcham factions fall out with one another within weeks of the revolution, within Khalq also, factional in-fighting broke out in no time, and these disputes were settled by bullets rather than by votes. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Halliday also mentions three other problems which contributed to the checking of the initial dynamic of the revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The first was ‘the disunity and thd extremely undemocratic internal structure of the PDPA itself.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
All the ministers in the new eighteen—man Cabinet were Khalqis, including some who had been members of the Parcham Revolution on the Verge of Collapse 69 70 Afghanistan faction earlier but had defected to Khalq. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The way in which the situation on the ground deteriorated has been described by a number of American anthropologists who have done field-work in Afghanistan and who claim to have first-hand informa- tion or knowledge of how the people of a number of provinces reacted to the radical reforms put through by the Marxist regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan was so short of competent hands in government that this action soon left the PDPA regime without the personnel essential to maintain a minimum level of administrative efficiency. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The rebellion began in Nuristan, which is a 5,000-square mile region strategically located in north-western Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
After a three-day battle, the outpost fell to the attackers. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For this uncommon achievement Revolution on the Verge of Collapse 73 74 Afghanistan of the rebels, Keiser found four main reasons. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Its land area of 40,886 sq. km. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In Badakhshan the traditional rural leaders had pursued a policy of avoidance rather than confrontation regarding the state. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The regime unleashed a reign of repression, with mass imprisonments, torture and murder of suspected enemies. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
ThomasJ. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The provin- cial administration was soon found to be woefully inadequate in discharging the responsibilities assigned to it. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘People with unmarried daughters resented the Revolution on the Verge of Collapse 77 78 Afghanistan decree most because they could no longer expect to receive brideprice payments for them when they were married.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the Kunar Valley, crops were burnt by Soviet—Afghan aircraft, :reating a severe shortage of grain in Afghanistan in 1980, which the oviets had to meet through exports. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Halliday believes that Amin expected elections to take place in Pakistan in 1979 in which he was convinced that political forces sympathetic towards Afghanistan would come to power, and in 1979 he was in touch with the leaders of some of these forces, notably Khan Wali Khan, of the National Awami League, a constituent of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a nine-party coalition of banned political groups, of which the leading faction was the Pakistan People’s Party founded by the late ZulfIkar Ali Bhutto. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Government forces carried out a number of large offensives and some of these met with a measure of success. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The lack of success of the Govermnent’s military operations and the rapid spread of the insurgency inevitably intensified factional in- fighting in the PDPA.. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1979 the Islamic revolution in Iran had an immediate impact on the civil war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Amin looked upon Taraki’s talks with Brezhnev with grave suspicion. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
When Amin appointed himself president of the DRA, a congratulatory message came from Moscow. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Outwardly, everything was friendly between Amin and Moscow. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In early December, Amin sent an urgent message to Pakistan’s Revolution on the Verge of Collapse 83 84 Afghanistan General Zia-ul Haq, asking for an early meeting. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Zia-ul Haq sent his Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, to Kabul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Since November, the Soviets had been preparing the alternative of last resort—a military intervention in Afghanistan in order to save the Saur revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On 27 December, the Soviets intervened with a ‘limited contingent’ of 85,000 troops, overpowered troops loyal to Amin without a major battle, and Amin died fighting. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
was proclaimed President of Afghanistan in ,a regime now openly protected by Soviet arms. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The second phase of the Saur revolution had begun. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Washington knew of Soviet troop movements in areas close to the Afghan border, but the skeletal personnel in the American embassy in Kabul had no knowledge of it whatsoever. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet leadersjustified the despatch of 85,000 to 110,000 troops into Afghanistan in December/January 1979—80 by their obligations under the 1978 treaty as well as by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the spring of Soviet Intervention and American Response H 86 Afghanistan 1979, General Alexei A. Epishev, chief of the Main Political Admini- stration of the Soviet armed forces, made an inspection tour of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets sent him several thousand military advisers, and kept anxious watch on the range and scale of fighting in the Afghan civil war. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Amin had been asking for Soviet military help since the winter of 1979 when the insurgency began to spread in the countryside. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This volume does not attempt to study the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan except in its relevance to the Afghan revolution and the Marxist regime in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet intervention or invasion has been studied at length by American and other Western scholars and Soviet intervention and American Response 87 journalists in the context of the century’s prolonged confrontation been given to the Marxist regime in Afghanistan as it has tried to assert has proved to be inseparable from the survival of the Marxist regime and its gradual, slow process of gaining political ground in Afghani- ev9nt. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The principal event was the fall of the Shah of Iran and his the Soviet leaders, but they watched the grotesque unfolding of the Islamic revolution under the Ayatollah Khomeini with considerable misgiving, if not alarm.(As Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The authoritative pronouncements made by Soviet leaders justify- ing the intervention (or invasion) in Afghanistan sketched the Soviet self-image as well as Soviet images of the United States at the turn of the decade of the 1980s. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
By defending with military force the Marxist revolution in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union signalled two important messages to the rest of the world. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Second, the time had come for a realignment of forces in the Third World, to identify the vanguard of radical change and militant anti-imperialism as well as its firm and reliable friends and allies, and to differentiate these nations from those who had chosen, or had been forced to choose, to toe the capitalist- imperialist line.6 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
If Afghanistan was the staging ground of a Soviet military- ideological offensive, paradoxically, it threw the Kremlin into a defen- sive posture on a wide political-strategic front. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
While the Soviet troops got bogged clown in Afghanistan in a prolonged civil war, brutal and gory in its daily, weekly and seasonal operations, and highly expensive in political terms, when it came to Soviet prestige and image in the community of developing countries, the Soviets fought defensive battles on several major fronts against American diplomatic—strategic offensives, lost some of the battles, won a few, and drove its adversary into a stalemate in the others. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Marshall Shulman, who was Secretary Vance’s chief adviser on Soviet affairs, told an American journal that it was his belief that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan because of a ‘broad fear’ of ‘the creation of a crescent of militant islamic anti-Soviet states on its southern borders, with the added possibility of Chinese or US influ- ence, and not because it seeks to gain access to the Indian Ocean and control over the Middle East.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Shulman added that the Soviet action in Afghanistan ‘opens up the possibility’ that the Soviets might attack Iran or Pakistan, although he did not believe that was the intention of the invasion.’8 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Brezhnev himself justified the intervention as a defensive action to ensure the security of the southern borders of the Soviet state. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘When all the positive and negative aspects were weighed from the point of view of revolutionary operation in Afghanistan and the general situation of forces in the world, it became clear that it was necessary.'16 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In order simply to save the Afghan revolution, the Soviets did not have to despatch to Afghanistan, in a matter of ten to fifteen days, a contingent of more than 100,000 troops. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Under these circumstances, there was inevitably a lot of hyperbole in the Soviet action and the American reaction. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
That is exactly what happened, The United States made Pakistan a ‘front—line’ state in its own strategy for resisting the Soviets in Afghanistan, and offered it, in 1980—1, a package of military and economic aid valued at $3.1 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
bn. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For New Delhi, the transfer of modern, sophisticated American arms to Pakistan constituted a greater security threat than the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
So were the political cleavages within Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The traditional cleavage in the subcontinent between Pakistan and India was deepened by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the American response to it. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets knew the Afghan terrain well. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the words of Pravda, ‘the fiery ring of counter- revolution backed actively from abroad became tighter and tighter round the capital.’2 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Brezhnev also declared that the Soviet troops would not be in Afghanistan longer than necessary. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘We want to state very definitely that we will be ready to commence the withdrawal of our troops as soon as all forms of outside interference directed against the government and the people of Afghanistan are fully terminated,’ announced Brezhnev in his interview with Pravda on 22 February 1980. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It is extremely difficult to attempt an objective assessment of the military operations of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The data base is practically non-existent. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets themselves only began to report casualties in 1981, though as early as May 1980 Pravda conceded that ‘struggle against the bandits is no easy matter’.6 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In August 1980, a high-level Soviet military delegation arrived in Kabul to reorganize both the Soviet forces and what remained of the Afghan army. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Panjsher has been the centre of the strongest fundamentalist group in Afghanistan since the early 1970s. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Massoud’s mentor is the Peshawar-based funda- mentalist leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, who has wide contacts with Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami, the fundamentalist party that has been in charge of relief and care of the over three million Afghan refugees living on Pakistani territory. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The military operations against Massoud’s guerrilla force in Panjsher Valley have a particular political significance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Selig Harrison, after a visit to Afghanistan in 1984, wrote that the number of Afghans on the Soviet-subsidized payroll of Kabul was some 375,000, including about 60,000 in the army, another 75,000 in various paramilitary forces and at least 25,000 in the secret police. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In early 1985, the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the 40th Army, were composed of seven divisions and five air assault brigades, backed up by a few spetsnaz (special purpose commando) units, 500 helicopters, several squadrons of MiG-21s and 23s, and at least one squadron of Su- 25 (Frog Foot) attack aircraft, which represents the first deployment of this ground-attack aircraft anywhere in the world.14 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The most brutal war is a civil war, and Afghanistan has been no exception. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets view pilot training in Afghanistan as superb.’: Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet military command has drawn several lessons from the fighting experience of their troops in Afghanistan; There have been numerous articles in the Soviet military press on mountain training and some emphasizing the need to develop the ‘initiatives’ of field commanders and the physical fitness of fighting men. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Estimates of Soviet losses in Afghanistan vary enormously, and so do estimates of what Afghanistan has been costing the Kremlin. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets are said to have lost 5,000 vehicles and 600 helicopters. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Selig Harrison’s overall picture of the political—military situation in Afghanistan in 1984 was one of a ‘deepening stalemate’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It is true that the Kabul regime does not have a grip on much of the countryside, but neither does the resistance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Writing for the Congressional Research Service in January 1985, Richard Cronin drew up a more or less similar political-military land- scape in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The mujahidin retain free movement over most of Afghanistan’s mountainous countryside, and the ability to mount limited rocket, mortar and small arms attacks on Soviet garrisons in urban areas.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Soviet strategy seems to be to maintain control of Afghanistan with a minimum military commitment while seeking to train a new generation of Afghan communist leaders loyal to Moscow. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Cronin’s overview of the impact of Soviet military operations in Afghanistan has been confirmed by other American sources. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
According to an Afghan scholar working at Columbia University, New York City, who has kept close track of the fighting within Afghanistan, the Soviets have had significant successes in several areas. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Perhaps their two most important successes have been, first, the failure of the resistance groups to unite politically and to set up an alternative government on ‘liberated Afghan territory’, and, second, the fighting Soviet Wingsfor the SaurRevolution 109 110 Afghanistan between and among insurgent groups. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the National Assembly members demanded retaliation, mainly in order to further embarrass the military regime which did not wish to get involved in a military conflict with Soviet-backed Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Members also demanded direct negotiation with Afghanistan, for which the military regime was not prepared. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On 12 June, the National Assembly held a thirty-minute debate on Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
take over the direction of the civil war as well as rebuilding the ravaged Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Under the Soviet Wingsfor the SaurRevolution 111 112 Afghanistan protective wings of Moscow, Babrak Karmal has been trying, since January 1980, to put the Saur revolution together again. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Whether the the Parchain Phase Soviets will withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, and when, will depend entirely on the Marxist regime acquiring the internal strength necessary for its survival when the Russian soldiers have gone. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They had given complete support to the regime since they had themselves helped to instal it in Kabul in the immediate wake of their military intervention. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In mid-1985, as will be seen later in this volume, the Soviets seemed to be more confident than at any time since December 1979 of bring- ing the Afghan drama to a denouement which was to their liking. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In April the Revolutionary Council proclaimed a new Afghan constitution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Revolutionary Council Total number 56 Babrak Karmal Assadullah Sarwarj Sultan Mi Kishtmand Nour Ahmad Nour Major General Abdul Qader Licutenant-Coloncl Mohammad Aslam Watanjar Licutenant-Coloncl Gui Aqa Dr Anahita Ratcbzad Dr Saich Mohammad Zcary Ghulam Dastagir Panchsheri Dr Raz Mohammad Paktin Saycd Mohammad Gulabzoi Shah Mohammad Dost Lieutenant-Colonel Shcrjan Mazdooryan’ Abdurrashid Aryan Abdui Majid Sarbuland Abdui Wakil Fazui Rahim Mohinand Licutcoant-Coloncl Faiz Mohammad Guldad Prof. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The new constitution ensured equal rights of women as well as ‘genuine equality’ of all large and small national groups and tribes in Afghanistan, providing them with equal opportunities to develop their traditions, languages, literature and arts. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Special status was con- ferred on the ‘numerous Pathan tribes inhabiting southern and south- western Afghanistan.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The public sector would extend chiefly to the production of capital goods, power development and transport. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The constitution came into force on 15 April, seven weeks after a week-long demonstration of popular resentment at the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, the February demonstration was the last public protest on a mass scale in Kabul or any other large city in Afghanistan against the Soviet military presence and/or the Karmal regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Carter administration was not willing to pay a high price for Pakistani co-operation in a bloody opposition to the Sovietization of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1981 Karma! Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karmal visited Moscow twice, the second time for a meeting with Yuri Andropov. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Kabul New Times carried reports of rebel activities in different areas, the rebels being described as ‘bandits’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Saur Revolution: the Parcham Phase 121 122 Afghanistan He reported a 0.5 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Kishtmand only came to the situation in Afghanistan at the end of a long speech delivered at the Non-Aligned summit. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He said that 300,000 landless peasants had been given land, free of cpst, since 1978, and the cancellation of land revenue had benefited 200,000 poor rural families. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets, he said, were doing everything in their power to help Afghanistan rebuild itself, but, said Karmal, Moscow could not solve Afghanistan’s economic problems: ‘we must take decisions ourselves’.23 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Addressing the 11th plenum of the PDPA central committee in March, Karma! said that the civil war had taken a toll of 24bn. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In a progress report in December 1983, the overall situation in Afghanistan was regarded as being modestly positive. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Sheberghan, capital of Tauzjan province, ‘one of the cradles’ of Afghan communism, was said to be fast develop- ing into a ‘big industrial sector’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Since 1983 the rebels in Afghanistan have been getting larger and better supplies of arms from the base camps in Pakistan, and reports printed in the Afghan press often speak of ‘intensified fighting with bandit gangs’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The plan gave an idea of the volume of development assistance Afghanistan was getting from the USSR. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In a long report published in the CPSU journal Party L!/~ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In his report to the 14th plenum, Karmal claimed that the political- military situation in Afghanistan had ‘improved to a certain extent’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On lOjanuary, Karmal inaugurated the ‘grand meeting’ in Kabul in the presence of fraternal delegations from twenty-seven foreign communist parties, and one from the ruling Congress I party of India.35 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The SaurRevolution: the Parcham Phase 127 128 Afghanistan parry’s membership stood at 120,000, of whom 32,000 had been recruited in the Afghan year of March 1983 to March 1984. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karmal was satisfied with the ‘consolidation of Afghanistan’s position in the world’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karma! Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karmal spoke warmly of the contributions of the Soviet Union towards Afghanistan’s economic development. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Ninety-nine projects built with Soviet assistance were in operation, he said, while ninety more were either under construction or undergoing feasibility study. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The parry’s Politburo had decided, as a matter of policy, that the border with Pakistan would be ‘sealed, protected and defended’, Babrak Karmal told the plenum. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Karmal implied that most of the people who had not joined the resistance or had seemingly accepted the regime were sullen in their minds and alienated in their attitudes. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The claims that Karma! Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the gory revolutionary drama of Afghanistan, the ‘contending kings’ are five. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Three are directly involved: Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Of the five parties involved in the Afghan problem, the positions of three—the United States, Pakistan and the Afghan resistance—are weakened by inherent contradictions and gaps between their avowed objectives and the resources they are willing to deploy, and are capable Prospects for a Political Settlement 132 Afghanistan of deploying, for the achievement of their goals. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The positions of the two other parties, the Soviet Union and the Marxist regime in Kabul, are also weak, but the weakness is derived more from the hard, intran- sigent realities in Afghanistan than from the external forces that are committed to make their political objectives difficult and expensive to attain. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the last five years or more no serious attempt has been made to find a solution to the Afghan problem which is both desirable and practicable. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Indeed, a fundamental contradiction exists between the two since what is desirable for the United States, Pakistan and the Afghan resistance, namely, the liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet occupation and control, and the restoration of its status as a non- aligned sovereign state with a government that represents the political preferences of the majority of its people, is not practicable. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The United States has neither the political will nor the military power to fight the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Clearly then, the three parties cannot, even with their combined resources, reasonably e’xpect to throw the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Moscow has dug in for a long haul, and time is its ally in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets have made it clear that the situation around Afghanistan is politically negotiable, the situation within Afghanistan is not. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet Union, for its part, cannot eliminate the resistance except over a long period of time.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Over the past three years, a narrow tunnel of negotiations has been bored by the UN mediator, Diego Cordovez, through the granite walls that separate the three main parties—the Soviet Union, the United States and Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet position on Afghanistan has remained stubbornly consistent. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Six basic premises can be distinguished from a mountain of Soviet pronounce- ments on Afghanistan, beginning with an article in Pravda of 31 December 1979 by political analyst A. Petrov, right up to the comments in the Soviet press in the first six months of 1985, including, in this broad sweep of time, numerous authoritative statements by Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachov. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Brezhnev was more specific when he said that ‘imperialism together with its accomplices launched an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
(2) The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in order to maintain the security and stability of its southern, central Asian, flank. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet action in Afghanistan is aimed at preventing a spill-over of(3) Islamic revivalism to the Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen Republics of the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet Union has gone into Afghanistan with military force to(4) defend a fraternal Marxist regime from imperialist-aided local counterrevolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet action in Afghanistan is aimed at preventing the United States(5) from advancing its spheres of influence in a region very close to the Soviet Union’s southern frontiers. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Making this point, a Pravda editorial on 29 January 1980 said, ‘Washington, it seems, proceeds from the assumption that it is enough to declare Iran, Afghanistan and other countries or areas thousands of kilometres away from the American shores as zones of America’s vital interest—to be more precise, of the biggest monopolist and the military industrial complex of the USA—for everybody to accept this.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
These six Soviet premises have remained unaltered in the five and a half years of Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Indeed, Soviet losses in Afghanistan have been more in terms of prestige and image in the Third World than in the fmancial and human costs of the military operations. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The cost of warfare, as we have seen in Chapter 8, has been bearable. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Those in the United States and elsewhere who had hoped that Afghanistan would develop as Moscow’s Vietnam have been proved wrong. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fighting in Afghanistan is not unpopular in the Soviet Union; if anything, it has stirred the patriotism of the Russian people. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan draws towards its fifth anniversary this month, it is clear that the war is not resulting in the domestic backlash that the Vicmam war stirred in the United States. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Kremlin leaders are preparing their countrymen for a long- drawn-out war in Afghanistan, the outcome of which, they are convinced, can only go in Kabul’s and Moscow’s favour. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As Izvestia put it in early December 1984, ‘Judging by the current attitudes of Washington and Islamabad toward the political regulation of the situation around Afghanistan, war against Afghanistan is more dear to them than that peace in Southwest Asia.’5 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It took the Bolsheviks more than ten years to tame the Central Asian republics and to yoke them fully to the Soviet State. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
From the beginning, the American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been a matter of dispute between the administra- tion and dissenting sections of the foreign policy elite.Jimmy Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Carter, as noted, described the Soviet action as a ‘stepping stone to .. . Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There are two contradictory versions of American aid to the Afghan resistance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On the vital question of how the Russians and the Kabul regimes are doing in Afghanistan and the success of the guerrillas operations, too, there are sharp differences among Americans as well as between American and British intelligence agencies. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Nearly two years ago, on 4 December 1983, Drew Middleton reported in the New York Times that resistance to the Soviets had diminished in Afghanistan as a result of’a shortage of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and rivalry between pro-western and pro-Iranian rebel groups’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Middleton added that ‘western analysts, surveying the present situa- tion, say they wonder whether the trend toward Soviet domination is Prospectsfor a Political Settlement 139 140 Afghanistan irreversible.’ Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This was perhaps an American way of expressing doubt that Afghanistan could ever be extricated from Soviet influence. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1984, the level of weapons supplied to the guerrillas was raised, but it is quite clear to objective observers that it is not the United States but Pakistan which determines how ‘effective’ the resistance can be. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There is a mock heroic touch in the resolutions that get extraordi- narily rapid passage through the United States Congress calling for ‘effective support’ by the administration to the Afghan guerrillas. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
‘We have maintained’, the statement said, that any negotiated political settlement for Afghanistan, besides including the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the return of the non-aligned and independent status of Afghanistan, and the return of the refugees, must include self- determination for the Afghan people. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
From the American position, the consent of the Afghan people to the type of government that exists in Kabul is of the first priority, and the consent must presumably come primarily from the resistance groups in Afghanistan and the refugees who have taken shelter in Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Reagan administration knows that the Soviets would neither change the regime in Kabul in accordance with the political wishes of the rebels nor restore a regime in Afghanistan which Mr Reagan could recognize as non-aligned and independent. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This rider has proved to be an adequate brake on Pakistan’s initial earnest intention to seek a solution to the Afghan problem through the UN negotiation process. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Pakistan’s dilemmas are many and it has to ride the wave of several contradictions. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The American connection is all-important for the military regime in Pakistan, but it is not enough to get Pakistan out of the binds created by the Soviet push into Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fourth round of ‘proximity talks’ between Pakistan and Afghanistan under the UN negotiation process took place in Geneva inJune 1985. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
General Zia has kept the UN negotiating process alive, but few informed observers believe that Cardovez will be able to deliver a comprehensive political settlement of the Afghan problem. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Before the June session began, the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan provisionally agreed to the protocol of a Prospecisfor a Political Settlement 143 144 Afghanistan draft agreement. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The 1983 Geneva meetings were held in two phases over the months of April andJune. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Whether the Soviet offer was a purely tactical move or else reflected a changed approach in response to the reality of an escalating stalemate within Afghanistan was never tested. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The exact shape and constituent elements of a future coalition was to be left to a later stage following preliminary agreement on the first steps of the Geneva negotiations and once implementation had been initiated. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Zahir Shah, self-exiled in Rome since 1973, issued a declaration when the June 1983 negotiating session reopened in Geneva. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets, for their part, gave the appearance of supporting the plan elaborated by the UN negotiator. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Prospectsfora Political Settlement 145 146 Afghanistan The first pertained to the question of international guarantees, and the second concerned the establishment of a precise timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He arrived in the Chinese capital on May 15 to discuss with the Chinese the terms of the accord. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
But there is also a hard-line faction that prefers the status quo in Afghanistan as it does in Cambodia as a means of bleeding Moscow’s resources and embarrassing it internationally as an aggressor, directly in the first instance, and by proxy in the second. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The underlying assumption of the UN scenario is that a face-saving Prospectsfora Political Settlement 147 148 Afghanistan agreement in Afghanistan cannot directly address the replacement or modifi- cation of the Kabul regime as a precondition for Soviet disengagement but must leave this to paralleled processes of political accommodation before, during and after the disengagement period.’8 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In Moscow, the Yakub Khan-Gromyko meeting ran into an impasse. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Were the Soviets serious in 1983 in their quest for a political settle- ment? Would they have withdrawn their troops from Afghanistan if Pakistan had concluded the negotiated agreements with Kabul? The Americans have expressed scepticism, but in Pakistan there was certainly an air of expectancy in early 1983, to which the present author was witness. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It is quite probable that Andropov wanted to get the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan after he had been elected General Secretary of the CPSU, if an honourable exit could be arranged. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
His position became stronger on the death of Suslov in 1982 and with the setbacks the Soviet—Afghan forces suffered in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A Third World diplomat who met Andropov in the spring of 1983, six months after the latter had taken over as CPSU General Secretary, claimed in an interview with Lifschultz: The discussion with Andropov was concerned almost exclusively with Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He ended the conversation by lifting his hand, and pulling his fingers down one by one as he enumerated the reasons why a solu- tion had to be found to the Afghanistan issue. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet attitude hardened after the passing of Andropov. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1983—4 the Soviets escalated their military operations against the Afghan rebels and terminated more than one local ceasefire agreement. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviet hardline was confirmed in icy language by Moscow’s ambassador to Pakistan who took the unusual step of writing a signed letter to the editor of The Muslim, of Islamabad, early in 1985, stating the Soviet position on Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
First, the Afghanistan problem was created by the ‘hostile action’ of several countries against the Marxist regime in Kabul; second, the Soviet troops were in Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan Govern- ment, fulfilling Moscow’s treaty-bound obligations to a friendly regime; third, if Pakistan or any other party wished to conduct negotiations, they must negotiate with Kabul and not with the Soviet Union; and, fourth, the political future of Afghanistan was not negoti- able. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Behind the Smirnov letter was a little-known fact connected with the UN negotiations. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Prospectsfor a Political Settlement 151 152 Afghanistan With the advent of 1985, the Soviets appeared to be poised at a cross- roads. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A commentary in Pravda reviewed disclosures that secret assist- ance by the CIA to the Afghan rebels had become the largest American operation since the Vietnam war. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU, following the death of Chernenko. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He received General Zia at Chernenko’s funeral, to tell him in the clearest possible terms that the Soviet Union was not prepared to remain engaged in a prolonged stalemate with Pakistan over Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Meanwhile, the political mood in Pakistan began to change after the party-less election to the National Assembly in February 1985. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
He identified two different schools of thought which had developed in Pakistan over the last five years regarding Afghanistan.. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
a Political Settlement 153 154 Afghanistan to a political settlement in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The fourth round of Geneva talks ended without any breakthrough Prospect.sfor Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In mid-1985 few Americans and fewer Pakistanis are confident that the Afghan resistance can win the war against the Soviet and the PDPA regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Americans are generally reluctant to concede the resist- ance’s defeat. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Most Americans would prefer to wrest the maximum possible advantage from the Soviet predicament inAfghanistan, to make the Soviets bleed as much and as long as possible, and to make the price of Afghanistan so heavy that the Kremlin will not repeat the adventure in another piece of Third World real estate. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Whether the Afghanistan issue is finally settled on the rubblized mountain terrain of the Hindu Kush in more blood, sweat, agony and suffering, or through a negotiated political settlement, it is going to be a long haul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, eventually, the Saur revolution will be saved, and it will have to address itself to the Herculean task of rebuilding and remoulding the ravaged and devastated Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Prospecisfora Pol itical Settlement 155 11 In the diverse world of some thirty Marxist regimes, Afghanistan has a number of distinctions all its own. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan had been a sovereign country since 1920, though never exactly outside the British sphere of influence. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Unlike South Yemen, no National Liberation Front(NLF)was set up in Afghanistan to struggle The Future of the Afghan Revolution for national independence. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Af han revolution is the first < Marxist revolution in the< world to becomd a target of Islamic fundamentalism < Afghanistan is not the only Third World country where a numeri- cally small communist party has carried out a successful revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It is somewhat surprising, however, that over twenty years of Soviet influence did not produce a more viable communist party than the PDPA was in 1978/In fact, the Soviets did not wish to help the PDPA enlarge its political base beyond that of a respectable pressure group, and were apparently taken by surprise when the Afghan party captured power. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
It would have commanded the disciplined loyalty of sizeable numbers of officers and larger numbers of soldiers, and since the soldiers were drawn from the tribes—a majority from the Pushtuns—the revolution would probably have provoked less hostility in the rural areas. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The political ambience of 1978 was very different from that of the late sixties and early seventies. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At the same time, the Soviet Union had emerged unmistakably as a global military power capable of intervening, and willing to intervene, in national liberation struggles on The Future of the Afghan Revolution 159 160 Afghanistan behalfofits friends and allies, In the early 1970s, the Soviets were supply- ing crucial military help to three Third World areas at the same time: to the North Vietnamese in South-east Asia, to the, Indians in South Asia (during the Bangladesh war), and to the Egyptians in the Middle East In the mid-seventies, Soviet military help proved a decisive factor in the Vietnam war, and the triumph of communist revolutions in the three Indo-China states; Cuban troops, airlifted in Soviet transport planes with heavy war equipment, determined the fate of the revolutions in Angola and Mozambique. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The reason why the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan with 100,000 troops will always remainamatter of controversy. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghans may reconcile themselves to the fact of Marxist rule, but they will not identify themselves with the Marxist state until they are convinced that it is a sovereign and independ- ent state controlled by themselves, and not directed from Moscow. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The compelling circumstances of a satellite revolution that existed inEastern Europe do not exist in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For the Afghans, development alone will not be sufficient recom- pense for the revolution if it is bereft of the conscious identity of an independent, sovereign people. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Each or most of them were genuine national liberation movements, whether they were aimed at foreign imperialist powers or, as in Cuba and Nicaragua, domestic reaction backed by foreign imperialism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
From 1983 onwards, PDPA propaganda has sought to portray the Saur revolution as a defender of Afghanistan’s sovereignty and independence as well as its traditional non-alignment. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They, as well as the PDPA leaders, are pinning their hopes on the build- ing up of a committed, disciplined Afghan army in the next five to ten years. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The diverse world of Marxist-Leninism is peopled with diverse models of development in a bewildering mix of Western and non- Western cultures. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
No two communisms are the same, and Afghan communisnZ as and when it develops its own identity will not only remain Afghan, but will increasingly rediscover its Afghan-ness. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Paradoxically, the great intensity of the civil war may make the task easier for the PDPA when Afghanistan settles down to face its terrible devastation. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The question of armed violence is as relevant to the mujahidin based on Pakistani territory as it is to the population of Marxist-ruled Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Soldiers of national liberation movements in the Third World have as a rule not fled their countries and taken shelter in adjoining states. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Louis Dupree has noted a significant result of the refugee movement out of Afghanistan, which, he believes, is loaded with political implications. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Since the Soviet military intervention, large numbers of northern-based Pushtuns have taken their families to the security of refugee camps in Pakistan and then returned to their ‘zones of origin’ to fight with their ‘distant cousins’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Among the Pushtun refugees who have assembled on Pakistani territory are many who had been compelled to move from the southern to the northern provinces of Afghanistan in the nineteenth- century reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880—1901). Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The levelling of ethnic and tribal barriers among the three million Afghan refugees encamped in Pakistan is of greater consequence for Pakistan’s political and social stability. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
As of February l985, three million Afghan refugees were located in 235 Refugee Tented Villages (RTV) in the NWFP sixty-one in Baluchistan and ten in the Punjab.” Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Among the refugees are members of the former royal family, of the bureaucracy, highly educated people who had jobs in the university or colleges or worked as journalists and writers, technocrats, disenchanted Marxists belong- ing to the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA, displaced students, military officers, nomad and gipsy groups, semi-nomadic and semi- stationary groups, and migrant labourers. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They came into Pakistan in three large waves, though the movement has hardly stopped at any time since April 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Pakistan Government has fed the refugees on promises that they will be able to return to an Afghanistan liberated from the Soviet invaders and from Marxism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
International contribu- tions to the maintenance of the Afghan refugees have been adequate so fac about half the cost is said to be borne byPakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Destruction of vast areas of the countryside has deprived the resistance of their essential supplies of food and water. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
This promise has been reiterated by numerous government leaders—of the United States, China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France, Japan and several other countries—who have visited the refugee camps since January 1980. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Future of the Afghan Revolution 167 168 Afghanistan Pakistan cannot create a similar situation in Afghanistan, nor can the United States, nor the Afghan refugees or the resistance within Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan refugees cannot be separated from the Afghan revolu- tion. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In the long mn perhaps in ten years from now, the political impact of Marxist-ruled Afghanistan will be quite strong on Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
If the PDPA can stabilize its national democracy in Afghanistan, with support from democratic non-Marxist elements, its political and economic experi- ments will be most closely watched by the elites ofPakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
A successful remoulding of the relationships among the Afghan national groups would have a strong impact on Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The strategic impact of a Marxist-ruled Afghanistan, closely tied up with the Soviet Union, on Pakistan will be felt sooner and more profoundly. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Pakistan cannot afford to live in hostility or even unfriendli- ness with the Soviet Union and India for any period of time—a reality which Pakistani strategic thinkers have recognized since 1982. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Sections of the opposition political elite in Pakistan have kept in close touch with the PDPA regime in Afghanistan ever since the Saur revolu- tion. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Khan Wali Khan, the National Awami Party leader of the NWFP, has been a regular visitor to Kabul; his aged father, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, still a respected figure in the Frontier Province, has lived the greater part of the last five years in the Afghan capital. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Future of the Afghan Revolution 169 170 Afghanistan Speaking in the same vein, Benazir Bhutto said that Pakistan should have med other means of resolving the crisis and should not have rushed to the United States, accusing the Soviet Union, whom she described as ‘a superpower and the fifth largest Muslim nation in the world’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Neither the Afghan revolution nor the PDPA regime in Afghanistan can be seen separately from Soviet power and influence in the strategic regions of Arabia and South Asia. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
With Afghanistan as an outpost of Soviet influence, Moscow will find it easier to operate its Pakistan policy and with greater chances of success. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
They have behaved to Pakistan with considerable sophistication during the Afghan crisis. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Future of the Afghan Revolution 171 172 Afghanistan Yet, when Shahi announced Pakistan’s rejection of the Carter admini- stration’s ‘peanut’ offer of $400 m. in aid, he did look to the Soviet Union as an alternative source of help. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
In 1985 the Soviets do not view their future inSouth Asia with pessi- mism either. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The friendship with India has not only survived their military move into Afghanistan, but also the assassination of Indira Gandhi; it is likely to grow stronger still under the prime miistership of Rajiv Gandhi.’8 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets face two different manifestations of Islamic funda- mentalism in the ‘situation around Afghanistan’: the radical funda- mentalism of the Aytollah Khomeini in Iran, and the conservative fundamentalism of Pakistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Both varieties are hostile to the Marxist regime of Afghanistan, but they are unable to unite on a common political platform, and are indeed fighting each other in some resistance— held areas of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
To be sure, this has helped the Afghan communists as well as the Soviets. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The radical Islamic fundamentalists are anti-American as well as anti-Soviet, in the Soviet perception— basically more anti-communist than anti—capitalist. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The third plank of the Soviet battle plan is Marxist revolution in Islamic nations. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets seem to believe that as the fundamentalist tide ebbs, South Yemen and Afghanistan will draw the minds and ears of the Muslims of Arabia, the Middle East and South Asia as attractive models of development and modernization. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Iran and Pakistan will be special targets of the Soviet battle plan against Islamic fundamentalism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Schilz, A Geography ofAfghanistan, University of Nebraska, Omaha, Cen- ter for Afghanistan Studies, 1976. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Asghar H. Bilgrami, Afghanistan and British India 1793—1907, A Study in5. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The buffer concept was rejected by Afghanistan also. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Anatomy of the Raj: Russian Consular Reports, New Delhi, People’s Publishing House, 1981, p. Nabokov’s reports show how great was Russian concern about Islamic fundamentalism spreading from Afghanistan to Turkey. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Cited in Fred Halliday, ‘Revolution in Afghanistan’, New Left Review, London, November-December 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Ibid.17. 18. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Hammond, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Robert Hennman, ‘Afghanistan under the Red Flag’, International Journal25. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Chapter 2 1. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Chapter 3 1. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. CanfIeld (eds), Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan, Berkeley, Institute of Internatipnal Studies, California University Press, 1983, p. 7. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 179 180 Afghanistan 16. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
See f~ort. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Robert Neumann, ‘Afghanistan Under the Red Flag’, in Z. Michael Zsaz, The Impact of the Iranian Events Upon the Persian Gulf and U.S. Security, Washington DC, American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979, p. 138; see also Dupree, ‘Afghanistan Under the Khalq’, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
13. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Bechtel, ‘Afghanistan: The Proud Revolution’, New World Review, 49, 1, 1981, p. 11. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Vladimir Glukhoded, ‘Economy of Independent Afghanistan’s Social Sciences Today, 1981, pp. 222-45. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Sadhan Mukherjee, of the Communist Party of India (CPI) estimated the total peasant debt in Afghanistan at 722 in. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
What Is Happening in Afghanistan, New Delhi, CPI Publications, 9,July 1981, p. 16. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Nancy Dupree, ‘Revolutionary Rhetoric and Afghan Women’ in Revolu~- tions and Rebellions in Afghanistan, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
pp. 312—13; also her ‘Behind the Veil in Afghanistan’, Asia, 1,2, August 1978, pp. 10_15;ProgressR~p0rt 1977, Kabul, Ministry of Information and Culture (MIC); and Dr Anihita Ratibzad’s interview with Soviet Women, 5, February 1980. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 181 182 Afghanistan 26. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
28. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Fred Halhiday, ‘Revolution in Afghanistan’, New Left Review, 112, November-December 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
30. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
31. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Chapter 5 1. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Clifford Geertz, Thelnterpretation ofCultures, NewYork,BasicBooks, 1973, p. 168; Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919-1922, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
M. Nazif Shahrani, ‘Marxist “Revolution” and Islamic Resistance’ in Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
1981, pp. 93—4. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
New York Times, 13 January 1980. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For one of the best accounts of the Afghan resistance, see Anthony Hyman, Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, London, Macmillan, 1982, Ch. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For perhaps the bestjournalistic field report, see Gerard Ghaliand, Reportfrom Afghanistan, New York, Viking Press, Penguin, 1981. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Fred Halliday, ‘War and Revolution in Afghanistan’, NewLeftReview, 119, January—February 1980, pp. 20—41. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 183 184 Afghanistan Chapter 6 1. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
7.Halliday, Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
See the pape,rs by these scholars in Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanis-9. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Halliday, ‘War and Revolution in Afghanistan’, (1980), op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Halliday, ‘Afghanistan: A Revolution Consumes Itself’, (1979), op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
FBIS, 10 October 1979; Halliday, ‘Revolution in Afghanistan’, op. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Major Taroon was described by the American embassy in Kabul as a ‘brutal, psychopathic killer’, second ‘only to Amin in the amount of blood on his hands’. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 185 186 Afghanistan 36. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Mishra (ed.), Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Kabul Radio did appear to have broadcast in Dari at 22.40 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 187 188 Afghanistan 9. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
There isan element ofirony that Afghanistan’s most fundamentalist Islamic rebel leader, who swears by the Iranian revolution, should become a focus for the Western legend of the resistance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Soviets have mobilized a formidable array of military force and have engaged in flexible tactics to overpower Masud’s guerrilla forces. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
JosephJ. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Individual Americans have claimed that Afghanistan has been costing 23. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
UN negotiation process, Selig S.. Harrison, ‘Rough Plan Emerging for Afghan Peace’, New York Times, 12 July 1982, and ‘A Breakthrough in Afghanistan?’, Fore:gn Policy, 51, summer, 1983; and Bhabam Sen Gupta, ‘A Regional Approach to a Political Settlement in Afghanistan’, paper read at International Conference on Afghanistan, Ch. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
See also, for a fuller and to a large extent corroborated overview of the Notes 191 192 Afghanistan 16. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Cited in Lifschultz. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Notes 193 194 Afghanistan 8. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For an overview of Afghan history since the last decades of the nineteenth century until the withering of the British empire in the subcontinent, the reader may pick up Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics ofReform and Modernization, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1974 edn, and supplement it profitablywithLeonB. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919—1929: King Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1973. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Also recommended is Richard S. Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan , Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
British interactions with Afghanistan are of considerable interest and importance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
On Afghanistan itself, D. N. Wilbur’s Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture ,New Haven, HRAF Press, 1962 is a good, reliable introductory volume. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Richard Tapper’s edited volume, The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan, London, Croom Helm, 1983; Ashraf Ghani, ‘Islam and State- Building in a Tribal Society: Afghanistan: 1880—1801’, in Modern Asian Studies, 12, 2, 1978, pp. 269—84; and Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973, together with M. ZazifShahrani and RobertL. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
However, there has also been a good deal of serious Soviet writing on Afghanistan since April 1978. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The non-expert reader interested in Soviet perspectives on Afghani- stan may usefully read the 1981 issue of Social Sciences Today, for a number of in-depth studies of Afghanistan’s social, economic and political problems by a group of Soviet specialists. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Afghan revolution and the Soviet military intervention to defend it from collapse are also to be seen in the context of ethnic and Islamic aspects of the Central Asian republics of the USSR Recommended reading are: E. Allworth (ed.), Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For insights into the new phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism, useful readings include Cynak K. Pullapilly (ed.), Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Islam in the Contemporary World, Notre Dame, Ind., Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Harrison’s In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981, is relevant to the long-term consequences of the Afghan revolution in the area around Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
At least two useful publications have emerged from Congressional concern over A Wodd View,edited by Bodgan Szajkowski, General Editor of the A VerySe!ect Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Soviet publications have been much fewer in number than American and West European put together. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
For South Asian perceptions of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Power, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1982; K. P. Mishra (ed.), Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan in Crisis, New Delhi, Vikas, 1981; G. S. Bhargava, South Asian Security after Afghanistan, Lexington, Mass., Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
The Yearbook of lnternational Communism 1985 carries an excellent survey of the affairs of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan in 1984 by Richard Cronon (Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, 1985). Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Anthony Arnold’s Afghanistan’s Two Party Communism, Stanford, Hoover institute, 1981, is infor- mative, but dated; as are Dupree’s several papers mentioned in the Notes to the text of this volume. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
the best sources are Ka bul New Times and Public Opinion Trends (POT), Afghanistan series, New Delhi. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Finally, the reader may like to see the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the larger context of Soviet foreign policy and Moscow’s involvement with Third World revolutions and conflicts. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979—1982 M. UNIVERSITY Berkeley Hassan Kakar OF CALIFORMA PRESS LondonLos Angeles University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan: response, 1979—1982. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
*Contents AFGHANISTAN i. z. Why Did the Soviet Union Invade? Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
138 10. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
During my stay in Honolulu, Mr. Dixon also provided me with press clippings on Afghanistan, for which I am also grateful. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Last but not least, I am grateful to Mr. Zamin Mohmand for sending me press clippings on Afghanistan and the region. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Introduction Landlocked Afghanistan links Central Asia with South Asia and, to some extent, with West Asia or the Middle East. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The latter is also con- nected through Afghanistan to China. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
These two groups constitute the over- whelming majority of Afghanistan’s inhabitants, who numbered i ~ million in 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Theii main division, the Durrani, provided Afghanistan with the ruling dynasties of Sadozay in the eighteenth century and Mohammadzay from then until recently. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
An ancient land, Afghanistan has a long and eventful history. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan has, mainly in its outlying regions, people of common descent with those of its neighboring countries. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In the nine- teenth century both powers grabbed vast territories from Afghanistan, reducing it to its present size; they then looked on it as a buffer state. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Britain was the more aggressive, warring with Afghanistan three times (in 1838, 1878, and 1918), conducting foreign relations for it (i88o— 1918), and imposing the aforementioned Durand Line (1893). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The delimitation of the boundaries of Afghanistan coincided with the efforts of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880—1901) to lay the founda- tion of a strong central government, which marked the emergence of a nation-state. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In this initial phase the state became absolute, monopolistic, protectionist, and indif- ferent to modernization schemes in fields other than the military. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
stan to the outside world, the introduction of modern education, and the emergence of a small but assertive educated and bureaucratic middle class that was nationalist and constitutionaliSt in outlook. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The consolidation of the nation-state, as well as of his dynastic rule, made it necessary for Amir Abdur Rahman Khan to build up a strong standing army aided by an expanded bureaucracy and an extensive intelligence service, a stupendous task considering the meager state income based mainly on an agricultural economy. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The failure of the reforms and the rule of a Tajik amir for the first time in modern Afghanistan had serious repercussions that became manifest during the reign of King Nadir (192.9—3 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Masterminded by the businessman Abdul Majid Zabuli, a banking system was introduced, and joint stock companies for export and import were set up. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The new prime minister, Shah Mahmud, another uncle of the king, was a mild person suitable to rule at a time when Afghanistan was applying for membership to the United Nations. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The creation of Pakistan following the British withdrawal from the subcontinent of India in 1947 prompted Afghanistan to raise the ques- tion of the principle of self-determination in regard to Pashtunistan, now claimed by Pakistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan disputed Pakistan’s claim over the territory, but the latter was unwilling to consider the complaint, despite the fact that it demanded itself the application of the same principle with regard to Kashmir, a territory disputed between Pakistan and India. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
During this decade Afghanistan experienced fundamental changes that were initiated more under his direction than under either his brother or the king. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
It started with the launching of the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1957, financed partly by a Soviet loan of $ioo million; a second plan was launched in 1962. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On the Pashtunistan issue, by contrast, the government failed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Premier Daoud was left no choice but to approach the Soviet Union for economic as well as military aid. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For its part the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, was willing to extend aid, hoping to keep Afghanistan outside the American-dominated military blocs. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Khrushchev also supported Afghanistan’s stand on Pashtunistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
King Mohammad Zahir decided that the time was ripe for Afghanistan to be ruled demo- cratically. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The accomplishments of the constitutional decade were many. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Prisoners of the previous regime were released, and no one could be imprisoned before being tried as law required. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Also during the constitutional period, for the first time in Afghan history the government ceased to be authoritarian and its agents ceased to boss individuals. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Mohammad Daoud ruled Afghanistan as president under conditions different from those that prevailed when he served as prime minister. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He now had to share power with members of the pro-Moscow communist Parcham faction of the PDPA, whose military wing helped him to usurp power. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The change in relations with the Soviet Union meant distancing Af- ghanistan from it when “the Russians had become increasingly dis- turbed by the emergence of new and expanded ties between Afghanistan and its Islamic neighbors.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Further, he “wanted the Afghan government to get rid of those experts, who were nothing more than spies bent on promot- ing the cause of imperialism.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Following the coup, the PDPA ruled Afghanistan with Nur Moham- mad Taraki as president of the Revolutionary Council, prime minister, and general secretary of the PDPA. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Even within the PDPA, the ruling Khalqi faction suppressed the Parcham faction and sent its leaders abroad as ambassadors, later dismissing them. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Despite the sheer quantity of interesting events, no historian in any language has so far studied the period as a unit in detail. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The account is divided into four parts. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Part i deals with why and how the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
After darkness set in, about five thousand Soviet soldiers, who had been landing during the past three days at the International Airport of Kabul,1 headed toward Tapa-e-Tajbeg palace, where Hafizullah Amin, president of the Revolutionary Council, prime minister of the Demo- cratic Republic of Afghanistan, and general secretary of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, had transferred his seat from the city palace on 19 December 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At the time of the attack Amin was conscious but groggy. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The invading units must have been concerned with the possible reac- tion by Division Eight of Qargha and Division Seven of Rishkhor. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Never before have the Afghan defenders of national dignity failed in their duty as these communist officers failed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin returned to Afghanistan in late 1965 a bitter man but deter- mined to stand up against the political establishment, which he thought to have deprived him of his right to higher education. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin was anxious to be on good terms with the Soviets. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin held that in developing countries such as Afghanistan the mili- tary, not workers or peasants, could bring about revolution. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For Amin, this theory had practical implications. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
“Whereas Amin did not favor the idea of Afghanistan being pushed into the Soviet bloc, Taraki did. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Simi- larly, with regard to the pursuit of the policy of non-alignment, Taraki preferred that Afghanistan should be non-aligned on the model of Cuba with the active support of the Soviet bloc, whereas Amin intended to. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On the day when Taraki’s plane was about to land at Kabul airport, Sarwari had arranged that a death squad would gun down Amin when he was on his way to receive Taraki. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Anwar was the first to describe the incident in the palace. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Once again he was mistaken. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghan officials were forced to accept Moscow’s price schedule and its word on the amount being transported into the Soviet Union and the credit due Af- ghanistan.25 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Being a communist, and seeing that Afghanistan had been made de- pendent on the Soviet Union, Amin hoped that the Soviet Union would assist Afghanistan in its development schemes. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At the same time Amin began to remove pro-Soviet officials from sensitive positions and recruited Western-educated Afghans to higher positions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He failed to understand that the Soviet leaders pre- ferred compliant rulers in countries such as Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Although concerned about independence, Amin wanted to de- velop Afghanistan with Soviet help, stating, “We are convinced that if there were no vast economic and military aid from the Soviet Union, we could not resist the aggression and conspiracies of imperialism, its leftist-looking allies [China and others] and international reaction, and could not move our country toward the construction of a socialist so- ciety.”34 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By “military aid” Amin meant military weapons. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin knew that the Durand Line could be used by either Pakistan or Afghanistan against the other, depending on circumstances. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
When Amin usurped power, it was Pakistan’s turn. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin proceeded to follow, in the words of the Kremlin masters, “a more balanced policy.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For them it was not hard to become certain about those intentions: Taraki had assured his Kremlin comrades that “we will never be as close to anyone else as we are to you”;4° by.contrast, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The turmoil in the region also seemed conducive to such a move. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To meet the assault, Afghanistan should be prepared militarily. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In December 1979 Soviet officials told Amin that the “revolution” was in danger from the United States, which was about to launch a mas- sive assault from the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The place was a sort of bridgehead where Soviet specialists and advisers with their fam- ilies could assemble if the situation got worse.”42 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet government and the regime of Karmal have claimed that the troops sent into Afghanistan were in line with article four of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation, which Taraki and Brezhnev had concluded in Moscow on ~ December 1978. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The security situation in Afghanistan was far from being so desperate as to need Soviet troops. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Had Amin requested military aid, as dis- tinct from weapons, the Soviet Union would have obtained a document about it, a point so significant that it was bound to affect, as it did, its relations with Afghanistan and to some extent also with the region and the world. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The treaty reads in part, “In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the high contracting parties, they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Since Amin was the central figure both in the party hierarchy and the II 40 state, and since he had driven away his rivals, and since he had assigned his own men to key positions in the party as well as the government, it is inconceivable that someone else would have dared to invite Soviet troops. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Also, in ordinary language the phrase “armed interference from the outside” means interference by one country in the internal affairs of another—in the present case, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In the course of the ten years that the Soviet troops were in Afghanistan, they fought against Afghans, not against the army of another country. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
If the Soviet Union sent troops to Afghanistan to be used “exclusively for assistance in rebuffing the armed interference from the outside,” why did they kill President Amin and topple his government, which they claimed to have invited them? On this point the Soviet argument was that Amin had been overthrown not by its forces but by the true Afghan 4 revolutionaries. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
December 1989 the Soviet Supreme Council declared the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan unconstitutional. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
While castigating Leonid Brezhnev and others for sending the troops into Afghanistan, it declared that the decision to invade Afghanistan “was made by a small circle of people in violation of the Soviet constitution, according to which such matters belong to the jurisdiction of higher state bodies.”48 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
First, this claim is not in line with the alle- gation that the troops were sent to repel foreign aggression. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
More specifically, across the wide Soviet empire no other country ex- cept Turkey had as geographically distinct boundaries as Afghanistan had with it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan was separated from the Soviet empire for 2,300 kilometers, for the greater part by the River Oxus and then by an unin- habitable desert. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The claims were a cover-up for an agenda the Kremlin decision mak- ers had for Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In the present interdependent world, a secret decision made by a few irresponsible men in the Soviet empire to wage an unprovoked war on Afghanistan was bound to be opposed by millions of men and women; it also led to the intensification of the cold war. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But could they succeed in Afghanistan with the outcast Karmal and his faction of Parcham? Under the Soviet Shadow When the Soviet forces started operations in Kabul, Babrak Karmal, the outcast leader of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, was in Doshanbay, the capital city of the Soviet republic of Tajikistan bordering Afghani- stan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviets had built their empire with this precept in mind. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At three o’clock in the morning the news of the formation of a new government was broadcast over the radio. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In- stead, a tape recording of his voice was used. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
It read in part, “The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan earnestly demands that the USSR render urgent political, moral, and economic assistance, including military aid, to Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The second official announcement was also brief but stunning. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At this time the new government existed only on paper. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On i o January i 980 the names of ministers of the new government were announced. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The new government was composed of Parchamis, Khalqis, and a few pro-Parcham individuals. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin’s senior ministers, with the exception of two, were imprisoned. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On i January 1965 twenty-eight educated Afghans assembled Se- cretly in the residence of Nur Mohammad Taraki in Karta-e-Char in the city of Kabul, and there they founded the PDPA along the lines of the pro-Moscow communist parties. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The incident brought the Sitam-e-Milli to the front line of national and international attention for the first time; it also worsened relations between Afghani- stan and the United States. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Serious also was the exploitation of the locals by government offi-’ cials. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
All peoples want to know the identity of their rulers, and that desire is particularly strong among the genealogy-conscious Afghans. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
It is a custom in Afghanistan for a person of no ethnic significance to relate himself to the ethnic group into which he has been integrated. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But in Afghanistan the head of state must gain legitimacy either directly from the constitu- encies or through their representatives, in accord with social conven- tions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
According to one of these stories, he entered Afghanistan “through revolutionary pathways” and along.with Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
was hurriedly brought back. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Karmal’s poor performance in interviews with foreign journalists also failed to help his public image. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
An adviser in Herat, in return for a golden necklace for his wife, released a member of the Afghan Millat Party who had been sentenced to death. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Also, the Afghans had seen that the same Karmal following the communist coup had, with others, promised that private as well as personal property would remain safe, a promise that they violated. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Among the measures promised by Karmal, the most important were the release of prisoners; the promulgation of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; the change of the red, Soviet-style banner of the Khalq period to the more orthodox one of black, red, and green; the granting of concessions to religious leaders; and the conditional restoration of confiscated property. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In April 1980 the Karmal regime adopted a temporary constitution, the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which had been drafted while Amin was in power. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Envisaged for the country was “a new-style state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,” guided by the PDPA. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He even had to plead with his Soviet comrades: “You brought me here [to Afghanistan], you protect me.”51 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
What was needed was a lecture to the Kremlin leaders themselves on why they had blundered in invading Afghanistan and raising to power a person whom their own historian called “a nobody.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A feature of this change was the emergence of educated Afghans in the forefront of poli- tics. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In Afghanistan as elsewhere in the Islamic world, Islamic fundamen- talism (or Islamism or Islamic radicalism)4 is the story of response to a society in transition from the traditional to the modern that sets the state on the road to secularization. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In their daily confrontations with the state, they must dissociate themselves from it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In a pamphlet published by the Jam’iyyat, Who Are We and What Do We Want? it was stated that the movement was nothing but an at- tempt to liberate the people of Afghanistan from the clutches of tyranny and to bring about a renaissance in religion. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But after Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan deteriorated over the issue of Pashtunistan, both countries financed and incited each other’s dissidents. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Serious also was the division among the Sunni leaders. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Another weakening factor was the Islamists’ loss of credit in the eyes of their patrons whose goodwill was essential for them, since they had to act from abroad inside Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
This point became serious when, following his victory over the Islamists, President Daoud took measures to distance Afghanistan from the Soviet bloc countries and to bring it closer to the Islamic world, in particular Pakistan and Iran.51 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Islamic moderate organizations were set up in various times in 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Not all resistance groups were included in the coalitions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
There were no coordinated military activities, nor did they make use of the expertise of the military officers of the Kabul re- gime who defected. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
According to one observer, 4 The Iranians consider the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the most favorable situation for the consolidation and extension of their influence in the country. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
When it did not work according to their wishes, they changed their policy and decided to federate the groups under their umbrella of one organi- zation, Nasr. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Most might be called so, since they defended their homeland against the inva- sion and stood for the view that the people of Afghanistan alone had the right to set up the kind of state they wanted. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In a proposal to the Revolutionary Islamic Coun- cil of the Islamic organizations it stated, “Since among you important talks are being held on the fate of Afghanistan, and since these talks are about our fatherland, religion, honor [namoas], and independence, we propose that on the question of determination of our fate all authorita- tive tribal elders should take part in decisions through such a loya jirga. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Since the implementation of the resolution required the cooperation of the Islamic organizations, the jirga asked their leaders to forge unity among themselves and to allow representatives of tribes to take part in the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A number of its founding members seceded from it to set up a rival jirga, the Loya Jirga of the Tribes of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
There were now two revolutionary councils: the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, com- posed of the six Islamic organizations, and the National and Islamic Revolutionary Council, composed of tribal and community elders. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But they had made this assistance conditional on the creation of a unified center. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Forging unity and procuring financial assistance were the two im- portant issues to which the National Islamic Council addressed itself. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ningrahar elders proposed the former king for the position; this motion was accepted after a debate in which the Kandahari proponents of the king argued against the advisability of the proposal at this juncture. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The question of the selection of a national leader (mule qa’id) domi- nated the meetings of the jirga. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The jirga is convened in times of na- tional emergency, especially when Afghanistan feels pressured by out- side powers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
As noted, Mohammad Zahir held that such an assembly was to delib- erate over ways and means to restore Afghan sovereignty and lay down the basis for a future government. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Even opponents of “a united front” could not reject overnight the proposal for its formation. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Under these circumstances it was not feasible for a united front to be formed through a jirga. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He also used his royal influence to commute capital punishment for persons convicted in criminal cases. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In 1979, in concert with other “nationalist groups,” SAMA forged a front, the National United Front of Afghanistan, or NUFA (Jabha-e-Mutahid-e-Milli-e- Afghanistan). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Among the pro-Chinese leftist groups SAMA, the most practical, was known to the public, while the rest were known primarily to their mem- bers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The suppression of the pro-Chinese elements shows the fate of rev-olu- tionary leftists in Afghanistan when unsupported by the might of a for- eign power. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Twice in the 1970S the Afghans were outraged: in 1978 by the com- munist coup, and in 1979 by the Russian invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Following the invasion, the Soviet army contingent increased in num- ber. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Some girls called them “Russian slaves” while others put their scarves on the officers, telling them that now they had become “women:’ an insulting word when uttered in such a manner to men in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Despite the repression, students were still inflamed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT RURAL TERRITORIES The Khalqi government was the government of Afghanistan in the sense that it ruled over it despite opposition. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They were thus safe from being crushed, but weakened. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By the force of circumstances the invaders found themselves in a situation in which they killed hundreds and thousands of those for whose protection they had purportedly come. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The invading army used air power, particularly helicopter gunships. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Spiritual persons and the ‘ulama provided them with religious blessing by issuing fatwas (rulings) and preaching for wars as sanctioned by Islam and tradition. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
This created a form of equilibrium,24 a situation that checked the dominance of one organization over the rest and the region as a whole. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Like people of other areas, the Logaris were compelled to pay taxes to the financial heads not of one mujahid organization, but of all of them. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The United States and some Muslim countries began to support the mujahideen, “cautiously channeling limited amounts of small arms and other mili- tary equipment to them.”~ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The detainees were charged not for opposition to the invasion but for acts that were considered crimes in the criminal code, the most repres- sive code there ever was in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Although it was impossible for my interrogator, Asad Rahmani, to substantiate any of the charges, he persisted, hoping that he might detect some contradictions in my re- sponses that would incriminate me. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Inmates faced a painful situation regarding the basic necessities of life—food and toilets. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Even the British exploited this situation with some success after they invaded Afghanistan twice in the last century. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES In the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, no clear line divided the government and the PDPA. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kishtmand’s promotion alarmed educated Afghans for a different reason. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Strategically it is also significant, because it is separated from the rest of the country by the Hindu Kush and also because it is close to Central Asia. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They feared that through the importation of central Asians and the cooperation of Parchamis and Afghan sectarians, the Soviet Union intended to carve out a state in northern Afghanistan with a view to making it part of its empire. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They also feared that with the presence of such surrogates the Soviets now intended to implement their design, as they had invaded the country when the Parcham faction provided them a pretext. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Thus, the promotion of Kishtmand made the regime more unpopular, despite the view that the Soviet model of nationalities, even if applied, would not work in Afghanistan since the Afghans were so- cially and linguistically more integrated than were the inhabitants of the neighboring lands. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
His position in the civil administration was also unenviable. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Gulabzoy said that since Moscow had appointed both himself and Karmal to their posts, Karma! could not remove him. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
One of their many antigovernment tracts (shabnama), this one addressed to the people of Kabul in February 19 8o, showed their spirit. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At home people would switch on their radios to hear what foreign news services, especially the BBC, had to say in their Pashto and Dan broad- casts about Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
During the first week of July 1981 the mujahideen began to enter the city in large num- bers, although the regime had taken new security measures. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Its view was that the “bandits” must be eliminated if they persisted. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Supported by Soviet might, the regime acted on the belief that it would accomplish this in time. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In August 1980 the authorities divided Afghanistan into eight new “zones,” or administrative units, each comprising a number of prov- inces. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The permanent commission was more important than its boss, who was not present all the time. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Starting with a special session on 15 January 1980, every year the General Assembly of the United Nations passed by an overwhelming majority a resolution demanding that foreign forces be unconditionally withdrawn from Afghanistan, that the country’s integrity and non- aligned status be maintained, and that the right of self-determination of the Afghan people be observed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
the secretary-general of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, on instruction from the General Assembly, appointed a spe- cial envoy to seek the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, but because of the intransigence of the Soviet Union, no progress could be made. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Similarly, a resolution calling for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was passed by the foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries at a ~neeting held early in 1981 in New Delhi; this resolution was particu- larly notable since the number of pro-Soviet countries in the movement was considerable. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In summer 1981 the European Economic Community (EEC) used even stronger terms asking that the Soviet Union withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
At the same time, the EEC assured the So- viet Union that Afghanistan would remain neutral after the withdrawal, much like Austria after the Soviet withdrawal in 1955. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In January 1981 President Giscard d’Estaing of France called for an international conference to be held on Afghanistan, but the Soviets rejected that as well. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Since it viewed the presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan as detrimental to its own security, the Chinese government made the improvement of its relations with the Soviet Union contingent on, among other things, the withdrawal of troops from Af- ghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan did not create a stir among the people of the world comparable to that aroused by the United States’ invOlvement in Vietnam, but on certain occasions anti- Soviet demonstrations were held. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
An eloquent appeal came from Czechoslovakia in January 1980, calling for an international boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow and even comparing them to the 1936 Olympics, held in the Berlin of Hitler’s Third Reich. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Inside the Soviet empire, although Soviet youths fell in Afghanistan, the voice of opposition to the war could not be heard. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet police state was too strong for Soviet men and women to express their views on the Afghan War as the American people had done on the Vietnam War. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
More serious was the policy of the regime toward “counterrevolu- tionaries.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Toward the end of the re- public, waves of terrorism and counterterrorism went hand in hand, the latter committed by radical Islamists against the leftists and government officials. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The revolutionary method of Stalinesque Russian communism, the overzealousness of Islamists, and the revenge-seeking spirit of Afghans made life in Afghanistan an inferno. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In Kabul it has not been heard that the perpetrator has been arrested. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Onlookers who in the past cooperated with authorities in seizing culprits now gaze impassively, doing nothing. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For genocide to happen, there must be certain preconditions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For example, in revenge for the killing by the mujahideen of three Russian soldiers, the commander brother of the fallen captain led his commando unit into the city of Tashqurghan in April 1982. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Because Afghanistan has long been a crossroad, famous conquerors such as Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Timur Lane, Babur, Nadir Shah Afshar, and the British have invaded it, but the Soviet invaders have surpassed all in the systematic killing of its people and the destruction of their land. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But the idea be- hind the society’s reorganization was old. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The communist idea was mo- nolithic (as opposed to pluralist): it emphasized the validity of only one truth, that is, communism. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Their works, particularly A Report from Helsinki Watch and A Nation Is Dying, are monuments of Soviet brutality in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I have used relevant sections of the final report of the International Afghanistan Hearing. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Thereafter they un- dertook major operations, and in none did they confine themselves to battles with the combatants. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan, states that three of his fellow 4 countrymen who had visited Afghanistan in the summer of 1980 “brought home pictorial documentation of bombarded farms, destroyed villages and the destruction of Kamdesh, the central town in Nuristan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
All the way from there on into Herat there was no one living there, absolutely no one. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
These areas have turned into the age before stone age. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
These operations made the people of Logar believe that “it is a nor- 2.40 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Paghman was still not pacified. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviets used chemical agents in inaccessible areas so that others might not know about it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For this reason, the Soviets and the regime wreaked havoc by helicopter gunships on areas where the presence of foreigners was suspected. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I have noted two cases of peculiar decomposition. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The helicopters dropped a couple of what we thought at that moment were bombs. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Mycotoxins such as yellow rain, sleeping death, and Blue X seem to ~iave been used in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
George Shultz, the former American secretary of state, has dealt with the subject of chemical warfare in Afghanistan in detail. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
indicate that the Soviet forces continue their selective use of chemi- cals and toxins against the resistance in Afghanistan.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The chemicals were stored at Kandahar Airport, which was an important staging area for Soviet military operations. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He collected information about chemical warfare from sources in Afghanistan and also from diplomatic sources abroad. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ricardo Fraile, a French legal expert on chemical warfare, visited Logar for a week in December i 982. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
We have been shown masks, we have been shown protective clothing, we hear witnesses—people who have come from different parts of the country. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Then in categorical terms he said, “In the past I was not necessarily convinced that chemical warfare was being carried out in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Besides, the commission had not visited Afghanistan, where these agents had allegedly been used as early as 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
This was in the early stage of the war. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A United Nations Commission of Enquiry set up in December 1980 had concluded, in Fraile’s words, that “at least for one case in Afghani- stan it would seem that it is almost certain that chemical agents, very specially of the irritant type, had been used.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In spring 1981, while dropping “heavy bombs” from air on villages, the Soviets also dropped plastic bombs and antipersonnel bombs on fields and pathways in Dehshaykh in the district of Baraki Barak.37 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
“The average Soviet had no motivation tofight in Afghanistan, other than to survive and go home. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Afghan adventure was not the Soviets’ only adventure, but it was their last. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
With the rise in March 1985 of Mikhail Gorbachev as the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, the scene was set for changes: in the Soviet Union by the inauguration of glasnost (openness) and per- estroika (economic restructuring); in Afghanistan by the gradual disen- gagement of the Soviet Union; and in the world by the relaxation of ten- sions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In Afghanistan the change was marked by the replacement in May 1986 of Karmal by Najibullah, first as general secretary of the PDPA and then as president of the Revolutionary Council. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
This replacement occurred after Gorbachev described the Soviet war in Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
As early as 1983 Yuri Andropov, general secretary of the Communist Party; had told Karmal that “he should not count on [an] indefinite and protracted stay of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan; that it was his obli- gation to expand the social base of his government by political 10 But Andropov died shortly afterward, and during the brief reign of his successor, Konstantin Chernenko, the issue was not pursued, and “Kar- mal did not draw the required conclusion.”11 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But the Soviet leaders did not agree on how Najibullah should pro- ceed to form a coalition government. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
If it failed, so the rumor went, he would then try to resolve the issue through diplomacy. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Sitami factions of SAZA and SZA (for- merly SAFRA) declared their support for the policy of “national recon- ciliation;’ and their leaders joined the government. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Despite these difficulties, the loya jirga succeeded in its mission. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In particular, they distrusted the PDPA and KhAD. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Despite these changes, Afghans not connected with the party or the regime held that President Najibullah was so committed to the ideals of PDPA and so loyal to the Soviet Union that he would not transform. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Since the basic parameters and structure of the agreements had been complefed at a time when Moscow enjoyed a position of strength mili- tarily, “The Geneva Accords accomplished little more than providing a respectable exit for the Soviet troops.”31 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Soviet Union took full advantage of this situation by supplying abundant arms to Kabul and raising its fighting capability several times.33 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
However, the shura was restricted to the seven Peshawar-based Islamic Sunni groups, the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan’s Mujahideen (J1JAM). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The IUAM leaders also had to battle with tribal and community el- ders. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Each group was assigned two ministerial posts. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The AIG needed to establish itself inside Afghanistan as a prelude to overcoming the Kabul regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For this purpose, some had in 1990 set up an association, the Movement for a Representative Government in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They stood behind the “broad-based” plan which the United Nations had devised for Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The breakup of the Soviet Union and the opening of Central Asia had made Afghanistan once again significant in linking the latter region with South Asia. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Unlike the “broad-based” formula that Diego Cordovez had put for- ward in the summer of 1988, this plan came out in a more favorable climate. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On 23 April, after cautioning heads of the Afghan factions against armed clashes, Benon Sevan informed Premier Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan of the dangerous situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Only Hekmatyar refused to attend, saying that “his presence was needed inside Afghanistan.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On the next evening (24 April) Premier Sharif summoned heads of the Islamic groups to the offi- cial Governor’s House in Peshawar. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The accords were drawn to meet the requirements of Pakistan with respect to the new Central Asian republics. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Abdullah Shiniwari even goes so far as to hold that, through a “grand conspiracy agrainst Afghanistan;’ foreigners “forced a[n] alliance of the minorities and the Communists to trigger an internecine war between the majority Pashtuns and the minority represented by Ahmad Shah Mas’ud.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Shiniwari also maintains that these foreigners schemed to em- broil the Afghans among themselves with a view to exhuasting the huge stockpiles of the Scud, Oregon, Luna-I, and Luna-Il missiles, as well as the huge stockpiles of conventional weapons Afghanistan had acquired during Najibullah’s rule—weapons that not many countries in the re- gion possessed.73 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Now Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of the Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan, and General Hameed Gui, the former chief of the ISI, who dreamed of “turning Afghanistan into the base for Islamic 90 separately tried to do the same. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Islamabad Accords were an improvement on the Peshawar Ac- cords. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan will long feel the effects of the destruction of Kabul as the nation’s main political, industrial, commercial, administrative, and cultural center—the place where people from all over the country had mingled and begun the move earlier in the century toward detribaliza- tion, secularization, national solidarity, and modern ways of life. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
An analyst notes, “Since there is no effective legal authority in the country, those who possess guns, money, and fighters call the 120 As described, in the resistance period rural Afghanistan was severely damaged, the agricultural system disrupted, and millions of mines placed throughout the land, while more than five million Afghans fled abroad. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The destruction that it has suffered since then is bound to adversely affect the future of Afghanistan as an independent nation- state. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By 1992. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To expect Afghanistan to be a country with a government constituted by the participation of its own citizens, capable of extending its rule throughout the land and con- ducting its domestic and foreign policy independently remains a dream for the present. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The educated and bureaucratic middle class, many of whose members have fled abroad, has become insignificant. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
With these policies they succeeded over the communists and the Soviet invaders, but it is unlikely they will triumph over each other. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But since they follow conflicting and unattain- able goals, and since they are prone to following foreign advice, their politics is anything but compromise. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For “during their time Afghanistan has been looted more than when the British and the Soviets had occupied it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The continuation of war politics is bound to weaken the groups further, discredit them further with their compatri- ots, and make them still more receptive to their foreign patrons. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan has experienced many critical periods in the past. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Still, all this is not cause for despair. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The United Nations for the third time has addressed the Afghan prob- lem, or what Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has called this “human tragedy.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Supporters have also urged the former king to come out of Rome. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Since the Soviet with- drawal, Afghanistan has become connected to drug trafficking and the training of terrorists. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Because of the absence of a central government and the openness of its borders, “thousands of Islamic radicals, outcasts, visionaries and gunmen from some 40 countries have come to Afghani- stan to learn the lessons ~f jehad, . Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
By helping to estab- lish such a government, the world governments, among other things, would secure millions of men and women throughout the world from the dangers of the poisonous culture. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afganistan Sitam-e-milli Ittehad-e-milli Nasl-e-nao-e-hazara Jabha-e-muttahid-e- milli-e-afganistan Sazman-c-islami-e-nasr Sazman-c-mardum-c- zahamatkash Hizbullah Hizb-c-dcmokratik-c- khalq-e-afganistan Khalq Dcmokratik-c-nawccn- e-khalq Hizb-c-muttaraqi-c- demokratik Sazman-c-azadibakhsh- e-mardum-e- afganistan Sazman-e- rihaycebakhsh-e- fcdayec-e-afganistan Pashto Islami harakat Islami milli inqilabi jirga Islami milli muttahida jabha Dc afganistan islami gund Islami inqilab Islami pawczun Inqilabi islami harakat Dc afganistan islami milli mahaz Dc Afganistan de-milli nejat jabha Milli sitam Milli ittehad Dc hazara ncway nasi Dc afganistan milli mut- tahida jabha Dc nasr islami sazman Dc khwarikisho khalko sazman Dc afganistan de khalko demokratik gund Khalk Dc khalko ncway demo- kratik Muttaraqi demokratik gund Dc afganistan de khalko azadigushtun- kay sazman Dc afganistan dc azadi- gushatunko fedaycc sazman ~tppc1iuLd~ A~ 4 English SAWO (Organization of the Real Patriots of Af- ghanistan) SAZA (Organization of the Toilers of Afghan- istan) Servants of the Quran Spark Strength Struggle Surkha (Rihaye) (Or- ganization for the Lib- eration of the People of Afghanistan) Thunder Union for the Indepen- dence of Pashtunistan Union of the Libera~ tioflists United Islamic Council Unity for the Liberation of Afghanistan Voice of the People Voice of the People Dan Sazman watanparastan- c-waqiye-e-afganistan Sazman-e- zahmatkashan-e- afganistan Khuddam ulfurqan Angar Nairo Paikar Sazman-e-rihaebakhsh- e-khalqha-c-afganistan Ra’d Ittehadiyya baray-e- azadi-c-pashtunistan Ittehadiyya-e-istiqlal ta- laban Shura-e-ittifaq-e-islami Ittehad baraye azadi-e- afganistan Saday-e-’awam Nida-e-khalq Pashto Dc afganistan de re- shteeno hcwadpalo sazman Dc afganistan de khwar- ikisho sazman Dc afganistan dc khalko dc azadigush- tunko sazman Tander Dc pashtunistan de azadi de para itteha- diyya Dc khpelwaki ghush- tunko ittehadiyya Dc islami ittefaq shura Dc afganistan de azadi de para ittehad Dc khalko gag Dc khalko awaz Selected Biographical Sketches For additional biographical sketches, see J. B. Amstutz, Afghanistan, The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986); A. Arnold, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Com- munism (Stanford: Hoover Institute, Stanford University, 1983); R. Klass, Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited (New York: Freedom House, 1987). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The other leaders of the PDPA, uncertain about their success, spent the night at the Kabul airfield ready to fly to safety if the situation warranted it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He was moderate and cooperated with the Khalqi government by joining it as the head of the Publications Department in the Ministry of Education. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Badakhshi was imprisoned in 1978 and eliminated by prison authorities during Amin’s rule. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
He joined the PDPA at its inception in j~, but quit it in 1968 to set up an organization of his own, the Sitam-e-Milli (Against National Oppression). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In prison Karmal was befriended by a fellow in- mate, Mier Akbar Khybar. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
KARMAL, BABRAK (1929—) Although born into a wealthy Tajikized family of Kashmir origin in the village of Kamari east of Kabul, Babrak Karmal lived in hardship following the death of his mother. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
After he felt secure in his position, President Daoud dismissed Parchamis from the presidential cabinet and tried to distance Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In 1967, when the PDPA split into the rival Parcham and Khalq factions, Karmal headed the smaller, and more cosmopolitan, Parcham faction. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
On i January 1965 the PDPA was founded in Kabul, with Karmal serving as one of its twenty-eight founding members in its founding congress. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Some Muslim fundamentalists claimed responsibility for the incident. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The PDPA leaders accused certain “circles” of the government, while some Parchami leaders claimed that Hafizullah Amin had engineered the killing. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
N~IIAZI, GHULAM MUHAMMAD (‘93 2-1978) N~Tiazi was the founder of the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The son of A~bdul Nabi, Niazi came from the village of Raheem Khel in the district of Andar n Ghazni Province. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
the organization still had no specific title; it was probably then that it was named the Islamic Association of Afghanistan (Jam’iyyat-e~Islame~eAfghanistan) By then Niazi had succeeded in developing three distinct cells: (~) a thinker’s cell through which religious scholars were to plan the future course of action; (z) a worker’s cell to carry its messages to the public; (~) a link cell to establish con- tacts in the government with a view to influence policymakers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In 1972. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Five weeks later, in Karachi, he disavowed his press conference and said he was returning to Afghanistan” (A. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Arnold, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism, 17). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
But the ephemeral allaying of fear was the only service of note he rendered his “revolu- tion.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
They will bring half of Iran into Afghanistan under the flag of [the] Herat division. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
While you will be taking counsel Herat will fall and both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan will have still greater difficulties. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I don’t want to distress you but such a fact is impossible to conceal. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
for giving me this along with a number of other books recently published on Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Farhang, Afghanistan 1:485—93. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Gregorian, Modern Afghanistan 352; Farhang, Afghanistan 1:426. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Gregorian, Modern Afghanistan, 363. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Farhang, Afghanistan 1:446—58; Dupree, Afghanistan, 494—98. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ghaus, Fall of Afghanistan, 65—79. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ghaus, Fall of Afghanistan, 90. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Fayzzad, National LoyaJirgas, 232—96. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For a background to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its wider Andrew and Gordiesky, KGB, 574. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
327 deputy chief in Afghanistan from 1975 to 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
9. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Arnold, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism, i86.13. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Roy, “Origin,” 53.5. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
17. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
From 1988 to 1989 he himself was prime minister of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
His book, which describes mainly the events in high circles, is very informative. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In addition, in 1980 the Soviets took the step of crediting its imports of Afghan natural gas against the cost of maintaining the “friendly fraternal assistance” of its “limited military contingent” in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In 1979 Soviet experts discovered another gas-bearing zone in northern Afghanistan capable of producing one- quarter million cubic meters per day. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
IL. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
15. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Baha, “Cruel Executions;’ 79, 8t. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Farhang, Afghanistan 1:498.30. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
32. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
35. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
36. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
39. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan, 136. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
46. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
I told Farhang that the Soviets had introduced their troops into Afghanistan not for the sake of Karma! Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A!though Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
52. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Arno!d, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism, io6. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ministry of P!anning, General Statistics, 113—22. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Front of Afghanistan’s Militant Mujahideen, Watan; M. N. Majruh, Fundamentalism, in the words of Professor Bernard Lewis, refers to the Muslim fundamentalists, however, base themse!ves Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
2.3. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
3~. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
40. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Brigot and Roy, War in Afghanistan, z~i.41. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
45. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
49. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
50. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
58. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
6z. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
SAWO: the Real Patriots of Afghanistan). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
See also Zadran, History of Afghanistan, 673. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Hytnan, Afghanistan, 179. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Zadran, History of Afghanistan 1:67 r. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Hyman, Afghanistan, i8o. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Zadran, History of Afghanistan, 671. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
S. Sh. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For details see, Ilmi, Afghanistan; Ilmi and Majruh, Sovietization of Af- Ruiz, Left Out in the Cold, 3. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
4. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Quoted in Alam, “Jehad of Afghanistan,” ~ i. Barth, “Cultural Welisprings,” 198. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In places the intergroup clashes were so bloody that a group would dis-i~. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
21. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
42. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amnesty International, Afghanistan, i.21. Bilolavo, “One Man’s Sentence,” 13.22. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
VICTORY AT ANY COST i. buro member, was specific about the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan: “Social- ist internationalism obliged us to help the Afghan people defend the April Revo- lution’s gains”; see Payand, “Soviet-Afghan Relations,” 122. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
~. 5. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
See also Kakar, Geneva Compromise on Af- ghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In 1991 the total number of Afghan refugees abroad was estimated to be 5,670,000. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Girardet, Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For details, see International Afghanistan Hearing, 173. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For details, see International Afghanistan Hearing (hereafter IAH), i86— Alam, “Memoirs of Jehad,” 178. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
IAH, ~86. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
IAH, 6~.34. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Saikal and Miley, Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, i6.6. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kaka; Geneva Compromise on Afghanistan, 138; Kaka; Afghans in Kaka; “Afghanistan on the Eve of Soviet Withdrawal.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
To effect equality among Afghan ethnic groups, Kishtmand, a politburo member of PDPA, wrote that the state was to carve out “autonomous adminis- trative units” on the basis of “national characteristics” within a “federal struc- ture.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 227; Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 297. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
72. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Maiwand Trust, 17 May 1992, 6.~ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
84. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
“Strange Calm in Kabul,” Afghanistan Forum, November 1993, 10.~ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
For comments on the Islamabad Accords, see Kaka; “Time for91. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
97. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
110. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
A. Safi, former member of parliament from Tagab, personal comunica- D. Sahari, “Afghanistan and the Islamic World,” Mujahid Wolas (news- Afghanistan Forum, January 1994, 7. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
S. Coll, “The Agony of Victory,” Afghanistan Forum, March 1994, i6. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Z. Abbas, “The Battle for Kabul”, Afghanistan Forum, May 1994, 9. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ibid. In particula; the loss in November 1993 to Dostum of the Sher D. Sahari, “Afghanistan and the Islamic World,” Mujahid Wolas (news- In Kabul an official spokesman claimed, “We have clear-cut evidence 352 114. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
117. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
124. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
12.5. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Most of these posts belong to major groups.’ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
12.8. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
1994, 4,. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Quoted in Sahari, “Afghanistan and the Islamic World,” 2. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Quoted in the San Diego Union-Tribune, 5 July 1994, A,z.137. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
UNWALI Social and legal codes of the Pashtuns. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Alam, Z. G. “The Jehad of Afghanistan: Observations, Views, and Evalua- tions.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
“Setback for Peace in Afghanistan?’ (In English.) Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kakar, M. H. “Afghanistan on the Eve of Soviet Withdrawal.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
R. “Bitter Facts on the War in Afghanistan.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
BOOKS AND BOOKLETS Adamec, L. Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Atlas of the Provinces of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan: Torture of Political Prisoners. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Washing- )n, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
ondon and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
London: Amnesty International 357 tutz, J. B. Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Gordiesky. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
~rson, E., and N. Dupree, eds. The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Lahore: Vanguard, 1988. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Fletcher, A. Afghanistan: The Highway of Conquest. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ghaus, A. S. The Fall of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Girardet, E. Afghanistan: The Soviet War. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Gregorian, V. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Haqshinas, N. Political Changes of Jehad in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
(In Dan.) Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Peshawan: Islamic Party of Afghanistan, 1988. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Hezb-e-Islami of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan: A Decade of Sovietization. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ilmi, M. Y., ed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
International Afghanistan Hearing. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Jamiat-e-Islami of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kakar, M. H. Afghan, Afghanistan, and the Afghans and the Organization of the State in India, Persia, and Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Peshawar: Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, 1988. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Pashto.) Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Front of Afghanistan, 1989. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
M. Y. A Message to the Mujahid Nation of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Zaki Ullah. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
R., ed. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
intock, M. instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsur- ncy, Counter-Terrorism, 1940—1990. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
e, R. Predicting Russia’s Future. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
IL Rustar, M. 0. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Saikal, A., and W. Miley, eds. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Shultz, G. Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Wajdi, A. J. The Present and Future of Traditional Jirgas of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Wakman, M. A, Afghanistan, Nonalignment, and the Superpowers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Yousaf, M., and M. Adkin. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Zadnan, G. History of Afghanistan from ‘747 up to 1982 A.D.. Vol. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
1983. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Peshawar: Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, 1990. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
ARTICLES Alam, Z. G. “Violation of Human Rights of the Afghans.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Amin, R. “The Future of Afghan Society after Settlement of the Conflict.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
(In Pashto.) Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Paktia in Uprising Waves. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Hurriyat, flOs. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
1—2 (1992): 10—17. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
he Front of Afghanistan’s Militant Mujahideen. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
hani, A. “Afghanistan: Islam and Counterrevolutionary Movements.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
In R. Wasserstrom, Today’s Moral Problems, 410—23. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ivanov, N. “Revelations on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan Forum, no. 3 (1993): 16—20. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, special issue, April—December 1992, 159—71. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan in the 1970s, 13—3 3. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Khan, M. A. “The Emergence of Religious Parties in Afghanistan.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kornienko, G. M. “The Afghan Endeavor: Perplexities of the Military Incursion and Withdrawal.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Peshawar: Emjay Books International, 1993. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 2. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
(1994): 2—17. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Ludin, A. “Economic Conditions and the Future of Development in Afghani- stan’s Economy.” Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
The Insight, ~ç December 1988, 8—~6. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Islamabad: Cultural Council of Afghani- stan Resistance, 1991. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Index Abdul Basir, 198 Abdul Ghaffar, Engineer, z6o Abdul Haq, 2.46, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
196 Bolshevik revolution, 57 Boundaries of Afghanistan, significance Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 298 Boyarinov, Colonel, 22, z6 Bradsher, Henry, 48 Brezhnev, Leonid, 14, 37, 39, 40, 42, 50; Britain, ‘94 Buddhism, 110 Bukhara, III Byzantium, 2.17 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Cairo, 87, 312., Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
6z, 7~ 307, 315, 318 49—50, ~6, 64, 68, 69, 70, 72, 8o, 102, 121, 126, 130, 135; commercial credit to Afghanistan, 7, 10, 14, 15; effects of invasion of Afghanistan, 140, 154, i~6, i6i, 163, 164, 175, -‘I ~ t Union (continued) 87, x88, 194, 295, 2.15, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
51, 2.55; Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
2.75, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
2.98, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Critical acclaim for AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET WAR: *Citation for Excellence, Overseas Press Club in America 1985 Awards “Girardet’s is the most comprehensive, and perhaps the best, English- language book so far to explain the Afghan war to general readers.” Afghanistan: The Soviet War
“In light of the scarcity of reliable information up to now, this informed appraisal of the war in Afghanistan is most welcome.... Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Edward Girardet has based AFGFL4NISTAN.~ Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Girardet closely analyzes the enormously complicated political, military, economic, ethnic and religious intricacies of the conflict in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan: Includes index. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
1985 958’.1044 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
being blessed with perfect sight, pick off our messmates left and right.’ Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Again the cry, ‘Boro, boro’ and the caravan lumbers forward. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Th~ lop of’ the Diwana flaba pass, a barren, ice-draped corridor, is ~lolstered by monumental gothic ridges. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Huge, sinister ravens croak hoarsely from its craggy parapets, and just overhead, a lone eagle grace- fully soars on the rising and plunging air currents. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But it took the physical presence of Soviet troops and tanks to provoke most of Afghanistan’s 15-17 million Muslims into the time-honoured tradition of grabbing their guns to defend the independence of their homeland — a homeland which, for many, has always resembled a spiritual emotion rather than a nation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As with resistance move- ments fighting against the Nazis in occupied Europe during World War II, Afghans now found themselves opposing a foreign invasion force, unwelcome~1 by all except a small minoritY of pro.SoViet Afghanistan: The Soviet War
collaborators and sympathisets. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Perhaps most poignant of all is Afghanistan’s dramatic refugee exodus, the largest in the world. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
More are leaving. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Both the international community and the Islamabad government have demonstrated generous concern for refugees in Pakistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Despite avowed concern on the part of the West, the Arab and the Third World nations, world opinion has brought 7 8 little effective pressure on the Soviets to leave. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
My own acquaintance with Afghanistan goes back to the spring of 1970 when, as part of a year off between school and university, I hitch- hiked from Istanbul to Delhi. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Following the invasion, I returned to Afghanistan in early January, 1980 on special assignment for The Christian Science Monitor and ABC Radio News to cover the war. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
This first took me on an official visa to Afghanistan’s second largest city, Kandahar, in the south. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Travelling clandestinely, I later crossed back into Afghanistan with a group of mujahideen to visit a series of mainly Afghan-Baluch partisan bases hidden in the arid Chagai Hills of Helmand province. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Since then, I have headed back to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India at regular intervals for the Monitor to cover different aspects of both the Soviet occupation and the resistance. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
This took me on major trips with the mujahideen to the eastern and northern parts of Afghanistan in 1981 and 1982 and the following year to the border areas. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
My main purpose is to provide an informed appraisal of what this tragic conflict is all about. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It is not meant to be a scholarly thesis. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Furthermore, apart from certain Western or Third World correspon- This book primarily examines Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Communications are archaic. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
To get from one area to another may take two, perhaps three, weeks of solid trekking by foot or horse. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
My reporting on Afghanistan for The Christian Science Monitor has been criticised occasionally by the Soviet and other East bloc media as ‘malicious’, ‘reactionary’ and a ‘complete fabrication’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As a journalist and fellow human being who has lived, travelled and shared common experiences with the Afghan resistance, it would be dis. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Unbeknown to them, similar operations were being carried out at Bagram airbase to the north, Jalalabad to the east, Kandahar to the south and Shindand to the southwest. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan has all but slipped from sight . Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Curiously, as late as 26 December, President Amin showed no indi- cation of recognising what the Soviets were up to. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had begun. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By eight o’clock, half an hour before the curfew, the town was empty. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Elsewhere in the country, the occupation developed in a similar manner. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Hindered as they were by winter conditions, guerrillas both here and in other rural parts of northern and eastern Afghanistan had sharply intensified their attacks in the immediate aftermath of the coup. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, because of the harsh winter coitditionS, resistance was less intense than during the previous summer months. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
An- other included General Ivan Pavlovsky, Deputy Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
When Moscow realised that the insurgency was seriously beginning to threaten the Kabul government, it took to dispatching high-level military delegations to gauge the situation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was torn by bitter and often bloody in- ternecine strife between the two rival factions: Taraki’s Khalq and Karmal’s Parcham. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As far as can be determined, the Politburo was in two minds as to how best to deal with the Afghan problem. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Aware that the Soviets were getting serious, the Americans claim to have warned the Kremlin five times not to take any action in Afghanistan but their admonitions were ignored. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In accordance with Soviet military and political doctrine, Moscow’s ‘Blitzkrieg’ of Afghanistan was swift and decisive: a fait accompli about which the world would howl but, in the end, do nothing. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan is no different. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Officially, the Kremlin claims to have acted according to its treaty obligations with the Kabul regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
periphery of the Middle East. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Unlike the British, the Americans failed to allow for the long-term strategic importance of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By occupying Afghanistan, Moscow secured considerable advantages over neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
On the one hand, Pakistan suddenly found itself under pressure on two fronts: Soviet troops to the West, Indians to the East. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Iran, however, remains the key to the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Already in the 1920S, the Russians became aware of its potential, particularlY in natural gas, oil, jrofl ore, copper and uranium. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Soviet Strategy proved to be a heavy, lumbering machine better suited to fighting in the lowlands of Europe than against a basically peasant population in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan- Soviet military planners had no doubt expected resistance to persist for a number of years, but at a tol- erably low level. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Promoting the New Revolution Among the Soviet Union’s first objectives was strengthening the coun- try’s foundering and utterly unpopular 20-month-old ‘new model t Afghanistan was not to be a mere textbook replay of Czecho- revolution’ - This meant providing the regime with a fresh and, it was hoped, human face. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Chehestoon Palace, a hilltop mansion normally reserved for foreign dignitaries. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Kunar refugees in Pakistan later made the fIrst reference to Soviet use of chemicals and toxins in Afghanistan by describing ‘gases’ which made one cry or laugh hystericallY or which painfully irritated the skin. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The outcome of the offensive, which had resulted in disastrous casualties, was a painful setback for the guerrillas. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the time former KGB chief Yuri Adropov replaced the late Leonid Brezhnev as head of state in the autumn of 1982, the Soviet war in Afghanistan was undergoing a subtle, yet dramatic, change. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It has made use of Afghanistan as a ‘live’ testing ground, the results of which (notably helicopter gunship skills) have already made themselves apparent among its forces in Eastern Europe. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Soviets were particularlY anxious to put an end to the remorse- less trafficking across the 320-odd mountain passes along the l,400 mile-long Durand Line dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan — some of them, traditional nomad routes, others mere goat paths open only during the snow-free summer months. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In July 1980, no fewer than 60 villageS were destroyed during a two-week operation south of Kabul. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
While numerous mujahed groups persisted with traditional but gener- ally clumsy assaults, others were steadily improving their grasp of modern guerrilla warfare. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Without doubt, the Soviets were also learning from their mistakes. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In the early spring and summer of 1982, the Soviets carried out huge military operations in western Afghanistan, notably in the provinces of Herat and Farah. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Bernard Dupaigne, the French ethnologist, who travelled around 45 46 The Soviet Strategy much of Afghanistan by bus in the late summer of 1980 on an ordinary tourist visa, reported bitter animosity and resentment wherever he went. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A few, such as the Mongolian-featured Hazara Shiites of central Afghanistan, have resented the continuation of Pushtun dominance in the resistance and have consistently refused to throw in their lot with the Peshawar parties. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
While the Peshawar groups have managed to glean most of the world’s limited attention, their influence over what is happening inside Afghanistan has greatly diminished since the end of 1980. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Organised along military and political lines, they have • developed more or less around the personalities of their leaders, whose names Afghans often use when referring to the groups. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Parties Since the invasion, the main Peshawar parties have split into two alli- ances, both calling themselves the ‘Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The moderates, also three groups, were formed in the wake of the 1978 coup d’etat. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At least three main Shiite groups (all based inside Afghanistan but with offices in Iran and Quetta, Pakistan) have emerged. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although the Nasr still remains a force to be reckoned with, most Iranian backing is now directed towards the more powerful Afghan Islamic Revolutionary party, the Sepah-e-Pasdara. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Another, the Jabha Motahed e Melli (National United Front) included several traditionalist groupings as well as the highly effective SAMA (Sazmane Azadibakch-e Mardom-e Afghanistan — OrganisatiOfl for the Liberation of the Afghan People), itself an urban resistance move- ment composed of five different factions. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
One French photographer visiting northern Afghanistan in late 1982 witnessed the takeover of the main mosque in Mazari-Sharif where • ~ti Despite strict government security, foreign observers touring with the mujahideen used the building’s loudspeaker system to broadcast to the local population. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The KGB, which became increasingly active in Afghanistan during the third year of the occupation, has often twisted these inside reports to its own advantage as part of its psychological warfare aganst the popula- tion. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
French photographer and traveller Alain Guillo, who has toured parts of Afghanistan regularly since the invasion, reported that on at least two occasions in the late summer of 1982 the resistance evacuated villages in Balkh province at night after normally reliable intelligence reports warned them of an impending attack. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At the same time, both ordinary commercial traffic and smuggling con- tinue despite the ravages of war; timber, semi-precious stones, dried fruits, meat and opium from Afghanistan to Pakistan, and clothes, weapons, wheat, farm utensils and radios on the return trip. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Outside assistance remains vital, however, if the resistance is to survive. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
There seems little doubt that a considerable portion of the military aid making its way into Afghanistan has been procured by American help, but many of these arms tend to be of poor quality or insufficient quantity. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Pakistan’S military intelligence keeps close track of arms movements through its vast network of informers and by recording all weapons entering Afghanistan through frontier posts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Other ethnic groups, such as the Tadjiks and the Hazaras, are prepared to judge newcomers on their merits; anyone bringing along better military skills, and who can be trusted not to be a government informer, is more than welcome. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Gesturing with constantly restless hands to the large map of nor- thern Afghanistan spread out before him he explained: Militarily the Soviets have failed to achieve their objectives. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Often referred to as the Che Guevara, even the Tito of Afghanistan, Massoud — a good-looking, charistmatic and energetic man approaching his mid-thirties — is an exceptional partisan commander. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But he soon dropped out because of anti- regime activities. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Originally, the Russians had planned it to coincide with the elaborate celebrations of the fourth anni- versary of the Saur Revolution on 27 April. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Roughly half the Soviet Union’s 200-strong force of armoured Mi-24 helicopter gunships in Afghanistan had been called in for the Panjshair operation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In the end, it was Massoud who brought the Red Army to check, 87 5 Direct Soviet involvement with Afghanistan dates from the Soviet- Afghan Friendship Treaty of 1921 through which the USSR sought to consolidate a hold over the now fully independent Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Until the assassination of King Habibullah in 1919 Britain had controlled the country’s foreign affairs. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Under Amanullah, Afghanistan adopted a nationalist, reformist and anti-imperialist approach. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Like his father, Amanullah disliked the way the British had treated Afghanistan as a vassal state, but through them he had become fascinated by European scientific and industrial achievements. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan’s relationship with the Soviet Union could serve as a model to the Indians. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Furthermore, the Kremlin, determined to crush the Muslim liberation movements in Soviet Central Asia, needed Afghanistan to prevent any renewed anti- Russian spillage across the border. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In contrast to their policies of exporting revolution to China, Mongolia, Iran and other ‘ripe’ countries, the Bolsheviks made little effort in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nearly half a century was to pass before Af- ghanistan had its own communist party. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The British granted Nadir Shah tacit backing by allowing him to cross India on his way to Afghanistan, but, unlike the Soviets who had used Red Army soldiers disguised as Afghans during the Charkbi expedition, they did not pro- vide him with any other means of support. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Ruling with his brothers, Nadir Shah was a stern autocrat who toler- ated little opposition. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For the Russians, Nadir Shah’s regime represented a setback. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Closely counselled during the pre-war years by Prime Mihister Hashim Khan, another of Nadir’s brothers, Zahir Shah went on to rule Afghanistan for forty years until his overthrow by Mohammad Daoud in 1973. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Under Hashim Khan’s influence, Zahir Shah’s Afghanistan was run like a police state and all political opposition was crushed. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For a long time, he spurned their offers of aid and refused to allow them to open a trade mission in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
During World War II, Afghanistan tried to remain completely neutral and at first refused the British demand to throw out the Germans. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The British Soviet Influence in Afghanistan and Soviet governments plainly indicated that Afghanistan might suffer the same fate as Iran, which had been occupied protectively by both Allied Powers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Postwar Relations When Shah Mahmud became Prime Minister in 1946, Afghanistan was allowed a limited form of democracy; more of a liberal than his brother, Shah Mabmud considered it prudent to make certain political concessions. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
One of the first poiitical-intellectual movements to appear after the The Russians were quick to encourage such sentiments. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
With the independence and partition of India in 1947, the hap. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
ance of preserving Afghanistan as a buffer state. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Washington, for its part, had never understood the strategic import. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Friction was caused by repeated rejections, or offers tied to unacceptable conditions, of Afghan requests for arms. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
When Daoud, who wanted to ensure his country’s continued non-alignment, refused to join the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organisation — CENTO) with Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Britain and the United States, the Americans opted for the Pakistanis (also a member of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation — SEATO) to whom they Soviet Influence in Afghanistan regularly supplied weapons and other forms of support. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Most significant of all, the Russians stepped in to provide Daoud with the weapons he so dearly wanted. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Intent as always on increasing their influence, the Soviets directed their Because of its proximity, Afghanistan obviously represented a 93 94 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan assistance to projects which would provide political gain almost immediately because of their tangible impact on the local population: the paving of streets in Kabul (less mud and dust), the building of grain silos and bakeries (fresh bread), housing (comfort) and power stations (electricity). Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘This detente in Afghanistan prefigured the global detente which was to follow during the 1970s.' Afghanistan: The Soviet War
While the Russians surveyed and aerially photographed the northern third of Afghanistan for maps (thus laying the groundwork for the invasion), the Americans did the same in the south. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By 1970, however, it was the USSR, which acted as the dominant power in Afghanistan’s military and economic development. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan was now almost totally dependent on the USSR for its foreign trade. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Russians shrewdly benefitted from this situation by airfreightiflg Afghanistan’s fruit harvests, which were in danger of rotting on the ground, to the USSR. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Pakistan suspended not only normal commerce but also the rights of nomads who had traditionallY moved between the two countries in search of pasture for their camels, sheep and goats. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The gesture greatly impressed local farmers and Moscow’s prestige grew. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
One of the reasons behind this was the fact that Afghanistan’s traditional tribal, ethnic and religious leaders, less than a third of whom could read and write, had recognised the advantages of sitting in parliament and therefore participated in the polls with vigour. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
ents, were elected to the 218-seat parliament, a significant drop com- pared to the ‘liberal’ assembly of 1949. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Between 1968 and 1970, Afghanistan was marked by an era of violence in which the PDPA and other left-wing parties played a leading role. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Taraki was intent on creating a Lenin-type workers’ party (there were only 40,000 workers in Afghani- stan at the time), but which would incorporate anyone, regardless of class, who was prepared to support radical change. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
These differences were strongly reflected not only in their strategies but in the make-up of their factions. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
His father was a small merchant. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Over the next three years, his movements remain vague; some reports say that he returned to Afghanistan via India and Pakistan, others that he also made a long trip through Europe and the USSR. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Already in the late 1950s, he was known to have made regular visits to the Soviet embassy in Kabul, but there is not sufficient evidence to confirm the extent of these pre-PDPA Soviet ties. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It managed to survive for more than a year 99 100 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan before being banned in July 1969 prior to the new parliamentary elections. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Furthermore, Afghanistan was struck by a severe famine in 1971-2. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to some estimates, as many as 100,000 people may have died. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
To the dismay of the PDPA and the Soviet Union, Daoud began mending his fences with Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghan gathering of tribal, religious and political leaders representing 101 102 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan the entire country, to approve a new constitution and elect him President for the next six years. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Most indicators suggest that the 1978 putsch was not only premature, but that events had forced the Soviet hand into supporting it. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Parcham would allow them to influence Afghan policy in a constitu- tional manner, while the ostracised Khalq had already infiltrated the armed forces, the administration and the educational system providing a cadre with the necessary organisation and clout to act against Daoud. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The two party factions presented the Soviets with a choice. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to some reports, these were photocopied late at night using machines at the Soviet embassy. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Others maintain that Soviet pilots flew planes in the attack against the ‘Arg,’ the presidential palace. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Even fewer had been aware that a coup was in the making. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The new communist order rapidly came to. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Toward the end of the summer, the Khalqi discovered an elaborate The Khalq reacted harshly by secretly sentencing several of them to 105 106 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan death including Keshtmand and Qadar, who had played a major role in both the 1973 and 1978 coups. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But such changes struck at the heart of the Afghan way of life. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It was Friday 20 April 1979, almost one year after the launching of the Saur Revolution.A Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Misguid- edly, they believed that by destroying the feudal and landowner classes, they could gain the support of the peasantry, the masses. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Traditionally, agricultural production is dependent on five factors: land, water, seed, animal or mechanical power, and human labour. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Many landlords in Afghanistan take a paternalistic interest in their peasants. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Six months after the invasion, I travelled by pickup truck to the Chagai Hills in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan with a group of Baluchi tribesmen. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Kunar witnessed its first anti-communist revolt in March 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Towards a Police State By the first anniversary of the Saur Revolution, much of Afghanistan was beginning to take on the characteristics of a nation under siege. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to Western intelligence, an estimated 100 Soviet military advisers had been killed in clashes with the guerrillas during the first year of communist rule. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘The government installed by the Kremlin was becoming more and more terrorist and arbitrary’, recalled Farid, member of an urban resistance group and a high school student at the time. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As frustration and anger against the regime deepened, the opposition 117 118 The Communist Overlay felt that something had to be done. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The uprising was planned for mid-day. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Many of the officers surviving the mutiny were arrested and, if not executed on the spot, dragged off to prison where they were tortured and killed. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Magic Bus Company in Amsterdam, one of the last tour operators on the overland ‘hippy’ route to India via Afghanistan, was attacked in the southern part of the country; a Swiss and a Canadian were shot dead and an Australian seriously injured as bullets fired by unseen gunmen The guerrillas were becoming less selective in their attacks. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
American pilots of the PanAm-operated Ariana Afghan national airlines, who had already removed all their personal belongings from the country, said they would fly only as long as conditions permitted. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
First as the AGSA, communist Afghanistan’s secret police was directed by Assadullah Sarwari, a much hated Khalqi fanatic notorious for his torture methods against both the Parcham and opposition dissi- dents. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As early as the autumn of 1978, human rights observers estimated that 50,000 Afghans had passed through or were still in Khaiqi deten- tion centres. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Early in 1980, American orientalist Michael Barry, a Farsi and Pashto speaker with an intimate knowledge of Afghanistan, travelled to western Pakistan on assignment for the International Federation of Human Rights. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The young woman claimed that six female party members, all roughly her age, had carried out the main interrogation which involved beatings, electric shocks, being forced to stand for two weeks without moving and being taken through chambers where other victims were being tortured. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Later that year, the Padkhwab-e-Shana massacre, also in Logar pro. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At a press conference in Decem- ber 1982 in Paris, visiting Foreign Ministry officials from Kabul insisted that such reports were totally unfounded even when they were con- fronted by Western journalists, including myself, who had witnessed government operations against civilians. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As for the ‘so-called KHAD’, one Information Ministry official (who, as it later turned out, had inter- rogated a captured French reporter in 1981 for the KHAD) tried to convince two French journalists filming in Kabul at the turn of the year 1983/84 that the existence of such an organisation was a figment of the imagination. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In late 1980, Hazaras recruited by the communist Tudeh Party in Iran in conjunction with the KGB and the KHAD began to filter back to Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For financial bonuses, they are usually willing to participate in special operations. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Kremlin, via the KHAD, ensures that funds are never lacking. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The resistance has also taken .steps Afghanistan: The Soviet War
7 Since the Soviet invasion, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) has gradually adopted the profile of a Soviet autonomous republic, with the Russians assuming total control of the government and the war against the resistance. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But Afghanistan remains an independent nation only in name. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Either way, the resistance has benefitted. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Estimates of present strength hover between 30,000 and 45,000 with battalions experiencing desertions — up to 80 per cent in certain units — at about the same rate as arriving conscripts, some of whom have been drafted several times over. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Overall army strength dwindled from an initial 100,000 in early 1978 to 30,000-40,000 by mid-i 980, with many soldiers joining the resistance, weapons and all, or simply returning home to their families. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the end of 1982, military conscription had become a key factor behind public animosity against the regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Afghan leadership visits the USSR and other Warsaw Pact The Sovietisation of Afghanistan countries regularly, often staying away for long periods at a time. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although Dost has dutifully represented his government at the UN-sponsored talks in Geneva on a political settlement in Afghanistan or delivered speeches at the General Assembly in New York, he is nothing but a pawn. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For a long time, the real Foreign Minister of Afghanistan was Vassily Sovruntchuk (since replaced), head of Dost’s advisory team after the invasion and technically number two at the Soviet embassy. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The and everyone knows that is not the case — or the Russians have 139 140 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan Soviets were conspicuously interested in original maps depicting the Durand Line, possibly preparing a legal dossier for future territorial claims against Pakistan in a resuscitation of the Pushtunistan issue. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Bodies such as the Democratic Organisation of Afghan Youth, the Democratic Women’s Organisation of Afghanistan and the Union of Writers and Poets have been formed, with the party and Soviet counterparts issuing guidelines on how each group should operate. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
With military service affecting all males between the ages of fourteen and fifty, conscription in Afghanistan is reminiscent of the desperation that existed in Nazi Germany towards the end of World War 11. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In one case in Kabul, a young boy and his mother were stopped at a roadblock by militiamen in search of con- 141 142 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan scripts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Afghanistan needs soldiers, not students’, one of the men told them; in the end, the boy was released when the mother convinced an officer that he was under fourteen. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, high schools were among the first educational institu- The Sovietisation of Afghanistan tions to protest against the Soviet intervention. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to most informed sources, regular instruction in the senior classes no longer exists. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Just as American, British, French, German and The Sovietisation of Afghanistan other foreign teachers have taught in Afghan educational establish- ments as part of development programmes, so have Soviet Russians, Tadjiks and Uzbeks. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The remaining non-communist Europeans, who avoid discussing politics in class, necessarily restrain their association with Afghans. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Originally designed with UNESCO assistance to span twenty years, it was whittled down under Khalqi pressure to an unrealistic four-year programme. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
People The Sovietisation of Afghanistan began getting suspicious and started calling the instructors ‘children of Russia’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Yet even among Afghans already in the USSR, there have been numerous reported cases of disenchantment or outright anti-Sovietism. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Aluned Kasim Zariffa, an Afghan student mechanic, was arrested in Moscow by the KGB four months after the invasion and never seen again. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Kremlin has concentrated on Afghan youth as its hope for the future. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As often as not, transistor radios among the mujahi. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Come and let me rise. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For a long time, the only programme that was watched with enthusiasm was the 149 150 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan weekend Indian movie. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Following such offensives, the Afghan authorities have often resorted to well-publicised efforts to impose a political presence in the The Sovietisation of Afghanistan Panjshair. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Jean-Paul Silve, a French amateur photographer, who spent nine months in jail after being picked up in 1981 by the security forces, was accused of being a member of the Central Intelligence Agency and forced to appear three times on the air to make self-critical statements, once before his trial, once during it and once after his release. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘On the whole, if you relied on the government press’, 151 152 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan said one student, ‘you would never know what was going on’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Soviet Economic Exploitation Without doubt, strategic reasons featured prominently in the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Generally, the Soviets The Sovietisation of Afghanistan remained secretive about the extent of their findings, even to the Afghans. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the time of the 1978 communist takeover, the Soviets had amassed vast amounts of excellent geological information about Afghan mineral resources. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
These involved no fewer than 70 commercially viable deposits and over 1,400 mineral occurrences. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The World Bank report had stressed that, for a country the size of Afghanistan, present oil and natural gas prospecting was totally inadequate. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Saur Revolution put an end to all threats of Western inter- ference. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
According to J.P. Carbonnel, head of the last French scientific mission to Afghanistan, which had to abandon its work in central Hazarajat in 1979 because of the turmoil, the Soviet oil research operation in the Mazar-e-Sharif area alone numbered 2,000 Soviet, East European and Afghan technicians. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Russians were also exploring the possibilities of developing Afghanistan’s uranium deposits, which were thought to be much larger than reported in official documents. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan’s inclusion within the Soviet orbit, maintained Carbonnel, ‘is good busi- ness for the USSR which will seek to exploit (these reserves) and eco- nomise on their own resources’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Economic Incarporation As before the invasion, Soviet aid to Afghanistan still consists of loans rather than grants. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Through their overseas development company, Technoexport (used both for development and as a front for intelligence operations), the Soviets immediately stepped up mining exploration in the north. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The 1978 World Bank report had observed that half of Afghanistan’s hydroelectric power potential would depend on harnessing energy from the Amu Daraya (Mother of Rivers), the ‘Nile’ of Central Asia. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For years, the USSR has been using water rightfully belonging to the Afghans for the The Sovietisation of Afghanistan irrigation of its cotton fields in Central Asia and has shown no indica- tion of altering its dominance in this field. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Hydroelectric and irrigation schemes are now under construction, albeit severely hampered by guerrilla activity, or have been planned for the Turkestan Basin of northern Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, both Western intelligence and Afghan resistance sources indicate that all these projects have been deliberately designed for total integration within the Soviet Central Asian system. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Hardly had the dust settled from the Red Army tanks crossing over into Afghanistan, when Moscow dispatched contingents of technicians with drilling equipment to join geologists already working on the in- tensive development of petroleum deposits at Dasht-e-L.aili, Afghanistan: The Soviet War
10 million tonnes in 1978. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Western oil technicians remain sceptical, often pointing out that, even if The World Bank had estimated Afghanistan’s oil deposits at a paltry 155 156 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan reserves are higher than reported, they are not necessarily commer- cially viable. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In 1980, a Soviet embasssy news bulletin published in Singapore casually, and surprisingly, noted that Afghanistan had large stocks of oil and that several deposits had been explored already, but it did not identify the fields. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Natural gas exploitation in Afghanistan is certainly one of the most striking examples of economic misappropriation by the Kremlin. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At the start, Moscow paid less than one fifth of the world commercial price, taking advantage of Afghanistan’s logistical inability to export it else- where. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The question of price, the contract noted, would be negotiated separately. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At $100.34 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Originally, 20 per cent of Afghanistan’s natural gas production from 1974 onwards was destined to be used in Afghan fertiliser and thermal The Sovietisation of Afghanistan plants in the north; the rest was pumped through to the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As for the Afghans, they have to make do with coal and charcoal. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
157 158 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan Apart from oil and natural gas, numerous other Soviet develop- ment projects have been delayed, halted or never, begun because of the war. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Moscow’s moves to integrate Afghanistan were strategically streng- thened in June 1982 with the completion of the 2,674 foot-long Khairaton Bridge across the Amu Daraya linking Termez on the Soviet side with the new terminal of Khairaton in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Started imme- diately after the invasion in order to ease transportation bottlenecks, it consists of a two-lane roadway embedded with a single railway track. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Apart from the bridge’s obvious military advantages, if provides more direct access to Afghanistan’s natural resources. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan is one of the few countries in the world without a railway system, resulting from the fact that it was never colonised. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Iran’s proposal to build a $1.2 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Still on the drawing board because of the fighting is another massive development plan estimated at $1.2 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The impact of the war varies from province to province and, despite severe shortages following military operations, the country has remained on the whole relatively self-sufficient. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Sugar exports to Afghanistan have doubled since the invasion, while wheat has more than trebled, with 200,000 tonnes promised in 1984. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Over the same period, per capita income dropped from $114.60 Afghanistan: The Soviet War
With agriculture, the situation is no different. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Not unlike their natural gas The Sovietisation of Afghanistan import practices, the Soviets paid two or three times below world prices for the cotton and deducted this from Afghan purchases of imported Soviet machinery and other industrial products. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
This led to widespread peasant revolts and severe famine, but it finally gave the Russians what they wanted: complete political leverage over an exhausted and downtrodden people. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the same token, however, Moscow might find itself forced to bolster communist- occupied Afghanistan even more with imports from the USSR and Eastern bloc countries, as the guerrillas are unlikely to tolerate govern- ment projects unless they serve resistance purposes. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
There seems little question that the Soviets have adopted a grim policy of attrition against the Afghans, particularly the civilian pop- ulation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Regardless of their own losses, they seem prepared to tolerate a low degree of armed opposition lasting years if not decades, but which, they hope, wifi permit the PDPA regime to lay the foundations of a ‘new’ Afghanistan, eventually winning over its war-fatigued and dejected inhabitants. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The second of the fundamentalists is the Hezb-i-Islami faction led by Maulawi Younis Khales, known as the ‘fighting mullah’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A resolute character with an intense hatred of the Russians (his son was executed by the Soviets), he first worked in Saudi Arabia and then returned to Afghanistan where he became a university lecturer and editor of a Kabul newspaper. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A man of few scruples, Hekmatyar has aroused violent antagonism among his fellow compatriots. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Gaylani often travels abroad in search of diplomatic and financial support, adamantly advocating a democratic constitutional monarchy as the best solution to Afghanistan’s religious and ethnic diversity. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
On the whole, it is the fundamentalists who have faired best both inside and outside Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although an ad hoc operation w en compared to the more experienced liberation movements elsewhere in the world, it did succeed in boosting the party’s renown. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The other parties soon caught on. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Thousands of demonstrators marched through the streets chanting slogans such as ‘Russians, Afghanistan is not Czechoslovakia’, ‘Down with Babrak, puppet of the Russians’ and ‘Out with the Russians!’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Revolution, Resistance and Local Loyalties In Soviet-occupied Afghanistan words like ‘revolution’, ‘democracy’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘progress’ are regarded with repugnance by most rural Afghans. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As a resistance movement, the mujahideen have tended to lack the ideological motivation and discipline of other more sophisticated libera- tion organisations around the world. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In one case cited by Olivier Roy, a French Afghan studies specialist who has visited resistance-controlled Afghanistan on a number of occasions since the invasion, mujahed efforts to assassinate a known collaborator in the western province of Ghor were frustrated by local ‘gawm’ loyalties. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Fish in Water Afghanistan’s rising contingent of modernist and Islamic-oriented mujahed commanders like Massoud have been quietly instituting their own ‘revolution’ among the rural communities, a revolution that has begun to spread to other resistance fronts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The more developed fronts (Panjshair, Nimruz, Herat, Mazar, Wardak etc.) Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Political sessions held by primarily young and educated mujahed cadres are rapidly becoming part of everyday life among certain fronts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Enforcing group identity, the political parties issue pocket calendars interspersed with Koranic readings, photographs and political essays, while the presence of foreign journalists in Afghanistan has drawn attention to the importance of the visual media in the struggle. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A handful of groups in western Afghanistan also have video recorders. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Any group on operations usually has one or two in its entourage. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Another form of propaganda, or psychological warfare, is the use of the loudhailer. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Apart from visiting journalists, French doctors and missives from the Peshawar parties, the shortwave radio stations — the VOA, BBC, West Germany’s Deutsche- welle and even Radio Moscow — remain their prime link with the out- side world. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Reliable information about events inside Afghanistan is diffi- cult to obtain. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The average Afghan has now realised that his country’s fate is not being decided solely on the battlefields of Afghanistan, but also in Washington, Moscow, Geneva, Warsaw and Managua. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Once, during the early stages of the war, three Western journalists and I visited the desert camp of a large group of partisans in southern Helmand pro- vince where we dined with the local resistance committee, about 189 I 190 The Afghan Struggle twenty men in all. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It is not uncommon for outsiders to be probingly questioned by village leaders or mujahideen about international affairs. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘Apart from answering their questions, we also try to ex- plain the short and long-term implications of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and why it is necessary to fight’, observed Es-Haq, a former engineering student and information director for the Panjshair. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
RFK has also been directing transmissions at the Soviet occupation forces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Apart from government bombardments and heliborne assaults aimed at knocking out the transmitters, the communist press has consistently attacked the mujahed network as an affront to the Soviet Union and the government of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Bearing in mind Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic, tribal and religious background, the notion of rapid political unity is unrealistic. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In France, where rivalry among the ‘maquis’ was often just as great as it is today in Afghanistan, the United States was still considering even after the The Afghan Struggle D-day invasion which of the resistance leaders, including Charles Dc Gaulle, to support. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At the UN-sponsored peace talks on Afghanistan, for example, the resistance parties continue to be excluded. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Pakistanis, in particular, have never been very keen on a united resistance movement that might prove difficult to control. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In August 1983, in another attempt at overall unity, the moderates announced the estab- lishment of the ‘United Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan’ following consultations with ex.King Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Despite considerable opposition to the ex-King, notably among the non.tribal Afghanistan: The Soviet War
195 196 The Afghan Struggle Since the early days of the war, Massoud has been gradually building up a valuable network of contacts with like-minded guerrilla corn. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Evolving in a totally different manner from the rest of Afghanistan, this central highland region has not only succeeded in isolating itself from the government, but from most other resistance organisations. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But most Hazaras have remained wary of working with the Pesha- war political parties because of their strong Pushtun influences. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Yet the gradual spread of an Iranian-style ‘cultural revolution’ by the Khomeinists could have a profound impact not only on the future of the Hazarajat but on the whole of Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The more fortunate refugees, thirty or forty thousand perhaps at the time, from Afghanistan’s eastern frontier provinces found sanctuary in the homes of Pushtun and Baluchi relatives living on the Pakistani side of the border. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It is our duty to help them’, explained a Pakistani headman from the Khyber Tribal Agency, who had taken in about a dozen kinsmen from a village only thirty miles inside Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
million beneficiaries in early 1984, an estimated 70 per cent, most of them Pushtuns from Afghanistan’s eastern provinces but also a slowly growing number of Farsi-speaking Tadjiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen from the north, have converged on the Northwest Frontier Province. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A further pressing predicament similar to that in the refugee areas of the Horn of Africa has been the presence of some three million camels, cattle, sheep and goats brought in from Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A disconcerting number of Afghanistan’s educated elite — university professors, doctors, lawyers — have headed for Western Europe and North America, much to the disgust of some of the resistance groups fighting at the front. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this airlift was the group transfer of Kirghiz nomads, living in the northeastern pan- handle of Afghanistan known as the Pamirs and Wakhan corridor at the time of the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Originally, the Mongolian-featured Kirghiz inhabited the inside fringes of the Soviet frontier but fled from Stalinist repression during the 1930s by seeking refuge in China and Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Many fled from Afghanistan toward the end of 1978 to escape the Khalqis, but others only left following the arrival of Red Army troops in May 1980. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although the Kirghiz remained in the mountainous northern areas around Gilgit at 4,800 feet. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Aid to the Interior: The Forgotten People The most neglected of all, however, are those Afghans ttying to survive inside Afghanistan itself. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Similarly, many of the hundreds of thousands of ‘internal refugees’ who have fled to Kabul and other towns are ignored both by the com- munist government and the UN agencies still in Afghanistan, apart from a few very limited health projects. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Some international aid organisations, which have extensive relief activities among the Afghan exiles, are prevented by their mandates from working inside Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Like the situations in South East Asia and the Horn of Africa, excessive aid outside, while at the same time turning a blind eye to the interior, has contributed towards attract- ing more refugees. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
One Paris group, the International Bureau for Afghanistan, launched a pilot livestock project in Kunar province in the summer of 1984 with EEC backing, while the Swedish Committee for Afghani- stan, which regularly sends its own observers to gauge requirements, has established some twenty health clinics and dispensaries in different provinces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Others, which do not consider it prudent to send relief personnel, notably Americans, into Afghanistan because of the problems that might arise if one were to be captured, have chosen instead to provide assistance direct to the mu- jahed fronts or to agencies already working inside. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Afghanistan Relief Committee in New York, for example, has been working in close co-operation with the French medical agencies by providing food and medication. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Another group, the Dignity of Man Foundation, organised its own direct aid shipments and provided funds for educational or social projects inside Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
On numerous occasions, doctors have been obliged to travel for days on end without protection. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
This includes relief co-ordinators, teachers, medical staff and technicians. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Leaving the mountainous frontier pass behind, the guerrilla caravan, horses loaded with guns, ammunition, food and medication, descended into the flowered valleys of Nuristan, the ‘land of light’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Many Afghan war casualties are not as lucky as Shah Mansour. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Operating in war zones such as Afghanistan, Laos, Eritrea, Kurdistan, Angola, Burma but also in Colombia, Haiti and elsewhere, they have recognised the needs of a steadily growing human phenomenon: the world’s ‘unofficial’ populations. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the end of 1980, most of the 1,600 doctors registered in Afghanistan before the Saur Revolution had fled the country, mainly to West Germany, France and North America to ‘continue their studies’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Like many developing countries, rural Afghanistan suffers from malaria, bronchitis, diphtheria, tuberculosis, parasitic and intestinal ailments. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
A major drawback has been the need to find surgeons able to leave their hospitals long enough to travel to and from a region that has been particularly badly hit by the war (several days to three weeks either way), and then spend two or three months working. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
One of the first teams to work in Afghanistan consisted of two doctors, a man and a woman, who travelled to Nuristan in the summer of 1980. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The first French team arrived in the Panjshair only in early 1981. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The conservatism of Afghanistan’s Islamic society often poses problems in the treatment of women. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Asking for clemency, he promised to tell the truth about the ‘real situation’ in Afghanistan on his return to France and never again to ‘act against the Democratic Republic’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
might be involved with foreign intelligence organisations, notably the CIA. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Back in France, the Paris-based medical organisations immediately launched a campaign for his release. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Afghan embassy in Paris countered that ‘what is even more shocking is the way (Dr Augyard) entered Afghanistan illegally and associated with a band of murderers’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
I was dictated what I should say . Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In practice, few governments or outside forces, be they Nazis in Europe, the French in Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam or the Russians in Afghanistan, have shown much humanitarian respect for their partisan opponents. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
ICRC statutes strictly limit the organisation’s humanitarian ac- tivities. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Red Cross officials have operated inside guerrilla-controlled areas of Angola and Ethiopia without the ‘permission’ of the host govern- ment. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Nevertheless, the strictness of the ICRC’s policy remains ambigu- ous. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It also seeks to inform them on Red Cross principles and humanitarian law through instruction and booklets published in Farsi and Pashto. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
225 226 Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners Afghanistan, on the other hand, presents a radically different equation . Afghanistan: The Soviet War
This posed a serious dilemma for the Soviets. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
In the end, the Soviets adopted the attitude, ‘You don’t bargain with terrorists’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
On 13 January 1980, the Kabul authorities granted it the right to operate in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Resistance leaders to Peshawar were becoming increasingly favour. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But the war in Afghanistan is no ordinary conflict. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The situation has led to painful uncertainty among the Soviet pris- oners. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Bitter fighting raged throughout much of northern and western Afghanistan during the summer. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As it stands, Moscow’s top priority in Afghanistan is a ‘normal. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
First initiated in early 1982 by the UN Secretary General’s special representative, Diego Cordovez, indirect negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Iran has refused to participate unless the mujahideen are included but remains briefed by the Islamabad government) produced a four-point peace plan: the withdrawal of all foreign groops from Afghanistan; the volun- tary repatriation of Afghans; a resumption of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the basis of non-interference and respect for each other’s terdtorial integrity, and finally, adequate international assurances (Soviet, US and Chinese) for the maintenance of Afghan- istan’s independence and non-aligned status. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Pakistanis have been placing greater emphasis on a precise timetable for Soviet withdrawal, which, they insist, should last no longer than three months and should coincide with the return of the Afghan refugees. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Cordovez has kept the door open for further talks. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Soviets, who 235 236 Perspectives control the Afghan delegation through a senior adviser, are expected to attend if only for the sake of appearances. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The air force appears to be faring satisfactorily as more (and better paid) cadets complete their training in the USSR. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Although the Soviets are stepping up military repression as a prin- cipal means of crushing the resistance, they still seek to maintain the myth of an independent Afghanistan and are persisting in their efforts to indoctrinate the young. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
‘The crimes of indiscriminate warfare are combined with the worst excesses of unbridled state-sanctioned violence against civilians’, com- mented researchers Jeri Laber and Barnett Ru~n. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Western Interest in the War The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is far from being a negligible or isolated affair but it is undoubtedly one of the most under-reported strategic wars today. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Even after five years of World War lI-style repres- sion and atrocities, Afghanistan’s predicament in the mid-1980s has failed to arouse the righteous indignation, or imagination, of the inter- national community as did Vietnam, Biafra, Bangladesh, Chile, Cambodia or Poland let alone the present situation in the Middle.East Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Already, the Kremlin has obtained resigned acceptance in many quarters of its tutelage over Afghanistan, just as some consider Grenada or El Salvador within America’s sphere of influence. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
But legal condonation of the occupation continues to evade Moscow’s grasp. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By the end of December 1984, a glimmer of hope appeared on the horizon. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Afghanistan, which was badly hit by famine in 1970-71, is once again facing similar conditions in a dozen provinces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As a ‘frontline’ state, it has regulated the flow of arms into Afghanistan at a level calculated not to provoke the Soviet Union. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For Western democracies, putting all one’s eggs into the basket of a military dictatorship poses certain risks. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
ment in Afghanistan and America’s involvement in Vietnam. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Russia: Without doubt, there are growing similarities between Soviet involve. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The result is that the Soviet public has learned little about the realities of the situation in Afghanistan from official sources. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
By September 1980, the Soviet press began to admit the existence of widespread fighting but this was couched more in terms of a condem- nation of guerrilla activities than of difficulties facing Russian soldiers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Citing a report from the Soviet news agency TASS, it said that scores of small shops had been reduced to smouldering ruins by the ‘bandits’ in Herat while elsewhere they had blown up bridges, trampled crops, destroyed power lines and mutilated the bodies of old men, women and children. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The truth, however, still seeps through. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
As with any war, it is the assortment of personal effects — identifica- tion cards, letters, diaries and photographs — taken from the bodies of Soviet soliders killed in Afghanistan and spread out on the floor of a guerrilla hideout that tragically humanise the ‘other side’. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
It is also evident that Afghanistan returnees (over half a million by early 1985) will confide in their close friends and relatives. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
At the same time, few are enamoured with the idea of risking their necks to ‘save’ Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
For many Soviet youths faced with military service, being sent to Afghanistan is equivalent to being sen- tenced to death. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
While saying nothing about low morale or drug addiction among the troops, more stories are appearing on stark conditions at the front. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Rhetorically asking ‘Why are our boys from Ryazan, Khabarovsk and Uzbekistan carrying out their military service in the environs of Kabul?’, Verstakov examined the ‘uneasy days’ and the internationalist and patriotic duty of the Soviet soldier and admitted that life in Afghanistan was hard. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
The Future: More International Focus Writing as a journalist, I have no doubt that the war in Afghanistan is one which deserves far more international attention. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in De- cember 1979, he was sent back to the regionto report the war. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Since then, he has made numerous visits to the Indian subcontinent includ- ing six major trips into Afghanistan — once with an official visa and five times clandestinely with the resistance. Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin 56, 167, 169-71, 175,194 helicopter gunshlps 16, 20, 23, 33, 35, 36,41-3, 45, 60,65,81-5 passlm, 114,118,127,162,169, 220, 233, 239 Helmand province 9, 112-1 3, 189-90, 204; River 94 Helsinki Watch Group, New York 238 Herat 8, 15, 17, 23, 35, 39, 44, 55, 74,101, 115-16, 126, 146, 184, 196,216,233 Herle, Jean-Denis 143 Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) (Hekmatyar faction) 56, 169-7 1, 174-5, (Khales faction) 48, 56, 70, 74, 113, 167-9, 194,196,226,227, 241 highways 5,8,15,21,40,60,61, 93-4,119, 185 Hindu Kush 21, 33, 51,76 Homer, John Evans 92 hospitals 220-1,224-5 housing shortages 182, 207 194,195, 196, 229; 253 254 Index human rights 121-7 passlm, 190,238; International Federation of 122 humanitarian rights 223-32 Hungary 26 Hussein, Sayed ‘Djendnal’ 55,297 hydno-electnic power 153-5 passim Ideology 27,57,102,145-8,174, 183 India 25,27,28,88,90,92,95,98, 101,104,139,150,159,228, 235 Indian Ocean 26,28,29,159 Indochina 25, 34, 38; see also Vietnam indoctrination 5,63,132,138, 142-3,145-8, 174, 237,see also propaganda; training infiltration, of government 62-3, 130; of mujahideen/refugees 118, 124,128-30,193 inflation 160, 182 informers 62-3 intelligence, mujahldeen 62-3, 67, 74,82,130; Soviet 14,233 Interdiction tactics 37-9 International Bureau for Afghanistan, Paris 211 interrogations 117, 122,124, 125, 126 invasion, Soviet 4,8,9, 1247; cost of 135, 160-1;reasons for 26-9, 152 Iran 22,25, 27-9passlm,88,91,92, 101,157, 159,235; and mujahideen 10,54, 56, 57,65, 66,115, 129,200-1,235,242; and refugees 7,24,54,128, 132, 202,209-10 Iraq 29,92 iron ore 29, 153, 159 irrigation schemes 154-5,242 Islam 6,26-7,31,36,52,55,77, 100,106, 113-14, 131, 145, 149, 169,218,241 Islamic Alliance 193; Pan- Union 101; Republic 27, 56, 169; Unity 65,193,194, of A. Mujahideen 55 Israel 170 Italy 90 Jabha Mobarezin 57,118 Jabha Motahed-e Mdi (National United Front) 57,74 Jalalabad 12, 20, 49, 50, 51, 126, 148,169 Jamiat-i-IslamI (Islamic Society) 56, 74,168, 170, 184, 188, 194, 195, 199,241 Japan 90, 120, 239 Jawana-i-Musalman (Militant Muslim Youth) 56, 78, 166 Jebhe-ye melii-te Najat-e Afghanistan (National Front for the Salvation of A.) 54,56, 171, 173, 193 Jehani, Ban (vice-president, Kabul TV) 149-50 ‘Jihad’ 2,5, 6,52,58, 194 Jirghas 69,101-2,108, 131-2, 172, 193-4 job competition 207 journalists 9-10, 31-2, 38, 128, 151, 168, 187, 189,229,238,243, 248 Jouvenal, Peter 48 Jouzjan province 157 Kabul 8, 16, 17,40,44,55, 59,60, 62,64,70,72-6,80, 114,116, 117,126,140, 141, 149,152, 159, 172, 175-82, 216, 234; University 91, 125, 141-5 passim, 166,see also Radio; airport 12, 16,76, 80,94; Polytechnic 145 Kakar, Professor Hassan 125 Kalakani, Mjaid 57 KAM 117,121,122 Kamyan, Mohammed Nabi (Minister of Health) 158 Kandahar 8,9, 12, 15, 17-20, 35, 39, 40, 44,57,59, 74, 94, 101,126, 159,204,233 Kar-Kum Canal 155 Karmal see Babrak Karokhel, Hassan Khan 62 Kazakhs 208 Kerala 107-10 KGB 14,35, 36,41,63,98,99, 122,124, 129,130,139, 147, 207,208, 245 KHAD 105, 117, 124-31 passim, 133, 140, 145,147, 164, 180, 182,201,207,220, 222, 229, 233 Khairaton 158-9 Khales, Younis 48, 56, 70, 168-9, 194, 227, 228 Index Khalq/Khalqis5, 9,14,15,22,31, 62,76,97,101-6,110-17,119, 130,135-6,146,151,164, 166, 172, 174-5, 196, 197, 203 Khalq 96 Khan, Ismail 55, 68,168, 196 Khomeini 27, 29,56, 129, 157, 169, 200; Khom”inists 57, 66, 199-20 1 Khrushchev, Nikita 93 Khyber, Mu Akbai 102,103 Khyber Tribal Agency 203 kidnappings 59,73, 148, 170,227 Kipling, Rudyard 2 Kirghiz 46,208-9 Kishtmand, Sultan Ali 96, 105, 107, 157,235 Kissilov, Valery Yunkevich 229 Kochka Riven 154, 160 Komoskaya Pravda 247 Korea, North 67 Kouli, Mohammad Yazkoulev 229 krasnaya Zvezda 247 Kunar province 107,113, 115,190-1, 195,211;Valley 33-4,83 Kunduz province 15,42,60,66,160, 161; River 155 Kurds/Kurdistan 210,215 Kutchis 199 Kuwait 8 Kuzichkin, Major Vladimir 14 Laber, Jeri 238 land reform 106,111-13,131,132 Laumonier, Dr Laurence 215-16, 218, 219,221 I.ayeq,Suleiman 132 legal factors 26 Libya 67,170 literacy programmes 115, 242; National 146-7 livestock 207,209,211,214 lobbying, international 37, 208, 2434 Logan province 39,65,121,171,221 losses, civilian 6-7,85, 110,118, 1234, 126-7, 178-80; foreign 8, 22, 119-20; government 7,44, 45, 110; Soviet 7,14-15, 19, 21,34, 35,38,44,45,75,83,85,115, 116,152,236,246-8 Lycee Istiqlal 125, 143, 145, 179; Nejat 99, 145 van Lynden, Aernout 70 Madjnuh, Dr Sayed Burhanudin 141 Mahaz-e meW-ye Islami (National Islamic Front) 56, 171, 172 Makbar, Soi 149 Maihuret, Dr Claude 211 Maniere, Dr Philippe 218 Mansoor, Sayiid 196 Mao-Ze-Dung 41, 78-9 massacres 6-7, 107-10, 123, 126-8 Massoud, Ahmed Shah 55, 62, 68, 69, 76-87, 150, 168, 184-5, 188, 196,221, 233,234 Maximov, Vladimir 191 Mazar-l-Sharif 8, 15, 46, 54, 55, 57, 59, 93, 126, 154, 156, 184, 185 Medecins du Monde 215; sans Frontieres 198, 211, 215 media 148-51;see also individual headings medical organisations 7, 215-23; supplies 86 MIs see helicopter gunships Middle East 27, 184,240 MIGs 16,20, 30, 35, 45, 60, 77, 81, 83,113,127,237 migration, nomad 88, 95 militia 61,62,117,125,129-30, 137, 141,142,151, 196; Hazara 198-9 mineral resources 29, 152, 153-8 passim mines, butterfly 213-14, 238 modernisation 88, 89,92, 100, 104, 183; see also reforms Mohabbat, Mohammad Daoud 139, 140 Mohammadi, Maulawi 54, 74, 169, 17 1-2 Mohseni, Sheikh Asaf 241 monarchists 172, 173, 194-5 Mongolia 88, 104 morale, army 136, 137; civilian 164; mujahideen 58; Soviet 247 moutariks 79-81 Mujadeddi, Sibghatullah 54, 56, 171-3 mujahideen 1-4, 6,7, 8, 20,21,23, 30-2, 34, 37-9, 42-5, 48-55, 58-87, 107-13, 119,129, 131-3, 152, 157, 158, 161-6, 170.1, Afghanistan: The Soviet War
1. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Dictionary of AFGHANISTAN M. JAMIL H,ANIFI Metuchefl, N.J. by 1976 Library of Congress Cataloging in Pu~Iication Data Harilfi, Mohammed Jainil. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Historical and cultural dic~tionary of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Title. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The landlocked nation of Afghanistan, situated in As is the case with all volumes in this series, Dr. M. Jamil Hanifi is a Pushtun native of A!- Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Grimes who has regularly served the editor in the prep- aration of several of the volumes in the series. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
In this instance, particularly, the amount of basic library search, secondary research and, indeed, some prelim- inary writing on the manuscript has been of immense value to both the editor and author. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
INTRODUCTION V enlightened Afghans, and Afghans themselves are devel- oping new and interesting forms of social organization, cultural and ideological foci. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
There are, however, considerable differences in The spelling of proper nouns in Pushtu and Dan Dates and statistics are provided when such data vi alphabetically, and cross-references are provided as of- ten as possible to facilitate cohesiveness of the divided text. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
M.J.H. 1 ABDALI. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It has trained Afghans in mechanical, electrical, and civil engineering since the mid-1950s. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Institute is now part of the Kabul University academic and ad- ministrative structure. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
tan, “Land of the Afghan,” has an area of about 250, 000 square miles and a population of approxi- mately 16 million. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
GHILZAI DYNASTY (post-high school) technical training school built with the assistance of the United States. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Kushans (135 B.C.-241 A.D.), the Sas- A. D.), each in turn, occupied Afghanistan Area under cultivation of main crops (in 1,000 hectares--l hec- tare = 2.471 Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
80 00 00 10 50 50 70 F 4. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
In a few years he consolidated the warring tribes within Afghanistan and formed one of the largest Muslim Empires in the second half of the 18th century. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Period Most of the kings of the Mohammedzai Dynasty as - suméd the title of Amir. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See DURRANI DYNASTIES. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The boundaries of modern Afghanistan are, to a large extent, the result of conditional agreements he signed with the governments of Colonial-British India, Iran, and Russia. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The eastern and southern boundaries of Afghanistan (the Durrand Line) were unilaterally imposed on the Amir by the British AMIR AMANULLAH KHAN (1890-1960). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The situation was that the Pushtun and Baluch tribes east and south of the Durrand Line would ultimately be incorporated into the boundaries of Afghanistan or would be given a choice to remain independent or be part of British India. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Son of Amir Colonial Government, and the Amir, more con- cerned with stability than with boundary demarcation, agreed--but conditionally. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
This condition has not been honored by the British or by Pakistan which became a state (in- corporating the Pushtuns east of the Durrand Line) following the partition of British India into the na- tions of India and Pakistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Mohammedzai Dynasty, he ruled Afghanistan from 1828 to 1839 and from 1843 to 1863. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Both his periods of rule were marked by intrigues within and outside Afghanistan for control of the throne. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Tribal revolts inside Afghanistan and op- position to the Amir from various tribal-political centers in the country marked the period of his reign. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Amir Dost Mohammed Khan died in 1863 in Herat, where he is buried. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
AMIR HABIBULLAH KHAN. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Son of Amir Abdul Khan, he AMIR AMIR SHER ALl KHAN. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
preventing Russian advances, invaded Afghanistan for the second time. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
In 1878, the British, under the pretense of ANJUMAN PASS see GEOGRAPHY (Central Highlands) AQ KUPRUK. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A composite of archaeological sites (Aq AQCHA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A Turkman town in the province of Jozjan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A small ethnic group, primarily located in west ARBAB see MALIK ARCHAEOLOGY. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) came 11 Anjuman Pass Arab ARAB. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Shortly it joins the Arghandab River and at Qala Bist is joined with the Helmand River, ultimately emptying into the Seistan lacustrine de - pression in the south. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
During its journey it is joined by the Tarnak River 17 miles southwest of Qandahar. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Capital of Kunar Province. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See also HISTORY- -ACHAEMENIDS. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Ghaznavid period. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The dance is originally Pushtun in character and was diffused to other areas of Afghanistan over the past forty to fifty years, when many Pushtuns were encouraged to settle in other areas of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
AVICENNA see 1BN-SINA AZAN. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Afghanistan which ranks fifth in size among the twenty-seven provinces of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The pro- vince is famous for the towering icy peaks of the Pamirs in its eastern fringes as well for the ex- cellent horses it provided to the caravans of the 13th century. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
g., regarding the sanctity of life, marriage, prestige, honor, the chastity of its female members, and other core values), then reciprocal action, prefer- ably the killing of the guilty party or a member of his group, will be incumbent upon the group which has suffered such infliction. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Doshi-Shairkhan Bandar highway) have placed Bagh- lan in closer proximity to other industrial, com - mercial, and administrative centers of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The domestic airline BAKTASH see RABIA BALKHI BALA HISSAR. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Industrial plants in the province are located 19 Baghlan Baihaqi BAIHAQI. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A prosaic style chronicler who lived during BAKHTAR AFGHAN AIRLINES. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
-I -DUNYA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
chalcolithic sites dating from the fourth to the first millennia B. C. have been excavated in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The chalcolithic pattern discovered in Afghanistan is one where a semisendentary situation is pre- dominant. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The period was marked by the seasonal migration of animals to pasturelands, with the bulk of the population remaining in farming villages. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It is gen- erally a quilted garment of many colors made in northern Afghanistan, and now exported to other Afghan areas. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It consists of a wooden framework covered with bamboo matting, is domed and often has elaborate decorations like those of the miniatures. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
city and townsmen in the cold season. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The quilted variety is worn in cold weather, while a lighter version is used during warm seasons. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
province of Fariab is the home of most of the best buzkashi horsemen. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
26 CHENGIS KHAN (Also spelled Genghis Khan, Jenghis CHIHL ZEENA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
DAIWA DAILY, THE (THE LAMP). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Of particular value are her published historical guides to Afghanistan and to the various important cities and major points of interest In the country. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Nancy Dupree has been of much help to the Afghan Tourist Organization in the agency’s efforts to stimulate tourism throughout Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The economy of Afghanistan depends pri- Amir Dost Mohammed Khan Shah Shuja (Saddozai -return) Amir Dost Mohammed Khan (return) Amir Sher Ali Khan Amir Mohammed Afzal Khan Amir Mohammed Azam Khan Amir Sher Ali Khan (return) Amir Mohammed Yaqub Khan Amir Abdul Rahman Khan Amir Habibullah Khan Amir Amanullah Khan Revolution and Bachae Saqau (not a Mohammedzai) Mohammed Nadir Shah Mohammed Zahir Shah and southwestern parts of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Ahmad Shah Timur Shah Shah Zaman Shah Mahmood Shah Shuja Shah Mahmood (return) Civil War The Saddozais Dupree, Nancy33 1747 -1773 1773 -1793 1793 -1799 1799 -1803 1803 -1809 1809 -1819 1819-1826 Durrani Tribes DURRA.NI Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
These tribes are located in the west ECONOMY. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See also QAYYUM, NAWABZADA ABDUL. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
cycles of 50/60 are common throughout Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Some of the Baluch have been relocated in northern and northwestern Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
There are an estimated 200, 000 Brahuis in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Farsiwan : live in western Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They belong to the sunni sect of Islam. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Moghul : Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Tajik : in northern Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Turkman : nomadic Turkmans live in northern Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Uzbek : ist Uzbeks live in northern Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
in Afghanistan where a domestic group consisting About 20,000 live in urban centers, and About ten thousand live in Kabul and other Several thousand live in the Pamir About 20, 000 live in central and northern About 100, 000 live in eastern Afghanis- Several thousand live in urban areas occupied There are about four million Tajiks living Some 125, 000 sedentary and semi- About one million sedentary and agricultur- 37 Extended Family Faizabad 38 FAIZABAD. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Hindu : are engaged as merchants and traders. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
About 600, 000 agriculturalist Farsiwans This is a herding-farming group located About 870, 000 in number, they live in the EXTENDED FAMILY. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They speak Dari with some Mongolian words. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They speak Hindi and often Pushtu or Dan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They lead a transhumant life. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Nuristani : tan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The flora (vegetation) of Afghanistan is as FEBETCHENKO. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Universal Five Pillars FLAG. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Its width is one -fourth of the width of the flag. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Be - low the black strip is the red color (symbolizing the valor and the sacrifices of the people of At ghan- istan) which appears in the same proportion as the black strip. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
41 Febetchenko FOLK MUSIC. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
GENGHIZ KHAN see CHENGIS KHAN GEOGRAPHY. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
includes the present provinces of Kabul, Jalalabad, and some regions immediately to the eastern bor- der of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
45 Gandhara Geography of Afghanistan can best be divided into the f ollow- ing major zones: Central Highlands : Afghanistan’s mountainous core, the Central Highlands, is part of the great Alpine- Himalayan mountain range. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Their most distinguished ruler in Afghanistan and in India is Sultan Mahmood Ghaznavi. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It was built recently under a contract between the Ministry of Public Works of Afghanistan and the Institute of Techno -Export of the Soviet Union. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
cupy the eastern border of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It shortens the former distance between its begin- fling and end by 200 kilometers. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
EJADDA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
cated in the central part of Afghanistan where the Hindu Kush breaks up into several separate chains. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A huge irrigation and hydroelectric project on the Helmand and Arghandab Rivers. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It was begun in the early 1950’s and is in the last phases of its completion. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Indo-Aryans. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
59 History History 60 depictions of the great deeds of the ancient kings. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Holidays Hotak HOTAK see GHILZAI TRIBES HUJRA see MELMASTIA HYDROGRAPHY. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
IMAM. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
JERIB. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The most important of these sites in Had- da (q. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
As a rule, Jinn are perhaps best understood for explaining and controlling any individual’s deviation in be- havior, physical, emotional, or psychological. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It extends from the Amu Darya in the north to the Hindu Kush in the south. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See also RIVERS. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
this is the largest museum in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It houses specimens from all the historic and pre - historic archaeological sites in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The catchment area in the Kabul is ap- 68 I KABUL RIVER. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A very fertile valley with a KABUL TIMES. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
KHAYR KHANA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The pass has been an important point in the routes of the invading armies which came from Greece, Central Asia, and Afghanistan to conquer and rule the Indian subcontinent. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The 28-mile Khyber gorge has been of political and military importance since prehistoric times. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
to the poor during the ceremonies and parties at the various post-burial ceremonies. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
from 1929-1933. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A khyrat can also be given when a wish or hope has been fulfilled. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Located in central of Afghanistan in Paris. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Kush west of Chitral. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The major languages spoken in Afghanis - LAPIS LAZULI. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Pushtu, the indigenous language of the largest tribal group, is spoken, primarily, through southern and eastern Afghanistan and has been de- clared the national language of the country. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
New residential and government buildings and a modern hotel have recently been built. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
MINERALS. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
AFGHAN WARS has done much original research on the languages of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Mua’zin are respected members of their com- munities throughout Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See also AZAN. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
gious leaders. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They are also influential in educa- tion and politics. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Close by is a large salt lake, the largest in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Some players are beginning to take the sport to audiences in Kabul. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Pushtu term for this kind of bread is dodai. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
3, 500 to 7, 500 years before historical times. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
one set of parents and their children, living in one household. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
also AMU DARYA RIVER and RIVERS. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It also has hundreds of thousands of acres of virgin timber including pine, willow, spruce, mahogany, and evergreen trees. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Some archaeological sites provide evidence of Paleolithic societies in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Pamir area which rise out of the Qaraqurom, Qun lum, and Himalayan Mountains, and shift the di- rection of mountain ranges from southeast -north - west to northeast-southwest through Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Afghanistan which follows a 65-mile course before uniting with the Wakhan River at Qala Panja to form the Panj River. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Ranked 22nd in size among the the Pamir River at Qala Panja form this river which is one of the headstreams of the Amu Darya River. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
of residence (common in Afghanistan) whereby the groom and his wife live with the groom’s paternal relatives after marriage (preferably the groom’s father or his eldest brother). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Afghan societies is in the hands of one or more males. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Parwan is also well known for its mulberries and a variety of other fruits. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
See also CHARIKAR. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Although the word is derived from Pushtu, it has a universal meaning throughout all Afghan ethnic groups. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND INTERNAL ADMINIS- mountainous regions in the country, and its valleys attract tourists and commercial interests. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
who has spent many years in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
He has published extensively on the history of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Leon Poullada is among the leaders of those who have encouraged institutional and organized study and research in and about Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
history of this area of the world, but the western part of the Iranian plateau has been inhabited since the Paleolithic period and further study will likely establish Neolithic settlements as well. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Daud served Afghanistan as premier from 1953 to 1963. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
During this period the five -year economic development plans were initiated. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The results of the efforts of General Mohammed Daud’s term in office as premier are beginning to show in many dimensions of the political, economic, The oldest known sculpture found in Asia Painted pottery dating to the 4th millennium PROPHET MOHAMMED see ISLAM PUL. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
A most prominent cultural value con- social, and cultural life of the Afghan society. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Pule Khumri is an important stopping point on the way from Kabul to the northern provinces. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
QALAI BOST. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Many monuments in and around the city mark im- portant events in the history of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Afghanistan with an area of 45,333 sq. km. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Abjush raisin is the most popular. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Qandahar pomegranates - -some reaching 18 centimeters in diameter are grown along the Arghandab River Haravati and the Rig Veda Surashuti are In 1747 in this city, Ahmad Shah Durrani Q amari Calendar101 Qaraqul QARAQUL see QARAQUL SHEEP QARAQUL SHEEP. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Raisins as well as grapes are exported. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
105 Radio Afghanistan Republic of Afghanistan 106 REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Repub - lican Government of Afghanistan particularly en- courages visits to Afghanistan by scholars and others interested in the natural beauty of the country, and/or in carrying out responsible, pro- fessional, and scholastic research and study of the Afghan society and culture. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Cultural, commercial, and diplomatic relationships with friendly nations are maintained. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
the composition of which is attributed to the sec - ond half of the millennium. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Robertson109 Sated Koh 110 SAFED KOH MOUNTAIN RANGE (EASTERN). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Samovar111 Sare Daura 112 SARE DAURA. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Prophet Mohammed. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
He died in Turkey. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
His writings on the Moghuls are a primary source of material for students and scholars interested in the ethnology of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
An Afghan title equivalent to “Sir” or SHAH FULADI PEAK see KOHE BABA MOUNTAIN SHAH RUKH. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Muslim religious mystics found throughout Afghan- Iranian border in Southern Afghanistan which is 4,262 feet in elevation. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
LAKE of Afghanistan constitutes two ears of wheat, mehrab and ____, an eagle and a rising sun. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The ears of wheat which form a circle from two sides of the emblem encircling other parts of the emblem symbolizes the fact that Afghanistan is an agricultural country. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
At the bottom of the wheat circle are the words “Republic of Afghanistan” in Pushtu and the day, month, and year (July 17, 1973 in Pushtu script, solar month, and year) of the revolution which established the Republic of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
place of prostration of Muslims and the pulpit from which believers are invited to seek the way of sal - vation) stand in the middle of the emblem. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Its attraction persists in the country and it is not The mehrab and mumbar (symbols of the The eagle symbolizes Afghanistan as a 115 Siddhartha Sufism SUFISM. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
and southeastern Afghanistan it extends beyond the boundaries of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
the Ghaznavid rulers, he extended his dominion from Afghanistan to the Punjab in India and beyond. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
the most common in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Situated about 235 miles north of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
It ranks 15th in size among the provinces of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Often known, in English, as “Tamer- northern provinces of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Afghan Tourist Organization, with offices in Kabul and at points of entry, provides information, brochures, pamphlets, etc. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
for those who wish to visit Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
They felt this was crucial to the safety of India. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Its altitude on the Afghanistan side of the border is 16,150 feet. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
v.), he continued his father’s march and completed the conquest of northern India. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The son of Kajula Kadphises (q. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
KADPHISES (KADPHISES II). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Jeghatto River was the site of Afghanistan’s first hydroelectric dam, which has supplied elec- tricity to Kabul for fifty years. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
tral -National Cabinet of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
twenty -eight provinces in Afghanistan, divided into districts and subdistricts. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
YURT. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
tinue in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Among them are witchcraft, black magic, shamanism, and varieties of voodoo. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
ZAHIRUDDIN MOHAMMED BABUR. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Zangilak Peak125 Jr Zranda ZRANDA.PuShtU Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
term for watermill. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Tucson: University of Ari- zona Press, 1974. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Taylor (eds.). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Archer, W. “The Music of Afghanistan and Iran,” The Auboyer, Jeanine. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Art of Afghanistan . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology , Vol. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Boston: Afghanistan: Jewett . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Brockelman, Carl. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
tury; Being Selections From the Poems of Khush Hal Khan Khatak . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Edinburgh University Press, 1963. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Pathans . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Bibliography129 Bibliography Caroe, Sir Olaf. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
London: Macmillan, Centlivers, Micheline and Pierre and Mark Slobin. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
National and Literary Language of Afghanistan,” Central Asian Review , Vol. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
24, No. 3, 1966, pp. 210-220. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Settlement and Social Change in Asia, by Wolfram Eberhard. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
< Deh Morasai Ghundai: A Chalcolithic Site< City and Nation in the Developing World, by et al. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
____ < Prehistoric Research in Afghanistan< Philadelphia: 131 American Phiosoph - Bibliography Bibliography Ferdinand, Klaus. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
London: Their Relations . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
“Afghanistan,” < Royal Central Asian< Grassmuck, George, etal. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
< Afghanistan: Some< Gregorian, Vartan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
The Emergence of Modern Afghan Griffiths, John C. Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Kabul: Dari. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
York, 1951. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
London: Sampson Low, Marston, n.d. < The Course of Afghanistan in History.< Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Central Asia . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Pushtuns of Afghanistan,” International Journal the Sociology of the Family, Vol. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
and Transformational Processes in Afghanistan.” Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
New York: Afghanistan Council, The Asia Society (occasional paper No. 6), 1974. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
2, 1928, pp. 485-494. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Warrior-Poet,” Islamic Culture , Vol. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Asian-African Hot and Cold Desert and Steppe, < Islam and the Transformation of Culture.< Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Random House, 1964. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Lal, Mohan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Mayne, Peter. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Journey to the Pathans . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Mirepoix, Camille. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Qn the Birds of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Patai, Raphael. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Poullada, Leon B. Reform and Rebellion in Afghanis -< Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Northern Tier: Southern Bor Recent Books About Afghanistan: A Selected, Annotated Rice, Francis M. and Benjamine Rowland. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Rowland, B. Ancient Art in Afghanistan . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
__________ Study of the Washington: ties, 1955. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Hove, England: Key Press, 1954. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
of the New State of Pakhtunistan . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Chitral,” Afghanistan . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
London: Macmillan, 1940. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Bibliography139 Bibliography 140 Tilman, H. W. “Wakhan: Or How to Vary a Route,” Trinkler, Emil. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Through the Heart of Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Boston: ment in Afghanistan,” Archaeology, Vol. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
< An Annotated Bibliography of Afghanistan.< Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Wilson, Andrew. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Wood-Walker, R. et al. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
47, 1960, pp. 286-295. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Their aim is precisely to redraw boundaries in order to divide—say in Kurdish Iraq or Mus- urn Sudan or Serbian-populated sections of Croatia. Jihad vs. McWorld
The question here is whether it is more than just a metaphor in the Muslim culture that produced the term. Jihad vs. McWorld
There is a second, more institutional step as well. Jihad vs. McWorld
&e also commercials; infomercials Afghanistan, 8, 207, 289 Africa, 34, 55—56, 70 Index agriculture, 27, 33, 34 Albania, 43, 44, 46, 196, 227 Algeria, 4.3, Jihad vs. McWorld
REVOLUTIONS & IN AFGHANISTAN REBELLIONS kevolutions & Afghanistan,. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Anthropological Perspectives Rebellions ROBERT L. CANFIELD, Editors University of California, Berkeley RESEARCH SERIES M. NAZIF SHAHRANI~ OF INTERNATIONAL No. 57 in jiB INSTITUTE STUDIES Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: Revolutions & rebellions in Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan_HistOry_Soviet occupation, 1979.1. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan—soCial conditions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
This volume is the result of a day-long symposium of the 1980 Eighteen scholars participated in the symposium. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
We believe, however, that the essays presented here suggest social conditions and developments that have been extant generally throughout the country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska at Omaha. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
I I NTRODUCTI ON PART I INTRODUCTION: To students and observers of the current political and military crisis in Afghanistan, it is apparent that there is a multitude of con- flicts and confrontations at various levels of society and with varying points of origin, motivations, and goals. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The official Soviet and Afghan government view depicts the situation in Afghanistan as a classical “international socialist” battle against “world capitalist-imperialist forces.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The view is made known in the West through a growing body of English-language Soviet publi- cations on Afghanistan and by a number of Soviet and Communist I would like to express my special gratitude to Robert L. Canfield for his unceasing support and many constructive comments and suggestions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN MARXIST “REVOLUTION” AND ISLAM IC Chapter 1 Nazif Shahrani M. 3 sympathizers and supporters among leftist intellectuals and organiza- tions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
some scholars, and the media have focused primarily on the policies of the Afghan Communist government (a coalition of the Khalq and Parcham parties), a few Afghan resistance organizations outside the country, and, particularly, on the causes of the direct Soviet military intervention and its regional and international implications for East- West relations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Commen- tators who have attempted to discuss the situation inside Afghanistan have frequently relied on a very narrow and reified knowledge of the country’s history, culture, and politics. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 6 in the same way as the Pashtun. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Pashtun ethnic groups has been complex. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
There is no evidence that the Khalq-Parcham regime withdrew such privileges from these groups. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Second,. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Marxists have characterized Afghanistan before April 1978 In an interview in World Marxist Review (April 1980), Babrak M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 10 The declared aim of the Afghan Marxist revolution was to effect social, economic and cultural transformations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
.. that would lead to the creation of a new and just democratic society in Afghanistan, where the exploitation of man by man, hunger, poverty, unemployment and illiteracy would be wiped out forever (Muradov 1981: 180). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
reaching” program of reforms. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On 9 May 1978, less than two weeks after the Khalq-Parcham party took power, it introduced most of its proposed re,forms in a Radio Afghanistan broadcast. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The thirty-point program, entitled “Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties of the Government of the Dem~ ocratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA] ,“ touched on a wide range of issues and promised numerous “democratic” changes—for example: land reform and abolition of “old feudal and pre-feudal relations” (Articles 1 and 2); a “democratic solution of national issues” (Art. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Decree No. 6: Land Mortgage and Indebtedness. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
By focusing on the costs of marriage, the new government has either totally ignored or misunderstood that in Afghanistan marriage is the focus of most economic and political activity and the way by which individuals, families, and kinship and ethnic groups recognize and validate status. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
in Nahrin (northern Afghanistan) tried to observe the provisions of Decree No. 7 by holding less elaborate wedding celebrations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Decree No. 7 Nancy Tapper (in this volume) suggests that there is little dif- Beattie (in this volume) reports that in the fall of 1978 people *Mahr in its strict Islamic sense is goods given to a bride by her husband at M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 14 while some planned marriages were abruptly abandoned, resulting in rising tensions among individuals and general resentment toward the government (see also N. Dupree in this volume). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
ternational socioeconomic indicators, during the 1960s and 1970s Afghanistan was among the poorest and least developed countries in the world, with a per capita income of about $160 in 1975 (United Nations 1978: 14). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
inhabitants are engaged in subsistence rural cultivation or nomadic pastoral activities. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Yet in the 1920s only one million ha was cultivated, in the 1960s, 3.5 Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Moreover, Soviet writers and the Marxist government in Afghanistan claim that the archaic methods of pro- duction were accompanied by extremely backward agrarian relations, often characterized as “feudal,” “semi-feudal” and “pre-feudal” (see, for example, Glukhoded 1981: 230-3 2). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Despite the increase in cultivated areas, the production rate of rural agriculture as a whole remained unchanged owing to extremely low levels of technology.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Official government statistics show a small increase in total annual M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 16 reason for the abject poverty reigning in the Afghan village. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE BY FAMILY/HOUSEHOLD UNITS IN AFGHANISTAN Families Number 420,000- 470,000 450,000 230,000 51,600 The figures are recalculated on the basis of first-grade land. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
BY FAMILY/HOUSEHOLD UNITS IN AFGHANISTAN The figures reflect estimates of absolute landholdings. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
0% 900,000 hectares of land are required, on the basis of the first group calculation” (1981: 242). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The government’s main reason for the speedy introduction of its land reform program was, it seems, the anticipation that “the popularity of the government will in- crease as a result of. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Halliday offers an intriguing explanation for the armed resistance which followed: “Afghanistan is a country where political and social issues have tended to be settled by the gun and where the room for peacefully handling conflicts within the state, or between the state and subjects, is extremely limited” (1980a: 23). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It certainly does not apply to most non-Pashtun peoples of the country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
When provincial officials were given the task of introducing an alien political ideology and implementing reform policies, the government began to collapse. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
MISINTERPRETATIONS AND DEFINITIONS tained that the resistance movement in Afghanistan is led by “sab- oteur gangs,” “mercenaries,” and “counterrevolutionaries” who are simply the creations of the Western imperialist powers. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
They deny that the movement has an indigenous, independent Islamic political and ideological basis. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Soviets further *The Soviets have published at least four books in English to support their claims that there are ties between the Afghan resistance with Western powers and the “reactionary regimes” in the region who are the clients of the imperialists: MARXIST “REVOLUTION” AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE THE PLACE OF ISLAM AND THE CONCEPT OF JIHAD The Soviets and the regime in Kabul have consistently main- 25 charge that the Western imperialists are “hypocritical ‘friends of Is- lam,” who are using Islam to their own advantage, while “the Soviet Union is, and always has been, a friend of the peoples of the East and a friend of the peoples of the Muslim World” (Grachev 1980: 125). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Indeed members of the resistance are said by the Soviets and the Kabul regime to be neither Afghan nor Muslim, but merely “the willing helpers of imperialism.”* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
articles by Aslanov, Arunova, Khalfin, and Korgun).* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
While recent English-language Soviet publications addressing the M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 26 Afghan conflict essentially as a religious war waged by traditional re- ligious leaders and “fundamentalist” mullahs (learned men) and their faithful horde of tribal and rural followers against the invading Soviet forces and the urban-based atheist Khalq-Parcham government. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On Afghanistan, see Volkov Ct al. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Kolarz 1966; Bociurkiw 1980.81; Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
ISLAM AND JIHAD IN THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF AFGHANISTAN Islam and the ideals of jihad have remained constant and dy- namic forces in the political processes of Afghanistan, particularly over the last two centuries. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 30 in the region), Islam and the concept of jihad have played very un- portant but varied roles. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
MARXIST “REVOLUTION” AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE In the history of Afghanistan (as in most other Muslim countries In the face of constant Russian tsarist colonialist advances in the 31 nullah Khan declared a jihad against Great Britain in order to gain Afghanistan’s full independence. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Just take a look around you: Do you think that those of our Muslim brothers who are living under the iron clasps of unbeievers and foreigners possess any freedom of religion, rights to a country, and national dignity, like we do? No! Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Never! Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
(reprinted in Farhadi 1977: 345; see also Shorish 1984). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Some of them were said to be Muslims from the subcontinent who were sent into Afghanistan, while others may have been Afghans educated in India and recruited there. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Mullaha-t-Fo~~~ang refers to mullahs who, regardless of their origin, were allegedly working for the British. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Musahiban rule. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
1n 1965 the Khalq was the only Communist party in Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Following their defeat, many members of the much weakened Islamic movement were forced underground or went into exile in Pakistan and elsewhere in the region. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In the summer of 1975 Mus- lim Youth groups staged armed attacks against the Daoud regime in several areas of the country, including the Panjsher Valley. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
However, the Khalqis were unwilling to share power with other Afghan Communist or secular nationalist groups, creating new tensions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
IDEOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS in Afghanistan in late 1978, attempts to organize formal resistance Power struggles raged between the Khalq and Parcham factions As local resistance grew, it was soon transformed into a national- Shortly after the beginning of large-scale armed opposition with- M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 44 organizations outside the country, particularly in Pakistan, mush- roomed. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
fall into one of two categories: (1) Groups which are inspired by West- ern ideologies of secular nationalism, socialism, Marxism, or Maoism; and (2) Groups organized according to the precepts of Islam. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Their base of support is either extremely narrow or nonexistent. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These parties are particularly well established in tribal Pathan [Pashtun] areas (in the south of the country) (1983: 12; see also N. Newell and R. Newell 1981: 93-94). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Like their traditionalist predecessors during the jihad against Amanullah, they lack any reformist ideals for the country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
They include leading figures from the former regime, tribal chiefs and traditionalist religious leaders trained in nongovernmental reli- gious institutions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
7; and Editors of Mirror of Jehad 1982a: 10). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
tionship between the educated Islamic-minded youth and the rural and urban masses of Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
We have also found out in the process who is good and who is bad. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Today, the Afghans know one another. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
But Sayyaf contends that [this jihad] has had a deep effect on all the Muslims. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In the hetero- geneous sociocultural and demographic mosaic of Afghanistan, the creation of a close-knit network of Islamic coalitions poses a major challenge to mujahidin leadership. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
13). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
and more obvious, it is a jihad in defense of Islam and Afghanistan against the direct Soviet military intervention. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On the first In this tripartite struggle among Marxists, traditionalists, and There are increasing signs that Afghanistan is witnessing a true M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 56 ranks may decrease the risks of a totalitarian regime if the mujahidin are victorious.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The lack of organizational linkage between the mujahidin groups and outside powers, particularly the superpowers, makes the Afghan strug- gle distinct in the recent history of liberation movements. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In Kabul the interventionists felt safe only behind the walls of the Sherpur fortress (Khalfm 1981: 108). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (1973-78) Republic of Afghanistan on 17 July 1973. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Prior to his overthrow and death in a second leftist coup, Daoud charted a reasonable path for Afghanistan but made several fundamental mistakes along the way. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Post-World War II leftist movements in Afghanistan have been minis- cule, fragmented, and on the whole home-grown. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
*Political parties were technically illegal in Afghanistan from 1973 until 1978, although several functioned unofficially—but openly. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
*A blanket of silence descended over the incident after the coup. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The confessions of those arrested—extracted by means usually em- ployed in Afghanistan regardless of the regime in power (physical and mental torture, threats to family members)—were broadcast over Radio Afghanistan, and the government-controlled press published facsimiles of the confessions in the handwriting of the accused (a tactic also employed in the past). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The confessions implicated Babrak as instigator and ringleader of the overthrow plot, but most of those involved appeared to have been more nationalist and Muslim than Parcham in orientation and to have favored a genuinely nonaligned Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
As presented, the reforms ran counter to major Afghan cultural, social, and economic institutions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
As the Khalq regime preempted the leftists and nationalists, it Most objectionable, the reforms and other pronouncements were It is interesting to note that the reform programs of the DRA *For details on the so-called “women’s reforms,” see the contribution in tThe transistor radio has created a revolution in communication in the Third **M~ist dialectic sounds stilted not only in Persian and Pashto, but also in MARXIST REGIMES AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE RHETORIC AND REFORMS 65 (Islamic Party), a dissident Muslim fundamentalist group led by Engineer Gulbudin Hikmatyar, most of the opposition was quiet in Afghanistan from the April coup until late August-early September 1978. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Except for sporadic attacks from Pakistan by the Hizb-i Islami Several factors account for the relative lack of early reaction In rural Afghanistan from early spring through early fall, the *For a discussion of how seasonal warfare affected imperialist tactics, see L. LOUIS DUPREE REVOLTS 66 Indian “burying the hatchet.”) Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
tions in rural Afghanistan, tensions build up between individuals, families, and lineages. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The tribesmen of Afghanistan can be described as having a short fuse and a long feud. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Government reprisals continued throughout the fall and winter of 19 78-79, and revolts spread to every province in Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
DRA had a Soviet-equipped and trained military, and it overreacted— as have many Third World central governments when faced with opposition from the countryside. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Dupree: 1979a, 1979b)— mainly because if the Soviets invaded Afghanistan it would be the first Soviet aggression since World War II on an independent and nonaligned territory—an important and potentially dangerous prece- dent.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Czechoslovakia and Hungary were not in the same cate ory as Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
They were consi ere by NATO < an e rest of the< world as part of the Soviet bloc c jn members < of the Warsaw Pact,< but Afghanistan was not. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Central Asians mingled with the local Afghan population in the cities and were rather dis- turbed to find that no foreign troops (other than from the USSR) were inside Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
sofication” of their Central Asian republics and have always feared that influences from the south (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan) would infiltrate across the border. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
*For discussions of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, see the following (amongothers): L. Dupree 1980g; Griffiths 1981;N. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
LOUIS DUPREE 70 with the Afghan mujahidin (freedom fighters). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
As a fmal gesture of cultural affinity with the Afghans, many Muslim troops combed the bazaars of Kabul and elsewhere for Qurans to take home. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
A small number of Central Asian Muslim troops deserted to fight When they invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 (85,000 Relatively speaking, few Afghans were involved in the fighting Afghan kin units (in almost all areas) are based on vertically Soviet tactics have helped accelerate the extension of regional *1 am writing a book on The First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842): Myth as MARXIST REGIMES AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE 71 tanks—and organization they would use in the plains of Eastern Europe. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Tactics quickly began to break down because Afghanistan is defmitely not tank country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Initially individual Yugoslav ethnolinguistic groups resisted the Germans and The Mi-24s roam up and down valleys with impunity, im- The tactics of rubbleization and migratory genocide have back- It is important that the processes of extension of local power The current situation in Afghanistan most resembles the evolu- LOUIS DUPREE 72 Italians independently. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
*A number of books on Afghanistan have been published since this manu- script was submitted for publication, among them the following: Afghanistan: The Target of Imperialism 1983; T. Amin 1982; Arnold 1981 and 1983;Bhargava 1983; Bradsher 1983; Chaliand 1982; Hammond 1984; Hyman 1982; Male 1982; Manzar 1980; Misra 1981;Monks 1981; Nayar 1981; Ratnain 1981; Rubinstein 1982; Victor 1983; Vogel 1980; Volkov et al. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It is to be hoped that the unifying process will continue in Whether the Russians leave Afghanistan or not, nothing will ever MARXIST REGIMES AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE 73 EASTERN AFGHANISTAN PART II NU RI STAN AND Muhammad Taraki and the Khalq party, the political situation in Af- ghanistan had so deteriorated that the leaders of the eastern Nuristani peoples of Kunar province decided that (in the words of one) “We should drive out this Russian crumb-licker from our Islamic soil.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Eastern Nuristan was no longer under the control of the central gov- ernment. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
After a three-day battle the Nuristanis overran the post, capturing a store of weapons. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Most of their ethnosociological vocabulary consists of terms that identify the social roles of individuals. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
He foresaw that given more time, the Khalqis would emasculate the Nuristani leadership. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Tales abound among the insurgents of the intrigues sown by Gulbudin to increase his own power at the expense of otherwise solid ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN EASTERN NURISTAN Parallel to the system of civilian village leaders, Anwar estab- As stated above, a chosen leader must maintain consensus for Throughout the fighting the Nuristanis’ entire supply of weapon- 91 local military commands. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
this word, although “Waigal” is the more widely used spelling. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In addition, I wish to thank Mr. Muhammad Alam Melabar, Faculty of Chapter 4 David J. Katz 94 The presentation is based primarily on material collected during ethnographic fieldwork in Afghanistan between August 1975 and July 1977.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
However, conclusions concerning post-1978 events must remain tentative until they can be verified through additional field study. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RESPONSES TO CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN NURISTAN: THE CASE OF THE VAYGAL VALLEY KALASHA* The acceptance of Afghan sovereignty and incorporation into In this chapter we shall examine the pre-1978 Kalasha-govern- *~Vaygal~~ is a more accurate transliteration for the Kalasha pronunciation of Grateful acknowledgment of support for this research is hereby given to the 10576. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
SITUATING NURISTAN AND THE KALASHA 95 involving cereal cultivation on intensively farmed, irrigated terraces and small animal pastoralism. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Kalasha came from neighboring non-Nuristani populations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Except for mullahs in every village, the only significant Kalasha integration into Afghanistan proceeded smoothly and 99 of young women and men from each village be sent to Kabul. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Fifteen years later, during heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, valley residents again actively supported the government by staging clandestine raids into Pakistani territory. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
of the Republic of Afghanistan (1973.78) Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The physical features of many Nuristanis, which are more typical of In the decades following their conquest Vàygal Valley Kalasha Stability in the region was shattered by a major uprising in 1946 The Kalasha-government relationship culminated during the era The treatment of Nuristanis by ‘Abdur Rahman and his succes- DAVIDJ. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
KATZ 100 northern Europeans than of other Afghan peoples—especially their fair complexions and blue eyes —also endeared them to the elite, making them highly desired as servants, concubines, and wives. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These officials are nearly always ethnic Palthtuns from distant parts of Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In Nuristan and elsewhere in rural Afghanistan two factors determine a community’s susceptibility to government meddling: its accessibility to officials because of its proximity to government outposts, and the government’s perceived need for involvement in the community. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Taxes were collected indirectly. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Kalasha to themselves, the local government was a genuine source of concern to the residents. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These local fundamentalist activists received support, moral and otherwise, from Pakistan, where many mullahs from eastern Afghanistan are trained. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Political differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan—mainly centering on Afghan- istan’s contention that the predominately Pashtun regions of Pakistan should be a sovereign state called Pashtunistan—have at times led each country to encourage subversion of the other through propa- ganda and covert backing of anti-government elements. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
To a large extent, they merely parroted the more politically astute Pakhtun fundamentalist complaints about the non-Islamic character of the Daoud regime. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In addition, fundamentalists in eastern Afghanistan draw support from fundamentalists in other countries—especially Pakistan, where the powerful fundamentalist Jamiat.i Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Marxist regime. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Their geographic situation effectively insulated them from the most oppressive aspects of contact with local authorities. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
First, rural residents distinguish between the comportment of local administrators and the legitimacy of the central authorities, and evaluations of both levels contribute to overall assessments of the government. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
As a result, a balance was Struck between government representatives and the people of Dana-i Nur. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In many respects villages were left to run their own affairs, but taxes were collected, men were conscripted, and the legitimate right of the gov- ernment to handle certain kinds of civil and criminal cases was recog. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The new officials Two policies introduced by Communist officials were particu- The second policy was to increase military conscription. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Such a perspective could be extremely useful in understanding popular uprisings not only in Darra-i Nur, but in other areas of Afghanistan as well. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
I have argued for the impor- tance of understanding how symbols motivate people to act in terms of moral imperatives. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
CAUSES AND CONTEXT OF RESPONSES TO THE Like in most other parts of Afghanistan, the responses of the It is argued in this chapter that the responses of the peoples SAUR REVOLUTION IN BADAKHSHAN Chapter 6 M. NazifShahrani 139 either on current events or on a regional or provincial context; an his- torical consideration of national political developments is necessary. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
By focusing only on current events, recent literature has defined the conflict in Afghanistan solely in terms of the intentions of the Marxist government (e.g., Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
rapid modernization through radical land reform) or the presumed intentions of the opposition (fighting to retain tribal, ethnic, and regional autonomy or personal wealth and privileges, de- fense of Islam, etc.).* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Viewed in light of Aya’s political model, it becomes clear that M. NAZIF SHAHRANI 140 Islamic political movements and not simply “religious” in nature (see the introduction above); second, the initial force behind the armed resistance and its leadership originated in the major urban centers (not the rural areas, as has been frequently claimed), but for tactical reasons the resistance—considered by Afghans to be an Islamic war of liberation, or jihad—has been fought to a large extent in the country- side; finally, the principal actors in the struggle for control of politi- cal power in this conflict are the newly educated elite (urban and rural, religious and secular), not the agrarian tribesmen, peasants, and nomads fighting a central government for their own narrow interests. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The government record in the field of health care, however, has been very poor. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Large numbers of merchants from urban as well as rural areas of Badakhshan participated in the trade caravans, and some spent many months—or even years—in these and other Central Asian cities. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
For example, it is commonly accepted in many parts of northern Afghanistan that in an effort to indoctrinate Muslim children, the Soviet Communists withheld food and water from them for a long time. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
There is no doubt that the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet army has reinforced the worst fears of the people of Badakh- shan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In addition, Badakhshan was under attack from the Uzbek khans of Qataghan, and on occasion the local mirs were made vassals of the Khanate of Qunduz. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Like many other parts of Afghanistan, Badakh- shan was left without any effective traditional local leadership above the village level. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Naqshbandi order. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RESPONSES TO THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN BADAKHSHAN Relationships between the mawlawis and mullahs and the gener- EDUCATION Traditional political leaders, both religious and secular, had *The government eventually provided high school education in most of the 153 the elitist high schools in Kabul. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
wasitah school at Faizabad and after finishing it was sent by his family to Kabul to attend one of the most elite non-vocational high schools (Habibiah). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RESPONSES TO THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN BADAKHSHAN Burhanuddin Rabbani, also from Faizabad, is a Sunni Tajik from *~~flj~~y claims that during a worsening of Afghan.Pakistan Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Alarmed by the Communist agitations and the government’s lack of. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Most of the Kirghiz who could leave the area have done so, the Wakhi have not rebelled, and the Soviets are thus peacefully installed in at least this small area of Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
ment of Afghanistan and its opponents differs from all previous political upheavals involving the central government (e.g., Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
to what constitutes legitimacy of state authority. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Kushkaki (1923: 174-381) estimated the total number of matchlocks (tufangi filtai) in the entire province at about 1,500 in 1921. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
There- fore, guerrilla warfare, which has been called “the latest weapon in the Communist arsenal” is being used against the Communists (Ahmad 1971: 138). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
With increasingly effective use of recently acquired anns, Badakh- shani youth are transformed into a formidable guerrilla force. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The changes in the reform policies of one contender in the con- *There is a major difference between the current situation in Afghanistan and 169 (PDPA) seized power in Kabul with the help of sympathetic units in the Afghan military in what has come to be known as the Saur Revolution. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
of the old political struc- ture. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
This structure was the product of fifty years of conservative dynastic rule of the Musahiban royal lineage that had begun with the installation of Nadir Shah as king in 1929 and ended with Muhammad Daoud as president of a nominal republic. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The central government was effective in expanding its power, but it did not completely displace older tribal structures. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In Qunduz province (in northeastern Afghanistan) the Imam Sahib Valley of the Amu River was an important subdistrict (the lowest level of government administration). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
They dressed in Western suits, which set them off from the turban-wearing residents of rural Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Indeed, with few exceptions, govern- ment officials were embarrassed by rural Afghanistan, stating that it was a backward place full of backward people. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
This time opposition was more widespread, and the Afghan army crumbled in the face of numerous attacks, forcing Amanullah to flee Afghanistan after abdicating the throne. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
With modern weapons the army would protect the government from the MUSAHIBAN STRATEGY TO REDUCE PROVINCIAL INFLUENCE The Musahiban government policy toward provincial Afghanistan The lesson of the civil war was not lost on Nadir Shah and his The Musahiban dynasty developed a tripartite strategy. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Amanullah’s fiscal dependence on the rural areas to pay for his projects made him vulnerable to opposition from the provinces. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
from rural opposition. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
However, they were still careful not to deliberately provoke provincial Afghans by demanding any great changes in the way they lived; furthermore, government reforms were always justified as being in line with orthodox Islamic values. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
One consequence of this strategy was to increase the distance between the values held by Afghanistan’s small literate urban population and the tribal village populations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s economic and social development, but also to put the party’s propaganda in a form that would attract a broader base of support outside the party itself. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Unlike the PDPA, opposition leaders used the old political language of Afghanistan, calling on their followers to defend the faith of Islam, the honor of their families and country, and their property. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Perhaps the most basic difficulty faced by the national govern- THOMAS 3. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Amanullah fell. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On 27 April 1978, a military coup in Afghanistan brought to Shortly after taking power, the new government embarked upon OF NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN Chapter 8 Hugh Beattie 184 historical context. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Loess hills around the valley and the plateau of Burqa to the north are used for dry-farming. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
A river runs through this valley as well as through the Yarm (or Jilga) Valley in the southeast of the subprovince, making possible some irrigated agriculture. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
per jirib for those owning between 15 and 20 jiribs; those who owned more than 120 jiribs were ineligible for membership. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
During the autumn of 1978, the local administration in Nahrin began setting up a coop- erative to make fertilizer, seed, and machinery available to the farmers and to help with marketing their produce. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Land reform has a much shorter history in Afghanistan than do In August 1975 the government of President Muhammad Daoud EFFECTS OF THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN NAHRIN 193 dry-farming land (Article il).* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
(Decree No.8 stated that land would be redistributed first to “the landless peasant who is busy working on the distributable land” [Article 24].) Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These are inlikely to have been substantial for two main reasons. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
governor tried to stop people using the word arbab except as a term of abuse. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
During a game of buzkashi which the subgovernor happened to attend, one of the players, a former arbab named Jabar, succeeded in winning a round.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In an effort to regulate prices, in June 1978 the Khalq govern- The Khalq attack on corruption had precedents in the anti- EFFECTS OF THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN NAHRIN 199 effective they really were. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
People said that although bribery still went on in the local administration, it was less prevalent than before. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Younger and much more energetic, he was a Pashtun from Kunar who had attended the Teacher Training College in Jalalabad. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
It did not repeat the mistake Amanullah made when he reduced both the size of the army and its pay (Poullada 1973:76). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
PREVAILING IDEAS ABOUT HOW ISLAM FIGURES IN AFGHANISTAN POLITICS called “mullahs”—have had a great deal of influence on traditional affairs in Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Studies of Afghanistan’s political history fre- quently mention the significant role that religious authorities have exerted in the country’s affairs.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Most analysts of Afghanistan social affairs have noted their social and political influence. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The term “Islamic coalition” implies a certain alignment of It has long been accepted that Islamic authorities—commonly ISLAMIC COALITIONS IN BAMYAN: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ISLAMIC COALITIONS Robert L. Canfield Chapter 9 211 Elphinstone reported that Meer Wauez, a mullah, had become so popular with the Afghans that he used his influence to dethrone Shah Mahmood (1972, vol. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
More than half a century later, Sultan Muhammad Khan wrote the following: At the time of the accession of the present Amir [‘Abdur Rahman] to the throne of Kabul, he found the most arbitrary and fantastic powers being exercised in the administration of the state by the clergy of Islam. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Even though the social and political strength of the religious The three most important books on politics in Afghanistan have *In a recent shorter work R. Newell (1980) speaks more directly to the prob. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
ISLAMIC COALITIONS IN BAMYAN 213 number of anthropologists have written about politics in local or re- gional contexts,* but few have had much to say about religious or sectarian groupings on the local or regional level.t Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
I shall emphasize that the Islamic coalition is one type of social unit that bears upon local affairs in Afghanistan and so acts— at least in certain contexts—as a political force. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Islamic co- alitions like those in Bamyan seem to be an important type of orga- nizational structure through which many of these local groups have coalesced in order to resist the Marxist Afghan government and its *See L. Dupree (1976a) for a comprehensive review covering most anthropo- logical studies done in Afghanistan up to 1976. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Because craft guilds have had an influence on political affairs elsewhere (see Miner 1965), I assume that they do in Afghanistan as well. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
kind of organization. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The approach will be causal-functional: we want to examine the organizational features of Islamic coalitions in Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
•The Imami pirs of Afghanistan were sometimes called mujtahids (learned enough to make innovative interpretations), but most people acknowlçdged that they were not true mujtahids; all of the true mujtahids, people told me, were in Iraq and Iran. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
I ISLAMIC COALITIONS IN BAMYAN 221 tions—that is, the Sunni, Isma’ili, and Imami sect groupS. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The maximal unit of Islamic coalition in Bamyan was the sect. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
term that the resistance groups in Afghanistan now use in referring to themselves: mujahidin. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
There are, in fact, some newcomers to the study of Afghanistan who have taken the muja- hidin to be disagreeable and undesirable in ways suggested by our word “fanatic.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Another, cited as an authority on contemporary Afghanistan, is quoted as saying that the Afghan resistance fighters “are medieval.... Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Freedom is a cause for which an honorable person may justifiably kill and die. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
freedom fighters has the merit of capturing well for the Western mind a dimension of the moral sensibility of the people of Afghani- stan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
hidin as freedom fighters. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
ready in evidence as early as the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries; Hugh Beattie has pointed out that it was implicit in the position of Marsiglio of Padua (per. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
sonal communication). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
THE INTRINSIC UNITY OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS CONCERNS separable from political and material interests. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
As noted, in the Islamic coalition political and social ideals are merged. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Western biases tend to mask that fact, so Westerners may miss the full range of moral impli- cations entailed in Afghanistan’s Islamic coalitions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
We do not know much about how the peoples of Afghanistan ISLAMIC COALITIONS AS ORGANIZATIONS FOR ISLAMIC COALITIONS IN BAMYAN GRASS-ROOTS RESISTANCE 229 ETHNICITY AND CLASS: DIMENSIONS OF INTERGROUP Few reports of events in the north-central region of Afghanistan have appeared since the Soviet invasion of 1979, but they all indicate that resistance there has been as strong and implacable as anywhere in the country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In the absence of specific information, I shall suggest the probable reactions of the local population to the 1978 Saur Revo- lution, on the one hand, and to an increasing Soviet presence, on the other. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
CONFLICT IN NORTH-CENTRAL AFGHANISTAN Chapter 10 Richard Tapper 230 if not as classes; classes, inherently stratified and unequal in terms of power, acquire cultural and ideological attributes and may be per- ceived by members in ethnic terms. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
the extent that all members of a particular class are considered to have common ethnic origins, or all members of a particular ethnic group have a similar class position (relation to the means of produc- tion). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Higher mountain chains lie further to the south in the provinces of Ghor and Bamyan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Persian-speakers with no other tribal or ethnic affiliations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Then large numbers of nomads began arriving from the west and southwest, ousting Arab and Turkmen pastoralists from the local grazing lands. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The year 1400 (A.H.) Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RICHARD TAPPER 246 SOUTHERN AFGHAMSTAN PART V WESTERN AND A STUDY OF INDIGENOUS AUTHORITY AND FOREIGN RULE Islam in rural Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
While the resettlement was partially successful and some of the Durrani nomads took up cultivation in the northern regions (N. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
By no means are such relations between nomads and the central state unique to Afghanistan, of course. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
BAHRAM TAVAKOLIAN 254 Similarly, Stauffer (1965), Salzman (1971), and Irons (1974) discuss the economic and political controls exercised by the central state over the pastoral nomadic populations of Iran, and Cole (1975) de- scribes the relationship between Al Murrah Bedouin and the Saudi Arabian state. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Foreign—i.e., Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These institutions are more typical of many Afghan villages, as well as of many of the nomadic populations of Iran. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Were the institutions of secular authority more firmly en- As I have stressed, the merger of indigenous religious and SHEIKIIANZAI NOMADS AND THE AFGHAN STATE 265 mobilizing political action in Afghanistan which often remain opaque in more strictly political analyses. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
That conjunction is found in mediations of Islam through shari’at (law, in the keeping of ‘ulama or religious scholars), tariqat (spiritual exemplars, often Sufi), and qawm (tribe, and more generally relations of codescent). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Durrani restoration under Nadir Shah was initially supported by Ahmadzai Ghilzai, some of whom had been punished with exile to northern Afghanistan by Amanullah for taking part in a revolt against him in 1924; but Nadir’s claims were resisted by many Ghilzai. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM One means for securing Ghilzai acquiescence and diluting their Any such institutionalization in Afghanistan marks an initiation 271 within the ‘ulama, whose capacities are self-assumed and popularly, hence variably, acknowledged. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
While to be avghan (a Pakhtun tribesman) is to be Muslim, the reverse is not true, and the truth that one can still be Muslim provides the basis for critiquing Pakhtunness as sunnat in comparison to the mediation of Islam through learning and through personal identification with the divine. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The claim for a unique mediation of Islam, analytically speaking, is an identification of Pakhtunness with Islam, but it is limited by other mediations through shari’at and tariqat, which diminish a common sense of being “already” Muslim. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Given the relative rise of religious figures in the late nineteenth HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM Many tribesmen would prefer to dispense altogether with 281 Such claims mirror those of Sayyid and of pirzadah and akhundzadah families to a genetic legitimacy which parallels that claimed for qawm; on a more practical level, few mullahs practice in the place of their birth, and Ghilzai routinely take mullahs to have no Pakhtun ancestry, even though they speak Pakhto, because they do not “do Pakhto.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Clericalization is seen as a characteristically Shi’a heresy and a mark of religion gone bad. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
By their disjunctions, each competes with a tribalism set both in relation to other Muslims and in relation to non-Muslims. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Mediations of Islam through shari’at and tariqat differ from that JON W. ANDERSON 284 mediations of Islam rests on presuppositions about settings to which they are appropriate, and the problem is that none of these settings are mutually exclusive. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
While this pattern has never been stable, but rather has fluctuated, the HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM Not to put too fine a point on it, the differentiation of these Continuity with all politics is not only potential but has Such associations of shari’at with strife and of tariqat with 285 (ideally) complementary mediations to qawm seem to have emerged as something more like alternatives to it— shari’at through institutional estrangements from tribal settings and tariqat through estrangements of tribesmen on a personal level. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM 287 THE SAUR REVOLUTION AND THE AFGHAN WOMAN PART VI Revolutionary Council in Afghanistan, initiated a wide-ranging program of change and development. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE ABOLITION In 1978 the government of Nur M. Taraki, President of the *Th in a speech on 4 November 1978 President Taraki said that it was OF BRIDEPRICE IN AFGHANISTAN Chapter 13 Nancy Tapper 291 as a radical improvement from the legislators’ point of view, this perspective has many critics in the Third World and elsewhere. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
exchange of a woman in marriage for cash or kind and the payment of other prestations customarily due from a bridegroom on festive occasions; the third article sets an upper limit of 300 afs. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
1See the interesting discussion of earlier marriage reform in Afghanistan, the political background to Decree No. 7, and some of its implications for the posi- tion of Afghan women in N. Dupree (1981:1, 10-12). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Child marriage and intermarriage between close kin were outlawed as contrary to Islamic principles. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan: Only in July 1973, when the conservative nature of the Afghan constitution was one of the issues behind the coup d’etat which established Muhammad Daoud’s Afghan Republic, did there seem some chance of promulgating more substantial marriage reforms coupled with legal sanctions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, as elsewhere in the Muslim Middle East, the legal code relating to marriage and the family is based directly on the Shari’a or canon law of Islam, and reforms in this area have typically provoked extreme reactions, explicitly in the defense of Islamic principles. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
However, it would seem that the relation between reform legislation and Islamic fundamentalism actually works the other way around. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The strength of the reaction clearly depends on the impor- tance of the institutions of marriage and the family in the regulation of daily living and the extent to which they are threatened. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF ABOLITION OF BRIDEPRICE AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON MARRIAGE PAYMENTS It has long been accepted by anthropologists that marriage Such a perspective on brideprice and marriage gifts is particularly In this context see especially N. Dupree (1981).* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Marriage arrangements can be delayed or exchanges arranged; men of any household can find brides and need not incur further debt to do so. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Yet contradictions between religion, custom, and reform have plagued the feminist movement in Afghanistan since its inception. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF ABOLITION OF BRIDEPRICE Marriage reforms such as Decree No. 7 attack symptoms, not In the longer term, however, the underlying goals of -the CONCLUSIONS 305 reform for women for a hundred years. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Women should also take part as women did in the early years of Islam. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
But very few women spoke out publicly on the subject. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In 1968 conservative members 309 at the legs of women in Western dress and splashing them with acid. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
These first demonstra- tions by women were early indications that a women’s consciousness S was developing—an initial statement that women should be considered a viable force with potential leadership. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Hundreds of demonstrating girls vociferously brought their constitutional guarantee of equal rights to the atten- tion of the parliamentarians. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Positions of responsibility and power were occasionally offered to women, but disproportion- ately to the female work force. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Taraki on 1 January 1965. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
with the people of Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On the night of 24 December 1979, they airlifted many thousands of troops into Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
On 1 October 1979 a fifty-eight-member Constitution Drafting In any case the efforts toward emancipation proved purely The country slid rapidly into chaos. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In a desperate attempt to lncluding Suraya (former president of the DOAW and a cousin of Babrak’s) NANCY HATCH DUPREE 326 invaded. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
against the Afghan revolution and disinterested assistance of the Soviet Union to Afghanistan” (Kabul New Times, 3/9/80). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The use of the DOAW for disseminating political propaganda continued to be prominent, but the DRA stressed the following: One important criterion of a progressive regime is the efforts it makes to ensure equality between males and females.... Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
but men used women as second-rate citizens and did not allow them to acquire knowledge and therefore women are not aware of their rights (Editorial, Kabul New Times, 3/16/80)i *From its inception the DRA attempted to identify the Afghan women’s movement with the world-wide women’s socialist movement. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
NANCY HATCH DUPREE 330 However, in May 1980 Dr. Anahita quoted some remarkable statistics: “At present, 500,000 have completed literacy training in 27,000 courses throughout the country. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The court, an inspiration of the late Justice Ghulam Ali Karimi in 1975 and one of the more positive accomplishments of the Afghan women’s movement, continued to function after the Saur Revolution. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
honor took more drastic forms. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC AND AFGHAN WOMEN Legend and fact combine in the accounts of women in the resis- The innate courage of Afghan women has been exemplified in When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains And the women come out to cut up what remains, An’ go to your Gawd like a soldier 335 to flee arrest while they remain behind to sell property and wind up other affairs. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
And so can Afghanistan!” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
positions, the Babrak regime offers women only token representa- tion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
of Representatives of the Women of Kabul City was organized by the DOAW specifically “to organize the women of Afghanistan in de- fending the revolution.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
A major objective of this conference was “to further expand the closed ranks of militant women in the country.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In addition, it elected representatives to a nationwide conference on Afghanistan’s women. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
After reiterating the party’s duty to implement the DRA’s Fundamental Principles, it continued: “Under the present circum- stances the training of sacrificing and firm adherents to . Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Her long, long speech included fulsome thanks to Karmal and the PDPA/CC for their sup- port of the women’s movement, gratitude for “the aid of the brother- ly people of the Soviet Union,” and quotes from Brezhnev on the “victories gained” by Babrak’s visit to the USSR.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE ON UNITY AND SOLIDARITY We have decided to: Promote the role of Afghanistan’s women in defense of the gains of the Saur1. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
August. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Ministry of Planning. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Amin, Abdul Rasul. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Anthropos 70: 575-601. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Tapper, ed. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Relations in Contemporary Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
New York: Asia Society, Afghanistan Council. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
“Islam Finds Marxism Wanting.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Anis (Kabul). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Occasional Paper no. 15. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Anthropological Quarterly 44, 3: 109.31. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Various issues. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
D.C. Heath and Co. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Middle Eastern Studies 5, 1: 10-30. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
London: Macmillan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Pathans; 550 BC-AD 1957. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
1965. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Caroe, 0. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Dupree, Louis. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
76. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
L” AUFS Reports, Asia, no. 1. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
A UFS Reports, Asia, no. 14. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
__________- 1980h. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Dupree, Nancy Hatch. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Asia Society, Afghanistan Council. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Editors of Mirror of Jehad (Peshawar). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan: Past and Present. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Austin: University of Texas Press. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Eickelman, D. F. 1976. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Folk 4: 123-59. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Primitive Polynesian Economy. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Firth, R. 1950. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
New York: Garland STMP. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Bibliography 361 _________ 1980a. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Hammond, Thomas T. 1984. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Foreign Policy 32. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Hikmatyar, Gulbudin. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan under Soviet Domination. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan: Onward March of the Revolution. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Ilyinsky, Mikhail. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
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Islami Afghanistan (JIA). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Hindukush: Selected Papers from the Hindu-Kush Cultural Conference Held at Moesg~rd 1970. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Men of Influence in Nuristan: A Study of Social Control and Dispute Settlement in Waigal Valley, Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Asia and Africa Today 3: 15-18. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Keddie, Nikki, ed. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
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London: Murray. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Rudyard Kipling’s Verse. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
New York: Pica. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
New York: St. Martin’s Press. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Forthcoming. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Marriage. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Ethnicity and Economic Development: East and West. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Stanford: Stanford University Press. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Bibliography 365 Moore, Barrington, Jr. 1966. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
The Politics of Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
“Revolution and Revolt in Afghanistan.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
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Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni- versity Press. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Report submitted to government of Afghanistan and UNICEF by Compagnie d’Etude Industrielle et d’Amenagement du Territoire (CINAM), KabuL Pullapilly, Cyriak K, ed. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Islami Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s Uncertain Future. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan Forum Newsletter 12, 1: 2. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Peshawar: Jamiat-i Islami. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Bibliography 367 ________ 1975. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
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The Mongols of Afghanistan: An Ethnography of the Mongols and Related People in Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Naples: Istituto Universitario Orientale. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Shah, Iqbal Au. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
London: Diamond. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Shahrani, M. Nazif. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
“Central Asian Emigres in Afghanistan: Social Dy- namics of Identity Creation.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
_________- 1979b “Central Asian Emigres in Afghanistan: Problems of Reli- gious and Ethnic Identity.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
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Occasional Paper no. 19. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Bibliography 368 _________- 1984. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Area Handbook for Afghanistan, 4th ed. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
1971 Fire in Afghanistan, 1914-1929: Faith, Hope and the British Empire. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
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Journal of Asian Studies 35, 4: 712-13. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
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In Anderson and Strand, eds., pp. 9-14. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Complex Marriage System.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Northern Afghanistan.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Gebieten Afghanistans. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Bibliography 370 Valenta, Jiri. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
“Network Analysis.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Afghanistan: Nicht aus Heiterem Himmel. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
“Legal Elites in Afghan Society.” Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Bibliography 371 el-Zein, A.H.M. 1974. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
In Persian and Pashto. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Journal published in Wiesbaden, Germany, by Hizb-i Islaini. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Bibliography 373 Absarinas, 186, 197 Abu Bakr, 150 Adi,Ghazi,313 Afandi, 33n Afghan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Nuristan, 79; among religious func- Dan, 38, 65, 84, 92, 239, 313, 321 tionaries, 280; during Republic of Darra-i Nur, 52, 119-35, 224n Afghanistan, 59, 63; among Sheik- Darwaz, 145, 153, 157, 167 hanzai, 260, 262; in VygaI Valley, Dastigir, Ghulam, 91 102-8passim Dawa, 243 Cotton, 171n Coup d’e’tat of 1973. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See Daoud, Mu- Debts, loans, interest rates, 12-14, 147, hammad; Republic of Afghanistan 179, 18 7-88, 291, 293-96, 298-99, Coup d’e’tat of 1978. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See also 377 25 2-53; significance of recourse to, da against, 200-201; and leftist op- Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW), 314-15, 317, 320, 329-30, 336-39 passim Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA): and land redistribution, 18- 20; and opposition, 66, 68-69, 249, 263, 264; organization of, 62; pro- paganda of, 63,313-14,329; reform policies of, 12 65, 264, 312, 316, 322-26, 330, 338; repressions of, 63. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See Democratic Republic of Af- ghanistan Dukandar, 238 Durand Line, 101 Durrani (Pashtun tribe), 58, 225n, 235- 45 passim, 249-65, 269-70, 273, 298-305 Durrani, Abmad Shah, 263, 313 Durrani, Aisha, 313 Ecology, 128, 145, 232,237, 252, 256, 262, 265 Economic behavior. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See also Amanullah, Amir, PDPA sinii- larities to; Bureaucracy; Government officials; Kabul among, 38, 50, 79, 102, 105-6, 123- 25, 262; and foreign aid, 37; and Khalq-Parcham policies, 24, 43, 88, 134, 161, 198-202; as oppressors of local populations, 22; in provincial administration, 102-3, 105-7, 123- 25, 172-75, 242; reigiousdignitanies in role of, 27 1-72, 281 dence, 32; and Afghan women, 335n; and Anglo-Afghan Wars, 57, 71, 228, 268, 272, 313; as enemy of Kbalq, 69n, 201; intrigues in Afghanistan, 31, 78, 201n; and role of Islam, 270, 274-75, 283-84 Guerrillas. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See Resistance “Gujanistan,” 90 Gujars, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 186 Gui Muhammad, 89, 90 Gulran, 251, 252 Gurziwan, 232 Habibiyah High School, 156 Habibullah, Amir (1901-19), 190, 221, 252, 294, 306, 307 Habibullah Ghazi. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
45 Hashimi, Mansur, 154.56, Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See Jihad Holy war fighters. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See Medical services Hotak, Mw Ways, 313 Index Hotaki (Pashtun tribe), 236 Hujwini, 217 Hukumat, 13n, 99, 100 Hungary, 70 Ibrahim Beg, 204 Ibtidaiya, 153, 154 Id-i Qurban, 202, 258 Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Afghan Muslim Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Egyptian Islamic Il be gi, 173 Imam, 220, 221n Imaini, 145, 216, 220, 221, 222. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Khalq-Parchani policies of, 179-83, 195-206, 320-26;underMusahibans, 34-35, 176-79; provincial adminis- tration before 1978, 170-76; rela- tionship with rural populations, 7-8, 68, 123-25, 236, 242; relationship with rural populations: Badakhshan, 141-44,147-49, 151-52;relationship with rural populations: Nuristan, 79, 94, 97-118; relationship with rural populations: Sheikhanzai no- mads, 249-53, 257, 262-63; and resistance movement, 9-10, 121-23, 161, 163-65, 245-46, 264-65; and role of Islam, 31, 34-35, 151-52, 212, 224-25, 268-72, 281, 285. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See Mujahidin Honor, 67, 181, 191, 276, 299, 300- 301, 305, 307, 310, 323, 333-34 Hospitals. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Pakistan: Afghan refugees in, 72, 89, 385 331 23 1-40 passim; herding activities of, 130-3 1, 145,173-74; and Khalq-Par- cham land reforms, 20; in resistance movement, 141; sedentarization of, 15, 185n 275, 283, 284, 286 206, 225n. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See also Afghan Milat; Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami; Hizb-i Isiami; Itihadi Islami Baray Azadyi Afghanistan; Itihadi Islami Mujahidini Afghanistan; Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan; Khalq; Mahaz-i Milli Islami;MuslimYouth;National Liberation Front; National United Front; Parcham; Sazrnani Azadi- bakhsh-i Marduin-i Afghanistan; Shu’la-i Jawid; Sitaini Milli Popalzai (Pashtun tribe), 236 Press, 27, 200 Price controls, 23, 199, 203. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
See also Disputes; Ethnic groups; Feuds; Islamic coalitions; Leaders; Resistance; Symbols; Tribes Political parties, 45, 46, 48, 91, 178, 213, 273, 318-20. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Refugees, 6n, 50, 72, 143-44, 160, 164, 167 Religion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Rural populations: agrarian relations Sada’iNuristan, 92 Safi (Pashtun tribe): alliance with Darra-i Nur peoples, 121, 122; and Kabul Conference (December 1980), 337n; living conditions of, 97; re- lations with government of, 101, 106-12; relations with Kalasba of, 101, 109, 113, 118; relations with Mir Beg, 120; revolt among, 100, 164 Saint. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
‘S “Rashidcombinesclosejournalisticfieldexperiencewiththe Taliban and long-term knowledge of Afghanistan in this work of great depth andunderstanding.”—BarnettR. Taliban
‘S Preface and Acknowledgements Maps Introduction: Afghanistan’s Holy Warriors Part 1: History of the Taliban Movement Chapter 1 Kandahar 1994: The Origins of the Taliban Chapter 2 Herat 1995: God’s Invincible Soldiers Chapter 3 Kabul 1996: Commander of the Faithful Chapter 4 Mazar-e-Sharif 1997: Massacre in the North Chapter 5 Bamiyan 1998—2000: The Never-Ending War Part 2: Islam and the Taliban Chapter 6 Challenging Islam The New-Style Fundamentalism of the Taliban Chapter 7 Secret Society: The Taliban’s Political and Military Organization CONTENTS vu XIII 1 17 31 41 55 67 82 95 vi Chapter 8 A Vanished Gendev Women, Children and Taliban Culture Chapter 9 High on Heroin: Drugs and the Taliban Economy Chapter 10 Global Jihad: The Arab-Afghans and Osama Bin Laden Part 3: The New Great Game Chapter 11 Dictators and Oil Barons: The Taliban and Central Asia~ Russia, Turkey and Israel Chapter 12 Romancing the Taliban 1: The Battle for Pipelines 1994-9~ Chapter 13 Romancing the Taliban 2: The Battle for Pipelines 1997-99 - The USA and the Taliban Chapter 14 Master or Victim: Pakistan’s Afghan War Chapter 15 Shia and Sunni: Iran and Saudi Arabia Chapter 16 Conclusion: The Future of Afghanistan Appendices Notes Index ~NTENTS ‘S p 105 117 128 143 157 170 183 196 207 217 248 266 This book has been 21 years in the writing - about as long as I have covered Afghanistan as a reporter. Taliban
Why Afghanistan? Anyone who has been touched by an Afghan or visited the country in peace or in war, will understand when I say the country and the people are amongst the most extraordinary on earth. Taliban
For me, luck has also played a role in my relationship with Afghanistan. Taliban
I was determined to write a book after spending several months in Geneva covering the excruciating UN sponsored negotiations in 1988, which ended with the Geneva Accords and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Taliban
But Afghanistan always drew me back. Taliban
I should have written another book in 1992 when I spent a month dodging bullets in Kabul as the regime of President Najibullah collapsed and the city fell to the Mujaheddin. Taliban
For years I was the only Pakistani journalist covering Afghanistan ser- iously, even though the war was next door and Afghanistan sustained Pakistan’s foreign policy and kept the military regime of General Zia ul Haq in power. Taliban
If there was another abiding interest, it was my conviction as early as 1982 that Islamabad’s Afghan policy would play a critical role in Pakistan’s future national security, domestic politics and create an Islamic fundamentalist backlash at home. Taliban
Afghanistan, like the Afghans themselves, is a country of contradic- tions that are constantly played out for any reporter. Taliban
My interest in Afghanistan could not have been sustained without the help of many people, above all the Afghans. Taliban
Over the years the UN agencies and the non-governmental aid organ- izations have provided a home for me all over Afghanistan and have given me ideas, information and support. Taliban
At the UN Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan I owe many thanks to its successive chiefs, Martin Barber, Aifredo Witschi-Cestari and Erick de Mul and to Brigette Neubacher, who has been in the Afghan business almost as long as I have. Taliban
At the UN Special Mission for Afghanistan many thanks are due to Francis Okelo, James Ngobi, Hiroshi Takahashi, Arnold Schifferdecker and Andrew Tesoriere and at the UN in New York, Benon Sevan and Andrew Gilmour. Taliban
At the International Committee of the Red Cross, Thomas Gurtner and Oliver Durr, at Acted aid agency Frederick Rousseau lxPREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS X and Marie Pierre Caley and at Save the Children Andrew Wilder and Sofie Elieussen. Taliban
For 16 years I have reported on Afghanistan for the Far Eastern Eco- nomic Review and I owe my editors, especially Nayan Chanda, enormous thanks for giving me space in the magazine, travel funds and sustaining an interest in running stories from what has now become an obscure war on the edge of Asia. Taliban
The former foreign editor V.0. Kulkarni took a huge risk when he convinced sceptical bosses that my 1997 story on the oil and gas pipeline battle in Afghanistan and Central Asia was worthy of a cover story. Taliban
My thanks to the Daily Telegraph’s successive foreign editors Nigel Wade, Patrick Bishop and Stephen Robinson for not totally forgetting about Afghanistan. Taliban
In Pakistan, Arif Nizami, editor of the Nation has stood by me as I wrote reams on Afghanistan. Taliban
This could not have been accomplished without the enormous support and friendship — not to speak of the website — of Bamett Rubin, who knows more about Afghanistan than anyone I know. Taliban
I owe heartfelt thanks to the Afghanistan brigade of scholars, journalists and human rights activists who like me cannot leave the story and from whom I have learnt so much — Olivier Roy, Nancy Hatch Dupree, Ashraf Ghani, William Maley, Anders Fange, Citha Maass, Eqbal Ahmad, Patti Gossman, Abbas Faiz, Steve Levine, Tony Davis, Edward Giradet, Sadao Sakai, Tim McGirk, Bob Nicklesberg, Maleeha Lodhi, Rahimullah Yousufzai, Leslie Cockburn, Francois Chipaux, Jennifer Griffin and Gretchen Peters. Taliban
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book could not have been written without the patience, love and understanding of my wife Angeles and my two children, who have put up with my wanderings and absences and have shared my feelings for Afghanistan for a long time. Taliban
It was March 1997 and for two and a half years Kandahar had been the capital of the fierce Taliban Islamic warriors, who had conquered two-thirds of Afghanistan and were now battling to conquer the rest of the country. Taliban
A handful of Taliban had fought the Soviet Red Army in the 1980s, more had fought the regime of President Najibullah who had hung on to power for four years after Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, but the vast majority had never fought the commun- ists and were young Koranic students, drawn from hundreds of rnad’rassas (Islamic theology schools) that had been set up in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. Taliban
Since their dramatic and sudden appearance at the end of 1994, the Taliban had brought relative peace and security to Kandahar and neigh- bouring provinces. Taliban
Heavy-set Pashtun tribesmen with long 2 ‘~ TALIBAN accounts for some 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s 20 million people, had also galvanized Pashtun nationalism. Taliban
‘This is not exactly going to encourage the international community to give more funds for aid projects in Afghanistan. Taliban
One pick-up sprouted a tinny sounding loudspeaker — the kind seen on thousands of mosques in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Taliban
Abdullah Afghan, a young man in his early 20s had allegedly stolen medicines from Abdul Wali, a farmer who lived in their common village near Kandahar. Taliban
A mixture of fear, acceptance, total exhaustion and devastation after years of war and more than 1.5 Taliban
Yet the Taliban have inadvertendy set a new agenda for Islamic radic- alism in the entire region, sending shock waves through Afghanistan’s neighbours. Taliban
In the post-Cold War era, this has created unprecedented polarization across the region. Taliban
At the heart of this regional stand-off is the battle for the vast oil and INTRODUCTiON: APOHANISTAN’S HOLY WARRIORS 5 6 TALIBAN gas riches of landlocked Central Asia - the last untapped reserves of energy in the world today. Taliban
The executive was Carlos Buigheroni, Chairman of Bridas Corporation, an Argentinean oil company which since 1994 had been secretly negotiat- ing with the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to build the same gas pipeline across Afghanistan. Taliban
But both Bridas and Unocal had kept a discreet silence. Taliban
For Afghanistan to be at the centre of such conflict is nothing new. Taliban
Today’s Taliban are only the latest in a long line of conquerors, warlords, preachers, saints and philosophers who have swept through the Afghan corridor destroying older civilizations and religions and introducing new ones. Taliban
Afghanistan’s geo-strategic location on the crossroads between Iran, the Arabian Sea and India and between Central Asia and South Asia has given its territory and moun- tain passes a significance since the earliest Aryan invasions 6,000 years ago. Taliban
Many years ago a wise old Afghan Mujahed once told me the mythical story of how God made Afghanistan. Taliban
He collected them all together and threw them down on to the earth. Taliban
Modern Afghanistan encompasses 245,000 square miles. Taliban
West- ern and southern Afghanistan marks the eastern end of the Iranian plat- eau — flat, bare and arid with few towns and a sparse population. Taliban
With its extremes of climate and terrain the north’s Turkic peoples are some of the toughest in the world and make the fiercest of fighters. Taliban
Only 10—12 per cent of Afghanistan’s terrain is cultivable and most farms, some hanging from mountain slopes, demand extraordinary amounts of labour to keep them productive. Taliban
Roads and routes have been at the centre of Afghanistan since the dawn of history. Taliban
The landlocked territory was the crossroads of Asia and the meeting place and battleground for two great waves of civilization, the more urbane Persian empires to the west and the Turkic nomadic empires to the north in Central Asia. Taliban
For these two ancient civilizations, which ebbed in greatness and con- quest according to the momentum of history, control over Afghanistan was vital for their survival. Taliban
At other times Afghanistan served as a buffer keeping these two empires apart, while at other times it served as a cor- ridor through which their armies marched north to south or west to east when they desired to invade India. Taliban
It was through Afghanistan that pilgrims and traders working the ancient Silk Route carried Buddhism to China and Japan. Taliban
In 329 BC the Macedonian Greeks under Alexander the Great conquered Afghanistan and Central Asia and went on to invade India. Taliban
By 654 AD Arab armies had swept through Afghanistan to arrive at the Oxus river on the border with Central Asia. Taliban
They brought with them their new religion of Islam, which preached equality and justice and quickly penetrated the entire region. Taliban
This fusion of Central Asian and Persian culture was a major legacy for the future of Afghanistan. Taliban
By the sixteenth century western Afghanistan again reverted to Persian rule under the Safavid dynasty. Taliban
Western Afghanistan was dominated by speakers of Persian or Dan as the Afghan Persian dialect is known. Taliban
Dan was also spoken by the Hazaras in central Afghanistan, who were converted to Shiism by the Persians, thereby becoming the largest Shia group in an otherwise Sunni territory. Taliban
It was the southern Pashtuns who were to form the modern state of Afghanistan at the historical conjuncture when the Persian Safavid dyn- asty in the west~ the Moguls in India and the Uzbek Janid dynasty were all in a period of decline in the eighteenth century. Taliban
By 1761 Ahmad Shah I)urrani had defeated the Hindu Mahrattas and captured the Delhi throne and Kashmir, thereby creating the first Afghan empire. Taliban
Considered the father of the Afghan nation, Ahmad Shah Durrani was buried in an ornate mausoleum in his capital Kandahar, where Afghans still come to pray. Taliban
However, one or another Durrani clan was to rule Afghanistan for over 200 years until 1973, when King Zahir Shah was deposed by his cousin Mohammed Daud Khan and Afghanistan was declared a Republic. Taliban
In the next century the Durranis were to lose their territories east of the Indus river while feuds between various Durrani clans dissipated their power. Taliban
In the nineteenth century, fearful of an ever expanding Russian empire in Cent- ral Asia which might covet Afghanistan for a thrust against Britain’s Indian empire, the British made three attempts to conquer and hold Afghanistan until they realised that the intractable Afghans could be bought much more easily than fought. Taliban
The weakened and bickering Durrani kings had to hold off two new empires, the British in the east and the Russians to the north. Taliban
Abdul Rebman crushed over 40 revolts by the non-Pashtuns during his reign and created Afghanistan’s first brutal secret police force, a precursor to the communist Khad in the 1980s. Taliban
Although these moves integrated Afghans of all ethnic groups and solidified the Afghan state as never before, much of the subsequent ethnic tensions in northern Afghanistan and the inter-ethnic massacres after 1997 can be traced back to the Iron Amir’s policies. Taliban
Afghanistan was declared a Republic and Daud ruled as president. Taliban
But the communists were bitterly divided into two factions, Khalq (the masses) and Parcham (the flag) and their lack of understanding of Afghanistan’s complex tribal society led to widespread rural revolts against them. Taliban
The jihad took on a new momentum as the USA, China and Arab states poured in money and arms supplies to the Mujaheddin. Taliban
It’s an old wooden stump. Taliban
The Soviet Union poured some US$5 billion a year into Afghanistan to subdue the I Mujaheddin or a total of US$45 billion — and they lost. Taliban
By chance I was in Kandahar in December 1979 and watched the first Soviet tanks roll in. Taliban
The contradictions within the Pashtun Mujaheddin leadership were to weaken the Pashtuns as the war progressed. Taliban
Kandahar is Afghanistan’s second largest city with a 1979 pre-war population of about 250,000 and twice that today. Taliban
Next to his tomb is the shrine of the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed — one of the holiest places of worship in Afghanistan. Taliban
Much of Afghanistan’s sub- sequent civil war was to be determined by the fact that Kabul fell, not to the well-armed and bickering Pashtun parties based in Peshawar, but to the better organized and more united Tajik forces of Burhanuddin Rab- bani and his military commander Ahmad Shah Masud and to the Uzbek forces from the north under General Rashid Dostum. Taliban
Afghanistan was in a state of virtual disintegration just before the Tali- ban emerged at the end of 1994. Taliban
In central Afghanistan the Hazaras controlled the province of Bamiyan. Taliban
Southern Afghanistan and Kandahan were divided up amongst dozens of petty ex-Mujaheddin warlords and bandits who plundered the population at wilL With the tribal structure and the economy in tatters, no consensus on a Pashtun leadership and Pakistan’s unwillingness to provide military aid to the Durranis as they did to Hikmetyar, the Pashtuns in the south were at war with each other. Taliban
After much discussion these divergent but deeply concerned groups chalked out an agenda which still remains the Taliban’s declared aims — restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan. Taliban
Pakistan’s Afghan policy was in the doldrums. Taliban
Some 20 per cent of the Pakistan army was made up of Pakistani Pashtuns and the pro- Pashtun and Islamic fundamentalist lobby within the IS! Taliban
However, before that meeting a major event had shaken the Kandahar warlords. Taliban
After a short, sharp battle they fled, losing seven dead and sev- eral wounded. Taliban
In just a couple of weeks this unknown force had captured the second largest city in Afghanistan with the loss of just a dozen men. Taliban
In Islamabad no foreign diplomat or analyst doubted that they had received consider- able support from Pakistan. Taliban
The Taliban cleared the chains from the roads, set up a one-toll system for trucks entering Afghanistan at Spin Baldak and patrolled the highway from Pakistan. Taliban
Meanwhile thousands of young Afghan Pashtuns studying in Bal- uchistan and the NWFP rushed to Kandahar to join the Taliban. Taliban
‘We have no favourites in Afghanistan and we do not interfere in Afghanistan,’ she said while visiting Manila.’5 Taliban
As international and domestic pressure mounted on Pakistan to explain its position, Bhutto made the first formal denial of any Pakistani backing of the Taliban in February 1995. Taliban
Later she said Pakistan could not stop new recruits from crossing the border to join the Taliban. Taliban
These boys were from a generation who had never seen their country at peace — an Afghanistan not at war with invaders and itself. Taliban
They had no memories of the past, no plans for the future while the present was everything. Taliban
Hikmetyar had allied with the Uzbek warlord General Rashid Dostum in the north and the Hazaras of central Afghanistan who held a portion of KabuL Pakistan had helped broker the new alliance as Hikme- tyar was still Islamabad’s clear favourite and at the beginning of the year he had received large quantities of Pakistani-supplied rockets to bombard the capital. Taliban
Appeals for a cease-fire by the UN Special Representative for Afghanistan, the Turn- sean diplomat Mehmoud Mestiri, were ignored as Masud and the Taliban now confronted each other. Taliban
Ismael Khan was an officer in the Afghan army when the Russi- ans invaded Afghanistan and he had strong Islamic and nationalist lean- ings. Taliban
Fearing no resistance, the Soviets developed the Shindanci airbase as their largest airbase in Afghanistan and allowed the families of their army officers to settle in Herat. Taliban
Herat was the cradle of Afghanistan’s history and civilization. Taliban
For centuries the city was the crossroads between the competing Turkic and Persian empires and its population was an early convert to Islam. Taliban
When Byron saw it in 1937, he described it as ‘the most beautiful example in colour in architecture ever devised by man to the glory of God and himself.’5 Taliban
TALIBAN west and central Afghanistan had arrived in the city. Taliban
It was the biggest gathering of mullahs and ulema that had ever taken place in modern Afghan history. Taliban
‘The Taliban cannot take Kabul nor can Masud take Kanda- har. Taliban
To patch over their differences, the core group of Kandaharis around Mullah Omar nominated him to become the ‘Amir-ul Momineen’ or ‘Commander of the Faithful’, an Islamic title that made him the undis- puted leader of the jihad and the Emir of Afghanistan. Taliban
(The Taliban were later to rename the country as the Emirate of Afghanistan). Taliban
This oath of allegiance or ‘baiat’ was a procedure similar to when Caliph Omar was confirmed as leader of the Muslim community in Arabia after the death of the Prophet Mohammed. Taliban
But the ulema meeting had deliberately not come to any decisions on the much more sensitive questions on how the Taliban planned to rule Afghanistan and what if anything they planned for the country’s eco- nomic and social development. Taliban
In February all the opposition groups except for the Taliban agreed to set up a ten-man council to negotiate peace terms with Kabul, even as the Taliban continued to demand the surrender of the regime. Taliban
Islamabad’s failure to create a united front against Kabul, emboldened Rabbani further. Taliban
In April 1996 alone, the Taliban fired 866 rockets, killing 180 civilians, injuring 550 and destroying large tracts of the city — a repetition of Hikmetyar’s attacks in 1993—95. Taliban
The Taliban’s first and bloodiest act was to hang former President Naji- bullah, then aged 50, who had ruled Afghanistan from 1986 to 1992. Taliban
‘Pakistan is trying to subjugate Afghanistan and turn it into a colony by installing a puppet government. Taliban
Pakistan also launched a diplomatic shuttle in a bid to break Dostum away from Masud. Taliban
The cost of their victory however was the deepening ethnic and sectarian divide that was clearly dividing Afghanistan and polarizing the region. Taliban
Now we are in control of 22 provinces including KabuL Inshallah [God willingi] the whole of Afghanistan will fail into our hands. Taliban
Northern Afghanistan now appeared ready for the taking. Taliban
Although most of Afghanistan’s population is concentrated in the south and was now under Taliban control, 60 per cent of Afghanistan’s agricultural resources and 80 per cent of its former industry, mineral and gas wealth are in the north. Taliban
Ensconced during the winter in the Qila-e-Jhangi, the Fort of War, on the outskirts of Mazar, Dostum suddenly found himself promoted by neighbouring states and many Afghans as a saviour and the last hope against the Taliban. Taliban
He rose through the ranks to become the commander of the armoured corps that defended the Soviet supply line into Afghanistan from Hairatan port on the Amu Darya river. Taliban
Ali is believed to be buried in what has become Afghanistan’s most magnificent mosque and holiest site. Taliban
As the north- ern provinces fell one after another to this unlikely alliance of Pashtuns and Uzbeks from Malik’s power base in Faryab province, Dostum fled with 135 officers and men, first to Uzbekistan and then to Turkey. Taliban
Malik’s troops swiftly retook four northern provinces (Takhar, Faryab, Jowzjan and Sari Pul), which the Taliban bad captured only five days earlier and there was heavy fighting for control of three other northern provinces (Balkh, Samangan and Kunduz). Taliban
The Taliban were also forced to recruit increasing manpower from the Ghilzai Pashtun tribes of eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan. Taliban
Some 3,000 Russian troops on the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border, 25,000 Russian troops on the Tajikistan- Afghanistan border, Russian border guards in Turkmenistan and local army divisions all went on a high state of alert. Taliban
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan closed their borders with northern Afghanistan. Taliban
At Termez, Uzbek heli- copter gunships flew patrol as troops laid tank traps and fortified the bridge that crosses the Amu Darya river, which divides Afghanistan from Cent- ral Asia. Taliban
Russia offered to send ten battalions of troops to Kyrgyzstan after an appeal by Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, even though his country has no border with Afghanistan. Taliban
Russia and Kazakhstan organized an emergency meeting of the Ct~mmonwea1th of Independent States (CIS) to discuss the crists, where Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov promised ‘very tough and effective actions by Russia’, if the Taliban advanced fur- ther. Taliban
On 13 June 1997 they set up the ‘United Islamic and National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan’ and declared Mazar as their capital. Taliban
The country was now virtually split along north-south lines and also along Pashtun and non-Pashtun lines. Taliban
The Taliban leadership, unversed in UN procedures and even the UN Charter, proved to be the greatest obstacle. Taliban
They also accused the UN of being influ- enced by regional countries in blocking recognition of their government. Taliban
The Taliban apologized, but Western enthusiasm for funding aid to Afghanistan was dealt another blow. Taliban
After visiting 13 countries including Afghanistan between 14 August and 23 September, Brahimi’s conclusions were to mobilize greater international pressure on Afghanistan’s neighbours to stop aiding the belligerents. Taliban
In October Annan had set up a Group of Concerned Countries at the UN. Taliban
Braharni hoped that this forum would encourage Iran to talk to Pakistan as well as re-engage Washington in a search for peace. Taliban
Annan followed up these steps in mid-November with a blistering report on Afghanistan to the UN Security Council, in which for the first time he used uncompromisingly tough language accusing regional countries, especially Iran and Pakistan, of fomenting the conflict. Taliban
Too many groups in Afghanistan, warlords, terrorists, drug dealers and others, appear to have too much to gain from war and too much to lose from peace.’2° Taliban
After years of neglect, Afghanistan now appeared to feature on the international diplomatic agenda, but that did little to satisfy the Taliban who were determined to conquer the north and their opponents who were equalily determined to resist them. Taliban
Later in Tehran, Annan addressed the summit meeting of the Organiza- tion of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and bluntly criticized their apathy in trying to resolve the conflict. Taliban
The estimated 3-4 million Hazaras are the largest SJ~uia Muslim group in Afghanistan. Taliban
Women were now forced to spend all their time indoors, where not even sunlight could penetrate. Taliban
Despite these problems Brahimi attempted to set up a meeting between the Taliban and the anti-Taliban alliance. Taliban
Part of these preparations involved a fresh escalation with the UN. Taliban
Meanwhile the Taliban had persuaded Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to back them in another offensive to take the north. Taliban
‘If the attack on Afghanistan is Clinton’s personal decision, then he has done it to divert the world and the American people’s attention from that shameful White House affair that has proved Clinton is a liar and a man devoid of decency and honour,’ Omar said, in reference to the Monica Lewinsky affair. Taliban
UN offices in several towns were attacked by mobs. Taliban
The two Buddhas, Afghanistan’s greatest archaeological heritage, had stood for nearly 2,000 years and had withstood the assault of the Mongols. Taliban
For the Iranians the fall of Bamiyan was the last straw. Taliban
The Taliban’s confrontation with Iran had given Masud the time and space to regroup his forces and the remaining Uzbek and Hazara fighters, who had not surrendered. Taliban
These international frustrations resulted, on 8 December 1998, in the toughest UN Security Council Resolution on Afghanistan to date. Taliban
By the end of 1998 Annan spoke ominously of ‘the prospect of a deeper regionalization of the conflict’ where Afghanistan had become ‘the stage for a new version of the Great Game’.’9 Taliban
Brahimi’s resignation was followed by a much tougher reaction against the Taliban by die international community. Taliban
They car- ried out intensive bombing of civilian targets and slowly made headway towards Taloqan, the political headquarters of the NA. Taliban
There was also increasing hostility from neighboring countries to the Taliban’s expanding support to Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist movements. Taliban
Francesc Vendrell, a Spanish diplomat, was appointed as the new UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to Afghanistan on 18 January. Taliban
Several attempts by the UN and Organization of the Islamic Confer- ence (OIC) to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table failed. Taliban
Islam and the Part 2 Taliban Ramadan or giving zakat — an Islamic contribution to the poor — few Muslim peoples in the world observe the rituals and the piety of Islam with such regularity and emotion as the Afghans. Taliban
Traditionally Islam in Afghanistan has been immensely toler- ant — to other Muslim sects, other religions and modem lifestyles. Taliban
The civil war has divided Islamic sects and ethnic groups in a way that before was unimaginable to ordinary Afghans. Taliban
Traditional Islam in Afghanistan believed in minimum government, where state interference was as little and as far away as possible. Taliban
In medieval times Herat was the centre of Afghanistan’s rnadrassa system but from the seven- teenth century Afghan scholars travelled to Central Asia, Egypt and India to study at more renowned madrassas in order to join the ranks of the Islam was also deeply rooted in Afghanistan because Sharia law gov- erned the legal process until 1925, when King Amanullah first began to introduce a civil legal code and the state took on the role of training NEW STiLE FUNDAMENTALISM OF THE TALIBAN -~ 83 I slam has always been at the very centre of the lives of ordinary Afghan people. Taliban
The Sunni Hanafi creed is essentially non-hierarchial and decentral- ized, which has made it difficult for twentieth-century rulers to incorpor- ate its religious leaders into strong centralized state systems. Taliban
Both men were maulvis who had studied for a time at the Haqqania rnadrassa in Pakistan and then established their own madrassas inside Afghanistan. Taliban
Another moderating factor for Islam in Afghanistan was the enormous popularity of Sufism, the trend of mystical Islam, which originated in Central Asia and Persia. Taliban
The two main Sufi orders in Afghanistan of Naqshbandiyah and Qad- eriyah played a major role in uniting the anti-Soviet resistance as they provided a network of associations and alliances outside the Mujaheddin parties and ethnic groups. Taliban
Nevertheless one survivor, Sibghatullah Mujad- dccli, set up his own”resistance party in Peshawar, the Jabha-i Najat Miii Afghanis~n, National Liberation Front of Afghanistan, and became a TALIBAN fierce critic of the radical Islamic parties. Taliban
Leaders of these orders were equally prominent. Taliban
Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani, the head of the Qaderiyah order and related to ex-King Zahir Shah through marriage, set up the Mahaz-e-Milli, National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, in Peshawar. Taliban
Before the Taliban, Islamic extremism had never flourished in Afghanistan. Taliban
Within the Sunni tradition were the Wahabbis, followers of the strict and austere Wahabbi creed of Saudi Arabia. Taliban
Hikmetyar and Masud had both participated in an unsuccessful uprising against President Mohammed Daud in 1975. Taliban
Afghanistan’s Islamicists failed to resolve this dichotomy. Taliban
The Taliban interpretation of Islam, jthad and social transformation was an anomaly in Afghanistan because the movement’s rise echoed none of the leading Islamicist trends that had emerged through the anti-Soviet war. Taliban
They fitted nowhere in the Islamic spectrum of ideas and movements that had emerged in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1994. Taliban
It could be said that the degeneration and col- NEW STYLE FUNDAMENTALISM OF THE TALIBAN -~ 87 88 lapse of legitimacy of all three trends (radical Islamicism, Sufism and traditionalism) into a naked, rapacious power struggle created the ideolo- gical vacuum which the Taliban were to fill. Taliban
Babar was in search of a new Pashtun group which could revive Pashtun fortunes in Afghanistan and give access to Pakistani trade with Central Asia through southern Afghanistan and the JUl offered him that opportunity. Taliban
However in the 1993 elections the JUL allied itself with the winning Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto, thus becoming a part of the ruling coalition.’4 Taliban
Haq is still bitter about how he was ignored by the ISI for so long. Taliban
‘Before 1994 I did not know Mullah Omar because he had not studied in Pakistan, but those around him were all Haqqania students and came to see me frequently to discuss what to do. Taliban
He is also the principle organizer for recruiting Pakistani students to fight for the Taliban. Taliban
The JUl were to benefit immensely from their Taliban protégés. Taliban
after 1996, the Taliban made known their desire to become the sole rulers of Afghanistan without the participation of other groups. Taliban
During the jihad, the Mujaheddin leadership based in Peshawar was highly factionalized and personalised. Taliban
Pakistan only helped fuel this process of disunity. Taliban
There was a passionate desire for greater structural unity amongst the field commanders. Taliban
Ismael Khan organized the first meeting of field com- manders in Ghor province in July 1987, which was attended by some 1,200 commanders from across Afghanistan. Taliban
The Taliban’s apex decision-making body was the Supreme Shura which continued to be based in Kandahar, a city which Mullah Omar has left only once (to visit Kabul in 1996) and which he turned into the new power centre for Afghanistan. Taliban
Two other Shuras report to the Kandahar Shura. Taliban
Thus the Taliban were forced to draw upon new recruits from the Ghilzai tribes of eastern Afghanistan but the Taliban were not prepared to yield them political power or include them in the Kandahar Shura. Taliban
The Court appointed Islamic judges, Qazis, and Assistant Qazis in the provinces and once or twice a year assembled them all in Kandahar to discuss cases and the application of Sharia law. Taliban
In October 1998, the Taliban arrested over 60 people in Jalalabad, the largest city in eastern Afghanistan, claiming there was a coup attempt by ex-military officers loyal to General Shahnawaz Tanai, the Pashtun general who in 1990 had deserted Najibullah’s army and joined the Mujaheddin. Taliban
By 1998, the Kabul Shura was keen to moderate Taliban policies so that UN agencies could return to Afghanistan and greater international aid flow to the cities. Taliban
Twenty years of continuous warfare has destroyed Afghan civil society, the clan community and family struc- ture which provided an important cushion of relief in an otherwise harsh economic landscape. Taliban
There were huge swathes of rural Afghanistan where schools had been destroyed in the war and not A VANISHED GENDER -~ 107 108 a single one remained. Taliban
Whereas in the 1980s the war in Afghanistan attracted attention and aid, the moment the Soviets withdrew their troops in 1989, Afghanis- tan dropped off the radar screen of world attention. Taliban
In 1996 the UN had requested US$124 million for its annual humanit- arian aid programme to Afghanistan, but by the end of the year, it had only received US$65 million. Taliban
By 1999 the UN had drastically scaled down its request to just US$113 million. Taliban
In the words of scholar Bamett Rubin: ‘If the situation in Afghanistan is ugly today, it is not because the people of Afghanistan are ugly. Taliban
No woman, not even the poorest or most conservative wants the Taliban to rule Afghanistan,’ said Nasiba. Taliban
The Taliban leaders were all from the poorest, most conservative and least literate southern Pashtun provinces of Afghanistan. Taliban
The rest of Afghanistan was not even remotely like the south. Taliban
Afghan Pashtuns in the east, heavily influenced by Pakistani Pashtuns, were proud to send their girls to school and many continued to do so under the Taliban, by running village schools or sending their families to Pakistan. Taliban
Afghanistan’s cities were even more diverse. Taliban
The Taliban tightened the screws ever further. Taliban
Finally in July 1997 the Taliban insisted that all 35 UN and NGO agen- cies move out of their offices to one pre-selected compound at the destroyed Polytechnic building. Taliban
The Taliban also banned every conceivable form of entertainment, which in a poor, deprived country such as Afghanistan was always in short supply anyway. Taliban
One of Afghanistan’s foremost artists, Mohammed Mashal, aged 82, who was painting a huge mural showing 500 years of Herat’s history was forced to watch as the Taliban whitewashed over it. Taliban
Most Afghans felt demoralized by the fact that the Islamic world declined to take up the task of condemning the Taliban’s extremism. Taliban
We cannot be more grateful to the Taliban,’ said Wali Jan, a toothless, elderly farmer as he weeded his fields. Taliban
Between 1992 and 1995 Afghanistan had produced a steady 2200—2400 metric tonnes of opium every year, rivalling Burma as the world’s largest producer of raw opium. Taliban
In 1996 Afghanistan produced 2,250 metric tonnes. Taliban
The Russian mafia, with ties to Afghanistan established during the Soviet occupation, used their networks to move heroin through Central Asia, Russia, the Baltics and into Europe. Taliban
Central Asia was the hardest hit by the explosion in Afghan heroin. Taliban
The donkey, camel and truck convoys which carried weapons into Afghanistan were coming back empty. Taliban
In Iran, the government admitted to having 1.2 Taliban
million addicts in 1998, but senior officials in Tehran told me the figure was nearer three million — even though Iran had one of the toughest anti-narcotics policies in the world, where anyone caught with a few ounces of heroin faced the death penalty automatically.9 Taliban
Herdin addiction was also increasing in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turk- menistan and Kyrgyzstan as they became part of the heroin export chain. Taliban
In 1998 guards on the Tajikistan—Afghanistan border confiscated one ton of opium and 200 kilograms of heroin. Taliban
Akayev said the war against drugs could not be won until there was peace in Afghanistan and the civil war had become the most destabilizing factor in the region.1’ Taliban
The heroin explosion emanating from Afghanistan is now affecting the politics and economics of the entire region. Taliban
But the agreement was never implemented by the Taliban and after the pull-out of UN agencies from Afghanistan in 1998, it simply fell apart. Taliban
Six months later Arlacchi was less optimistic when he told me, ‘Afghanistan is one of the most difficult and crucial parts of the world but HIGH ON HEROIN: DRUGS AND THE TALIBAN ECONOMY 123 124 TAL1BAN a wider political settlement is needed before drugs production can be be controlled.”4 Taliban
Between 1993 and 1997 UNDCP had asked for US$16.4 Taliban
The Afghan Transit Trade (ATT), described in detail in Chapter 15, is the largest source of official revenue for the Taliban and generates an estimated US$3 billion annually for the Afghan economy. Taliban
Taliban customs revenues from the smuggling trade are channelled through the State Bank of Afghanistan which is trying to set up branches in all provincial capitals. Taliban
We want to develop Afghanistan as a modern state and we have enormous mineral, oil and gas resources which should interest foreign investors,’ said Maulvi Ahmed Jan, the Minister of Mines and Industries, who left his carpet business in Saudi Arabia to join the Taliban and run Afghanistan’s industries. Taliban
Some of the mullah traders within the Taliban are trying to encourage industry and foreign investment, but there appears to be no serious sup- port from the Taliban leadership for these efforts. Taliban
As an investment incentive to foreigners, particularly Pakistani traders, Ahmed Jan was offering free land to anyone who would build a new factory. Taliban
In the meantime Afghanistan is like an economic black hole that is sending out waves of insecurity and chaos to a region that is already facing multiple economic crises. Taliban
Afghanistan’s infrastructure lies in ruins. Taliban
Clearly the Taliban did not create the economic devastation in Afghanistan. Taliban
However, the Taliban and the UN agencies still had to import 750,000 tons of wheat in 1998 for the cities to make up the food shortfall. Taliban
Rather they inherited it from the civil war which all the factions waged after 1992. Taliban
Eventually more than 100,000 Muslim radicals were to have direct contact with Pakistan and Afghanistan and be influenced by the jihad. Taliban
It was the first opportunity for most of them to learn about Islamic movements in other countries and they forged tactical and ideological links that would serve them well in the future. Taliban
Bin Laden studied for a Masters GLOBAL JIHAD~ THE ARAB-AFGHANS AND OSAMA BIN LADEN -~ 131 Amongst these thousands of foreign recruits was a young Saudi student The centre for the Arab-Afghans was the offices of the World Muslim Until he arrived in Afghanistan, Bin Laden’s life had hardly been 132 degree in business administration at King Abdul Aziz University inJeddah but soon switched to Islamic studies. Taliban
He first travelled to Peshawar in 1980 and met the Mujaheddin leaders, returning frequently with Saudi donations for the cause until 1982 when he decided to settle in Peshawan. Taliban
‘I settled in Pakistan in the Afghan border region. Taliban
Bin Laden knew many of the perpetrators of these violent acts across the Muslim world, because they had lived and fought together in Afghanistan. Taliban
The Arab-Afghans had come full circle. Taliban
Land- locked and surrounded by potentially jealous and hostile powers — Russia, Iran, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan — the Central Asian states have man- oeuvered relentlessly for pipelines to be built that would end their isola- tion, free them from economic dependence on Russia and earn hard cur- rency to refloat their economies after the devastation wrought by the break-up of the Soviet Union. Taliban
Convinced that the ethnic issue in Afghanistan was going to become explosive after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, I wanted to understand the ethnic origins of the Afghan Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks and see their original homelands. Taliban
My subsequent visits resulted in a book on Central Asia but with Afghanistan disintegrating into civil war, I con- cluded that its repercussions would rebound on Central Asia and the issue of pipelines would determine the future geo-politics of the region.4 Taliban
The label — the new Great Game — resonated with history. Taliban
In the late nineteenth century the British in India and tsarist Russia fought an undeclared war of competition and influence to contain each other in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Taliban
The centre of gravity for both powers was Afghanistan. Taliban
But as in the nineteenth century, Afghanistan’s instability and the 1 advancing Taliban were creating a new dimension to this global rivalry and becoming a significant fulcrum for the new Great Game. Taliban
Afghanistan had held Central Asia in a tight embrace for centuries. Taliban
The territory comprising modern day Tajikistan, southern Uzbekistan and northern Afghanistan was one contiguous territory for centuries, ruled intermittently by amirs or kings in Bukhara or Kabul. Taliban
Afghanistan today borders Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan but only Turkmenistan has large energy resources. Taliban
Along the Panur mountains Tajikistan’s five million people share a rugged ó40-mile border with Afghanistan, which is divided by the Amu Darya river. Taliban
In ancient times, Tajikistan was the military and economic centre of the region. Taliban
They include the Ismaelis, a Shia sect and followers of the Agha Kban, who also inhabit the contiguous Badakhshan region of Afghanistan. Taliban
Its budget depended on subsidies from Moscow. Taliban
The Taliban added to Masud’s image by accusing him of trying to divide Afghanistan and create a ‘Greater Tajikistan’ by joining Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province with Tajikistan. Taliban
In Uzbekistan Islamic militancy, partly fuelled by Afghanistan, is the most serious challenge to President Islam Karimov. Taliban
The Uzbeks — the most numerous, aggressive and influential race in the region — occupy today’s Islamic heartland and the political nerve centre of Central Asia. Taliban
The~Uzbeks trace their genealogy to Genghis Khan’s Mongols, one branch of which, the Shaybani clan, conquered modern-day Uzbekistan ~j northern Afghanistan in 1500. Taliban
Mahmud Ibn Wali, a sixteenth- century historian, described the early Uzbeks as ‘famed for their bad nature, swiftness, audacity and boldness’ and revelling in their outlaw image.8 Taliban
Well before Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, Moscow and Tashkent were cultivating Afghan Uzbeks to create a secular Uzbek- controlled ‘cordon sanitaire’ in northern Afghanistan that would resist any Mujaheddin takeover. Taliban
Since then Uzbekistan’s influence in Afghanistan has waned considerably as Karimov was unwilling to back Masud, a Tajik. Taliban
Karimov runs a tightly controlled, authoritarian police state and cites the civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan as justification for repression at home. Taliban
Karimov’s failed forays into Afghanistan and Tajiki- stan have only encouraged Islamic militancy. Taliban
Afghanistan’s 500,000 Turkmen population also arrived as a result of the 1920s civil war in the Soviet Union. Taliban
The first migration into Afghanistan was by the Esari tribe in the early nineteenth century, who were followed by the Tekke tribe after their revolt against the Bolsheviks failed. Taliban
The Tekke, the largest Turkmen tribe, began to resist Russian advances into their territory in 1870 and wiped out a Russian army at the oasis fort of Geok Tepe in 1881. Taliban
As Niyazov saw his economy crumble he sought alternative export routes. Taliban
Weak and impoverished and with no military force to defend its long ~ borders with Iran, Afghanistan and its rival Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan opted for a foreign policy of neutrality This gave the Turkmens the justi- I fication to keep their distance from Russia and avoid being sucked into the economic and military pacts that arose out of the break up of the Soviet Union. Taliban
Neutrality also allowed Ashkhabad to avoid taking sides in the Afghan conflict, which angered Moscow and Tashkent as Turk- menistan refused to join the anti Taliban alliance Ashkhabad had pro- vided the communist regime in Afghanistan with diesel fuel until Kabul fell in 1992 It proceeded to do the same for Ismael Khan who controlled 3 Herat until 1995 and later the Taliban. Taliban
Turkey had backed the Afghan Mujaheddin in the 1980s, but its role remained limited. Taliban
Turkey also played a role in turning around Israel’s policy in Afghanis- tan. Taliban
Turkey convinced Israel that the Taliban were a security threat to the region and could export Islamic fundamentalism to Central Asia. Taliban
‘The CARs have two problems with Afghanistan. Taliban
One is fear and the other is opportunity,’ the UN mediator for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi told me. Taliban
By keeping the conflict in Afghanistan on the boil Russia keeps the region unstable and has the excuse to maintain a military presence in the CARs. Taliban
‘Throughout Central Asia, leaders are on edge about instability in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Taliban
TALIBAN ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 1: company’s gas fields in Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India — thereby creating a swathe of infrastructure connections that could allow peace to break out in Afghanistan and even between India and Pakistan. Taliban
Between 1995 and 1996 he left his business in South America and spent nine months in his executive jet flying from warlord to warlord in Afghanistan and to Islamabad, Ashkhabad, Moscow and Washington, to convince leaders that his pipeline was a realistic possibil- ity. Taliban
An Argentinian and Chairman of Bridas, he visualized connecting his 158 around Afghanistan? After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Bridas had first ventured into Western Siberia, ‘But there were too many problems there with pipelines and taxes so we arrived in Turkmenistan when it opened up,’ Buigheroni told me in the only interview he has given on Bridas’s role in Afghanistan.’ Taliban
What had brought these Argentinians halfway across the world to ride FOR PIPELINES 1994—96 ~12~ THE BATTLE C arlos Bulgheroni was the Taliban’s first introduction to the outside world of high finance, oil politics and the new Great Game. Taliban
Bridas invested some US$400 million in exploring its leases — a stagger- ing sum in those early days for a small oil company, when not even the oil majors were involved in Central Asia. Taliban
Bnidas began to export oil from its Keimir field in 1994, with production rising to 16,800 b/d. Taliban
Then in July 1995, in the hot, arid Karakum desert, Bridas struck gold — a massive new gas field at Yashlar with estimated reserves of 27 tcf, more than double Pakistan’s total gas reserves. Taliban
By now, the Pakistani military and the ISI were backing the Taliban to open up a southern transportation route via Kandahar and Herat to Turkmenistan. Taliban
Bridas proposed building an 875-mile-long pipeline from its Yashlar field, crossing southern Afghanistan to Sui in Baluchistan province, where Pakistan’s gas reserves and pipeline network originates. Taliban
This was particularly appealing to the Afghan warlords as Afghanistan had gas fields in the north, which once supplied Uzbekistan but had been shut down. Taliban
As Kissinger pondered a route through Afghanistan he quipped that the deal looked like ‘the triumph of hope over experience’. Taliban
Unocal persisted in this ~ belief even after Bridas had realized that I was just a very curious journalist who had covered Afghanistan far too long to be satisfied with bland state- ments. Taliban
Later, Bulgheroni explained how he felt. Taliban
We have an American com- pany which is interested in building a pipeline from Turkmenistan through to Pakistan,’ said Raphel at a press conference in Islamabad on 21 April 1996. Taliban
‘The good part of what has happened is that one of the factions at last seems capable of developing a government in Afghanistan,’ said Senator Hank Brown, a supporter of the Unocal project.2’ Taliban
‘The outside interference in Afghanistan is now all related to the battle for oil and gas pipelines. Taliban
As tensions developed between Unocal and Delta because of Delta’s inability to woo the Afghans, Unocal set up its own team of experts to advise the company on Afghanistan. Taliban
Refusing to accept the problems posed by the constant fighting in Afghanistan, he urged Unocal to start work as quickly as possible. Taliban
When his terrified Foreign Ministry officials tried to explain that construction could not start in the middle of a civil war, he would shout them down. Taliban
It depends on peace in Afghanistan and a government we can work with. Taliban
After the winter lull in Afghanistan, fresh fighting broke out in the spring of 1998 and for both companies the project appeared as distant as ever. Taliban
On 5 October 1998, the Texas District Court dismissed Bridas’s US$15 billion suit against Unocal — on the grounds that the dispute was governed by the laws of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, not Texas law. Taliban
Clinton only woke up to the Afghanistan problem when American women knocked on his door. Taliban
In 1999 ‘getting Bin Laden’ was Washington’s primary policy objective, even as it ignored the new Islamic radicalism Afghanistan was fostering, which would in time only throw up dozens more Bin Ladens. Taliban
A covert policy involves planning, funding and taking decisions, but there was no such process taking place at the highest levels in Washington on Afghanistan. Taliban
But the Sharif regime remained at odds with itselI wanting to become an energy conduit for Central Asia, wanting peace in Afghanistan but insisting this would best be achieved by a Taliban vic- tory. Taliban
Afghanistan is in,’ wrote the Washington Post.28 Taliban
The allocation would allow the Foreign Ministry to dispense 50 million rupees every month for the next six months to pay the salaries of Afghanistan’s rulers. Taliban
This flow of aid was a legacy from the past. Taliban
The ISI became the eyes and ears of President Zia’s military regime and by 1989 it was the most powerful political and foreign policy force in Pakistan, repeatedly overriding later civilian governments and parliament in policy areas it concluded were critical to the country’s national security interests. Taliban
Kandahar could be dialled from anywhere hi Pakistan as a domestic call using the prefix 081 - the same as Quetta’s prefix. Taliban
Pakistan’s security perceptions were initially shaped by Afghanistan’s territorial claims on parts of the NWFP and Baluchistan and there were border clashes between the two states in the 1950s and 1960s. Taliban
Afghanis- tan insisted that Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal belt should be allowed to opt either for independence or join Pakistan or Afghanistan. Taliban
Pakistan’s elongated geography, the lack of space, depth and a hinterland denied its armed forces the ability to fight a prolonged war with India. Taliban
Pakistan med to resolve this problem in 1993 by moving many of the Kashmiri groups’ bases to eastern Afghanistan and paying the Jalalabad Shura and later the Taliban to take them under their protection. Taliban
‘The attainment of strategic depth has been a prime objective of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy since General Zia ul Haq. Taliban
The Tali- ban refused to recognize the Durand Line or drop Afghanistan’s claims to parts of the NWFP. Taliban
The triumph of the Taliban has virtually elimin- ated the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Taliban
The de facto absorption of Afghanistan will accentuate centrifugal tendencies within Pakistan,’ predicted Olivier Roy in 1997.~ Taliban
In fact the backwash from Afghanistan was leading to the ‘Talibanization’ of Pakistan. Taliban
had no room for critical reappraisals, accommodating dissent from the status quo, nor the imagination or flexibility to adapt to changing situations and the ever-evolving geo-political environment. Taliban
MASTER OR VICTIM: PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN WAR 187 188 TALIBAN By running both Afghan policy and operations, the IS! Taliban
When the Taliban emerged the IS! Taliban
But by now the IS! Taliban
‘The UN has gradually marginalized itself in Afghanistan and lost credib- ility as an impartial mediator,’ said Ahmad Kamal, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the UN in January 1998. Taliban
Pakistan accused UN Secretary General Kofi Annan of being partisan. Taliban
The smuggling trade to and from Afghanistan became the most devastating manifestation of these losses. Taliban
The border post between Chaman in Baluchistan province and Spin Baldak in Afghanistan is a prime location for watching the racket at work. Taliban
MASTER OR VICTIM: PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN WAR 189 190 TALIBAN This Wild West of free trade expanded due to the civil war in Afghanistan, the drugs business and the collapse and corruption of Pakis- tani, Iranian and Central Asian state institutions along their borders with Afghanistan. Taliban
Trade has always been critical to the Islamic heartland. Taliban
In 1950, under international agreements, Pakistan gave land-locked Afghanistan permission to import duty-free goods through the port of Karachi according to an AU agreement. Taliban
Truckers would drive their sealed containers from Karachi, cross into Afghanistan, sell some goods in Kabul and then turn around to resell the rest in Paldstani markets. Taliban
The AU expanded in the 1980s, servicing Afghanistan’s communist- controlled cities. Taliban
Although the Peshawar-based transport mafia were trading between Pakis- tan, northern Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, despite the continuing war around Kabul, the Quetta-based mafia were at a loss with the rapacious, Kandahar warlonA~ who had setup dozens of toll chains along the highway from Pakistan. Taliban
Taliban leaders were well connected to the Querta mafia, who were the first to provide financial support to the Taliban movement. Taliban
This nexus extended to politicans and cabinet ministers in Baluchistan and the NWFP. Taliban
As the mafia extendec} their trade, they also stripped Afghanistan bare. Taliban
They cut down millions of acres of timber in Afghanistan for the Pakistani market, denuding the countryside as there was no reforestation. Taliban
According to an academic study, the underground economy in Pakistan has snowballed from 15 billion rupees in 1973 to 1,115 billion rupees in 1996, with its share in GDP increasing from 20 per cent to 51 per cent.’5 Taliban
For example, in 1994 Pakistan, which manufactured its own air-conditioners, imported just 30 million rupees’ worth of foreign air-conditoners. Taliban
The transport mafia’s smuggling of fuel and other goods from Iran to Afghanistan and Pakistan led to revenue losses, crippled local industry and corrupted people at the highest level of gov- ernment. Taliban
A similar undermining of the economy and widespread corruption was taking place in iran. Taliban
The backlash from Afghanistan added fuel to the spreading fire of instability in Pakistan. Taliban
In the 1980s the fall-out from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had created ‘the heroin and kalashnikov culture’ that undermined Pakistan’s politics and economy. Taliban
As early as 1995 Maulana Sufi Mohammed had led his Tanzim Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammedi in Bajaur Agency in an uprising to demand Sharia law. Taliban
Yet after the Taliban captured Mazar in 1998, Pakistan declared vic- tory, demanding that the world recognize the movement which now con- trolled 80 per cent of Afghanistan. Taliban
Pakistan considered Iranian influ- ence in Afghanistan to be over and that Russia and the Central Asian states would be obliged to deal with the Taliban through Islamabad while the West would have no choice but to accept the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam. Taliban
Outsiders increasingly saw Pakistan as a failing or failed state like Afghanistan, Sudan or Somalia. Taliban
‘The positive climate between Iran and Saudi Arabia is encouraging and both sides are ready to co-operate for the resolution of the conflict SHIA VERSUS SUNNI: ~15~ IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA in Afghanistan,’ Iran’s new Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said in May 1998.’ Taliban
Iran’s new leaders were deeply antagonistic to the Taliban, but they were pragmatic enough to realize that peace in Afghanistan was necessary for economic development and political liberalization in Iran. Taliban
Afghanistan has been just one area of conflict in the intense rivalry between the Persians and the Arabs. Taliban
Both peoples have conquered and ruled one another against a background of dispute between Sunni Arabia and Shia Persia. Taliban
As that war began, another was just beginning in Afghanistan and here too the age-old rivalries would continue — this time in the context of the Cold War and the US aim to isolate Iran with the help of the Arab states. Taliban
It was the era in which Iran’s Revolutionary Guards funded Shia militants worldwide — from Lebanon to Pakistan. Taliban
They helped unite the eight Iran-based Hazara groups into the single Hizb-e-Wahadat party. Taliban
As the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia intensffied with the Saudis importing more Arabs to spread Wahabbistn and anti-Shiism inside Afghanistan, Pakistan kept the balance between them. Taliban
Iran considered the Kabul regime as the only force now capable of res- isting a Sunni Pashtun takeover of Afghanistan. Taliban
The Iranians had also become more pragmatic, backing not just the SHIA VERSUS SUNNb IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA -~ 199 200 -~ TAUBAN Afghan Shias but all the Persian-speaking ethnic groups who were res- isting Pashtun domination. Taliban
Saudi Arabia viewed the Taliban as an important asset to their dwind- ling influence in Afghanistan. Taliban
However, for Tehran the real fall-out with Afghanistan was internal. Taliban
Boroujerdi, who ran Afghan policy for more than a decade was a smart diplomat. Taliban
The spectre of Afghanis- tan’s ethnic conflict threatened to spill into Iran along with the economic burden of supporting millions of Afghan refugees, who were deeply dis- liked by ordinary Iranians. Taliban
In June 1997, the Taliban closed down the Iranian Embassy in Kabul, accusing Iran of destroying peace and stability in Afghanistan’.’8 Taliban
There was enormous popular support for an Iranian invasion of western Afghanistan, which was further manipulated by hardliners in Tehran wanting to destabilize President Khataxni. Taliban
Iran felt betrayed by Pakistan on several counts. Taliban
The Taliban pose a security threat to the Saudis, especially through their support for Saudi dissidents. Taliban
Its first and biggest test could be in helping to bring peace to Afghanistan. Taliban
The world has turned away from Afghanistan, allowing civil war, ethnic fragmenta- tion and polarization to become state failure. Taliban
The tribal hierarchy which once mediated conflicts has been killed or is in exile. Taliban
The FSU began the process with its brutal invasion of Afghanistan, but suffered hugely. Taliban
Much of the blame for the continuation of the war lies in the hands of outsiders who continue to back their proxies in an ever-increasing spiral of intervention and violence. Taliban
While the Afghans take all credit for this, the West has gone the other way, barely acknow- ledging the Afghan contribution to the end of the Cold War. Taliban
Russia and Great Britain marked out borders and signed treaties, creating Afghanistan as a buffer between them. Taliban
With such deep crises of identity, political legitimacy, economic mismanagement and social polarization, the elite has neverthe- less indulged in the worst example of imperial overstretch by any third world country in the latter half of this century. Taliban
Pakistan’s own economy would benefit as it would provide workers, technicians and materials for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Taliban
While Pakistan has had a forward policy in Afghanistan, Iran’s interfer- ence has essentially been defensive, maintaining a limited influence and resisting a total Taliban takeover. Taliban
But Iran has contributed heavily to the fragmentation of Afghanistan by playing the Shia card, the Persian lan- guage card and keeping the very ethnic groups it supports divided amongst themselves. Taliban
Moreover, the complete breakdown of trust and understanding between Iran and Pakistan has set back the peace process and proved ruinous for the Afghans. Taliban
There is no common ground between the two states on a solution to the Afghan civil war and even more ominously both states are funding proxy wars between Shias and Sunnis in each other’s countries as well as in Afghanistan, increasing the likeithood of a major sectarian explosion in the region. Taliban
Pashtun domination of Afghanistan does not suit them and they abhor the kind of Islamic sentiments the Taliban espouse. Taliban
Until their ethnic cousins in Afghanistan are part of some power-sharing formula in Kabul, the Central Asian states will not cease to aid them to resist the Taliban. Taliban
The Central Asian states are the new players on the block, but they have quickly taken to protecting what they see as threats to their national interests. Taliban
And unless Afghanistan moves towards peace, dozens more Bin Ladens are ready and waiting to take his place from their bases inside Afghanistan. Taliban
Increasingly, Western popular perception equates Islam with the Taliban and Bin Laden-style terrorism. Taliban
The genius of early Muslim-Arab civilization was its multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic diversity. Taliban
In their present form, the Taliban cannot hope to rule Afghanistan and be recognized by the international community. Taliban
Even if they were to conquer the north, it would not bring stability, only continuing guerrilla war by the non-Pashtuns, but this time from bases in Central Asia and Iran which would further destabilize the region. Taliban
The fear of fragmentation is ever present and the lines have been well CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN 213 214 TALIBAN drawn since 1996 ..- a Pashtun south under the Taliban and a non-Pashtun north divided by the Hindu Kush mountains., Taliban
leaving Kabul contested by the two sides. Taliban
Peace-making by the UN has so far failed to yield any dividends, but not for lack of trying. Taliban
The reason is simply that as long as outside powers fuel the warlords with money and weapons, the civil war does not have a likelihood of winding down. Taliban
Outside influence cannot now be eliminated in Afghanistan, but it must be con- tained and limited with mutual agreement to acceptable levels. Taliban
In short, each neighbouring state would have to recognize not only its own national security needs, but also those of its neighbours. Taliban
Afghanistan’s internal settlement can no longer be achieved by what is euphemistically called ‘a broad-based government.’ Taliban
This would essentially be a bribe for the warlords and an incentive for the Afghan people to pressurize them to accept an agreement. Taliban
Peace in Afghanistan would pay enormous dividends across the entire region. Taliban
Pakistan would benefit economically from the reconstruction in Afghanistan and it could begin to tackle the leftovers of the Afghan war on its own soil — the proliferation of weapons, drugs, terrorism, sectarian- ism and the black economy. Taliban
Russia could build a more realistic relationship with Central and South Asia based on economic realities rather than false hegemonic ambitions, while laying its Afghan ghosts to rest. Taliban
APPENDIX 1 219 The Taliban leader is Mullah Mohammed Omar, also known as the Amir-ul Momineen, or Commander of the Faithful. Taliban
Nifa = National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (Gailani), Har = Harakat (Maulvi Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi) Name M. Mohammed Omar M. Mohammed Rabbani Mohammed Hassan M. Mohammed Ghaus M. Abdul Razaq M. Sayed Ghiasuddin Name M. Khairuia Khairkhwa Ehsanullah Ehsan Maulvl Abdul Sattar Sanani Mohammed Abbas Obaidullah Daduilah Mohammedullah Akhond Amir Khan Mutaqqi Office Leader Chairman of Kabul Shura Foreign Minister after 1997 Foreign Minister, retired 1997 Customs Dept. Taliban
Afghanistan and Kabul fall to the Mujaheddin as President Najibullah seeks shelter in UN compound in Kabut. Taliban
UN appoints Mehmoud Mestiri to head Special Mission to Afghanistan. Taliban
3,000 Pakistani Taliban from Peshawar leave for Afghanistan. Taliban
1999 21 February. Taliban
Appendix 4 Great Game Route Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan- Turkey Turkmenistan—Pakistan-- Afghanistan Turkmenistan-Pakistan-- Afghanistan Turkmenistan—Iran— Turkey Turkmenistan—Kazakhstan— China—Japan Kazakhstan—Turkmenistan— Iran-Persian Gulf g~ pipeline connecting Iran-Turkmenistan opened in The New Details Under Caspian Sea. Taliban
AFGHANISTAN PIPELINE Bridas awarded gas exploration rights for Yashlar block in eastern Turkmerustan, 50—50 split in pro- duction profits. Taliban
Traditional leader of prayer at local mosque. Taliban
Appendix 5 Glossary of Afghan terms 244 TALIBAN MuIlah. Taliban
Hurst and Co, London 1985. Taliban
Appendix 6 Bibliography 246 Dupree, Nancy Hatch, A Historical Guide to Afghanistan, Afghan Tourist Organization, Kabul 1970. Taliban
Roy, Olivier, Afghanistan, from Holy War to Civil War, Princeton University 1995. Taliban
Roy, Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge University Press 1986. Taliban
Rubin, Bamett, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, State Formation and Collapse in the International System, Yale University Press, New Haven 1995. Taliban
Rubin, Bamett, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, From Buffer State to Failed Stare, Yale University Press, New Haven 1995. Taliban
APPENDIX 6 — 247 Introduction 1. Taliban
Chapter 1 1. Taliban
UNHCR 199& 14. Taliban
Chapter 7 1. Taliban
NOTES 255 256 ~- NOTES 14. Taliban
Chapter 16 1. Taliban
For many years he taught history at Kabul University, where in 1981 he be- came a professor. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
About the Author Mohammad Hassan Kakar holds a B.A. from Kabul University and an M.Phil. and Ph~D. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There, as a member of the Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, he served as an analyst of Afghan political developments. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
After his release from prison, Professor Kakar fled with his family to Peshawar in Pakistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Before immigrating to the United States in 1989, he was elected the first president of the Association of the Professors of the Universities of Af- 379 anistan (in exile). The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
11/13 Bembo Bembo Peter Marsden has a degree in Modern Arabic and worked for a number of years as. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Afghanistan subject to Kushan dynasty. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Afghanistan subject to Sasanian dynasty and Hephthalite empire. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Development of the Silk Route. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Chronology V Chronology 5880-1901 5904—19 1919—29 1929 1929—33 5933—73 1973 1978 1979 1989 1992 5994 1995 5996 Abdur-Rahman undertakes comprehensive conquest of Afghanistan and establishes Pushtun populations in the north. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Present boundaries of Afghanistan fixed through a series of international agreements. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Habibullah rules Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It therefore looks at what the Taliban believe and how this set of beliefs has manifested itself in the different parts of Afghanistan and in relation to different elements in the population. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In order to do this one has to look at the wider geopolitical picture and at Afghanistan’s role in the world economy, and to take on board the country’s ethnic, religious and linguistic mix and the nature of its terrain. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Similarly, their behaviour has generated a set of responses among Afghanistan’s neighbours as well as in the West, with potentially conflicting agendas operating within each neighbouring state. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
These agendas have included the very considerable interests relating to Afghanistan’s role as a major producer of opium, its direct involve- ment in the processing of heroin, its potential as a conduit for Central Asian gas and oil and its heavy involvement in smuggling. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In seeking to engage and negotiate with a movement such as the Taliban, what benchmarks should one be using? Are the UN Human Rights Conventions appropriate or are they, as the Taliban state, based on Western value systems? Should one take the view that radical movements can be a symptom of the state of a society and 2 Introduction that one should respect their philosophies as a manifestation of popular belief, or should one look to the views of moderates and liberals within the population to guide one’s negotiating position? Should one be influenced by what Islamic scholars are saying as to what is or is not consistent with the Qur’an and the reported sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, the Hadith? Should one look to women within the population of Islamic scholars and other intellectuals to indicate what may be reasonable norms? Alternatively, should one draw on the perspectives and values of those living in the rural areas of Afghanistan, both women and men? In so doing, how does one take on board the diversity of perspectives and values from village to village, province to province and one ethnic group to another? The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Faced with this inevitable internal divergence, humanitarian agencies have often felt at a loss in assessing whether the Taliban have been responding positively to negotiations on human rights issues. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
During the Soviet occupation, from 5979 to 1989, there was a tendency to criticise the abuses of the occupying forces because they were seen as the unprovoked aggressor, and to turn a blind eye to abuses committed by the Mujahidin, who, at that time, were accorded the image by the media of heroic freedom-fighters. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The relationship of agencies to the Taliban is very much in- fluenced by the perspectives that agency personnel bring with them. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There are thus many problems in the delivery of aid. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Any effort to 5 The Taliban tackle this subject has to get to grips with what may be regarded as normal custom and practice in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There have been considerable variations over time and between one part of Afghanistan and another, and the conflict has complicated the situation enormously. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
7 In a country like Afghanistan, where the concept of the nation has developed but recently, where the state is seen as external to society and where people’s allegiance is directed primarily towards the local community the only thing which all Afghans have in common is Islam (Roy, 1986: 30). The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The conflict has led to the neglect or destruction of many of the irrigation structures on which the agricultural economy has depended, and much of the aid provided in recent years has been aimed at their repair. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Certain areas have fared much better than others. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The conflict has seen a mushrooming of Afghanistan’s urban centres as a proportion of the population have opted to move to the towns and cities in an effort to survive economically. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The people of Afghanistan are ethnically, religiously and linguistic- ally mixed. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Sunni Islam is the dominant faith but there are two significant Shi’a minorities: the Hazaras of central Afghanistan, who have his- torically been marginalised both politically and economically, and the Ismailis of north-eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Culturally, the country is very mixed. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Shi’a Hazara population of central Afghanistan may also be described as conservative, but the codes of behaviour are less rigid than those of the Pushtun south. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The capital, Kabul, has moved through many stages as the city has espoused modernism, reverted to ultra-traditionalism, been 10 The nature of Afghanistan influenced by the liberalism of the 196os, adopted the outward manifestations of Soviet-style socialism and seen its liberal intel- ligentsia depart in waves in the face of purges and the arrival of, first, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime, which took power in 1978, the Mujahidin government of 1992—96, and, more recently, the Taliban government. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It is difficult to determine whether Afghanistan belongs more appropriately in Central Asia, in the Indian subcontinent or in the Middle East. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The tribal culture of the Pushtuns bears many simil- arities to that of the Arabian peninsula, yet the system of purdah that is so characteristic of Muslim society in south Asia is also in evidence. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The enigma is compounded by the impact on the various cultures and sub-cultures within Afghanistan of the conflict following the Soviet invasion. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
No one has been unaffected by the conflict, but it has inevitably been more traumatic for some than for others. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Historically, Afghanistan has been inextricably linked with Iran and Central Asia by virtue of its position astride the ancient trade route between Europe and China, with the fortunes of the Indian subcontinent periodically linked with those of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The first mention of the area currently known as Afghanistan occurs in the Zoroastrian scriptures recorded during the reign of Cyrus the Great (d. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Alexander entered what is now Afghanistan in 330 BC, following the destruction of Persepolis and the murder of Darius the Third by three of his satraps. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
12 I The nature of Afghanistan Two years later, after a succession of hard-won military achieve- ments in Central Asia, his remaining forces travelled south through Bamyan and the Ghorband Valley to the western reaches of modern- day Pakistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
China exported raw silk and India supplied cotton cloth, spices, ivory and semi-precious stones. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The first and second centuries AD saw the development of the famous Silk Route between the Roman empire and China. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, the territory of Afghanistan again disintegrated, with the Kabul- based Hindu Shahi dynasty taking control of much of eastern Afghanistan, as vassals of the Ummayad Caliphs based in Damascus, until the ninth and tenth centuries AD. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
A new force entered Afghanistan towards the end of the tenth ‘3 The Taliban century, made up of Turks from the north. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Following the demise of the Timurid dynasty, Afghanistan was split between the Moghul and Safavid empires. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Simultaneously with the period of the Moghul empire, the Persian Safavid dynasty ruled Persia and western Afghanistan from 1501 to 1732. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Finally, in 1648, the Moghuls gave up on 14 J The nature of Afghanistan their efforts to retain northern Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
During this brief expansionist phase, centred on Afghanistan, neither Mir Mahmoud nor Ashraf was able to exercise much control within Afghanistan beyond Kandahar, and what control they had was fre- quently threatened. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, the Safavids, under Nadir Shah, were able to recover control after inflicting a military defeat on Ashraf in 1729. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
When Nadir Shah was assassinated a few years later, it was the turn of another Afghan leader, Ahmed Shah Durrani, to rise to prominence. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Although the Afghan ruler failed to conclude an agreement with either Britain or Russia and the siege of Herat failed, the Russian presence had alarmed hawks within the British Indian government, The nature of Afghanistan who decided that Britain had to make absolutely sure that Afghanistan was not vulnerable to Russian influence or invasion. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The following year, the combined British and Indian troops entered Afghanistan from the south and took Kandahar, Ghazni and Kabul. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Assuming that their occupation was well established they proceeded to import their wives and children and the colonial lifestyle they had developed in India, but it took only two years for popular resentment to manifest itself in armed insurrection. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Over this period Russia, concerned at Britain’s intervention in Afghanistan, proceeded to annex the Central Asian khanates or to bring them under its sphere of influence. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Under the Anglo- Russian Agreement of 1872, Britain and Russia tacitly agreed to the Amu Darya as the northern frontier of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In 1873, under pressure from Britain, Russia agreed to the creation of a corridor of land to divide Russia from British India in north-eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
‘7 The Taliban The Wakhan of Badakshan thus brought Afghanistan face to face with China amidst the Himalayan heights. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The British demanded that they also be permitted to station a mission in Kabul. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Sher Au travelled to the north bank of the Amu Darya and sought permission to travel to St Petersburg to request support from the Tsar. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The first representative arrived in July 1879 and was assassinated the following September. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
General Roberts in Kabul The nature of Afghanistan gathered a large army and marched on Kandahar to reverse the defeat. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The British accepted his claim and withdrew from Kabul in August i88o, prompted by the defeat, towards the end of July, of a British force at Maiwand near Kandahar. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The continuing tensions between Russia and Britain finally re- sulted in agreements being drawn up in 1891 and 1895—96 to fix the present northern frontiers of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Durand line, agreed in 1893, delineated the boundary between Afghanistan and British India, effectively cutting the Pushtun population in half. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Abdur-Rahman died in 1901 and was succeeded by his eldest son, Habibullah. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Within months of taking power Amanullah declared war on Britain, seeking to exploit reports of its post-war weakness. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Missions were also sent to Europe and the USA to establish diplomatic relations. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Soviet Union was also facing unrest in Central Asia, where the rebels were receiving support from volunteers from Afghanistan and India. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
He was concerned at what he saw as the backwardness of Afghanistan relative to the West and felt that the only way to strengthen it, on the religious and cultural levels, was to modernise it. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
He undertook a seven-month tour of Europe in 1928, fuelling rumours that he was turning against Islam. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Amanullah was overthrown by a Tajik, Bacha-e-Saqqao, who led the rebel advance. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Afghanistan remained neutral during the Second World War, in spite of strong relations with Germany, Italy and Japan during the pre- ceding years. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Afghan government took the opportunity provided by the negotiations to argue that the Pushtun tribal areas of North- West Frontier Province, which had held a semi-independent status in relation to British India since 1901, should be able to opt for in- dependence. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The immediate post-war period saw early negotiations for the independence of India, based on partition between India and Pakistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Afghanistan was pushed even further into the hold of the Soviet Union when diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan The nature of Afghanistan 22 were cut in 1961 over the Pushtunistan issue, resulting in the closure of the border and a halt to transit trade through Pakistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It never- theless stated that ‘Islam is the sacred religion of Afghanistan’ and provided that Hanafi Shari’a law should be the last resort where no existing secular law applied. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Some advocated a much faster process of reform and found a vehicle in the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Among the ready recruits were the sons of Tajiks and Uzbeks who had fled to northern Afghanistan from the religious persecution perpetrated by the Soviet government across Central Asia during the 1920S and 1930S. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
As with Amanullah, no attempt was made to build a gradual process of reform from below. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The PDPA’s use of force in bringing the changes to fruition, combined with a brutal disregard for societal and religious sensi- tivities, resulted in a massive backlash from the rural population, 24 The nature of Afghanistan including those elements in whose interests the PDPA felt it was acting. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Interestingly, it was the non-tribal areas of the north, including the Shi’a zone of central Afghanistan, that launched the first insurrections. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Soviet Union had taken advantage of the PDPA’s assumption of power by engaging ever more deeply in Afghanistan on the economic, political and military fronts. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Kremlin was far from happy at the way the situation was unfolding in Afghanistan, but felt it had no choice but to back the PDPA. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
With the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by an Islamist government, Moscow was nervous at the possibility that the Islamists in Afghanistan might exploit any ambivalence it might manifest towards the PDPA regime. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In December 1978, an agree- ment was signed empowering the Kabul government to call on Moscow for direct military assistance if the need arose. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There has been much speculation as to why the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan towards the end of December but the evidence suggests that Moscow’s historical fear of encirclement from the south was the dominant factor. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Soviet forces remained in Afghanistan until 15 February 1989. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
27 I The Taliban countries, in that Afghanistan had been transgressed by a secular force and therefore ceased to be Islamic . The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The definition of Mujahidin thus encompasses all those who moved to Pakistan and Iran, and engaged in fighting within Afghanistan on the basis of incursionary movements from these two countries, to- gether with the many people who opted to remain in Afghanistan throughout the war, often fleeing to the sanctuary of the mountains with their families and organising raids from there. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
When the leaders first arrived in Pakistan they were welcomed by the then president, Zulfikar Bhutto. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Following the hanging of Bhutto by the new president of Pakistan, Zia Al-Haq, the Islamist parties found a leader whose ideoligical aspirations for Pakistan w re very much in line with their own thinking and with the thinking of sim ar parties in Pakistan, such as the Jamaat-i-Islami. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The parties, with their leadership, were as follows. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Another key member of Jamiat-i-Islami is Ahmed Shah Masoud, who joined while an engineering student at Kabul University. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
He played a major role during the period of Soviet occupation in leading the resistance forces in the Panjshir Valley, to the north-east of Kabul. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Khalis was trained in Islamic theology at the Deoband School in Delhi, which produced several generations of Afghan Ulema. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
His attacks in the press on Daoud’s reforms meant that he had to flee to Pakistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
From the time that these parties were designated as channels for military aid, it became difficult to determine to what extent the various groups inside Afghanistan were affiliating themselves to one party or another because of the resources on offer, and to what extent conviction was the deciding factor. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It was also represented through Ismail Khan in north-western Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The parties recruited within the camps for men and teenagers to fight for them and the camps became bases for in- cursionary attacks into Afghanistan, with the result that the parties became enormously powerful. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The seven parties, which formed themselves into the Seven < Alliance in May < 1985, were all adherents of Sunni Islam and all but 9 . The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
n addition, there were two Shi’a parties. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
That is quite possible, but it is also important to recognise that Gorbachov may have decided to close the Afghan chapter because of the serious problems he was facing at home. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
establishing an alternative capital within Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In addition, it was able to buy support in the rural areas, including the services of various militia groups, such as that of Rashid Dostam in northern Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The continued existence of the jihad was, almost certainly, the dominant factor in the earlier reluctance to return, although in- security and economic factors would have had some impact. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The decisions were, for the most part, spontaneous and freely taken. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Masoud had particular difficulties with Hekmatyar. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The tensions between the two men went back some way, and it proved difficult to come to an accommodation that would ensure a share of power 39 The Taliban between all the main elements within Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Whatever Rabbani’s and Masoud’s calculations as to how best to achieve a broad-based Islamic government in Afghanistan, they suc- ceeded in alienating the Uzbeks as well as finding themselves engaged in battle with the Hazaras. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The attempt failed, but it spread panic amongst the population and led to the exodus of over 65,000 people to Pakistan and to other parts of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
How they moved from small group to major force is not clear. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It is none the less clear that they benefited considerably from the willingness of young people, both from the rural areas and from refugee camps on the Pakistan border, to join their ranks as they advanced through southern Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The ideological underpinning of the movement has been a further cause for debate. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Mullah Omar is a Pushtun from south-western Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The capture of Kabul has brought a new entity, known as the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, to prominence. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
These religious police have played an increasing role in enforcing the Taliban policies on the urban populations. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Over the winter of 1994—95, the Taliban were able to repeat this pattern many times over and, by February 1995, they were positioned on hilltops overlooking the southern suburbs of Kabul, having taken almost half of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
While the Taliban were endeavouring to take Kabul, there was also intense military activity in western Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, the Taliban did not wait to consolidate their hold on Kabul but moved immediately north. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
50 The warriors of God The Taliban responded to the alliance by opening up a new front in north-western Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Casualties on both sides were said to be high. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Taliban leadership responded quickly to the victory by send- ing many of their top people to Mazar. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Then, on 20 July, the opposition alliance succeeded in capturing Charikar and the strategically important airbase of Bagram, north of Kabul. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Further gains were made until the Taliban managed to halt the northern forces 25 km north of the capital, where a stalemate ensued. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
They have also, from a Western point of view, and from the point of view of most Muslims, behaved 5. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Four schools of Islamic or Shari’a law developed, some of which took a more uncompromising stand towards the interpretation of the Qur’an and the Hadith. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
New movements sprang up, based on Sufist spirituality in response to the felt need for a personal relation- ship with the deity. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There was widespread corruption and theft, and there were road-blocks every- where. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The aim of the Taliban has always been the purification of Afghanistan alone. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Further clarification of the Taliban creed was given in a broadcast 61 The Taliban by the Taliban’s Voice of Shari’a radio station on 5 November 1996: The Taliban, who have emerged from the masses of the people, have started their struggle to deliver their compatriots from pain and hard- ship, to ensure complete peace and security across the country by collecting weapons, by doing away with feudal principalities here and there in the country and by creating a powerful Islamic government in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Instead, there is legality and fulfilment of the lofty Shari’a of Muhammad, the peace and blessing of God be upon him, both in words and action. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There no longer exists any cruelty, oppression, savagery or selfishness in the framework of the Islamic government. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In justifying their albeit limited use in Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, Sher Muhammad Stanakzai, the acting foreign minister, speaking on Voice of Shari’a Radio, said, on 20 November: By the enforcement of Shari’a Hudud, we have made safe the lives and property of millions of people from Herat tojalalabad and Kabul. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The population of Kabul has perhaps been singled out as needing particular corrective action. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The military agenda, the objective of bringing the whole country under Taliban control, has been the most important one, followed closely by the imposition of prescribed codes of behaviour and dress. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
As already mentioned, there is no concept of pan-Islam in the Taliban creed. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Taliban are clearly extremely concerned not to 73 The Taliban weaken the resolve of their footsoldiers, on whom they depend to achieve their ambition of bringing Afghanistan under their control. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The wish of the Taliban to protect Afghanistan from non-Islamic elements produces echoes of Moamar al Gaddafi, who took power in Libya in 1969 and created an ideology that had the eradication of Western influence at its core. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
While the Taliban are clearly seeking to free Afghanistan of outside influences, nothing that they have said to date indicates that they regard socialism as anything but the alien ideology the Soviet Union sought to introduce into Afghanistan, or that they see social justice as more than the exercise of Islamic charity by the population through the zakat or tythe system. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, there was concern that some of the Mujahidin parties were rumoured to be receiving large amounts of money from external backers and from involvement in the black economy; Both presented Islam as an all-encompassing religion and 75 than separately may be aimed to create a strong sense of cohesion The Taliban argued that an Islamic state should embrace the social, economic, political and judicial spheres. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, its members have been brought up and educated in an environment in which many of these ideas have been in circulation. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Thus one should not discount the in- fluence of other Islamic movements even if the Taliban give the appearence, at least, of drawing heavily on Afghan custom and practice in relation to Islam. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The abortive attempts of Britain to take Afghanistan during the nineteenth century and the pressure from the north, first from Russia and then from the Soviet Union, have strengthened the resolve of the Ulema to resist outside interference and to render the government of Afghanistan more purely Islamic. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The state first emerged as a mechanism through which the dominant Pushtun tribe, which had conquered large areas of what is now Afghanistan, could consolidate its hold. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, King Amanullah, who reigned from 1919 to 1929, sought to impose modernity on Afghanistan as a means of strengthening its capacity to withstand non-Islamic influences — in his perception Afghanistan was vulnerable because it was backward. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It now became possible for them to receive training in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The major Shi’a party, Hisb-e-Wahdat, has perhaps gone further than this approach in establishing what is clearly an Islamist regime within the Hazarajat, modelled on the thinking of Ayatollah Khom- eini. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There has been considerable ambivalence within both Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arab presence and to the presence of other Muslims. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
(Saudi Arabia was extremely active in developing universities, madrasahs) and mosques in Afghanistan and in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
86 The Afghan Islamic tradition To summarise, one can see a range of influences in the creed of the Taliban, drawn from Islamic movements in the Middle East, Iran, the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
87 Women ... are not Just the biological reproducers of the nation, but also its cultural reproducers, often being given the task of guardians of culture who are responsible for transmitting it to the children and constructing the ‘home’ in a specific cultural style. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Similarly, although the Taliban have strong support among the refugee population in Pakistan, many refugees feel they cannot con- sider returning to Afghanistan until their daughters can be sure of receiving an education and unless women are allowed to work. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Female employment has proved to be a necessity for many families in the camps and the prospect of having to survive in Afghanistan without this option, given the harsh economic conditions, is a clear disincentive to return. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The ban on female education has been linked to the drawing up 89 The Taliban of an appropriate education curriculum, in order to ensure that the next generation is brought up on the basis of an acceptable system of belief. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Mujahidin parties have never insisted that women wear the burqa, although its use has been widespread in the areas under Mujahidin control. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In the centre and north of Afghanistan, other traditions have dictated the mobility of women, with strong influences from Central 92 The gender policies of the Taliban Asia, from which significant elements of the population have mi- grated. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan as a whole, both women and men have traditionally conformed to certain codes of dress regarded as appropriate in order to ensure modesty. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In certain parts of Afghanistan it has been the custom to grow the hair long, while in others short hair has been the norm. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The government set up by the People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, through the coup of April 1978, took the reform process 94 The gender policies of the Taliban a substantial step further by seeking to impose female education throughout the country in an effort to combat the very high level of illiteracy. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
For many of the six million refugees who fled to Pakistan or Iran as a result of the PDPA coup and the subsequent Soviet invasion, fear that their daughters would be influenced by a secular ideology was a major factor, consistent with the declaration of the jihad, in their decision to leave Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
(Many years later, urban dwellers left Afghanistan following the collapse of the Najibullah government in April 1992 and the emergence of the Mujahidin government, out of concern that their daughters would have to conform to a stricter interpretation of Islam.) The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The debates that have taken’place in Afghanistan have their echoes in Iran. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The debate as to how women should behave and participate in society has been going on for a very long time and it has perhaps been the cause of more controversy than any other issue since the beginning of the twentieth century. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Their awareness of developments within Afghanistan during the twentieth century is also likely to have coloured the Taliban attitude to female education. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Education has been explicitly used as a tool to impart particular ideologies, starting with King Amanullah’s attempts to modernise Afghanistan through the education system. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Because Western society is relatively individualistic, each individual, female or male, will normally seek fulfilment on the basis of personal life choices. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There are differences between women in Afghanistan based on ethnicity, religion, access to income and urban or rural settlement, just as within the West there are significant differences based on nationality, class, age, income and environment. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It is also important to recognise that Western society is no more homogeneous than Afghan society. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The recent history of Afghanistan has seen this process in an acute form but there have been similar episodes in European and American history. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Afghanistan is one of the few places left in the world where Western media do not penetrate to a significant degree. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
UN agencies and non*governmental organisatlons (NGOs) were ready’ ‘to assist from the date of the Soviet pull-out: NGOs already had long experience of providing aid to enable impoverished popu- lations in the rural areas of Afghanistan to survive. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan created equally 9. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Many of the solidarity committees organ- ised themselves to deliver relief supplies to Afghanistan, and they were joined by established aid organisations from both the Islamic world and the West. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The humanitarian assistance organisations worked largely through Mujahidin commanders, providing cash and wheat to them for dis- tribution to communities within Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Common textbooks were published and were distributed to schools throughout Afghanistan NGOs assisted with the repair and construction of school buildings and provided financial support for the payment of teachers’ salaries and to cover the costs of materials. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Agencies working in the health sector expressed concern to the Taliban that they were not able to provide health care to women because of the ban on female employment. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
UNICEF, for example, had been distributing educational materials to schools. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Agencies felt the issues should, theoretically, be negotiable because they were presented in the context of a belief system that was clearly stated as being based on Islam. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The agencies opted to focus on operational concerns and to rely on the concept of charity inherent in Islam as a basis for negotiation. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The UN agencies and NGOs operating in Kabul met on 5 October 1996 to draw up a position statement. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
We do not favour any group on the basis of political or religious affiliation. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Both situations have arisen in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In discussions between agencies operating in different parts of Afghanistan, the differing perceptions agencies bring to the debate make it harder to arrive at a common position. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Increasingly, donors have been meeting the agencies to discuss possible options. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
112 The dialogue with the humanitarian agencies These dilemmas are faced in other conflict areas, where agencies and donors have necessarily had to make compromises with their mandates and principles in the face of what are termed complex emergencies. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 3 October 1996 the European Union’s commissioner for humanitarian affairs, Emma Bonino, said in an interview that the rights of women must be respected in Afghanistan before there could be any international recognition of the new Taliban government in Kabul. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The following day, the UN human rights commissioner, José Ayala-Lasso, said in a prepared statement that he had urged his representative in Kabul urgently to convey to the Taliban his ‘strong concern for the situation of human rights in Afghanistan’. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
He ap- pealed to the Taliban ‘to ensure respect for such rights as the rights of women to work and the rights of girls to education’, noting that Afghanistan had signed various conventions to protect women’s rights. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It also called for an immediate ceasefire in Afghanistan and urged all Afghan parties to begin a dialogue in cooperation with the UN. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 17 October the UN Security Council issued a resolution in The Taliban which it expressed concern at what it described as extreme dis- crimination against women and urged strict adherence to the norms of international humanitarian law. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Parlia- ment proposed an embargo on all arms supplied to Afghanistan and the suspension of any new aid except for emergency assistance. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On the other hand, they feel upset that the West has not recognised what they regard as a major achievement: the bringing of peace, law and order to Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It is surprising that the indigenous cultures have survived so well in Afghanistan, given the upheaval created by the conflict. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
As already mentioned, for many refugee families in Pakistan and Iran the ban on female education by the Taliban is a significant factor in their consideration of the circumstances under which they would return to Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It is in relation to this particular right that there is the greatest difficulty in considering the policies and practice of the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Destitute families in Kabul are also not able to call on their relatives elsewhere. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The worsening economic conditions in Iran and the withdrawal of rations in Pakistan, combined with the requirement for refugees to pay for health, education, water supply and electricity, have virtually removed the capacity of refugees to help their relatives in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Consideration therefore has to be given to whether there are aspects of the UN Human Rights Conventions with which it is unreasonable to expect com- pliance under present circumstances in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
This is a difficult question, and one the international community may or may not be asking itself. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
As explained in Chapter 2, Afghanistan as a country has existed for barely a hundred years. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
When the Soviet troops left Afghanistan in February 1989, Pakistan played an active role in trying to bring the Mujahidin parties, both radical and traditionalist, under a single umbrella. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The latter welcomed the stability Ismail Khan had brought to western Afghanistan and the opportunity this provided to facilitate the repatriation of the three million Afghan refugees in Iran. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
At the same time Ismail Khan, who had created a semi-independent emirate based on Herat, was building an uneasy alliance of mutual self-interest with Iran. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
With maximum publicity; he travelled across Afghanistan himself, via Kandahar and Herat, in October 1994 and then organised a trade convoy to cover the same route. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 3 October Pakistan’s prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, stated that if the Taliban managed to unite Afghanistan, it would be a welcome development. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
128 The regional picture The international reactions to the capture of Kabul on 26 Sep- tember 1996 provide interesting insights. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 4 October 1996, Radio Pakistan commented: ‘It appears that they [the Taliban] enjoy the full support of the war-weary people who have welcomed the prospects for peace that have now emerged in Afghanistan.’ The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 2 October 1996, only a few days after the Taliban capture of Kabul, one of the radical Islamic parties in Pakistan,Jamiat-al-Ulema al-Islami, which is headed by Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman, announced that it had prepared a draft constitution for Afghanistan at the request of the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 12 October 1996 the chargé d’affaires at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Kabul passed on the congratulations of the Saudi king, and expressed delight at the enforcement of the sacred Muham- madan law in Afghanistan and the peace and security that had been restored in most parts of Afghanistan by the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 7 October 1996 Ayatollah Mi Khamanei, in a Friday sermon, said: ‘In the neighbourhood of Iran, something is taking place in the name of Islam and a group whose knowledge of Islam is unknown has embarked on actions having nothing to do with Islam.’ The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
He added: ‘We do not quite share the results of the Almaty summit. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In the meantime, he noted, one should be ‘patient’ about differing viewpoints in the CIS. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
President Leghari was accompanied by, among others, Pakistan’s minister for petroleum and natural resources. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
On 19 October, President Karimov of Uzbekistan received the president of Pakistan, Farooq Leghari, in Tashkent. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
India has also, predictably, taken an anti-Taliban position. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Dostam attempted to increase his bargain- 132 The regional picture ing position at the talks by strengthening his forces on the ground north of Kabul at the same time as the talks were going on. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Their evident popularity would have quickly come to the notice of those outside Afghanistan who saw potential advan- tage in the stability the Taliban might be able to bring to Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
This recruitment process was augmented by ‘33 The Taliban appeals to tribal leaders in the Pushtun areas of Afghanistan, and to those in the refugee camps, to send some of their young men to fight. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
As the Taliban advanced, three countries in particular felt concern: Iran, Russia and India. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It sought to strengthen the Shi’a minority in the country and lent support to resistance parties within the Shi’a communities of Afghanistan, encouraging most of them to unite under a single party, Hisb-e-Wahdat. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Following the Taliban takeover of Kabul, Iran hosted a regional conference in Tehran on 29 and 30 October 1996 to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Iran also became concerned at the potential fate of the Shi’a population living in the Hazarajat in central Afghanistan, who had enjoyed a high degree of independence since the Soviet invasion, if the Taliban were to take over the area. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Taliban have accused Iran of having provided support to resistance forces in western Afghanistan and of having also strength- ened the efforts of the northern alliance to withstand Taliban attacks on northern and central Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Observers at the time commented that Russia was, in any event, unlikely to involve itself militarily again in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
There was, however, reported to be considerable anxiety in Russia that the stated policy of the Taliban of non-interference beyond the borders of Afghanistan could change if they took the whole country; or that elements within the Taliban would encourage and support 136 The regional picture Islamic movements in Central Asia. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
A statement by the leader of the Islamic opposition movement in Tajikistan that he did not rule out an agreement with the Taliban, in support of the long-standing Tajik insurgency from Afghanistan, will have done nothing to reassure them. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Other factors prompted Russia’s concern at the Taliban presence in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In its public statements, it made much of its fears that the Taliban would advance the spread of radical Islam within Central Asia and so promote a further exodus of ethnic Russians from the Central Asian Republics to Russia, which was not in a position to provide for them adequately. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It is also reluctant to give up the power it used to wield in Central Asia and the Taliban threat provides a good justification for it to maintain an armed presence, together with political and economic influence, in some of the republics, particularly Tajikistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
InJanuary 1993 a fierce civil war sent refugees from Tajikistan into Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
For several years the rebels launched raids from Afghan territory on CIS troops manning the border between Tajikistan and north-eastern Afghanistan, with backing from Jamiat-i-Islami. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, the Taliban creed is not easily transferable to Central Asian societies. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
India has been unequivocal in its continued recognition of Burhannudin Rabbani as the legitimate president of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It has long had a strategic interest in seeking to thwart Pakistan’s ambition to create a defensive Islamic bloc stretching from Pakistan through Afghanistan to Central Asia. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Of additional interest is whether, if gas and oil pipelines were to be built across Afghanistan, the Taliban would be able to hold back the tide of Western cultural influence, with the inevitable influx of Western oil workers to oversee the construction and maintenance of the pipelines. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The latter has taken the Turkmen government to court and has been competing with UNOCAL to secure the agreement of the Taliban to have the construction rights for the pipelines within Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, an agreement signed between UNOCAL, Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia and the Pakistan and Turkmen governments in July 1997 provided for the construction of a gas pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan to commence at the end of 1988. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
UNOCAL, however, enigmatically commented that it would not start the construction work until there was an internationally recognised government in full control of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Afghanistan is the largest world producer of opium 140 The regional picture poppies, from which heroin is processed both in Afghanistan and in the wider region. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
As well as being caught up in global economic interests through oil and gas, the Taliban are inevitably players in the international heroin trade. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
However, those supporting the Taliban could not expect the Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras to submit easily to what is perceived by the northern minorities as a Pushtun force that has, in their view, been used by Pakistan to colonise Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Saudi government has been barely visible in all the diplomatic The regional picture. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The part that Saudi Arabia may have played is also of interest. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It is quite possible, however, that funding from non-governmental organisations seeking to promote Wahhabism, and from collections within the mosques of Saudi Arabia and from wealthy individuals there, is reaching Afghanistan through one channel or another. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In considering the responses of the outside world to what is happening in Afghanistan, it is always safer to talk about elements within each country rather than the government. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Thus, in Pakistan, the military and the intelligence services have tended to dominate policy towards Afghanistan, with the political wing being relatively powerless. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
In looking to the future, we can be reasonably certain that power- ful elements within Pakistan will continue to seek strategic strength against India through the establishment of stronger links with and greater influence and power over Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Iran can equally be relied upon to counter growing radical Sunni influence in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
It has demonstrated a growing commitment to the opposition forces in northern Afghanistan in an effort to stem the onward advance of the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Similarly, one can be reasonably sure that, whether or not the Taliban take northern and central Afghanistan, the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Turkomans will feel less affinity with the Taliban creed than will the Pushtuns of the south. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Any temptations to pass judgement on the policies and actions of the Taliban may be countered by a measure of sympathy and under- standing for the situation in which the people of Afghanistan have found themselves. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
‘53 Arney, George, 1990, Afghanistan, Mandarin, London. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
BAAG (British Agencies Afghanistan Group), 1997, Return and Reconstruction, Refugee Council, London. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Dupree, Louis, 1980, Afghanistan, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Roy, Olivier, 1986, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
Rubin, Barnett, 1995, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT Ruthven, Malise, 1984, islam in the World, Penguin, Harmondsworth. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, as conduit for aid, 142; creation of, ~i; recognition of Taliban, 53; sending of trade convoy, 45, 128, 132; support for Taliban, 128, 129, 133 see also refugees Pan-Islam, 7!, The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The phenomenon that the Central Intelligence Agency calls “blow- back” is equally unnerving. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Intelligence analysis is as much an art as a science. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
President Clinton and his aides came to believe that the United States was vulnerable to even more devastating assaults. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
williamj@tenbase2.com