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A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A History of Modern Yemen
Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Comtemporary Yemen
Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Making of the Georgian Nation

Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, Al-Mu’tamar ab-Islami al-’aam bait al-maqdis [The General
Islamic Conference of Jerusalem], (Jerusalem, 1989), p. 21.
	HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice

The Brotherhood used the opportunity to secure agreement among the participants for an annual conference in Jerusalem. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Those who remained in the Gaza Strip “were not yet fully in tune with the spirit of the Brotherhood. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
1982—83, which resulted in tempestuous demonstrations flowing out of the mosques in the wake of inflammatory Israeli actions, such as the incursion into the al-Aqsa Mosque. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Surah 17 (al-Isra’), v. 1 Surah 59 (al-Hashr), v. 13 [General Edmund] Allenby claimed when he entered Jerusalem: “Now the Crusades are over;” and General Guroud stood by the tomb of Sal- adin and said: “We have returned, 0 Saladin.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It must be solved on this basis because Pales- tine contains the Islamic holy sanctuaries of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Haram Mosque, which are inexorably linked, as long as the heavens and earth exist, to the night journey (isra) of the Prophet of God (may peace be upon him), who ascended to the heavens (miraj) from there. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This was the clan of the Bagratids, who were to unify Georgia under a single crown and reign there for a thousand years. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Russian Finance Minister, “7 Byron, Byronism, in Russian and Georgian literature, 63, 88 Byzantium, 21, 27—8, 30, 113 ‘Cadets’ (Constitutional Democrats), 159—6o, 170—i, 174 Cambon, Jules, 22! A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Russian gen- eral, 91 Armazi, 21, 23, 25 Armenia, Armenians, 2, 4, 5, 14, 21, 26, z8, 36, 48, ~8, 6o, 62, 79, 87, 96, 104, ii8, 131, 138, 141, 144, 155, 161—4, 204—07, 225, 229, 233—4, 238, 252, 256, 258 Arsacid dynasty, 25 Arsena of Marabda, Georgian popular hero, 22 Arsenidze, R., Georgian Minister of Justice, 209 Artag, Georgian ruler, 19 Artanuji, 6, 28 Artvin, 6, 185, 234 Ashilta, 72 Ashot the Great, Bagratid ruler of Georgia, 28—9 287 x8i, 185—6, 193, 196—202, 210—Il, 214—17, 219, 221, Asia Minor, 2, ~, i8, 25, 62 Aslanduz, battle of, 55 Asparukh, 25 Assyria, Assyrians, 3 Astrakhan, 32, 35—6 Atchara (Ajaria), Atcharans (Ajar), 4—7, Athens, 26 Athos, Mount, 13 Austerlitz, battle of, 57 Australia, 223 Austria, ,o8, ,8,, 201 Avalishvili, Zurab, Georgian jurist and negotiator, 205, 208, 215, 220 Avaria, Avars, 4, 71—2, 84 Avchala cast-iron factory, 253 Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis, 4, 5, 3~, 49, 138, 162—3, 193, 199, 204—6, 215, 2 17—22, 225, 233—4, 238, 252, 258 Azov, Sea of, i Babylonians, 3, 26 Baghdad, 28, 184, 186 Bagrat III, King of Georgia, 28 Bagratid dynasty, 28—69 Bagration, General Prince Peter, 20 Bagration-Mukhra~~, General Prince Ivane, 93 Bakradze, Valerian, Georgian Prime Minister, 26!, A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
. A History of Modern Yemen
Revolutions and civil wars: the 19 6os 113 I 14 A history of modern Yemen FLOSY were more numerous perhaps within Aden, save among the oil workers and the dockers who were largely NLF. A History of Modern Yemen
The growth of a republican military late in the civil war brought Hamdan and Sankian to prominence, and both Ghashmi and cAll cAbdullah rose to prominence Plate 5.3. A History of Modern Yemen
Complaints were heard of con- sumerism, encouraged it was said by the arrival in 1983 of Palestinian fighters whom Israel had driven from Beirut. A History of Modern Yemen
Enmeshed in financial links, both commercial and governmental, the North became a more conventional part than previously of relations among states. A History of Modern Yemen
Yahya’s treaty with Italy. A History of Modern Yemen
as rhetoric of left, g6, 97, 104, 120—I, 125—6, 154, 169, [72 changes in Aden hinterland, 74, III “new class” in Aden, 72—3 coffee, 4, 13, i6, 19, 22, 131 commerce, see trade and commerce conferences, political, 104, ,86, 189, 192—3, 195, 208—9 Arab League, 56, 100 Emerging Democracies (Sanaa, [999), 212 London (1964), 100 National Conference (Sanaa, 1992), 193 Popular National Congress (Ta’izz, 1963), 95—6 consumerism, 131, ,68, 177, 192, 212—13 Consultative Council (in North), 124, 126, 130, 575—6 Coon, Carlton, 45 co-operatives, 8o, 195 in North, 95, 126, 129—30, 139, [59—60 in South, 134, 157 corruption, governmental, 103, 124, 129—30, 163, 176—7 before the revolution, 46, 61—2, 8o, 85, 97 post-1990, 190—I, 192, 203—4 cotton, see agriculture currency and coinage, 31, 58, 95, 203, 228 n.17 exchange rates, 131, 157, 177, i86, 191—2 money-changing, 157, 162, 200 see also finance, governmental al-Dabbagh, Husayn (Islamic reformer), ~ Dahbash (television character), 190 Index al-Dali’, 28, 33, 37, 75, 76, 8o, 1i3, 120, 146 Amirs of, 10, 20, 6z, 62, 97, [13 and Radfan tribes, 37—8, 97 land reform, 122 al-Dammaj family (near Ibb), 68, i6~ MutT’ (shaykh), 47, 53, 83, 107, 240 n.44 Dathinah, 97, 113, 146 dawleths, 20, 21, 27, 37, 43—4, 223 fl.5 A History of Modern Yemen
Most likely, Abu Nidal chose Naji al-Au as the name for his Libyan camp because he hates Arafat as much as Israel does, holding him responsible not just for a cartoonist’s death but for the persistent “betrayal” of the Palestinian cause, which, according to Abu Nidal, is the annihilation of the state of Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For close on twenty years, Arafat’s PLO has been caught between two fires—heavy broadsides from Israel and murderous sniping from Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Go to a village, find a destitute old woman, and give her two or three hundred dollars. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In that attack, on September 6, 1986, two members of the organization, posing as photographers, had entered the synagogue, locked the door from the inside with an iron bar, and opened fire on the congregation with submachine guns before blowing themselves up. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Jorde knew he would not be on his own. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1985, he was sent to Cyprus as a security guard in the PLO office. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It reveals as much about the workings of the PLO as it does about Hamza himself. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In October 1984, he was transferred to Bulgaria as a security guard in the office of the PLO representative. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, by the end of that same year, he was back in detention in Tunis for bad behavior. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestine,” the public sym- bol of Palestinian aspirations, his closest colleagues, Abu lyad, the intelligence chief, and the military chief, Abu Jihad, ran their own autonomous outfits with their own loyalists, much as barons might I will always remember the remarkable sight of George Ha- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 41 42 / PATRICK SEALE do under a medieval king. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
like me to make. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Every Palestinian who works in intelligence,” he told me, “is convinced that Israel has a big hand in Abu Nidal’s affairs.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel had gained control of him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Abu lyad’s mind there was no great mystery about it: Israel wanted to destroy the PLO and prevent negotiations that might lead to a peaceful solution involving an autonomous Palestinian state on the West Bank. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Any genuine negotiations would necessar- ily involve the surrender of territory, which is why Israel had gone to such lengths to persuade the world that the Palestinians were terrorists with whom no deal could be contemplated. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal, he believed, was Israel’s prime instrument for this purpose, central to its strategy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But his allegations were a different matter. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He then made an extraordinary admission: “I feel very guilty that I was responsible for not facing up sooner to the threat from Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I wanted to believe that he was a patriot who had strayed from the path and that I could win him back. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For far too long I was reluctant to accept that he was a traitor.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal an Israeli agent? The extravagance of the charge made me think that I had stumbled on yet another Palestinian feud. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
One has to spend only a little time with the guerrilla factions to be amazed at the wild stories they tell about one another. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This would explain Abu lyad’s injured tone. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Ami Shachori, agricultural at- October 17, 1972—Wa’il Zu’aiter, Fatah’s representative December 8, 1972—Mahmud al-Hamshari, PLO repre- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 47 PATRICK SEALE / December 28, 1972—Black September gunmen seize the Israeli embassy in Bangkok and take six Israeli hostages. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
July 21, 1973—Israeli agents looking for Ali Hasan Sala- meh, a Black September commander, kill a Moroccan waiter by mistake in the Norwegian town of Lillehammer. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Isam Sartawi, a close associate of April 16, 1988—Abu Jihad (or, by his real name, Khalil ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 49 50 / PATRICK SEALE I looked at the list long and hard. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It fell into two halves, with an obvious break after 1973. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
My list wasn’t all that neat, but there seemed to be a general pattern. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Immediately after the Israeli fiasco at Lillehammer, Arafat sent four messages to Kissinger, between July and October 1973, calling for a dialogue with the United States. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Kissinger shied brusquely away. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For him, as for many Israelis, the PLO was not the advocate of a legitimate na- tional claim but a “terrorist group,” “unacceptable as a negotiating partner.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Accordingly, Kissinger dropped the West Bank from his agenda and agreed with Israel to exclude the PLO from any post- war settlement. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As his “step-by-step” diplomacy unfolded, it gradu. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
1974, he persuaded Arab leaders to recognize the PLO as “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In November 1974, he told the United Nations, “I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand,” signaling his readiness to negotiate with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Israel and Kissinger said no. tinians’ frustrated hopes for peace and the fears of the Christians that if the Palestinians were not to get a state of their own, Lebanon would never be rid of them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The war sucked in several outside parties, notably Syria, and distracted the region for the next couple of years. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For Begin, Arafat was obvi- ously a major problem. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But for Israel negotiation could mean losing the West Bank. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Nevertheless, Arafat, who had lost some of his best men, was now ready to steer his fractious movement away from violence and toward a negotiated peace. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Kissinger sent General Vernon Walters, then deputy director of the CIA, to tell an Arafat aide in Morocco that “the United States has no proposals to make.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Of all the men of violence in the contemporary Middle East, Abu Nidal poses the most intriguing riddles. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE SHOCK OF EXILE Abu Nidal’s bitter and vengeful personality was very probably shaped by the slights he suffered as a child but also by the impact on him of the disaster that overtook his family, and the whole of the Palestinian community, as a result of massive Jewish immigration into Palestine, culminating in 1948 with the establishment of the state of Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the way the state of Israel was created, with the violent expulsion or stampeding of its Arab inhabitants, left much to be desired and has been a source of furious controversy ever since. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Jaffa, the fighting shut down schools, factories, the bus service, and the citrus industry, the Banna orange groves and packing plant included. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Dispossessed Palestinians, who had enjoyed almost uninterrupted tenure of their land for thirteen hundred years, suf- fered a great shock from which they have been unable or unwilling to recover. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The West Bank, and the city of Nablus in particular, packed as it was with embittered refugees, was fertile ground for Ba’athist ideas, especially in the turbulent years that followed the assassina- tion of King Abdallah of Jordan in 1951—killed by a Palestinian for his collusion with Israel during the 1948 war and his proposal to accept its existence after the war. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, he was clever and ambitious, and attempting to read on his own, he came upon a semiclandestine news sheet, a!- Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This Ba’ath was the party that the young Abu Nidal joined when he was eighteen. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In his early twenties, already conscious of his latent abilities, he saw himself as something of a leader, seeking to impress others by spinning yarns about his own achievements. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In a light- fling preemptive campaign, Israel shattered the armies of its Arab neighbors, seized East Jerusalem and all that was left of Arab Palestine, as well as Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and Syria’s Golan Heights, and emerged as the region’s superpower, evidently stronger than any combination of Arab states. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal did not join Fatah as a humble foot soldier. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He had a head for figures, and his business was doing well. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On a visit to Nablus, he met and married a girl, Hiyam al-Bitar, from a good Jaffa family exiled like his own. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abandoning his trading company, Impex, and his Fatah comrades, he ducked out just when the guer- rillas in Jordan were coming under intense pressure from both Israel and King Hussein—a move that later earned him the charge of cowardice. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel’s counterstrategy was to lash out ferociously not only against the guerrillas themselves, on the principle of an eye for an eyelash, but also against the Arab countries that gave them sanctuary. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal was also struck by the Irgun’s more extreme offshoot, the Stern Gang, which under Shamir and others played a crucial role in unnerving both the Arabs and the British in the struggle for the Jewish state. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
During the Arab rebel- Abu Nidal seems to have had doubts about the way the How did this strategy evolve? Under the pressure of events, his Men who knew him then report that he was much influenced ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 71 72 / PATRICK SEALE lion of 1936—39, the Stern Gang was the first to introduce terrorism to the Middle East by exploding bombs on buses and in Arab markets and, in November 1944, by assassinating Lord Moyne, the British resident minister in the Middle East. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Its most eye-catching and notorious exploit was blowing up the King David Hotel in Jerusa- lem in July 1946, where the British had set up their headquarters. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
More than a hundred people died in the attack. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Where had the Palestinians gone wrong? In the mid- 1930s, they had risen in spontaneous revolt against massive Jewish immigration, but the British had crushed them, reducing the Pales- tinian community as a whole to helpless spectators for the duration of the Second World War. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
By contrast, tens of thousands of Jews served in Allied armies and learned how to fight (including the teachings of sabotage and terrorism, which some of them used to devastating effect in 1947—48 against the ill-prepared Arab popula- tion of Palestine and the rabble forces of the Arab states). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From 1948 to 1965, as Israel grew stronger and stronger, the Palestinians did nothing. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The disastrous experience of 1967 should have discredited the old guerrilla strategy, but the Palestinians were seduced into believ- ing that despite the defeat of regular Arab armies, “armed struggle” could still be waged against Israel, on the Algerian or Vietnamese model, in the form of a popular liberation war. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
By early 1968, such ineffectual pinpricks had been virtually ended and Israel was ready to counterattack against guer- rilla bases in Jordan—and then against Jordan itself, predictably creating grave tensions between the guerrillas and the king. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Not surprisingly, King Hussein saw their undisciplined posturings as a threat to himself and began cooperating secretly with Israel to contain them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Women, children, and non-Israelis on board were soon freed, but to Israel’s rage, the remaining twelve Israeli men among the passengers were held for thirty-nine days and were only released in exchange for fifteen Palestinians detained in Israeli jails. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Outraged by the violence Israel had done to his people, he had vowed to use violence in return. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It needs to be recalled that in the twenty years from 1948 to 1968, the Palestinians had never considered attacking an Israeli, still less a Jew, outside Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Stiff- ened by the United States and by a threat of intervention by Israel, he unleashed his tanks against the guerrillas and his air force against some Syrian armor that had crossed halfheartedly into Jordan in their support. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
At a stroke, the guerrillas lost their vital sanctuary in Jordan, from which they had dreamed of pushing Israel back from the Jordan River—and so liberating Palestine inch by inch. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Militarily, their “armed strug- gle” had been totally ineffective and had lost them the sympathy and backing of Jordan, the Arab country with the longest frontier with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This was the first terrorist operation of its kind, the prototype for many others to come, and its mastermind was Wadi Haddad, a Palestinian revolutionary from Safad who had graduated as a medi- cal doctor from the American University of Beirut. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Had the first hijacked plane not been Israeli, such piracy might have been rejected by the Palestinians themselves from the very beginning. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Fatah disapproved of hijacking and had no intention of following the PFLP’s example. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But because the PFLP’s target had been an “enemy” plane, the Arab world was loath to condemn the hijacking. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Spirits that had been downcast were now raised and a great impetus was given to violence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The resistance movement in 1971 was in utter disarray. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Their inability to hit the enemy on his home ground had convinced them that their only option was to seek targets abroad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Such, for example, was the PFLP attack on December 26, 1968, on an El Al Boeing at the Athens airport, in which one Israeli was killed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
of a TWA Boeing on a flight from Rome to Tel Aviv and its diversion to Damascus. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Two Israelis on board were quietly ex- changed for two captured Syrian pilots, but Israel’s response then took the familiar form of air raids, artillery barrages, and ground assaults against Arab and Palestinian targets. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Reprisals became still more violent when Golda Meir took over as Israel’s prime minister in March 1969, inaugurating a policy of “active self-defense,” which meant seeking out and destroying Palestinians—before or in case they attacked. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
under the banner of Black September, Fatah radicals joined with Wadi Haddad and others in a widespread terrorist campaign. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Three distinct trends were discernible: Some of these militants wanted to kill Israelis; others wanted to put pressure on King Hussein to release the three thousand Palestinian prisoners held in his jails since September 1970 and allow the guerrillas back into Jordan; still others wanted to attack American targets, especially airlines and oil companies, to punish the U.S. for its support of Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But by 1973, after the murders and counter-murders of the War of the Spooks, Fatah and Israel were ready to conclude an unofficial truce. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For example, he justified the attack on the Israeli athletes at Munich—an operation that, perhaps more than any other, tarnished the Palestinians’ repu- tation—with the specious argument that Israel had taken the Pales- tinians’ rightful place at the games. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ans’ catastrophic defeat in Jordan and the subsequent dirty war with Israel, which, as is clear from the list I drew up at the start, took a heavy toll of Palestinian lives. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Why aren’t we landing?” Suffering what appeared to be an attack of hysteria, he found he could no longer move his legs. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But with Jordan now lost to them, how were the guerrillas to fight Israel? Many Palestinian fighters believed that they had been unjustly thrown out of Jordan and that King Hussein should be coerced into letting them back in. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They appealed to Arab intermediaries like King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to intercede for them, asking to be allowed back to fight Israel in full coordination with the king, if he so wished. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Wanting safe and peaceful frontiers with Israel, Hussein firmly rejected their overtures. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the Arab world, the October War is still thought of as an Arab victory that erased the humiliation of 1967. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arabs prefer to remember the early successes, when Egypt and Syria caught Israel napping and stormed its defenses on the Suez and Golan fronts, rather than the later failures, when Israel re- gained the initiative. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
June--July 1974, adopted after much heated debate a ten-point political program that accepted the principle that the PLO should set up a “national authority” on any “liberated” territory. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Amjad Ata was married to one of Abu Nidal’s nieces and was to become one of the leading killers in his organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On September 5, the day of the attack on the Saudi embassy, fifty-six heads of state had assembled in Algiers for the Fourth Non-Aligned Conference, which was opened that day by the Al- gerian leader Houari Boumédienne, in the presence of UN Secre- tary-General Kurt Waldheim. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Why are you attacking Abu Nidal?” he asked. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In any event, no effort was made to carry it out. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
(He would eventually be killed in southern Lebanon, during Israel’s invasion in 1982.) Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad recounted to me that when he first spoke to the gunmen from the control tower, they were violent and abusive, but he was gradually able to influence each one of them in turn, including their leader, who called himself Tony. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the meantime, President Sadat agreed to release the five prisoners held in Egypt, who were flown to Tunis to join the gun- men on board the plane. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When they chose Libya, Abu lyad got President Bourguiba to agree to the transaction. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The four gunmen on board, who called themselves mem- bers of the Martyr Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur Squad, forced the plane to fly to Tunis, where one of their hostages, a German doctor, was shot and tossed out onto the tarmac. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Their most pressing demand was for the release from Egyptian jails of the five comrades who had staged the attack on the Pan Am plane at Fiumicino in December 1973 and who were awaiting trial by the PLO. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad thought the whole thing a scandal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
head, about the colonel’s manner. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The turmoil started in Lebanon in the wake of Operation Litani, Israel’s invasion of March 1978. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel occupied the whole of South Lebanon up to the Litani River, One of Abu Nidal’s principal lieutenants at this time was Abd Israel announced that its invasion of Lebanon was a response ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 113 114 / PATRICK SEALE sending a panic-stricken population fleeing northward toward Bei- rut. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the shootout, nine guerrillas and thirty-seven Israelis were killed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Skirmishing broke out at several camps and there were casual- ties on both sides. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Between January and May 1981, Isa went five times to Damascus at the head of a small delegation for discreet talks with General Au Duba, head of military intelligence; General Muhammad al-Khuly, head of air force intelligence; and Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Syria was holding half a dozen of his members in jail, on suspicion of having been involved in sabotage in Damascus in the 1970s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For his part, Abd al-Rahman Isa took the Syrians to task for their intervention against the Palestinians in Lebanon and for standing by while Maronite militias besieged the Palestinian camp of Ta! a!-Za’tar and then massacred many of its inhabitants. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, by 1983—85, his main subject of disagreement with Hus- sein was over strategy vis-à-vis Israel, and in particular a dispute over how to recover the Arab territories Israel had conquered in 1967. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
King Hussein thought that he could win at least some of them back through negotiations with Israel, in which he would represent the Palestinians as well as himself. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Assad’s view was that only a solid Arab front, which included Syria, could have any chance of making Israel yield. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Assad had fought the 1973 October War together with Sadat in the hope of loosening Israel’s hold over the occupied territories and forcing it to the conference table. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Israel had gained the upper hand, defeating Egypt so decisively that it was Sadat who was forced to conclude a separate peace, leaving Syria and its neighbors Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians exposed to Israeli power. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From then on, Syria’s concern was to prevent Israel from picking off the lesser players and bringing them into its orbit. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel sought to offer Hussein the job of policing the Palestinians in the occupied territories while retaining sovereignty for itself, together with control over land, water, and security. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hussein’s counter- strategy was to press for a Jordanian-Palestinian federation, which, he felt, would give Israel the security it needed while providing the necessary outlet for restless Palestinian aspirations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1983, Hussein set about trying to convince Arafat to let him talk to Israel on behalf of both of them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Three Fatah At first, this had to be done in small numbers and with very Israel’s second invasion of Lebanon, of June 1982, was a great ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 131 132 / PATRICK SEALE colonels—Abu Musa, Abu Salih, and Abu Khalid al-Amli—had been outraged by Arafat’s decision to evacuate Beirut in September 1982 rather than carry on the fight against Israel, and they resented the protection he had given to a number of cowardly officers who had failed the test of battle. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
An event then took place that was also hugely to Abu Nidal’s advantage. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A group of Fatah officers, based in Lebanon and Syria, rose in rebellion against Arafat in the spring of 1983. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The cars provided by air force intelligence proved a dangerous loophole. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As Israel’s armies, harried by the Lebanese resistance, fell back toward the border, Abu Nidal’s men pushed south as far as Sidon, adding all the while to their numbers as they went along. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
~ Ith i~o / PATRICK SEALE and character, presenting him with a number of critical choices: What sort of movement did he wish to command and what sort of leader did he wish to be? The main impetus for the organization’s transformation was the so-called War of the Camps, a pitiless struggle between Pales- tinians and Shi’ites, which lasted from 1985 to 1987, leaving count- less thousands dead, wounded, or uprooted from their homes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Shi’ites and Palestini- ans believed their very survival was at stake. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
flare up again, because the fundamental problem was not resolved: The Shi’ites wanted to be masters in their own house. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The original tightly knit, secretive terrorist organization had suddenly come above- ground and rejoined the Palestinian mainstream. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
While Abu Nidal was abroad in Poland, his organization had taken on a different life When, in earlier years, he had been on good terms with Arafat, Qaddafi felt he needed Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
(It was said that this was done with the complicity of Libya’s minister of the interior, Colonel Khwaldi al-Humaidi, whose sympathies were with Fatah.) Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal himself posed as the supreme rejectionist, a diehard opponent of the negotiated settlement with Israel that the “capitu- lationist” Arafat had been angling for since 1974. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Widening the scope of my inquiries, I left Tunis and its hot- house politics of defectors and guerrilla fighters to consult sources in Europe and the Middle East. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
What view did they have of Abu Nidal and his organization? I heard two quite different explanations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The conventional view was the one Abu Nidal advanced—that he represented one extreme pole of the internal Palestinian debate, which had raged for twenty years, about whether a compromise with Israel was possible or even desirable. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But a second opinion put forward by some of my sources was more sensational—and more in line with Abu lyad’s allegations: Abu Nidal was a tool of the Israelis, either because his organization had been penetrated by the Mossad (much as the Mossad had penetrated every other Palestinian faction, at one time or another, over the past twenty-five years) or because he himself had been recruited. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hard evidence remained scant, but as I discovered, the subject was gossiped about a good deal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Jordanian intelligence officer supplied no evidence to support his remarks, but his view is typical of the widespread gossip that surrounds this supposition in Mideast intel- ligence circles. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
the Palestinian rebellion, greatly strengthened the Israeli-Jordanian intelligence relationship. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As my Jordanian source explained, the guerrillas shook King Hussein’s throne; they called on Syrian tanks for support; they assassinated Hussein’s prime minister, Wasfi al- Tal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
powers, Israel and Jordan, whose excellent intelligence services wanted to contain Palestinian militancy and penetrate the various Palestinian groups beyond their borders. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I couldn’t understand what drove him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In this view, Abu Nidal was less a product of intra-Palestinian disputes than of Israel’s long-running war against the Palestinians. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Whatever jobs he might have done for Arab sponsors, and they had been numerous and nasty, he had done many other jobs from which Israel alone appeared to “benefit.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ficer about a Mossad—Abu Nidal connection was put more strongly by some of my other sources. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Then a French government expert on international terrorism, with considerable Middle East experience, said to me in the course of a long interview in 1991, “If Abu Nidal himself is not an Israeli agent, then two or three of his senior people most certainly are. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Nothing else can explain some of his operations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Some thought the penetration was at a low level; some believed that senior men had been recruited, perhaps even Abu Nidal him- self and members of his extended family. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It’s quite likely that Mossad picked up Abu Nidal in the late 1960s, when it was putting a lot of effort into penetrating the newly formed Palestinian guerrilla groups. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For practioners of counterespionage, this was the stuff of dreams. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE BOMB AND THE BULLET Throughout their recent history, many Palestinians have been killed by both Israel and their fellow Arabs. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In more than forty years of bloodletting, Palestinians have died in the 1947—48 war that led to the creation of Israel; the 1967 war, in which Israel conquered the rest of Palestine; the showdown with King Hussein of Jordan and the “pacification” of Gaza by General Ariel Sharon, both in 1970—71; the battles in Lebanon against the Maronites and against Syria in 1975—77; Israel’s two invasions of Lebanon, in 1978 and 1982; the intra-Palestinian fighting at the time of the Fatah mutiny of 1983; the War of the Camps between Palestinians and Shi’ites in 1986—87; Israel’s repression of the intifada from 1987 onward and its repeated bombing of Palestinian settlements and positions up to the present time; and of course, the punishment inflicted on the Palestinians, in Kuwait and elsewhere, for their stance in favor of Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf war. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As was clear from the list I drew up at the start, many of its brightest people have been gunned down or blown up in cold blood either by Israel or by Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the meantime, the murder of so many of his associates has crippled the PLO. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal’s split from Fatah, the most damaging factional dispute in its history, occurred in October 1974, at a crucial moment in the fortunes of the resistance movement. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His efforts to persuade his followers to substitute political action for armed struggle strongly suggested that he wanted a peaceful settlement with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As we have seen, for both Israeli and Palestinian hard-liners this program was a deadly threat, and over the following years, Arafat found himself caught between two fires, neither of them friendly. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The more sympathy Arafat won for the PLO, the higher his interna- tional profile, the more urgent it became for Israel and its friends to stop him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When the Labor party’s Yitzhak Rabin was prime minister, Israel’s attitude toward the Palestinians was negative enough: Rabin had no interest in encouraging PLO moderates and opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the policy became one of violent and unflinching rejection once Menachem Begin came to power in May 1977. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Just as Israel considered the PLO a menace to be rooted out, so Abu Nidal branded Arafat a traitor for considering the “surren- der” to Israel of 80 percent of Palestinian territory, condemning most Palestinians never to return to their original homes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Fatah, he thundered, was run by traitors who threatened to wreck the revolution by working for a “peaceful solution” with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In their parallel anti-PLO activities, to what extent did Israel between Likud and Labor. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel’s strategy to destroy the PLO by all possible means has There is no place for any division in the Israeli camp ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 161 C, 162 / PATRICK SEALE and Abu Nidal act independently of each other and to what extent were their efforts coordinated? This, my intelligence sources said, was the puzzle every service was anxious to crack. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For example, if Abu lyad’s suspicions were correct, Abu Nidal may have killed Pales- tinian doves because Israel wished to eliminate Palestinian moder- ates who had made an impression on Western leaders; but he may also have killed them because he believed they were traitors who consorted with the Israeli enemy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arafat, too, con- demned Sadat, but so hesitantly that Arab rejectionists suspected him of wanting to go to Israel himself. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From I reflected that in the murders of the Palestinian moderates, It could be argued, however, that the successful manipulation Moreover, Abu Nidal’s violence made it easier for Israel to Hammami was one of the most eloquent Palestinian advocates 1975 onward, he had held a series of meetings with Israeli peace campaigners, notably with the editor and writer Un Avnery, whose book My Friend, the Enemy (1986) gives a moving account of these furtive but unfruitful encounters. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Israel’s hard-liners also loathed him for his advocacy of a two-state solution and his impact on British opinion. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But had Israel, by manipulation, given the murderous process a nudge? So far as I could see, there was no evidence for it and the mystery remained unsolved. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This sounded plausible as Iraq was then taking the lead in ostracizing Egypt for its contacts with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Who, I wondered, was responsible this time? Was it Iraq, or was some other party involved? November 1978, an Arab summit was convened in Baghdad to condemn Egypt for signing the Camp David accords with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1987 when, as we shall see, Abu lyad had a night-long If neither Iraqi intelligence nor Abu Nidal ordered the killings, Israel giving up territory. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They were both eloquent exponents of Israeli-Palestinian coexistence, of a two-state solution, ideas that were anathema to the Likud, the governing coalition in Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Another powerful blow had been struck in Israel’s war against the PLO. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
To complete The rumor was that Israel was exacting revenge for Salameh’s The new, prestigious job in Fatah, together with optimism ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 167 •,; H i~~l i~s / PATRICK SEALE his entry into the conservative beau monde, Salameh took as his second wife a stunning Lebanese beauty queen and a former Miss Universe, a Christian girl named Georgina Rizk. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
role in Black September operations five years earlier. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He then took over one of Black September’s “tiger cub” groups and managed to throw a small bomb at some oil storage tanks in Trieste on August 5, 1972—whereupon he was secretly contacted by a number of oil companies with offers of protection money. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
U.S.-PLO relations grew closer still when Jimmy Carter de- According to my Western intelligence sources, Israel opposed However, the former Mossad agent Victor Ostrovsky says prime minister, was greatly concerned with Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Having removed Egypt from the Arab front line by the 1979 peace treaty, Begin now wanted to bring Lebanon into Israel’s orbit—and thus neutralize Syria. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Mossad had for some years been grooming a Lebanese Christian warlord, Bashir Gemayel, to be Israel’s procon- sul in Beirut. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In fact he had to wait until June 1982, when an attempt on the life of Israel’s ambassador in London gave him the pretext he needed for a war in Lebanon, which he hoped would allow him to realize his strategic plan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But this was the last thing the Israeli government wanted to do, for as we have seen, the main fear of Israeli hard-liners such as Begin—a fear shared by his successors—is not PLO militancy but PLO modera- tion, which might, under pressure of international opinion, force Israel to negotiate and therefore make territorial concessions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Israel’s Secret Wars (1991), two highly respected authors, Ian Black and Benny Morris, say that Ostrovsky’s book embar- rassed the Israelis. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“If an intelligence agency cannot manage to Khudr was killed at a time when Menachem Begin, Israel’s Khudr, the PLO’s man in Brussels, was one of several Pales- In his book, Ostrovsky says that Khudr was murdered by a Ostrovsky is not a careful writer, hardly, it would appear, any ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 169 I~I I 170 / PATRICK SEALE keep its own innermost secrets . Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
even more skeptical. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On August 29, 1981, three months after Khudr’s death, two of Abu Nidal’s gunmen stormed a synagogue in Vienna. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Ac- cording to the Israeli writer Yossi Melman, in The Master Terror- ist: The True Story of Abu Nidal (1987), the Austrians sent a photograph of one of the gunmen they had arrested to the Belgian police team investigating the Khudr murder. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On March 3, 1980, an attempt to kill Max Mazin, a prominent member of Madrid’s Jewish community, had also gone wrong: In an apparent case of mistaken identity, the killer gunned down a Spanish lawyer, Adolfo Cottello, who happened to live or work in the same building. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
And in Vienna, on May 1, 1981, Heinz Nittal, a prominent member of Vienna’s Jewish community, head of the Austria-Israel Friendship Society and a friend of Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, was murdered. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the spring of 1981, Begin began a series of aggres- sive maneuvers in Lebanon—the shooting down of two Syrian helicopters in April; the heavy air and naval bombardments of Palestinian positions in May and June—which he clearly hoped would draw the Syrians and the Palestinians into a fight. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In an intervie~ with the distinguished French daily Le Monde on January 22, 1982, Sartawi was bold: the rejection front, but a renegade in the service of Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal is not a maximalist serving the cause of Who but Israel could be interested in eliminating We do not ask ourselves these questions anymore interviewed him a year later in Algiers, at the Palestine National Council meeting of February 1983. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1948, his family had fled from Acre, near Haifa, to Iraq, where he began his medical studies, later becoming a heart surgeon in the In great agitation, Sartawi repeated this charge to me when I To make matters worse for him, at the PNC meeting Arafat On April 10, 1983, as Sartawi was chatting in the lobby of a Whether or not Israel had had a hand in his murder, there was Sartawi had not always been a dove. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He argued that the Arabs could not challenge Israel with conventional military force or with guerrilla warfare. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Only dialogue and links to forces inside Israel could bring peace to the Middle East, a peace that might at last give the Palestinians a state of their own. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
‘I know Israel is playing games with you,’ I told him.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel has pene- trated us in the past. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel used to plant them on me. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But let me tell you that I send my own North African members—the ones I really trust—to France to turn and recruit Israel’s North African agents! Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They told me that the CIA, which works closely with Israel on Palestinian matters, had brought the Mossad into the arrangement as well. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They gave me all the As he recollected their conversation, Abu lyad could still Abu lyad told me that he had thought about Israel’s manipula- “We stopped terrorism in 1974,” he insisted, “but the Israelis The Mossad agents that Abu Iyad had in mind were probably ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 175 el ~ II. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was an attempted murder rather than a murder, and it did not involve a dove. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
seen nothing and never offered to help me.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He had been Abu Nidal’s friend, he told me, since their early days in Saudi Arabia but had broken with him over the killing of Yassin and the other PLO representatives. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If Dr. Ghassan was in fact Israel’s man, he was extremely well placed to manipulate the organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was he who had handled the operation to kill Heinz Nittal, Chancellor Bruno Kreisky’s friend, in Vienna in May 1981—which, as we have seen, is difficult but not impossible to square with the notion that Israel had penetrated the organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was headed from 1979 to 1982 by an explosives expert, Naji Abu al-Fawaris, who had lost a hand and an eye in an accident in 1973. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hailing from the village of Amin, near Jenin in the West Bank, he was consumed, like many Palestinians of similar To an outside observer, there seemed to be periods when the This directorate was the object of Abu Nidal’s special atten- At the beginning, when the directorate was first founded, in When the organization planned to move to Syria in the early Although physically ugly, unshaven, and shabbily dressed, Isa But Isa was restless. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
(Its name is the same as the PLO’s magazine, another example of Abu Nidal’s wish to pre- sent himself as a rival and alternative to Yasser Arafat’s move- ment.) Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The experience of killing his mother-in-law and sister-in-law to From my investigations, I concluded that real power in Leba- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 209 The case for suspecting a possible link between Israel and Abu Nidal rests on a body of evidence, much of it inferential and conjec- tural, some of it more substantial. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I then sought to identify the senior men inside the organization who might be directing these agents and otherwise manipulating operations in Israel’s interest. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Since the late 1960s, Israel has repeatedly bombed, shelled, raided, and overrun the positions of its Palestinian and Shi’ite oponents in Lebanon— whether they be Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP, the PFLP—General Command, Hizballah, or others. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel has had a largely free hand in Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It controls the skies over Lebanon, and even on the ground in the south, there is little to stop it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A German expert on counterterrorism told me in London in 1990, “Those that the Israelis want to destroy, they destroy, even if it means sending in assassins. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
east of Sidon, in Lebanon, known as the Cadres School, is in fact a military camp, standing alone and exposed in the mountains. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Since the 1970s, Israel has also regularly sent ground forces on Abu Nidal has very largely been left alone. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
behavior seemed to me suspect. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal sabotaged the meeting by discussing such trivia as whose wife had been seen at the hairdresser’s? Who had lunched at a fancy restau- rant in Switzerland instead of making do with a sandwich? And who had thrown away a kilo of perfectly edible tomatoes at the training camp? interfered with it, as, for example in the case of the mysterious Lt. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Was Abu Nidal aware, they asked, of the risks he was running by killing Soviet agents? Abu Nidal, Atif Abu Bakr told me that he had confronted Abu Nidal with the Soviet accusation and that to his great surprise, Abu Nidal had said they were right, he had killed Mraish to get back at Fatah. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Organiza- tion Directorate’s Palestine/Jordan Committee has almost no funds or facilities and was for a long time manned by only two persons—Samir Darwish, who was sent on a mission to Peru, where he was arrested, and Fadil al-Qaisi, who died in London after undergoing heart surgery. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1988, Atif Abu Bakr called for a special session of the leadership to see what could be done to help the int~fada. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They presented their evidence to Atif Abu Bakr, then head of Abu Nidal’s Political Directorate, and demanded an expla- nation. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
OPERATIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES Another aspect of Abu Nidal’s activities puzzled me. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestinian nationalists from the socialist left to the Islamic right regard the intifada in the occupied territories as the great national battle, a unique effort, after years of passivity, to liberate the territories. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Yet he has not thrown a stone in the occupied territories, either before or during the int~fada. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Old women brave tear gas. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), the umbrella organization running the int?fada, was set up in 1988, Abu Nidal’s publications considered it an extension of Arafat’s PLO and ig- nored it completely. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal’s inattention to the Palestinian cause is reflected in the structure of his organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Ma’mun Mraish. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was based at its clandestine naval station in Greece, where, in association with Abu Jihad, he was principally concerned with moving men and weapons into the occupied territo- ries. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The CIA must therefore have been on his trail as well. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The PLO concluded that either the Mossad or the CIA was responsible. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Mraish their man and wanted his killer. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Many Palestinians knew that Mraish was one of the most effective links between the PLO and the West Bank, and Abu Nidal, therefore, did not want it to be known that he had killed him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In all the years I have been talking to people from the territories, no one has ever heard of a single operation—no matter how trivial—attributed to Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Intelligence Directorate’s Committee for Special Missions—which mounts assassinations— employs dozens of cadres and has unlimited funds. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Throughout the entire int~[ada, Abu Nidal has given no additional resources to the Palestine/Jordan Committee and mounted no operations in southern Lebanon, like those by other Palestinian organizations, to harass the Israelis. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Universally known in the Palestinian under- ground as Ma’mun al-Saghir, Mraish was one of Fatah’s ablest and most active officers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They investigated the case for several months and concluded that Mraish had been killed by Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Despite his attacks Abu Nidal’s large establishment near the village of Bqasta, Before a split within Abu Nidal’s ranks that would make them ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 211 There have been no victims of Israeli reprisals among i 212 / PATRICK SEALE Nidal’s top leadership. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal has struck targets in nearly all parts of the world—Bangkok, Australia, Peru. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
of Athens, a gunman riding pillion on a motorcycle came abreast Mraish’s car and killed him outright with a burst of machine-gun fire. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Shi’ite fighters harried the Israeli army, blew up the American embassy, slaughtered Amer- ican marines, took Western hostages. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Syria used terror against its own inhabitants at Hama when they challenged the regime in 1982; it encouraged its proxies to use terror to drive Israel out of Leba- non; and it used terror against Jordan to draw it back from the brink of making a separate deal with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Even before the creation of the state, Zionist terrorists killed Lord Moyne, the British resident minister in Cairo, in 1944, and very nearly killed the high commis- sioner in Palestine, Sir Harold MacMichael. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the middle of the Palestine war, the extremist LHI (or the Stern Gang, as it was known, after its founder) murdered the UN mediator, Count Ber- nadotte, who had negotiated a truce and was attempting to make it permanent—which would have limited Israel’s further expansion. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In his book Bernadotte in Palestine, 1948 (1989), Amitzur Ilan shows that LHI’s leaders, Nathan Yelin-Mor, Dr. Israel Eldred, and Yitzhak Shamir, were directly responsible for the assassina- tion. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1954, an Israeli undercover unit bombed the U.S. information cen- ter in Cairo in an attempt to damage U.S.-Arab relations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As Robert I. Friedman has related in his biography of Kahane, The False Prophet (1990), the object was to put U.S.-Soviet relations under such strain that rather than risk damaging détente, Moscow would release hun- dreds of thousands of Jews, many of whom would have to settle in Israel—a strategy that was to bear fruit in due course. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The latest such victim was Dr. Gerald Bull, the Canadian inventor of Iraq’s “supergun,” who was killed by Israeli agents in Brussels in March 1990 (as described by William Lowther in his book Arms and the Man: Dr. Gerald Bull, Iraq and the Supergun [199!]). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
goals, Abu Nidal’s was usually fitful and purposeless, although several of his attacks were aimed at securing the release of some of his men held in European jails after earlier, and often botched, operations, and his attacks on European targets in the mid-1980s were, as I suggested, intended to embarrass Syria so as to explain his departure from that country. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel’s terror was coherent, pro- fessional, and largely successful in achieving its objectives; Abu Nidal’s was incoherent, incompetent, and invariably counterpro- ductive to Palestinian interests. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal’s terror took the form of “services rendered” to his various Arab hosts or exercises in extortion inspired by no strategic vision. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
PLO and Israel so as to recover Palestine was not a credible objec- tive. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The vast imbalance of strength between Israel and its oppo- nents made such a pursuit suicidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
TANGLED THREADS OF VIOLENCE At this stage in my researches I decided to make another list—this time focusing on international acts of violence that were related to But whereas Israel’s terror always served long-term political His claim that he wanted to prevent a compromise between the ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 231 232 / PATRICK SEALE Middle Eastern players—to see if I could discern a pattern as I had been able to do from the earlier list. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel’s Prime Minister Begin says it is “the saddest day of his life.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
groomed by Israel to rule in Lebanon, is assassinated, almost certainly with the complicity of Syrian agents. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel and Lebanon is signed, giving Israel a wide measure of control over its northern neighbor. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
casualties in Lebanon, Menachem Begin resigns as prime min- ister of Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
non’s Shuf Mountains, whereupon Syrian-backed Druze and Shi’ite forces expel Israel’s Maronite allies from the area and lay siege to the presidential palace. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Shi’ite anger is directed at Israel’s ally America, as well as at Israel itself. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
wage a terrorist war on Jordan to deter King Hussein from entering into separate negotiations with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
revives a U.S.-Israel agreement on strategic cooperation (first concluded in 1981, suspended when Israel annexed the Golan Heights, but activated in 1982 by Alexander Haig), giving Israel wide opportunities to influence U.S. Middle East policy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
April 18, 1983—The U.S. embassy in Beirut is blown up May 17, 1983—An American-brokered accord between August 29, 1983—Demoralized by Israel’s mounting September 3—25, 1983—Israel pulls its forces out of Leba- October 16, 1983—In a clash with a vast crowd of Shi’ites October 23, 1983—A car-bomb attack on the U.S. Ma- *October 1983—November 1985—Syria uses Abu Nidal to November 1983—U.S. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
secretary of state George Shultz December—January 1983—84—American war planes and December 4, 1983—Eight more U.S. Marines are killed in January 26, 1984—In his state of the union address, Ro- February 29, 1984-The Israel-Lebanon accord of May ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 233 234 / PATRICK SEALE 17, 1983, is abrogated. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
May 23, 1984-Israel’s state attorney’s office indicts Palestinian fighters “terrorists” so as to deny them legitimacy, greatly expanded its exploitation of this issue, aiming to shape American attitudes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Israelis were being driven out, while the American embassy had been blown up and American marines slaughtered in their barracks. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
used by Ronald Reagan and George Shultz and echoed by Vice President George Bush and CIA director William Casey. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
America’s policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute would thereafter be limited largely to counterterrorism rather than an attempt to trace the roots of violence to the dispossession of the Palestinians, to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, or to the Shi’ites’ burning sense of injustice. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
time, by the proceedings of a conference organized in Washington in June 1984 by Israel’s Jonathan Institute. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They include men who car-bombed and maimed Palestinian mayors on the West Bank in June 1980. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Like Claire Sterling’s The Terror Network in the early Reagan years, the conference papers became the master text of America’s obsession with terrorism in Reagan’s second term. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He identified Syria as the key terrorist state whose “worldwide intelligence apparatus” made use of Palestinians, Armenians, Japanese, and even Thais! Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
*March 24, 1984-A bomb explodes in the forecourt of the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman two days before a planned visit to Jordan by Queen Elizabeth of Britain. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In a phone call to a London news agency, the Revolutionary Organization of So- cialist Muslims claims responsibility. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
*November 29, 1984-The British Airways office in Bei- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 235 PATRICK SEALE / rut is bombed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
April 3, 1984-President Reagan signs a directive author- izing reprisals and preemptive strikes against “terrorists.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the summer of 1984, Israel, which had for years labeled all The new focus was on “state-sponsored terrorism,” the phrase President Reagan was apparently greatly influenced, at this ambassador, Benjamin Netanyahu, these proceedings were later published in a book titled Terrorism: How the West Can Win. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Part of an elaborate cam- paign of psychological warfare directed against the PLO, Syria, and Libya, the book helped persuade American opinion that Israel’s enemies were also America’s, that Arabs in dispute with Israel were terrorists, and that brute force against them was legitimate and desirable. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
*March 28, 1984-Ken Whitty, a cultural-affairs coun- selor at the British embassy in Athens, is killed when a gunman opens fire on his car. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Beirut, the Revolutionary Organiza- tion of Socialist Muslims (an Abu Nidal front) claims responsi- bility. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal claims responsibility. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims again claims responsibility. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
April 17, 1984-A British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, is killed when a gunman inside the Libyan People’s Bureau in London opens fire on anti-Qaddafi demonstrators. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Only Israel stood to gain from such outrages, he said. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel would not massacre Jews, whatever political or propaganda advantages could be derived from such an operation. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Yet the puzzling and inexplicable fact was that although everyone knew Rome and Vienna were Abu Nidal’s operations and that he had moved his headquarters to Libya, which was perfectly accessible to an Israeli strike, Israel did not retaliate— not against Libya or against Abu Nidal or against the men directly involved, Dr. Ghassan and Alaa. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But they had, and Israel, uniquely in this case, had done nothing to punish them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But whoever ordered the attacks, the intended political effect was clear: to stop short the developing contacts between Italy and Austria and the PLO for an accommodation with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Rome and Vienna op- erations had created violent anti-Arab feeling in the West; they had enabled Israel to make political capital out of the terrorist issue; and—together with the bomb at La Belle discotheque in Berlin, in which Abu Nidal had no part—they had prepared the ground for the American attack on Libya of April 1986. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The implication he drew—and in view of his hatred of Abu Nidal, it was a self-serving one—was that Abu Nidal’s organization provided Israel with a means to penetrate not just the Palestinian movemeni but Arab society as a whole. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He had promised to join her in Israel, where they were to be married. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was timed to go off while the aircraft was in flight. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Could Assad have known about it? Given his anxiousness to avoid war with Israel, I could hardly believe that he would sanction the Heathrow bomb. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was widely supposed that Khuly’s motive was revenge for an incident two months earlier, when Israel, hoping to capture Pales- tinian guerrilla leaders, had intercepted and forced down in Israel the executive jet returning Syrian officials to Damascus. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Air force intelligence then sent the bomb by Syrian diplomatic bag to London, where it was handed over to Hindawi. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1985, some months before the Heathrow incident, Hai- dar had recommended Hindawi to Syrian intelligence as a London- based free-lance writer and opponent of the Jordanian regime who might come in useful in the campaign Syria was then waging against Jordan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
which his sleep was interrupted. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He then confessed that he had met General Khuly in Damascus in January 1986 and that a month later one of Khuly’s officers, Colonel Haitham Sa’id, had given him a Syrian service passport in a false name and instructed him to place a bomb on an El Al aircraft in London. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On his return to Damascus, Sa’id had shown him the suitcase bomb and told him how to prime it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
However, in court, Hindawi retracted his confession and claimed he was the victim of a conspiracy, probably by Israeli agents. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He alleged that the British detective sergeant who had arrested him and taken part in his interrogation had threatened to turn him over to the Mossad and had told him that his father and mother, who lived in London, were also under arrest. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He complained that the police had invented statements attributed to him and had forced him to sign them unread. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Ann Murphy, a chambermaid at a London hotel, had been given the bag by her Jordanian boyfriend, Nizar Hindawi, by whom she was five months pregnant. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hindawi left the bus hurriedly and went to the Syrian embassy, where he asked the ambassador, Dr. Lutfallah Haidar, for assistance. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In February 1990, he was reported to have left Syria for Jordan, where the authorities are believed to have offered him safe haven. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Cyprus, in the eastern Mediterranean just off the Syrian coast, had long been sympathetic to the Palestinians, having supported them during Israel’s siege of Beirut in 1982 and given them a haven when Arab states expelled them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Cyprus sometimes seemed more committed to the Palestinian cause than many Arab countries— much to Israel’s annoyance. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
claiming they were directed at places from which Falasha Jews, escaping from Ethiopia, were taken to Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Sudanese Lawyers’ Association condemned the terrorists but, in lingering sympathy with the Pales- tinian cause, undertook their defense. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Qaddafi didn’t want the French to think ill of him, but Abu Nidal did not mind embarrassing Palestinians. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
And whenever the press reported that Iran was secretly buying arms from Israel, Abu Nidal’s magazine rushed to refute the charge, as if he himself had stood accused. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
lah’s numerous operations against Israel’s self-styled “security zone” in southern Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Bound hand and foot, the prisoner could move his hands only enough to take and eat food thrown in to him from an opening in the cell wall. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
By 1986—87, beatings and torture in the organi- zation’s prisons had become routine. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
INTERNAL MASSACRES With the passage of years, the blood shed by Abu Nidal swelled into a torrent. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
That she was a new bride, who had not known her husband for long and knew nothing of the organization and no one in it, did not spare her. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Syrian air force intelligence asked its contact man in the organiza- tion, Abd al-Karim al-Banna (Abu Nidal’s nephew), if he knew of a member called Mujahid al-Bayyari; they wished to interview him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Like Habash’s PFLP or Jibril’s PFLP—General Command or the myriad Lebanese resistance groups, they wanted to join the struggle against Israel, which, apart from its repression of Palestini- ans in the occupied territories, still occupied a substantial slice of South Lebanon, from which it regularly mounted raids northward. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But each adversary feared the other’s hidden agenda: Abu Nidal suspected that Abu lyad was scheming to split his organization; Abu lyad was convinced that Abu Nidal was plotting, with encouragement from Israel, to pene- trate the PLO, brand it as a terrorist organization, and destroy it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They sparred for a long while, reviewing the history of their mutual assassination attempts. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Let me tell you a little story about Abu lyad,” he told the meeting. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Con- vinced more than ever that the Mossad was directing Abu Nidal’s moves, Abu lyad sought to penetrate his organization and encour- age defections. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Disgusted by Abu Nidal’s methods, Abu Bakr, poet, thinker, and sharp-tongued radical, returned with relief to Fatah, the move- ment to which he had made a lifelong commitment. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE EMERGENCY LEADERSHIP Abu Bakr was a commanding figure in Palestinian circles, and his defection was a serious blow to Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abd al-Rah- man Isa was a practical man, not a theoretician. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Isa knew the real identity of the cadres; the location of the secret arms caches and bank accounts; the contents of letters Abu Nidal had exchanged with foreign governments and intelli- gence services. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Unlike Abu Bakr, he had no nostalgia for Fatah and, as an old-style rejectionist, he could not easily rid himself of the notion that Fatah was a treacherous organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If there was a Mossad link with Abu Nidal, Abd al-Rahman Isa apparently knew nothing about it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was not close to Dr. Ghassan or to his own replacement, Alaa, and he may have lost his job because he was beginning to ask awkward questions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After Abu Nizar’s murder, Isa had begun to think about his own safety. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal had killed his right-hand man. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
These included a prominent Egyptian soldier, General Sa’d al-Din Shazli, who had been President Sadat’s chief of staff during the 1973 October War but, having fallen out with him, had taken refuge in Algeria. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He knew, of course, that Abu Nizar was by then long since in his grave, buried in cement under Abu Nidal’s Libyan villa. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He put up some resistance, but they attacked him with an ax, shot him twice, and made their escape, leaving him for dead. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Surgeons at the Algiers military hospital managed to save his sight, but they had to remove one of his kidneys. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Abu Bakr But a disappointment awaited her. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On November 1, 1989, Abd al-Rahman Isa and AtifAbu Bakr issued a joint communiqué, which was in effect a declaration of war—a war that at the time of writing is still raging. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“The operations of Rome, Vienna, Sudan, Athens, Paris, and Karachi were senseless and did us immense harm. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
We will never compromise with a butcher whose hands are stained with the blood of our brothers.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Iraq set him up; Syria took him over; Libya inherited him; whether or not Israel manipulated and exploited him—and at the very least the evidence suggests there is a case to answer—it has certainly benefited from his attacks on the moderate PLO and has The disaster suffered by the PLO and by the Emergency Lead- Arafat’s misfortune was Abu Nidal’s good fortune, although ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 319 320 / PATRICK SEALE done nothing to stop him despite his attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
And now Egypt has resuscitated him in opposition to Ara- fat, whom it despises for supporting Saddam. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal’s Arab sponsors have also found the PLO threatening, and though they have been willing to buy it off, they have also felt it necessary to contain and enfeeble it, so as to frustrate Arafat’s ambition of independent policy making. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Yet Arafat is still owed the credit for renouncing terrorism and attempting to seek a negotiated settlement with Israel since 1974—a position that so alarmed both Israeli and Arab rejectionists that the most committed PLO doves were murdered by Israeli and Arab killers, the latter, Abu lyad believed, acting on Israel’s behalf. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The truth is that the PLO has for years been the main victim of terrorism rather than its perpetrator, the antithesis of the popular perception encouraged by Israeli propaganda. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Today, although battered and stumbling from Israeli and Arab assaults, the PLO remains, for lack of an alternative, the champion of Palestinian aspirations for a homeland. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The next Abu Nidal who emerges may not so easily be turned against his own people. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ans, and perhaps all Arabs, will never live in peace with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Many of these problems—Israeli occupation, guerrilla resist- ance, civilian suffering, terror—stem from Israel’s victory in 1967 over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, when it seized great tracts of terri- tory and emerged as an imperial power immeasurably stronger than all its neighbors put together. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Isaac Deutscher, a historian of the Russian revolution, was one of the first to observe that colonizing a million or more Arabs would hurt Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Just a few days after the Six-Day War, Deutscher, a Jew and a distinguished anti-Stalinist, told an interviewer (New Left Review, June 23, 1967): “It was only with disgust that I could watch on television the scenes from Israel in those days; the displays of the conquerors’ pride and brutality; the outbursts of chauvinism; and the wild celebrations of the inglorious triumph, all contrasting sharply with the pictures of Arab suffering and desolation, the treks of Jordanian refugees and the bodies of Egyptian soldiers killed by thirst in the desert. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
(‘What do they matter to me?’ ‘As far as I am concerned, they may stay or they may go.’)” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I have written it to show what bloodstained lunacy goes on behind the scenes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They kill and die to get it back. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Without peace, the prospect ahead is of more terror and counterterror of the cruel, remorseless sort I have described in this book. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Over the years, I have come to believe that Israel’s long-term security lies not in crushing Palestinian nationalism and the PLO but in coming to terms with them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
under constant threat of extinction. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The last time it faced such a threat was in the brief truce during the 1948 war, as Ezer Weizman, an Israeli war hero and former air force chief, has publicly acknowledged. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It is a peace that I, for one, involved in studying the area for the past three decades, ardently hope for. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
two things that they will not accept and that, if Israel insists on them, are bound to breed further terrorist violence such as Abu Nidal’s, and in due course further wars. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israeli domination. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But they are not ready to live indefinitely in the shadow of Israeli power, in fear of attack by its far superior military force. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Vulnerability and humiliation inevitably drive them to acquire the means to hold Israel in check. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
neighbors can only rest on mutual deterrence, on an Arab-Israeli balance of power, and eventually on good neighborliness. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel’s security cannot forever be maintained at the cost of the insecurity of its neighbors—the formula of successive Israeli and American governments over the decades. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
bearing in mind that Abu lyad and his Fatah allies had every reason to make a case against Abu Nidal and Israel, their two greatest enemies. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I looked at the medieval figures of the rabbis and Until the Palestinians’ legitimate grievances are met, Palestini- The Arab states have dealt harshly with the Palestinians out of ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 321 322 / PATRICK SEALE hassidim jumping with joy at the Wailing Wall; and I felt how the ghosts of Talmudic obscurantism—and I know these only too well—crowded in on the country, and how the reactionary atmo- sphere in Israel had grown dense and stifling. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Then came the many interviews with General Dayan, the hero and saviour, with the political mind of a regimental sergeant-major, ranting about annex- ations and venting a raucous callousness about the fate of the Arabs in the conquered areas. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Israeli writer Amos Oz says that Israelis and Palestinians have gone mad and, for their own protection, need to be separated until they can recover their sanity. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
*PLO and, 5, 69—70, 79, 85—86, 92, 96, 97—100, 114—16, 131—35, 151—54, 158—78, 198, 200, 224, 271—72, 302—27; 1974 UN General Assembly address by, 94, 160; and Qaddafi, 148-49, 313—14; relations with Iraq, 96, 112, 166, 313—16; relations with Syria, 132, 134, 223—26; and Third Fatah Congress, 86—87, 99; and War of the Camps, 140—42, 159 A’raj, Bassam al-, 189 Aranki, Nabil, 118 Arens, Moshe, 235, 322 Argov, Shiomo, 223, 232, 271 Argov affair, 222—27, 232, 271 Armenia, 190, 206, 230, 273 Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 273—75 Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), 190, 206, 272—75 Asba, Hamdi Abu, 149, 311 Assad, Hafez al-, 39—40, 42, 58, 96, 106—107, 111, 120, 125, 132, 141, 145, 166, 201, 223, 224, 234, 241, 265, 315; and Hindawi affair, 248—51, 256, 257; relations with Jordan, 121, 125—28 Ata, Amjad, 5, 18, 92, 184, 300, 301 Athens, 21, 22, 83, 184, 241; terrorist attacks in, 127, 213, 222, 235—38, 242, 266, 274 Atwan, Bajis Abu, 256 Austria, 54, 173, 204, 260; terrorist attacks in, 46, 170—71, 183, 186, 211, 228, 238—39, 243—47, 278 Awad, Mustafa, see Alaa Awad, Ramzi, 183—84, 236 Awdah, Isam, 226 Ayyat, Lakhal, 304 Aziz, Khalifa Ahmad Abd al-, 129 Aziz, Tariq, 111, 123, 145, 166, 201 Ba’ath party, 63—67, 77, 88, 95—97, 109—11 120, 214, 229—30, 239 Badawi, Abdallah Ghani, 28 Badran, Ayish, 290—91 Baghdad, 32, 37, 95, 110, 217, 230, 231, 279; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 77—80, 84, 85, 88—108, 109, 112—24, 180—86, 198, 207, 282—84; 1978 Arab summit in, 112, 166; Pact, 64 Bakr, Abmad Hasan al-, 78, 79, 88, 92, 95—96, 100, 111—12, 121, 145, 166 Bakr, Atif Abu, 35, 38, 45, 53, 141—43, 183, 188, 200, 201, 212, 213, 218—21, 255, 259, 279, 295—301, 307—12, 318—19; defection of, 307—309 Bangkok, 27, 30—31, 48 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), 204-205 Banna, Abd al-Karim al-, 293 Banna, Khalil al-, 57, 61 Banna, Marwan al-, 223, 225 Banna, Muhammed al-, 58 Banna, Sabri al-, see Nidal, Abu Banna, Salwa al-, 199—200 Barak, Ehud, 40 Basil, 104-105, 225—27, 284—85, 290—91 Bayyari, Mujahid al-, 292—93 Begin, Menachem, 5 1—52, 71, 111, 114, 160, 167, 169, 171—72, 222—27, 232, 233 Beirut, 7, 10, 13, 15, 31, 40, 47—49, 65, 74, 83, 84, 98, 101, 102, 141, 165, 167, 169, 173, 182, 199, 217, 220, 235, 268, 273, 279, 283; Israeli invasions of, 114-16, 132, 148, 159—60, 222, 224, 227, 232, 262; 1980s terrorism in, 226, 232—41 Bekaa Valley, 131—33, 140, 226—27, 232, 253, 273, 285, 288 Belgium, 23, 165, 168—71, 280; and Silco affair, 267—69 Belgrade, 23—24, 30, 37, 52, 272, 276, 277, 279 Berlin, 277, 278, 294; 1986 discotheque bombing in, 240, 246 Bernadotte, Count, 230 Biram, 47 Bishan, Ibrahim al-, 136, 144 Bitar, Hussein al-, 146—47 Black June, 107—108 Black September, 46, 47, 48, 8 1—85, 93, 101, 105, 153, 158, 160, 167—68 Boudia, Muhammad, 48 Boumédienne, Houari, 92, 147 Bourdet, Claude, 163, 178 Bourguiba, President, 103 Bqasta, 205, 211, 285—86, 291, 312 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 304 Britain, 5, 59, 60, 64, 71, 72, 137, 191, 235; and Argov affair, 223—25, 232, 271; and Hindawi affair, 247—52; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 183—84, 192, 204, 205, 223—25, 232, 235—36, 247—52, 254, 271; terrorist attacks against, 47, 49, 52, 127, 137, 148, 159, 162—63, 165, 169, 211, 223—25, 232, 234—41, 243, 247—52, 271 British Airways, terrorist attacks on, 102—103, 235—37 Brussels, 23, 47, 49, 157, 159, 268, 269; terrorist attacks in, 165, 168—70, 231, 269, 280 Budapest, 37, 53, 278—79 Bulgaria, 36, 204, 279 Bull, Gerald, 231 Bureau of the Political Directorate Abroad, 198, 208 Bush, George, 234, 314, 315 Cabral, Amilcar, 158—59 Cadres School, 211 Cairo, 81, 90, 91, 93, 96, 230, 237, 238, 242—43, 272, 319 Camp David accords, 112, 166, 169 Carter, Jimmy, 52, 112, 114, 168, 257 Casey, William, 52, 234, 236 Cells of the Arab Fedayeen, 254, 263 Central Committee, 5, 14, 16, 18, 180—81, 187, 195, 202, 203, 206, 209, 262, 290, 296, 300 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 50, 52, 110, 145, 153, 167—68, 175—76, 178, 203, 213, 234, 236, 239, 291 China, 87—88, 276 Chirac, Jacques, 249 Chou En-lai, 87—88 City of Poros (ship), attack on, 222, 265—67, 281 Cohen, Baruch, 48, 156—58 Cohen, Gula, 322 Collett, Alec, 236, 240, 271 Committee for Arab Countries, 191—93 Committee for Foreign Countries, 191—92 Committee for Revolutionary Justice, 181, 205—206, 217—19, 285—87, 288; structure and workings of, 205—206 Committee for Special Missions, 6, 20, 24, 183—84, 186, 188, 212, 245 Counterespionage Committee, 186, 188 Cuba, 8, 52, 94, 117 Cyprus, 36, 37, 48, 54, 105, 156, 164, 187, 222—23, 245, 237, 240—43, 262—67 Czechoslovakia, 275, 279 Damascus, 6, 8, 36, 40, 63, 81, 83, 85, 97, 98, 126, 173, 239, 248—52, 279; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 107—108, 109, 119—35, INDEX / 331 143—47, 194—95, 198, 199, 201, 229, 256, 257, 280, 284—85 Damm, Sayyid Qaddaf al-, 103, 245 Dar Sabra (news agency), 125, 198—99 Darwish, Samir, 212 Dawud, Abu, 41, 48, 49, 53, 70, 86—90, 91, 92, 96—99, 106—107, 114—15, 117, 189, 289; assassination attempt on, 176—178, 180 Dayan, Moshe, 151, 322 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), 41, 76—77, 176, 210 Desert Storm, 32, 50, 268, 281, 313—16, 319 Deutscher, Isaac, 321, 322 Dikko, Umaro, 236 Din, Mahmud Nur al-, 243 Disi, Jasir al-, 290—91 Douglas, Leigh, 240 Druqi, Salih al-, 245 Druze forces, 205, 214, 233 Duba, Au, 120, 121 East Berlin, 119, 203, 277, 278 East Germany, 89, 275, 277—78, 324 East Jerusalem, 66, 314 Egypt, 50—51, 64, 65, 72—73, 77, 102, 106, 126, 134, 137, 162, 164, 174, 223, 231, 237, 238, 242—43, 264, 266, 272, 3 19—20; Camp David accords, 112, 166, 169; Fatah in, 88; October War (1973), 50, 90, 93, 106, 126, 311; relations with Libya, 109, 147, 148, 242—43; Six-Day War (1967), 66, 72, 73, 155, 315; U.S. relations with, 112 Egypt Air hijacking (1985), 238, 242, 256 Egypt’s Revolution, 242—43, 254, 272 Eid, Guy, 48 Eitan, Rafael, 224 El Al Airlines, terrorist attacks on, 46, 48, 73—74, 83, 174, 183, 211, 228, 238—39, 240, 243—52, 271 Eldar, Efraim, 170 Eldred, Israel, 230 Emergency Leadership, 53, 2 18-19, 284, 309—12, 318—19 ETA, 16, 229, 272 Ethiopia, 94, 227, 263 Etritean People’s Liberation Front, 94 European operations of Abu Nidal, 23—25, 28, 54, 91—92, 105, 119, 130, 134, 168—78, 183—84, 190—92, 204, 231, 236, 243—52, 254, 265—72, 275—79, 294; see also spec~f1c cities and countries 332 / INDEX Fadi, Abu, 64 Fadlallah, Muhammad Hussein, 236, 281 Fahmi, Umar, 117 Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia, 88, 92 Faraj, 117, 119 Farazani, Muftah al-, 144 Fans, Adnan al-, 252, 277 Farra, Mi al-, see Kamal, Dr. Fatah, 7, 10—31, 32, 36—37, 40, 42, 48, 49, 66, 68—80, 117, 155, 176, 180, 210, 228, 275, 278, 290, 295, 310, 311, 314; and Black September, 81—85, 101, 105, 153, 158, 160, 167—68; diplomatic role of, 93—96, 101, 132, 142, 160—61; in Egypt, 88; in Europe, 156—58, 192, 243—47, 275, 276, 277; internal quarrels, 31, 75—77, 82, 85—86, 94—104, 109, 142, 155, 159—63; in Iraq, 77—80, 84, 85, 88—108, 203, 207, 283; in Jordan, 68—71, 75—83, 85—90, 93, 101, 153, 167; in Kuwait, 66; in Lebanon, 82, 83, 84, 96, 101, 102, 114—17, 122, 131—35, 165, 167, 173; in Libya, 88, 101, 102, 139, 147—48; mid-l980s reconciliation in, 142—43; mutiny of 1983, 131—35, 139, 141, 159, 208; Abu Nidal in, 66—71, 78—80, 88—99, 101, 154; Abu Nidal’s breach with, 78—80, 86, 93, 97—100, 118, 119, 142, 160—61, 182, 185, 276, 282, 303—306; penetration and manipulation of, 155—78, 210—27; in Syria, 88, 96—97, 122, 131, 132; terrorist and counterterrorist activities with Israel, 71—85, 88, 230—42; Third Congress, 85—87, 99; working methods of, 6—31 Fatah: The Revolutionary Council, 99—100, 305 Fattah, Nabil Abd al-, 283—84 Fawaris, Mustafa Abu al-, 207 Fawaris, Naji Abu al-, 186 Filastin al-thawra (journal), 7, 198—200 Finance Directorate, 181, 190, 202—205, 259, 270, 291 Fletcher, Yvonne, 137, 234 Force 17, 4, 49, 167, 237 Foreign Intelligence Committee, 186, 188, 266 France, 32, 64, 105, 175, 178, 180, 187, 190, 201, 222, 229, 293; and Silco affair, 267—70; terrorist attacks in, 47, 48, 49, 91—92, 129, 157, 159, 165, 184, 270—72, 274, 293 Free Officers movement, 137, 148 French Action Directe, 180, 229, 272 Fu’ad, Abu Ahmad, 288 Garang, John, 264 Gaza, 61, 62, 66, 82, 93, 159, 267, 314 Gemayel, Amin, 232, 234 Gemayel, Bashir, 169, 222, 227, 232 Geneva, 106, 127, 187, 205 Ghafur, Ahmad Abd al-, 100—104, 282 Ghassan al-All, Dr., 145, 177, 179, 181—85, 186, 190, 195, 202, 205, 206, 209, 215, 218—21, 310 Ghubash, Saif al-, 107, 129, 245 Gilzer, Simha, 48 Golan Heights, 66, 93, lii, 223, 233, 314—15 Goldmann, Nahum, 172 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 324 Goutierre, Christian, 274 Greece, 54, 83, 105, 127, 184, 187, 193, 213, 235, 236, 237, 242; terrorist attacks in, 127, 213, 222, 235—39, 242, 265-67, 281 Gulf Air 737 bombing (1983), 129 Gulf War (1991), 32—33, 38, 50, 110, 159, 268, 281, 313—16, 319 Habash, George, 7, 41, 47, 74, 76, 83, 95, 97, 139, 254 Haddad, Sa’d, 114 Haddad, Sami, 156—57 Haddad, Wadi, 74—75, 83, 95, 97, 199, 273 Hagana, 60, 61 Hagopian, Hagop, 273—75 Haidar, Lutfallah, 248 Haig, Alexander, 52, 223, 227, 233 Hama, 120; 1982 massacre, 223, 230 Hamadani, Adnan al-, 145 Hamdan, Mansur, 201 Hammad, Adnan, 165 Hammad, Nimr, 165 Hammami, Ahmad, 165 Hammami, Sa’id, 43, 49, 52, 148, 159; murder of, 162—66, 175, 179, 304 Hammuda, Atif, 190, 202—203, 205, 259, 270, 299 Hamshari, Mahmud al-, 47, 157 Hannun, Wasfi, 208—209, 215, 290 Hantash, Yusif Abu, 49, 165 Harb, Hisham, 24-27, 30, 266 Harzallah, Fathi, 214-17 Hasan, Abdallah, 206 Hasan, Kamal, 182 Hatem, Husni, 272 Hawatmeh, Nayif, 41, 76 Higgins, Robert, 226 Hijazi, Abdallah, 103, 245 Hindawi, Nizar, 240, 241, 247—51 Hmdawi affair, 247—52, 256—57, 265 Hindi, Ham al-, 74 Hitler, Adolf, 59 Hizballah, 7, 210, 214, 226, 236, 280—81 225, 227, 245—46, 288—91, 301, Hol, Abu al-, 32—35, 37—39, 314, 316 Holocaust, 59, 62 Honecker, Erich, 275, 278 Humaidi, Khwaldi al-, 148 Hungary, 37, 192, 275, 278—79 Hum, Abd al-Mun’im al-, 103, 148, 313 Hurok, Sol, 230 Hussein, Kayid, 163, 166, 272 Hussein, King of Jordan, 46, 64, 93, 94, 125, 159, 194, 229, 233, 238, 251; and Arab-Israeli negotiations, 126—28, 132, 142; vs. Fatah, 70—82, 83, 86—90, 91, 153; relations with Syria, 121, 125—28 Hussein, Saddam, 32, 88, 96, 107, 166; and Arafat, 112, 315—16; and Argov affair, 224—25; and Gulf War, 32, 159, 313—16, 319; and killing of Abu lyad, 313—16; and Abu Nidal, 111—13, 123, 280, 283, 313—16, 319—20; rise to power, 111—13 Ibrahim, Hamza, 130 Idris, King, 101 Ikrit, 47 India, 192, 235, 236 Intelligence Directorate, 20, 25, 125, 149, 181, 183—91, 201, 206, 208, 209, 212, 221, 243, 253, 256, 259, 266, 270, 277, 288, 293, 295; structure and workings of, 185—91 int4fada, 159, 193, 212—13, 221, 262—67, 269, 288, 310, 321 Iran, 31, 52, 94, 105, 140, 204, 227, 280-8 1; Abu Nidal’s relations with, 280—81 Iran, Shah of, 105 Irangate scandal, 241—42 Iran-Iraq war, 110, 112—13, 123, 124, 151, 204, 224, 230, 281 Iraq, 27, 32, 37, 45, 77, 92, 94, 95, 100, 148, 155, 164, 173, 174, 239, 280—81; vs. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arafat and the PLO, 96, 166, 313—16; and Argov affair, 224-25; Ba’ath party in, 95—97, 109—11, 229—30; Fatah in, 77—80, 84, 85, 88—108, 203, 207, 283; and Gulf War, 32—33, 110, 159, 268, 281, 313—16, 319; Hussein’s rise to power in, 111—13; Abu Nidal’s expulsion from, 123—24; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 77—80, 84, 85, 88—108, 109, 111—24, 148, 151, 164—66, 184, 186, 193, 200—204, 207, 280—81, 282—84, 287; Syrian relations with, 96—97, 106—108, 109, 111, 120—22, 166, 223—25, 242; U.S. relations with, 112 Irgun, 51, 71—72 Irish Republican Army, 229, 254, 271, 272 Isa, Abd al-Rahman, 45, 53, 113, 120—23, 125, 128, 131, 136—37, 145, 243, 255—58, 266—67, 273, 282—83, 286, 294—300, 309—11; in Intelligence Directorate, 187—88 Islamic Association of Libya, 137 Islamic Jihad, 31, 280 Isma’il, Colonel, 132 Israel, 5 and n., 21, 26, 33, 36, 37—42, 50, 102, 104—105, 106, 109, 110, 121, 155, 230; active self-defense policy of, 83, 210—11; and Argov affair, 222—27, 232; Camp David accords, 112, 166, 169; future of, 322—24; and Gulf War (1991), 3 14-16; invasions of Lebanon, 113—16, 131—32, INDEX / 333 140, 148, 159, 189, 222—27, 232, 234, 262, 273; Jordanian relations with, 126—28, 152—53, 251; lists of attacks on Palestinians, 46—50, 232—42; negotiations with Arabs, 50—52, 93—94, 121, 126—28, 132, 142, 152, 160—63, 166—67, 169, 174, 315—16, 320—24; Abu Nidal’s connections with, 43—53, 55, 78, 152—80, 183, 206, 210—27, 246, 257, 264—67, 290, 293, 304, 307, 314, 316—24; 1980s relations with Lebanon, 169, 210—15, 230—42; October War of 1973, 50, 84, 90, 93, 94, 126; penetration of Palestinian groups, 155—59, 210—27; and the PLO, 43—53, 114—16, 142, 152, 155—58, 160—78, 189, 210, 222—27, 231—42, 315—23; Six-Day War (1967), 66, 68, 72, 73, 93, 155, 159, 315, 321; statehood of, 59—63, 68, 159; terrorist and counterterrorist activities with Palestinian groups, 7 1—85, 88, 230—42; U.S. relations with, 83, 94, 111, 114, 223, 232—42; see also Mossad Istanbul, 107, 271; synagogue attacks in, 26, 46, 183, 211, 228, 241, 271 Italy, 32, 54, 105, 187, 206, 271; terrorist attacks in, 46—49, 73, 83, 101, 102, 107, 127, 129, 157, 183, 211, 219, 228, 237—39, 243—47, 271 lyad, Abu, 32—55, 77—80, 84, 90, 93, 95, 101—104, 112, 130, 165, 166, 179, 281, 297—98; and Arafat, 114-16; and Emergency Leadership, 309—12; murder of, 33—35, 36, 38, 39, 312—18; and Abu Nidal, 33—53, 69—71, 77, 78—80, 86, 97—99, 104, 114—16, 166, 174, 227, 246—47, 302—17; and Qaddafi, 147—48, 313—14, 323 lyad, Abu Ali, 81—82, 85 Jabotinsky, Vladimir, 71 Jabr, Mustafa, 89, 90 Jallud, Abd al-Salem, 148 Japanese Red Army, 261, 272 Jarallãh, Ahmad al-, 170 334 / INDEX Jerusalem, 52, 62, 72, 287 Jibril, Ahmad, 41, 44, 76—77, 95, 97, 125, 139, 150, 244, 298, 308 Jihad, Abu, 34, 38, 39, 40-42, 49, 79, 102, 175, 213; murder of, 219 and n., 220n., Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
314 Jordan, 16, 36, 46, 48, 63—64, 69, 71, 73, 76, 100, 105, 135, 155, 174, 185, 208, 230, 283—84, 320; Fatah activities in, 68—82, 83, 85, 86—90, 93, 101, 153, 167; and list of 1980s terrorism, 235; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 122, 123, 125—28, 193—94, 208—209, 229, 235, 236; 1970—71 Palestinian rebellion, 77—82, 153, 159; relations with Israel, 126—28, 152—53, 251; relations with Syria, 120—22, 125—28, 145, 147, 151, 153, 223, 250—51 Jordanian Airlines, terrorist attacks on, 127 Jorde, Hussein, 9—31, 53—54, 92, 184, 318 Jum’a, Ahmad, 283 Jumblat, Walid, 8, 198, 205, 312 Kahane, Rabbi Meir, 230 Kalthoum, Umm, 16—17 Kamal, Dr., 149, 188, 190, 202, 270, 277, 295 Kanafani, Ghassan, 47 Karachi, 28, 129, 130, 189; 1986 Pan Am hijacking, 183, 192, 228, 241, 252—56 Karameh, 70, 73, 81, 174, 306 Kaylani, Adnan al-, 203 Khaddam, Abd al-Halim, 107—108, 120, 129, 193 Khair, Hussein Abu al-, 48 Khair, Muhammad, 220, 291—92 Khalaf, Salah, see Iyad, Abu Khalid, Walid, 201, 268—69 Khalifa, Munzhir, 81—82 Khaliq, Aziz Abd al-, 196 Khartoum, 48, 70, 75, 78, 230; 1988 bombings, 263—65 Khatib, Ahmad al-, 74 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 280 Khudr, Na’im, 49, 159; murder of, 168—72, 175, 179 Khudr, Samih Muhammad, 164, 253, 266—67, 269 Khuly, Muhammad al-, 120, 121, 122, 145, 248, 249, 252, 257, 296 Kilburn, Peter, 240 Kissinger, Henry, 50—51, 94, 106, 322 Klinghoffer, Leon, 238 Klutznick, Philip, 172 Kreisky, Bruno, 171, 172, 174, 186 Kurds, 94, 227, 230 Kuwait, 9, 44, 49, 66, 91, 107, 159, 320; Iraqi invasion of, 32, 110, 159, 281, 313—16, 319; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 130, 147, 148, 165, 219, 254, 266, 291, 293 Kuwait Airlines, 9, 91 Lavon affair, 230 Lebanon, 6, 9, 10, 37, 40, 45, 47, 48, 71, 102—105, 111, 117, 120, 126, 169, 230, 320; Americans attacked in, 226, 233, 234, 240; ASALA in, 272—75; civil war in, 51, 106—107, 110; Fatah in, 82—84, 96, 101, 102, 114—17, 122, 131—35, 165, 167, 173; Israeli invasions of, 113—16, 131—32, 140, 148, 159, 189, 222—27, 232—34, 262, 273; and list of 1980s terrorism, 232—42; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 122, 13 1—35, 139—44, 146, 181, 184, 190, 198, 199, 201, 202, 205—27, 255—59, 261, 269, 272—75, 303, 307, 311—12; 1980s relations with Israel, 169, 210—15, 230—42; and War of the Camps, 140—44, 159, 208 Lebanon Committee, 186, 188 Libya, 3, 27, 38, 45, 50, 52, 77, 90, 101, 103, 135; Egyptian relations with, 109, 147, 148, 242—43; Fatah in, 88, 101, 102, 139, 147—48; intelligence apparatus in, 149—50, 234, 238—40; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 3—31, 109, 112, 139, 143—51, 165, 180, 181, 184, 188, 190, 193, 195, 201, 202, 206, 219, 221, 228—29, 238—47, 254—72, 287—91, 294—301, 303, 307—17, 319; refugee camps in, 3—31, 184, 289; and Silco affair, 267—72; U.S. relations with, 149, 238—40, 246—47, 251, 267 Libyan Airlines, 1973 Israeli attack on, 48 Libyan Constitutional Union, 137 Libyan Democratic National Rally, 137 Libyan People’s Bureau (London), 137, 234 Lod Airport, 1972 terrorist attack on, 47 London, 4, 39, 43, 102, 119, 126, 162, 184, 204, 205, 235; and Argov affair, 223—25, 232; and Hindawi affair, 247—52; terrorist attacks in, 47, 49, 52, 127, 137, 148, 159, 162—63, 165, 169, 211, 223—25, 232, 234, 236, 240, 247—52 London Agreement (1987), 251 Lutf, Abu al-, 78, 79 Machanaimi, Gideon, 239 Madi, Khalid al-, 202—203 Madrid, 48, 127, 130, 156—58 Mafia, 272 281, 284, 287—90, 293, 294—301, 261; and list of 1980s terrorism, Mahdi, Sadiq al-, 264, 265 Mahjubi, Muhammad Ali, 2l9n.—20n. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Maliki, Salah al-, 31 Malta, 22, 49, 54, 201, 219, 238, 242, 267 Manara Press, 199—200 Mao Tse-tung, 87—88 Maraqa, Isam, 182, 195, 277, 288, 290—91, 294, 301 Maronites, 106, 140, 159, 224, 230, 233 Marxism, 276 Masri, Zafir al-, 254 Matar, Ahmad Abu, 198—99 Mazin, Abu, 48, 79, 92, 97—98; attempted m Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal, 5, 69—70, 79, 85—86, 92, 96, 97, 99—100, 114—16, 132—35, 151—54, 158, 159—78, 198, 200, 224, 271—72, 302—23; penetration of, 155—78, 210—27; and Qaddafi, 148—49, 313—14; U.S. relations with, 77, 94, 167—68 Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee, 76, 96, 304 Palestine National Charter, 76 Palestine National Council (PNC), 40—41, 43, 76, 93—94, 96, 304; 1974 Cairo meeting, 93; 1983 Algiers meeting, 173; 1984 Amman meeting, 142; 1987 Algiers meeting, 302—307 Palestine National Salvation Front, 303 Palestine Secret Organization, 65, 66 Palestinian resistance movement, 66—90; assassinations in, 46—50, 159—79, 210; internal quarrels, 31, 75—77, 82, 83, 85—86, 94—104, 109, 142, 155, 159—63, 214; Israeli penetration of, 154—78, 210—27; mid-1980s reconciliation in, 142—43; Abu Nidal’s development in, 66—80; terrorist and counterterrorist activities with Israel, 71—85, 88, 230—42; Third Fatah Congress, 85—87, 99; see also specy’ic organizations Pan Am Airline terrorism: flight 103 bombing (Lockerbie), 44, 254—55; 19,76—77,93, 102, 111, 121, 139, 243—47, 271—79; future of, 319; internal quarrels, 31, Karachi hijacking (1986), 183, 192, 228, 241, 252—55, 265; Rome attack (1973), 101, 102 Papandreou, Andreas, 265—66 Paris, 21, 25, 27, 44, 54, 129, 178, 184; terrorist attacks in, 47, 48, 49, 91—92, 106, 129, 157, 159, 165, 184, 270—72, 274 Party of Socialist Action, 131 passports and visas, 21—24, 25, 26, 30, 119, 144, 184, 187, 206—207, 259, 270, 308 People’s Army, 4, 139, 143, 181, 207—209, 214—15, structure and workings of, 207—209 Peres, Shimon, 26, 238, 239, 240, 251 Philippines, 37—38, 94, 190, 192, 261 Poland, 113, 176—78, 204; Abu Nidal in, 119, 125, 134—35, 139, 142—46, 195, 227, 275, 278, 294 Political Bureau, 142, 180—81, 189, 208, 259, 262, 296 Political Directorate, 45, 142, 181, 197—201, 208, 213, 220, 264, 292; structure and workings of, 197—201 Political Relations Committee, 198, 201, 259, 277, 292 Pollard, Jonathan Jay, 238 Popular Arab Movement, 118 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), 7, 41, 47, 48, 74—77, 83, 86, 95, 97, 131, 139, 176, 199, 210, 238, 254, 273, 288, 295 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command, 76—77, 95, 97, 125, 139, 176, 210, 216, 244, 295 Portugal, 49, 158—59, 170, 173, 271—72 Prague, 37, 53, 134, 279 press, 7, 78—80, 85, 98, 117, 122, 125, 182, 197—201, 228—29, 241, 254, 261; see also spec jfic publications Publications Committee, 197—201, 292 Qaddafi, Muammar al-, 3, 5—6, 39, 100, 103, 109, 144, 201, 238—41, 243, 289, 298; and Fatah, 139, 147-49; Green Book, 136—37, 147-48; and killing of Abu lyad, 3 13—14; and Abu Nidal, 136—39, 258, 261—69, 313; and the PLO, 148—49, 313—14; and Silco affair, 267—69; terrorist attacks on, 240, 247 Qaddumi, Faruq, 173 Qaddura, Abu Mustafa, 102 Qadir, Khalid Abd al-, 260 Qaisi, Fadil al-, 212 Qalaq, Izz al-Din, 44, 49, 159, 270, 272; murder of, 165—67, 175, 179 Qasim, All, 33 Qasim, Ghassan Ahmad, 204—205 226, 259, 284, 288, 290, 295; 147—50, 201, 229, 238—39, 245, Qassam, Sheikh Izz al-Din, 60 Qubaisi, Basil al-, 48 Qubrusli, Abir, 189 Rabin, Yitzhak, 160 Rafsanjani, All Akbar, 280 Ramadi training camp, 100, 120, 123, 124 Rashid, Muhammad Hussein, 272 Rashidi, Adnan al-, 170 Rashidiya camp, 269, 311—12 Reagan, Ronald, 52, 223, 229, 232—39 Red Army Faction (Germany), 229 Red Front, 157 Rejection Front, 95 refugee camps, 6, 60—61 and n., 62, 140—42, INDEX / 337 214, 215, 224, 232, 244, 249, 287, 288—89, 311—12; Naji al-All (Libya), 3—3 1, 184, 289; see also spec~fic camps Revolutionary Command Council (Iraq), 77—78, 111 Revolutionary Council, 10, 97, 98, 107, 180; formed by Abu Nidal, 99—100 Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, 235—36, 237, 240, 254 Rimawi, Abdallah, 64, 65 Riyadh, 28, 64, 65, 68—69, 91, 128, 222 Romania, 279 Rome, 21, 184; terrorist attacks in, 46, 47, 48, 49, 73, 83, 101, 102, 107, 127, 129, 157, 183, 211, 219, 228, 237—39, 243—47, 254, 271 Rosan, Nawaf, 223 Roumis, Victor, 24 Sabena jet hijacking (1972), 85 Sabra camp, 232, 244, 245 Sa’d, Mustafa, 214, 312 Sadat, Anwar, 50, 102, 107, 111, 126, 162, 164,253, 311 Sadiq, Dr., 203 Sadr, Imam Musa al-, 140, 313 Sa’id, Ahmad, 33 Sa’id, Haitham, 249, 252, 274 Sa’id, Hisham, 243 Sa’id, Hussein, 223 Sa’id, Nasir al-, 268—69 Sa’iqa, al-, 77, 97, 293 Salahat, Muhammad Khudr, 185 Salameh, All Hasan, 47, 48, 49, 167—68 Salem, Arif, 185 Salih, Abu, 132, 134, 208 Salih, Ali Abdallah, 39 Salih, Mabmud, 49 Samirra’i, Abd al-Khaliq, 77, 79 Sammur, Hani, 243 Samrin, Sulaiman, see Ghassan al-All, Dr. Sanduqa, Mustafa Ibrahim, 206, 209, 217—19, 221, 286, 288 338 / INDEX Sanussi, Abdallah al-, 144, 261 Saqr, Hisham Muhammad, 311 Saqr, Ra’id, 20 Sartawi, Isam, 49, 159, 172—76, 272 SAS, 119, 203 Saudi Arabia, 27, 48, 64—66, 88, 91, 112, 168, 236, 315; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 27—31, 91—92, 106, 128, 184, 204, 222, 280 Sayigh, Anis al-, 47 Schiff, Ze’ev, 155 Scientific Committee, 181, 182—83, 207, 217, 218 Secretariat, 181—85, 209, 218, 259, 261; structure and workings of, 181—85 Shachori, Ami, 47 Shahin, Abu Mi, 66, 154 Shakir, Sa’dun, 80, 100, 111, 166 Shamir, Yitzhak, 71, 160—61, 230, 251, 322 Sharah, Faisal Abu, 237 Sharar, Majid Abu, 49, 219 Sharif, Bassam Abu, 41, 47 Sharon, Ariel, 37—38, 82, 159, 172, 222—23, 227, 322 Shatila camp, 232, 244, 245 Shazli, Sa’d al-Din, 311 Shevardnaze, Eduard, 324 Shin Bet, 155 Sh’ites, 7, 58, 140—44, 210, 214, 226, 230, 233—37, 276, 313 Shultz, George, 233, 234 Shuquairy, Ahmad, 76 Siba’i, Yusuf al-, 164, 253, 266 Sidon, 8, 11, 106, 139, 181, 189, 196, 206, 214, 226, 236, 271, 293, 312 Silco affair, 201, 222, 267—72 Silwani, Dirar Abd al-Fattah al-, 203, 270, 278 Sinai, 48, 66, 72 Six-Day War (1967), 66, 68, 72, 73, 93, 155, 159, 315, 321 Southeast Asian operations of Abu Nidal, 27—31, South Lebanon, 8, 213—15, 236, 281, 285—90, invasions of, 113—14, 132, 226—27, 233; and War of the Camps, 140 Soviet Union, 52, 87, 90, 111, 168, 213, 230, 276, 279, 315 Spain, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 29, 48, 118, 127, 178, 191, 318; Fatah in, 156—58, 191; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 192, 204, 237, 271 Stasi, 277—78 Stern Gang, 60, 71—72, 230 Sudan, 70, 110, 137, 154, 206, 222, 230; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 263—65 Suez War of 1956, 64, 73 192 315; ASALA in, 272—75; Israeli Suffarini, Fu’ad al-, 107, 193—94, 253, 277 Sufyan, 215—17, 218 Sughayyir, Azmi al-, 102 Suwaidi, Muhammad al-, 129—30 Sweden, 271 Switzerland, 187, 204; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 205, 270-7 1, 291, 294 synagogue attacks: in Istanbul, 26, 46, 183, 211, 228, 241, 271; in Vienna, 170, 171 Syria, 16, 27, 36, 39—40, 42, 45, 50, 51, 52, 57—58, 64, 66, 72—73, 75, 77, 93, 112, 140, 155, 157, 169, 214, 222, 315, 320; and Argov affair, 222—27; Ba’ath party in, 109, 120; Fatah in, 88, 96—97, 122, 131, 132; and Hindawi affair, 247—52, 256—57; Iraqi relations with, 96—97, 106—108, 109, 111, 120—22, 166, 223—25, 242; Jordanian relations with, 120—22, 125—28, 145, 147, 151, 153, 223, 250—51; and list of 1980s terrorism, 232—42; Abu Nidal’s expulsion from, 255—57; Abu Nidal’s operations concerning, 106—109, 111, 112, 119—35, 139, 143—47, 150, 151, 180, 184, 186, 187, 193—98, 201, 220, 224—25, 229, 248—57, 284—85, 287, 293—97, 303; relations with Arafat and the PLO, 132, 134, 223—24 Syrian Airlines, 91, 248; terrorist attacks on, 107, 127, 247—52 Syrian Arab News Agency, 128 Syrian-Egyptian Union (1958), 65 Syrian-Jordanian war, 126—28 Syrian Social Nationalist Party, 226 Takriti, Hardan al-, 78 Tal, Wasfi al-, 81—82, 84, 85, 86, 153 Tamim, Mahmud, 208-209 Tamimi, Ibrahim al-, 200 Tariq, Abu, 49 Tariq, al- (magazine), 26, 182, 259 Technical Committee, 23, 181, 206—207, 248 Tehran, 52, 101, 280—81 Tel Aviv, 46, 47, 60, 61, 73, 77, 83, 85, 157 terrorist and counterterrorist activities, Israeli-Palestinian, 71—85, 88, 230—42 Thailand, 27—31, 192 Thatcher, Margaret, 229, 238, 249, 251, 254 Third Fatah Congress (1971), 85—87, 99 Tlas, Mustafa, 145 torture methods, 286—87 Trieste, 47, 167 Tripoli, 3, 5—6, 8, 20, 21, 22, 27, 30, 31, 38, 103, 132, 137, 143, 147, 235, 239, 240, 242, 278; Abu Nidal’s operations in, 147—SO, 165, 180, 181, 190, 219, 229, 255, 259, 298—301, 303, 308 Tunis, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 49, 53, 54, 102, 160, 175, 219, 231, 237—38, 3 18—19 Tunisia, 3, 26—27, 35, 38—39, 45, 103, 219, 320 Turk, Muhammad Harb al-, 253, 284 Turkey, 57, 94, 105, 107, 127, 186—87, 191, 192, 207, 230, 271, 273—74, 279, 292 TWA jet bombing (1986), 240 Tyre, 9, 232, 236, 311 Ubaid, Abd al-Karim, 226 Udwan, Kamal, 48 Umari, Fakhri al-, 33, 34, 35 UNIFIL, 114 United Arab Emirates, 123, 129—30, 193, 216, 245 United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), 212 United Nations, 51, 224, 226, 236; 1947 partition plan for Palestine, 59—63, 68; 1991 ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, 32, 316 United Nations General Assembly, 94; 1974 Arafat address to, 94, 160; Resolution 181, 59 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 9,236 United Nations Security Council: Resolution 242, 106; Resolution 425, 114 United States, 28, 48, 101, 110, 137, 145, 203, 230; Camp David accords, 112, 166; in Gulf War (1991), 32, 50, 268, 281, 313—16, 319; Irangate scandal, 241—42; Libya attacked by, 149, 238—40, 246—47, 251, 267; Middle East policies of, 40, 50—52, 64, 75, 77, 83, 94, 111, 114, 126, 149, 161, 167—68, 223, 230—42, 257, 267, 313—16 U.S. Marine Corps, 230; attacks on, in Lebanon, 226, 233, 234 Uthman, Faruq and Nabil, 219 Vanunu, Morechai, 241 Vienna, 30, 85, 173, 294; terrorist attacks in, 46, 170, 171, 183, 186, 211, 228, 238—39, 243—47, 254, 278 Vietnam, 73, 94, 117, 315 Voice of Palestine, 78—80 WAFA (Palestinian news agency), 98 Waldheim, Kurt, 92, 114 Walters, Vernon, 50 War of the Camps, 140—44, 159, 195, 208. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Preface Introduction 1. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Business of the FRC 18. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Holy Wars and Hollywood: The Manufacture of Modern Terrorism 19. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Greece 20. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When Israel expelled 419 Hamas supporters in 1993, the cover of the periodical The Middle East read, “Thanks to Israel, Hamas becomes a major player.”2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Hamas was never strong until Israel made its supporters heroes. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
If you read Palestinian lit- erature and journalism you will readily notice a recurring theme of victim- ization: Israel bombs villages, beats prisoners, and commits every horrible act against the innocent. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Palestinian actions such as attacks against Israel were not designed to win back territory—their professed goal—but to insti- gate counter-attacks and prolong the righteous victimization. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When they became effective in a guerrilla war against Israel in 1970, Palestinians fought amongst themselves, then senselessly precipitated a civil war in Jordan that destroyed their national ambitions; then they repeated the story in Lebanon, ensuring them continued victimization. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Palestinians look at the gunmen who invaded Israel in equally romantic terms, claiming that the real terrorists were Israeli soldiers who bombed villages. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Moreover, terrorism, like war, does not spring from a vacuum but has dis- tinct political causes, and it is unfair to discuss the Irgun’s terrorism against the British without considering the plight of Jews in Europe, or to discuss Palestinian plane hijackings without considering Israel’s treatment of Pales- tinian civilians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They did not have an easy time, Let us for now use a broad approach to discuss the incidents of violence Historians have examined the roots of the Middle East dispute begin- For purposes of our discussion, the Palestine-Israel conflict began at the Introduction 5 6 Arab and Israeli Terrorism and most left, but the movement to re-create a Jewish state received new impe- tus when the energetic journalist Theodore Herzl popularized Zionism with the publication of an 1896 tract, The Jewish State. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The colonial men- tality made it easier for the British to blame the natives and support the Euro- pean Jews, with whom they could more easily identify. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Individual officers had wide powers; one officer ordered 1. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
(Coincidentally, the Abu Nidal group attacked a hotel by the same name in Damascus in September 1976.) Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Later, when the British were ready to flog two captured Irgun members, an Irgun team led by Amihai Piglin kidnapped a British officer and three soldiers on December 29, 1946 and gave them the same sentence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
My father was a pacifist, and it took a lot of persua- sion from his brother to convince him to spend what was at that time a for- tune and buy a rifle on the black market. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Seeing that Israel might lose face by honoring those who had taken part in a massacre, Mayor Teddy Kollek forced the matter to drop, secretly promising the families of the five that the city would name streets or institutions after them in the near future.’6 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They had no significant diplomatic support or sym- pathy, and turned to terrorism as a substitute. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The narrowness of the new state, in one place only 15 km wide, remained unacceptable, making 1948 only a partial victory. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At Israel’s cre- ation, the founders specifically voted not to define borders. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Another reason to maintain terrorist activity was that Israeli lead- ers wanted to attract Jews from around the world. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Just as they needed to ter- rify Arabs into leaving Palestine, they staged at least one anti—Jewish terror- ist action abroad to convince Jews to immigrate to safety in Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Finally, the dynamic pioneer spirit shared by Israel’s founders needed militarism to keep it alive. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Bernadotte landed in Beirut and trav- eled between various cites until he arrived in Jerusalem. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was condemned, regretted and deplored because it would cast reflections on Israel, and make the work of her diplomats more difficult; not because it was wrong in itself to resort to ~ This was the last act of terrorism by the Stern and Irgun, who merged into the country’s political machinery. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Bernadotte’s death was unnecessary, since Arab intransigence, inability to recognize Israel, and unwillingness to compromise would have allowed Israel to escape his proposals.54 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It turned out that the other party was a group of Israeli Border Guards also masquerading as Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Beginning in the 1936 general strike, it became a cornerstone of Zionist or Israeli armed forces policy either to use an Arab disguise or to recruit Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
We have seen how the King David Hotel blast was engineered using Arab disguise, and the reader who is informed about the struggle to create Israel will no doubt be able to recount other incidents where Zionist militias disguised themselves as Arabs and penetrated Arab areas. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A group of OrientalJews dressed as Arabs drove a truck of orange crates into the town center and left it on the street, blowing up the Arab National Committee headquarters, the police station, and other buildings.9 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Palestinians too turned to disguise, recruiting British 3. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The attacks were quickly followed by an underground publicity campaign and American fundraising to save Iraqi Jewry from the coming pogroms. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Even so, the ruse worked: over 121,500 Iraqi Jews fled what they thought was persecu- tion for safety in Israel without knowing that Israel had staged a deception campaign.’5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The group of secret service agents inside Iraq had weapons, money, safe houses, printing equipment, and a distribution network. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Haifa is the only integrated city in Israel, and it turned out that the perpetrators were Jews trying to incriminate Arabs so that Jews would take revenge. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Responding to a published letter from an angry Israeli settler, journalist Robert I. Friedman writes, “Israel radio, quoting Israel’s northern district police spokesman Gideon Arbel, reported that the set- tlers, pretending to be marauding Arabs, had attacked Israeli settlers and hurled a firebomb on an Israeli-owned car as a pretext to launch ‘counterat- tacks’ against Arab villages.”24 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The agents had received training in Israel before they began their subversive activities in Egypt. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The operations against the British were timed to coincide with Anglo-Egyptian negotiations concerning British evacuation from Suez, which Israel opposed, and those against Amer- ican facilities were aimed at destroying the growing friendly relations between Egypt and the United States (President Gamal Abdel Nasser had not yet become the West’s ogre), which included a $50 million aid program and $500 million arms deal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In a low-key cere- mony Chief of Staff Dan Shomron awarded the posthumous rank of lieu- tenant colonel to the two executed members, Moshe Marzouk and Samuel Azzar, as well as Max Bennet. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israelis were caught in London masquerading as violent Arabs, probably involved in the killing of Palestinian journalist and cartoonist Naji al-Ali. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As mentioned, the Iraqi agents used in the operation were brought to Israel for training, and by their actions we can guess that they received weapons and combat ~ We know also that Israel brought Jews from Morocco, Yemen, Argentina, and Ethiopia for training and sent them back to their countries. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The details of Israel’s activities inside Morocco remain secret.’4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Raviv and Melman also say that the Mossad brought “young Jewish activists from Argentina and nearby countries to Israel to receive intensive training in self- defense. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Also, according to the authors, Ethiopian Jews were brought to Israel for similar training.’6 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Independent tells us that during the height of the Ethiopian civil war, Israel paid $2500 for each of the 18,000 Ethiopian Jews to immigrate.’7 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel’s Use ofArab Disguises 31 32 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Yet the historical truth of these immigration activities remains obscured; documents have not been released, and we should not offer innuendo as a replacement for scholarship. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was a secret Mossad project.”’5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
More obvious is Lebanon, where Israel used dirty tricks in concert with an explicit bombing campaign to fos- ter internal conflicts. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Bean Grosscup echoes other reports when he writes: Israel bombed bridges and civilian targets, as Jonathan Randal observes, to create maximum havoc for Lebanese civilians so they would turn against the Palestinians.49 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abundant oral reports speak of Israel’s fueling the civil war by having agents in a Christian area, disguised as a militia, fire at Druze positions from the tops of buildings, while other agents fired at Christians from Muslim West Beirut. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel’s purpose has been to radicalize and divide the opposition, as is clear from its clandestine and overt activities in Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the exam- ples mentioned here we can see that Israel sought to make Arabs appear as ter- rorists—throwing bombs at Jews and killing fellow Palestinians—and this activ- ity goes beyond spying. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel held a strong capacity to fight on the battlefield, and they excelled in that area, but until the 1993 peace accord they failed to cope with the Intifada or peace negotiations or Palestinians who advocate these. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Of course disguise is required and considered normal in spying and related 3. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Passive infiltration focuses on informa- tion collection, while active infiltration involves manipulation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In one of their many senseless operations, the NAY tried to bomb the residence of the Israeli ambassador in Nicosia (the ambassador had left his house prior to the attack); then another unit in a Land Rover stormed onto the airport and drove around an Israeli plane, shouting and firing, like Spaghetti Western Indians around a wagon train.52 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, the raiding party encountered resistance at two locations and had to call for helicopters to make their escape.54 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Cir- cumstantial evidence would indicate that Israel had known about the Nicosia action beforehand because it had infiltrated the NAY. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It is also possible to assume that an infiltrator had obtained a leadership position in the group and was able to orchestrate the event so Israel could rationalize its Beirut raid. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They machine-gunned the Rome airport during the 1973 Christmas season and firebombed a Pan Amer- ican jet,57 a seemingly irrational act that was repeated by Abu Nidal a dozen Christmas seasons later, and while Arafat was addressing the United Nations in 1974, the NAY hijacked a plane and senselessly killed a German passen- ger.58 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Coupled with Israel’s historical record of Arab masquerade designed to project Arabs as extremists, the conduct of the NAY and other proponents of meaningless violence should be reevaluated. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel encouraged the radicalization of its enemy, as the bombing of South Lebanon attests. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It is well known that Israel helped arm various factions in Lebanon and gave support to Hamas and radicals in the occupied territories during the 1980s in order to create divisions among Palestinians.60 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
We will see that Israel assassinated moderate leaders, leaving militants alone. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By bombing villages and approaching the Middle East with warlike vengeance, dropping a hundred bombs when one would do, Israel instigated a policy designed to radicalize the region.61 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
3. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
fledgling Fatah group, who aimed to blow up a canal that was diverting water from the River Jordan, an issue which had developed into an international dis- pute that Arab countries were too impotent to address. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All leaders spoke eloquently; Fatah wanted to show the Arab world that unlike the old guard, they were doers, not talkers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Abu Nidal poster of “Military Commu- nique Number One” and the Palestinians who demonstrate on Fatah Day do not discuss the outcome of the heroic act. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Whereas before 1955 most Arabs who crossed the border were generally desperate refugees or criminals, Israel now faced com- mandos, trained and directed, whose effectiveness increased, although they never came close to the damage Unit 101 inflicted. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Indeed, Israel had been harassed by the fedayeen, whom they made Egypt promise to curb as a major ingredient to the 1957 ceasefire treaty. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
regaining their homeland, young idealists who rebelled against the passivity of the older generation24 and were later inspired by the July 1962 FLN victory in Algeria that won independence from France through guerrilla war,25 as well Egyptian officers spent six months training 700 Palestinians,’4 from Another major Sharon operation took place against Syria on December When Israel occupied Gaza in 1956, it gave the future Palestinian activists The original group consisted of two dozen with a philosophical idea of Arab and Israeli Terrorism as by the liberation movements in Asia and Africa. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Two days later Israel retaliated, as Fatah leaders wanted and expected; but instead of piercing the heavily fortified Golan and hitting Syria, whom they publicly condemned for the attack, they raided two West Bank towns. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel’s terrain is not suited to guerrilla warfare, and few Pales- tinians were inclined to spend their lives for the cause. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel admitted to 35 incursions and brought the subject up at the United Nations, giving the unknown group international status. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
hit-and-run operations against Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They sought to involve the neighbor- ing Arab states in the conflict, for they reasoned that since Israel publicly held the neighboring Arab countries responsible for cross-border attacks, it would 4. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During that summer these incursions killed or wounded 200 Israelis.16 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Al-Ass~fa attacks were directed more against Arab governments than against Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His mouth expelled a flood of hollow words calling for Israel’s destruction, but he, like other Arab leaders, firmly opposed commando actions, making him a carica- ture of Arab verbosity. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The PNC drafted their infamous charter, revised in June 1—17, 1968, which called for Israel to be replaced by a secular Arab secret services were the fedayeen’s greatest obstacle. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The ANM was small, a group of intellectuals from various Arab countries who met in coffee houses and people’s homes, published a newsletter, and put the Pales- tine-Israeli conflict in the context of capitalism, imperialism, communism, and revolutionary struggle. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
George Habash, the most charismatic of the group, became its head, and eventually he, like Ché Guevara (who met several Palestinian leaders, includ- ing Arafat), gave up his medical practice in Amman for full-time political work. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Still, he and the ANM did not believe in mili- tary or guerrilla action. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The GC made several successful attacks against Israel and is often blamed for foreign attacks, but Jabril was not involved in such adventures, which he felt had no military objective. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, two men who had left with Jabril, Abu Abbas and Talat Yaqub, broke from the GC in 1977 to form the Palestine Liberation Front (formed March 11, 1978), which was responsible for three grand failures: in summer 1980, 80 PLF men tried to raid Israel in an Aerostat, but it burned shortly after takeoff since it was painted with flamma- ble varnish; in 1985 the PLF was in charge of the Achille Lauro episode, and after the Intifada a large number of PLF men tried to raid Israel in boats but were intercepted. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When Israel occupied the West Bank, Fatah and the PFLP began orga- nizing underground cells, Arafat working in Nablus to recruit young men. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Activists operated in Gaza, but in August 1970, after the War of Attrition, Sharon took the job of taming the natives, and as usual, he excelled. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Thus the guerrillas, unable to work in the occupied territories, massed themselves in Jordan. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Their inability to inspire the population to action demonstrates the weakness of their leaders and the effectiveness of Israeli measures. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Except for isolated incidents, the Israeli Palestinians remained silent and sep- arated from those who fled, and although Fatah and the PFLP tried many times to form cells within Israel with the intention of instigating disruptive operations against the government, they were never successful. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Fatah paid its men $20-SO a month, depending on rank and family, while the PFLP could only afford half that amount. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
I remember in the United States the strong sentiment against the blood- thirsty Arab aggressors aiming to drive Israel into the sea. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States presidential campaign of 1968 brought with it a suc- cession of candidates pledging their loyalty to the state of Israel, a tradition reaching back to Harry Truman. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During his 1968 primary campaign he put on a yarmulke, walked into a synagogue, and told a cheering audience that if he was elected president he would sent SO advanced F-4E jet fighters to Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They had been following Sharon’s travels and thought that he would be taking that flight back to Israel, but he changed his itinerary. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel did not know what to do, issu- ing mixed statements and contradictory remarks. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At last, thought Haddad and the PFLP leadership, we have struck Israel at their point of vulnerability; as the Vietnamese learned to fight the United States by hitting their weak- nesses, so too the Palestinians had begun their guerrilla war, fighting not the way their enemy intended but catching them off guard. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Finally, after 40 long days of negotiating, with the Italian government acting as go-between, Israel agreed to release 15 5. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Algerian government was incensed, believing that it was an Egyptian plot to embarrass them, but they put the Israeli passengers in a guarded hotel and negotiated for the release of the prisoners. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The two gunmen walked onto the field and began shooting at it, killing a passen- ger and wounding a stewardess. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On January 24, 1970, a bomb was thrown at the Hapoalim Bank in London, injuring one person, and on August 17 the PFLP planted incendiary bombs in Marks and Spencer because of the owner’s gen- erous support of Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The PFLP immediately denied it had carried out the attacks, but airlines began banning flight mail to Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
5. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The El Al failed, but the others succeeded. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Again, these actions had nothing to do with Israel but were meant to pre- cipitate a war in Jordan, which they did. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Again, Jews were separated and kept as hostages, showing that for all their talk of world revolution and a secular state, the PFLP were racist. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The two spokespersons for the PFLP, poet Ghassan Kanafani and writer Bassam Abu Sharif, held a press conference justifying the hijackings and demanding that Israel release its Palestinian prisoners. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Habash made a public announcement, vowing to attack only Israeli targets in Israel and to defend their refugee camps 5. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
“We Have Thken Over Your Flight” 55 56 Arab and Israeli Terrorism and villages against Israeli attacks. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From Jordan the ftdayeen carried out hundreds of raids against Israel from their bases. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1968 Israel claimed to have intercepted 2650 fedayeen, while the fedayeen claimed to have caused over 1000 incidents.29 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1969 the fedayeen attacked Israel 500 times, but just as their cross-border terrorism was becoming effective and troublesome, Haddad pre- cipitated a meaningless war and subsequently lost all guerrilla bases. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After this, Palestinian leaders such as Kamal Nasser thought it was idiocy to go afterJor- dan when their enemy was Israel, and Black September changed track. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A few Palestinians had worked on the At least two groups of assassins were waiting for the premier (Abu lyad The action occurred just after the War of Attrition when Egypt and Israel In May 1972 two men and two women took control of a Sabena jet from Black September’s biggest operation was against the 1972 Munich 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mundir Khalifa, the killer, walked over and put his finger into Wasfi’s blood and put it to his lips, saying he got his revenge. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Olympics, planned by the flamboyant Au Hassan Salameh (Abu Hassan) and executed by specially selected gunmen.3 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chancellor Willy Brandt telephoned Prime Minister Meir and tried to persuade her to make a gesture, perhaps releasing a dozen secondary prisoners, but Meir absolutely refused, instead sending advisors.4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The raid was organized by the PFLP leadership and justified as a commando attack against Israel, not an outside operation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Who would suspect two Japanese men and a woman return- ing to Japan via Israel? When they arrived they went to the baggage claim, collected their suitcases off the carousel, unzipped them, and immediately began firing indiscriminately while throwing shrapnel grenades. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By the time the Israeli guards responded and killed two of the Japanese and wounded the third, the terrorists had killed 27 people, including 16 Catholic pilgrims from Puerto Rico and Aharon Katzir, a physicist in charge of Israel’s nuclear weapons program.’2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The king happened to be honeymooning in the United States with his new wife. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The White House had dispatched Undersecretary of State William Macomber but said he would observe, not negotiate. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Palestinian gunmen had been well tempered and obliging to all except the two Americans. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel, angry at Libya’s belligerence, especially the sanctuary it gave to the Munich terrorists, at first refused to apologize, blaming the crew for flying slightly off course into the occupied Sinai and asserting that the plane may have been on a suicide mission to Tel Aviv. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the Palestinians took over the Saudi embassy in Khartoum they took the heat off Israel and gave a rationale for its aggressive militarism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One of the bombs killed Ami Shachori in the Israeli embassy in London, but all other devices were detected and defused. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During operations they wore masks to remain anonymous, as some security units do. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Such amorphous organizations tend to be out of control. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Thus the period of systematic international terrorism by PLO factions stretches about five years, 1968 to 1973. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Militarily, they were of little consequence; they did not help the Palestinians recoup any of their homeland. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The undercover war carried out by Israel during the same period had equally negative consequences. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He and his deputy, Bassam Abu Sharif (who would be wounded by a mail bomb two weeks after Kanafani’s death), had demanded that Israel release prisoners during the 1970 hijacks. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The sniper had actually started to shoot me, then stopped, saying, “I saw his face through my tele- scope, and I saw how the Israelis had damaged his face, and my finger couldn’t pull the trigger.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Of that there is no doubt; Israeli spokesmen virtually admitted it. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Black September vs. Mossad 65 66 Arab and Israeli Terrorism One day Kanafani and his niece got into his car outside his Beirut apart- ment, turned on the ignition, and both were burned alive. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
That afternoon Prime Minister Meir told her parliament that Israel would use all methods to defend itself from Arab terrorism abroad.36 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
She was speak- ing about the bomb that had blown up an Arab bookstore in Paris ten days before, in effect saying that the bookstore, which also served as a library and meeting place, was blown up by Israel for self-defense. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Black September vs. Mossad 71 72 Arab and Israeli Terrorism tore into Kamal’s books and collected poems, as if they hoped to silence his words too.”~ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After they shot him, Palestinians claim that the gunmen tore his mouth off with bullets, Mafia style, since he was the PLO spokesman, and laid his body as if hanging on a cross since he was a Christian. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israelis killed 17 Palestinians and Lebanese during the operation and took away documents from the apartments of those killed and from an empty PLO office, carting them away by helicopter. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Dan Aerbel, one of those arrested, was a Danish businessman. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The police certainly did not tor- ture him, nor did they know anything about his previous exploits. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
ing which the five agents told the court how the Mossad organized the oper- ation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mossad’s activities in Norway and Paris, probably including Avi Primor, intel- ligence chief in Paris, who became ambassador to Belgium when the Mossad moved its European headquarters to Belgium.57 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Weapons were brought into the country in diplomatic pouches. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Time magazine tells us that during the 1972-73 period the Mossad killed 13 terrorist leaders.59 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
of their leaders, but they can be seriously hurt, as when the British deported Palestinian leaders before World War II. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The retardation of the PLO’s progress toward international recognition was in part a direct result of the Mossad operations beginning in 1972. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
European police discovered Israel’s net of safe houses and its method of operation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A month after Lillehammer two Israeli fighter jets grabbed an Iraqi Airways flight as soon as it took off from Beirut and forced it to Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Meanwhile, guerrilla bands kept mounting raids on Israel, and two par- ticularly bloody Palestinian attacks against Israeli civilians in 1974 need to be mentioned. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The first took place in April when three members of the Ahmed Jibril group raided Israel from Lebanon and took eighteen hostages—eight of them children—in an apartment block of Qjryat Shmona. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel refused to negotiate and stormed the building. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel launched reprisal raids against six Lebanese villages, and the Jewish Defense League exploded a bomb at the Lebanese consulate in Los Angeles.61 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A month later, on the eve of Israel’s Independence Day celebrations, three men belonging to Naif Hawathmeh’s DFLP crossed the border and, the next morning, broke into an apartment in Ma’alot village, shooting three occupants. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The operation was specifically targeted against children, for the DFLP reasoned that Israel could not fail to negotiate for their lives. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
General Mordechai Gur wanted to negotiate, but Dyan and Meir refused (although Meir said on radio that they would give into the demands since “we Generally European governments forgave Israel, and the dirty war turned 756. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His distrust and hatred for It is said that Sabri’s father was a close friend of Zionist nationalists, including Dr. Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president and foremost leader of the Zionist movement, and Avraham Shapira, head of a Zionist militia.1 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
stration against Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After Karameh the guerrillas moved their bases away from the Israeli border, making it hard for Israel to hit them, and they operated semi-openly in Jordan—even King Hussein declared that he was a guerrilla. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sabri’s responsibilities were similar to a military supply clerk who helped the many Fatah raids into Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terror attacks on Israel were planned from South Lebanon by Dalan Moghrabi and Abu Jihad, who divided Pales- tine into three regions: the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel proper (what they called inside the 1948 boundaries), with a separate office handling each area. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By the early 1970s the Fatah leadership was willing to accept the reality of Israel’s presence, although they did not concretely declare their acceptance. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It took over a year for the PLO to establish a functioning headquarters in Beirut after the Black September war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Saddam Hussein took charge of bringing them together.2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
standing political success. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Evidence later emerged that Israel wanted to destabilize the Italian gov- ernment by such incidents. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel insisted on excluding even the mention of Pales- tinians, and Kissinger bowed to the request, making the meeting a nonstarter.8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The attackers wrote the slogan Israel vaincra (“Israel will win”) and the letters F.E.J. on the bookstore grate, indicating that the attack was the work of the Jewish Defense League’s French branch. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The PLO naturally blamed Israel for the killing of Salah, but the FRC accused Arafat, and through the FRC ranks the hatred of Fatah overshadowed that of Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The foreign office had officially welcomed Abu Daoud to France, and they had to step in and order his release. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
joined Abu Nidal, arrived at the modern Abu Dhabi airport and waited for Syrian foreign minister Abdel Halim Khaddam. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Feeling threatened by Egypt’s peace with Israel, Syria wanted to come to better terms with its other adversary, Iraq. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He received his weapon from his contact in Abu Dhabi in the usual FRC manner. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the PLO took an unquestioning stand behind Iraq, even though they had good relations with Iran after the fall of the Shah. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
If it had not been for the massive airlift of military hardware from the United States as well as the bullheaded determination of Sadat not to return armor units to attack a Sharon counter-offensive, Israel might have suffered significant territorial losses. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The king was as cunning as his enemy, and ordered one of his squires to mount the horse in order to try him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Palestinians who know Israel best are those who grew up inside it, speak Hebrew and understand the country, but the PLO was staffed by 1948 refugees, many of whom had anti—Jewish prejudices. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Also, Israel never viewed Palestinian orga- nizations as an organic force, a revolutionary movement as dynamic as the Zionist movement that created Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Western countries helped Israel with intelligence.9 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel signed intelli- gence cooperation pacts, usually called anti-terrorist agreements, with several European countries. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Germany gave Israel a list of Palestinian students in their country as well as information about their political activism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Arab countries also exchange information with Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Miles Copeland claims, Nigel West adds: “Mossad’s need to resort to false-flag operations is Besides Lillehammer and the 1973 war, Israel suffered other intelligence [Syria] has gone so far as to provoke Palestinian units into making raids into Israel, and then to tip off the Israelis. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Algerian Government donated a number of blank passports to al-Fatah for “Black September,” then told the French security authorities how to identify the secret mark- ings they put on them.’° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel uses a storehouse of Palestinian and Arab collaborators. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They immerse a collaborator gradually, step by step, getting him to do something immoral, something that violates his code of behavior. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Had the West been seriously concerned about combating Abu Nidal they would have met with anyone who could have Although he wanted a political settlement with Israel, Hammami was no sports. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He studied English literature at Damascus University and was a polit- Hammami was born in Jaffa in 1948. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His family was put on a truck and changed after the 1967 war, suddenly turning up as a guerrilla in Jordan and the West Bank. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ali Hassan Salameh, the PLO leader directing this close cooperation with the United States, was the person the Mossad had been targeting in Lillehammer when they killed the wrong man. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Did this desire stem from the need to settle the account on Munich, or was it inspired by his successful building of bridges? Probably both. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Salameh, unlike the other leaders the Israelis assas- sinated, was well guarded. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
According to Time, Israel used 14 agents, including some of the same peo- After Chambers knew Salameh’s habits, the agents rented a Volkswagen When Salameh’s car passed the Volkswagen, Chambers pressed the remote Zuhair Mohsin loved a fine cigar, a dark, fat Havana. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When Asad gave Mohsin Saika, he put 7,000 men under Mohsin’s command,9 and in 1976 the group joined Syrian forces in attacking Palestinian positions in Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Saika attacked Israel in the early 1970s and participated in international terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Austria had been a key reception center for Soviet Jews, 60,000 having been processed in the previous two years. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Despite his acid statements, however, Mohsin was practical and wanted territorial compromise with Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After Mohsin’s assassination, Saika continued to function, but they became more militant, and In the summer of 1979 11. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Death to theArabs 111 112 Arab and Israeli Terrorism like the rest of the Syrian groups, Saika became anti—PLO after the 1982 inva- sion of Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel asked almost nothing of Rashid, only that he stay with Abu Nidal’s men. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As the Jerusalem Post declared, “Khader played an important role in winning European support for the Palestinian cause,”21 and an Italian newspaper adds that with his death the PLO lost one of its most valuable diplomats.22 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Khader was a Palestinian Christian from a small town near Jenin on the northern part of the West Bank. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The flight the gunmen attacked was not for Israelis but for 150 French insurance employees who were awarded a vacation in Israel for their labors. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The terrorists missed Israeli ambassador Mordechai Gazit and labor minister Israel Katz, who had gotten off the incoming flight and were in another part of the airport at the time of the shooting.1 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Portugal only recognized Israel in 1977, and Efraim Eldar was dispatched as ambassador. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The incident occurred as Spain was try- ing to join the European Community. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Spain did not officially recognize Israel, and the European Community wanted Spain to change its pro—Palestinian policy in order to bring its foreign policy in line with the other member nations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The European Com- munity was scheduled to consider recognition, and it seemed no coincidence that such a repulsive attack against children took place close to where the dele- gation was about to meet.’° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Europe, stirring up anti—Semitism and showing the Palestinians as uncivilized and cruel, the neo—Nazis. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Aus- tria had a history of sympathy with the Palestinians, and these attacks had the effect of dampening their support. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was another in a steady series of blunders during the blundering war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In his pocket was a fake passport from Oman and a picture of the man he was sup- posed to kill, Max Mazin, head of the local B’nai B’rith.7 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He killed a 15-year-old boy and injured 13 others, then took to his heels, running into a police patrol.9 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The two men did not look alike, but they lived in the same building. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This unfortunate incident happened early in the morning in March 1980 when the lawyer, Adolfo Cotelo, was driving two of his daughters to school. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He then ran down the street with his machine gun until the police leapt on top of him and disarmed him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Madrid had become known as a main recruiting center for both the FRC and the Mossad in January1973 when the PLO lured Mossad recruiter Baruch Cohen to a Madrid cafe and killed him.8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Both organizations were able to operate quite freely, recruiting Palestinian and North African students who were having difficulties. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, the assassin for this operation was flown in from Baghdad two weeks before, ready to follow instructions from his liai- son. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After shuttle diplomacy between Damascus, Jerusalem, and Beirut, Chapter 13 Lebanon War 125 Juvenal, second century 126 Arab and Israeli Terrorism In an earlier chapter we touched on Israel’s fueling the Lebanese civil war through a dirty tricks campaign. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On March 11, 1978, eight Fatah commandos, led by woman named Dalal Moghrabi who worked with Abu Jihad, landed two rubber dinghies in North Israel and hijacked two busses. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
President Carter told Begin that unless he withdrew all troops within 24 hours, he would cut off United States aid and sponsor a United Nations resolution condemning Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After Israel’s invasion, several FRC members were arrested by the PLO for attempting to attack UNIFIL forces and thereby undermining the Stone of Wisdom ceasefire.8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Meanwhile, Israel continued bombing Lebanese civilian targets such as bridges and a main oil refinery at Zahrani to “create maximum havoc for Lebanese civilian traffic and turn the Lebanese against the Palestinians.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Randal concludes, “Armed struggle never physically threatened Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On the contrary, it gave Israel the pretext for destabilizing Lebanon and eventually smashing the PLO’s military infrastructure.”9 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Guards aboard the bus immediately fired back (though Israel officially denied it’°), shooting one of the gunmen, and apparently the grenade he was about to throw blew him up. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Within a month of the signing of the Camp David accords, Alan Hart notes, “Israel began a five-month blitz on Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In response to terrorist attacks abroad, Israel twice tried to declare the truce null and void. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On April 3, 1982, Israel again lightly shelled South Lebanon after Jacqueline Esber, a member of George Abdullah’s FARL, killed the Israeli second secretary in charge of political affairs in Paris.’4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel imme- diately blamed the PLO, calling it a violation of the United States—initiated ceasefire.’5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Shortly after the Paris killing and two weeks before the complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (April 25, 1982) United States satellite photos showed Israel massing troops on its northern border. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States confronted Israel, and Israel backed down,16 but Israel’s ambas- sador to the United States, Moshe Arens, declared that Israel would shortly invade Lebanon,17 and Arid Sharon visited Christian Maronite leaders in Beirut to secure their cooperation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sharon passed the plan to United States secretary of state Alexan- der Haig for his approval, which he gave on the condition that Israel attack only when it had a clear provocation, stating that an attack from Jordan would not be justified.’9 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Former United States president Ronald Reagan adds, “By early June, when I was getting ready to leave for the Versailles economic sum- mit, it was apparent that Israel had already made the decision to attack in Lebanon and was waiting only for an excuse to deliver the blow.”20 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel needed to find a pre- text. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Then the FRC, who never before or since attacked Israel, had the sud- den urge to launch a cross-border raid. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They got a few men into South Lebanon, but according to members who left the group, they could not get close enough to the border to give Israel its needed provocation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel often made internationally unpopular moves under the cover of international crisis. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They announced the expulsion of Palestinian residents on a Sunday, when most of the world’s journalists take the day off. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Military strategists tell us that Israel planned their invasion carefully, including the best possible date. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One Syrian gen- eral said that the ruthless force they used was justified since they knew that Israel was about to invade Lebanon and put Syria at risk; Syria, he said, had to avoid internal dissent at such a crucial time. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
For both the Israelis living near the Lebanese border and the Lebanese and Palestinians in South Lebanon the 1981-82 truce produced peace and sta- bility, but hawkish Israeli leaders were obsessed with destroying the PLO. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the weeks before the date set for the invasion, Begin and other Israeli leaders began, as the London Times said, “emphasizing that Israel regards the terms of the cease-fire as applying to Jewish targets abroad,” retracting the oral agreement Habib specifically refuted.2’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the early summer of 1982 Begin invited his ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov, to Israel and singled him out, congratulating him for doing a good job.22 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was a strange gesture; Argov, who had held the job since 1979, not only belonged to the opposition Labor party, he was a liberal, in sharp contrast to the intransigent Begin. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the late afternoon of June 3, 1982, Argov, back in London, accepted an invitation to attend a reception of ambassadors given that evening at the Dorcester Hotel by the De La Due textile company. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He was in charge of arms but did not know how they came into the country. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Marwan al-Banna, a second cousin of Abu Nidal, was not smart or well adjusted, but he needed a job, so Abu Nidal gave him money to leave his home in Nablus and train in Iraq. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He turned out to be a hopeless recruit and was sent to London in November 1979 with a scholarship and a pocketful of money. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Rosan set him up, and his main duty was to live well, an activity he performed proficiently. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He tried to start again in Barcelona, but failed there as well, remaining constantly broke. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
An FRC recruit, perhaps in tandem with a Mossad agent, stepped in and gave him a little money, promising to fulfill his dream of studying in England. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Said was a cheap recruit. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The ring of poverty Abu Nidal was never able to operate in Lebanon until after the Israel inva- The FRC had money, millions of dollars, and although they preached the 13. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Two PLO leaders were assassinated in Rome by the JDL operating from the information and assistance of the Mossad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His brother ran off in fright.33 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sartawi infuriated Palestinians by calling for negotiations with Israel, whose bombs had just killed thousands of innocent Lebanese and Palestini- ans; then he infuriated Israelis by saying that Abu Nidal’s organization, which had triggered the war, was infiltrated by the Mossad, repeating Arafat’s charge of a year earlier. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He felt Palestinians should recognize and negotiate with Israel, solve the problem, and move on, always moving, never time for those lagging behind. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He was one of the first to realize FRC’s relationship with Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
war, stating his position for recognition and negotiation, but especially after the brutality of Israel’s war, Sartawi’s position outraged most PNC members, who used a technicality to prevent him from formally addressing the PNC. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli government gives his picture to journalists, but it is of someone totally different. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He became, supposedly, the most vicious enemy of the West and Israel, and this meeting was held in the house of a former PLO ambas- sador, a well-known personality who in 1984 publicly left Arafat’s Tunis-based organization and joined his old friend Abu Nidal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In Damascus they have two refugee camps full of silent but loyal supporters. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Bakr first encountered Abu Nidal the year after the Arabs’ humiliat- ing defeat in the 1967 war when both were loyal members of Fatah. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
earlier in Murad’s home. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Politburo meets about every week; the same points are discussed again in a more abstract vein when the Central Commit- tee meets every four to six weeks, and later when the 56-member Revolu- tionary Council meets. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Members of the Politburo belong to the Central Com- mittee, and members of the Central Committee belong to the Revolutionary Several eyes glance at Mustafa Murad, who they know helped organize Frustrated by Abu Nidal’s stiff denials, Abu Bakr drops the subject, but The group is gearing for a series of outside operations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
the stream of rather uninteresting news, which contains not one word about outside operations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
he remains visibly upset most of the morning. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He never drinks during Central Com- mittee meetings. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
out a white case of small Dutch cigars and lights one up. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But even though the real power is left to the Politburo, FRC’s primary work, outside operations, is the business of Abu Nidal, Mustafa Murad, Abd al-Rahman, Amjed Attar, and Dr. Ghassan. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He takes out some papers from a black carrying case on his lap, puts on his glasses, and reads the same report he read two days earlier during the Politburo meeting. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The report describes Amal’s grip on the camp and the inability of FRC fighters to break the siege. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All other groups have formed a united front against Amal’s blockade. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The report doesn’t give num- bers, but FRC has about 30 fighters there. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Perhaps this growing British support for a political settlement to the Pales- tinian-Israeli conffict explains the terror directed towards Britain. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
People had heard her groaning after she was shot. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One of the gunmen was blond, of Nordic appearance, and the press asked him who he was. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel discounted the Syrian report but still distributed no background on the victims, only nam- ing them (Esther Pultzur, her husband Reuben Pultzur, and Avraham Avn- ery~°). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A week later the Telegraph declared that the three were top Mossad officials,31 but Israel had already avenged the attack by bombing the PLO headquarters in Tunis and the area surrounding it, killing about 80 people, including several high-ranking officials. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After that she worked principally in Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel had been planning to bomb the PLO for months, allegedly using information that Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard pilfered from his job as United States Navy analyst to arrange the attack.33 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship, the major news item of the period, began three days after the Israeli aerial attack on Tunis. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The group responsible, Abu Abbas’s PLF, claimed that the attack was hastily put together as retribution for the Tunis bombing. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Most of the passengers got off to tour by land,36 but four dark young Arabs with mustaches never left their cabin. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli inspectors with walkie talkies usually come onto the ship from a small boat as it is entering the port, and they screen passengers on the ship. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Former CIA agents contend that the PLF had been infiltrated, so Israel or the United States may have known about the hijack before the gunmen boarded the ship in Genova. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A short time later the three attacked in Austria in the same manner. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Compared to Rome, this was a lighter raid, but it left three dead and thirty injured. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The gunmen opened fire at embarking El Al passengers, then tried to flee but were caught by Austrian police, who killed one Arab. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Speaking on May 21, Sec- retary Shultz did not deny the evidence, saying “actions must speak louder than words,” alluding to United States involvement against Sheikh Fadlallah.52 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Considering its magnitude and its implication for United States foreign pol- icy, not to mention morality, when compared to the Achille Lauro or even Rome and Vienna, the bombing received almost no media attention or analy- sis.53 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The 1982 invasion showed Syrians that their most sophisti- cated missiles and jets were no match for Israel’s. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel implicated Syria. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Anti-Syrian rhetoric in the press and by govern- ment leaders was worrying Damascus into believing that Israel was going to launch a full-scale invasion, and Syria bought Soviet advanced missiles, includ- ing surface-to-surface SS-21s capable of delivering heavy payloads of destruc- tion, possibly chemical. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In February 1986 Israel force-landed a Libyan plane carrying Syrian and Lebanese passengers, including a Baath party official, and kept saber-rattling about the Syrian preparation for war.5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States, however, wanted better relations with Syria and did not want Israel’s reac- tionary government starting another war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In an interview later that year French prime minister Jacques Chirac said that Germany’s chancellor, Hel- mut Kohl, and foreign secretary, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, had concluded that the Heathrow attack “was a provocation probably organized by Israel’s Mossad secret service and renegade Syrians in an attempt to bring down the govern- ment of Syrian President Hafez Assad.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At that time Assad was making moves toward the West, and the last thing on his mind was a confrontation with Israel, which was sure to again destroy his army and air force within hours. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Over 2 million Americans canceled over- seas trips in 1985. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
ested in unity and only wanted to take over and disrupt the Palestine move- ment. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But they could have done something— trailed him, arranged an auto accident, subdued him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He came to London and tried to become active with other Palestinians, helping the PLO office whenever he could. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His older brother Ibrahim wa$ notorious in the West Bank, collecting information from the local Palestin- ian community and openly receiving money and protection from the author- ities. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Police thought they were going to kill PLO representative Aweida, but they were actually being cultivated for a Jordanian target. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal tried to meet his old friends Abu Daoud and Naji Alush, but no one was interested, and he returned to Libya after taking away the victory achieved by the PLO in its reunification. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He went there and told the PLO security office under Abu Hol that he was a spy and wanted to amend his ways, saying he had a lot of information to offer. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But the PLO had already been burned by that trick, and after a couple of cold showers Usta admitted that the Mossad had given him the line about wanting to confess, with bits of unimportant information to spill, in order to win the confidence The Mossad sent Sowan to other cities, including Paris in 1982. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Later, however, the Mossad would use that tactic effectively to sneak an agent right next to Abu Hol and the top leadership of the PLO. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Finally, he arranged a dia- logue between Abu lyad and Abu Nidal, and they are said to have talked for 20 hours (perhaps an Arab exaggeration). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The PLO claims it could not have killed or arrested Abu Nidal because he was protected by Algeria, a strong PLO supporter; such an action would go against acceptable Arab tradition. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ismail Sowan did not want to become an Israeli collaborator; not really. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ismail joined the Mossad at 18 while he was living in the West Bank. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Cyprus complained that Israel, who denied involvement, was using their country for terrorism, but most of the press paid little attention. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The PLO’s incompetence in the ways of the world allowed Israel to defeat the project, ending another PLO propaganda opportunity. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The attempt may have been the work of Hizballah. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
16. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Baader- Meinhof had 20 core people, and with that number they successfully discred- ited other leftists. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Guerrilla movements start with a handful of loyal supporters, but they have an ideology. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As head of the Polish branch called SAS (the Arabs pro- nounce it “Sash”), which operated in the Intraco building on Stawski Street in Warsaw and had a branch in London, he traveled throughout Europe on busi- ness, largely dealing in weapons.13 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Acting on information from Silwani, the Swiss apprehended Najmeddin when he was in their country, but he was freed and went to Libya, where Abu Nidal demoted him to a secondary position.’4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel radio used the word in every broadcast, almost every sentence.5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The PLO says that Israel’s bombing of Lebanese refugee camps or shoot- ing of unarmed youths in the West Bank is terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After Israel invaded and occupied Lebanon, it threw thousands of Shia in makeshift prisons in Lebanon and transported others to prisons in Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
International pressure forced Israel to promise that they would release 340 Shia prisoners, but on the scheduled day (June 10, 1985), Israel changed its mind. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Shia have no army to fight Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Either they can accept whatever Israel does to them or they can resort to what is called terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Four days later they hijacked a TWA jet to Beirut in order to get the United States to force Israel to release their comrades.23 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terrorism does not spring from a vacuum, nor does it exist without a logic.”25 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Who was more effective? about the Marine bombing beforehand.26 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Some contain horrific pictures of boys and girls hit by phos- phorus bombs, running while brown smoke pours out of their mouths, and families mutilated by cluster bombs that spray heavy jagged pieces of metal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
We all know that grim face of war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It seems that someone phoned his Finnish wife and told her that Khader was alive. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The killing of Nimri probably hastened Amari’s untimely retirement. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Khalid Nazzal, a Central Committee member of Naif Hawath- meh’s DFLP, had come from Tunis for a brief vacation without checking in with the PLO office or the DFLP responsible in the city. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In October of the same year the Mossad was able to silence a PLO mil- itary commander who had managed to stay alive since the stand at Karameh, Mondher Abu Ghazalah, officially in charge of naval operations and also a member of the DFLP, who came from a military family. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He could work in an office or with a militia, but his assignment showed that the PLO did not have the required maturity to select people by their skills instead of their connections. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mreich, a PLO lieutenant colonel, held a central position during the siege of Beirut. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He managed to shell out 450,000 PLO dollars for the Santa Andrea, but although Mreich was security conscious, changing his habits and using a driver, word filtered to the Israelis about his new ship. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
I saw that all the results were going to Israel’s pocket. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They were killed by leaders who observers believe have links with the Mossad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Deserters report that hundreds were killed, their best fighters, including almost everyone involved in outside operations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The next day, after a 9-hour battle, 40 FRC men surrendered to Fatah. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Bakr turned him over to the PLO. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
(Such complex clan codes help account for Arafat’s failure to destroy Abu Nidal.) Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Bakr’s rebellion came hard on the heels of a bloody internal fight. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The effectiveness of terrorism—that is, whether the use of terrorism helped the Palestinians and Israelis—is a multifaceted question. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, the terror campaign, culminating in the massacre at Deir Yassin, went hand-in-hand with military victory over Arab forces, and it would be difficult to deduce what effect the terrorist activ- ities by the Stern or Irgun might have had if the Haganah military campaign had not been such a sweeping success. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chapter 21 Conclusions 207 208 Arab and Israeli Terrorism The 1965—73 Palestinian terror crusade, concentrating first on direct attacks against Israel and then on headline-grabbing international operations, was also successful, since it brought about the 1967 and 1970 wars, which Palestinians had wanted but which they lost since they had neither the fore- sight nor the military intelligence to know that the combined Arab armies were no match for Israel’s. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The wars they instigated led to further disappointment and further lost territory. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Because of infighting and Israeli security measures, the Palestinians turned to terrorist attacks abroad, and it is debatable whether this helped the Arabs by keeping their cause alive or hurt them by giving them a bad reputation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Reprisals are not rationally thought out; they are inspired more by revenge than by a desire to end the conflict victoriously, and they are directed at those who represent a political, not a military, threat. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Palestinians abandoned attacks on Israel because they were too hard and concentrated on easier targets in Europe. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Economist notes, “By comparison with anywhere else in the developed world, America is an astonishingly violent place... Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel encouraged Hamas in the 1980s as an alterna- Paul Wilkinson, “Terrorism: International Dimensions,” in The New Ter- Edward S. Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan, “‘Terrorism’ as Ideology and FrederickJ. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Hacker adds: “The terms ‘criminal’ and ‘crazy’ are labels that Robert 0. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
12. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
11. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 132—33, adds that details of the forgery were revealed in a 1934- 35 trial in Switzerland. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
25. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Its history is discussed by studies such as Richard Deacon, The Israel~ Secret Service (London: Sphere, 1979). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
David Ben-Gurion, Israel: Years of Challenge (New York: Holt, Rinehart 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There are conflicting reports on Moyne’s attitude to Zionism, with many Jews claiming he was anti—Semitic. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sayed Noful, Israel’s Crime Record (Cairo: Information Department, 1965),34. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, p. 237. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Livia Rokach, Israel’s Secret Terrorism:A Study Based on Moshe Sharett’s Per- sonal Diary and Other Documents (Belmont MA: AAUG, 1980), pp. 46—47. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
52. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Covert Relationship (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 36, the authors claim the killers were given exit visas for Czechoslovakia and that Ben-Gurion became close friends with one of the assassins. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
53. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
An in-depth report is contained in Newsfrom Within (Jerusalem) 2, no. 37, 23 October 1986. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chapter 3 1. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
4. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Donald Neff, “The U.S., Iraq, Israel, and Iran: Back- drop to War,” Journal of Palestine 20, no. 4, Summer 1991, p. 24. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Tad Szulc, The SecretAiiance: The Extraordinary Story of the Rescue of the ward corrupt Imman Ahmed li-din Allah of Yemen, who would send his army to stop a school from opening before he would defend his palace, almost certainly received money from Israel, and all emigrants’ property was confiscated. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Max Bennet, one of their friends involved in another espionage operation, was also caught, and he later committed suicide in prison (we should always be suspicious of prison suicides, but in this case it seems that Bennet did take his own life by thrusting an old nail into his wrists). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
American Ideological System,” in Said and Hitchens, p. 106. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
9 December 1972, cited in Vincent Monteil, Dossier Secret sur Israel: Le Terrorisme (Paris: Guy Authier, 1978), p. 262. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Stephen Green, Living by the Sword:America and Israel in the Middle East (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), pp. 42—43. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
5, 1969—70 (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1977), pp. 134—36: On 22 October 1972 Maj-Gen Avraham Adan, who was in command in 1969, confirmed this story. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Alan Hart, Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker? (London: Sidgwick & Jack- son, 1984), p. 306; David Yallop, Tracking the Jackal: The Search for Carlos, the World’s Most Wanted Man, (New York: Random House, 1993), p.38. Israel also bombed an American-funded irrigation project, threatening the Jordanians with more bombings unless they stopped the fedayeen. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
54. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of Pales- tinian Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 160. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Love, pp. 5—20. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mitchell G. Bard, “The Turning Point in United States Relations with Israel: The 1968 Sale of Phantom Jets,” Middle East Review Vol. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Khaled carried him around the corner to the AUB hospital where Haddad graduated. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Yallop, pp. 41—42, claims the Iraqi defense minister was bribed with two suitcases of dollars. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
ful Triangle: The Un ited States, Israel andthe Palestinians (Boston: South End, 1983). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel, America and the Bomb William R. Farrell, Blood and Rage: The Story of the Japanese RedArmy The story was carried in all papers during the first days of March. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This story is carried by all the papers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the 1988 PNC that recognized Israel, spokesman Abu Sharif said 1. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel and Palestine Report no. 127, September 1987, p. 3. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Seale,Assad, p. 313. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
(London: Hod- 2. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
9. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Hirst and Beeson, p. 267. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New York Times, 19 September 1982, p. 12; Washington Post, 19 September 1982, p. 21; Israel blamed the PLO. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sharon with Chanoff, pp. 432—33; George W. Ball, Error and Betrayal ii~ Lebanon (Washington: Foundation for Middle East Peace [1522 K street NW, Wash- ington DC 200051,1984), pp. 34—35. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
for Middle East Policy, 1983): Israel showed “no concern for American objectives and no fear of American penalties” during the Lebanon invasion. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Guardian, 7 March 1983, p. 1, back page; Washington Post, 8 March 1983, John C. Cambell, “The Reagan Plan and the Western Alliance” (Center Sean MacBride, Israel in Lebanon (London: International Commission, Mackey, p. 178; Israel destroyed many buildings while aiming for Arafat. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
in Said The accounts of these killings were on the front pages of all Italian news- Israel and Palestine Report no. 142, May 1988, and all newspapers, 18 June, Le Monde, 24 July 1982, pp. 1, 22; London Times, 24 July 1982, p. 1; New London Times, 7 March 1983, P. 8. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel and Palestine Report no. 127, September 1986, gives a long account of the Larnaca episode. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Raid on Libya (London: Pluto, 1986), p. 12. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Skye), P. 63 “Next to armaments, [Israel’s] second largest industry earning foreign currency is tourism.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel and Palestine Report, no. 132, April 1987, p. 4. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
40. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
suggests, quoting Exodus 21:23, that Israel kills Muslim and Palestinian prison- ers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The structure of the Mossad is described by Samuel Katz, Israel versus Jabril: The Thirty-Year WarAgainsi a Master Ter- 1. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
94—95. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
ter, 1985), P. 78. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel’s Secret Wars: The Untold History of Israeli Intelligence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
_____ The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Friedman, Robert I. Zealotsfor Zion: Inside Israel’s West Bank Settlement Movement. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Trans by Peretz Kidron, with Foreword by Golda Meir. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New York: Pantheon, 1990. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Institute for Palestine Studies. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
_____ Israel Versus Jabnil: The Thirty-Year War Against a Master Terrorist. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel: Nature and Impact. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
YasirArafat. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Kimche, Jon, and Kimche, David. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
London: International Commission, 1983. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
from 1957 Hebrew edition by H.A.G. Shucklev. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Martin, David. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Meade, Robert C.,Jr. RedBrigades: The Story ofltalian Terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mossad: Israel’s Most Secret Service. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel Undercover. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New York: Franklin Watts, 1982. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New York: Elisabeth Sifton Books, 1986. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
and Michael Stohi, eds. Current Perspectives on International Ter- rorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New York: Ballantine, 1970. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Khomeini and Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Stein, Leonard. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America and the State of Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Preparing to deliver political power in South Yemen to 70 The PDR Y: Three Designs for Independence ‘London’s Congress for treason’. Comtemporary Yemen
This means that one could, by controlling Bab al-Mandab: (1) affect access to the Suez Canal from Asian points of origin; (2) affect traffic patterns to Israel’s port-city of Eilat; (3) affect traffic patterns to Saudi Arabia’s major harbours on the Red Sea, i.e. Jeddah, Yanbu’ and Jizan; (4) affect traffic patterns to Sudan’s ports; (5) affect traffic patterns to Egypt’s Red Sea maritime facilities; (6) affect traffic patterns to Eritrea and Ethiopia; and, (7) in more general terms, perhaps effect a change in the trade patterns of one or more of these Red Sea riparian states. Comtemporary Yemen
Indeed, several analysts see the Saudis as having been responsible for the overthrow of several YAR leaders who became too indepen- dent or moved closer to Aden; for example, the removal of Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani from the presidency in 1974, the dismissal of Muhsin al-Aini from the premiership in 1975, and the murder of President Ibrahim al-Hamdi in 1977.” Comtemporary Yemen
Egypt 1958—60; Iraq 1963, 1978; Sudan 1971). Comtemporary Yemen
FIGHTING TERRORISM How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists ii EDITED BY BENJAMIN NETANYAHU International Terrorism: Challenge and Response A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World Terrorism: How the West Can Win BY BENJAMIN NETANYAHU FIGHTING TERRORISM I How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International BENJAMIN NETANYAHU FARRAR STRAUS GIROUX Terrorists New York Copyright © 1995 by Benjamin Netanyahu All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Published simultaneously in Canada by HarperCollinsCanadaLtd LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING~INPUBLICATI0N DATA Fighting terrorism: how democracies can defeat domestic and First edition, 1995 Netanyahu, Binyamin. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In this he drew not only from his own rich professional experience in Israel but also from his insights gleaned from a vast network of contacts with ACKNOWLEDGMENTS V anti-terror authorities in many lands, examples of which I have used liberally throughout these pages. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Lastly, I am much indebted to my publisher, Roger Straus, who with his boundless élan and unmatched nerve prodded me to write this book while in the throes of Israel’s less than genteel politics. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Today’s tragedies can either be the harbingers of much greater calamities yet to come or the turning point in which free societies-once again mobilize their resources, their inge- nuity, and their will to wipe out this evil from our midst. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fighting Terrorism 25 The Question of Civil If the chances of waging a campaign of domestic ter- rorism against a modern democracy are in theory mar- ginal, there is a catch: The major democracies, although eminently capable of fighting terror effectively, are often hesistant to do so. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But while passive measures against terror may be par- tially effective in a small country such as Israel, they are of only limited use in a vast nation like the United States, which has thousands of airports and tens of thousands of federal buildings strewn throughout the fifty states. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
One was his arsenal of Scud missiles and chemical-weapons stockpiles, which he claimed to be willing to use to “incinerate half of Israel,” thereby hoping to shift the focus of the war to an Arab— Israeli confrontation and splitting the Arab partners in the international coalition arrayed against him; the other was terror, which he threatened to loose against the United States and its allies in the event of a counter- offensive in Kuwait. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The fact is that both the primary co-conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing entered the United States as po- litical refugees—one from Iraq and the other claiming he had been oppressed in Israel (both would have most likely received political asylum had they not spoiled their chances by blowing up a building). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But the centrality of terrorism to Soviet foreign policy emerged only in the 1960s, with the stalemate in the Cold War and the emergence of independent Arab states willing to hitch their oil reve- nues and their war against Israel to the terrorist inter- nationale. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
State-sponsored terror of a more limited variety had in fact been a constant factor in the Arab war against Israel. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After Israel’s independence in 1948, Egypt and Syria con- tinued to encourage cross-border fedayeen attacks, which claimed hundreds of lives and resulted in Israeli counter- actions on the Arab side of its borders. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Early on, Arafat recognized that the support of various Arab states would be insufficient to produce any kind of Benjamin Netanyahu 58 sustained terrorist campaign against Israel. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Arafat therefore intensified PLO ties with the Soviet bloc, which would help him wage an unrelenting terror- ist war against Israel. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For example, much of Soviet covert operations in the Western Hemisphere was taken over by the Cuban secret service, the DGI, although it eventually became clear that the DGI was itself nothing more than an arm of Soviet intelligence. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Israel played an important role in persuading the United States to adopt this stance. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In the military sphere, Israel served as an example of an uncompromising fight against terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
On the political level, Israel’s representatives in the United States waged a concerted campaign to convince American citizens that they should adopt similar policies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
When Arens re- turned to Israel in 1983 to serve as Minister of Defense, I served for six months as acting ambassador. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In order to sharpen their demand for the release of terrorists jailed in Kuwait and Lebanese Shiites being held by Israel, the gunmen murdered an American pas- senger in cold blood and threw his body on the tarmac. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At the start of the crisis, a special communications channel was established between Shultz and the two key leaders in the govern- ment of Israel, Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir (who, although of opposing parties, were jointly ruling in a National Unity Govern- ment); I was then serving as Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, and sensitive messages concerning the crisis were passed back and forth through my office. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For the privilege of seeing its archenemy Iraq crushed by the West, it received badly needed economic assis- tance, and was offered great respectability in the attain- ment of its strategic objectives, such as pushing Israel off the Golan Heights and digesting what remained of Leb- anon. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Once in Lebanon, they were instrumental in spawning the Shiite terror organization Hizballah, the Party of God, which with Syrian and Iranian sponsorship masterminded the terrorist attacks that drove the Amer- ican forces out of the country in the mid-1980s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It is suspected of involvement in a number of bomb- ing attacks around the world, including the 1988 midair destruction of a Pan Am airliner over Lockerbie, Scot- land, which claimed 258 lives, and the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community building in Buenos Aires, which left nearly a hundred dead and hundreds more wounded. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A hint of the potential power of this policy was provided by the convening of a special Islamic conference called by Iran and held in Teheran in October 1991, on the eve of the Madrid Peace Conference between Israel and its Arab neighbors; the Teheran conference was attended by rad- ical Islamic movements and terrorist groups from forty countries, and declared itself to be against making any kind of peace with the Jewish state. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While Libya and Iraq have chafed under the yoke of Western sanctions (imposed on Libya in 1986 in the wake of its complicity in the bombing of a discotheque in Germany frequented by American servicemen, and on Iraq in 1991 after its invasion of Kuwait), and while the other Pan-Arabisi state, Syria, has had to tone down its more overt associ- ations with international terrorism to win U.S. pressure on Israel, Iran has gone virtually unscathed, carefully cul. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After all, the Iranians are mainly Shiites, and they therefore do not command the automatic attention and allegiance of Sunni militants, who stem from the other great branch of Islam. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Funded by the United States and Saudi Arabia— the Americans alone poured in $3 billion—the war in Afghanistan became to Sunni Islam what the Spanish Civil War was to the Communists; it created an inter- national brotherhood of fighting men, well versed in the ways of terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As soon as the Arab states began to achieve full independence after World War II, these two movements began working to dispose of the Arab monarchs, with no small measure of success: Three decades later, the pro-Western monarchs of Egypt, Iraq, and Libya had been deposed and replaced Fighting Terrorism 85 by Pan-Arabist military regimes of one stripe or an- other—all of them eager to devote themselves to the task of dismantling the remaining Arab monarchies and add- ing them to their own realms; all of them sympathetic to the confrontation with the West being spearheaded by the Soviet Union; all of them recognizing the liberation of Jerusalem as a central vehicle for stirring up ultra- nationalist sentiment among their people; and all of them possessing no hesitation about resorting to terrorism to achieve these ends. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
If the Western powers disavow our rights and ridicule and despise us, we Arabs must teach them to respect us and take us seriously.”2 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After years of Arab propaganda directed at the West, it has become fairly easy to sell the assertion of Western Arabists that if only Israel had not come into being, the Muslim and Arab relationship with the West would be Benjamin Netanyahu 86 harmonious. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But in fact, the antagonism of the Islamic world toward the West raged for a millennium before Israel was added to its list of enemies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The soldiers of militant Islam and Pan-Arabism do not hate the West be- cause of Israel; they hate Israel because of the West. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From virtually the beginning of the contemporary Jewish resettlement in the land of Israel, parts of the Arab world saw Zionism as an expression and represen- tation of Western civilization, an alien implantation that split the realm of Islam down the middle. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
That in this larger anti-Western context, militant Arabs understand Israel as a mere tool of the West to be used against them can be seen in the constant references made by Saddam, Assad, and Arafat to Saladin—the great Muslim general who liberated Je- rusalem from the European Crusaders in 1187, after having signed a treaty avowing peace. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
These activities gained the mili- tants no operational capacity which could be directed against Israel or the West. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Most of the European Mus- urns, like their co-religionists in the United States and Israel, are law-abiding citizens or residents who would never dream of participating in terrorist activity or in any other illegal act. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
An even more powerful organization is the Association for a New World Out- look in Europe (AMGT), the European branch of the Turkish Welfare Party (RP). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In 1994, a pathbreaking piece of investigative journalism, Jihad in America, was aired by PBS, weaving together the threads of the quiltwork of Islamic terrorist groups and terrorist sponsors which have sprung up across America since the Iranian revolution. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In short, elements in the American Muslim commu- nity have rapidly developed into the supportive hinter- land necessary to serve as at least a partial home base for international terror directed outward, at Israel, Egypt, Al- geria, Jordan, and other non-Islamic Middle Eastern re- gimes. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And it can only be a matter of time before this terror is turned inward against the United States, the leader of the hated West and the country responsible in the eyes of militant Muslims for having created Israel and for maintaining the supposedly heretical Arab regimes. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And it is this wholly new domestic-international terrorism which the United States and Europe now face and which threatens to assume even more alarming proportions as a result of two recent developments far from their shores. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu 98 The Gaza Syndrome One of the most important boosts Islamic terrorism has received since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran has been the creation of the PLO enclave in Gaza in the wake of the 1993 Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
How did the deal between Israel and the PLO come about? Shortly after Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, it had begun to dawn on portions of the Arab world that there was no possibility of destroying the Jew- ish state by conventional means. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
That war had pushed Israel’s borders from the outskirts of Tel Aviv to the Jordan Valley forty miles to the east, and from the de- velopment towns of the Negev to the Suez Canal one hundred miles to the west. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
With residence in the United States and even American citizenship, these international terrorists have now become domestic terror- ists as well, living in America so that they can wage jihad Fighting Terrorism 97 against America. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As we have seen, a similar process is well underway in Europe. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A stone wall a thousand me- ters high in the form of the Judean-Samarian mountains now provided a formidable barrier to Arab invasion from the east, while the sea and the huge Sinai desert to the southwest shielded Israel’s populated coastline from any V 99 threat in the west. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The first approach maintained that since the Arabs lacked a cred- ible war option against Israel in its present boundaries, they had no choice but to gradually come to terms with Israel’s existence, and eventually to make formal peace with it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Though there were differences as to what territorial con- cessions Israel might be prepared to make, there was a broad consensus against returning to the pre-1967 lines, which had been so fragile as to have provoked the Six- Day War, and against the establishment of a PLO state next to Israel. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the chief patron of the Arab dictatorships, and the Allied victory in the Gulf War created international conditions con- ducive to reaching an Arab-Israeli peace on this basis— and it was from this consensual position that Israel opened negotiations with all its neighbors at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But the rise of the Labor government in Israel in June 1992 produced a drastic change in Israeli foreign Fighting Terrorism 101 policy. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At Oslo, Israel in effect ac- cepted the first stage of the PLO’s Phased Plan: a gradual withdrawal to the pre-1967 border and the creation of the conditions for an independent PLO state on its bor- ders (except for Jerusalem and the other Jewish com- munities in Judea and Samaria, which were left for later negotiation). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
During this period, the Palestinian Arabs of Gaza were denied Egyptian citizenship—as compared with Palestin- ian Arabs living in lands captured by Israel and Jordan in 1948, who were immediately granted citizenship by those two countries. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In the 1950s, Gaza became the foremost base for fedayeen, terrorists backed by the Egyptian government, who staged murderous cross-border raids into Israel resulting in hundreds of deaths and casualties. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
When Gaza fell into Israel’s hands 102 during the 1967 Six-Day War, the city was in a state of appalling underdevelopment, and continued to be one of the principal centers of terrorist activity until 1970, when a concerted action by Israel uprooted most of the active terrorist cells from the area. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While Gaza’s economy grew over 400 percent in the subsequent years of Israeli ad- ministration,2 the most ambitious Israeli efforts to dis- mantle the refugee camps and move the residents into modern and permanent housing projects met with fero- cious resistance from the PLO, which relied on the sys- tem of refugee camps to foster anti-Israel hatred and provide the organization with a steady stream of recruits for its terrorist activities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Despite a rich Jewish history, Gaza has be- come a byword for a hostile and alien place, one of the few bits of land taken by Israel in the Six-Day War of which many Israelis would be pleased to rid themselves. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For this reason it was chosen by the Oslo negotiators as the most likely spot to be transferred to the hands of Yasir Arafat as an “empirical” experiment to prove that a PLO state on Israel’s borders would be a step toward peace. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Gaza was thus handed over to the PLO along with the village of Jericho (population 15,000), as the first step in implementing the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Under these accords, Israel was to with- draw in stages from all the populated areas in the West Bank and Gaza, and the PLO would set up a regime ostensibly called “autonomy,” but which in effect would have nearly all the trappings and attributes of a sovereign state: its own army (called a “police force”); its own ex- ecutive, legislative, and judicial branches (all of them con- trolled by Arafat); its own flag, passports, stamps, and border authorities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The PLO in turn promised to annul the PLO Covenant, which calls for Israel’s destruction, and to act resolutely to quell any terrorist attacks ema- nating from PLO-controlled areas. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Shortly after Israel withdrew from Gaza, it became abundantly clear that the PLO had no intention of ful- filling any of its commitments under the Oslo agreement. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Arafat refused to convene the Palestine National Council to annul the PLO Covenant, daily generating new ex- cuses until the Israeli government even stopped asking. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
To understand the true intentions of Yasir Arafat and the rest of the PLO leadership, one had only to listen to what they were saying in Arabic to their own people. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
I am for negotiations, but they are not the only means. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
PLO Foreign Minister Farouq Kaddoumi granted an interview in which he added: “The Palestin- ian people know that there is a state [Israel] that was founded by compulsion of history, and that this state must be brought to an end.”7 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
With this kind of policy, it is no wonder that soon after Israel’s withdrawal the various terrorist groups headquartered in Gaza understood that the time had come for an unprecedented murder spree against Israel. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
They could hatch their plans, arm their killers, dispatch them to Israel, and receive those that came back with no fear whatsoever of Israeli reprisal or interception. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Downtown Jerusalem and central Tel Aviv became the scenes of horrible carnage as buses exploded and crowds of pedestrians were mowed down by machine-gun fire. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Not coincidentally, this immunity facilitated an expan- sion of an Islamic fundamentalist specialty—the suicide attack. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Arafat’s refusal to extradite to Israel fourteen Palestinians wanted for murder prompted the legal ad- visor of the Labor government to state that “this refusal by the Palestinian Authority is a violation of the Oslo accords.”3 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Yasir Ara- fat—who more than anyone else alive contributed to the Fighting Terrorism 109 spread of international terrorism, who presides over an organization whose central and guiding political idea re- mains the desruction of Israel, and who personally pre- sided over countless atrocities against civilians of virtually every nationality in the free world in the service of this goal—is without question the lowest point in the history of the prize, and one which vitiates it of any moral worth. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For if hitherto Israel had shown the world how terrorism could be fought, now it showed how terrorism could be facilitated. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From 1993 on, the Israeli government committed many of the mistakes that a state could commit in the war against terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Equally, the Israeli government severely impaired its operational capacity to fight terrorism by committing no fewer than six classic blunders: 1. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
2. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After increasingly bloody and savage attacks emanat- ing from Gaza began to turn Israeli public opinion against further Israeli withdrawals, and after Israel’s clo- sure of its cities to Gazan workers imposed economic hardship on his regime, Arafat had to show Israel that he was doing something against terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As long as Israel continued to hand over ad- ditional land, the relative diminution in terrorism would continue. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As soon as Israel stopped its withdrawals, the terror campaign would be resumed in full force. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Brushing aside demands that he take forceful action against terrorists from Gaza, he staged instead mock detentions of a cadre of regular Islamic detainees, releasing most of them within days, all the while offering feeble circumlocutions to pass as condemnations of terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After some internal scuffling between the PLO and these groups threatened to explode into full-scale conflict, Arafat quickly shifted gears and proceeded instead to seek a strategic alliance with the militants, pleading with them that a tactical pause in their terrorist activities would enable the Rabin government to hand over more territory to the PLO, from which the Islamic groups could resume even more intense attacks at a later date.’7 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet it is difficult for many outside Israel to accept the failings built into the Oslo accords, espe- cially since so many hopes for peace have been vested in these agreements. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Only a year and a half later did the situation become so intolerable that even Israel’s pres- ident, Ezer Weizman, and leading commentators of the Benjamin Netanyahu 114 Israeli left were ready to declare that at the very least Israel should suspend the next phase of the Oslo accord5 and rethink the wisdom of handing over parts of the West Bank, ten minutes away from the outskirts of Tel Aviv, to a PLO army and to the Islamic terrorists. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
When the Oslo deal was signed, my party and I re- peated this warning, but much of the public at first dis- missed our arguments. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
ticism which threatened the continued implementation of the Oslo accords. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
tween Hamas and the PLO, an understanding was ar- rived at between the leadership of both movements. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Finally, after months of intense negotiations be. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Hamas militants agreed to ease up on terrorism, or at least not to wage it in and around Gaza, so as to permit Arafat to extend the Palestinian domains to the suburb5 of Israel’s major cities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As they made clear to Arafat, in no way did they give up their plan to fully resume the “armed struggle” once the additional territories had been procured. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A senior Israeli military officer described thi5 suspension of violence as a “temporary respite” aimed at “consolidating political gains.” Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Further, the PLO—Hama5 understanding did not prevent lower echelons of mili- tants from continued terrorist attacks, some of which (like the July 1995 suicide bombing of an Israeli bus in Fighting Terrorism 115 downtown Ramat Gan) continued to exact a growing toll of innocent Israeli lives. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But [Yasir Arafat’s] Fatah, which leads the PLO, feels that the Phased Plan must be pursued. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
All this has disturbing implications not only for Israel but for the rest of the free world as well. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
(Such linkages could be reversed, of course, and Hamas could easily send op- eratives to the West.) Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Stability may be achieved and terror- ism put on the defensive if Israel reassumes responsibility for its own security and asserts a policy of local autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs instead of the independent terror-free zones now being built. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It will take some time for the rest of the world to understand what many in Israel now know: that far from producing the durable peace all Israelis yearn for, the continued expansion of an armed, independent Palestinian domain is merely a stepping-stone to the eventual escalation of conflict and the continued march of Islamic militancy in the Middle East and beyond. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And the peace treaties which Israel has signed may be placed under intolerable pressure under the withering radiation of a nuclear-armed militant Islam. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
One need only recall how King Hussein—whose commitment to peace with Israel has been demonstrated since 1970—found himself having to make common cause with Saddam Hussein in 1991, when Saddam was at the height of his prestige in the days following Iraq’s incursion into Kuwait. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Such a group could emerge anywhere in the sea of militant Islamic puddles that now cover the entire West. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Obsta principi—oppose bad things when they are small—was the motto of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu 130 Zangwill, one of the first leaders of the modern Jewish national movement at the beginning of this century. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
These groups prosecute ter- rorist campaigns against Israel, as well as Jewish and non-Jewish targets throughout the world. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The most notable include the Hizballah en- clave in southern Lebanon, the PLO—Hamas fiefdom in Gaza, the Kurdish PKK strongholds in northern Iraq, and the Mujahdeen enclave on the Pakistani border with Kashmir. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This is a mistake that Israel, once the leader in anti-terror techniques, has made over and over again. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Israel has had some spectacular successes in this area, including the rescue of 103 hostages at Entebbe. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
the Nations: Israel and the World (New York: Bantam, 1993), pp. 194—95. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World, p. 122. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Israel Television News, November 10, 1994. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Hatzofeh, July 13, 1995. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
15. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The final word of gratitude goes for the dearest person. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
1 2 INTRODUCTION 1 HOW IT ALL BEGAN 11 POLITICAL PERSPECTWE ON THE CONFLICT 43 Historic Roots 11 The Rise and Evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine 14 The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and the 1948 War The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood after the 1948 War The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank 20 The Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip 23 The Brotherhood and Fateh: Reform versus Liberation (1957—67) 25 The 1967 War and its Aftermath 29 The Outbreak of the Intifada and the Creation of Hamas 36 The Strategy of Hamas 48 The Parties to the Struggle 49 The Nature of the Struggle 52 The International Context 52 Contents 18 19 lxi Contents xii Politics versus Morality 54 The Decision-Making Process 58 Evolution of Hanias’s Vision of How to Conduct the Struggle 59 Trying to Strike a Balance between an Interim and Historic Solution 60 Moderating the Tone and Behavior of Hamas 62 Not Antagonizing States In or Outside the Region 64 Avoiding Political Isolation 64 Betting on Popular Participation 66 The Historic Solution and the Interim Solution 69 The Historic Solution: Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River 69 Interim Solution with Armistice: A Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 73 Acceptance in Princzjple ofan Interim Solution 77 The Condition that There Should be No Recognition Forcing the Withdrawal of the Israeli Army and Termination The Armistice 81 A Popular Referendum 84 3 THE POLITICAL RELATIONS OF HAMAS WITH PALESTINIAN GROUPS 87 Hamas and the PLO/Fateh 88 Hamas’s View of the PLO 88 The PLO’S View of Hamas 91 Conditions for a Relationship with the PLO 94 Option 1: Hamas could take over the PLO from within 96 Option 2: Hamas could set itself up as a rival Option 3: Hamas simply could refrain from adopting Hamas and the Palestinian Authority 103 Hamas and the Palestinian Resistance Organizations 110 The Ideological Dimension 110 of Israel 78 of the Occupation 80 to the PLO 98 a clear position 101 4 HAMAS’S POLITICAL RELATIONS 145 The Practical Dimension 113 Relations with Fateh 113 Hamas’s Relations with Leftist and Nationalist Resistance Relations with IslamicJi had 125 Assessment 129 Hanias and the Christian Palestinians 133 Hamas and the Islamic Movement in Israel 139 Relations with the Arab States 145 Parameters of Hamas’s Relations 147 Hamas and the Arab Regimes 152 Hamas’s Arab Relations Policy 153 Hamas’s View of Arab Positions and Issues 155 Arab Positions on the Int~fada and Resistance Arab-Israeli Settlement 158 Arab Attitudes toward the Palestinians 159 Inter-Arab Conflict: The Gulf War 162 Domestic Arab Affairs 166 Pan-Arab Issues 168 At the Popular Level 171 Hamas and the Islamic World 175 The Official Level 175 Relations with Iran 176 Expressing Concern for Islamic Issues 180 Balkans 182 Afghanistan 183 Kashmir 184 Chechnya 184 At the Popular Level 185 Hamas’s International Relations 189 Evolution of Hamas’s Ideological Position and General Policies 189 The Practice of Hamas 193 The UN and International Organizations 199 Organizations 119 to Occupation 155 Contents I xiii xiv I Contents 5 THEORY AND PRACTICE 209 CONCLUSION 253 APPENDIX 263 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 313 INDEX 321 Hamas and Israel: Perception and Language of Interaction 200 Israel’s Position on the Palestinian Islamist Phenomenon 200 Israel and Dialogue with Hamas 204 Hamas and Political Pluralism 209 Hamas and Elections 215 Student, Professional Association, and Municipal Elections 216 Political Elections 220 Self-Rule Elections of January 1996 224 Share of the Electoral Vote and Opinion Polls 229 Hamas and Social Action 233 Fortifying Society through Religious Education 235 The Role of Mosques and Islamic Institutions 240 Military Action 242 Policies and General Tendencies of Hamas’s Military Action 245 Political Thought 253 Practice 256 The Future 259 Document No. 1, First Communique of Hamas 265 Document No.2, The Hamas Charter 267 Document No.3, Introductory Memorandum 292 Document No.4, Important Statement by the Political Bureau 302 Document No.5, Important Memorandum for the Sharm al Sheikh Conferees 306 I What else could I say? IfI were a young Palestinian immersed from birth in the Palestinian ethos, I’d have become a third-grade teacher? —Ehud Barak, responding to a television interviewer who asked whether he would have joined a Palestinian guerrilla group if he had been born a Palestinian. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
L Israel itself, despite its fierce attack on Hamas—which it describes as a terrorist organization—and its effort to rally opposition to the movement in the Middle East and the world in general, is prepared in the final analy- sis to talk to Hamas, not only because of the grass-roots support it enjoys inside Palestine, but also because of the influence and support it enjoys in the Arab and Islamic worlds.4 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Fur- thermore, there are fears that implementation of this accord could lead to a Palestinian civil war in the name of a war on terrorism, an internecine conflict in which the primary victor would be Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ezer Weizmann (President of Israel), Al-Hayat (London), 10 October 1997. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Palestin- ian rebellions since that time, including the revolution that began in the early 1 960s against Israel and was led by the Palestinian National Libera- tion Movement (Fateh), are subject to the same logic. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From that point on, resistance to the Israeli occupation was given precedence over the long-standing goal of trans- forming and Islamicizing Palestinian society as a prelude to engagement in resistance activities. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It attacked the Eisenhower Doctrine, which the regime supported; and parliamentarians representing the Brotherhood voted against granting confidence to some cabinet appointments by the king, notably that of Wasfi al-Tal in 1963. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
under the name of the Muslim Brotherhood) would be extremely difficult if not impossible, particularly since the conflict in Egypt between the Brother- hood and Nasir was escalating. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Al-Madhoon, “Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya,” p. 20 How ItAliBegan 23 24 HAMAS al-Qishawi, Zuhdi Saqallah, Sulaiman Abu Karsh, and Kamal al-Wahidi. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It avoided direct resistance to Israel, except for a brief effort during 1968—70 when the Brotherhood established camps in the Jordan Valley under the banner of Fateh and engaged in some significant military operations across the bor- der with Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Palestinian Brotherhood continued to maintain that mobilization for the war of liberation had to have a proper Islamic foundation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For the Muslim Brotherhood, the war was a landmark in the ideo- logical competition between the Islamic position and the Nasirist Arab nationalist position because the latter had been soundly defeated. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
pp. 123—65. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Within a few years after Fateh had split from the Muslim Brotherhood, Fateh rather than the Brotherhood clearly embodied the aspirations of the Palestinian people for liberation and enjoyed popular legitimacy for cham- pioning the national cause and engaging in armed struggle. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, it is difficult to find evidence for the thesis that the victory of the Likud and right-wing parties in Israel elicited corresponding support for Islamists among the Palestinians.70 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It also is hard to refute the view that the same line of development among Palestin- ian Islamists would have taken place even if the Labor Party had continued to dominate the political scene in Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Rather than perceiving the rise of Palestinian Islamism as a reaction to developments within the Israeli domes- tic arena and their consequences for the Palestinians, this movement’s rise should be viewed as an outcome of two long, intertwined processes: (a) the internal dynamics of Palestinian politics as they developed in light of the struggle against Israel and the position of the Islamists within this dynamism; and (b) the phenomenon of political Islam, which swept the region by the late 1970s and remained at the heart of sociopolitical change and tension, Palestinian Islamism being the local manifestation of a much wider tide. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Military action refers to the process that began with the creation of a military unit by Sheikh Yassin, as mentioned above. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
On the eve of the outbreak of the intifada, Israel’s policy regarding the Gaza Strip and West Bank was remarkably arrogant and highhanded, formulated in the full flush of victory, and indicating that Israel believed it had acquired a firm grip on Palestinian civil society in addition to its political and military control over the land of Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They have given up hoping Israel will give them their rights. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Then, in the eighties, following the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, the Palestinian cause was marginalized at both the Arab and international levels ... And the policies of the Zionist entity have become more obdurate and arrogant with the encouragement and sup- port of the United States of America, which signed a strategic coopera- tion agreement [with Israel] in 1981. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this period, the Golan Heights have been annexed, Israel destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor, and it then invaded Lebanon and laid siege to Beirut in 1982, which constitutes the greatest insult to the Arab umma since the 1967 war.... HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The movement uses Islamic discourse to mobilize and energize the masses and to criticize official Palestinian and Arab organizations for their positions on negotiations with Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
for example, Meir Litvak, The Islamization of Palestinian Identity: The Case ofHamas (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1966); Stephen C. Pelletiere, Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994); and Pinhas Inbari, The Palestinians Between Terrorism and Statehood (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Papers, 1996). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Seen from this perspective, the conflict with Israel is due to acts of aggression, not to differences in religious ideology. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
ations of these dominant perceptions were presented at the conference “Arabs and the Con- frontation with Israel: Toward a Strategy and Blueprint for Action,” held in Beirut, 10—13 March 1999, which has received detailed coverage in the journal Al-Mustaqba al-~4rabi, no. 243 (May 1999): 52—135. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The belligerent Zionist settler movement complements the Western design to separate the Islamic umma from its cultural roots and to impose Zionist-Western hegemony over it through the realization of the Greater Israel plan, so that it then can dom- inate our entire umma politically and economically. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The new attitudes have been reflected in Hamas’s practice, such as its establishment of contacts with Western states and international bodies. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The International Context A series of important changes at the international and regional levels have had an impact on the Palestinian problem since the birth of Hamas in 1987. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibid. had represented supportive fora where scores of states could be found that opposed U.S. policies and backed Third World causes, including the Pales- tinian cause. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The moral and political vic- tories won in the General Assembly, including condemnations of Israel’s expansionist and aggressive policies and the dozens of resolutions support- ing the Palestinian cause, all became empty shells. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Many countries that had sup- ported the Palestinian cause in the past under the protection of the Soviet Union could not withstand the political and economic pressures that the United States brought to bear on them to alter their position on Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, the above-mentioned changes in the balance of power kept the leverage that could be gained from world sympathy to a minimum. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As the bipolar international system collapsed, Israel was able to This new imbalance of power, favoring Israel, undermined the great Political Perspective on the Conflict I 53 HAMAS The strength of Hamas and its political clout increased just as inter- national state support for the Palestinian cause was ebbing and the Arab military option in the battle with Israel had virtually been eliminated. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas hoped that this wave would lead to the adoption of choices that were at variance with the international balance of power, dampen its negative impact on the Middle East, stiffen resistance to Israel, and mobilize [Islamic] potential for the battle of liberation.26 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas seemed to be undeterred by the common knowledge that the principal task of the police force would be to prevent any military opera- tions against Israel, a function that created ambiguity about the prospects of a clash between the police and Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This state of affairs led to a sense of almost total political isolation on the part of Hamas, just a few years after its birth. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin, interview, Filastin al-Muslima, April 1997, p. 18. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These views form the basis of the Hamas position: “the best way to conduct the struggle with the Zion- ist enemy is to mobilize the potential of the Palestinian people and use all means available to keep the jihad and the issue alive until such time as the requirements for victory materialize, the Arab and Islamic renaissance takes place, the will and the political purpose of the umma are united, and its full potential can be tapped to provide the necessary power.”36 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He wrote in a letter from prison: No doubt our Palestinian people are agitated and unhappy today. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Instead, the organization focused on the capitulation embodied in the agreement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To its credit, it kept its pledge, since the date it was established, to stay away from political assas- sinations ~ This conscious attempt to appear moderate even while declaring its opposition to the settlement with Israel is the same attitude that Hamas adopted toward various Arab-Israeli agreements and the multilateral and bilateral tracks in the peace talks. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s efforts to deal with Arab-Israel talks and agreements are discussed in detail in chapter 4. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Its recent discourse has tended to minimize the number of its antagonists. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Writing about Palestinian-Jordanian Islamic movements, Musa al- Kilani, who enjoys close ties to Jordan’s establishment, states that “the thing that set Hamas apart from other Palestinian nationalist organizations is that it has avoided involvement in the internal affairs of host Arab coun- tries.... HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas has learned from the lessons of the rev- olutionary Palestinian left in the 1960s and 1970s. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas tried therefore to expand its base of support. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
~ This “historic solution” position remained constant for years after the Charter was issued. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The movement saw the PLO as responding in phases to changing circumstances in the region and throughout the world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This change would have to come from outside Pales- tine, such as military action from a state surrounding Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This idea, however, was not developed in terms of the right to self-determination, elections, and other civil rights measures that could have earned it international legitimacy. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Broadly speaking, Pales- tinian resistance discourse in the Occupied Territories, as enunciated by the movements’ leaders and central figures, has focused on terminating the occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These developments offered Hamas a glimmer of hope on an otherwise bleak horizon, and the progress achieved by the Islamists in the Middle East encouraged it.6’ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nor did it constitute a cohesive view that Hamas could put forward, even as an abstract solution, which would have allowed the movement some room for maneuver and offered it some protection from the aggressive Israeli information campaign portraying the Arabs and Hamas as being bent on the destruction of Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To summarize: Hamas did not abandon its position of advocating the historic solution. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, the movement’s representative in Jordan, Muhammad Nazzal, stated in January 1993 that Hamas was prepared to accept a peaceful solution in return for Israel’s withdrawal from the terri- tories it had occupied in 1967, so long as this was not conditioned on Hamas recognizing Israel.67 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This legitimate elected leadership alone shall have the right to speak for our people’s will and aspirations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The remarkable aspect here is that “these points are grouped together in the form of an agenda or initiative. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The former head of Hamas’s Political Bureau summed up five pillars or guidelines on which Hamas based its support for an interim solution: First, [Hamas] does not reject the interim solution on principle, but rather depending on the resulting entitlements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Second, the main dispute concerns recognition of the Zionist entity and its continued existence on the soil of Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas will adhere to what- ever the people choose—whether they choose to accept or to reject the political proposals before them—and will accept the results of the choice of leaders who will be the legitimate representatives of the people and 67. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Political Perspective on the Conflict I 75 76 HAMAS who will be in charge of implementing the programs on the basis of which they were elected.68 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Its main points are as follows: 1. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Do you recognize Israel? Q: Y: If I were to recognize Israel, it would be all over. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
What if Israel were to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza? Q HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
But should Israel be recognized in that event? Q: Y: It is up to the representatives of the Palestinian people to answer that. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In an interview with Israeli television, he linked the idea of recognition of Israel with the prospect of negotiating with Israel in the following manner: If Israel were to speak of the rights of the Palestinian people, is Q HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If [Israel] speaks, we shall speak. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
When Israel speaks we shall give our opinion of what it has to say. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Does that mean the Islamic groups would be prepared to negotiate Q HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Y: Israel is willing to negotiate with anyone, but on the terms and conditions it imposes. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If Israel were to stipulate the terms and con- ditions that the Palestinian people want, there could be negotia- tions under those circumstances. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In principle, are the Islamic groups willing to negotiate with Israel? Q: Y: If Israel were to agree to grant the Palestinian people their rights and to make a declaration to that effect beforehand, then we could discuss the matter.74 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin’s second approach was one of being more explicit about refusing to recognize Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Interview aired on Israeli television, 10 September 1988, and cited inAl-Nahar, 11 Sep- tember 1988. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
According to the text of the Quran, “Praise be to the Lord who took His servant, whom We have blessed, on a midnight journey from the Holy Mosque to the al-Aqsa Mosque.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
And is jihad the path to that? Q: Y: Because we no longer have the means, we cannot get our rights either through peace or otherwise. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
‘What are we to do?75 Forcing the Withdrawal of the Israeli Army and Termination of the Occupation Hamas believed in a strategy of force to compel Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a belief that was central to the question of an interim solution. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Force is what convinced the enemy, following the years of the blessed intifada, to withdraw from every bit of our territory, which we turned into hell for him, his soldiers and his settlers. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If that defeatist group which is in charge of the PLO leadership had put its energies in this direction, instead of wast- ing its efforts and its funds pursuing the path of defeat, then the enemy would have withdrawn under the blows of the mujahidin.”76 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
their vanguard. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Armistice refers to the idea of signing a truce with Israel for a fixed duration, such as ten or twenty years. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A treaty therefore would involve capitulation of Palestinian rights and acceptance of the usurpation of those rights by Israel, according to Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The letters include a dialogue with Talab al-Sane’, one of the Arab members of the Israeli Knesset. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
‘Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, a Hamas leader inside the Occupied Territories, indicated his acceptance of the essence of Sheikh Yassin’s idea: “With respect to the armistice as an interim solution, we are not opposed to the idea, because it safeguards the right of the Palestinians to demand that their homeland be returned to them. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
of military operations against Israeli targets was concerned. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“Armistice” assumed more significance for defusing potential clashes with the PA, in addition to its original rele- vance for the conflict with Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He proposed a cessation of attacks by Hamas for ten years on condition that Israel agree to democra- tic elections in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; it withdraw from those territories, including East Jerusalem; and it evacuate the Jewish settlers.83 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In response to a question concerning the prospects of peace with Israel, the sheikh said: “One can envision an agreement for a limited period, let us say 15 years, but not forever... HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In a series of communiques, Hamas mentioned an “armistice” that would grant immunity to civilians from violence. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Four subsequent sections look at Hamas’s political rela- tions with the Palestinian Authority (PA), the other Palestinian factions, Palestinian Christians, and the Islamic movement inside Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first section of this chapter examines Hamas’s relations with the PLO and Fateh. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s position on that issue is portrayed more accurately elsewhere, particularly in the “Inter- view with Hamas Leaders,” published in Muslim Palestine magazine (in Arabic) less than a year after the publication of the Charter. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Thus, the simultaneous maintenance of disparate positions, encountered earlier with respect to the historic and interim solutions for the Palestinian problem propounded by Hamas, has an analogue here in the case of the PLO and its positions on Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Three months later the PLO recognition was overtaken by a vituperous campaign, launched in Filastin al- Thawra (the official organ of the PLO), that accused Hamas of deserting the unity of nationalist ranks and of trying to deviate from “the commandments, the organic structure and the laws of the Palestinian family.”0 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This situation led to a bitter struggle between prisoners loyal to Fateh and those loyal to Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
conspicuously absent from the list of four Hamas conditions for joining the PNC. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
20. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Political Relations of Hamas with Palestinian Groups 95 96 HAMAS Option 1: Hamas could take over the PLO from within, join the PLO, change it, and “inherit it.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The premise of this option is that the current PLO (since the late 1 980s) again has exhausted its agenda and no longer expresses the aspirations of the Palestinian masses or the rising gen- erations, just like the early and official PLO in the late 1 960s when it had run out of steam and no longer reflected the aspirations of the Palestinian people at that time. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Two sets of objections can be raised to this hypothetical situation, the first concerning issues of principle, the second having to do with practi- calities. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The objections on principle concern the political direction adopted by the PLO after its exit from Beirut, a strategy that clearly relied on political and diplo- matic action revolving around Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If the PLO claimed that it represented the Palestinian people when it was pursuing the liberation of Palestine, then with what right can it claim that it represents the Palestin- ian people now that it has recognized Israel and given all of Palestine to it.”25 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
recognition of the PLO to a much larger extent than it derived from recog- nition extended to it by the Palestinian people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In addition, the middle-of- the-road option of not adopting one or the other position allowed Hamas to maintain a modicum of relations and keep channels open to all parties, including the PLO itself. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
PLO leaders wanted to curtail the growing influence of Hamas and to gain access to the territory of Palestine as quickly as possible. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Many statements by the leaders of Hamas both inside and outside the Occupied Territories lay out the essence of this posi- tion. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas did not deviate from this position even as tensions between it and the PA increased fol- lowing the guerrilla operations launched from the Gaza Strip by the ‘Izzidin al-Qassam Brigades against Israeli targets.33 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Throughout its existence, there have been hardly any junctures from which Hamas gained political knowledge. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Another negative aspect paradoxically arose from the growth in the influence of Hamas, particularly in the period just before the exile of Islamic leaders in December 1992 to south Lebanon and lasting for the duration of the exile, or about one year. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Consequently, haunted by the specter of losing its influence and control over grass-roots Palestinian support, the PLO made additional and otherwise unnecessary concessions to Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In brief, 1996 was a very bad year for Hamas in view of the blows it received from Israel and the PA. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the wake of these bombings, relations between the two sides reached their nadir. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Final Communique of the Cairo Dialogue Meeting, dated 21 December 1995; it was signed by Salim Za’noun, head of the PA delegation, and Khaled Mash’al, head of the Hamas del- egation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It draws an indirect con- nection between the rise of Hamas and Israel’s plans. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Political Relations of Hamas with Palestinian Groups I 112 HAMAS ership and that the Islamists and Israelis both placed their hopes on that alternative. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Fateh raised the slogan of harnessing the intifada to secure an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, the strategy endorsed by the PNC in 1988. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In contrast, Hamas defied the harsh reality of occupa- tion by raising the slogan of not surrendering a single inch of the territory of historic Palestine, from the Mediterranean to the Jordan, and calling for the total condemnation of the legitimization of Israel’s presence in the territories occupied in 1948. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Even as it grew, the Muslim Brotherhood expressed reservations about Fateh, denouncing its secularism and irreli- giosity, as well as the atheism characteristic of the leftist Palestinian resis- tance organizations in general. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The intifada barely suc- ceeded in defusing that tension, although it did put an end to charges by Fateh and the nationalist groups that the Islamists were shirking their responsibility for military resistance to the occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas and Fateh pleased Israel, which indirectly fanned the flames of that dispute. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel also went out of its way to torpedo any potential rap- prochement by preventing Hamas leaders or prominent figures close to the movement from travelling abroad for meetings with Fateh and PLO leaders.57 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel has remained wary of even minor improvements in rela- tions between the two sides. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, in August 1992 Israel prevented ‘Abdul ‘Aziz al-Rantisi and al-Zahhar The Political Reiations ofHamas with Palestinian Groups 117 118 HAMAS prompted Israeli fears that this could be the beginning of a real rap- prochement.58 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Meanwhile, there was a new competition and a “shift” in the identities of some of the parties engaged in conflict.60 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For the Arabic text of the modified proposal, see ibid., pp. 334—36. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This demanded the release of more than 150 pris- oners affiliated with the fasa’il and who were serving long jail terms in return for the release of the soldier. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“Military communique of the Martyr ‘Izzidin al-Qassam Brigades” [in Arabic], 11 October 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Eight months after that incident, Israel exiled 413 Palestinians—all 73. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nevertheless, the relationship remains confined to declarations of sol- Quote is taken from the video tape, “Inna baqoon” [We are staying], which was made by the Islamic Movement in Israel to support the Palestinians whom Israel deported to south Lebanon in December 1992; see also Abdul Salam Ibrahim, “Al-Muslim wal Masihi ma’an fi khandaq al-wihda al-wataniyya” [The Muslim and the Christian are together in the trench of national unity], Filastin al-Muslima, May 1993, p. 23. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
HAMAS AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN ISRAEL The Islamic trend has been gaining strength among the Palestinians in the territory of Palestine that was occupied in 1948. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These Palestinians number about 850,000 and are citizens of Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Abu Marzouq, interview with author, 21 April 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Only through Rakah or other Israeli leftist parties had the Arabs managed to win a few seats in the Knesset. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Islamic movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip made a transition from proselytizing and educational activ- ities in the days of the Muslim Brotherhood to armed struggle after Hamas came on the scene, gaining wide support, new adherents, and significant influence. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
An important turning point for this move- ment occurred in 1985, when Sheikh Abdullah Nimr Darwish was released from prison. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He had been arrested, along with a group of his brethren, in 1981, and charged with establishing military cells belonging to Usrat al-fihad [Jihad family], whose objective was armed struggle against Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Palestinian national consciousness emerged from a long and serious crisis involving the to the impact of efforts to give an Israeli identity to the Arab minority in Israel.92 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
the minority by engaging in political struggles; to contest municipal elec- tions; and even to run for the Knesset. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This position now constitutes the frame of reference governing the activities of the Islamic movement in Israel and has taken the movement far from any form of armed struggle.93 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Despite repeated allegations in the Israeli media that the Islamic move- ment in Israel has close ties to Hamas, both movements deny this vehe- mently. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Any researcher who follows the course Hamas has taken in the last few years in its relations with the Islamists in Israel or monitors offi- cial (Israeli) reactions and security measures will conclude that it is far- fetched to postulate an organizational link between the two. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Islamists in Israel were the first to realize that establishing relations with Hamas would be playing with fire; would place their social, cultural, and civil insti- tutions in jeopardy; and would nullify their growing achievements at the municipal and political levels. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
At times support is given for specific demands, such as for the release of detainees, the return of exiles, or the release of Sheikh Yassin when he was in prison. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A sit-in tent was pitched in front of the Knesset and government building in Jerusalem; politicians, journalists, and opponents of the deportation vis- ited this tent, which stayed up until the exiles were allowed to return. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Particular scrutiny was maintained on the activities of charitable committees, especially when the struggle 93. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
215—16 (February—March, n.d.): 3—15. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Political Relations of Hamas with Palestinian Groups 141 142 HAMAS between Israel and Hamas reached a high point in the 1994—96 period. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel accused these committees of supporting the families of Hamas martyrs, especially those who had carried out suicide bombings. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel also subjected the newspapers and other publications of the Islamists in Israel to severe scrutiny and censorship, and it has stopped the publication of the Arabic newspaper, The Voice of Truth and Freedom, on several occasions on the grounds that it was carrying inflammatory material and supporting Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the political sphere, Israel did not need to intervene to stop any effective support by the Islamic movement for Hamas because the move- ment had placed restraints on its activities through a major decision not to participate in the Knesset elections, a decision that seriously curtailed its political influence. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Islamic movement came under additional pressures in Israel, and there were renewed charges that it was supporting Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See further “Tahjim al-’amal al-khairi fil 48, hel yakun al-bidaya Ii muwajahaten bain Isra’il wal haraka al-Islamiyya” [Downsizing charitable work among the 1948 Palestinians: Is it the beginning of a confrontation between Israel and the Islamic movement?], Filastin al-Muslima, September 1995; and Al-Hayat, 18 March 1996. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One way to alleviate the pressure on Hamas was to have Islamist deputies enter the Knesset in accordance with the law, thereby constituting a thorny dilemma for Israel: It could not keep them out because they are Israeli citizens, but neither was it willing to tol- erate the positions they represented or the defenses they put forward, both of which played an important role. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The second period began near the outset of the Gulf War when Hamas named Ibrahim Ghosheh as its official representative to the Popular Islamic Delegation, which consisted of leaders and representatives of Islamic move- ments. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
After the Gulf War, the Madrid Conference was held in 1991; then came the Oslo Agreement between the PLO and Israel in 1993 and the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In addition, the informal ties between Israel and more than one Arab country since have multiplied and become more extensive; tangible progress has been made toward a peace settlement on the ground, and Arab commitment to such an outcome has grown. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Even during the years of the intifada, Palestinian recognition of Israel had taken the form of PNC resolutions, Arab and international pres- sures to bring about a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute had intensified, and the Arab and regional mood gradually had shifted away 5. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Eastern bloc, new theories were put forward that substituted the “Islamic threat” for the vanquished “Com- munist threat.”7 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Furthermore, the argument goes, there is a pressing need for Hamas to step in and fill the vacuum created in the political and information area when the PLO vacated a number of positions it used to hold following its agreements with Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas believes that fighting Arab regimes in this manner only exacerbates their weaknesses while making Israel even stronger, which would be a gratuitous service to Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It established a presence in the countries surrounding Israel as well as in the Gulf area and opened talks with officials in those countries. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The following discussion shall examine in particular Hamas’s views of Arab positions that pertain to the conflict with Israel; these have been analyzed at length in the movement’s literature. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The official Arab position toward Hamas became more complex as Hamas mounted a series of armed operations that were painful to Israel and had a significant impact. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
the beginning of the intifada and its adoption of more moderate language and careful choice of words is manifest in its commentary on the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty in October 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “The Jordanian-Zionist Treaty: A New Fissure in the Wall of Arab Soli- darity,” 27 October 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
21. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas used to respond with criti- cism of a general nature to any official Arab manifestations of the desire to establish commercial or political relations with Israel, or to any talk about ending the boycott of Israel, but it used indirect references, without naming names.23 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Therefore, it has refrained from inter- ference in Jordan’s domestic affairs and has avoided exploiting its presence in Jordan for anything beyond informational and political activities. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nevertheless, Hamas’s relations with the Jordanian regime have under- gone tense moments on more than one occasion as a result of Hamas’s armed activities, notably its suicide bombings inside Israel and the result- ing intensification of pressure on Jordan to close down Hamas’s offices and to arrest the movement’s representatives. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The second episode was in April 1995, in the wake of fur- ther operations by Hamas, to which Israel responded by stepping up pressure on Jordan, which reacted by expelling two Hamas leaders, Abu Marzouq, the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, and ‘Imad al-’Alami, a Political Bureau member. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See further Yehuda Lukas, Israel, Jordan, and the Peace Process (Syracuse: Syracuse Uni- See, for example, Hamas, Periodic statement no. 124 of 7 June 1995, which expressed Musa Zeid al-Keylani, op. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The victories of the Sudanese army in the south against the rebels headed by John Garang were welcomed by Hamas, which congrat- ulated President Omar Hassan al-Bashir on occasions such as the July 1992 liberation of the strategic city of Torit, which had served as the headquar- ters of the rebels.58 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
58. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
the conflict from metamorphosing into a conflict between Israel and the Palestinians alone. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibid. Hamas’s Political Relations 169 170 HAMAS to them constituted an evolution in its thinking, compared with the cate- gorical censure of all Arab summits and conferences during the first two years of the movement’s life. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas tended to see all major events in the Middle East from the perspective of the battle with Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In Hamas’s view, the Gulf War was a hemorrhage of Arab capabilities that should have been channeled into the battle with Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Even the occupation of the Yemeni island of Hanish in the Red Sea by Eritrea in January 1996 was not free of Israeli involvement and served Israeli objectives.64 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Egypt’s position encouraged Hamas, as did its hosting of the negotiations between the PA and Hamas in Cairo, which constituted tacit recognition of a role for the movement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas was outspoken in its appreciation for Egypt’s position at the Sharm al-Sheikh anti-terrorism summit in March 1996, which clashed with the Israeli and U.S. objective to dedicate the summit exclusively to questions relating to the security of Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “No to the Unjust Penalties Imposed on the Muslim People of Libya,” dated 15 April 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
odic acts of aggression by Israel against south Lebanon, which it considered to be an Arab national cause. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Official Level Hamas has made an effort to establish direct relations with the govern- ments and peoples in the Islamic world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This support was crowned by the convening in Tehran of a conference of forces opposed to a settlement with Israel on 22 October 1991, just eight days before the Madrid Conference began. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
(Cairo: al-Ahram Center for Translation and Publishing, 1988). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This office symbolized Iran’s acknowledgement of the central role of Hamas in the Palestinian opposition. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Rather, there are frequent negative references and strong denunciations of foreign states and international organizations for their support of Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s early bul- letins are replete with incessant condemnations of “international conspir- acies” against Palestine, in particular, “the British conspiracy via the Balfour Declaration” and “the conspiracy to partition Palestine,” as well as “the American conspiracy” to provide unwavering support for Israel and to come to its defense whenever needed.”5 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Gradually, a process of disengagement developed between Hamas’s ideological perspective concerning the nature of the struggle and the nuanced political standpoint required to comment on events (both local Palestinian and Middle Eastern or world events bearing on the Palestinian question) and the need to formulate and give voice to the movement’s position on them. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Second, and quite significantly, was the deportation of over four hundred Palestinians (composed mainly of Hamas’s leaders, prominent figures, and supporters) to south Lebanon at the end of 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
At a later stage, Hamas’s discourse became more discriminating toward the West. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The talks were suspended because of the incident, and the center of attention in the Middle East and the focus for the United States shifted temporarily to resolving the problem, securing the return of the deportees, and then resuming the peace talks. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From the date of the deportation incident, if progress was to be achieved toward a solution of the Palestinian problem, Hamas had to be taken into account, despite its Islamic ideology and its rejection of Israel’s presence in the region.”9 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas thought there was a need to explain this crime to the West, to convince the West of its duty to rectify it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Americans ended the two-month contacts in early March due to pressure from Israel and because they felt no progress had been achieved to justify their continuation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is particularly interesting because Hamas refrained from conducting attacks against American or Western interests inside or outside Israel and had limited its operations to Israeli military targets. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In May 1993, when the Con- gressional Research Service issued a report entitled “Hamas: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?”—implying that the nature of Hamas was a debat- able issue, influential pro-Israel groups in Washington objected to the study and it was amended; points demanded by the Jewish groups were included and its title was changed.’3° HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The U.S. position became more uncompromising with each operation by Hamas, and occasionally this was reflected in decisions or measures designed to help Israel deal with Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Having expressed satisfaction at the measures taken by the PA against Hamas, the U.S. government felt that it had to adopt measures of its own to show solidarity with Israel after the Hamas bombings. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ahmad Rashad, Hamas: Palestinian Politics with an Islamic Hue, pp. 34—39; on the impact of the pro-Israel lobbies on American attitudes toward Hamas, see Ahmad Yusef and AhmadAbu al-Jibeen, “Ab’ad al-hamlah al-sahyooniyah fi amrika dhid harakat hamas” [The con- sequences of the Zionist campaign in America against the Hamas movement], A1-Mujtama’, 1 and 8 November 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s Political Relations 19? 198 HAMAS to a number of Arab Americans and Islamic societies in the United States accused of financing Hamas would be frozen. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the following July, U.S. authorities arrested Abu Marzouq, then the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, when he landed in New York on a private visit. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The incident was embarrassing to both Israel and the United States, because they did not want to appear to be bowing to pressure from Hamas, but the United States did not have a strong case against Abu Marzouq. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It has not been translated into action nor led to the adop- tion of a policy of targeting U.S. interests in the region. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They also point out that Israel is the most “rejectionist and violating” state in the world with respect to UN resolu- tions.’38 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
138. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For example, in March 1996 it sent lengthy memoranda and letters to the United Nations and to the contracting par- ties of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the wake of the convening of the Sharm al-Sheikh Conference, which targeted Hamas in particular.’39 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With the exception of occasional contacts with the International Red Cross, the record of Hamas’s ties to international groups is remarkably poor. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
HAMAS AND ISRAEL: PERCEPTION AND LANGUAGE OF INTERACTION Two basic issues need to be considered in analyzing the mutual perceptions of Hamas and Israel and the attendant political practice that has been pursued since the creation of Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There is a common belief that Israel encouraged the Islamists, its goal being to weaken the position and dimin- ish the influence of its main enemy, the PLO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The second issue relates to a few Israeli attempts, at different stages in Hamas’s existence, to open a dialogue with it with the aim of inducing it to renounce military action in favor of joining the peace process. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Israeli goal of such benign policy was to undermine the preeminent leadership position of the PLO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In fact, the PLO information apparatus wholeheartedly adopted these interpreta- tions and worked to propagate them. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In contrast, the Islamists repeatedly claim that Israel’s repressive poli- cies against Islamic institutions and all vestiges of Islamic awakening, such as the Islamic University in Gaza, the mosques, and Islamic organizations in general, are evidence of its fear of Palestinian Islam and its growth. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is not reasonable, they insist, that Israel should overlook, let alone encourage, the ideologically most implacable opponent of its existence. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Some observers agree; according to Mi Jarbawi, “the occupying authority was not to give the National Islamic tendency the opportunity to strengthen its foundations and to spread its influence among the masses, because to Israel, this tendency constitutes the greatest danger to its future.”4° HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this study I advance a fourth interpretation, namely, that Israel’s policy toward the growing strength of Islamic movements throughout the 1 970s and 1 980s up to the first year of the intifada was characterized by confu- sion, bewilderment, and an inability to take decisive action. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Consequently, Israel confined itself to reaction to and monitoring of developments. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
First, Israel’s position toward Islamic institutions or toward the social and educational aspects of the Islamic awakening was no different from its established position toward other nonmilitary phenomena that accom- panied the Palestinian national movement and factions of the PLO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
All these institutions operated by virtue of per- mits issued by the Israeli occupying authority; some of the institutions belonged directly or indirectly to the PLO or other Palestinian political fac- tions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is not fair, therefore, to mention only the permits granted to Islamic institutions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Second, it was not easy for Israel, especially after the late 1970s, to resort to a harsh repressive policy toward the manifestations of Islamic awakening in the Occupied Territories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There are many reasons for this, the most important being the fear that such a policy might render an indi- rect service to the Islamic current by giving credence to its claim that the Jews and Israel are fighting Islam. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The situation only changed in the 1994—96 period, when regional circumstances favored the adoption of a merciless repressive pol- icy under the slogan “fighting Islamic terrorism.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This mind-set invented the myth of the “invincible Israeli army,” wove legends around the “supernatural” capabil- ities of its security services (including Mossad and Shin Bet), and painted a fabulous picture of its ability to influence events both regionally and on the Palestinian plane. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Islamic current in the Occupied Territories thus was influenced and nur- tured by the growth of an Islamic movement in Jordan to the east, the emergence of an Islamic movement, especially Hizballah, in Lebanon to the north, and the advancement of the Islamic movement in Egypt, where moderate groups exerted influence through democratic processes in par- liament and the unions while armed groups engaged in a bloody con- frontation with the security forces. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This situation remained true throughout the 1970s and 1 980s, but it changed with the commencement of the Madrid peace process and the establishment of contacts between Israel and the PLO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Throughout the early years of Hamas’s existence, Israelis attempted to find openings through which they hoped to change the attitude toward Israel of whomever they met. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, after the intifada gradually shifted gears from mass Israel and Dialogue with Hamas The importance of the topic of an Israel-Hamas dialogue derives from two angles. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One is general and concerns the question of how it is even possible for any sort of serious discussion to take place between the two, given Hamas’s political and ideological position on Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel attempted, especially after the Oslo Agreement and Hamas’s mil- itary operations in 1993 and 1994, to feel out Hamas about the possibil- ity of establishing a dialogue or liaison, the goal being to convince Hamas to renounce violence in exchange for a guaranteed political role in a peace settlement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Several Israeli officials, including then Prime Minister Rabin, declared Israel’s readiness for dialogue and negotiations with Hamas to achieve this objective.’45 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Even before Oslo, Shimon Peres, who at the time was foreign minister, declared that Israel was “ready to negotiate with extremists from Hamas if they were freely elected in the Occupied Terri- tories.”46 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In addition to sounding out Hamas and issuing press statements, Israel offered early release to many jailed leaders of the movement in order for them to travel abroad and discuss its demands for stopping military operations with Hamas representatives.’47 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel (before the Madrid Conference), suggesting that Hamas be represented in the delegation provided that it recognizes the right of Israel to exist. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Moshe Shahal, published in Al-QudsAl-Arabi (2 November 1994): “Israel makes a mistake by not being ready to talk to people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Among these discussions is one conducted in April 1994 by General Doron Almough, Hamas’s PoliticaiRelations 205 206 HAMAS In the first few months of 1994, Israel’s attempts to engage Hamas intensified. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One prominent Hamas official described these efforts as follows: The most important of these attempts included a meeting between the deputy chief of staff of the enemy army, Amnon Shahak, with the brother, ‘Imad al-Faluji, who was detained in Gaza’s central prison in February 1994; a discussion between two members of the occupation central command and the brother, Dr. Mahmoud al-Rumhi, who was held in Hebron’s central prison to await trial for being the political direc- tor of Hamas in the Ramallah area; a contact made by an Israeli living in Europe with Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahhar; and a further communication by the same Israeli with a person close to Hamas in one of the Euro- pean countries whereby Israel offered to negotiate with Hamas through a third party (an Arab country) in such a way that this country would communicate the demands of the movement to the Zionist entity and vice versa. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
According to this same official, Hamas believed that Israel had four goals: The first is to exert pressure on Arafat by putting him on notice that there is a strong competitor with whom Israel can negotiate. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With respect to [the proposal] for self-government, Bahar expressed his opposition because it consolidates the occupation and does not fulfill people’s demands; see his interview with the author published in Khaled Hroub, “Harakat Hamas bain al-sulta al-filastiniyya wa-Isra’il: Mm muthallath al-quwa ila al-mitraqa wal-sindan,” [Hamas Between the PA and Israel: From the triangle of power to the anvil and hammer], MajalLit al-dirasat al-fiI.astiniyya, HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This may be done by having At a later stage, specifically after the series of Hamas operations in Feb- ruary and March 1996 and the subsequent violent campaign against it through arrests, the destruction of homes, and the closure of institutions, Israel tried once again to open communication channels with Hamas, using people close to both sides in Europe. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
More important, it obliquely hinted at its readiness to open a dialogue with Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “Resistance and Struggle will be the Sole Language of Dialogue,” 152. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “Clarification from Hamas spokesman, Ibrahim Ghosheh,” 7 Novem- 153. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From Hamas’s perspective, the only elec- tions acceptable to the Palestinians are “those which are conducted under international supervision, [because that] guarantees the freedom of the Political Elections particular attention to general elections of a political nature and the pro- posals pertaining to them. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In a lengthy interview at the beginning of 1990, Hamas luminary al-Zahhar analyzed Israel’s motive for proposing elections. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He said that if the Palestinians reject the idea, they will “appear to the world to be rejecting the practice of democracy,” but if the Palestinian people accept elections, they will be putting Israel on the spot.29 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He outlined the issues that Israel had to address: “determine the deployment of Israeli army before, during, and after the elections; determine the situation of the security detainees and prisoners; determine who would supervise the elections; determine how to guarantee the honesty of the elections; determine how much coordina- tion between Palestinians inside and outside Israel will be permitted; and determine the status of Palestinians outside [Palestine]. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
dom], organ of the Islamist movement in Israel, 26 January 1990. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Other parties, particularly Israel, silently hoped that Hamas would participate in the elections provided for in the Oslo framework because that would enhance the legitimacy of the entire agreement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Nevertheless, the media brouhaha made by Israel and its extortionist tactics in the Cairo negotiations concerning the details of the elections were designed to pre- vent Hamas and the Palestinian opposition from taking part in the elec- tions, despite various assertions to the contrary.38 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Prior to the elections Hamas put out a statement to explain once more the five main reasons for the position it had adopted: the Council whose members were to be elected derived from Oslo, and it would be limited by the ceiling set by Oslo; Israel would retain the right to abrogate any Council resolution that it did not like; holding these elections meant abrogating the rights of four million Palestinians living in the diaspora because they were not permitted to participate; the man- ner in which the elections were to be conducted would consolidate the annexation of Jerusalem by Israel, given that the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem would be required to send in their ballots by mail, confirm- ing their status as foreigners residing on foreign soil; and ultimately what is required of the Council is to legitimize Oslo. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel would have had two alternatives: Either to dissolve the council and reject its decision—a right Israel retains under the Oslo Agreement, in which case the accord would have landed in trouble; or to work with the council in view of the electoral legitimacy and public support it enjoyed and allow alternatives to Oslo to be proposed. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, it is not so easy to understand why Hamas and the TRO did not try a dif- ferent approach. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
That is, if the TRO allies had chosen to contest the elections by turning out the vote and using a united list of candidates to capture an out- right majority, they may have been able to abrogate the Oslo Agreement, which, after all, was their goal. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
And their “responses” are closely related to their standards of living, the reality of the Israeli occupation, the existence of Israel, Arab weakness, and the international recognition accorded to 55. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
According to al-Zahhar, “Hamas’s plan is divine, while Fateh’s plan is human.”57 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To be fair, that is not Hamas’s official view because it implies an infallibility that Hamas does not claim. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This situation, which is supported by Israel, the neighboring Arab states, and the major powers, has a strong, if indirect, effect on public opin- ion. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
More precisely, voters’ hearts may be with Hamas, but they will vote for the PLO or to support the PA. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This was reflected in a new social atmosphere akin to the dominant one in the region, under which the sense of an external threat (Israel in this case) is replaced by an internal gov- ernmental authority-society conflict. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
What is more worrisome about the human rights record of the PA and its modeling itself on the traditional Arab mold is that world public opinion is turning a blind eye to the violations in the name of giving peace between Israel and the Palestinians time to succeed. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel offered to exchange the freedom of Sheikh Yassin for the body, an offer that was rejected by Yassin himself as insulting, especially because the offer included the provision that Yassin renounce violence. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In 1994, the military work of these brigades took a more violent turn when they car- ried out a series of suicide attacks in the heart of Israel against buses carry- ing Israeli soldiers and settlers (according to Hamas); these attacks resulted in the killing of tens of Israeli civilians. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These attacks caused Israel to freeze the commencement of the final status negotiations, created confusion in the Israeli domestic scene, weakened the position of the Labor party led by Shimon Peres, and indeed led to the defeat of Peres and the election of Netanyahu as prime minister in the May 1996 elections. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
After these events, Hamas offered Israel a mutual “armistice” in which civilians would be removed from the arena of struggle.88 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel rejected the offer and did not respond to it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“89 Hamas managed, in the period preceding the Hebron massacre (that is, before violating its own policy of not targeting civilians), to embarrass Israel militarily, politically, and in front of public opinion. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“How Israel Misjudges Hamas and Its Terrorism,” Washington Post, 19 October 1997. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s goal has been to transform Israel from a land that attracts world Jews to a land that repels them by making its residents insecure. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It might seem somewhat overdrawn to quote, even if extensively, from the writings of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to demonstrate this point, especially because Abu Mazen is the one who negotiated the Oslo Accord and renounced all military actions against Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Or, in other words, targeting equipment, plants, buildings, institutions, and factories should be its last choice ... We have only to know the joint that aches the most.94 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this way, Hamas gained extra popularity, being perceived as the only Palestinian power willing and able to respond to Israel with the language of force. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
96. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Theory and Practice 249 250 HAMAS jobs in Israel, some voices within Hamas began to call for a reassessment of patch of letters to the United States explaining its philosophy on the subject clearly and in detail.98 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel was always ready to give this possible erosion a push by means of its policy of collective punishment against the Palestinian people for the actions of Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Particularly after the series of suicide bombings it mounted following the January 1996 assassination of Yahya ‘Ayyash, Hamas’s activities and its style of resistance to occupation came to be seen as terrorism. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
THE FUTURE Because of the difficulties that Hamas has encountered since the estab- lishment of the PA, the threat of being marginalized in the wake of the Palestinian Legislative Council elections (which Hamas boycotted) and the fierce campaign against the movement waged by Israel, the PA, the United States, Jordan, and others and aimed at undermining its organization and infrastructure, there was a high probability that the movement would freeze its armed operations temporarily and pursue a purely political course while it tried to rebuild its organization. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
21 March 1996, in the midst of the battle by Israel and the PA against Hamas’s bases and infra- structure. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
But that same eventuality would be a loss for the PA, and even more so for Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The appearance of any armed militaristic group that is not guided by politics would lead to a vicious circle of violence—what Israel and the PA call “terrorism.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Many of the answers to these questions depend on the outcome of the final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Specifically, it will depend on the success or failure of the Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese track of negotiations~ the nature of any bilateral agreement that may be concluded between Israel and Syria, and the general Palestinian reaction to an Israeli-Syrian accord. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
We give peace and blessings upon the Messenger of God, his family, his companions, his followers, You are the best community that has been raised up for mankind, enjoin- Shame is pitched over them wheresoever they are found, except when under Israel will rise and will remain firm until Islam eliminates it as it had The Islamic World is burning. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Arab states surrounding Israel are requested to open their borders to ease the movement of mujahidin to and from it, and that is the least they could do. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
So Israel with its Jewishness and its Jewish population challenges Islam and Muslims. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The odd contrast in that year was the convening of an Arab summit conference at Fez, Morocco, in September 1982, which came as a sort of Recognize the Zionist existence and its legitimacy Cede the larger part of Palestine to the Zionist entity. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This aggressive enterprise complements the larger Western project that seeks to strip the Arab Islamic nation of its cultural roots in order to consolidate Western Zionist hegemony over it by completing the plan of greater Israel and establishing political and eco- nomic hegemony over it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s Stance on Political Settlement Its profound understanding of the Zionist enemy, its intellec- tual background in the Torah and the Talmud, the writings of the founders of the Zionist movement, and its attachment to the myths of the promised land, God’s chosen people, and Greater Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel still applies against the Palestinian people all manner of stringent repressive measures that ignore the basic forms of human rights as enun- ciated in international agreements, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel continues to do these things despite signing a peace agreement with the PLO. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
6. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The children were victimized even while playing inno- cently in the streets; the women were victimized while on peaceful protest marches, while doing their household chores, or as they passed by a demonstration on some street. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It must pressure Israel to implement UN reso- lutions and respect international conventions pertaining to the occupied Arab territories and force it to withdraw. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“Hamas wa itifaq ghazza-ariha awwalan: al-mawaqifwal- _____ “Hanakat Hamas bayn al-sulta al-filastiniyya wa Israel: mm muthal- _____ Hamas: Al-Fekr wal mamarasa al-siyasiyya [Hamas: Ideology and Huwaidi, Fahmi, Iran minal dakhil [Iran from the Inside], third ed. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
lath al-quwa ila al-mitraqa Wal sindan” [The Hamas movement between the Palestinian authority and Israel: From the triad of power to the hammer and anvil], Majallat al-dirasat al-fl lastiniyya, no. 18 (Spring 1994): 24—37. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
al-Madhoon, Rabi’. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Maqadima, Ibrahim. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Bibliography 315 316 HAMAS al-Keylani, Musa Zeid. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
al-Nasir, Husam. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Paper presented to the symposium on Palestinian self-rule elections, by the Center for Middle East Studies, Amman, 17—18 August 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Kuwait: Al-Manah, 1989. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Int~fada: The Palestinian Uprising: Israel’s ThirdFront. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Shadid, Mohammad K. “The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza,” The Third World Quarterly, v. 10, n. 2 (April 1988). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Schiff, Ze’ev and Ehud Ya’ari. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See Palestinian problem; Palestinian-Israeli con- flict Palestinian Authority (PA), 2, 7, 55, 63, 69, 82, 93, 94, 102, 122, 130, 157, 161, 166, 212, 229, 232, 233, 250, 260; and relations with Hamas, 8, 55—56, 59, 67, 88, 103—109, 198, 219, 224, 228, 230, 240—42, 245, 256; as representative of 118—19, 170, 187, 196, 244—45, 249—50, 256, 258, 259; see also Oslo Agreement, PA’S establishment under Palestinian National Council (PNC), 15, 25n. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Islam and politics—Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From her modest home in Beirut, Maha, a small, pretty woman, recalled the last few days of her husband’s life. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Banners denouncing Israel and pledging to reclaim al-Quds, Jerusalem, are a common sight. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Salah was an active member of the Islamic Resistance and had to spend much time in the South, planning or taking part in the steady flow of attacks against his enemy, Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah 4 With a calmness uncommon amongst Shiite women, who usually break down into a fit of wailing and sobbing when recalling the death of their loved ones, Maha added: Although I was emotional at losing the dearest person in my life, I was filled with joy because he had died while carrying out such an operation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
know, he always told me that if and when he died I would never feel lonely or suffer a sense of loss, because he would come to me in my dreams and, thank God, he does so nearly every night. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Salah’s act and those of the ~Islamic] Resistance are what make Israel live in a state of panic and insecurity. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
My husband’s attack only confirmed and proved to Israel that the Resistance can reach it wherever it may be and whenever it wants. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
That in itself is of value and importance.You Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
see, as long as Israel remains on our land there is no solution, but to resist with whatever means are available. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The West also carries part of the blame, because if it did not support and back Israel then none of this might have happened. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘I can live with that and will fulfil Salah’s wishes.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s invasion was the brain-child of Ariel Sharon, the minister of defence in Menachem Begin’s government. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its stated aim was to drive the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from Israel’s northern border.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
PLO had been using Lebanon as the base for its raids against Israel since the late sixties and Israel’s northern settlements bore the brunt of the attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s invasion had followed fast on the heels of the most significant event in modern times for Shia Muslims: the Iranian Revolution of 1 979.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In 1968, the PLO began making raids into Israel from South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His time in Lebanon was a pivotal era. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Two years later, in March 1978, Israel launched ‘Operation Litani’ and invaded the country for the first time, following the PLO’s attack on a bus inside Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The United Nations Resolution 425 called for Israel’s withdrawal and for a UN force to be established in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (IJNIFIL) duly arrived, but Israel continued to control part of South Lebanon with the help of a proxy Christian militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA).The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The SLA still occupies the area which Israel has declared a ‘security zone’; it constitutes 10 per cent of Lebanon’s territory. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon had become a backyard for the power struggle between Israel and Syria. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As Patrick Seale sums it up in his book Asad: ‘“Greater Israel” went to war against “Greater Syria”, both controversial concepts of uncertain definition but which certainly ruled each other out.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Five months after Israel’s invasion in 1978, Musa Sadr suddenly vanished on an official visit to Libya. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
cataclysmic succession of events — civil war, Israel’s 1978 invasion and Sadr’s disappearance — was capped by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Nothing has been heard of him since and Libya has always claimed that he left the country and took a plane bound for Rome. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Sadr’s mysterious disappearance echoed the fate of a central figure in Shia theology: theTwelfth Imam, considered the rightful leader of Islam, who vanished in the ninth century. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Sadr had politicised the Lebanese Shiites and the Iranian revolution had catapulted Shia Islam on to the world stage. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s accomplishment in ridding the South of the PLO guerrillas also brought with it material prosperity. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Refugees returned home to their villages and the construction industry boomed as many visualised personal economic benefits from contact with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Ironically, Israel, Bern and the southern Shiites all wanted the same thing — an end to the Palestinian presence and guerrilla activity in South Lebanon, as well as security across both borders. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The weariness of the southerners from the years of suffering under their Palestinian masters was reflected in their show of welcome and gratitude to those who had freed them of their tormentors. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The change in attitude occurred slowly as the Shiites became aware that Israel was reluctant to leave Lebanon and appeared set on staying for a long period of time, despite having achieved its main objective of driving the Palestinians from the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In early 1983, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) issued the first draft of their plan to form the ‘Organisation for a Unified South’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
purpose of this newly acquired organisation and militia was, first and foremost, to protect Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Turning a blind eye to Israel’s trespass on their land for the sake of the common aim of expelling the PLO was one thing, but becoming their surrogates * See Israel’s Lebanon War, Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, pp. 239—40 ** See Sacred Rage, Robin Wright, p. 221 Tm~ SHHTES STRIKE BACK 15 and allowing Israeli domination of their lives and territory was totally unacceptable to the Shiites. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The mistrust awakened years of dormant fear that Israel had the same designs on South Lebanon as it had had on Jordan’s West Bank and on Syria’s Golan Heights, both seized during Israel’s 1967 war against the Arab states. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When the Zionists had presented their territorial demands at theVersailles peace conference in 1919, they originally asked for Israel’s northern border to extend as far as the Litani River in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Zionists’ chief concern was water: Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Zionist Organisation and later president of Israel, wrote to Lloyd George in 1919 about the vital importance of water for the future of Palestine and the need for the Litani River. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At an international symposium on water held in Amman in 1984, Israel’s invasion and occupation of Lebanon in 1982 was viewed in this historical perspective. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Salah Halawani, former director-general of the Litani Water Authority, Lebanon, argued that while Israel justified its actions with the need for security, the pursuit ol further water resources may also have been one of its objectives.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Some Lebanese officials have claimed that Israel is taking water from the Litani for its own purposes, although there in no hard evidence. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel, however, has denied that it has any designs on the Litani. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s political ambitions for Lebanon were rooted in its early history. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In 1948, David Ben-Gurion, the founder of the state of Israel, spoke of creating a Christian state in Lebanon which would form an alliance with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Israelis had been supporting the Maronites since 1976 and had provided them with arms even * See Salah Halawani, ‘Lebanese Development Project and Israel’s Pursuit of the Litani and Hasbani Waters’ in Israel and Arab Water:An International Symposium,Amman 25 and 26 February 1984, Eds. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Support was increased under Menachem Begin’s government which took office in 1977. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
If the Shiites had learnt anything from the Palestinian experience, it was that fighting was the only way to prevent Israel or anyone else from taking their land. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Everyone remembered how the Palestinians were driven out of their homeland when the state of Israel was founded. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Initially it was a limited number See Israel’s Lebanon War, p. 18* THE SHIITES STRIKE BACK 17 of people engaging in small-scale protests, from boycotting the Israeli products which had poured into the Lebanese markets to attacking the homes of Lebanese collaborators and planting home-made roadside bombs against the Israeli patrols. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was there that Ayatollah Khomeini outlined the ideas which were to form the basis of Islamic government in Iran after the revolution of 1 9’79~* Following Israel’s invasion in 1982, Iran sent 1,500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Baal- beck in the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel swiftly turned on the clerics who were leading the Resistance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His townsfolk remember him saying frequently, ‘Israel will kill me and shed my blood.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He was continuously aware of the danger but strongly believed that he and his people had an obligation and a right to oppose the occupation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel reported nine soldiers injured. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Jarradi frequently challenged Israel’s presence, boasted of his participation in attacks and dared the soldiers to find him. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A few days after he spoke to the newspaper, Israel launched a massive dawn raid on the village of Maarakeh followed by similar incursions in other villages in South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Six days after Jarradi’s murder, on 10 March 1985, a young man drove a red pick-up Chevrolet, containing 900 kilograms of explosives, into a military Israeli convoy just two miles away from Israel’s settlement Metullah, north of Galilee.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
convoy was taking soldiers back from leave in Israel to their military bases in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The bomber, who was identified only by his alias ‘Abu Zeinab’, and believed to be from Israel’s ‘security zone’, killed twelve soldiers and wounded fourteen others. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The fact that the attack took place so close to Israel’s northern settlements and border with Lebanon unnerved Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It confirmed Israel’s worst fear — that the spirit of the Resistance had extended to the ‘security zone’, where Israel had believed itself to be safe and in the least danger from its Shiite foes. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel denied accusations that it was behind his murder, contrary to the belief of the observers and inhabitants in the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In both cases, Israel’s strategy backfired. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
PLO was evacuated in August under the supervision of multinational forces and in 1983 Israel had begun its retreat through Lebanon and withdrawn to the Awali River, north of Sidon.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel Defence Forces came under increasing attack from the Shiite Resistance fighters, who played a significant role in forcing Israel’s retreat. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In February 1985, Israel concluded the first stage of its withdrawal to the Litani River and declared an ‘Iron Fist’ policy over the 900-square-mile area it still controlled. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s withdrawal coincided with the public debut of Hezbollah and the first anniversary of Harb’s murder. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel Defence Forces’ new regulations banned motorists from driving their cars alone, in an attempt to prevent human bomb attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Many families who refused to co-operate with the Israel Defence Forces had to suffer the destruction of their homes. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Western news agencies and journalists in Beirut received telexes from the Israel Defence Forces warning them against visiting the region from the Lebanese side.Those Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On 6 June 1985, the third anniversary of its invasion, Israel fulfilled its last stage of withdrawal and retreated to the ‘security zone’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It now established the name of the Islamic Resistance as the force responsible for fighting Israel and its Tm~ SHIITES STRIKE BACK 27 surrogates, the South Lebanon Army. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On 17 February 1986, the Islamic Resistance dealt a severe military blow against Israel when a group of its combatants captured two Israeli soldiers near the town of Qounin. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel has continued to denounce the capture of its soldiers and has made attempts to include them in negotiations for the release of Lebanon’s foreign hostages. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It has said it would release the bodies of the two men in exchange for Lebanese prisoners who are being held without trial in the notorious Khiam prison in South Lebanon and in Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel has not ceased pressing for information on another missing soldier, the navigator Ron Arad. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel has relentlessly accused Hezbollah of holding Arad. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel has not abandoned its quest and Arad has almost become a symbol of its military loss in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
By mid-1986, the Islamic Resistance realised its war against Israel was not going too successfully when it suffered twenty- four fatalities in one attack.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was a measure of their frustration that Hezbollah had accused the UN of deliberately obstructing the Islamic Resistance in an attempt to protect the security of Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At the time, Syria was isolated: it had taken a severe military battering following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and had been side-lined while America became a mediator in the civil war. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
and Hezbollah’s differences had first come into the open when Israel withdrew its troops from most of the South and retreated to the ‘security zone’ in June 1985. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Higgins’s UN status and US nationality ensured the participation of both the UN and Israel in the search. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The group made three demands in return for Higgins’s freedom: an Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, an end to American ‘interference’ in the Middle East, and freedom for all Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Syria’s alliance with Iran had been a shrewd political move in the wake of Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel at Camp David and Assad was aware that the emergence of Hezbollah formed an effective force against Israel and the United States. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For the first time, the group had the chance to con- vinceAssad, during a high-level meeting with the Syrian leader in Latakia, that its prime goal and mission was to fight the Israeli occupation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was Israel, however, which struck the next blow. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel also maintained that the clergyman had been involved in the capture of the two Israeli soldiers near Qounin. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Although international reaction was swift, it fell short of taking any real action against Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
US President George Bush said that he could not condone the abduction and both the UN secretary-general and the British Foreign Office deplored it, asking Israel to free Obeid and his two aides. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
None of the three Lebanese captives was released: Israel continued to insist that Obeid was behind major attacks against their country as well as being heavily involved in the kidnap of the American UN officer. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Twenty minutes after the deadline expired, the Israeli prime minister offered to exchange all the Shiite Muslim prisoners whom Israel was holding in exchange for the freedom of the three Israeli servicemen and foreign captives. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Later that day, and in what appeared to be attempts by Israel to deflect criticism for its behaviour, Israel said Obeid had confirmed all the charges which it had made against him. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah continued to deny its involvement in hostage-taking and issued a statement on 5 August in which it said that the seizure of Obeid had halted all possibilities of an exchange of prisoners with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
By 1991, the Islamic Resistance was adopting bolder measures. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the past we had problems because Israel sends in daily reconnaissance flights over the area before the movement Hezbollah 38 of their ground convoys. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
UNIFIL, Arab governments and even European countries, including Britain, have described Hezbollah’s war with Israel as a justified fight for the liberation of occupied territories. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Yet by the time Hezbollah came into the open, it felt that its war with Israel was being falsely portrayed. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As a result, in the past few years, Hezbollah has engaged in a propaganda war with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It has concentrated a large section of its campaign on proving that, contrary to the portrayal of its guerrillas as a bunch of fanatics, the Islamic Resistance’s members are fighting for a just cause, as Sheikh Nabil Qaouq says: While it is important for Israel to portray the battle as a fight between Israel and Hezbollah, it is more important for us to show it in its true form — a war, not just between Hezbollah and the Israeli soldiers but one in which the whole of Lebanon and its people are in danger. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A fierce fighter himself, he had personally inspired, planned and led many attacks against Israel’s forces in Lebanon when he was the Islamic Resistance’s leader in South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel, which for years had rightly blamed most attacks and the Islamic Resistance’s progress on Musawi, believed that by assassinating him it would remove the head of the dragon and weaken the military wing of Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Following the end of the Gulf War, there was talk of peace with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The political scenario in the region was geared towards halting military action against Israel, especially in South Lebanon, and Hezbollah was facing the possibility of being asked to cool down its jihad against the occupation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They raised clenched fists in the air in a sign of defiance and chanted slogans against Israel and America. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In a passionate speech he charged Israel with ‘corn- miffing its worst folly yet’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It heightened its barrage of Katyusha rockets against settlements along israel’s northern borders, sparking further retaliation in the form of air raids. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Even reports from Israel suggested that the assassination of Musawi might have been a misjudgernent on their behalf. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For instead of destroying the conceived brains behind the Islamic Resistance, the murder seemed to have launched a deadlier, more dangerous force that would cause serious aggravation to Israel’s occupying forces in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For Israel, South Lebanon became a quagmire from which its army never returned in glory. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Between 1982 and 1985, Israel withdrew from a large sector of the land which it occupied. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Where has it got them? We believe and consider the Resistance to be the only way. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
That only came about when Israel invaded Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the eyes of many Shiites, he had made the unforgivable error of participating in the National Salvation Committee, an emergency executive which brokered the 17 May 1983 accord between Lebanon and Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Muslims and Druze considered it to be a vehicle for securing Israel’s dominance in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its terms allowed Israel’s proxy Christian militia to control a 30-mile area in South Lebanon and permitted its army to conduct patrols with the Lebanese army as far as the Awali River, north of Sidon.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Their style was simple, but direct. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From the very beginning, the United States and Israel searched in vain for the individuals within the new movement who were responsible for the group’s attacks.They Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Shortly after Israel’s withdrawal to the Awali River in 1983, the shoura sent three of the group’s top men, who had largely participated in founding the party, to Beirut’s southern suburbs.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He was one of the many militants who held America responsible for encouraging and allowing Israel to invade and occupy Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah regards the West, and particularly the United States, as its staunchest enemy after Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s grievances against the United States are largely based on the US’s support of Israel during the 1982 invasion. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
belief that Israel exists to execute American policy and that US foreign policy in the Middle East is often undertaken with Israel’s prime interests in mind. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘They [Israel] attacked Tm~ PARTY OF GOD 57 our country, destroyed our villages, slaughtered our children and dishonoured our sanctity,’ stated the manifesto. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The bombs that flattened whole residential neighbourhoods and the war planes which blitzed Beirut were made in America. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Over the years, the United States has attacked Hezbollah’s Islamic Resistance for carrying out raids against Israel’s occupying forces in Lebanon, while failing to call on Israel to adhere to the United Nations Resolution 425, which calls for Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
America’s defence of Kuwait against Saddam Hussein’s invasion stood out in stark contrast to its policy towards Israel’s occupation in Lebanon and confirmed the militants’ suspicion that US policy in the Middle East was based on self-interest. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah is unyielding in its hatred towards Israel, which it sees as a Western conspiracy planted in the Middle East to ensure instability in the region. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its manifesto describes Israel as ‘America’s spearhead in our Islamic world’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While Hezbollah sees itself as capable of having relations with the West in the future, it cannot envisage such a possibility with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The manifesto stated: Hezbollah 58 Our struggle with Israel stems from an ideological and historic understanding to the effect that this Zionist entity is an aggressor in its development and formation and is existing on a land usurped at the cost of the rights of the Muslim people. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Based on this we do not admit to nor abide by any cease-fire decisions against it nor do we adhere to any peace treaty with it. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah believes that Israel has expansionist plans in the Middle East, claiming that it dreams of creating a Greater State of Israel from the Euphrates to the Nile. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s belief may spring from a biblical verse, in which God promises Abraham the land from the Nile to the Euphrates (Genesis 15; verses 18—2 1).While Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah, however, declares that the occupation of Palestine was only the beginning and that Israel will not settle until it has regained what it regards as its Promised Land. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
With the prevailing international mood which is sup- portive of Israel, we consider ourselves not to have any other choice, but to confront and fight Israel until such a THE PARTY OF GOD 59 day when they leave our land. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Many officials within Hezbollah even refuse to utter the name Israel when referring to the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
To refer to it as Israel is seen by Hezbollah as an admission of its legal status, which Hezbollah refuses to recognise. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
weekly newspaper, Al-A hed, on 6 December 1985, Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, a leading cleric, outlined the argument: ‘Israel cannot be viewed as a state with the right to security and peace just like any other state in the region. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
We cannot see Israel as a legal presence, considering that it is a conglomeration of people who came from all parts of the world to live in Palestine on the ruins of another people.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As far as Hezbollah is concerned, fighting Israel’s occupation is not just a national duty. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
regarding the two groups’ differing tactics towards Israel’s occupation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
THE PARTY OF GOD 61 Naiim Qassem, deputy secretary-general, described the group’s reasons for remaining underground in its early stages and its hesitation in announcing itself to the world: Up until 1985, Hezbollah was not yet a single entity that could stand up and speak for itself.We Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Khomeini, for example, set the agenda regarding Israel when he made the infamous declara- tion that Israel was an evil and called on all Muslims around the world to ‘fight the Jewish state until its eradication’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Having said that I must stress, as regards the issue of consulting him, that Sayyed Fadlallah’s opinions were not always binding or obligatory. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
I have to add here, that had he wanted to have a larger role [in Hezbollah] he could have achieved that. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Taif Accord of 1989 proposed to address the political imbalance in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Americans were playing a major role in mediating peace between the Palestinians and Israel, while Syria was keen to improve its relations with the West having lost its Soviet sponsor. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The group, however, remains an important tool for Syria to use against Israel and THE PARTY OF GOD 73 Washington. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Syria has not been willing to compromise on its demand for the full withdrawal of Israeli troops from both the Golan Heights and from South Lebanon in return for peace. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Despite the fact that many do not agree with Hezbollah’s ideology and political vision for Lebanon and may merely be paying lip-service in the name of political correctness, they have all come to recognise and respect its combatants’ opposition to the occupation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s Minister of Defence Ariel Sharon, who had planned and commanded the invasion, refused to accept a European force without American troops. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His election had been backed by the Israelis and it marked the fulfilment of one of their aims when they invaded Lebanon: installing a Christian president who would be friendly to Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel then invaded West Beirut, breaking its promise to the United States that it would stay out of the district, and took Bashir Gemayel’s Phalangist militia in with them. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The carnage enraged the PLO leaderYasser Arafat and the Muslim leaders, who had accepted the US’s pledges that Israel would not enter the Western sector after the evacua- tion of the PLO and that the remaining families of the exiled Palestinian guerrillas would not be harmed. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While the multinational forces supported the administration, the US did not make itself any more popular by sponsoring the Lebanese—Israeli peace agreement in May 1983, which sought to turn Israel’s military gains in Lebanon into political profit. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel had occupied the Chouf and installed Christian militias in the region. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In Septem- ber, Israel abruptly withdrew from the area and full-scale battles erupted between the Druze and the Christians.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Nor were the Iranians happy about the support which America had given to Israel’s actions. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At the time, the Soviets were still in the grip of the Cold War and had been angered by America’s moves to weaken Syria, their strongest ally in the Middle East, and by Israel’s attack on Syrian targets in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Nor had the United States taken any action when Israel stormed into West Beirut, the Muslims’ sanctuary and HuM~ BOMBS 81 capital.Worse Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Moshe Arens, Israel’s defence minister, vowed to strike against HuIvIAN BoMBs 83 Lebanon which he described as one big nest of murderers: ‘We are fighting a cruel and oppressive enemy who does not work with logical methods at least with regards to the general basis and principles acknowledged in the civilised world.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
between their desire to attack Israel at the heart of its operations in Lebanon and their Islamic teaching and upbringing which condemned the killing of their fellow Muslims, the fighters realised that what they needed was Hezbollah 88 not just a military decision, but a religious edict,fatwa, from a scholar. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
although Hezbollah enrols fighters as young as seventeen for the continuing war of occupation with Israel, it selects only men of what it describes as a certain age-group, maturity and understanding, to go on its special missions and attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A seventeen-year-old Sunni girl, Sanaa Muhaidily, became the first symbol of women’s participation in the battle against Israel when she drove her white Peugeot car at an Israeli target, killing herself and two Israeli soldiers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel occupies our land and we, the occupied people, are branded terrorists. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Fortunately, it was not an air raid, but one of Israel’s daily reconnaissance flights. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hassan’s earlier friendly look had become a steely glare and he continued with an icy voice: The West demands that we halt all attacks and end our war with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Why wasn’t the same done for Lebanon? How come Israel’s occupation of Lebanon has been allowed to go on for more than fifteen years? Hezbollah 94 Don’t you see, we have wised up to the fact that it’s all a charade.We Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The world is not bothered with Lebanon because, unlike Kuwait, we are not an oil-rich country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah had never hidden its animosity towards the West, and in particular the US and Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Farid is a professor of literature and a graduate of the Lebanese University of Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Dodge was abducted initially by the Lebanese. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon was a small, defenceless country and the Lebanese were caught in the middle of Israel’s war against the PLO. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Abu Jihad knew that it would only be a matter of time before Israel finished off his guerrillas. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The enemy, Israel, had not changed, but the agenda was altogether different. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The arrival of the Guards in Baalbeck in the Bekaa Valley during the summer of 1982 did not attract much attention or arouse the curiosity of the buzzing local journalists and Western media who had converged on Beirut to cover Israel’s invasion. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon’s preoccupation with the civil war and Israel’s invasion gave the Guards the freedom to operate.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In March 1982, three months before Israel’s invasion, the French embassy in Beirut was bombed. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When Israel invaded Lebanon, Montazeri told the Lebanese clerics who were visiting Iran in August 1982 that they should draw inspiration from the Islamic Revolution. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Guards duly embarked on their campaign in Lebanon to carry out Khomeini’s orders of punishing the ‘crimes and oppression of the enemies of Islam especially America and Israel’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
One of John McCarthy’s prisons: he was held for some months in the basement of this building in the Southern suburbs of Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Abbas and his surviving family with pictures of his wife and daughters who were killed as they fled the South of Lebanon in an ambulance which was attacked by a helicopter gunship. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Islamic Jihad announced that it had executed him on 4 October 1985 in retaliation for America’s alleged assistance in Israel’s air raid on the PLO head- quarters outside Tunis four days previously. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
first consignment of arms was 100 anti-tank TOW missiles, provided by Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
them, the invasion of Israel in Lebanon might have passed as an acceptable and necessary Israeli military exercise. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
According to Naiim Qassem, deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah: ‘It [Kuwait 17] was the starting point for the idea of hostages, to impose pressure for the release of prisoners in Israel and elsewhere.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Qassem cites the West’s support of Israel, the prisoners held in Israel’s jails without trial and the West’s ‘consistent attempts to tighten the noose around us, in every aspect, and their persisting negative dealings with our area’ as additional factors which contributed to the emergence of groups in Lebanon who considered that the only solution lay in imposing pressure on the West through taking hostages. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In a clear reprimand to Israel and the West, Khomeini hoped that the organisation ‘would alleviate the pain of the Lebanese oppressed who had not only suffered at the hands of the colonialists, but were further afflicted, impoverished and orphaned by the civil war and the wars of opportunists seeking to overtake their country’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Even Israel supported the Mujama and registered the organisation as a charity in an attempt to undermine support for the PLO. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As in Lebanon, Israel’s political tactics failed: Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, both vehemently opposed to the peace process, are offshoots of the Mujama.** Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The social welfare of the Shiites in the South is a particular concern to Hezbollah, since the region is the arena of its conflict with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When Hezbollah’s Resistance fighters carry out attacks against Israeli soldiers, the civilian population of South Lebanon often bears the brunt of Israel’s reprisals. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel claims that Hezbollah launches its attacks from the villages and that its reprisals are aimed at Hezbollah strongholds, but the damage inflicted on the villages suggests that Israel has targeted civilians in an attempt to turn them against the Islamic Resistance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In an effort to counter any such eventuality and maintain the Hezbollah 156 villagers’ support, Jihad al-Binaa has permanent teams ready to enter areas of destruction and repair the damage. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
By the end of the year the organisation had rebuilt 957 homes. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Every step that the group has taken to rebuild Israel’s destruction in Lebanon has encouraged people to remain in their villages. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Islamic Resistance’s improved military performance in the South has further increased its prestige and the group has the backing of Syria and the Lebanese government in its war with Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Relief Committee’s practice of visiting its beneficiaries to hand them their monthly payments certainly allows it to maintain a personal link and remain updated on changing circumstances and any pending problems as the Committee claims. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The welfare organisation has declared that it intends to focus on the Shiites’ cultural development ‘in order to improve the level of maturity amongst the community so that it will not remain vulnerable to opportunists’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s 1993 July offensive against South Lebanon and the western Bekaa sector left a trail of destruction across eighty villages and approximately 6,000 homes.Thousands Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
During Israel’s sixteen-day air, land and sea offensive against Lebanon inApril 1996, the Lebanese government became more involved from the start and extended considerable assistance both to the refugees and to the families who insisted on re- maining in their homes in the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanese who were previously un- willing to accept that Hezbollah was becoming a fact of life in Lebanon now discuss the group’s achievements with open praise. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The crowd screamed and wailed and punched their fists in the air in defiance, chanting, ‘Death to Israel’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was the largest UN post in South Hezbollah 170 Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The attack against the base came exactly one week after Israel launched’Operation Grapes of Wrath’ against South Lebanon and the western Bekaa Valley under the pretext of neutralising Hezbollah guerrillas in the area. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The purpose of the artillery barrage, they argued, was to provide protective fire to their commandos, not to hit the UN base.Very Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Once again, Israel’s attempts to eliminate the Islamic Resistance were to backfire. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The tit-for-tat war between the Resistance and Israeli soldiers first climaxed in 1993, when Israel launched ‘Operation Accountability’, an air and artillery blitz of South Lebanon in response to the killing of eight soldiers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was Israel’s fiercest air and land offensive against the South since its 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For fear of incurring casualties and a repetition of the 1982 mass invasion, in which 650 Israeli soldiers were killed along with thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians, Israel’s Prime Minister Rabin had decided to limit his country’s operations in Lebanon to artillery, air and sea attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hundreds of houses were pulverised, whole neighbourhoods and areas wiped out and more than 200,000 refugees fled north to the safety of Beirut following Israel’s latest attempt to depopulate the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was clear that Israel was enforcing its old tactic of penalising the residents of the South for the activities of the Islamic Resistance in the hope of turning them against the fighters. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel was once again getting away with its actions in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was only on the fourth day of its frenzied bombardment of the South, during which it had fired about 13,000 heavy artillery shells, that Boutros Boutros Ghali, the United Nations secretary- general, managed to issue a lame criticism of Israel for intentionally pursuing a policy of displacing civilian inhabitants in South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s Prime MinisterYitzhak Rabin said that he regretted the suffering which the attack was causing, but vowed to carry on until the Shiite guerrillas stopped their resistance: ‘We are steadfast in our decision to continue to act to achieve our aims. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
we will continue this action until we achieve this pur- pose of ours whether militarily or whether by a military and political combination,’ Rabin told a special Knesset meeting to debate the effect of Israel’s latest bombardments. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah came to an understanding with Israel which stipulated that while the war between the two sides would continue, it would in future be contained between the guerrillas and the Israeli soldiers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel undertook not to shell or attack civilian targets and villages outside its occupied zone, while Hezbollah pledged not to fire rockets at Israel’s northern border. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah claimed that Israel breached the truce and attacked civilian targets 231 times between 1993 and 1996. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In return, the Party of God says it retaliated with Katyushas against settlements in northern Israel on thirteen occasions. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah had meanwhile intensified its attacks against Israel’s soldiers and the South LebanonArmy militia (SLA) in the ‘security zone’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On 4 March, Hezbollah’s Resistance fighters killed four Israeli soldiers in the ‘security zone’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
This was followed on 10 March by another bomb attack, also in the ‘security zone’, in which one Israeli soldier was killed and four T~ GRAPES OF WRATH 173 others wounded. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s apologies fell on deaf ears in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah was determined to pay Israel back in kind. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah fired salvoes of Katyusha rockets into Israel’s northern settlements as a reminder to Israel of their 1993 understanding. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The following day, Hezbollah accused Israel of planting the mine, claiming that the bomb fragments carried Hebrew markings. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s Prime Minister Shimon Peres was also facing war on other fronts. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
assassination had shaken Israel to its core. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His campaign slogan was ‘Israel is strong with Peres’ and he had to prove it. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah was not responsible for the Palestinian attacks and was not solely to blame for the mood of discontent in Israel, but it was still a principal cause of irritation for Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Moreover, its sponsor, Iran, was considered to be supporting the extremist Palestinian groups. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Peres could not go to war against the Palestinian extremists without enraging Yasser Arafat and * See Keesing’s Guide to the Middle East Peace Process, Lawrence Joffe, p. 419 THE GRAPES OF WRATH 175 sabotaging the peace treaty; Lebanon, however, was a weak country, where Israel had already exercised its military might. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Iran had called the bombings ‘divine retribution’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel left the summit armed with the knowledge that it could seek its revenge against Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
According to an official in the Clinton administration, who was quoted in Newsweek’s 6 May edition, the US had told Israel ‘to go ahead into Lebanon’, but had warned: ‘If things go wrong don’t come running to us.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Clinton had personally worked towards achieving peace between the Arab countries and Israel and was determined to strengthen Peres’s election campaign. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Until the Qana massacre, the US administration made few remarks and voiced little concern about Israel’s activities in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When asked about the issue, Clinton’s representatives would defend Israel’s position by putting the blame on Hezbollah and Iran. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
President Bill Clinton was also facing a general election and was not prepared to jeopardise the votes of the Jewish American lobby. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Like most Western leaders, he feared the prospect of an elected Likud government and its repercussions on the Middle East peace process. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Investors would think twice about making a financial commitment to a country which was clearly under constant threat of future attacks from Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
If you look at the two countries [Lebanon and Israel] they are in the same location strategically and they are bound to play a similar role as a point of entry to the Near East region. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel had assured the world that it would target Hezbollah camps and armed caches in Lebanon; in fact the campaign killed only thirteen guerrillas and failed to destroy a single Katyusha launcher. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s World War Two vintage Katyusha rockets had proved to be a difficult target for Israel’s American-made F- 16 and Cobra helicopter gunships to eradicate. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Arieh O’Sullivan, the distinguished defence analyst of the right-wing Jerusalem Post, made the same point when he wrote: ‘Despite all its bravado and state-of-the-art weapons systems, the IDF’s attempts to stop Hezbollah from firing Katyushas into northern Israel is like a tiger trying to catch a mosquito in his teeth.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It also destroyed telephone lines and highways and pulverised scores of villages in the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Peres ignored the example set by Yitzhak Rabin who had embarked on a similar tactic of collective punishment in ‘Operation Accountabifity’ in 1993 and had also failed to achieve his aim. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As before, the 1996 campaign was in danger of glorifying Hezbollah and of drawing more sympathy towards the group. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The campaign also raised questions about the accuracy oJ Israel’s intelligence and its supply of aerial maps, which had been plotted with the information gathered from years of daily reconnaissance flights over Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On checking the targets hit, it was difficult not to wonder about Israel’s claim to have details of Hezbollah’s hideouts and locations. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
a.m. on that same murky, spring day, Israel returned, with a vengeance, to Beirut, after almost fourteen years. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Four of its American-made Apache helicopters, bearing the blue Star of David, flew across the Mediterranean and turned into Dahiya, Beirut’s southern * See A. R. Norton, ‘Israel in the grip of the insecurity zone’ in Lebanoi~ on Hold, eds. Rosemary Hollis and Nadim Shehadi Tim GRAPES OF WRATH 179 suburbs, Hezbollah’s bastion and home to many of its leadership. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Although the attack on Beirut was small and almost symbolic compared to that of 1982, it was nevertheless a major escalation after fourteen years and a line which people had believed Israel would never cross again. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Another smart missile, delivered by another helicopter against yet another ‘Hezbollah target’, hit a BMW car by the Jiyeh power station Hezbollah 180 on the road north of Sidon, incinerating a twenty-seven-year- old woman. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Assad could only reiterate that Israel’s latest war in Lebanon would diminish the little hope which remained for the progress of the peace initiative. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He stressed that it was Israel and not Hezbollah which was breaching the 1993 understanding. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Syrian leader warned the US that it risked losing its role as a mediator in the Middle East after the American administration bluntly defended Israel’s strikes and called on Damascus and Iran to curb Hezbollah’s attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Further air raids, backed by artillery bombardment, were delivered against the South and the Bekaa Valley as Israel gave civilians ultimatums to leave their homes and villages or face the consequences. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s proxy, the South Lebanon Army militia (SLA), warned that electricity power stations and water systems would also be attacked, confirming suspicions that Israel’s real motive was to coerce Lebanon’s government into disarming Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He pledged that the Katyusha attacks would stop once Israel ended its occupation and withdrew its troops from the South of the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’ continued into its second day, Israel laid siege to the ports of Lebanon alleging that it was blocking Hezbollah’s shipments of weapons from getting through. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel gave the villagers in the South until 2.30 Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its surrogate, the South Lebanon Army, made further threats on its behalf by broadcasting to the population of South Lebanon that ‘he who forewarns is excused’: Israel would not be to blame for the consequences if the civilians chose to remain in their homes. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For many of the refugees, it was the fourth occasion since Israel first invaded Lebanon in 1978. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The picture of the little Lebanese girl lying dead in the ambulance that was taking her to safety shocked the world that weekend, but it did not rouse the West to intervene and end Israel’s offensive against Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel immediately claimed that the ambulance was carrying Hezbollah guerrillas and blamed the group for the death of the women and children in the vehicle. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Two women and four little girls were instantly killed in the Hezbollah 182 ambulance attack, which was said to be the bloodiest episode since Israel began its blitz against the Islamic militants. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His name was Abbas and he was one of the men Israel claimed were Hezbollah ‘terrorists’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was hard for anyone to explain to the bereaved father and husband that even the simple demand for a joint UN and world condemnation of Israel’s acts against Lebanon had become impossible to achieve, thanks to the US decision to block any such moves for fear of offending Israel or endangering Peres’s chances of winning the elections. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel had given Ibtissam’s village a deadline to evacuate Suhmor or face the consequences. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Nasrallah issued a statement, his first since the Israeli military operation had begun, in which he threatened revenge. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon had lodged a complaint against Israel’s military activities and asked for an urgent meeting to discuss the crisis. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Lebanese felt that requests for further delays were largely aimed at allowing Israel more time to carry out its military operation in Lebanon and refused the US’s request. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
She was apparently unhappy to discover that the Lebanese were determined to request the UN Council to order Israel to halt all its attacks on Lebanon, to appeal for an official condemnation of Israel and to call for the implementation of Resolution 425. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It came as no surprise to the Lebanese mission whenWestern intermediaries informed them that the US was determined to use its right of veto against any moves which might be made against Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Americans’ argument, the Lebanese were told, was that if Israel was to be condemned then Hezbollah should be condemned as well. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon objected to this on the basis that it could not allow a legitimate resistance to be treated in the same manner as the country launching the aggression; to allow Hezbollah to be condemned would set a precedent for the condemnation of any future resistance against Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
were all too familiar with the outcome of UN decisions when it came to Israeli—Lebanese issues and on this occasion they were even told in advance not to expect any action to be taken against Israel nor even to hope for a UN resolution or statement con- demning Israeli attacks on Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It considered that if it adhered to the Americans’ wishes it would, in effect, be giving Israel and the US a licence for future intimidation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
All was going well for Israel: it had suffered no military casualties and world opinion remained largely unmoved. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Michael Portillo, Britain’s Minister of Defence, spoke out in support of Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At a press conference in Jerusalem, on a pre-scheduled visit to Israel during ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’, he said: Ti-rn GRAPES OF WRATH 189 I would not describe the Israeli reaction as disproportionate. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
My view is that we look to Israel to take measures which are measured, considered and which are proportionate. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
I believe Israel has taken measures to ensure civilian casualties are kept to a minimum. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel is facing a very substantial terrorist threat from Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The United Kingdom had in the past been seen as an advocate of the Arab cause and had been frequently criticised by Israel and the Jewish community in Britain for being pro-Arab. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s defence, it seemed, was also threatened by a 300- yard strip of the Beirut—Sidon—Tyre coastal highway, 15 miles south of Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israeli officials claimed that the naval blockade along the coastal highway was aimed at obstructing Hezbollah’s supply lines and deterring it from sending reinforcements South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Moreover, as an underground Resistance waging a guerrilla- style war against Israeli occupiers, its members were already based in the areas and villages in which the conflict was taking place. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
So Israel’s 500-ton naval might flexed its muscles against unarmed civilians in their saloon cars, vans and even ambulances. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
day began with more Katyusha salvoes raining down on northern Israel, which had been evacuated by the Israel Defence Forces. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Baby Nour was only four days old and the youngest victim of Israel’s campaign. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
were still asleep, that morning, when Israel’s warplanes fired five rockets in retaliation for a mortar attack at a nearby village which had caused no Israeli casualties. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
But Thursday 18 April had worse in store. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Christopher, who had been conducting discussions on the telephone with both Syria’s Foreign Minister Farouq al-Sharaa and Israel’s Foreign Minister Ehud Barak, started out on a round of shuttle diplomacy. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The American administration had little choice but to reverse its previous tolerance of Israel’s campaign. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
America’s continued backing of Israel’s campaign not only threatened the US-sponsored peace process, but was undermining the international support which its administration had won for Israel at Sharm el-Sheikh. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Russia’s Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov was said to have had a rancorous meeting with Israel’s Prime Minister at which he said: ‘If you sought to convene the Sharm el-Sheikh conference today, the heads of state would not come.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Before Israel had launched its campaign against Lebanon, the new order which was being created in the Middle East had left Assad politically encircled. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
To his south, King Hussein of Jordan had Tm~ GRAPES OF WRATH 193 allowed the US to set up a temporary 1,000-man airforce base on its territory. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
ton knew that a cease-fire agreement could not be worked out between Hezbollah and Israel withoutAssad’s intervention and Clinton sent his most senior emissaries to Damascus. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Warren Christopher, who had constructed the truce between Israel and Hezbollah in 1993, was expected to join forces with the French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charrette, who had unsuccessfully embarked on a lone mission to negotiate a cease- fire. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Lebanese and the Syrians were initially dismayed to find that the US proposals made no reference to the 1978 UN Resolution 425 which called on Israel to withdraw from all Lebanese territory.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
US initiative involved securing a cease- fire based on an agreement between Hezbollah and Israel to halt all attacks against civilians. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Provided that no attacks took place for nine months, Israel would then commence discussions on its military withdrawal from Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The proposal was automatically rejected by both Syria and Lebanon, who considered it to be a realisation of the aims which Israel had attempted to pursue in its military campaign. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Assad was also not willing to lose the strongest card which he held at his disposal in his negotiations with Israel over the Golan Heights. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Further- more, neither he nor the Lebanese government trusted Israel’s word on timetabled withdrawals: they had already seen it fail to keep to its schedule with Yasser Arafat. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s tactics in Lebanon had backfired once again. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It had Tim GRAPES OF WRATH 195 not succeeded in increasing Peres’s standing in the opinion polls or his chances of winning the 29 May elections, but it had served to give new status to Hezbollah’s Resistance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Despite the great destruction inflicted on Lebanon by ‘Grapes of Wrath’ and despite all the fanfare about ending Hezbollah’s Katyusha attacks against northern Israel, the number of rockets raining down on Galilee appeared to have increased during the military operation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For the first time since the group had come into being, Lebanese of all religions, sects and classes rallied around the Party of God’s Islamic Resistance in an unprecedented show of support and solidarity. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Others discussed the latest reports and stories circulating about the women and men who had contacted the group with large offers of money to contribute towards the purchase of Katyushas. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A Christian woman who had sent Hezbollah a cheque for 15,000 dollars went on a radio station identifying herself and said that she had contributed the money on condition that Katyushas be bought with the sum and fired at Israel’s settle- ments in her name. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
She said: Our people in the South have as much right as the Israelis to lead a safe and secured life, and if Israel insists on carrying out its policy of displacing them, then we too will apply that same policy and displace their northern settlers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
But that made little difference to the supporters. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For most, the issue had gone beyond Hezbollah itself: Israel and the US were attempting to force Lebanon to comply with their strategies in the region, by means of waging a war against Lebanon’s right to resist an unlawful occupation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s image, meanwhile, was fixed as an aggressor and occupier. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Moderates in the region who had supported the move towards peace with Israel were now beginning to question the nature of the peace on offer. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Salem bin Hamid, Imam of the Grand Mosque at Mecca and a member of Saudi Arabia’s highest Consultative Religious Council, denounced Israel’s campaign when he addressed some one million Muslim faithful on the last day of the pilgrimage to Mecca. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon’s Arab allies in the Arab League and the Arab Collective Security Pact had failed to fulfil their moral and legal obligation during Israel’s campaign. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon, an eternal victim of Israel’s military might, had once again been left to face the consequences of the Arab— Israeli conflict alone. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
editor of Egypt’s Al-Ahram newspaper, mouthpiece of the Egyptian establish- ment, also addressed the US when he warned that Israel’s actions in Lebanon were ‘making it impossible to continue controlling the reactions of the Arab people, who are bound to rebel against the humiliation of their national ethos’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
America is the master of terrorism because it continues to support Israel which terronises us and does what it does to us. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
I also extend a message to the Arab leaders who are crawling and begging to make peace with Israel and who leave us alone when they know that our country is weak and unable to take on the Israeli army. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
I tell them, we should all detonate ourselves against Israel and America. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Her sentiment was becoming typical and was a reflection of the new hatred brewing amongst Lebanon’s southerners against Israel and the United States. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Iran, Syria and Hezbollah knew that the continuation of the campaign would cause more harm to Israel and the US than to their own cause. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s objectives were no longer attainable and Peres needed a cease-fire deal that would extricate him from Lebanon without damaging his credibility any further. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His army had promised to deliver him two prizes in the military operation and had disastrously failed: it had guaranteed an end to Hezbollah’s ability to fire Katyushas into northern Israel and it had promised to eliminate the group altogether. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
More than 150 civilians had been killed, including four massacres which not only drew international outrage, but damaged Israel’s military reputation and under- mined the image of the Israel Defence Forces’ professionalism. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It took Warren Christopher six days of intense shuttling between the Syrian capital and Israel, including a brief stop- over in Lebanon, to clinch a cease-fire agreement between the parties concerned. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was not the ideal agreement that Israel had hoped for: Syria and Lebanon had rejected Israel’s demand What have we done to deserve what they are doing to Hezbollah 202 for immunity for its troops in the ‘security zone’ and the right to fire against civilian villages, if its forces were attacked. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Following the Qana massacre, Peres knew that he was no longer in a position to demand his former goals and had to settle for less. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Both sides agreed not to attack civilian targets and a committee of representatives from the US, Syria, Israel, Lebanon and France was to be formed to supervise any violations across the border. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel’s occupation of Lebanon continued: no reference was made in the agreement to the UN Resolution 425 which calls on Israel to withdraw from the Lebanese territory it occupies. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Damascus was back as a main broker in the peace process and Hezbollah’s right to continue its resistance against Israel’s occupying forces had been recognised. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
So long as the problem of Israel’s occupation of the South is ignored and Israel’s demand that Hezbollah guerrifias be disarmed has not been achieved, there is no reason why the bloodshed of ‘Operation Grapes ofWrath’ should not be repeated. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In a nice turn of phrase, Augustus Norton has called the ‘security zone’ in South Lebanon Israel’s ‘insecurity zone’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel retaliated and, in its first breach of the agreement, attacked a civilian area in the Bekaa Valley injuring two people. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah 204 When the Israelis went to the polls in May 1996, the Middle East held its breath. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Since the end of the Gulf War, peace had at last appeared to be a possibility. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It seemed that it would only be a matter of time before Palestinian autonomy would give rise to a Palestinian state. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel had begun to break out of its long years of isolation in the Middle East. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A peace treaty was signed with Jordan in 1994 and relations were being established with Morocco, Qatar, Oman,Tunisia and Turkey. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
According to the terms of the deal, Israel would be prepared to withdraw from Lebanon once Hezbollah has been disbanded and the Lebanese army deployed in the ‘security zone’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon demands that Israel adhere to UN Resolution 425 and withdraw from its territory, while Israel attaches conditions to its withdrawal. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Not only does Israel want to see an end to Hezbollah, it also wants guarantees for the safety of its proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel would like to see the SLA incorporated into the Lebanese army. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While Lebanon remains unable to effect Israel’s withdrawal, it has however begun to take action against the SLA. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As a result of the intensity of Hezbollah’s campaign and the persistence of its members in the Lebanese parliament, the government has also taken action. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It has publicly confirmed Hezbollah’s views that membership of the SLA is a treasonable offence and has issued summonses ordering members of the SLA to come to trial. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
None have obeyed. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Court martial proceedings began in March 1996 and resulted in Lebanon’s military prosecutor indicting at least eighty-nine SLA officials and militiamen in absentia with life imprisonment on charges of ‘collaborating with Israel’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Some of their families work in Israel and in the event of a peace settlement a few might find refuge there, but the majority would be left to their fate. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Will Hezbollah ever accept peace with Israel? In public, Hezbollah’s leaders have not softened their position. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It is not possible to confirm, as yet, whether Hezbollah is in fact truly Hezbollah 206 prepared to integrate the SLA renegades into its community or whether it plans to exact punishment. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘I am saying that I am hostile to Israel. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Subhi Tufeili, however, who represents Hezbollah’s most militant trend, is not afraid to make his hardline views known in public. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the days leading up to Ashura, Shiites attend nightly religious gatherings at which Lebanese and Iranian clerics preach to the congregations. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
had also participated in the resistance to Israel’s military operation and was determined to assert its presence and draw attention to its contribution towards the defence of the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Yitzhak Rabin once ruefully commented that Israel’s invasion of Lebanon had ‘let the Shiites out of the bottle’.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
* Cited in Sacred Rage, Robin Wright, p. 233 EPILOGUE 213 So long as the West and Israel continue to regard the problem as a crusade against terrorism they are in effect denying their own responsibility for fostering the conditions which gave rise to Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel can continue to deny Hezbollah’s cause any legitimacy by branding the Resistance as ‘terrorists’ and it can conceal its illegal occupation of South Lebanon under the euphemism ‘security zone’, but as long as Israel continues to defy the international decree which calls for the end of its presence in South Lebanon, there is very little hope that the circle of violence will end. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah 214 Sources written in English: Agha, Hussein J., and Khalidi, Ahmad S., Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Co-operation, London, 1995 Ajami, Fouad, The Vanished Imam: Musa Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon, NewYork, 1986 BBC World Service Newspack, Foreign Hostage Crisis in Lebanon, Cyprus, 1991 Chomsky, Noam, The Fateful Triangle:The United States, Israel and the Palestinians, London, 1983 Coughlin, Con, Hostage, London, 1993 Dekmeijan, R. Hrair, Islam in Revolution, New York, 1995 Ehteshami, Anoushiravam, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic, London, 1995 Esposito, John L., The Islamic Threat:Myth or Reality?, NewYork, 1995 Fisk, Robert, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, Oxford, 1992 Bibliography 215 Hiro, Dilip, Islamic Fundamentalism, London, 1989 Hiro, Diip, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, London, 1993 Hollis, Rosemary, and Shehadi, Nadim, (eds), Lebanon on Hold, London, 1996 Izadi, Mostafa (Ed.), Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Extracts from Speeches ofAyatollah Montazeri, Tehran, 1988 Joffe, Lawrence, Keesing’s Guide to the Middle East Peace Process, London, 1996 Katzman, Kenneth, The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Boulder, Colorado, 1993 Kramer, Martin, ‘Hezbollah’s Vision of the West’, Washington Institute Policy Papers, Number 16,Washington, 1989 Kramer, Martin (Ed.), Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hassan, Al-Khiyar Al-A khar, Beirut, 1994 Sourour, A!i Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hassan, Tahaddi al-Mamnua, Beirut, 1992 BIBuoG1~P1~w 217 1920 1943 1948 1958 1959 1967 1968 1970—71 1975 Chronology France receives the mandate for Lebanon and expands the boundaries to include the Bekaa Valley, South Lebanon and part of the coastal region. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah forms first shoura, council; April: Lebanon peace accord; September: Israel withdraws to Awali River, north of Sidon; October: clash bet- ween Israeli troops and Shiite civilians in Nabatiyeh, followed by call for civil resistance; bombing of multinational forces; December: bombings in Kuwait, 17 men charged. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
resistance begins against Israeli occupation; Hezbollah is conceived; Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrive in Lebanon; four Iranians abducted by Lebanese Forces; David Dodge is kidnapped; multinational forces arrive; PLO evacuated from Beirut; massacre of Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Chatila. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Binaa and Islamic Health Committee founded. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Salah Ghandour makes human bomb assault Hezbollah 222 Hamas bombings in Israel, 62 Ama!: Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel Defence Forces. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Dispatched to Lebanon in 1982. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s council. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The zone covers ten per cent of Lebanon’s territory. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The highest circles of society were occupied by the royal princes and princesses, members of the Bagratid family, which had ruled in Georgia for over a thousand years and still claimed descent from King David of Israel. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Even the Jews of Georgia, a group that historically had not suffered from anti-Semitic persecutions from the dominant community and that was well integrated into Georgian life, nevertheless began to emigrate to Israel and the United States in the early 1970s. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A few weeks earlier, in November 1977, Egypt’s President Sadat had vis- ited Israel—a bold initiative hailed in the West as a breakthrough but condemned by many Arabs as a betrayal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hurok’s secretary died in one attack. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Sciascia, Leonardo. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They are at the heart of international terrorism, a thing that will destroy civilization if it is not stopped.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel:America’s Key to Survival. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
So when Hindawi showed up at the Syrian embassy asking for help, the ambassador, presuming him to be a Syrian agent in some sort of trouble, passed him on to his security men, who took him to their lodgings, where they attempted to alter his appearance by cutting and dyeing his hair. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Though the Israeli security forces provided him lists of known per- petrators, and though his police force had ballooned into an army of 16,000 armed men—per capita ten times the police force of Israel—Arafat did practically nothing to rein in terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Despite the persistent assertions in Hamas’s statements that the move- ment would refuse to participate in elections called for in settlement plans drafted in Madrid, Washington, Oslo, and Cairo, many persons in the PLO—and to a certain extent also in Israel—became convinced that Hamas was thinking seriously about participating in the elections which were to be scheduled in accordance with the 1993 Oslo Agreement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Israel~c Use ofArab Disguises 27 28 Arab and Israeli Terrorism deserters during the 1948 war who were able to move freely in Jewish areas and blow up the Palestine Post and apartment buildings, killing 50.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel~c Use ofArab Disguises 29 30 Arab and Israeli Terrorism an incendiary bomb malfunctioned and discharged a cloud of smoke from an agent’s pocket as he was standing in line at an Alexandria cinema. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel~c Use ofArab Disguises 33 34 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Israel worked the masquerade tactic by penetrating Palestinian organi- zations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel~c Use ofArab Disguises 35 tinians in the West Bank and Gaza staged demonstrations to honor Fatah Day, commemorating the day that Fatah, the primary pillar of the Palestine national movement, surfaced in its 1965 guerrilla action against Israel, the first act of the armed struggle to liberate Palestine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
References 271 Alphabetical ordering of proper names ignores the definite article, al-. A History of Modern Yemen
Red Flag, Black Flag (with Maureen McConville) The Hilton Assignment (with Maureen McConville) Philby: The Long Road to Moscow (with Maureen McConville) The Shaping of an Arab Statesman: Abd al-Hamid Sharaf Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East BY THE SAME AUTHOR The Struggle for Syria and the Modern Arab World (ed.) Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE GREAT PURGE 14. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
DUEL TO THE DEATH 15. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For them, the one way to survive in the last two decades of upheavals, the one way to feel that their lives had some meaning, was to join one of the militias that sprang up to fill the vacuum in Lebanon when the state collapsed in 1975. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He gave Jorde half the load to carry in his suitcase and arranged to meet him at the airport in the afternoon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Looking for their weapons, the guards came scrambling out and dispersed to their stations, thinking the attack had come from outside. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As recorded in a PLO ifie, his “permanent address” was: Mustafa Salim’s shop, Behind the girls’ school, Wahdat refugee camp, Jordan nineteen years there. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They heard cars drive up to the house and much running back Upstairs, the telephone rang again and again. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Finally, Hamza ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 35 36 / PATRICK SEALE BIOGRAPHY OF A KILLER Hamza Abu Zaid was just another young Palestinian with a trou- bled past, another Jorde. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
intelligence colleagues I was able to trace Hamza’s feckless, itiner- ant life in the ten years before he killed Abu lyad and his two colleagues in Tunis. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But he proved rowdy and undisciplined and in November he was sent back to Tunis, where Fatah sentenced him to a month’s deten- tion. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was decided to send him to Lebanon, but as no transport was immediately available, Abu al-Ho!, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Some Palestinian intelligence sources, sensitive, or perhaps oversensitive, to the risk of Israeli penetration, believe that it was here that an agent of the Mossad, Israel’s foreign- intelligence service, disguised as a member of Abu Nidal’s organization, approached him to persuade him to defect se- cretly to the organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was rumored that he had had a hand in the attack on the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad’s diatribe rather took my breath away. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Iraq and Syria, he said, the PLO could not monitor Abu Nidal’s movements properly, and in Libya it was still more difficult. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“He would ally himself with the devil in order to stay alive and drink a bottle of whiskey every night! Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Clearly, love had now turned to hate. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was of course well known that Israel’s Mossad, like other intelligence agencies, tried to penetrate terrorist groups~ but to suggest that Abu Nidal had been “turned” and his organization taken over seemed to me a very tall story indeed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I tried to question Abu lyad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Where was the evidence? Disarm- ingly, he said it wasn’t foolproof. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When you didn’t have your own country and couldn’t control airports, ports, borders, hotels, and taxi drivers, gathering the evidence was difficult. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
May 31, 1972—In retaliation, three Japanese terrorists, July 9, 1972—Israel hits back with a car bomb in Beirut, July 11, 1972—To avenge Kanafani, a terrorist throws a July 19, 1972—An Israeli letter bomb injures Dr. Anis July 25, 1972—Another Israeli letter bomb delivered to a August 5, 1972—Black September terrorists, led by Ali September 5, 1972—Eight Palestinian terrorists break September 11, 1972—Zadok Ophir, a Mossad clerk at the September 19, 1972—Dr. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The hostages are eventually released unharmed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
April 4, 1973—Dr. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Basil al-Qubaisi, a prominent PFLP official, is killed by Israeli agents in Paris. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
April 10, 1973—An Israeli assassination squad kills three prominent Fatah leaders—Muhammad Yusif Najjar, Kamal Udwan, and Kamal Nasser—in their homes in central Beirut, which is a devastating blow to the Palestinians and brings down the Lebanese government. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
April 27, 1973—An Israeli employee of El Al is killed in Rome by a Palestinian gunman. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
July 2, 1 973—Col. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
October 1974—Abu Nidal agents try to kill Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin), a close colleague of Yasser Arafat. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Four other people are killed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
man al-Shurafa), Fatah representative in Libya, escapes an attack on his life in Malta by an Abu Nidal gunman, who kills another man by mistake. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arafat and the most prominent dove in the Palestinian move- ment, is killed by an Abu Nidal gunman in Lisbon, Portugal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was largely successful, though there were groups within the PLO, like that of Abu’l Abbas for example, that he could not control. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The PLO leader wanted to negotiate. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I made showed that Abu Nidal began killing prominent PLO mod- erates—precisely the men who were trying to influence Western opinion by preaching negotiation and reconciliation with Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was scorned by his older half-brothers and -sist- ers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Aged eight, Sabri remained in the parental home, but there was no one to care for him, and such neglect meant that he received virtually no educa- tion. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hostility between Arab and Jew, in Abu Nidal’s youth, was an inescapable fact of daily life. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In a notorious incident early in 1948, two Stern Gang terrorists dis- guised as Arabs drove a truck full of dynamite hidden under a pile of oranges into the town and blew it up, causing over a hundred casualties. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was then that the intractable Palestinian refugee problem was born. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A few weeks before the fall of Jaffa, the once proud and prosperous Banna family fled south to the small town of Majdal, where they hoped they would be safe, but they were soon driven out again by the advancing Israelis. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
contentious subjects in modern history. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A Jewish attempt in 1935 to smuggle weapons through Jaffa port was one of the first incidents that roused the Arabs to What happened in Palestine in 1947-48 is one of the most In the 1930s many a Palestinian child, like the young Sabri ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 59 60 / PATRICK SEALE take up arms against the Jews and their British protectors. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His death was one of the sparks that ignited the great Arab revolt of 1936—39, which the British put down with terrible ruthlessness, killing thousands of Palestinians and interning tens of thousands. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A Palestinian acquaintance, Abu Au Shahin (who was later to spend many years in Israeli jails), remembers Abu Nidal at that time. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He seemed well launched into life. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But, to his taste, she was agreeably docile, halfway between a traditional Arab wife and a modern woman. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE STRATEGY OF TERROR A history of recurrent defeat forced Palestinian leaders, Abu Nidal among them, to think hard about the strategy of armed struggle— the attempt to send guerrillas on sabotage missions inside Israeli territory—which they adopted with blithe amateurishness in the mid-1960s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Inevitably, the host countries turned on the guerrillas, as happened in Jordan and later in Lebanon: Made to choose between helping the guerrillas and sparing themselves Israeli reprisals, the Arab states not unnaturally put their own security first. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His former comrades told me that in the late sixties, Abu Nidal was forever brooding over the lessons to be learned from the loss of Palestine. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The first occurred in March, when an Israeli armored force of 15,000 men, with air support, crossed the river and attacked Fatah’s guerrilla base, at Karameh in Jordan, with overwhelming strength. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From 1965 onward, Fatah’s “armed struggle” was directed at such targets as Israeli water pipelines and railway tracks. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The crunch came in September 1970, when, in a hijacking orgy, the PFLP forced no fewer than three passenger planes to land at a disused airstrip in Jordan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In that year alone, nearly a thousand “terrorists”—Israel’s term for whoever dared challenge its rule—were killed or captured under the heavy hand of General Ariel Sharon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
There were prolonged curfews, demolition of homes, torture, summary executions, mass detention of families of wanted men, and the destruction of or- chards, the only means of subsistence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
TERROR AND COUNTERTERROR The dirty war of terror and counterterror between Israel and the Palestinians of 1972—73 was something of a new phenomenon, different in significant ways from the violence that preceded it and from the violence that was to follow. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Before 1972, terrorist attacks on Israeli and foreign targets were the work not of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, which disapproved of such “adventurism,” but of radical groups like George Habash’s PFLP. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Fatah was now in a stronger position to regain control over undisciplined Palestinian fighters still thirsting for re- venge, partly because Muslim opinion in Lebanon had rallied mas- sively behind the resistance after an Israeli commando raid in central Beirut in which three top Fatah leaders were killed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Many of them still dreamed of waging guerrilla warfare against the Israeli-occupied West Bank, and between 1971 and 1973, the Palestinians attempted repeatedly to placate King Hussein. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Terrorism was out of fashion as Arafat and his lieutenants sought to muzzle the hotheads and prepare the PLO for a diplomatic role. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He then contacted the head of Libyan intelligence at the time, Abd al-Mun’im al-Huni, and he too approved the plan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They laughed, nodded, and left. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But in scope and destructiveness, the Israeli invasion dwarfed the incident that had provoked it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Some two thousand Lebanese and Palestinians were killed and an estimated two hundred thousand displaced from their homes. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For years, Hussein had come under sustained Israeli pressure to “solve” the Palestine problem in direct negotiations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In December 1984, a Syrian attaché in Athens was attacked but drove off his assailant. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In April 1985, the Rome office of Syrian Arab Airlines was bombed and three employ- ees wounded; an attempt was also made to kill a Syrian diplomat in Geneva. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In May, his colleague in Rabat was shot, while in June a bomb was defused outside the Syrian embassy in London. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This unhappy situation led to Shi’ite mobilization under the Imam Musa al-Sadr, a charismatic cleric of Iranian-Lebanese de- scent who founded his Movement of the Disinherited in 1974, followed in 1975 by a self-defense force called Amal (Hope). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
And when they sought to impose Maronite rule on the country, the Shi’ites moved into outright opposition. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The man was a puzzle. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Much of this man’s career had been spent liaising with Israeli intelligence and running agents against Palestinian organizations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If it can make use of him, so much the better. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But,” he added, “the tracks are well covered and proof will be hard to find.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
eral Arab countries and whose attitude toward the Arab-Israeli The grave crisis of 1970—71, in which King Hussein put down Most Palestinians thus found themselves controlled by two The intriguing hint dropped by the Jordanian intelligence of- Among such people it was widely assumed that there was some A former CIA officer, who had served as station head in sev- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 153 154 / PATRICK SEALE conflict was detached and professional, was more explicit: “It’s as easy,” he said, “to recruit the man at the top as it is someone lower down the ladder. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But it was evident chapter S A Ben-Gurion said that whoever approaches the Zionist problem from a moral aspect is not a Zionist. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But according to the retired Fatah officer, Fatah agents in Madrid, who had been keeping Haddad under surveillance, learned that his real destination was not Tel Aviv but Brussels, where he was based at the Israeli embassy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was, he said, an unequal struggle. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I determined to take a closer look at the spate of murders of moderate Palestinians, focusing in particular on five well-known Palestinian “doves”—Hammami, Yassin, Qalaq, Khudr, and Sartawi—killed in London, Kuwait, Paris, Brussels, and Portugal between 1978 and 1983, allegedly by Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Yasser Arafat has so far escaped assassination—although he has had a number of narrow escapes, notably during the Israeli siege of Beirut But the fact that manipulation of liberation movements has There was plenty of evidence of Israeli penetration of Pales- In addition to these “battlefield” deaths, the resistance has ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / is~ i~o / PATRICK SEALE in 1982 and, again, in 1985, when Israel bombed his Tunis head- quarters. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I started by reviewing the political background to the murder of the moderates. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Yasser Arafat had persuaded Arab leaders to recognize the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people; he had tamed Black September activists and largely put an end to PLO terrorism; he had gone on to address the UN General Assembly and won observer status for his organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This fitted in well with the Israeli view that the PLO should never be allowed to escape from the terrorist stigma or be accepted as a partner in the peace process. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“How can you negotiate with a man who wants to kill you?” was a familiar Israeli query. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Everyone knew that he had encouraged Hammami, his man in London, to put out peace feelers to the Israeli left. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Both Arab and Israeli rejectionists had reason to want Ham- On February 18, 1978, a few days after the service for Ham- Defectors from Abu Nidal’s organization told me in Tunis that Once they had killed Siba’i, the gunmen seized hostages at the THE KILLINGS OF YASSIN AND QALAQ A few months later, three more prominent PLO “ambassadors” were attacked. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Within a few weeks of the Baghdad summit, on January 22, 1979, an Israeli car bomb in a Beirut street killed Fatah’s security chief, Au Hassan Salameh (also known as Abu Hassan), together with four of his bodyguards and five passersby. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Khudr had telephoned a diplomat at the Israeli embassy in Brussels, asking for a meeting to explore ways of defusing the dangerous Lebanese situation. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Israeli government tried strenuously to suppress his book and sued him in New York to stop its publica- tion. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
tinian leaders at that time who understood how vital it was not to give Begin reasons to invade Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It is therefore hard simply to dismiss Ostrovsky’s claim that the Mossad killed Khudr. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His name was Adnan al-Rashidi (code-named Hisham Hijah), and the murder weapon was smug- gled into Belgium by a Tunisian, Muhammad Abu al-Jasim, and given to Adnan al-Rashidi by an unknown cut-out. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On this theory the Mossad had either planted its man in Abu Nidal’s organization or, by complicities higher up the chain of command, had managed to influence Abu Nidal’s target selection. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal had attacked several other “soft” Jewish or Israeli tar- gets in Europe. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On November 13, 1979, for example, an attempt to kill Efraim Eldar, the Israeli ambassador to Portugal, failed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE KILLING OF ISAM SARTAWI After the murders of Hammami, Yassin, Qalaq, and Khudr, Dr. Isam Sartawi was the only prominent dove left in the Palestinian movement, a perfect example of the species loathed equally by Israeli hawks and Arab rejectionists. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He had repeatedly and pub- licly accused Abu Nidal of being an Israeli agent. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In contacting the Israeli peace camp, Sartawi had acted under Arafat’s instructions, but he may have gone too far. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A few months before his death, Sartawi had received a letter from Abu Nidal asking when he planned to meet his Israeli contacts in Vienna. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But by the early l970s, Sartawi underwent a conversion and became for the rest of his life an ardent advocate of Arab-Israeli coexistence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He worked with PLO and Israeli peace activists and appealed to such people as Austria’s Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and the king of Morocco. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu lyad told Abu Nidal that he began to suspect Israeli penetration when a Moroccan intelligence officer had given him a list of Abu Nidal’s members in Spain—nineteen names in all—and said his source was the Mossad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
hardly believe what he had heard: “Israeli agents were present in his organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He added that he was trying to liquidate the Israeli agents one by one. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
(One of his twin sons recently died violently. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But she rejected him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But this did not prevent a couple of catastrophic defections. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arif Salem defected to Jordan, and it is suspected that he may have been working for Jordanian intelli- gence all along. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The organization’s technique, much like that of other Palestinian factions, was to approach young people who had just left school and did not know what to do next. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In 1986, Israeli intelligence es- timated the strength at five hundred to eight hundred active mem- bers and several hundred sympathizers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This epi- sode led me to suspect that if there was an Israeli connection, Sanduqa, like Dr. Ghassan and Alaa, was probably part of it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the previous chapters I dis- cussed the possible involvement of Israeli agents, principally North Africans, in the murder of Palestinian moderates generally at- tributed to Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hardly a month passes without the publication of an Israeli military communiqué an- nouncing a raid against “terrorist positions,” which usually ends with the ritual formula “Our planes returned safely to base.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
INVISIBLE STRINGS chapter 10 A punitive missions north of its self-styled security zone, established in southern Lebanon in 1978. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
That Abu Nidal should be left to kill Jews with impunity is an extraordinary—indeed outrageous—de- parture from Israeli policy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal does nothing. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Col. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Eight-year-old children throw stones at Israeli troops. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
sources say that he had excellent contacts with the Soviets and had given them information, and even sensitive technical equipment, which he was well placed to acquire. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestinians from the territories hardly know his name, because he has commit- ted no men, donated not a penny, done nothing at all—absolutely nothing—to support their struggle against Israeli rule. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When, in Algiers in 1987, Abu lyad asked Abu Nidal about the In any case, the provocation that Haig said was necessary had From the earliest days of the Israeli state, the techniques of Against this background, I thought it not inconceivable that ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 227 Abu Nidal’s reputation as a terrorist rests largely on the bonfire of violence he lit in the mid-1980s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Armenians used terror against Turks to wring from them an admission of guilt for the genocide of their people. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Shi’ites in Leba- non used terror in support of Iran during its war with Iraq, and to frustrate Israeli attempts to dominate them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As we have seen, Israeli agents bombed Jewish targets in Baghdad in 1950 to terrorize Iraqi Jews into fleeing to Israel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
And the same charge of state terrorism must be made against its long record of assassinating scientists engaged on Arab arms programs, beginning with its attacks on German scientists working for Nasser’s Egypt in the 1960s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He rules out permanent Israeli control of the occupied territories, calls for an immedi- ate freeze on settlements, and pronounces in favor of Pales- tinian self-government “in association with Jordan.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
litiamen massacre over a thousand Palestinian men, women, and children in Sabra and Shatila camps, under the eyes of Israeli troops. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
*June 3, 1982—Israel’s ambassador to Britain, Shlomo June 6, 1982—Israel invades Lebanon, committing to bat- June 9, 1982—Israel destroys Syria’s entire SAM air de- June 13, 1982, to August 12, 1982—Israel bombs and September 1, 1982—Over ten thousand Palestinian fight- September 1, 1982—President Reagan announces his September 14, 1982—President Bashir Gemayel, September 16—18, 1982—To avenge Bashir, Christian mi- November 11, 1982—The Israeli army headquarters at December 28, 1982—Israel-Lebanon talks open under by a suicide bomber driving a truck packed with explosives. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
gathered in South Lebanon for the annual Ashura ceremonies, Israeli troops kill many civilians. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
By this time, both the United States and Israel had recognized the grave setback to their policy in Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
*November 27, 1984-Percy Norris, Britain’s deputy high commissioner in Bombay, is shot dead. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
President Amin Gemayel travels to Damascus to pay homage to President Assad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Several other Westerners are taken hostage in Lebanon by Shi’ite militants between 1985 and 1988. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They had been told, I later learned, that the people they saw standing at the counters were Israeli pilots in civilian clothes, returning home from a training mission—the same pilots who had bombed their families in South Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
To this day, no one in the Palestinian movement knows why these operations were mounted, but a former close aide of Abu Nidal told me that the original plan was to hit not just Rome and Vienna but the Frankfurt airport as well—with the help of Ahmad Jibril, head of the PFLP—General Command and one of the most effective military officers in the whole guerrilla movement, who had a long record of anti-Israeli operations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
These men were, of course, on my short list of possible Israeli penetration agents. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Former members of Abu Nidal’s organization told me that On Abu Nidal’s side, the chief planner of both the Rome and ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 245 II 216 < / PATRICK SEALE Abu lyad was convinced that in the case of Rome and Vienna, Abu Nidal’s organization had been manipulated by Israeli agents. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If, as Abu Iyad suspected, these men were the Mossad link, it was hard to explain why they had attacked Israeli targets. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On April 17, 1986, The Washington Post reported that Israeli intelligence had provided continuous updates on Qaddafi’s whereabouts, the last at 11:15 P.M. Libyan time, just two hours and forty-five minutes before the U.S. attack began. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE HINDAWI AFFAIR At London’s Heathrow Airport on April 17, 1986, an Israeli secu- rity guard discovered 1.5 Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Leaving his fiancée at Heathrow at about 8 A.M. on April 17, Hindawi traveled back into London and later that morning boarded a Syrian Arab Airlines bus to return to the airport to catch a 2 P.M. ffight to Damascus. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
kilograms of Semtex, a powerful plastic explosive of Czechoslovak manufacture, in the false bottom of a bag that an Irishwoman, Ann Murphy, was about to carry onto an El Al flight to Tel Aviv. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Apart from Hindawi, the only people thought to be in the know were two or three officers in Syrian air force intelligence, including its chief, General Muhammad al-Khuly, and two or three of Abu Nidal’s members. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hindawi’s trial at the Old Bailey in October 1986. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When Zafir al-Masri, the Israeli-appointed mayor of the West Bank city of Nablus, was assassinated in March 1986, Abu Nidal issued a long communiqué claiming credit in the name of his organization, whereas everyone in the Palestinian movement knew that it was George Habash’s PFLP that had been responsible. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In any event, a large cache of weapons, some seventy sub- machine guns, mainly Polish Scorpions and Israeli Uzis, had been walled in and plastered over in the basement of a house owned by At the same time, a number of offices and apartments were But as efficiently as the move was planned, an arms cache was ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 255 256 / PATRICK SEALE the Intelligence Directorate. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
To his own people, Abu Nidal claimed that the plan had been to blow up the Israeli embassy, but the car exploded two hundred yards from the embassy building, which was undamaged. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On January 7, 1991, to the dismay of the British and American governments, all five Abu Nidal terrorists were released, after “blood money” was paid to the families of the Sudanese victims and a pardon allegedly secured from the families of the British victims. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Some of them spoke Flemish, which the Libyans mistook for Hebrew, and one of the adults had a passport with an Israeli stamp. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On Novem- ber 8, 1987, Abu Nidal’s organization announced in Beirut that a Palestinian gunboat had captured the Silco off the coast of Gaza and that its crew of suspected Israeli spies was being held prisoner in southern Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But he was swiftly released when it was discovered that he had actually been given a visa by the authorities to come to Belgium for talks with Jan Hollants Van Loocke, direc- tor of political affairs at the foreign ministry. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Equally, his ties with the Japanese Red Army and the French Action Directe were minimal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Between 1977 and 1982, ASALA and such radical Palestinian groups as the PFLP shared training facili- ties in South Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
What was to be done with them? If the Iraqis attempted to release them, Abu Nidal gave orders that grenades were to be thrown at once into the prison cells. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE JUSTICE COMMITTEE Based in the village of Bqasta in the hills above Sidon in South Lebanon, some twenty miles north of the Israeli border, the Com- Another case of which Basil had firsthand knowledge was that “He’s in Lebanon,” they told him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“You taught me how to kill!” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
cooperation on all matters to do with the occupied territo- ries; “3. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Our martyrs should have fought in Palestine, but Abu Nidal turned his back on the just struggle. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was severely wounded, but he lived. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Led by a member of the Political Bureau, Shawki Muham- mad Yusif (code-named Munir Ahmad), the delegation included the demoted intelligence chief Abd al-Rahman Isa. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“Our martyrs fell in the wrong wars,” they declared. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal is a professional killer who has sold his deadly services certainly to the Arabs and perhaps to the Israelis as well. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Throughout Abu Nidal’s career, the thread has been his hostil- ity to Yasser Arafat and the PLO, a hostility shared by each of his sponsors, including most recently Egypt. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For years Abu Nidal has kept the Palestinian national movement down and both Arabs and Israelis have benefited. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arab leaders have publicly supported the Palestinian cause, but they have, almost without exception, distrusted the PLO, which has often challenged their authority in their own countries, at- tracted Israeli reprisals, and even threatened to drag them into war. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
What would Deutscher have thought, I wonder, of Shamir and Rabin, of Arens, Sharon, Geula Cohen, and the rest of them, of the bone-breaking beatings and the tortures, of the grisly detention camps and the pitiless curfews, of the death squads, of the children murdered by the score, of the Palestinian girl of nineteen I read about the other day who was forced to give birth while handcuffed to the bars of her Israeli hospital bed? How can Jews, who have known far greater suffering them- selves, do such things? For the miserable career of Abu Nidal might never have happened had Israel been willing to talk with the PLO in 1974, when Arafat sent his four messages to Henry Kissinger saying that he was ready to sit down. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But Israel faces no existential threat. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The first is the permanent oppression and dispersal of the Palestinian people: If Israel wants real peace, it must make room for a Palestinian homeland, as a partner not an adversary, within the boundaries of historic Pales- tine. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Accepting Israel as a major player in the Middle East system, competing and interacting with Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the others, is something the Arab players are recon- ciled to, indeed expect and look to. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Such deterrent means may not yet be available to Israel’s weak and divided neighbors, but the quest for them will go on—and, most likely, cause Israel to preempt, setting off a new cycle of violence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Arab and Israeli Terrorism ISRAELI TERRORISM of Political Violence, 193 6—1993 ARAB AND The Causes and Effects Kameel B,~asr McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Jefferson, North Carolina, and London British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication data are available Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Nasr, Kameel B., 1949— Arab and Israeli terrorism : the causes and effects of political violence, 1936—1993 / Kameel B. Nasr. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
©1997 Kameel B. Nasr. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
DS119.7.N346 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
956.04—dc2O Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Questionable 1980s 17. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Psychologists tell us that our subconscious desires are sometimes in direct We can effectively transpose the intention/counter-intention concept to For example, the Israelis professed a desire to eliminate guerrilla or ter- Introduction 3 Robespierre, 1794 4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism opposite result. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
fling with the biblical story of the walls of Jericho and continuing to the rise of Islam in the seventh century. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This wing would become the Zionists’ major fighting force, the antecedent of the Israeli army, with Vladimir Jabotinsky as its first leader.21 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Battle lines had been drawn, the British having worsened the situation by promising independence to the Arabs and a state on the same land for the Introduction 7 8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Jews. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The issue in 1928 was a table and screen put in front of the Wailing Wall. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The demonstrators demanded control of the Wall, and shouted that the Harem al-Sharif should be destroyed so they could rebuild the Jew- ish Temple. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Many of the new immigrants coming to Palestine were filled with intel- lectual and idealistic moral values of creating a progressive socialist state, while the Arab residents were becoming increasingly apprehensive. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Although the Arab strike was mainly nonviolent, radical groups began throwing bombs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Arab rebels torched the airport at Lydda, killed British constables, robbed banks, attacked British offices, and frequently sabotaged the Iraq Petro- leum Company pipeline. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
W.F. Abboushi writes: The European powers decided the future of the Arab Middle East with- out consulting the Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They The Irgun and Stern began a round of hostage-taking incidents against There were dozens of other incidents against the British administration, The Zionist military campaign against Britain succeeded: it forced the Arab and Israeli Terrorism The Zionists also systematically targeted Palestinians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
To penetrate the King David the Zionists masqueraded as Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Beginning before 1940, dozens of bombs exploded in markets, busses, cinemas, and cafes. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli army always displayed a savage face in an attempt to rule the Palestinians by intimidation, by the implication that they were ready to kill and torture men and to rape women. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The day after the British withdrew and Israeli statehood was declared, (To jump ahead of the story, in August 1951 Haj Amin, who had escaped 2. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
To justify their takeover they had to dehumanize the Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Bernadotte thought that victory had gone to the Zionists’ heads and that they now had no use for the United Nations.5° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Yellin was released immediately after the trial and given a seat in the Israeli parliament under the name Nathan Yellin- Mor. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There was, as Israeli historian Jon Kimche notes, “an absence of any public conscience about this foul deed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On October 29, 1956, just before the Suez War, Israeli soldiers imposed a curfew on Kufr Kassem village, then killed 31 men, 9 women, and 7 children as they were com- ing home, unaware that a curfew had been declared. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All served in half-free circumstances and were released within three years. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Strugglefor Statehood 25 dressed as Arabs encountered a group of armed Arabs, and the two sides opened fire. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This manipulative tactic proved successful for Israel’s military as well as groups of Israelis not part of the government. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli spokespersons showed these forged leaflets to journalists to discredit the Intifada. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was not known until a year later, after the journalistic interest had died, that the raiders were Israeli settlers.8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli leaders often used disguise: Golda Meir dressed as an Arab woman when she went to meet King Abdullah,’° and Menachem Begin went disguised as an Arab or Rabbi.11 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Jews could not enter such nation- alistic Arab areas such asJaffa without Arab disguise. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On 11 March 1948 an Arab driver at the American consulate drove a car flying the United States flag to the Jewish Agency and blew it up.14 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Moreover, there is evidence of complicity within the Iraqi government to encourage the Jews to flee. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel actively used Arabs to disguise controversial operations; the actual actors were Arab, but their activ- ities were Israeli. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Agents in Egypt, under the direct command of Israeli leaders and disguised as Muslim fundamentalists, planted small bombs against American, British, and Egyptian civil targets. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Bombs of nitroglycerin surrounded by acid were put in books and placed on shelves of the United States Information Service and British libraries in Cairo and Alexandria just before closing time. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Bombs were also placed in the MGM theater, various American businesses, the British con- sulate, and Egyptian offices. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By chance during the early stage of the operation, 3. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Since the group kept intimate contact with each other, it was easy to round them up, but their Israeli controllers fled as soon as they discovered that something had gone wrong. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Avraham Seidenberg, who had been court-martialed for stealing from Israeli Arabs, was the group’s supervisor. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the plot was uncovered, the Americans and British were understandably upset and demanded an answer. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Again jumping ahead three decades, we find another similar case. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli leaders claimed to have paid $500,000 in bribes to Moroccan officjals.’2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Raviv and Melman tell us that the Mossad “established a secret infra- structure for Zionist activity in Morocco ... [underground members] had to have been in combat units, and preferably they had experience in clandestine activities ... if, as they feared, their Arab neighbors launched pogroms or other disturbances.”” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
We discussed Israel’s mail bomb campaigns against the British, later used against Arabs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Sunday Times legitimately asks, “Why put the leaflets inside let- ters which, hopefully, would disintegrate in the blast? And why so few letters [five]... Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli sources claim that these two men were helpingftdayeen guerrilla attacks, while Palestinians say that they were stopping cross-border raids. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
What is clear, however, is that the Israelis leaked reports to the press blaming Arabs for killing other Arabs.4° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As Stew- art Steven says of the Mossad, “The finger which pulled the trigger had been superbly camouflaged.”41 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Turning Arab against Arab was a central Israeli policy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Researchers have suspected that Israeli agents provoked shooting incidents in Amman, Jordan, before the September 1970 civil war to create a state of tension and allow for Israeli “retaliation” against guerrilla bases.47 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli spokesmen said in 1993 that their bombings were “intended to create a flood of refugees.”5° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Jim Muir adds that the Israelis helped fuel the Christian-Druze conflict; Noam Chomsky notes that Israeli soldiers shot into Palestinian camps from Christian areas to incite the Pales- tinians against the Christians, and Israeli patrols forced Christians and Mus- lims at gunpoint to punch one another.51 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
[Menachem] Begin admits that the Israeli Air Force bombed Arab civil- ians, canals, bridges, and transport on a regular basis. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Begin’s revelation is echoed by other Israeli leaders such as former Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Chief of Staff Mordachai Gur, who admit that terrorism is a central part of Israeli military policy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Eban even defends Israeli terrorism as log- ical, on the ground that it can move innocent parties who have been vic- timized by terrorism to exert pressure on their political leaders to make peace.48 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Infiltrating such a group would have been the first priority of the Mossad and one of the most simple tasks. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
If a discovered agent provocateur achieves a controlling position, it foments suspicion and brings disrepute to the cause. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The operation had been planned for months, and Israelis, under the guise of Arabs and foreigners, had already rented cars and established a network for the raid well before the Cyprus action. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
How can such activities help the Palestinians win a state? Who benefits? If we look at these events in light of the long-standing Israeli disguise tactic, their authenticity must be called into question. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Arafat gave them last-minute instructions on New Year’s Eve, and the leaders wrote a pompous press release about the attack, “Military Com- munique Number One,” evoking God’s glory for this mighty action destined to change the course of human events. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After a heated internal meeting just before the raid, the 20 Fatah mem- bers agreed to call the attacking group al-Ass jfa (the storm) so that members who were opposed to military action—and even at the initial stage they were a sizable number—could disassociate themselves from the venture.3 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
“Al-Ass ~fa forces,” it read, “have launched forward to announce both to the enemy and the world that we [Palestinians] have not faded away and that the armed revolution is returning for victory.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The communique, full of Arabic hyperbole, was adopted by the Abu Nidal group a decade later, as was the name al-Ass~fa, without giving credit to its authors. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This new al-Ass~fa group, it said, carried out a crippling attack against the canal, after which all commandos returned safely to base. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was not until later that morning, after the Lebanese were reading the grand pronouncement in the comfort of their seaside villas, that the embarrassing reality became known: the group never left their base.4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Another group of five brave com- mandos, led by Ahmed Musa, also had ten sticks of dynamite. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Egypt stopped the fedayeen; the Israeli government controlled Sharon, and the region was never so quiet as the following decade. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli intelligence then overestimated the group’s size, consid- ering it a Syrian-sponsored faction. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The frequency of the attacks accelerated as the Fatah was bolstered, not by the minor destruction they were causing, but by the pre- dictable Israeli reprisals. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
According to Abu Jyad, the Israeli army did not hit the guerrillas during their reprisals. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Birth of the Palestinian Guerrillas The Kuwaitis, always generous to the Palestinians, did not restrict their Israeli intelligence apparently knew nothing of this new group. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Nasser was personally furious; the raid, using sophisticated weapons, had no provocation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Nasser often described Sharon’s raid as a major turning point. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Pales- tinians say that the first Fatah casualty was killed not by Israeli soldiers but by a Jordanian border guard, who shot Ahmed Musa in the back after the first raid when he crossed the border back to Jordan, which was hostile to Fatah from the beginning. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the Arab League launched the PLO, it nominated as its chair the eloquent Dr. Ahmed Shukeiry, a 52-year-old former Saudi representative to the United Nations, whose pugnacious language won him stature. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Since its founding in 1866 by Protestant minister Daniel Bliss, the AUB has been fertile ground for liberal, often anti—American, intellectualism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He would be the first leading Palestinian to be interviewed by Israeli journalists and make alliances with leftist Israelis, and he was stern in his opposition to international terrorism as a means of winning back Palestine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On December 13, 1968, the Israeli military captured one of the main leaders, Abd al-Qadir Abu Faim, and this led to the arrests of over 100 of his network, show- ing that the organizers were untrained in protecting undercover activity. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Birth of the Palestinian Guerrillas 45 46 Arab and Israeli Terrorism deportations, and the Arab population was neutralized. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
These groups also completely failed to politicize as a fifth column the Arabs who remained in Israel after 1948. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Using Jordan as a base, the guerrillas began attacking Israel within months of the 1967 war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
According to Stephen Greene, a repre- sentative from the United States embassy informed Fatah where the attack would take place,3’ but instead of following the guerrilla rule of retreating, Fatah stayed and confronted the Israeli army. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli action at Karameh put the hitherto obscure Fatah on the map. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
That was the beginning Chapter 5 “We Have Taken Over Your Flight” 48 of anti—Arab racism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In a fit of rage he decided to kill. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
a publicity campaign for Sirhan and the cause for which he killed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Typically, however, the fellow they sent had no practical experience in dealing with the slick, image-conscious world of the American media. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The hijackers demanded the release of 100 Palestinians in Israeli jails. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Using a woman was not new; Haddad got the idea when nine months before a woman seized a small turboprop from Mexico and took it to Cuba. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On May 2 gunmen broke into the Israeli embassy in Paraguay, killing one woman and wounding another.14 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There were a few other PFLP hijackings, and gradually they received more press coverage. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Henceforth Palestinians would call that month Black September, and would give that name to the terrorist organization that would dazzle and appall the world with its international stunts against Jordanian, Israeli, and American targets. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In a November 1970 meeting the PFLP Central Committee renounced what they called outside operations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Haddad kept his small network in Europe and established contact with German and French radicals. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There was an attack almost every day, sometimes two or three, and they were taking their toll on Israeli citizens. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli authorities shot out the plane’s tires and began to negotiate, but a group of commandos disguised as mechanics with a Red Cross flag successfully stormed the plane, killing the two male terrorists and one passenger and cap- turing the two women, Theresa Halsa and Rima Tannous. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was the first of a few suc- cesses of Israeli counter-terrorism.2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the PFLP outside operations stopped, creating a terrorism media Black September carried out very few actions, but those they staged were The first order of business was revenge for the Black September war, and Chapter 6 Black September vs. Mossad 58 William B. Quandt’ they chose to assassinate Wasfi al-Tel, the conservative Jordanian premier and defense minister whom they held responsible. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
PLO political chief Khaled al- Hassan, who at the time of the killing was scheduled to have a meeting at the Cairo Sheraton with Tel in order to solidify an agreement between Jordan and the PLO, claims that it was actually an internal struggle that led to Tel’s assas- sination. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
According to Hassan, the Palestinian leadership wanted to reconcile with Jordan, and although a hard man, Tel was under pressure by other Arab governments to arrive at an accommodation with the PLO. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was followed by an unsuccessful attempt to kill Jordan’s ambassador to London and a failed hijacking of a Jordanian jet. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Since there was no sign of the gunmen giving up without at least a partial satisfaction of their demands, bloodshed seemed inevitable. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A Black September atrocity matching Munich came on March 1, 1973, from a group of gunmen led by Rizig Abu Ghassan, and it also ended in 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One of the gunmen, hooded and sinister, walked onto the balcony and raised his arms in defiant victory. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The kidnappers suggested that they be allowed to fly to the United States with their captives, make a public statement, then surrender, but that was immediately turned down by the United States and Sudan. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Western diplo- mats distanced themselves from the Palestinians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A week before, Israeli F-4 Phantoms had shot down a Libyan Boeing 727 traveling between Tripoli and Cairo, killing 107 pas- sengers, including former Libyan foreign minister Salah Buassir and one Amer- ican. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Hours before downing the jet, Israeli bombers had pounded Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and mounted a sea assault on the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon, killing a total of 106 people.2° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli government launched the attack to blacken a visit by Sadat’s emissary Hafez Ismail to Washington, the first such visit since the 1967 war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The fact is that both sides have committed unfor- givable acts of terror, both sides have killed innocents, both sides have legitimate grievances and illegitimate methods of expressing them.23 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At about the same time, Black September was held responsible for attacks in the United States. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the second, April 16, 1973, shots were fired into the home of the New Zealand chargé in Washington. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
These assassinations were part of the covert Israeli-Palestinian war; the Palestinians who died were usually not involved in terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Kanafani’s poetry kept alive the Palestinian identity, and he was one of the first advocates of co- existence in a democratic Palestine, giving lectures in Europe, being inter- vieweçl by Israeli journalists, and having contact with many European Jews active in the antiwar movement in Denmark and Sweden (Kanafani had a Swedish wife). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It is commonly understood that Golda Meir established the assassination However, the first victims were Ghassan Kanafani and his 17-year-old 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel ordered the bombing of Kanafani, Abu Sharif, and Sayegh. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Five weeks after Munich an Israeli assassination squad in Rome killed Wail Zwaiter, another noted Palestinian poet who translated The Thousand and One Nights into Italian and edited the PLO’s Italian newsletter. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli version—that Zwaiter’s work was all a front and he was actually one of the most dangerous terrorists, responsible for Munich—does not hold up. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli agents had trailed him for weeks, probably singling him out to be killed before the Munich massacre. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Two Israeli assassins made themselves obvious by hanging around the entrance of his modest apartment building for most of the evening. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
An Italian court held an Israeli-controlled squad responsible for the killing of Zwaiter, but no one was captured.35 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Another Israeli claiming to be an Italian jour- nalist had previously called Hamshari and requested an interview, which he conducted in a cafe, though there seemed to be no need for this subterfuge. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Two months later another assassination squad killed Dr. Mahmoud Hamshari, the PLO representative in Paris, and again, the Israelis leaked the story that he was the brains behind Munich.39 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mossad chief Avraham Avnery, whom the Palestini- ans would kill a dozen years later, helped plan it. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli team finally suc- ceeded when they broke into Yousefal-Najjar’s flat, killing both him and his wife. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
was at the time working on an elegy for Issa Nakha, a colleague who had died a few days before: “The Israeli bullets 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Kamal Nasser was the final target, but on their way to his apartment, a neighbor opened her door, and the commandos filled her with lead. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Lebanese contacts told Abu lyad that Israel had been contacting Lebanese informers in order to launch an attack, but the Palestinians thought that Beirut was safe. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Military historian Richard Deacon says the government leaked facts about assassinations “to boost morale back in Israel,”52 but the Mossad would have liked to have kept its most noted assassination secret. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Two others took refuge in an apartment of an Israeli diplomat. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Two women were part of the team: Sylvia Rafael from South Africa, whom terrorist writers regard as one of the Mossad’s slickest agents—we will meet her again—and Marianne Gladnikoff, a large woman ofjoint Swedish- Israeli citizenship, who had no similar experience. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Rafael (alias Patricia Roxburg) was carrying the name of the Mossad man in Oslo, who happened to be the security officer at the Israeli embassy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Black September vs. Mossad 73 74 Israel for its nuclear weapons factory at Dimona.54 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli intelligence kept flopping. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They seized 90 children from a nearby school for Israeli cadets in the Gadna community, demanding the release of 26 prisoners, one for each year since statehood, including two Jews convicted of working with the fedayeen. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But they were mistaken. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Arab and Israeli Terrorism The Rise ofAbu Nidal women is a cornerstone of his existence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But in early 1967, before the Arab-Israeli war, he suddenly changed and wanted to become a member of the new Fatah movement that people were talking about. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Musa, who would later lead a dissident Syrian-controlled militia, also worked in the office while Sabri became the focal point of his group of armchair Palestinian revo- During the 1967 war, the Palestinians in Saudi Arabia staged a demon- The person in charge of the office was a man called Khadri, a member of Arab and Israeli Terrorism Sabri was there. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Frank and serious, he Arab and Israeli Terrorism rarely smiled, and he began verbally abusing Abu lyad, Arafat, and Hassan, calling them cowards. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He came to New York wearing a uniform and a gun, and he wanted to walk into the General Assembly with his gun as a symbol of armed struggle, but a Palestinian American persuaded him to dis- card it. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
An Italian official alleged that Asa Leven, the late Israeli ambassador to Italy who also controlled the Mossad agents, may have had a role in sabotaging the plane. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The connections between these events were buried in secrecy until an Ital- 878. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The airport massacre was timed with Arab-Israeli talks in Geneva orga- nized by United States secretary of state Henry Kissinger and presided over by Kurt Waldheim. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Syria claimed that the takeover was an Israeli intelligence service plot to disrupt the Algiers conference of nonaligned nations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In Baghdad Abu Nidal became a focal point for the Rejectionists, and he 9. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Arafat at last agreed to meet with Abu Nidal, and after many assurances 9. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There seems to be no ques- tion that Salah was killed by a right-wing Israeli death squad who had hounded him before; they had previously planted two bombs at his store and had threat- ened him many times.5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The same day Salah was killed, members of the PLO, headed by Dr. Issam Sartawi, met in Paris with a delegation of Israeli peace activists. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Both Abu Nidal and King Hus- sein had made their points. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal’s doctor also recommended that he stay away from hot weather, During Abu Nidal’s time in hospital the differences in his own organi- Shortly after, the FRC engineered a mini-war between the PLO and 9. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After Saddam had taken absolute control in Iraq, Abu Nidal hardly spent time in his headquarters in Baghdad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Both countries had been conducting military drills and exer- cises involving thousands of troops,2 but Israeli intelligence knew nothing about them. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Egypt and Syria’s surprise attack in October 1973, which began the Yom Kip- pur War. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Percy Anecdotes, 18231 Israelis blamed the Mossad and military intelligence for failing to detect Gathering intelligence is a monotonous occupation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Intelligence means inspecting and cataloging aerial photographs, stationing undercover personnel at a port so they can record the names of ships that travel in and out; drawing maps of waterfronts, train tracks, and roads; debriefing visitors; locating military bases, petrol storage tanks, factories, and government buildings. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Many countries, however, dispatch ambassadors and embassy staff who have little knowledge of their host country, hampering information-gather- ing activities, which are largely centered in an embassy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The PLO puts people in office not because of their abilities but because of their con- nections, which may explain their overall incompetence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
These serious, costly intelligence mistakes demonstrate that like the PLO, Israeli intelligence was out of touch with its target. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli intelligence personnel had good rapport with many European authorities, and undoubt- edly a lot of information was given under the table by Israeli sympathizers who hold sensitive positions in European countries. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
For example, the sons of for- mer Greek defense minister loannis Charalambopoulos have dual Israeli and Greek citizenship and have served in the Israeli army. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Jordanian and Israeli officials have secretly met many times. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the early 1980s, before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Lebanese were oper- ating joint patrols of Beirut with Palestinians in one of the many agreements. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Kadura was one of the brightest leaders of the PFLP, a sharp exponent of a heavy leftist anti—Israeli philosophy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Hitchens, like others who met the terrorist leader, was never debriefed States television show 60 Minutes. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He spoke persuasively for an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, never sparing criticism for the Jordanian and Syrian governments, and although he worked for peace, he never verbally attacked those who preached armed struggle as long as they struggled against Israel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Some came into Beirut with Canadian and British passports.6 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Furthermore, Salameh did nothing after the Lebanese leadership tipped him off that Israel had a squad ready for him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Syria and the PLO, ever enemies, had been making attempts to cooper- ate against Camp David, and Mohsin had been an important ingredient in the reconciliation since he had good relations with both parties. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Rashid went to school and was later trained in Abu Nidal’s camp, toward which he had no particu- larly positive feeling, and given trips to Cyprus, where Israeli agents would talk to him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Both killers were given life prison sentences, but in 1982 the FRC man- The killing of Sebai and the subsequent fight between Cypriots and In the early 1970s the Israelis recruited a Palestinian student in the Wesi They arranged for him to go to Baghdad, and Abu Nidal, then still with 11. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As PLO representative, Khadar effectively lobbied the European Com- munity for Palestinian rights. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Yassine, who moved to Kuwait in 1965, became an effective and admired leader. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Toward the end of 1979 Arabs attacked the Israeli ambassador in Portu- gal as he was arriving from work. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There are mixed reports on how it happened: either a lone gunman stood next to the Israeli embassy, or a passing car drove up and started shooting. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli embassy in Lisbon was new. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the FRC strikes at Arabs, they are usually deadly accurate; when 12. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Three Palestinians, one born in Baghdad and the others from Nablus, were separately given Polish machine guns and fragmentation bombs one Sat- urday morning by their liaison, then told to meet in front of the central Vien- nese synagogue. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Nothing could have given the Palestinians worse publicity. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Between 1968 and 1974 there were 44 major Israeli attacks on Lebanon, result- ing in the death of about 880 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians.4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli army stormed the busses, leaving thirty-five passengers and six guerrillas dead5 then they occupied South Lebanon in an operation called Stone of Wisdom. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Journalist Jonathan Randal adds that half a dozen villages “were all but leveled in a frenzy of violence during which Israeli troops committed atroci- ties.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, the Israeli govern- ment found a new need to batter Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
William Polk believes that this need “resulted from Israeli fears that the United States was on the brink of a peace initiative” after the withdrawal from Sinai in April.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
First, when FRC gunmen attacked the Vienna Synagogue two months after the agreement, the Israeli deputy prime minister called it a violation of the ceasefire, and the Israelis fired a few shells over the border but received no response. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli leaders began planning the Lebanon invasion to destroy the PLO right after Habib’s treaty. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1982 both the foreign minister and the director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry were former senior Mossad officials.’8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was the difficult part, for the PLO had been rigidly obeying the ceasefire, even fol- lowing the two Israeli bombings, in order to protect themselves against counter-attacks. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Another unforeseen incident occurred: Argentinean troops landed in the Falkland Islands, and Britain and Argentina began warring. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Everyone knew an invasion was coming; for months Arafat had been showing journalists maps of Lebanon and indicating the paths the invading army would take. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He left for the event about the same time as the three London-based members of the FRC went into action. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Instead they used Rosan and two local students, Marwan al- Banna and Ghassan Said, both of whom, thanks to the FRC bankroll, had been studying in London. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ben-Gurion once said that it would be worthwhile to pay an Arab a million pounds to start a war, so Said was a real bargain. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Several people, possibly agents, were speaking against Arafat, influenc- ing Said, prodding him to make some action to liberate Palestine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Lebanon war turned out to be a tragedy for everyone—the PLO, the More than anything the Lebanon invasion showed that the right-wing After the invasion Lebanon endured deprivation. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Officials of other groups who had offices right next to the FRC knew little about their neighbor’s activities. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the Lebanon invasion, one of the PLO’s most charismatic leaders, Dr. Issam Sartawi, spoke at a press conference with Israeli dove General Matti Peled. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Many world lead- ers were there, heads of socialist parties around the world, including Israeli leader Shimon Peres, who told the delegates that they should not allow ter- rorists a stage and successfully prevented Sartawi from addressing the confer- ence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Although Sartawi angered Palestinians, his moderate stand calling for negotiation won him favor in the West and the friendship of European lead- ers.37 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All the Politburo members were well known. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Deadtime 137 138 Arab and Israeli Terrorism eating at restaurants, and staying in hotels like an ordinary Arab businessman. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Dr. Ghassan says there’s talk that a Revolutionary Council member in South Lebanon may have had sex with one of the fighters under him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All their new recruits were coming from the refugee camps in Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Bakr makes known his opposition to such outside operations, but Abu Nidal keeps denying involvement. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The first item on the agenda is the siege of Em al-Hilway refugee camp in South Lebanon on the outskirts of Sidon by the militia of the Lebanese Shia movement Amal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1985 and 1986 the well-orchestrated Middle East terrorism scare would The terrorism scare received impetus from a host of terrorism experts who This was the only period since the Wadi Haddad hijackings when other Many of the terrorist attacks of this period were directed against Jordan. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chapter 15 The Heyday 145 146 Arab and Israeli Terrorism In 1983 Arafat began to make overtures to be part of a delegation led by Jor- dan, and that is when the heyday began. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The targeted hotels are truly hideous, typical of the third-rate concrete In 1984 FRC gunmen killed British embassy officials in Beirut, Athens, In Athens during the summer of 1985 the FRC bombed two mediocre Both bombs were crude devices. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In September 1985, a young man threw a grenade at tourists drinking sodas at a sidewalk café on the fashionable via Venato in Rome. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The action followed British foreign secretary Geoffrey Howe’s announce- ment that he would meet the jointJordanian-Palestinian delegation and Prime Minister Thatcher’s surprise invitation to host the meeting with Anglican bishop Elia Khoury and Mohammed Milham, both accepted by PLO officials to speak on their behalf in London.25 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The FRC sent a warning via the AP office 15. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Just three days before the bombing of the British Airways office, Andreotti praised both Arafat and the PLO.26 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After, the PLO spoke with bitterness. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The ship was supposed to land at Ashod in southern Israel, and according to Abu Abbas, the gunmen were going to launch a military attack as soon as the ship docked.37 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The gunmen, today in prison near Genova, believed this to be the case as well. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The hijackers made a deal with Egypt to release the ship in return for their freedom as long as they did not hurt anyone on board. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The liaisons told the Rome attackers that the terminal would be full of Israeli pilots, passing through Rome on their way home from training in the United States, and that it was their duty to kill them all since pilots kill Palestinians in the refugee camps. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They told the Vienna attackers that they were going to hijack an El Al plane and explode it over an Israeli refinery. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Like robots, the attackers did what they were told. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
First the terrorists walked into the terminal at Rome, took out their weapons, and began firing at passengers waiting to check in at TWA, El Al, and other airlines. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Everyone in the United States government declined to comment. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1985 the Israeli press began a massive publicity campaign against Syria. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During the Easter weekend of 1986, an unsophisticated bomb went off This happened about the time the United States launched missiles in the Chapter 16 159 Dutch Courtesan 160 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Gulf of Sirte, sinking a Libyan ship. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The raid justified the hundreds of Israeli bombing raids on Lebanese refugee camps, or as an Israeli reporter said, the raid demonstrated the soundness of the Israeli policy of preemptive strike.7 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was neat—too neat. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Hindawi family knew little of Palestine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His cover was a job in London for an Arab newspa- per, but he remained a braggart and liar, common traits for agents. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Abu Nidal and Abu Musa groups decided to begin formal talks to unite their organizations in January 1985. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During the meetings Murad and Abd al-Rahman encouraged Abu Bakr to join them, and he did, while Dr. Ghassan and Sufanni worked closely together, coming up with several aspects of the agreement separately. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
News spread that he had been forgiven by Arafat and was going to be back in the mainstream. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The new movement lasted only two months, since FRC was not inter- The 1983—85 split harmed the Palestinians more than the Lebanon inva- But Algeria, the host country, threw a wrench into the works when they 16. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He wanted to study abroad and have a good time, meet women. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
According to PLO sources, his Mossad handlers suggested the idea as a way of inspiring confidence, having told him not to worry: “We’ll kill for you; we’ll plant bombs wherever they want. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It will give you standing in the PLO.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There is a revealing picture of the PLO leadership taken in a hotel lobby during the conference. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He and the others had had no security protection, and the PLO had not thought it necessary to add any even though they knew this project was driving the Israeli government mad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
To make sure al-A wda did not sail, Israeli frogmen planted a mine on the side of the ship which blew a hole in the hull and made it unseaworthy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Two months later the FRC devastated the British Club and Acropole Hotel in Khartoum, Sudan. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There were stories from the terrorism experts that the attack was revenge for the assassination of Abu Jihad,4’ but again, Abu Nidal does not even the score for Fatah. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Nine died in that attack. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In a new type of terrorism, the Italian press reported in April 1988 that Israeli grapefruit had been injected with a blue poison. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the results of the tests hit the newspapers, several people were also reported to have died from eating Israeli grapefruit. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When it hit the ground, the car exploded while it was on a bridge, killing an elderly pedestrian as well as one of the occu- pants. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Questionable 1980s 173 and hearing one person, who had worked for Israeli security abroad, mention that Israel ran the Abu Nidal group. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal had no popular support and not one prisoner in an Israeli jail. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
FRC’s killings, their major activity, can be divided five ways: (1) Internal Patrick Seale also researched the Abu Nidal group, and I have tried to “There isn’t much difference between all these groups,” one Western There’s no such thing as November 17 or the Red Army Faction, or Abu Nidal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
People who knew Abu Nidal are divided over whether he was an agent or was manipulated by others. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
These figures do not even take into consideration the cost of building his desert training camp or the enormous amount of money needed for outside operations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Athens office was opened right after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and it acted solely as an import-export office, sitting next to hundreds of similar offices in Athens. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States State Department also pressured the Greek govern- ment to close down Abu Nidal’s Athens branch of the company on Solonos Street, which operated under the name al-Noor.’2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Some sources that finance other Palestinian groups are not available to Abu Nidal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By the time the group went to Libya in 1987, any money they might have While Abu Nidal was in Libya his organization was spending between By looking at FRC offices in different cities, it is difficult to see that the Abu Nidal had other investments in Europe and the Middle East. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Membership Committee, a small group of three or four people, was 17. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Any of Abu Nidal’s people who discovered something are now dead, killed by Abu Nidal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the 1980s the first thing visitors entering American embassies saw was The desire to raid in a hostage situation indicates the United States gov- of Modern Terrorism Chapter 18 Holy Wars and Hollywood: The Manufacture 185 Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf 186 Arab and Israeli Terrorism an anti—Arab media extravaganza. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From Hollywood, dark-skinned, masked Arabs mounted an onscreen cam- paign of destruction against the Western world but were stopped by methodical and dedicated American and Israeli agents who ridded the world of their menace. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1988 the Israeli antiter- rorism business brought in $100 million of foreign capital to the two main Israeli companies, ATLAS and ISPS, who sell their services to United States and European airlines and international corporations.’3 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
According to an Israeli newspaper, 800 Israeli arms and security companies operate around the world.14 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the United States Marines arrived in Lebanon for the second time in 1983 they were welcomed as a peacekeeping force by all parties, including the Shia. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
over 18,000 people, 70 to 80 percent civilians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Athens has seen dozens of assassinations, hit and run accidents that killed In the 1960s and 1970s tanks rolled down city streets and riot police No one is sure how many people were inside, probably two, possibly three; Chapter 19 Greece 193 194 Arab and Israeli Terrorism A short time after the bombing a ship of vacationing tourists suddenly turned into a nightmare when men with guns and grenades ran around the decks killing passengers and each other. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The FRC was involved in this, but Greek sources say that at least two A search ofJaballa’s hotel near the marina found traces of plastic explo- 19. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terror experts tell us that FRC wanted to control the ship by bringing the booby-trapped car on board, and because of the heat or an accidental electronic signal the car exploded. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States claimed that the whole thing was the work of FRC. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A lone FRC gunman,Jihad al-Amari, a member of the Revolutionary Council, shot Nimri and ran away. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the bombing of Libya the Mossad launched a couple of its own 19. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Despite this easy kill, the Athenian police managed to arrest him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Talk traveled, and the Israeli embassy found out about the boat. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He tried to get other Arab and Israeli Terrorism AtifAbu Bakr, FRC deserter. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Bakr deserted Abu Nidal in November 1989. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The killings and beatings of British soldiers had run down the morale of British troops, and public opinion could neither stomach nor rationalize continuing to waste lives and resources where British interests were not paramount and conffict reso- lution seemed a distant prospect. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
And of course, Palestinian terrorism did not win a square inch of land or unite the Arab countries to fight on their behalf. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Patrick Seale does not reach this conclusion because he believes that Jews do not kill Jews. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
If anything, counter- terrorist measures have been the strongest force for the promotion of terrorism, since they radicalize the opposition. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
210 Arab and Israeli Terrorism West Bank woman who had part of her house sealed by the Israeli military when hex son was imprisoned on security charges. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The low level of vio- lence characteristic of Palestinian terrorism is dwarfed by Israeli bombings and mass arrests, even though such actions by a country have an air of legitimacy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Countries with the weakest defenses were the first targets for Israeli reprisals, even if they had nothing to do with the original attack.8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The 1973 Palestinian attack on Rome’s airport, in which all victims were innocents who had nothing to do with the Middle East conflict, cannot be considered in the same category as a 1969 Fatah attack on an Israeli army base. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Conclusions 209 American Embassy in Beirut after suicide bomb- ing. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Yet their revolt did not evaporate. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
19. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
30. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli leaders met Abdullah a few times but never formalized an agreement. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
London Times, 23 July 1951, p. 6, states that Israeli leaders had crossed to Jordan for secret meetings with Abdullah. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Dr. Elath, an Israeli diplomat, added that most Iraqi Jews have no wish to leave. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The press was forbidden to men- tion their release. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
James Rusbridger, The Intelligence Game (London: Bodley Head, 1989),29. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
41. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Steven, p. 89. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Arabs killed a Cypriot policeman, and an Israeli guard killed one of the plane attackers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Jonathan Randal, GoingAll the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventur- ers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Viking, 1983), p. 237. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Arid Sharon with David Chanoff, Warrior(New Yoric Simon and Schus- ter, 1989), p. 121. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
John Laffin, Fedayeen: The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 39, adds that by mid—1972 Fatah’s strength was down to 4000. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chapter 6 Israeli Conflict 196 7-76 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 248. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was not the first time Israel shot down a civilian plane. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
See Raymond Palmer, The Making of a Spy (Crescent, 1977), p. 121; Deacon, pp. 162-67; Intelligence Newslet- ter no. 122, 7 June 1989, p. 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli agents were on the ship as it loaded in Antwerp. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Cattan, p. 123, states, “There is little doubt that the school children were shot by the Israeli army”; Chomsky, Culture of Terrorism p. 122.; Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israeli Military (California: BIP, 1987). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the Iranian revolution the American and Israeli 10. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Papandreaou, and other world leaders, and he set up one of the first meetings between Arafat and Israeli peace activists. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Posner, P. 213, says a Norwegian newspaper broke the story citing an Israeli government source, but Posner claims to have had a lettert from Rafael since then. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
“Ter- YediotAhronot, 16 March 1987; Sunday Times, 15 March 1987, P. 1; New This incident is discussed in many Mossad books; see Israeli Foreign Sunday Telegraph, 16 December 1988; Intelligence Newsletter, 18 January London Times, 15 February 1988, p. 6; Jerusalem Post, 15 February 1988, San Francisco Chronicle, 18 February 1988, p. 15. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
of the Beirut Catastrophe (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), Pp. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sharon:An Israeli Caesar. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israeli Secret Service. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Dupuy, Trevor N. Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947—74. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ennes, James M., Jr. Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Recent Trends in Palestinian Terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Palestine Diary. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Khouri, Fred J. The Arab-Israeli Dilemma. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Kaldor, Mary, and Paul Anderson. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New York: Harper and Row, 1988. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Quandt, William B. Decade of Decisions: American Policy Thward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967—76. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Powers, Thomas. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Intelligence Game. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The problems which the right-wing leadership was finding within the NLF may have made it more receptive to Egyptian suggestion and on 13 January 1966 three NLF leaders announced in Cairo the formation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) which was supposed to represent the merger between OLOS and the NLF (and the exclusion of the SAL elements within OLOS). Comtemporary Yemen
17. Comtemporary Yemen
18. Comtemporary Yemen
The Saudis tried to help the YAR militarily but they were so hopelessly disorganised that this help never materialised; they even interfered with the American military help which the Saudis themselves had originally requested. Comtemporary Yemen
The Soviet Union provided the Arab states confronting Israel with the means to continue this conflict. Comtemporary Yemen
But this military relationship was not matched by comparable economic or diplomatic reliance. Comtemporary Yemen
The ‘Marxism-Leninism’ of the radicals was, if anything, as sympathetic to China as to the Soviet Union, and the mood amongst Arab left-wing groups at this period was critical of the Soviet Union, for what were felt to be Moscow’s failings in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Comtemporary Yemen
South Yemen had no relations with Saudi Arabia and none with the United States, the former because of a Saudi refusal to recognise a communist regime in Arabia, the latter because the PDRY broke links in October 1969 as a protest against US citizens with dual nationality serving in the Israeli Army. Comtemporary Yemen
Soviet support for the South in the 1972 and 1979 wars greatly disturbed the North Yemenis. Comtemporary Yemen
Both Egypt under Sadat and Saudi Arabia planned to replace Soviet with Western supplies, and in February 1979 it seemed that this long-delayed transfer was about to occur, as Carter promised to send $400 million worth of arms to San’a’ as emergency aid to face the South. Comtemporary Yemen
The Soviet Union was cautious about these South Yemeni initia- tives. Comtemporary Yemen
Meetings of the Heads of State continue, however, as do those of the Ministerial Committee. Comtemporary Yemen
Yigal Carmon, a former adviser on ter- rorism to two Israeli prime ministers, deserves my heart- felt thanks for unstintingly making available to me his unique observations on the operational methods of fight- ing terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
I have been involved in the battle against terrorism for most of my adult life—first as a soldier in the special forces of the Israeli Army, then as one of the founders of an institute devoted to the study of terrorism, and later as a diplomat seeking to forge an alliance of the free nations in the active effort to defeat international terror- ism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In December 1982, a neo-Nazi terrorist group embarked on a campaign of bombings against the cars of American GIs, eventually turning on Israeli targets in Vienna, Am- Fighting Terrorism 31 sterdam, and Geneva. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While most people are aware of the results of Sad- dam’s missile attacks against Israel—thirty-nine barrages against Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities resulted in only a single death from the actual bombardment—less is re- membered about the terrorist front of the war against Saddam. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The avowed goal of both of these organizations was the “liberation of Palestine,” which in practice meant liber- ating it from both the Israeli and the Jordanian states. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
More deadly was the Fatah organization sponsored by Syria and headed by Yasir Ar- afat, which by 1967 had mounted a campaign of cross- border attacks primarily against Israeli civilian targets. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Egyptian President Nasser’s fulminations notwithstanding, Shu- keiri had never been permitted to launch extensive at- tacks from Egyptian soil for fear of triggering an unplanned Israeli response; Arafat himself had been kept on a short leash in Syria, and his gunmen had run into trouble with Jordanian troops from the very first. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Within short order, the Soviet—PLO axis had managed to transform an astonishing collection of domestic ter- rorist factions into a full-blown international movement devoted to anti-Western and anti-Israeli political vio- lence. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At the end of the Badawi Conference, Ha- bash triumphantly announced:. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Israeli incursion resulted in the destruction of the kingdom of terror that the PLO had carefully built up in south Lebanon over more than a decade. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Named after my brother Jonathan, who had fallen while leading the Israeli force that rescued the hostages at Entebbe in 1976, its purpose Fighting Terrorism 63 was to educate free societies as to the nature of terrorism and the methods needed to fight it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The refusal of successive Israeli gov- ernments to capitulate to terrorist demands—a refusal that found expression in the repeated assaults by the Is- rael Defense Forces against terrorists in hostage situations from Maalot to Entebbe—and the Israeli policy of ac- tive military pursuit of terrorists into their strongholds, showed other nations that it was possible to fight terror- ism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Israeli campaign against the PLO terrorist haven in Lebanon. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Later that year, a TWA airliner was hijacked by Arab gunmen to Beirut, where the passengers were held as hostages. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At the height of the crisis, the Israeli government had offered to release the Shiite prisoners in its custody—but according to the original timetable which had been set before the hijacking. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A few weeks later, a face-saving compromise was arranged, whereby the hostages were released, followed by the release of Israeli- held Shiite prisoners according to the original timetable. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
By 1995 at least fourteen militant Islamic groups were known to be operating throughout Europe, their active membership reaching into the tens of thousands. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Other terrorism originates from still an- other source, the Arab—Israeli conflict. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Signifi- cantly, this last attack was carried out by Hizballah ter- rorists who have sought, with Iranian support, to make Turkey into a regular staging area for their activities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Until 1992, all Israeli governments, whether led by the Labor Party or by the Likud, sought to strengthen the first approach in the Arab world while discouraging the second, striving to achieve peace with the Arab states while remaining within the improved defensive borders. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu The first step in the Israeli withdrawal was the evacuation of the Israeli administration and military pres- ence from Gaza. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Egypt occupied Gaza during the Israeli War of Independence in 1948, and controlled the district for nineteen years. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat were awarded the No- bel Peace Prize in Oslo, the same city in which negoti- ations for the PLO—Israel deal were secretly negotiated a year earlier. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The same happened in the Israeli towns of Hadera, Afula, and Ashdod, and at Beit Lid near Netanya. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Most were conducted by two Islamic movements in Gaza, Hamas and the Is- lamic Jihad, which dramatically expanded their opera- tions after the Israeli withdrawal. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For as part of the Oslo accords, the Israeli government agreed, incredibly, to give up on the right of “hot pursuit” and preemptive attacks against terrorists, principles that had guided all previous Israeli govern- Fighting Terrorism 107 ments and which Israel continues to apply against the bases of the militant Islamic organization Hizballah in Lebanon. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Following Arafat’s arrival in Gaza, the Israeli government made more than a dozen requests for extradition of known murderers, many of them serving in the PLO “police”—including Sammy Abu Samadana, murderer of more than thirty Palestinian Arabs and at least one Israeli, now a commander in the PLO police; and the brothers Abu Sita, who murdered an Israeli in March 1993 and are now active in the police force. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In- deed, the entire “Fatah Hawks” terrorist organization was incorporated into the PLO police en masse, despite the fact that its members continued terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens well after the signing of the Oslo accords.’2 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A second deadly linkage was un- wittingly facilitated by the Israeli government itself, tying the Sunni and Shiite vintages of Islamic radicalism in a tight operational knot. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Understandably, many Israelis do not want to see that base expanded twenty times to include the West Bank, thereby having an Iranian-influenced Is- lamic domain hovering over its major cities, and within ten miles of the sea. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While such action under UN supervision has been taken against Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War, little or no action was taken until recently against the Iranian nuclear program. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Similarly, the special exemption hitherto granted to Syria must be brought to an end. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Israeli law, for example, requires careful licensing of handguns and prohibits the ownership of more powerful weapons, yet gun ownership is widespread. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Arab-Israeli conflict—1973—1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Arab-Israeli conflict—1993— I. Title DS1 19.7.H3764413 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To her and to our two won- derful children, Laith and Mayce, I extend my love and ask their forgive- ness for all those long days and nights I stayed in my study at the expense of our family time. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
With respect to geography, the center of weight of Palestinian military and political leadership was moved to the furthest place from Palestine since the rise of the Palestine question early in the twentieth century. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Geographically, the erup- tion of the Palestinian popular uprising, or intifada, in December 1987 brought the center of struggle to the heart of the historic territory of Pales- tine for the first time since the Israeli occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The pop- ular support that Hamas gained in this way molded it into a significant rival of the PLO in the period between 1988 and 1994, when the Palestinian Authority was established in accordance with the 1993 Oslo Agreement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Starting with the historic roots and evolution of the movement, then focusing on the record of Hamas’s political and social thought, this study examines and analyzes Hamas’s posture and role within the context of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sec- ondarily, Hamas is seen as the natural product of unnatural circumstances: the Israeli occupation under which the Palestinian people live. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The continuation of the brutal and repressive Israeli occupation led to the popular uprising or intifada and to the birth of Hamas in late 1987. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In fact, the official Israeli account of the war referred to “incitement in mosques, and the festivals and meetings organized by the Muslim Brotherhood, an extreme nationalist religious organization originating in Egypt.”25 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ahmed Khalifa, translator from Hebrew, Harb Filastin 1947—1948: AI-riwaya al-isra’ihzya ab-rasmiyya [Palestine War 1947—1948: The official Israeli version] (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986), p. 14. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
commander of Jordanian forces in the region for members of his branch to receive training from army instructors.~ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibid., pp. 168—69. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibid., pp. 74, 76. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
50. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This development represented a setback in the effort to resist Israeli occupation and liberate Palestine, which was the main objective in the Brotherhood’s platform. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Egyptian president’s immense public appeal, particularly among Palestinians, drove a wedge between the Brotherhood and his followers. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This rather loose notion of working toward liberation gave the Broth- erhood some borrowed solace from misgivings about the reason for post- poning the jihad. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
When the PLO moved to Lebanon following the September 1970 clashes in Jordan, the Palestinian Brotherhood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip once again retreated back to its educational mission, keeping clear of “hot” confrontations (armed struggle or popular resistance) with the Israeli occupation forces. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Islamic Jihad was formed in the Gaza Strip by Brother- hood leaders who broke off from the organization in protest against its unwillingness to take on the Israeli occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
How hAil Began 33 34 HAMAS in the entire Gaza Strip. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It includes target- ing collaborators, gathering intelligence, and creating an infrastructure of arms storage for future years. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Salah She- hadeh, another member of the Political Bureau, became head of the first military wing of Hamas; he was arrested and put on trial less than a year after the intifada began. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Subsequent publications reveal details of mili- tary cells organized by the Brotherhood, as well as the names of members and leaders of those cells, prior to the outbreak of the intifada. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In fact, it could be said that the years 1984—87 were the period of building up a new confrontational perspective. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Rashad al-Shawwa, the mayor of Gaza, summed up the situation very accurately in an interview broadcast on Israeli radio, 10 December 1987, the third day of the intifada: “One must expect these things after twenty years of debilitating occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
the Islamic movement in Palestine perceives a great challenge stemming from two factors: 81. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
At the partisan level, the curve of changes encompassing the regional The Brotherhood had ignited unrest in the mosques during 82. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
From the Hamas “Introductory Memorandum;” see Appendix, document no. 3. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
83. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
On 6 December, an Israeli settler was stabbed to death in the Gaza town square by a member of Islamic Jihad. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This created furor among the Israelis, and in the hysterical atmosphere that followed, on 8 December, an Israeli truck ran down some Palestinian workers on their way back home, killing four and wounding nine others. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
On the evening of the following day, the Political Bureau of the Mus- lim Brotherhood in Gaza met and agreed that the previous day’s incident, and the public reaction to it, presented the right moment to translate their new conviction into practice and to assign top priority to the confrontation with the Israeli occupation.86 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
85. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Abdel Sattar Qasem, “Al-Fikr al-siyasi li harakat Hamas” [The political thought of Hamas], A/-Siyasa al-Filastin(yya, Vol. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These changes not only undermined support for the PLO but also created an environment that was hostile to the acceptance of a new Palestinian “fundamentalist” organization, such as Hamas, which was seek- ing to become a spokesman for the same cause. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The latter country championed a peace settlement in the Middle East that was perceived by Hamas as virtually identical to the Israeli perspective. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There are several similar fatwas, among them ones issued by Sheikh Yusef al-Qardhawi, a prominent Egyptian scholar with a following across the Arab world, banning travel to Jerusalem (in 1996) and forbidding partici- pation in the Israeli Knesset elections (March 1995). HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s thought was not exceptional in this respect and got caught in this dilemma. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is noteworthy in this respect that there is an important difference between Hamas’s mode of expression in relation to the Oslo agreements and to the Arab-Israeli agreements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the case of the Arab-Israeli agree- ments, Hamas was more calculating and tried to avoid the inevitable backlash that would have followed a more verbally violent position on the Jordanian-Israeli agreement or Syria’s participation in the Madrid and Washington talks.46 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
All quotes in this paragraph are from Marzouq interview with author, 21 April 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Second, there is the short- or medium-term solution, which can be called the interim solution to the problem. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Interim Solution with Armistice: A Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Since the first few months of its existence, Hamas has adopted a wavering position in favor of an interim solution in tandem with its core position calling for liberating Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas initially was the object of intense scrutiny by the media due to interest in a new and very energetic movement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Those interviews provide the first thoughts by Hamas and its leaders on the interim solution. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In making its choice, Hamas tried to bridge the two so that it would gain a voice in developments while simultaneously emphasizing that “discussing details [of settlement plans] 64. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In particular, the growing power of Islamists in Algeria and the Sudan, in addition to Iran of course, had a strong impact on the minds and spirits of Islamist activists, who began to hope that a change in the regional Political Perspective on the Conflict 71 72 HAMAS balance of power was about to occur. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s response to the successes of Islamic currents are discussed in chapter 4. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The cost of the intifada to Israel caused it seriously to entertain the idea of withdrawing from the Gaza Strip as a first step. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin, in reply to a question concerning what he hoped to achieve through the intifada, said: “In the first place, I want a total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, then to have these territories placed under the supervision of the United Nations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Political Perspective on the Conflict I 81 82 I The basic reference to an armistice occurs in Sheikh Yassin’s letters from prison, referred to earlier. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As quoted in ibid., 19 April 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A statement on the subject of an armistice by Sheikh Yassin was made in mid-1995 (that is, one and one-half years after he first brought forth the idea) in an interview with Maariv newspaper during an intensive Israeli campaign against Hamas and a wave of arrests of its members. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin’s response to the Israeli journalist as reprinted in Al-Hayat, 3 June 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
87. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Political Relations of Hamas with Palestinian Groups 91 92 HAMAS directly contradictory—that were formulated at different stages. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It maintained that Palestinian elections would be very difficult if not impossible to hold, whether in the territories under Israeli occupation or among Palestinian communities abroad where the obstacles were legion. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In brief, Hamas undertook not to use violence against the self- governing authority but instead to engage in opposition through peaceful means and to direct its military effort against Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Despite the tensions that arose between Hamas and the police a few months after their arrival into the area admin- istered by the PA, Hamas continued to refer to the Palestinian police as comprising nationalist and honorable men who, in the final analysis, would take a stand alongside Hamas’s fighters to defend the people from 33. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In effect, the movement is standing still, if not frozen in place. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They occurred at a very sensitive juncture for Hamas and Palestine as a whole: the redeployment of the Israeli army in the West Bank outside of the cities, villages, and refugee camps had begun; and elections for the Legislative Council of the PA had been set for 20 January 1996. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It only produced a few general declarations expressing support for national solidarity, condemning internecine fighting, urging the use of dialogue for dealing with each other, and encouraging all efforts to be directed at secur- ing the release of prisoners in Israeli jails; a joint committee was formed to deal with emergencies.38 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
At this stage the dialogue broke down, but it resumed in 1997 and took on new life after the peace process ran into trouble due to the intran- sigence of the Benymin Netanyahu government and its refusal to carry out Israeli obligations under the Oslo Agreement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas and the PLO were back to square one. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It also blamed Hamas for the delay in the withdrawal of Israeli troops from, or their redeploy- ment in, the West Bank. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See further Khaled Hroub, “Hamas: la mafarr mm al-hizb al-siyasi fil-nihaya” [Hamas: Ghosheh interview, 26 April 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
a hindrance to peace negotiations and, consequently, contrary to the gen- eral national interest. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
At one period Hamas was accused of being the handiwork of Israel and of serving the interests of the occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
At a minimum, Hamas had to contend with nonrecognition. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For details on the Hamas-Fateh talks, see Khaled Hroub, “Sijill bi-tarikh al-liqa’at The Political Relations of Hamas with Palestinian Groups I 115 116 HAMAS would include all resistance organizations participating in the intifada. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A good indication of this was the way in which those quar- rels and clashes were given prominent coverage and blown out of pro- portion in the Israeli media; Israeli correspondents also attempted to get prominent Fateh and Hamas leaders to condemn each other in the media.56 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This interview stirred strong negative reactions not only within the ranks of Fateh but also within Hamas itself because al-Zahhar fell into the trap of using the Israeli media to attack Fateh. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One example is the interview Israeli television conducted with Mahmoud al-Zahhar 57. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The third observation is that the conflictual relationship between 55. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the absence of military coordination among these organizations inside the Occupied Territories, there was only one communique from the ‘Izzidin al-Qassam Brigades, issued after the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier in October 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Islamic Resistance Movement considers these movements as a reserve fund on which it can draw. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Despite this theoretical tolerance, in practice aloofness characterized the political relationship between the two movements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is difficult to understand without reviewing the historical roots of the relationship. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They should be asked not to emigrate under the monstrous pres- sure of [Israeli] terrorism, and its aggressive and beastly conduct toward our people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Using similar language, Hamas denounced the May 1995 Israeli attacks on St. Anthony’s Church in Jaffa.86 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In its statements, Hamas reiterated that Palestinians were immigrating because of the constant pressure on them from the Israeli occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In con- testing municipal and Knesset elections or the control of local and regional committees representing the Palestinians, the Rakah (Communist) Party had been the most important political vehicle for the realization of the political and legal demands of the Arab minority. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
After his release, Sheikh Darwish adopted peaceful means of spreading his message, based on a realistic vision that the objective of Islamists in Israel should be: to consolidate an Arab-Islamic identity; to defend the rights ol deepening Palestinian nationalism among the Arabs in Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
is an image that best is captured within a postmodernist political frame- work, where it brought to reality a contradictory combination: Palestin- ian Islamic representation in the Israeli Knesset. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas felt it was totally unreasonable for Islamists to participate in the Israeli Knesset elections, while it boycotted the self-government elections. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
How- ever, Hamas may have been mistaken on this point, considering the immense pressure to which it was subjected and the Israeli, regional, and international campaigns against it in the wake of the series of suicide bombings in February and March 1996. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Fifth, Hamas makes it clear to all sides that the purpose of its estab- lishing relations with any party is to gain support for the movement’s resistance to Israeli occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The deportation led to the Arab delegations suspending their meetings with the Israeli delegation at the Washington peace talks. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Consequently, Hamas’s call for an Arab summit following the massacre of 36 worshipers and the wounding of many others at the Abra- ham Mosque in Hebron by Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein in February 1994 was little more than a cry in the wilderness.’~ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This inci- dent was followed by a number of armed attacks, most notably the series of bus bombings in retaliation for the Hebron massacre in 1994, then another series of bus bombings in February and March 1996 in retaliation for the January assassination by Israeli security agents in Gaza of the engi- neer, Yahya ‘Ayyash, then leader of Hamas’s military arm, the ‘Izziddin al-Qassam Brigades. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas found itself in the position of having to defend, explain, and justify these operations and to connect them to Zionist massacres of Palestinians, such as the Hebron massacre or Israeli operations to liquidate armed groups belonging to the al-Qassam Brigades. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s first communique issued during the intifada inveighed against “those who are panting after a feeble peace ... after vacuous international conferences after treasonous bilateral accords in the manner of Camp David.”9 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the second period, emphasis is on the deed, the signature, and the treaty, rather than on the doer of the deed, the signatory of the treaty. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
These talks had been frozen for four months in response to Israel’s December 1992 deportation of over four hundred Palestinian Islamists to south Lebanon. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas, Press Statement of 9 September 1995, gives details of contacts between Ibrahim Hamas’s PoliticaiRelations 161 162 HAMAS crisis is latent in Jordan, where the largest Palestinian community outside Palestine lives, and is connected intricately to the provisions of the Israeli- Palestinian deals that will be negotiated concerning the future of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons, and the role that Jordan will play in those agreements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Asserting that “occupation” should be condemned—whether it was Israeli occupation of Palestine or Iraqi occupation of Kuwait—’Abdul 37. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
59. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It saw the Egyptian-Sudanese border dispute over Halayeb also as benefiting Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The visit resulted in the opening of a Palestine embassy in place of what used to be the Israeli mission under the shah. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Then a thaw in the freeze began with the out- break of the intifada at the end of 1987, particularly in view of the significant and noteworthy participation of the Islamists in the uprising against Israeli occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Subse- quently, Hamas secured the signatures of hundreds of ‘u/ama, religious leaders, and prominent nationalists from various Arab and Islamic coun- tries to a document entitled “Statement of Support and Solidarity.”05 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The incident was also significant because of the negative repercussion the Israeli action had on the progress of the peace talks in Washington. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Being at the center of controversy and armed with Security Council Resolution 799, which called on Israel to take back all the deportees, Hamas found that it finally had an opportunity to be heard. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “An Important Statement on the American-Israeli Collusion in the Abu See for example a letter sent from Hamas spokesman Ghosheh “To His Excellency Abu Marzouq, interview with author, 21 April 1995. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first issue concerns the accepted “wisdom” in the media, political circles, and even in academic circles about Israel’s stance toward the Islamist phenomenon—the Muslim Brotherhood before the intifada and later Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Some interpretations attributed the 139. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See for example Hamas’s letter, “Memorandum from the Islamic Resistance Move- ment (Hamas) to the Contracting Parties of the Fourth Geneva Convention,” dated 26 March 1996. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hence, the level of tolerance for or suppression of the work of those institutions was the same regardless of their ideological or political bent. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If this assertion acquired credibility, the national struggle would be recast as an ideological one—a war between religions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Interna- tionally, such a policy, interpreted as an abridgment of religious freedom, would harm the reputation of Israel. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Such considerations apparently con- tinued to influence the formulation of Israeli policy through the first two years of the intifada. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Resistance activities during that time, whether directed by Hamas or by the United National Leadership of the Intifada, were confined to mass demonstrations, and the use of firearms was avoided. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Third, the implicit Israeli acceptance of responsibility for indirectly helping Hamas by looking the other way when it came into being can be explained by reference to the Israeli political mind-set, which is character- ized by a “superiority complex.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In effect, it perceived Israeli control of most (if not all) strings as virtually absolute. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Fifth, considering the factors mentioned above, one can conclude that Israel’s stance toward the competition among the various Palestinian forces, such as that between Hamas and the PLO, was one of exploitation and manipulation in the service of Israeli interests. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the pre- vious three years, when Hamas had no declared political leadership “abroad,” Hamas leaders, without being identified as such, had been sum- moned to meet Israeli officials not as representatives of Hamas but in their capacity as influential, public Islamic figures. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Consequently, they spent only short stints in Israeli prisons and detention centers and continued to play informational and political roles among their people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
By virtue of the relationship between the occupation authorities and the people under occupation, Hamas leaders and others close to it were compelled to meet Israeli security and political officials. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this respect, Hamas’s situation Initially, the Israelis tried to make sense of a new phenomenon with For example, the head of the Israeli civil administration in Gaza summoned al-Zahhar and discussed with him the feasibility of forming a Palestinian delegation to negotiate with 142. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In the second stage of Hamas’s career, i.e., after Hamas had declared the pres- ence of its leaders abroad, its position corresponded with PLO policy, which was to reject meeting with official Israeli parties. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Similarly, some Israeli military commanders discussed the same subject with numerous Hamas supporters in the Gaza Strip.’48 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
‘When al-Zahhar refused, the Israeli threat- ened him with arrest; see further Al-Nahar, 16 December 1989. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
commander of Israeli troops in Gaza, with Sheikh Ahmad Bahar, the head of the Islamic For example, the Israeli daily Ha’aretz reported on 15 January 1990 that “the Min- Hamas leaflet, “Resistance and Struggle will be the Sole Language of Dialogue with Al-A hram (Cairo), 19 April 1994; see also a statement by the Israeli minister of police, Al-Hayat, 1 January 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas continued to rebuff Israeli attempts to open communication chan- nels with it, persisted in announcing those attempts when they occurred, and used very strong language in firmly rejecting Rabin’s offer to negotiate. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
[Prime Ministerj Rabin issue clear instructions to the occupation army, [Israeli] settlers, and Arab collaborators to stop attacking or targeting Palestinian civilians for killing, arrest, and house demolition. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One example is the Sep- tember 1992 elections for the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the city of Jenin. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It objected to and strongly resented the appointment of mayors and municipal council members rather than having them elected, and it condemned this practice whether undertaken by the PA or the Israeli occupation authorities. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas, Periodic statement no. 114 of 6 August 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
was put forward as a principal article in the Shamir Plan, which was based on the idea of self-rule as stipulated in the Camp David agreements. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
majority of citizens.”26 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Prior to Madrid, the emphasis had been on whether elections should take place under Israeli occupation or under United Nations super- vision. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Some prominent figures in Hamas also have alleged that the polls are conducted on Fridays during the noon prayers when Hamas supporters are at the mosque; they have alleged that the poli takers are instructed to avoid universities and mosques, organizational headquarters, the offices of lawyers, doctors, and engineers, and other places of support for Hamas.52 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This organic connection between the social and the political imparted its legacy in Hamas’s political thought and practice. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This reputation won him enormous respect. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
However, this judicial function was under- mined, particularly in the Gaza Strip, by the arrest of Sheikh Yassin because none of the other Hamas leaders could fill his place. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Hamas and Unified National Leadership experiments were partially successful, but they were aborted after the first year when the Israeli authorities closed down a number of mosques where students were being taught, declared educational commit- tees to be illegal, and subjected their members to imprisonment.68 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas brought this composite perspective to bear on the significant issues arising from resis- tance to the occupation, the most serious of which was that of [Israeli] agents. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It even ordered merchants to boycott Israeli goods for which there were Palestinian-produced alternatives, covering both industrial and agri- cultural products, in order to support the national economy.7’ HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
the subject of collaborators with the Israeli occupation and published in Al-Sharq Al-A wsat, 9 October 1993, and inAl-Nahar, 14 October 1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Interview with Sheikh Ahmad Yassin conducted in prison by ‘Abdel Jawad Saleh on 71. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
74. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
zens during the years after the Oslo Agreement; many reports by human rights organizations— Palestinian ones (whose directors have been arrested), Israeli ones, and international ones, such as Amnesty International—attest to this. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The following discussion will trace the evolution of Hamas’s thinking on and practice of military action and examine the main policies adopted, includ- ing the question of targeting Israeli civilians. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
There were two operations that had a profound effect and dealt a blow to the pride of the Israeli security apparatus. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In one incident, an Israeli soldier, Avi Sasportas, was kidnapped inside the “green line,” that is, the Israeli heartland, in February 1989; in the other, and less than three months after the first, a second soldier, han Sa’don, was kidnapped in May of the same year. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A quantum jump in Hamas’s military activity occurred when the Qas- sam Brigades were formed at the beginning of 1992 and promptly carried out a series of operations culminating in the kidnapping and killing of an Israeli border guard, Nassim Toledano, in December 1992. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Internationally, most of Hamas’s work was described as “terrorism” in conformity with the American position, which in turn echoed Israeli char- acterizations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
First, Hamas confined mili- tary action to the occupied territory and made a commitment not to attack Israeli targets abroad. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ehud Sprinzak observed that “Hamas only resorted to this atrocious type of terrorism after February 1994, when Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli physician and army reserve captain, massacred 29 praying Palestinians in the Hebron shrine.”87 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
General Shiomo Gazit, former chief of Israeli military intelligence, commented on Hamas’s modus operandi as follows: Lately, we have been facing operations that seem to be based on a policy of concentrating more and more on soldiers and security forces. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The second conclusion, the success of opera- tions of guerrilla cells, deals a heavy blow to the pride of the Israeli army, its image of invincibility, and its deterrent power. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Here, it is worthwhile to give special consideration to Hamas’s shift toward a policy of targeting Israeli civilians because of its moral importance and its political and informational repercussions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“~ From a broader perspective, it should be stated that the matter of strik- ing at Israeli civilians is an indirect extension of views and modes of oper- ation that occupied an important place in Palestinian military strategy generally, and specifically in PLO strategy in the 1970s and 1980s. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The basic logic held by Hamas now in permitting strikes on the “most vulner- able” Israeli target—civilians—is the very logic held by the PLO in the past. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibrahim Ghosheh, Al-Quds Press, 2 October 1997. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The third policy tendency is the tying of the painful strikes that Hamas dealt Israeli targets, especially the ones that aroused interna- tional concern and condemnation, to the various massacres committed by the Zionists against the Palestinian people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas also tried to exploit popular anger and bitterness engendered by Israeli attacks by carrying out its operations while the atmosphere of anger and bitterness was still high. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Furthermore, in order to retain mass support, Hamas tied its military actions to short-term objec- tives to which people easily could relate, such as the release of prisoners in Israeli jails,96 a halt to construction of Israeli settlements, and disarm- ing the Israeli settlers. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See, for example, the statement by Sufian Abu Zaydeh, a Fateh official in Gaza, to Israeli radio on 12 October 1994, commenting on a Hamas kidnapping of an Israeli soldier: “The Pales- tinian street is with the demands of the kidnappers and with the release of the [5,000] Palestin- ian prisoners.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For instance, the unfolding of events up to the tenth year of Hamas’s existence (1998)—in other words, five years after Oslo—pointed to a became a distinct possibility, and when popular support for its armed oper- ations began to ebb in response to Israel’s policy of sealing off Gaza after every operation and preventing Palestinian workers from going to their the entire policy of armed action. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Since 1988, American and international efforts to find a peaceful solu- tion to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have intensified, while an Arab mili- tary option became remote as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this context, Hamas is credited for tolerating the harshest measures taken against it by the PA without responding violently. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
If a political environment is created that is favorable to a settlement that secures the basic rights of the Palestinians—a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that is free of Israeli domination, Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, a return of the refugees, and the dismantling of Israeli set- tlements—then Hamas would be obliged to give up its armed operations to avoid being isolated. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Therefore, despite our respect for the Palestine Liberation Organization and what it might become, and not reducing its role in the Arab-Israeli struggle, we cannot exchange the Islamic nature of Palestine to adopt the secular ide- ology because the Islamic nature of the Palestinian issue is part and par- cel of our religion, and whosoever neglects part of his religion is surely lost. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
We regard the Israeli presence in all its forms in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip to be an occupational presence—this being consistent with the text of successive UN resolutions and with the announced official positions of most governments in the world since 1967. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In particular, UN Security Council Resolution No. 242 called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories that were occu- pied in 1967, but the Israeli authorities still refuse to comply with the text and spirit of this resolution. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The fundamental cause of instability in the Middle East derives from continuous Israeli aggression against the rights of the Palestinian people, aggression that began with usurping its land and exiling its people to vari- ous corners of the world under the bayonets of terrorism and intimidation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this context, it is worth mentioning the Israeli “death squads” that belong to the Ministry of Defense and operate in the Occupied Territories. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As confirmed by Amnesty International, death squad members wear Arab Appendix 307 308 HAMAS civilian clothes as disguises and use standard military methods to shoot their victims at very close distances ranging from 1 to 5 meters, usually aiming above the waist, most often at the head, finishing off the wounded while fleeing. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is considered the same as self-defense. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In contrast with these policies, statistics of international and human rights organizations confirm the high proportion of Palestinian children and women killed and wounded at the hands of Israeli troops during the years of the intifada. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In one engagement between armed settlers and unarmed Palestinian civilians, a young Israeli woman was killed. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Policies of Hamas in Resisting Occupation In its resistance operations to occupation, Hamas follows a number of basic policies that conform to international laws and conventions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The most important among them are the following: 1. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
To respect the humanity of the other side even under condi- tions of armed engagement. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Despite Hamas’s rejection of the Israeli project for self-rule and its decision not to participate in the process—because it contradicts UN res- olutions and international law, falsifies history and the facts, and makes the future of Palestinians uncertain, it has not used any type of violence or political assassination against the Palestinian side that has participated in it. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
For instance, it adheres to international conventions pertaining to human rights and does not use force except in the face of terrorism and its Israeli instruments. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Based on this, it is incumbent upon the international community to support and foster this Movement and to cooperate with it in connection with realizing these goals. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In conclusion, we assure you that Hamas has made many offers for a cease-fire on just conditions. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
We call upon you further to pressure the Israeli government to respond to the voices of wisdom and rea- son by dealing positively with the initiatives offered several times by Hamas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The justification for conducting military operations against Israeli targets is the continuation of occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Gaza: N.p., 1991. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
“Hawiyyat al-filastiniyyin fi Isra’il: hel hiya filastiniyya-isra’iliyya?” [The identity of Palestinians in Israel: Is it Palestinian-Israeli?], Majal- lat al-dirasat al-fllastiniyya, no. 10 (Spring 1992): 40—60. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
96 Afghanistan, 152, 175, 183—84, 255 al-’Alami, ‘Imad, 167, 179 Albright, Madeleine, 198 Algeria, 71, 90, 152, 154, 168, 203, 255 Algiers: 1988 PNC Conference in, 93, 96, 112, 114; 1991 PNC Conference in, 90 Alliance of Palestinian Forces, 65, 119, 120, 121—122, 130 Amman, 36, 117, 167, 194, 195 Amnesty International, 188 al-Aqsa Mosque, 34, 38, 43, 80, 249 Arab-Islamic Convention, 174 Arab Islamic Popular Congress, 116, 174 Index Arab-Israeli Conflict, 149, 168—69, 194, 220; 1967 War, 29, 37 Arab League, 16, 156, 160 Arab Nationalist Conference, 174 Arafat, Yasir, 30, 56, 87, 93, 98, 104, 105, 109, 112, 116, 122, 125, 130, 165, 177, 206, 228; and ver- bal attacks on Hamas, 117, 178—79, 201 al-’Aref, ‘Aref, 19 armed struggle, 75, 80, 121, 215, 242, 249, 257, 258, 259, 260 al-Mad, Hafiz, 1 59n. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See also Gaza Strip, West Bank Oslo Agreement, 6, 8, 81, 89, 91, 107, 111, 120, 123, 131, 149, 196, 205, 212, 213, 216, 230, 241, 244, 247, 250, 251, 255, 257, 258, 260; Hamas’s opposi- tion to, 55, 61, 62, 63, 66, 97, 103, 112, 121, 122, 124, 133, 158, 226, PA’S establishment under/implementation of, 2, 3, 67, 82, 83, 98, 197, 214, 244; provisions for elections of, 109, 121, 220, 222, 223, 225, 228 Oslo process, See peace process ‘Oyoun Qarah: maasacre of Palestini- ans in, 249 P Pakistan, 3, 21, 175, 183, 185, 186 Palestine, 12, 26, 27, 30, 36, 44, 47, 48, 66, 71, 72, 74, 75, 79, 80, 102, 151, 162, 164, 167, 181, 184, 191, 245, 260; borders of, from the Mediterranean to the Jor- dan River, 69, 72, 73, 80, 95, 110, 113, 119; as Islamic waqf 69,70; Mandate of, 5, 13, 16; and 1947 UN partition resolution of, 18 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 1, 5, 28, 30, 31, 36, 37, 52, 54,65, 69, 70,71,72,75, 80, 114, 120, 131, 132, 147, 151, 152, 153, 155, 160, 164, 165, 177, 180—81, 188, 195, 200, 201, 204, 205, 210, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 222, 232, 233, 235, 236, 238, 239, 245, 247, 254, 257; and relations with Hamas, 8, 55, 87—102, 124, 129, 130, 116, 148—49, 156, 178, 179, 204. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
See Fateh Palestinian people, 11, 60, 62, 74, 75, 76, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 89, 103, 122, 125, 129, 147, 152, 174, 175, 178, 179, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 199, 211, 224, 229, 243, 260 Palestinian problem, 1, 13, 14, 16, 41, 129, 173, 190, 194,211,255 Palestinian Red Crescent, 236 Palestinian refugees, 24, 151, 162, 192, 260 Palestinian resistance organizations çfaca’il), 87, 97, 129, 133, 136, 147, 151, 177, 210, 223, 227, 254; and relations with Hamas, 8, 65, 68, 88, 110—25, 129—33, 256, 257 Palestinian state, 71, 72, 74, 77, 78, 90, 162 Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 43—48, 60, 142, 153, 155, 170, 215, 255, 256; and Hamas’s armistice with Israel proposal, 69, 73, 75, 76, 81—84, 186—87, 208, 246; and Hamas’s historic solution to, 8, 60—61, 69—73, 74, 75; and Hamas’s interim solution to, 8, 60—61, 69, 70, 72, 73—86, 124; and Hamas’s resistance to Israeli occupation, 4, 154, 155, 156, 180, 192, 195, 199,211,234, 235, 238, 239, 242, 243, 246, 248—49, 250, 256, 257—58; and Hamas’s suicide bombings in Israel, 108, 145, 167, 197, 198, 246, 250, 256—57, 258; and liber- ation of Palestine, 47—49, 51, 60, 69, 73, 77, 78, 121, 153, 195, 242—43, 1948, 18—19, 215 peace process, 5, 8, 62, 73, 74, 97, 102, 109, 115, 120, 122, 149, 152, 156, 159, 175, 189, 195, 197, 198, 200, 218, 224, 228, 232, 233, 241, 242, 251, 255, 257, 258, 260—61 Peace-Makers’ Conference. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
-Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
ISBN 0—231—10834—6 (cloth) 1. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Mohammed’s father, Salah Ghandour, rammed a car packed with 450 kilograms of explosives into an Israeli convoy, in South Lebanon, on 25 May 1995. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He blew himself to pieces and killed twelve Israeli soldiers. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Lebanese government hailed Salah as a hero; the Israeli government denounced him as a terrorist and launched an investigation into its army’s security measures in South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘If my son wants to follow in his father’s footsteps, then of course he can go,’ said Maha. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
By the early seventies, Lebanon had become the PLO’s only base, following its expulsion from Jordan. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As Israeli reprisals against the PLO intensified, Musa Sadr demanded protection for the Shiites in the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Under the pressure of the Israeli attacks and the activities of the Palestinian commandos, the bitter grievances of Lebanon’s confessional groups erupted and civil war broke out in 1975. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Some Israeli Hezbollah 14 officers suggested cultivating the Shiites as affies. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Determined to achieve their plan, the IDF began pressuring families to join the scheme and threatened reprisals against relatives whom they were holding in the infamous Ansar prison in South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
And so the resistance began. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
From the summer of 1982 until early 1983, there was still no organisation directing this. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was a spontaneous movement which had been started by a minority of civilians, motivated by a sense of nationalism and determined to reject Israeli domina- tion. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The ceremony, attended by 50,000 southern Lebanese, was at its height when an Israeli military convoy drove into the town.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israeli commander insisted on driving through the crowds, infuriating the Muslims who saw the act as an outrageous violation of their holy day. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the mayhem that followed, an Israeli truck was overturned and set alight. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
reprisals raffled further support for the resistance and drove larger numbers of people to join its ranks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s initial goal was to launch a revolt against the Israeli occupation, which would eventually grow to embrace the task of ridding Lebanon from the presence of Western forces and * See The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, John L. Esposito, p. 147 ** Ibid. Hezbollah 20 influence. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He was well known as the brains behind the attacks made against Israeli soldiers and members of the National Guard. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It is currently one of Hezbollah’s bastions in South Lebanon and a regular target of Israeli aggression. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Harb is said to have received scores of death threats and warnings from the Israeli forces who arrested him on 18 March 1983. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Resistance began to employ a deadly weapon: young Shiite fighters volunteered to drive vehicles packed with explosives into Israeli targets and went to their deaths as human bombs. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On 6 June 1984, Bilal was seen sitting in a white Mercedes car by the lemon groves on the Zahrani—Tyre coastal road, awaiting the arrival of an expected Israeli convoy. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
By mid-1984, seven villages, including Jibsheet and Maarakeh, had become known as the ‘arc of resistance’: Israeli soldiers dared enter them only during daytime with massive back-up. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
According to Israeli newspapers, the surviving soldiers of the attack believed the death toll to be higher than the official number. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For years, the Israeli military and intelligence have believed that they could curb the Islamic Resistance in the South by eliminating its leaders. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Furthermore, the Israeli government has worked on the assumption that penalising the population for the attacks of the Resistance would eventually provoke the vifiagers’ wrath against the Muslim fighters. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
After each Israeli reprisal, their grief, anger and frustration strengthened their determination to continue the fight. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Israeli invasion in June 1982 had penetrated as far as Lebanon’s capital and submitted West Beirut to a devastating siege.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘Free-fire zones’ were also established which in effect gave the Israeli soldiers and patrols carte blanche to shoot at anyone and anything that moved in the area. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
To emphasise their seriousness, the Israeli forces launched mass raids on most villages, rounding up hundreds, killing some in the process, and deporting many from the area. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
wishing to do so had to apply to the military which would escort them from the Israeli border. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Journalists caught without IDF approval would be arrested. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He vowed angrily that Israeli villages across the border would be targeted every time a Lebanese town was attacked. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It took the line that if the South was not used as a fountainhead for attacks against the Israeli forces then its residents would not be subjected to reprisals. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The official Israeli view on this has been that those detained in its prisons are not hostages, but terrorists, who should be treated accordingly. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On 16 October 1986, Amal militiamen shot down an Israeli warplane just after it had carried out an air raid on Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The pilot managed to eject and was later rescued by an Israeli helicopter, but his air force navigator, Ron Arad, was captured by the group’s fighters patrolling the area. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Islamic Resistance carried out seven or eight assaults a day against the occupying force and the southerners lived under the constant threat of Israeli reprisals.Timur Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah fighters were often caught sandwiched between Amal militiamen on the one side and Israeli fire on the other. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Party of God was expelled from the South and its fighters banned from carrying out attacks against Israeli or South Lebanon Army targets. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Even when Damascus laid its heavy hand on the group, it continued to tolerate and encourage its anti-Israeli activities in South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On 28 July 1989, an airborne unit of Israeli commandos swooped on Jibsheet, Hezbollah bastion and home of the murdered Sheikh Harb. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On 19 August the Islamic Resistance retaliated for Obeid’s abduction with a human bomb attack against an Israeli military convoy killing five soldiers and several SLA militiamen. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its fighters were now launching raids and assaults against Israeli positions and strongholds in Lebanon Ti-rn SHUTES STRIKE BACK 37 as well as threatening the security of Israel’s northern border whenever the lives of Lebanese civilians were endangered. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah gave the Islamic Resistance the status of an autonomous body, able to deal with the day-to-day attacks on Israeli targets without having to refer to the leadership in Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They would fire a couple of rocket-propelled grenades themselves and this has on some occasions nearly got the elite forces in trouble because it immediately attracted Israeli anti-fire which got them cut off when they were withdrawing.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They have taken the Israeli troops by surprise by no longer restricting their attacks to the front line, but by sometimes taking them to the depths of the ‘security zone’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Having done so the group has not only laid the usual roadside bomb, but has initiated attacks against Israeli positions using heavy-calibre weapons ranging from artillery tank fire to surface-to-air missiles and heavy machine-gun fire. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It is these bolder, but effective measures of fighting which have taken the Israeli forces by surprise and caused concern amongst their generals. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
scrutinised the types of weapons used by the enemy, how they used them and what their effects were, as well as studying the psychological effects of our operations against the Israeli soldiers and the psychological state in which the soldiers returned to Lebanon to fight. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah was determined to prove the effectiveness of its Resistance against the Israeli occupation and with each broadcast the Party of God gained new momentum and a new influx of recruits. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On at least two significant occasions, Israeli efforts to distance the Lebanese public from the Islamic Resistance and Hezbollah have failed. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On 16 February 1992, Israeli helicopter gunships carried out an air attack against Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Sayyed Abbas Musawi, killing him, his wife and one-year-old baby as well as the escorts and T~ Smims STRIKE BACK 43 bodyguards driving in his motorcade. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The situation in South Lebanon deteriorated after that; Hezbollah and the Israeli forces became locked in a chain of tit-for-tat attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Islamic Resistance increased its attacks on Israeli forces in the ‘security zone’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Between 1992 and 1993 the Islamic Resistance undertook more daring attacks against Israeli troops. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Party of God had quickly registered the tolerance of many Shiite Muslims towards the Israeli army and immediately sought to bring its influence to bear. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Over the next two years, Hezbollah continued to operate underground from its main base, Baalbeck, in the eastern Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was also close to Syria, giving Hezbollah the freedom of movement to travel to fran. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Islamic Amal had been started by Hussein Musawi in 1982, following Musawi’s objections to Nabih Bern’s political stance towards the Israeli invasion. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For many Lebanese, resentment towards the American administration reached its height during the 1982 invasion when it failed to denounce the Israeli bombardment and the killing of thousands of innocent civilians. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It is a religious obligation that falls within their concept ofjihad and they are determined to continue the fight until Lebanese soil is liberated and every Israeli soldier has withdrawn from the country. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israel seized Syria’s Golan Heights during the Six Day War in 1967 and annexed them in 1981. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At the assailant’s own request, his identity was only revealed two and a half years later: he had believed that South Lebanon would be liberated from Israeli occupation by then and had wanted to protect his family from reprisals. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israeli tanks had even personally delivered deputies to the election post to ensure a forum for Gemayel’s election, but their efforts to shape Lebanon’s political future were to be in vain: Gemayel was assassinated less than a month after the elections in an explosion which blew up the Lebanese Forces’ headquarters in East Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The US hoped to bring about the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli troops from Lebanon as part of a comprehensive peace Hezbollah 78 initiative, but neither the Syrians nor the Lebanese wished to see Israel rewarded for its invasion. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘The image of the US multinational force, in the eyes of the factional militias, had become pro-Israeli, pro-Phalange and anti-Muslim,’ declared the Long Commission’s investigation into the bombings.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Iran was outraged by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and had resolved to help the Lebanese Muslims.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Syria, meanwhile, had its own agenda. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The two would embark on a counter-offensive, using their Lebanese Muslim proxies, that would eventually lead to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces into their self-declared ‘security zone’ in the spring of 1985 and the abrogation of the US-sponsored Israeli— Lebanon peace accord. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In their eyes, the United States was largely responsible for the Israeli invasion in not having taken a tougher stance against the Jewish State. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
According to Israeli sources, the blast killed twenty-nine Israeli troops and wounded more than thirty. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Given Hussein’s symbolic stature, the Shiites were bound to be severely provoked by the Israelis’ interruption of the Ashura festival in Nabatiyeh in October 1983. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s human bombs have taken the same message to heart. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Some Muslims, however, who lost their lives in human bomb attacks had not chosen to die in such a manner: when the Israeli military headquarters was attacked in Tyre, Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners in the building were killed in the blasts alongside Israelis. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
With total calmness I shall carry out an attack of my choice hoping to kill the largest number possible of the Israeli enemy. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Take, for example, an Israeli warplane or, better still, the American and British air power in the Gulf War. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He graduated as a civil engineer in the United States and returned home to Lebanon a few years ago. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While Hassan fiddled with his Ml 6 rifle, Israeli warplanes flew over the hills and the men scattered to take up their combat positions. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He is a handsome man with piercing blue eyes. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Israeli army was blockading Beirut and the kidnappers had sensed that the army was about to invade the capital.They Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
needed to move Dodge to the safety of the Bekaa where the Israeli troops had no jurisdiction.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘It was crazy,’ recalled Farid, revealing for the first time how the kidnappers managed to remove Dodge from Beirut under the noses of the Israelis: There was no way for us to move him without him being discovered by the Israeli troops surrounding the city. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The sofa would be placed with other pieces of furniture in a station wagon and it would look like someone was moving house rather than smuggling a hostage out. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
We wanted an end to the Israeli invasion and an end to the Israeli—US-backed efforts to impose a pro-Israeli government in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They had been pushed out of the South and were now trapped in West Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In November a demonstra- tion instigated by the Guards and Lebanese radicals brought thousands of men and women to the barracks to demand the eviction of the Lebanese army which they accused of being a tool in the hands of Bashir Gemayel, and party to Israeli— American scheming against the Muslims. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In a garage at the rear the Amal men found a false wall which, when revolved, revealed several small cells where it is thought Higgins and Buckley were both held after their capture in Southern Lebanon and before they were moved to Hezbollah strongholds. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Sheikh Subhi Tufeili, Hezbollah ‘godfather’ and founder, in the courtyard outside his home in the Bekaa, with bodyguards. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He was resolute in his hostility towards the Israeli occupiers and the Western presence in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the summer of 1982, Mughniyeh had seen his village occupied by the Israeli troops, his Palestinian comrades killed and evicted from Lebanon and their families later massacred in cold blood while the Arab leaders watched from a distance and the Western world and the US issued lame condemnations. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Shortly after the PLO’s eviction from Beirut in August 1982, Mughniyeh was injured when the Israeli-backed Christians unleashed an artillery offensive against the Muslim population of the southern suburbs in full view of the multinational peace- keeping forces and with the support of America’s warships. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the early years of the crusade, the phantom was at its most secret and no one was privy to such information aside from perhaps the leadership of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards themselves. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
As a journalist,Terry Anderson had vividly reported on the ruthlessness of the Israeli invasion and had put his life on the line for the sake of pursuing the truth. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Journalists were not able to change the course of events, but they brought the Israeli blitz of Beirut and the suffering of its people to the attention of the world. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The group’s investments are already taking cane of a large part of its costs with the exception of the funds needed to finance its war against the Israeli occupation in South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah therefore demands that civilians remain in their homes and villages in the face of Israeli threats and reprisals. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
One of Jihad al-Binaa’s first large-scale projects was to rebuild the village of Maydoun, which had been abandoned by its vifiagers in 1985 after a major Israeli ground and air assault. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In one example, a resident of Nabatiyeh, who lives in London, received a telephone call from his vifiage in South Lebanon shortly after the 1996 Israeli offensive. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In the vifiage of Jebaa, in South Lebanon, a major health centre was opened in 1987 to provide assistance to the surround- ing villagers who regularly endure Israeli shelling. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Since the Israeli attacks on Lebanon in 1993 and 1996, the group’s fighters have won the status of national heroes and a greater sector of the population has come to support the Resistance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Following the two major Israeli air and artillery blitzes of July 1993 and April 1996, the Lebanese government began to match Hezbollah’s efforts for the civilian victims in the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
After the Israeli offensive in 1993, ‘Operation Accountability’, Hariri launched the first major government compensation programme for the southern Lebanese. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
One of the soldiers had been carrying a baby in his arms when the Israeli 155mm howitzer artillery shells had suddenly begun to land on 18 April. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Some carried placards: ‘The massacre of Qana is a real witness of Israeli terrorism.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’ was the second time in three years that an Israeli government had launched an extensive military operation against the South to destroy the Islamic Resistance, but Hezbollah had proved to be a more elusive adversary than the Palestinian guerrillas. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘Operation Accountability’, the Israeli government assured the world, was aimed at ‘wiping out Hezbollah terrorist bases’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah 172 Hezbollah, on the other hand, vowed to continue with its attacks against Israel’s ‘security zone’ and its northern borders. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It took a week of intense negotiations to end the Israeli on- slaught against South Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Since the beginning of 1996, approximately fifty Israeli soldiers had been injured. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
An officer was killed in the attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It said that it had heard such standard disclaimers too many times and that Israeli promises to hold military inquiries into such incidents in the past had never materialised. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
If Lebanese civilians and villages outside the zone were to be hit then Israeli settlements and settlers would bear the consequences. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Once again, it activated its Katyusha batteries, unleashing over twenty salvoes of rockets against the Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
An extremist, right-wing Israeli shot Rabin at a peace rally; his intention was to put an end to the peace process.Yitzhak Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Labour government of Rabin and Peres not only faced violent opposition from Israeli extremists, but from Palestinians. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In February 1996, Hamas launched a series of devastating bomb attacks against Israeli civilians in revenge for the murder of the group’s master bomb maker, Yahya Ayash. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Although the Israeli and Palestinian authorities rounded up Hamas and Islamic Jihad officials and actually succeeded in preventing further planned bombings, the damage had already been done.* Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The United States had its own political agenda in the region. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
According to an Israeli economist, Peres used military strikes against Lebanon’s newly built infrastructure in a bid to pressure the Lebanese government and Syria into curbing Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Many military experts later said that Israeli airstrikes were always doomed to be ineffective against small targets such as the mobile Katyushas. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The onslaught sought to alienate the Lebanese civilian population from the Resistance in the hope of ending their support for Hezbollah. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
a.m., Israeli F-16s dropped gravity bombs on what was described as a ‘logistic base of Hezbollah’s’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
popular, nationalistic songs of Marcel Khalife and Ahmad Qaabour, both famous for their Resistance anthems and lyrics on the ‘heroism’ of South Lebanon and the ‘steadfastness’ of its people against Israeli aggression, dominated airtime. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On the third day of the attack, an Israeli helicopter gunship attacked an ambulance packed with fleeing women and children. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
No one could answer Abbas’s heart-wrenching questions. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Two families were instantly killed by an Israeli missile as they evacuated their village following an Israeli ultimatum. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah appealed to the Muslims for a general mobiisation, a call which had in the past drawn thousands of young men and fighters from other parties and Hezbollah 186 militias to support the Party of God’s regular army. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Shortly after the film was shown, the human bombs were scattered along the front lines with one mission in mind: they were to blow themselves up against any Israeli convoys or soldiers in the event of an Israeli ground assault. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They argued that Hezbollah’s Katyusha attacks were a response to Israeli strikes against Lebanese civilians and that Lebanon had a legitimate, recognised international right to resist the occupation of its territory by a foreign country and should not be denounced for taking action against that occupation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
After four hours of discussion and debate, the Council issued a five-line statement agreeing that the fighting should end in Lebanon: The one conclusion I think I can draw as President of the Council from this debate is that all who have spoken are concerned that the fighting, violence and bloodshed should cease once and for all, that the humanitarian needs of the civilian population should be addressed and that the peace process must be sustained. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On the sixth day of the offensive, three Israeli gunboats which had been laying siege to the port of Beirut targeted the highway. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
According to the official Israeli line, individual cars were being targeted based on ‘intelligence information’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
a.m. that morning Israeli helicopter gunships fired several smart missiles at a three-floor building, in the southern front-line town of Nabatiyeh, where a family of eleven had taken refuge. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Their own home was close to an Israeli position.They Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It was a terrible start for Lebanon that day. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Two days before the attack on Qana, the Israeli Prime Minister had said: ‘It is too early to negotiate.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Israeli government had sought to bargain with Lebanon and Syria while keeping them under the pressure of artillery bombardment. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It also called for Hezbollah to be disarmed and for an end to its resistance against Israeli troops in the ‘security zone’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Lebanese government had repeatedly stated that it was not pre- pared to take action against Hezbollah while Israeli troops still occupied South Lebanon, as to do so would be taking sides against a legitimate resistance to occupation and would most certainly plunge the country into civil war. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Their lack of trust had been further underlined when the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had proclaimed, after signing the peace treaty with Arafat, that timetables were not sacred. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The French proposals, on the other hand, mentioned the UN Resolution 425 and considered that any truce to end the current crisis would be a preliminary step towards a later withdrawal of Israeli troops from the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The French did not call for Hezbollah to be disarmed before an Israeli withdrawal; nor did it call for an end to the group’s military activities against the Israeli troops in the ‘security zone’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Once the cease-fire took hold, Hezbollah continued with its operations against Israeli occupying forces and their South THE GRAPES OF WRATH 203 Lebanon Army militia within the ‘security zone’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On the day of the Israeli elections, the Islamic Resistance carried out two attacks in the occupied heartland of Manjayoun. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Four Israeli soldiers were killed and seven others were wounded in the two attacks which also injured several SLA militiamen. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In 1993, the PLO and Israel’s Labour government had achieved the unimaginable. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The following year, the Israeli army had begun its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from part of the West Bank. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Binyamin Netanyahu’s victory in the Israeli elections changed everything. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
His triumph was a blow to the Clinton administration, which had sponsored the peace process. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The atmosphere at this time is charged as Shiites collectively mourn their supreme martyr, Hussein. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
November: first human bomb attack destroys Israeli military headquarters in Tyre. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Common name for southern suburbs of Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Shiite religious centres named after Hussein, also serve as mourning houses and social centres. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
New York: Pantheon, 1988. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
of Balahvar: A Christian Legend of the Buddha The First Russian Radical: Alexander Radishchev 1749—1802 (Published by George Allen & Unwin) The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchji, 16y8—1832 (Published by Columbia University Press) A MODERN HISTORY OF SOVIET GEORGIA DAVID MARSHALL LANG, M.A., D.Lit. Reader in Caucasian Studies in the GROVE PRESS, INC. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The expulsion of the Turks from Eastern Georgia by Shah ‘Abbas was followed by a reign of terror instituted by the Shah with a view to eliminating the more vigorous Georgian princes, and turning the land into a Persian province. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The insurgents planned to restore the monarchy of Imereti. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Amid the festivities and parades arranged in his honour, the Tsar performed an act designed to strike terror into malefactors in high places. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They have proudly declared to the authorities that Cossack whips and sabres, torture by the police and the gendarmerie hold no terror for them! A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
One of these, Gubeli (real name: S. Medzmariashvili) murdered the White Russian General Lyakhov, notorious for his suppression of the Constitutional movement in Persia and his reign of terror in the northern Caucasus under Denikin. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A MODERN HISTORY OP GEORGIA 244 CHAPTER XII THE STALIN ERA: I9z4-~ Industrial development — Georgian agriculture collectivir<ed— The war against the kulaks — ‘Di~r<iness with Success’ — The rise of Beria — The Five-Year Plans — Georgia under the purges — Political reorganization and the Stalin Constitution — The Georgian émigrés — Georgia during World War II — The final terror — Industrial development THE SUPPRESSION of the ~ jurisin was followed by an uneasy calm. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Rector, the noted historian Ivane Javakhishvili (1876—1940), was dismissed from his post and replaced by a professor more in tune with Communist aims; as it turned out, this eclipse probably saved Javakhishvili’s life, since the then Rector of the University was among the purge victims during the terror of 1936—37. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The final terror The last years of Stalin’s life were marked by an intensification of his personal reign of terror. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
OPERATION TERROR 12. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
While the War of the Spooks was raging in the early 1970s, Egypt’s President Sadat was pleading with the Americans to bring Israel to the nego- tiating table. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
198 1—Majid Abu Sharar, a prominent Fatah April 10, 1983—Dr. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I don’t know the answer to that puzzle, and Abu lyad is beyond questioning. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestinians consider him the father of their armed resistance. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Terror was not on their agenda. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For another, the October War of 1973 had opened up prospects for a peaceful settlement, taking the sting out of Palestinian frustrations and making terror seem largely irrelevent. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Within the resistance move- ment, radicals and moderates were quarreling over what had gone wrong and how to proceed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The king himself came to my prison cell and told me I was free.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ABU NIDAL’S FIRST TERRORIST ACT This operation was Abu Nidal’s first act of terror, planned and directed by him from Baghdad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As an acquaintance put it, “For Abu Nidal, self is everything. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A considerable obstacle to this program was his sponsorship of terror- ism. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
in Iraq. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The organization’s main headquarters, in the Sha’lan district As we have seen, Syria was mainly interested in using Abu With Syrian encouragement, Abu Nidal was to wage a terror- ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 125 126 / PATRICK SEALE THE SYRIAN-JORDANIAN WAR There were several strands to the quarrel between President Assad and King Hussein, but two deserve special mention. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
unleashed his hit men against Jordan. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
OPERATION TERROR Yet only a year earlier, skulking in Poland and virtually absent from the scene, he had seemed ready to retire from his terrorist career. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Lebanon, he seemed in danger of losing control as new cadres, in revolt against his policies, tried to rejoin the mainstream Palestinians and give up terror. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
VARIETIES OF TERROR There is hardly a player in the Middle East that has not at one time or another resorted to terror. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Iraq’s government under the Ba’ath was based on terror, as Samir al-Khalil detailed in Republic of Fear Certainly, many of his operations at this time were carried out Abu Nidal knew that if he hit at Western targets while he was ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 229 230 / PATRICK SEALE (1989). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Israel wanted to smash the PLO, quell the Lebanese resistance, maintain its military edge, preempt potential threats to its security, and destabilize its Arab environ- ment. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
I began with the attack on Argov in 1982 but looked more closely at the period 1984—86, when terror in the Middle East was at its height. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Its claim to have renounced terror was obviously a fraud. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Qaddafi himself was too crafty to discuss such operations with Abu Nidal, but his intelligence officers, according to my informants, certainly did—men who specialized in assassination and terror, like Sayyid Qaddaf al-Damm, Abdallah Hijazi, and Salih al-Druqi. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As the principal victims of Abu Nidal’s terror, both in the number of men killed and in the loss of reputation, the PLO was particularly concerned to discover who had penetrated and manipulated Abu Nidal’s organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Dozens of men were murdered in the 1970s, when the organization was based in Iraq. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“I’m a sick man,” he said. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But many Israelis, claiming that the West Bank is an integral part of the “land of Israel,” will kill and die rather than give it up. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
We do not tend to think of an army as terror- ists, and we do not include financial, sexual, or social terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The line between warfare and terror is blurry; nevertheless, certain distinct actions are designed to terrify a civilian population. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
We want to examine the overall impact that terror has had on the Mid- dle East conflict, for both proponents and adversaries of terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As lin- guist and political scientist Noam Chomsky notes, “The Cycle of ‘retaliation’ (by Jews) and ‘terror’ (by Palestinians) can be traced back, step-by-step, for many years, an exercise that will quickly reveal that the terminology belongs to the realm of propaganda, not factual description.”11 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Arab bit- terness increased as Arab nationalism grew more intense.’8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Arab dictators began using that anti-Western feeling to justify their power and avoid dealing with the substantive problems in their countries. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Arab deaths during 1938 due to the revolt were put at 3,717, while 92 Jews and 69 British were killed the same year.39 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They later told residents not to carry identity cards. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In Begin’s words, “The legend of terror goes before a fighting force and wins.”47 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Certainly, a few thousand, the young and the poor, wanted to leave for a possible better life, but the majority of Jews would have stayed had it not been for the underground terror activities. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Historian Noah Lucas agrees with this squeaky-wheel hypothesis, adding that while the PLO terror campaign “earned it little sympathy in the world, it nev- ertheless succeeded in establishing the image of its cause as the quest of a vic- timized people for national self-determination, rather than a neglected refugee problem as it had hitherto been widely regarded.”3° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Newsweek summed it up: “As tragic as it was, the Sinai disaster was clearly not in the same league with the calculated terror and callously executed atrocity in Khartoum.”22 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This new prestige also won over many Pales- tinians since Arafat had tangible proof that his platform was working. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The terror group named itself Black March, after the month of Camp David, the first and last time Abu Nidal used that name.’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A Portuguese bodyguard, the only person apparently alert enough Since 1974 two Middle East performers dabbled in international terror- Paris airport had been the scene of other malicious stupidities in Janu- Chapter 12 Death to the Jews 118 to know what was happening, drew his gun but was killed by the attackers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By a common under- standing no ill words against Syria, Amal’s patron, are spoken. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During the attack on Alia in Madrid just mentioned, FRC terrorists simultaneously bombed the British Airways office, killing one Spanish woman and injuring 26.’~ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Also, six days before, Thatcher had signed an agreement in Amman to sell $500 million worth of arms to Jordan. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Palestinian boys were given life sentences—one had to be tried in juvenile court44—and Abu Abbas was later indicted and sentenced in absentia, a com- mon Italian ploy of avoiding responsibility. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was a one- minute nightmare that left dead and wounded bodies all over the terminal.47 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
One terror expert called it a “step in the right direction,”8 and it received popular backing in the United States. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Finally, in early 1987 the PLO looked as if it would again be united. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The terrorism scare was at its height, the central agenda for the United States government and the press, giving rise to Terror and Force are the only way to triumph over reason. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Why did the Reagan government not storm his settlement and capture him as they did the Achille Lauro hijackers? The FBI called the JDL the second most active terror group in the United States,12 but the government left it alone and bombed Gadaffi. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The hijacking was one of the most covered events in the 1980s. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The following Febru- ary, after interrogating several Palestinians and Khader’s wife, Arja Saloranta, they declared that Khader had had a cell operating there for some years, even though the only terror action in either Norway or Sweden had been the 1973 Lillehammer affair.2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It was common prac- tice for the group to send money to families of members they killed, telling the family that the member was on a secret mission, and if the family asked an FRC member, he would not know. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Historians and researchers have shown that the Zionist militias, including the Haganah, employed systematic terror as well as forced expulsion to clear the land of Palestinians, effectively terrorizing over 750,000 Palestinians into fleeing, a necessary prerequisite to the foundation of a state with a Jewish majority.2 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The real, every- day terror of violent crime continues unabated.”’° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
J. Bowyer Bell, Terror Out of Zion: Irgun, Zvai Leumi, LEHI, and the 4. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Steven, p. 274, states, “More than a hundred Palestinians, all ter- rorists, lost their lives in the action.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Jerusalem Post, 9 October 1981, p. 2; Brian Jenkins, International Terror- ism: A New Mode of Conflict, (Los Angeles: Crescent, 1975), P. 154. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Edward Said, “The Essential Terrorist” in Said and Hitchens, p. 157. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Between 1977 and 1984 it committed 37 acts of terror, according to the FBI. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
10. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
London: Croom Helm, 1984. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New York: Macmillan, 1980. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As for Aden, the site of the British military base and headquarters of Middle East Forces, fida’iyin operations began in mid-1964 and reached their climax during the visit of Anthony Greenwood, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in November 1965. Comtemporary Yemen
Colonel (res.) Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In the United States, the bombings of the World Trade Center in Manhattan and the federal build- ing in Oklahoma City demonstrated to Americans that terrorism could now strike on Main Street. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Terror- ism thrives in the dark and withers when stripped of its deniability. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet it is a fact that today’s domestic and in- ternational terrorists may be identified fairly easily, and it is therefore possible to deter and prevent them from pursuing the policies of terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In 1986, I edited a book on anti-terror theory called Terrorism: How the West Can Win, which advanced an overall strategy for fighting the international terror which then raged around the globe. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Within a short time, policymakers began recognizing that this terror could be defeated, and had to be forcefully confronted. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Indeed, after an interlude of several years in which the vigil against terrorism was relaxed, new forces of do- mestic and international terror have emerged. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In fact, the more removed the target of the attack from any connection to the grievance enunciated by the terrorists, the greater the terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For even in a nation as vast as America, the number of places in which any given terror initia- tive may be incubated or hatched is so small that it can usually be identifed with relative ease. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Klan really was living in a sea of covert and overt sympathy, which sometimes reached as far as protection by local law enforcement officials—hence its longevity and its ability to muster not only terror but actual mass membership reaching millions at its height in the 1930s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
These can and must be distinguished from the tiny splinters at the absolute fringes of democratic society, which may endorse many similar ideas but use them as a pretext to step outside the rubric of the democratic system to resort to violence and terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But by their uninhibited resort to vio- lence and their repeated attacks on civilians, the terror- ists brazenly cross the line between the permissible and the impermissible. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
If the first obstacle to the spread of domestic terror- ism in most democracies is in the realm of political cul- ture, the second is in the realm of operations. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet eventually the FBI was able to catch up with the entire ring. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In the advanced democracies, none of these require- Benjamin Netanyahu 24 ments is easy to meet, and for the same reasons that re- cruitment of terrorists is so difficult. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Unwanted by the American public, the terrorists have neither the support of government officials who, in a non-democratic soci- ety, might share intelligence information with them or fail to take the necessary actions against them—they generally do not have a significant enough backing among citizens who are sympathetic and willing to help fund their activities—nor any piece of territory that has any kind of depth as a home base. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In order to defend such an immense and complex society against terrorism—and the same must be said of other major democracies, such as Britain, France, and Ger- many—there is little choice but to adopt an active posture against terror, taking the initiative to put into use the overwhelming technological and logistical advantages in the hands of law enforcement agencies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Against such active anti-terror activities, the amateur practitioners of domestic terrorism, unschooled in the arts of covert action, do not stand a chance. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But the trouble with such active anti-terror activities is that, unlike pas- sive measures, they do constitute a substantial intrusion on the lives of those who are being monitored. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Indeed, every one of the active steps that a democratic state can take against domestic terror- ists constitutes a certain curtailment of someone’s freedom to speak, assemble, or practice his religion without inter- ference. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
An example of how domestic intelligence work such as that forbidden to the FBI has made all the difference in the European counter-terror effort was provided by Christian Lochte, former head of the Office for the Pro- tection of the Constitution, the branch of the German security services responsible for anti-terror activities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Lochte reports that at first the se- curity services were baffled by the attacks, since they seemed to be part of the neo-Nazi terrorism which had spawned attacks like the 1980 bombing of the Munich Oktoberfest, which had claimed thirteen lives. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet the threat to the basic civic rights of not fighting terrorism are even more debilitating to a free society. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It is evident that such terror-inflicted violations of the civil rights of a people may, if attacks are an extraordi- nary rarity, be insufficient to justify taking any kind of serious action; but it is equally evident that there is some point at which terror becomes by far the bigger threat to citizens’ rights and the time comes to take unflinching action. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The result was a revolution in German criminal law giving the security services an extended right of detention without warrant, as well as a substan- tial removal of constraints on search and seizure. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In fact, the record of active anti-terror techniques, once adopted, has been excellent. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In the wake of active anti- terror action by democratic governments in the 1970s and Benjamin Netanyahu 34 1980s, the most notorious of European domestic terror- ist groups were eliminated one by one, including the Baader-Meinhof, the German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, Action Directe in France, and Ger- many’s bizarre anti-Western neo-Nazi terrorist cells. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Japan’s Red Army withered as the pro- Soviet terror axis of which it was a part disintegrated, eventually all but disappearing under less than over- whelming pressure from the Japanese government. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While the United States and Canada have been hesi- tant to follow the lead of the European states and Japan in moving against their terrorist enemies at home, this is not to say the great democracies on the western side of Benjamin Netanyahu 36 the Atlantic have had no experience with a more ag- gressive anti-terror policy. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In 1970 Canada was faced with a spate of domestic terror at the hands of the Quebecois Liberation Front (FLQ), a tiny separatist group which got as far as blowing up a plane. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But Saddam had several cards up his sleeve that he believed might be able to make the Americans think twice. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Even before the war, the American intelligence community recognized that with the majority of the world’s terrorist networks poised to assault Western tar- gets, the Allied invasion of Kuwait could easily end up being a costly affair even if the Allied troops won the land and air battles handily. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
There was no viable option of passive defense against the terrorists, and the Bush administration concluded that there was no choice but tc Benjamin Netanyahu 38 follow the Europeans’ lead and adopt a more activist pol- icy. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And the result was an unambiguous victory for the Western security services. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The “students” were members of the Islamic Jihad Brigades, one of the six known factions of the Islamic Jihad; this one an organ of the “Western Sector” terror apparatus in Yasir Ara- fat’s Fatah. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What these examples show is that domestic terror- Fighting Terrorism 39 ism—and, as we have just seen, under certain conditions international terrorism as well—can be controlled, re- versed, or defeated outright by the democratic nations. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
There is no question that the United States has the po- litical culture and operational capacity to eviscerate do- mestic terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The question is whether it has yet reached that same moment of truth which brought the major Western European countries to allow their security ser- vices to take the vigorous action needed to uproot the terror in the midst of their societies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Some Americans fear that an active anti-terror strategy would compromise the free, democratic nature of American society. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet in none of the democracies has the adoption of firm anti-terror measures led to a signif- icant or lasting curtailment of individual freedoms. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A good example of the absurdity of shielding terrorist incitement is provided by the case of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian cleric whose Gamaa Isla- miya terror network has been charged with the World Trade Center bombing and with planning attacks on tar- gets such as the Lincoln Tunnel. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At the Jonathan Institute’s 1979 conference, Professor Joseph W. Bishop of Yale University inquired into the question of whether the United States Constitution could be made to square with firm anti-terror measures such as had been adopted in Britain, Germany, and other Eu- ropean democracies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
On the Continent, on the other hand, the responsibility for keep- ing an eye on the activities of the security services is usually concentrated in the hands of the judicial system, which reviews anti-terror actions to make sure that they can be justified out of legitimate concerns for public safety, generally within a specified number of days. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It is the terrorists who are in fact weak, resorting to bombs only because they can get no one to listen to them in any other fashion. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And while such abuses may be relatively unimportant during war- time or when the terror threat appears to be entirely out of control, it is also natural that when the authorities get the upper hand and the threat recedes somewhat, the relative importance of every abuse will grow again, rais- ing the demand for more careful oversight of the security services. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
We need not adopt Spinoza’s particular prescription regarding which kinds of speech are to be regulated in order to preserve democracy. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
That is, democracies have a right and a duty to protect themselves in advance against those who would set out to destroy their societies and extinguish their freedoms. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Sometimes the terror is imported at the initiative of a foreign movement which nevertheless enjoys the support of a sovereign state, at the very least in the form of a benign passivity which encourages the growth of such groups on its own soil. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu 52 As late as 1979, when my colleagues and I had organ- ized one of the first conferences on international terror- ism, there were still many who did not recognize that there was such a thing as international terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As has by now been re- vealed in the wake of the collapse of Soviet Communism in 1989, most of the international terror that plagued the world from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s was the product of an ad hoc alliance between the Soviet bloc and dictatorial Arab regimes. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The proclivity toward terror on the Soviet side had clearly defined origins. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
There “students” were selected for training in a network of training camps in Odessa, Baku, Simferopol, and Tashkent, where they were taught propaganda, bomb making, urban warfare, and assassination techniques. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The willingness to engage in terror, albeit under the control and supervision of the Party hierarchy in Mos- cow, was always part of Soviet Communist internation- alism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But by the 1960s, the nuclear balance of terror between Benjamin Netanyahu 56 the superpowers had cooled any lingering Soviet interest in open confrontations with the West. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
During the 1950s, it still appeared as though containment might fail, and the Communist juggernaut would continue its expansion into Southeast Asia, south- ern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South America. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Terror, of course, had been a staple crop of Middle Eastern politics for a thousand years, since the time of the eleventh-century Shiite As- sassin sect, originally called hashishin, for the hashish with which they drugged themselves to better carry out their deadly attacks against their Seijuk Turkish rulers. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Jewish communities in mandatory Palestine were subjected to campaigns of terror from the 1920s on. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This quasi-independent base was to be the propelling force behind the tidal wave of interna- tional terror which hit the Western democracies in the two decades that followed. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Other states were in some cases willing to take the heat in exchange for Soviet sup- port in other areas; Libya and North Korea, for example, covered for the Soviets by providing a place of refuge for airline hijackers, allowing the Soviets to insist that they were opposed to this particular type of terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Soviets could merely deny knowledge of what was taking place, and the various branches of the PLO would hap- pily collude in a worldwide movement of terror against the Western countries. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In time, the PLO’s newfound playground of hor- rors offered a base of operations and a safe haven for virtually every one of the most notorious terror groups ever to raise its head. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
They cut deals with dozens of terror factions, allowing them to establish head offices in their respective capitals, providing them with training, diplomatic cover, financing, and ref- uge in exchange for terrorist services directed at enemies of their choice. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Arafat’s activities in Lebanon were replicated to differ- ent degrees by Libya, Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Moreover, the mid-1980s saw the West open up a broad and unprece- dented offensive against international terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This offen- sive was first and foremost political; it was intended to expose those countries supporting terror, and to un- equivocally label terrorism as immoral, regardless of the identity of the terrorists and their professed motives. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It was in the context of these efforts that the Jonathan Institute was founded. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The participants at the conference, among them Senator Henry Jackson and George Bush, then a candidate for the U.S. presidency, provided evidence of the direct involvement of the East- ern bloc and Arab regimes in spawning international ter- ror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The idea that terror- ism was not merely a random collection of violent acts by desperate individuals but a means of purposeful war- fare pursued by states and international organizations was at that time simply too much for many to believe. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From the beginning of my involvement with the Jon- athan Institute, and later in my tenure as a diplomat, I believed that the key to the elimination of international terror was having the United States lead the battle, and that this American leadership would harness the coun- tries of the free world into line, much as a powerful locomotive pulls the cars of a train. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Since the view that prevailed in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s held that terrorism was the result of political and social oppression, the inescapable conclusion was that terror could not be eliminated without first bringing these conditions to an end. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
First, it must refuse to yield to ter- rorist demands; and second, it must be ready to confront the regimes sponsoring terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The bombings left many hundreds dead, including 240 American Ma- Fighting Terrorism 67 rifles. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
“These terror- ists aren’t human beings,” he said. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Shultz suggested a series of meetings in which we could work to define what the United States could do in conjunction with the other countries of the free world to uproot the terrorist scourge. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The growing under- standing of the nature of terrorist methods, combined with the very real threat of further American operations against terrorist bases and terrorist states around the world, undermined the foundations on which interna- tional terror had been built. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Despite the setbacks, the Reagan—Shultz anti-terror policy of the 1980s was an immense overall success. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
There is no one-step solution available in which the democracies take forceful action against the sources of terror and then proceed to forget about the problem. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And as long as they retain their dictatorial nature, they will retain their proclivity for terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After their impressive victories, some of the Western se- curity services quickly relaxed their anti-terror posture in the pursuit of terrorist cells on their home turf. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The results of the Gulf War were hardly decisive in discouraging terror from the Middle East. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Since the Madrid Peace Conference convened by the United States and Russia after the war, the Western countries have seldom, if ever, demanded that Syria clearly cease its sponsorship of terror or that it dismantle the headquarters of the dozen terrorist movements based in Damascus, lest such “upsetting” efforts drive the Syr- ian dictator, Hafez Assad, away from the Western orbit. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Most prominent is the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who rose to prominence in the Khomeinist Shiite revolution in Iran in 1979 and soon afterward sent expeditionary forces to Lebanon. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Iran, Hizballah, and their satellite organizations have rapidly replaced both Communism and Pan-Arab fas- cism as the driving force behind international terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But while many people are aware of this Iranian prac- tice, few have yet recognized that the Iranian-sponsored terrorist web is not the only source of militant Islamic terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Germany, too, has become an epicenter of militant European Islamic activities, not only including organi- zations affiliated with the Iranian-Shiite and Sunni Mu- jahdeen terrorist networks but also those serving as the base for a third militant Islamic terror movement—a fa- natical Turkish Islamic terrorism which has found a ha- ven among the two-million-strong Turkish community in Germany. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Jihad in America (PBS, final script, November 21, 1994; Executive Producer, Steve Emerson, p. 16). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While the United States is certainly not a state sponsor of terror, it has nonetheless become an unwitting state incubator of ter- ror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Within a year and a half after Oslo, the agreement heralded by the Labor government as “the end to terror,” acts of terror against Israel had reached unprecedented dimensions. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The revolutionaries in Algeria and Vietnam talked peace and fought at the Fighting Terrorism 105 same time”5—that is, just as the FLN “talked peace” before completely driving the French out of Algeria, and just as the North Vietnamese “talked peace” before com- pletely driving the United States out of Vietnam (peace talks for which Henry Kissinger and his Vietnamese counterpart were granted the Nobel Peace Prize), so, too, could the PLO talk peace until Israel had been com- pletely driven out of “Palestine”—which is to say, all of Israel. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Just as free-trade zones encourage trade, the creation of any “free-terror zone” is bound to encourage terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
To understand how Gaza under the PLO facilitated terror, it is enough to imagine how ter- rorism would multiply in the United States if, say, Wich- ita, Kansas, were a free-terror zone, Gaza-style. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Gaza under Arafat has thus become a unique Islamic base, with solid links in two directions—westward to the United States and Europe, eastward (through Hizballah) to Iran. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Even now, it is possible to correct the mistakes which the Labor government has made in its efforts to appease Palestinian terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
We can only shudder at the consequences for the world if Hitler’s mad antipathies had been wed- ded to nuclear weapons. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Just as Soviet-Arab terror- ism produced its imitators, so, too, the growth of this kind of chaos is bound to have an effect on its would-be imitators. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In general, the dosage of these sanctions should be on an escalating scale, beginning with closing down embassies, proceeding to trade sanctions, and, if this fails, considering the possibility of military strikes such as those delivered against Libya in 1986, which all but put this fanatical regime out of the terror- ism business. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It is not enough any- more that Syria merely continues to appear on Washing- ton’s list of states sponsoring terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Involvement in any stage of this process is tantamount to directly facilitating lethal terror and should be regarded as a crime of that magnitude. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The American counter-terror bill more or less takes this step by outlawing fund-raising for any organization designated by the President to be a terrorist group. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Permit investigation of groups preaching terror and planning the violent overthrow of the government. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Sur- veillance of and intelligence gathering on groups ex- horting violence and suspected of planning violent attacks must be permitted. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Potential sources of terror particular provisions in question can be jettisoned automatically. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
emphasis must be placed on the training of special units equipped for anti-terror operations. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In anti-terror training, law enforcers learn to fight a completely dif- Benjamin Netanyahu Do not release jailed terrorists. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But the likelihood of avoiding such catastrophes is considerably increased if the forces involved are proficient in anti-terror techniques. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It is therefore important that units of local police forces be trained in anti-terror tactics as well. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But it has also had its share of spectacular failures, the worst of which was the loss of twenty-six schoolchildren being Fighting Terrorism 145 held hostage in a school building in Maalot. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What is crucial to recognize is that the risk to society of not challenging the terrorists forcefully—that is, of negotiating with them and accepting their demands—is far greater than the risk involved in the use of special forces. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
By preparing terrorism- education programs for various age groups and including 146 them in the school curriculum, the government can in- oculate the population against the impulse to give in when faced with protracted terrorist pressure. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
With such a program of steadfast resistance to the ris- ing tide of terror, the United States may once again lead the West, as it did in the 1980s, in successfully fighting terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Terrorists may test this resolution a number of times before they draw back, and a gov- ernment has to be prepared to sustain its anti-terror Fighting Terrorism 147 policies through shrill criticism, anxious calls to give in to terrorists’ demands, and even responses of panic. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And seldom has there been a menace that so called for the courage and resolve of the true statesman as the resurgent terror which threatens to rob us of the freedoms and values we so cherish. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yigal Carmon, former Prime Minister’s adviser on terror- ism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Source for militant Islamic activity in Europe, except where otherwise indicated: Yigal Carmon, formerly Ad- viser to the Prime Minister on Terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Because of such, its [Palestine’s] liberation is obligatory on every Mus- When the problem begins to be resolved on this basis, where all the Ofa truth you are stronger because there is terror in their hearts from God. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Terror is for everyone. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
assassination, as we reject achieving political aims by violent means. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Assad knew that if Hezbollah was persuaded to participate in Lebanon’s parliament and abandon its shroud of terror, the group would gain official political cover. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Not only had France offered sanctuary to members of the Shah’s administration, it had also armed * See The Warriors of Islam, Kenneth Katzman, pp. 95—10 1 ** ‘Iran’s State of Terror’, Time Magazine, 11 November 1996 EXPORT OF A REvoLUTION 111 Iraq in its war against Iran and had frozen Iranian assets. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It is related to each and every newly born organisation with a grievance against the West and the United States and often tops the list of suspects when acts of terror are committed. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
David combined these reforms with a policy of repression and terror against his domestic enemies, directed by his appointed police chief, the mandaturtukhutsesi, who ranked just below the vaziri. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The most long-lived of such models, that of totalitarianism, was designed to link Stalinism with its contemporaries, nazism and fascism, which in their political aspects—one-man rule, applied state terror, economic development through state intervention and direction, ideological conformity, and elevation of the party—seemed quite similar. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Robert Conquest argues that the general secretary was prepar- ing for the “Great Terror” even in the early 1930s but was thwarted by moderates like Kirov. The Making of the Georgian Nation
After an angry exchange with Stalin, Orjonikidze shot himself (February 18, 1937), and all obstacles to the full terrorization of the party and state hierarchy were removed. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The figures are staggering: 57,000 Old Bolsheviks were lost between 1934 and 1939; nearly 300,000 Communists were expelled from the party in 1937—1938; 110 of the 139 members and candidates of the Central Com- mittee elected in 1934 were arrested and many perished, including Politburo members V. Ia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Terror did not end altogether, however. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The un- resolved tension between the assimilationist tendencies of urban industrial society and the reconsolidation of Georgian ethnicity had produced an Nationality Policy since Stalin 313 314 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA increasingly potent nationalist mood in all parts of Georgian society—.and The Making of the Georgian Nation
With the end of Stalin- ist terror, Abkhaz leaders pushed to make the republic more Abkhaz. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Lomashvili, Velikii perevorot, p. 306. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Igor Kedrov was arrested and shot; Mikhail Kedrov was arrested in 1939, tried by the military collegium of the Supreme Court, acquitted, but then ordered shot by Beria (Leningradskaia pravda, February 25, 1964; Werner G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946—53 [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982], pp. 163—64; Levytsky, Stalinist Terror, pp. 485—89). The Making of the Georgian Nation
See, for example, Getty, Origins of the Great Purges; Gabor T. Rittersporn, See the interesting essay by Francesco Benvenuti, “Kirov in Soviet Politics, Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties (London Conquest, Great Terror, pp. 58—60. The Making of the Georgian Nation
L. Beria, On the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia, Notes for pages 266 to 272 389 390 Notes for pages 272 to 276 Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Party Functionaries, July 2 1—22, 1935 (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), p. 35; Pravda, June 8, i93S; Conquest, Great Terror, p. 88. The Making of the Georgian Nation
See Shelepin’s speech at the Twenty-second Party Congress, Kommunist (Erevan), November 15, 1961; November 28, 1963; Conquest, Great Terror, pp. 248—49; Medvedev, Let History Judge, pp. 367—68. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Bertram D. Wolfe, Khrushchev and Stalin’s Ghost: Text, Background and Meaning of Khrushchev’s Secret Report to the Twentieth Congress on the Night of February 24—25, 1956 (London: Atlantic Press, 1957), p. 173; Conquest, Great Terror, p. 155. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Conquest, Great Terror, pp. 248—49. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Zaria vostoka, no. 195, August 26, 1937; typed copy is available in the archives of the Hoover Institution, (ms) DK 511 G47T88; Conquest, Great Terror, pp. 249—50. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Beria flew to Moscow, met with Stalin, and instead of going to jail was soon positioned to replace Ezhov (Gazarian, “0 Berii,” pp. 119—20; Conquest, Great Terror, p. 452). The Making of the Georgian Nation
Conquest, Great Terror, pp. 464—65; Gazarian, “0 Berii,” p. 120. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The word terrorism was first used after the French Revolution, when a wave of terrore swept across the country in a cycle of retaliation and rash exe- cutions. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By God, by your country, by your brothers, by your patriotism, by your relig- ion~ let not the hated aggressive Coloniser terrorise you with his arms. A History of Modern Yemen
The degree to which ordinary citizens were terrorised was exaggerated by Western propaganda, and it was worse in the early 1970S than later (Lackner 1985: 74—5). A History of Modern Yemen
Islamic Jihad threatened, terrorised and claimed responsibility for a chain of horrendous attacks.Yet Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The emergence of the freelance kidnappers was a particularly sinister side-effect of an already terrorising phenomenon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The operation did, however, succeed in terrorising and killing over 165 civilians. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The argument did not convince the Lebanese: the Islamic Resistance, which was mainly based in South Lebanon, did not depend on daily supplies from Beirut Hezbollah 190 and would not have used the Beirut—Sidon highway in any case. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The landlords had never forgiven him the reform of 1861, while the peasants found that the yoke of serfdom had been replaced by the burden of poverty and debt. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Orgeiani’, to edit one of the first Russian anarchist papers, K.bleb i Vo(ya or Bread anti Libertj. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Despite all repressions, the Georgian revolutionary move- ment continued to gather momentum. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
They saw that if the Tsar granted a truly democratic, parliamentary régime to Russia, with safeguards to the rights of national minorities, then support for terrorism would wither away amid the general rejoicing, and the prospect of a Marxian millennium would recede into the distant future. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The workers, they believed, should renounce terrorism and lay down their arms. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Nor, when occasion demanded, did they renounce the weapon of terrorism. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
As Zhordania writes in his memoirs: ‘We abandoned terrorism as a method of overthrowing autocracy, in the fashion conceived by the Narodniks, but did not reject it as a weapon for self-preservation and for the sowing of panic among the political authorities.’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Whatever the truth concerning lila’s murder, the summer of 1907 was marked by a revival of Bolshevik terrorism in the Caucasus. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Beria ingratiated himself further with Stalin by building up the famous ‘personality cult’. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
As in Russia itself, the holocaust in Georgia was carried to diabolical lengths. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Universal horror was excited by the execution of two of Georgia’s greatest national writers, the novelist Mikheil Javakhishvili and the poet Titsian Tabidze, the latter a close friend of Boris Pasternak, who knew him as ‘a reserved and complicated soul, wholly attracted to the good and capable of clairvoyance and self-sacrifice’.’15 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Terrorism. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Terrorism in mass media. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But it was soon clear that he had something else on his mind. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Leaning forward and talking very fast as was his habit, he told me that there was no other plausible explanation for the evidence that had accumulated over the years. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
January 3, 1977—Mahmud Salih, a PLO representative in January 4, 1978—Sa’id Hammami, PLO representative in June 15, 1 978—Ali Yassin, PLO representative in Ku- August 3, 1978—Izz al-Din Qalaq, PLO representative in August 5, 1978—YusifAbu Hantash, PLO representative January 22, 1979—Ali Hassan Salameh, head of Arafat’s April 22, 1980—Abu lyad (or, to give him his real name, June 1, 198 1—Na’im Khudr, PLO representative in Brus- July 27, 198 1—Abu Dawud (or, by his real name, October 8, 198 1—Abu Tariq (or, by his real name, Sulai- October .9, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After 1977 Abu Nidal began killing Palestinian moderates—”doves” who wanted to ne- gotiate with Israel, not to bomb it out of existence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was in particular much impressed by the Irgun, the brainchild of the Russian-born agitator Vladimir Jabotinsky, who called for the unabashed use of force—an “iron wall”—against the Arabs to establish full Jewish sovereignty over both banks of the Jordan, an agenda adopted by his loyal disciples Yitzhak Shamir and Menachem Begin. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Some fighters, with little grasp of reality, imagined that Tal’s disappearance would allow them to return to Jordan and resume their fight against Israel from there. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
No one, it seemed, was ready to accept the Palestinian resistance movement as a serious political force. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As a chal- lenge of sorts, he threw himself into terrorism, as if to convince those Palestinians already engaged in it that he was stronger and more effective than they were. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The despair that had produced the violence of Black September now gave way to optimism. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
not honored our agreement to hand the gunmen over to the PLO? I had, after all, saved his reputation by resolving the crisis peace- fully. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Syrians were careful to stay in the background, not wishing to be obviously implicated in terrorism. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Several Western leaders called for a joint strategy to combat Libyan-sponsored terrorism, prompting Qaddafi to re- tort defiantly that he would “hurt” countries that conspired against him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
was the Syrians’ refusal to recognize that he had any political legiti- macy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If he could be encouraged to kill Arafat loyalists, so much the better. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After 1974, he became something more deadly: He split the Palestinian movement, identified it with terrorism, and then silenced the moderates by killing them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Sartawi tipped off the Austrian police: Fatah was then cooperating with the Austrians, and with other European police forces, to frustrate Abu Nidal’s terrorism. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For decades, Israel has armed the Kurds against Baghdad, the southern Sudanese against Khartoum, and the Maronites in Leba- non against the Palestinians, as Conor Gearty has suggested in Terror (1991). Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
nald Reagan declares: “We must not be driven from our objec- tives for peace in Lebanon by state-sponsored terrorism.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Edited by Israel’s UN twenty-five Israeli settlers for involvement in a Jewish terrorist underground. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The bomb’s detonator was disguised as a pocket calculator. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When Pan Am 103 was downed oven Lockerbie, Scotland—an act of terrorism with which he had no connection—he said with an air of mystery, ac- cording to one of his associates, “We do have some involvement in this matter, but if anyone so much as mentions it, I will kill him with my own hands!” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
This motley group of hostages was eventually freed—but only in installments. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal has tried to establish more of a presence in Western In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Abu Nidal made Istanbul the Another is Britain. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A committee of Czechs, Hungarians, and East Germans met monthly to pool information on terrorism, and a larger com- mittee, on which all Warsaw Pact members were represented, also met at intervals to review the security situation throughout the bloc. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As a result, from 1980 to 1985, Yugoslavia became the organizational center for Abu Nidal’s European operations. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They also felt the time had come to distance themselves from terrorism and demanded more of a say in policy making. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
For the first two hours, Abu Nizar had sounded like Abu Nidal’s official mouth- piece. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He kept getting up and then sitting down. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
By May of that year, Atif Abu Bakr had had enough. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They an- nounced the formation of an Emergency Leadership, with the de- clared aim of taking control of the organization and punishing the criminal Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Heyday 16. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Manufactured in the United States of America McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Box 611, Jefferson, North Carolina 28640 p. cm. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
These are harsh judgments against both sides, and few people involved in the conflict will acknowledge them, but they are necessary before we can make a meaningful assessment of terrorism’s effectiveness. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the Palestinian terrorist attack on the 1972 Munich Olympics, the subject of terrorism was raised at the United Nations, and since then there have been dozens of international conventions and proclamations, backed by an anti-terrorism intelligence network which spends $30 billion a year and in the United States alone employs 18,000 peo- ple.4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Today we use the word terrorism to describe the activities of small polit- ically inspired groups, but it has become an obscure concept, lacking a precise definition, associated with propaganda rather than impartial principles. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Clearly, blowing up a hotel or civil airplane or placing a car bomb in a market is an act of terrorism, but terrorism experts would likely hold differing opinions about blowing up a military compound or bombing a military airport, operations which better fall under the category of warfare. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Finally, we want to see which measures are effective against terrorism or political violence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They sent the British embassy in Rome a parcel bomb—a crude device, but when it exploded in late 1946, it set, as the Sunday Times said a quarter-century later, a new precedent in the world of international terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the two sergeants were found hanged, British soldiers ran out into the streets of Tel Aviv, shooting indiscriminately, killing five and wounding fifteen, and the news triggered anti—Semitic riots in Eng- land.27 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But the rifle made such a terrible noise. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
For their part, the Palestinians failed to organize a mass movement; they were disunited, under weak leadership, and unable to enlist a military force to fight a conventional war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On March 18, 1968, an Israeli school bus ran over a mine, killing a doctor and wounding several children. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
I recall one TV com- mentator making a bold speech in which he had the guts to say that among his friends were Arab Americans and that we should not condemn the whole lot of those rotten people. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Palestinians became not a people but a problem that filled UNRWA statistics and United Nations documents. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
try when he was 13, and although he acted alone (contrary to conspiracy the- ories),2 the assassination could be called the first act of Palestinian interna- tional terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
PFLP international terrorism was not restricted to airports. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Thereafter, hijackings and attacks on airports became more difficult, requiring well-funded, well-organized groups. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terrorism did, however, give Palestinians the dark, fearsome image from which they have never been able to escape. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When discussing terrorism with the Israelis, Nixon startled his hosts by leaping from his seat and declaring that there was only one way to deal with terrorists. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As a terrorist organization, Black September was well organized and proba- bly not penetrated. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Fewer than half a dozen people a year get shot in Norway, and this was Norway’s first encounter with interna- tional terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Soldiers stormed the build- ing using bazookas and automatics, killing the three gunmen as well as 20 of the children. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After 1974 almost all Palestinian acts of terrorism were carried out by the Abu Nidal group. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was one of the must brutal acts of international terrorism in the 1970s. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He issued a dictum that no United States government could negotiate with the PLO because of terrorism, making it the issue central of the dispute. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Then he realized he was my rela- tive. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The caller came to his office, took out a gun and shot Hammami three times, killing him instantly. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Four PLO officials offered themselves as hostages and were taken aboard the plane. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Someone called a newspaper and said that it was an action of the PFLP. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The recruiter asked nothing of him, just helped him out of a tight situation, and in Sep- tember arranged for him to go to London. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But this prototypal meeting was held in late April 1985, when the attention of the world, espe- cially the United States, became obsessively focused on this small band of pirates’ outside operations: terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They had offices and businesses and student cells and weapon deposits in many cities, but Damascus remained the base during that period. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They always met during deadtime, early in the morning or late at night, when few people notice who walks the streets. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal takes This meeting is a copy of a Politburo meeting that took place two days 14. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It says that the bakery run by the FRC can’t get flour. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It doesn’t say that the Abu Nidal group— the Council, as they call it—is the only Palestinian group in the camp that has not united with the others against their common enemy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
FRC is always trying to pass itself off as a regular Palestinian organiza- tion, since all such organizations have fighters in Lebanon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Both Andreotti and Craxi, the now discredited heads of the two major ruling parties, were personal friends of PLO leaders. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Although Gadaffi bankrolled and supported the PLF, Abu Abbas was also a PLO loyalist, and when Arafat failed to denounce Abu Abbas, it was difficult for the PLO to avoid the terrorism rap in both the Achille Lauro case and the 1990 beach raid. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
All means for stopping terrorism now seemed justified. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal made his mark as the grand terrorist in these dual actions that would always haunt the Palestinians, justifying the phrase Palestinian terror- ists.48 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Whenever Syria acquired weapons from the Soviet Union, the Israelis would exaggerate their impact, omitting the fact that the weapons were defensive since Syria feared an Israeli attack. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Bakr claims that he was not threatening but giv- ing examples of what he called American-sponsored terrorism against Cuba and Angola. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chirac added, “I am always suspicious of this sort of affair [terrorism and Hindawi], especially when it fits into a cer- tain policy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
FRC deserters say that their group provided Said, FRC’s liaison with Syria, the explosives Hindawi gave to Murphy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal had given two rare newspaper interviews in which he struck a conciliatory tone and began talking modera- tion.17 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terrorism succeeded. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In terrorism studies the incident is hardly mentioned. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Questionable 1980s 171 172 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Three PLO officials killed by car bomb in Limassol, Cyprus, February 1988. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They had no popular support, and those who were wise to terrorism were telling me that in reality they did not exist. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal never mixed finance with terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, Najmeddin had an FRC account in the London branch of the fraudulent BCCI containing $60 million, with the knowledge of British authorities.16 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Less than two weeks later the Intifada began after eight Palestinians were killed by a truck, but many people believe that Aker, who became known as a Pales- tinian Rambo, sparked the revolt. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
ernment’s obsession with terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Reagan administration created a terrorism office whose director held ambassadorial rank and “enjoyed direct access to Shultz.”4 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terrorism experts were talking about trends, cit- ing the Achille Lauro (as if one action makes a trend), and formulating an inter- national conspiracy logic. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Professor Edward Said sums it up: Today’s discourse on terrorism is an altogether more streamlined thing. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Most writing about terrorism is brief, pithy, totally devoid of scholarly armature of evidence, proof, argu- ment... Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The worst aspect of the terrorism scam, intellectually speaking, is that there seems to be so little resistance to its massively inflated claims, undocumented allegations and ridiculous tautologies.6 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Coverage of terrorism is often selective. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terrorism pays well. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There were about 400 people aboard when gunmen But terrorism is not a matter of guns and killing; editorial decisions of Terrorism has also become a business for companies who manufacture Six weeks after the Achille Lauro affair, an Egypt Airlines flight with 97 We have already discussed the 1986 takeover of the Pan American flight 18. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terrorists, terrorists, terrorists. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Its scholarship is yesterday’s newspapers or today’s CNN bulletin. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mean- while, as the ship was under the control of the gunmen, the JDL planted a bomb at the Los Angeles office of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, killing a 41-year-old Arab American, Alex Odeh. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
While it may be true that Arabs are mostly the victims of terrorism rather than its manufacturers, they have little idea that headline-catching, sensation-grabbing, individual operations focus negative attention on the perpetrators much more than an army bombing civilians, even though such bombing inflames violence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Those who use terrorism usually justify it by the military actions against them. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Let us examine three examples of Shia (Shiite) terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This is the birth of terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Secretary of State George Shultz claimed that the New Jersey was protecting United States citizens. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, in September the United States opened fire on Druze and Syrian-backed positions near Souk al-Gharb using the large guns of the USS New Jersey. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The shells from these guns are as heavy as a small car, and because they are fired from such a distance, they have little accuracy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This decision was 18. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Holy Wars and Hollywood 189 190 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Above: Cemetery in Beirut, where, as in other Arab cities, Jews lived in large num- bers; below: Beirut’s Green Line separating east and west. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
I&P Report and other sources claim that the Mossad helped in the April, 1983, truck bombing of the American embassy, killing 63 people, includ- ing the entire CIA stafl who were having a meeting at the time of the attack under the leadership of Robert Ames, a senior Middle East intelligence ana- lyst who was investigating terrorism.30 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It seems unlikely that someone could have made such a huge error about the island-hopping ship. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A few days before the killing Syrian defense chief Mustafa Tlass, who has a major publishing business on the side, visited Athens, and it is thought that he gave his approval for Nimri’s demise. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
During the 1970s and 1980s warfare accelerated, espe- cially in Lebanon, accompanied by a broader use of terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Stern and Irgun terrorism convinced the British to abandon Palestine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the period leading up to Israel’s statehood the British were already prepared to withdraw, and while the Israeli armies were successful in the 1948 war, they dramatically failed to create a safe state. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel’s military expenditure over the next decades drained the country’s economy, not to mention the moral or spir- itual costs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Had it not been for a massive and continuous infusion of foreign capital from the United States and Europe, Israel would never have been a viable state. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Almost every knowledgeable person acknowledges connections between Abu Nidal and the Mossad. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Another certain conclusion is that reprisals, often called counter-terrorism, have been entirely inef- fective in stopping terrorist operations. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Re- prisals only raised the level of conflict. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the Middle East, terrorism became a form of war for the less power- ful, and it cannot be properly discussed without considering the military actions of the enemy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Gerard Chaliand notes, “The weaker the guerrilla move- ment is, the stronger the temptation to turn to urban terrorism.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Regarding the late 1960s, Chaliand observes, “For the Palestinians ... the use of transna- tional terrorism was also an admission of powerlessness.”7 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But we have to be careful not to consider all terrorism equal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Refusing to negotiate has not diminished the amount of violence, and there is no evidence that “giving in” in hostage situ- ations encourages more terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
six months of 1993 there were 11 violent deaths in Belfast, a city synonymous with terrorism, while Washington, D.C., during the same time experienced 230 murders. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the end, it did not matter Political violence does not seem to be successful unless it has a mass fol- Commando operations against those who are holding hostages fail more Concentrating on terrorism is a way of avoiding larger issues. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the first The war against Middle East terrorism did not work. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It would be unrealistic to think that these groups would abandon their cause because their opposition is more powerful. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Human nature does not work that way. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Extrem- ists are either immature (and therefore dangerous), or they are saboteurs, and events in the Middle East were run by the immature and the saboteurs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The glorification of thugs encourages more thuggery. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The League of Nations met in Geneva in 1937 to discuss the issue and drafted the first conventions against terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Cultural Industry,” in Western State Terrorism, Alexander George, ed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Current Perspec- tives on International Terrorism (New York: St. Martin’s, 1988, p. 4). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Slater and Michael Stohl say that “terrorism is a purposeful act Edmund Ghareeb, ed., Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Shaw Commission, which issued its report in 1930, upheld the Arab 8. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Edgar O’Ballance, Terrorism in the 1980s (1989), pp. 24—28. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Notes—Chapter 2 221 222 Notes—Chapter 3 51. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
American officials played a key role in37. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Bean Grosscup, The Explosion of Terrorism (New York: New Horizon, 1987), p. 249. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Both quotes cited in Noam Chomsky, “Middle East Terrorism and the 52. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
14. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Richard Thackray, Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence (London: Rout- ledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 37. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
John Abraham H. Miller, Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations (Boulder CO: Notes— Chapter 6 229 230 Notes—Chapter 6 16. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New York Times, 18 December 1973, p. 1, 18. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Reuters (Rome), 23 May 1989; Reader’s Digest, October 1986, p. 156. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Yeshayahu Ben-Ponat, Eitan Haber, and Zeev Schiff, Entebbe Rescue (New York: Delacorte, 1977). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Yehoshua Porath, cited by Chomsky, “Middle East Terrorism...” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Notes— Chapter 13 237 238 Notes—Chapters 14; 15 Chapter 14 1. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Noam Chomsky, “International Terrorism: Image and Reality,” in George, claims that Claire Sterling’s The Terror Network became the founding document of the Reagan government, even though it “was soon exposed as a worthless propaganda tract.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Mossad chief Isser Hare! Arab and Israeli Terrorism
said, “The PLO is organizing terrorism all over the world.... Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chomsky, “Middle East Terrorism...,” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Asaf Hussain, Political Terrorism and the State in the Middle East (Lon- don: Mansell, 1988, p. 128), says the cruise was advertised in the New York Times with the slogan, “Come for a cruise with Maureen Reagan in the fall,” but the United States president’s eldest daughter was not on the ship. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Almost every terrorism book discusses this event; the New York Times had exhaustive coverage. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Italian national police respond to all internal matters, which is why the army was not called out, even though it was a military base. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Wolf Blitzer in Jerusalem Post, 26 September 1986, p. 17, adds that the bombing had important political benefits for Israel since it demonstrated Israeli use of “legitimate self-defense” in its bombings of Arab countries. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
(New York: Pergamon-Brassey, 1989), P. 218. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1991), pp. 1, 2: 17 Americans were killed abroad by terrorists that year. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Julius Emeka Okolo, “Nigerian Politics and the Dikko Affair,” in Terrorism (Washing- ton), vol. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chris Ryan, Thurism, Terrorism and Violence (London: Research Institute Roy L. Cleveland, The Middle East and South Asia 1984 (Washington: Al-Zahfal-Akhdar (Tripoli), 11 March 1985; CIA “FBIS Trends,” 8 Jan- Al Qabas (Kuwait), 7 May 1987, Al-Tadamun (London), 9 May 1987; see London Times, 13 April 1987, P. 7. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Five FRC members were con- victed but released after only 3 years in prison, the U.S. State Department calling the release reprehensible and an insult (14 January 1991 dispatch, p. 32). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At one time the FRC had relations with members of international revolu- tionary movements such as Action Directe, but they lost those, although they con- tinued to claim otherwise; for instance, they claimed to have participated in the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Thatcher in Brighton. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
David E. Long, deputy director of the Office of Counter Terrorism, wrote The Anatomy of Terrorism (New York: Free Press, 1990), which shows a limited and inaccurate knowledge of the Arab World and of conflict, reflecting poorly on the department’s ability. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
justice which will lead to more terrorism, but they offered no alternative, San Fran- cisco Examiner, 21 April 1988, P. All; La Repubblica, 16 April and 21 April 1988, 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Richard Rubenstein, Akhemists of Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern 9. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On June 7, 1991, the district Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism in the United States during 1985,” in Wilkin- Intelligence Newsletter, no. 119,12 April 1989, Pp. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
United States, Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1988,” To use an example from International Affairs (an English version of a This is described in Meade. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Intelligence Newsletter, no. 121, 10 May 1989, p. 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Schultz, P. 644. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On July 30, 1988, police in Lima, Peru, broke up a small FRC that was 4. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chaliand, P. 55. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terrorism: From Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Culture of Terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe After 1992. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Never-Ending War: Terrorism in the 80’s. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Freedman, Lawrence Zehic, and Yonah Alexander, eds. Perspectives on Terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Gally, Laurent. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Living by the Sword:America and Israel in the Middle East 1968—87. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
London: Wei- denfeld and Nicolson, 1984. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Hart, Alan. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sadat. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Preparedfor the Worst: Selected Essays and Minority Reports. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
London: Zed, 1982. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
London: Pluto, 1986. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
London: Ithaca, 1978. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Boston: Little, Brown, 1987. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Litvinoff, Barnet. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Love, Kenneth. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
London: Macmillan, 1989. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
McCullin, Don. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Washington DC: Institute for Pales- tine Studies, 1992. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Count Folke Bernadotte. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
_____ Todd Sandler, and Jean Murdock. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Perdue, William D. Terrorism and the State. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Posner, Steve. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The WarAgainst the Terrorists. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Robertson, Terence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel’s Secret Terrorism: A Study Based on Moshe Sharett’s Personal Roosevelt, Archie. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
London: Bodley Head, 1989. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
by Sacha Rubinovitch. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Cape Town: Juta, 1984. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Secret Alliance: The Extraordinary Story of the Rescue of the Jews Since World War II. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Boston: Little, Brown, 1976. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Puppet Masters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
File on Arab Terrorism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This situation is bound to continue for years to come, not only to keep the Saudi economy functioning but also to implement Saudi Arabia’s ambitious development plans. Comtemporary Yemen
Aspects of North Yemen’s Relations with Saudi Arabia 201 US-Saudi-YAR Triangle An important part of the Saudi design to ensure the safety of the Kingdom’s southern border is its goal of supplanting a long- established arms supply relationship between the YAR and the Soviet Union. Comtemporary Yemen
The Soviet Union also began to supply arms to the YAR directly at this time, whereas hitherto Egypt had insisted that all arms were to be channelled through its forces in the country. Comtemporary Yemen
It was with him that I discussed and tested all the ideas in this book, drawing especially on his expertise in political philosophy to sharpen and hone the legal and moral as- pects of a democracy’s response to the dilemma of fight- ing terrorism while preserving civil liberties. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
I am grateful to Boaz Ganor, a specialist on terrorism at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, for having read the entire manuscript, offering important comments which served to clarify and amplify many passages. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Roger’s encourage- ment on the need to clearly state the fundamentals of fighting terrorism in the 1990s were as valuable to me as they were during our earlier collaboration on this subject in the 1980s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The form of the problem has changed, the need to address it has not. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Admittedly, the modus operandi of this new wave of terrorism is usually different from that of the earlier ter- rorism that afflicted the world for two decades beginning Preface 3 in the 1960s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The new terrorism boasts few, if any, hos- tage takings and practically no hijackings. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It specializes in the bombing of its targets, and for good reason: The punishment meted out in the 1980s to hostage takers and airline hijackers, and to their sponsors, made the more overt kind of terrorism a costly affair. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The new and not so new forces engaging in renewed terrorism seek to evade this punishment by hiding more deeply in the shadows than even their shadowy predecessors. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
During the mid-1980s, I was part of a broad inter- national effort to convince the citizens and leaders of the democratic nations that this terrorism could be stamped out. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
When I say that today’s terrorism can be driven back as well, I do not mean to suggest that there are no hard decisions to be made along the way. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
An ef- fective battle against terrorism must of necessity require a shift in the domestic and international policies that en- able terrorism to grow and the intensification of those efforts that can uproot it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Domestically in the United States, this requires a reassessment of the legal instru- ments necessary for combating homegrown terrorism, alongside the means to monitor added powers given to the government to pursue these ends. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Internationally, this means identifying the great change that has taken place in the forces driving worldwide terrorism since the 1980s, and shaping a powerful international alliance against them. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Notable among the former are the runaway American militias of the “patriot movement,” whose avowed goal is to prepare for a violent showdown with a “satanic” federal govern- ment; chief among the latter are the various strains of Fighting Terrorism 5 militant Islam, which likewise see their ultimate destiny as leading to a final confrontation with the Great Satan, the United States. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What this new terrorism portends for America and the world and what can be done about it has not yet been sufficiently understood. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The growth of terrorism has been accompanied by a steady escalation in the means of violence, from small arms used to assassinate individ- uals, to automatic weapons used to mow down groups, to car bombs now capable of bringing down entire build- ings, to lethal chemicals that (as in Japan) can threaten entire cities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The very real possibility that terrorist states and organizations may soon acquire horrific weapons of mass destruction and use them to escalate terrorism be- yond our wildest nightmares has not been addressed properly by Western governments. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It must be recognized that barring firm and resolute action by the United States and the West, terrorism in the 1990s will expand dra- matically both domestically and internationally. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fighting terrorism is not a “policy option”; it is a neces- sity for the survival of our democratic society and our freedoms. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It has attacked business establishments, assaulted judges, corrupted police officials. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This gets to the heart of what terrorism is, and how it differs from other kinds of violence. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet for terrorism to have any impact, it is precisely the lack of connection, the lack of any possible involve- ment or “complicity” of the chosen victims in the cause the terrorists seek to attack, that produces the desired fear. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For terrorism’s underlying message is that every Benjamin Netanyahu 8 member of society is “guilty,” that anyone can be a vic- tim, and that therefore no one is safe. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
France, of course, is today a democracy; Cambodia is merely another one Fighting Terrorism 9 of the many despotisms where terrorists have come to power—and where they proceeded to carry out some of the most ghoulish crimes committed against human- ity since World War II. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Organized crime does not deal with the advancement of political ideas; it deals with the advancement of corruption, assisted by intimidation. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After all, America is the world’s greatest democracy, and if terrorism cannot be successfully fought there, perhaps it is not a chal- lenge as easily met as I have suggested. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It is true that the success of terrorism in one place often prompts im- itation elsewhere, and in that regard it is not inconceiv- able that demented individuals and organizations will seek to replicate this tragedy. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Such ideological inoculation can be seen in an example gleaned from a different field: Two former KGB agents said on the CBS program 60 Minutes’ that they worked for twenty years out of the Soviet embassy in Washington, yet failed to recruit even a single Amen- Fighting Terrorism 11 can citizen to spy against the United States. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This fact flies directly in the face of one of the most infamous pieces of revolutionary wisdom ever uttered: Mao Ze-dong’s theory that the irregular violence of his “people’s army” could not be resisted because his men would simply disappear into the friendly and suppor- tive populace, swimming among them “like the fish in the sea.” Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While not every terrorist group can be located quite this quickly, it is nevertheless true that the Oklahoma Fighting Terrorism 13 City bombers are not a needle in the haystack of American society; they are a needle in a bathtub, whose clear water ensures that their chances of hiding and getting away with their acts for very long is ordinarily exceedingly limited. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In 1983, for example, a member of the Posse Comitatus—a movement of agrarian tax resisters claiming the IRS was an arm of “Zionist international bankers”—wanted for the slaying of two U.S. marshals, was himself killed in a shoot-out with federal agents in Arkansas. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And it is these beliefs which have in the last few years fueled an unprecedented explosion of Fighting Terrorism 17 membership in these organizations, as thousands of sympathizers and fellow travelers have openly joined their ranks. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Here one must be careful to maintain an important distinction between the xenophobia and bigotry of po- litical extremism in the democracies, both on the left Benjamin Netanyahu 18 and on the right, and actual terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It even lacks the pernicious cho- rus of intellectual rationalizers and legitimizers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon who gave Euro- pean terrorism its short-lived flurry of faddish glamour when it first appeared. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
While there is a ready audience right now for instant experts expounding on the inevi- table proliferation of domestic terrorism in America, Fighting Terrorism 19 the fact is that domestic terrorism has a bleak future in the United States, precisely because Americans—virtu- ally all Americans—reject it out of hand. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In short, American society at the close of the twen- tieth century still lacks a widespread and enduring so- cial and cultural climate for the breeding of domestic terrorist organizations. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Before I discuss the operational issues involved in defeating domestic terrorism, it is crucial to mention the battle of ideas which constitutes the first and most fundamental defense against terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
I have said that Americans, as profound believers in democracy and genuine lovers of their country, are for the most part inoculated against the ideas which are the wellspring of terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But, as in the South of the Ku Klux Klan, it is clear that this was not always the case, and it would be foolish to think that the cultural resistance of Amer- icans is necessarily permanent and undamageable. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But when no such ethos is present, so- cieties can descend into the most horrific bloodshed Benjamin Netanyahu 20 over almost any issue, as we have seen most recently in the monumental bloodlettings in Bosnia, Rwanda, Uganda, Somalia, and Algeria. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The salient point that has to be underlined again and again is that nothing justifies terrorism, that it is evil per se—that the various real or imagined reasons proffered by the terrorists to justify their actions are meaningless. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
By conditioning us to accept savage outrages as habitual or normal responses to undesired political circumstances, terrorism attacks the very foun- Fighting Terrorism 21 dations of civilization and threatens to erase it alto- gether by killing man’s sense of sin, as Pope John Paul II put it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In its long and unfinished march from barbarism to civilization, humanity has tried to deline- ate limits to conflict. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A vast instant literature sprang forth seeking to explain the motivations and psychological makeup of America’s newfound terrorists, just as a similar litera- ture was produced at the height of European terrorism in the 1970s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A clinical understanding of terrorist psy- chology is of course important for fighting terrorism, but it must not spill over into the other connotation of understanding, that of acceptance. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Terrorism should be given no intellectual quarter. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Like organized crime, the battle against terrorism should be waged relentlessly, resisting the attempt to glorify or mystify its perpetrators or their cause in any way. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Indeed, the point of departure for the domestic battle against terrorism is to treat it as a crime and ter- rorists as criminals. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Additional and more ambitious attacks were in the works, including assaults on prisons in which Fighting Terrorism 23 FALN members were being held. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And it is just these kinds of speech, assembly, and relig- Fighting Terrorism 29 ious expression which, if properly monitored, give law enforcement agencies the warning they need in order to head off calamity. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The governments of free societies charged with fight- ing a rising tide of terrorism are thus faced with a dem- ocratic dilemma: If they do not fight terrorism with the means available to them, they endanger their citizenry; if they do, they appear to endanger the very freedoms which they are charged to protect. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At present, the FBI is not allowed to per- form the most basic intelligence activities required for piecing together the puzzle of political ideology, incite- ment, infrastructure, and paramilitary organization which, once assembled, could lead to an understanding of where the most deadly terrorism is likely to come from. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From the days of Robespierre’s infamous Committee for Public Safety, Benjamin Netanyahu 32 democracies have had to guard against this danger, couched in terms of national security, which unduly in- vades the privacy of each citizen in the name of national security. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In Britain, that mo- Fighting Terrorism 33 ment came in 1973, after IRA violence had reached un- precedented heights. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Thus Europe was for the most part freed of the plague of domestically grown terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As in any other land, Japanese culture occasionally breeds wild offshoots of what could Fighting Terrorism 35 be called Japanese fundamentalists—private militias cen- tered around charismatic leaders who use terrorism and violence to bring a straying Japan back to the “pure” ways of an older order. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet in 1995 Japan found itself facing a much more immediate terrorist threat. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Iraq had long been one of the foremost sponsors Fighting Terrorism 37 of international terrorism, hosting in Baghdad such ter- rorist groups as the Abu Nidal organization, Abul Abbas’s Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the or- ganization of the notorious bomb maker Abu Ibrahim. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Perhaps the most striking example in which the United States was forced to momentarily curtail civil lib- erties in the face of potential terrorist activity occurred during the Gulf War. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
His fatwahs in Egypt and the United States are among the Fighting Terrorism 41 bloodiest ever issued, calling for the death of Sadat’s suc- cessor, Hosni Mubarak, and the overthrow of the Egyp- tian regime, and ruling in favor of the murder of foreign tourists traveling in Egypt. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
the globe from the common calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the govern- ment of a single weapon, which in any possible con- [The powers to ensure security] ought to exist As I know nothing to exempt this portion of Fighting Terrorism 45 tingency might be usefully employed for the general defense and security [emphasis mine]. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The terrorism of today has obviously in no way Benjamin Netanyahu 46 reached the dimensions of the Civil War in jeopardizing the United States. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But the unchecked growth of terrorism is a grave danger in and of itself. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Rampant terrorism is a mortal threat to any society. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In the European democracies, two methods have been developed for ensuring that the executive branch’s efforts against terrorism remain within the bounds of the legit- imate effort to save lives. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The British model, which dates back to 1973 and the beginning of intensified terrorism by the new Irish Republican Army (IRA), controls the activities of the security services by requiring that they annually receive a new legislative mandate from Parlia- ment. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Re- Fighting Terrorism 47 quiring periodic renewal of a legislative mandate and judicial review within a prescribed period permits the public, through its elected representatives and judges, to monitor the activities of its monitors. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But perhaps the most important factor in regulating the conduct of counter-terrorism by democratic govern- ments is the independent investigative powers of the free press—and the right of the citizens to turn their govern- ment out of power if they feel it has gone too far. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet the history of European counter-terrorism reveals no such public re- action, and for good reason. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The prospect of constantly being jostled by the swings of this pendulum is not all that pleasant, but it is not Fighting Terrorism 49 that bad either. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But we should recognize the larger principle that he is articulating: that civil lib- erties should sometimes be limited not only at the point when physical violence is actually being perpetrated against others but also when such action is being incited, planned, and organized. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The 1980s: Successes Against International III Terrorism 51 International terrorism is the use of terrorist violence against a given nation by another state, which uses the ter- rorists to fight a proxy war as an alternative to conven- tional war. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The reason that international terrorism is so persistent and so difficult to uproot is that the support of a modern state can provide the interna- tional terrorist with everything that the domestic terrorist usually lacks in the way of cultural and logistical assis- tance. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The wild growth of terrorism against the United States and vir- tually every one of its allies over the preceding two de- cades was often understood to be the result of a proliferation of technology, which had suddenly permit- ted “frustrated” individuals to become much more effec- tive in expressing domestic social outrage that had always been there. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At the time, many of the journalists attending the conference, and even some of the participants, be- lieved that the support of states for terrorism was an incidental phenomenon, and that its essence lay in the domestic causes that “spontaneously” generated the vio- lence. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The philosophical roots of Eu- ropean and Soviet terrorism may be traced to an anti- czarist group called Narodnaya Volya, or The People’s Will, which in 1879 began a campaign which eventually succeeded in killing Czar Alexander II as a representa- Fighting Terrorism 53 tive of the autocratic, capitalist, Russian Orthodox social system which was to be destroyed in its entirety. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
One of the best-known among them was the notori- Fighting Terrorism 55 ous archterrorist RamIrez Sanchez, known as “Carlos the Jackal.” Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The graduates of such courses were often sent to Cuba, Bulgaria, and North Ko- rea. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Here the carefully concealed, one-step-removed brand of Soviet-supported terrorism found a ready partner in the rabid anti-Western antipathies of the radical Arab regimes led by Syria, Libya, and Iraq. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But it was only with the emergence of independent Arab states that this tested weapon of subduing opponents was trans- Fighting Terrorism 57 formed into a habitual tool of foreign policy, rivaling oil as the Middle East’s chief export, and reaching practically every part of the world. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As noted, the Soviets had supported terrorist insur- gents since World War II, but had carefully avoided tak- ing direct responsibility for launching terrorist campaigns Fighting Terrorism 59 against the NATO powers. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Receiving generous Eastern bloc support, he established in Lebanon a training center and launching ground for international terrorism the world over. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
These states soon became a second, inde- Fighting Terrorism 61 pendent source of international terror. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The full extent of the Soviet-Arab terrorist network— indeed, the fact that it was a network—was throughout the traumatic years ~of international terrorism obscured by successful efforts to “delegate” much of the violence to other Eastern bloc and Arab regimes that could be blamed for these activities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The political offensive had been preceded by a delib- erate intellectual effort spanning a number of years to persuade the West to change its policies regarding ter- rorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
(After the collapse of the Soviet Union, I had the oppor- tunity to discuss this incredulity with a number of offi- cials of the former Soviet bloc, and they expressed astonishment at the naïveté of Western journalists and government figures in this regard.) Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Yet these and other revelations had a sobering effect on Soviet sponsorship of terror in the 1980s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
At the second conference of the Jonathan Institute, held in Washington in 1984, the participants, including leading figures in American politics, called for political, economic, and military sanctions against the states spon- soring terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The proceedings were edited by me into a book entitled Terrorism: How the West Can Win, to which I contributed an essay arguing the need to take direct military action against the terrorist states, which by then were primarily radical Arab regimes. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But it was no simple matter to change the minds of American opinion makers on this subject. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In July of that year, I joined the embassy as deputy ambassador and soon participated in the effort to per- suade the American government to shift its policy to a more aggressive opposition to terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Both in dip- lomatic channels and in appearances in the media, I used every opportunity to attack international terrorism and the regimes and organizations that stood behind it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The West could defeat international terrorism, I insisted, pro- vided that it adopt two principles as the foundation stones of its policy. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
One of the early supporters of an active American poi- icy against international terrorism was Secretary of State George Shultz. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Shultz was particularly shaken by the series of car bombings in 1983 aimed at the American embassy in Beirut, and the American and French ser- vicemen stationed there as peacekeepers under the agree- ment negotiated for the PLO withdrawal. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The epidemic is spreading, and the civilized world is still groping for remedies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What we have learned about terrorism is, first, that it is not random, undirected, purposeless vio- lence. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
From a practical standpoint, a purely passive defense does not provide enough of a deterrent to terrorism and the states that sponsor it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
He and President Ronald Reagan took the lead in mounting an unprece- dented war against international terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Under their Fighting Terrorism 69 leadership, the United States imposed diplomatic and ec- onomic sanctions against terrorist states such as Libya, Syria, and Iran. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fighting Terrorism 71 The central demand—the release of the terrorists’ com- rades in Kuwait—was not met. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
These successes encouraged the Reagan administration to work for an overall change in the Western stance to- ward terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In 1986, the United States called a sum- mit conference of Western leaders in Tokyo, in which sweeping resolutions were adopted calling for an aggres- sive Western defense against international terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After twenty years in which international terrorism under the leadership of the PLO had enjoyed virtually unrestricted freedom of action, the West had finally be- gun to grasp the principle that the terrorist organizations and their state sponsors should no longer be able to es- cape punishment for their deeds. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Of course, the West’s battle against terrorism was not without its setbacks. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The worst of these was the revela- tion in November 1986 that even as the United States had been stepping up its war against terrorism, elements in the Reagan White House had been simultaneously ne- gotiating with Iranian-controlled terrorists in Lebanon Benjamin Netanyahu 72 for the release of American hostages in their custody. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
We have spawned a hostage-taking industry. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Every principle that the President praised in Netanyahu’s book on terrorism has been dealt a terrible blow by what has been done.”° Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In- ternational terrorism was dealt a stunning defeat. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The sharp political, economic, and military blows delivered by the West against its chief sponsors Fighting Terrorism 73 caused them to rescind their support and rein in the ter- rorists. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And the destruction of the PLO base in Lebanon deprived the Soviets and the Arab world of their most useful staging ground for terrorist operations against the democracies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Terrorism is rooted in the deepest nature of the dictatorial regimes and organizations that practice it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
First, while the conquest of Kuwait by Iraq was a clear act of aggression for the entire world to see (and punish), terrorism is invariably secretive, relying on its deniability for impunity. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fighting Terrorism 77 The result of all this was that by the mid-1990s inter- national terrorism’s major Middle Eastern sponsors were far from defeated and prostrate. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fifth, after the Gulf War, a new base was added to the roster of terrorist havens in the form of PLO- controlled Gaza, which quickly became a safe haven for several Islamic terrorist movements. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Most important, they were joined by new bullies on the block. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fighting Terrorism 79 tivating a modern international terrorist network of which the Soviets would have been proud. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And while the Islamic resistance dur- ing the Afghan war was more similar to the Unita in- surgents in Angola than it was to the world of Arab terrorism, times have changed. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Often Benjamin Netanyahu 80 they have had to move from country to country, having been denied the right to return to their home countries for fear that their excessive zeal would find an outlet there. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
After a tortuous Fighting Terrorism 83 history of fourteen centuries, which had seen triumph and decline, the political independence of the Islamic world appeared to come to a final and complete end. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What the two movements had in common was their abiding hatred of the weakness and treachery of the Arab monarchies (and of the Shah’s rule in Iran) and of the Western powers, which they believed to have dismem- bered the Islamic world, leaving it humiliated, impov- erished, divided, and culturally colonized. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
w flat is not statea explicitly, Dut wnat Fighting Terrorism ~ 1 1 ~,3 1 Muslim audiences understand well in its historical con- text, is that Saladin’s peace treaty with the Crusaders was merely a tactical ruse that was followed by Muslim at- tacks which wiped out the Christian presence in the Holy Land.4 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The infiltration of Islamic terrorism into Europe was not immediately obvious. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But a few of them have come under Fighting Terrorism 89 the sway of a perverse and primitive interpretation of the faith, which moves them to fanaticism and vio- lence. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Turkey too has recently experienced a rash of Islamic terrorist attacks, quite apart from its lingering battle with the Syrian-sponsored terrorism of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Much of this new anti-Turkish terrorism Fighting Terrorism 91 emanates from enclaves of ‘Turkish Islamic radicals based in Germany. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In November 1990, an Egyptian immigrant to the United Fighting Terrorism 93 States named El Sayyid Nosair was arrested and charged with murdering Rabbi Meir Kahane in New York.* Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In recent years the United States has played host to at least a dozen known conferences of international Islamic terrorism, where the Islamic militants coordinated their moves and exchanged logistical information. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
One gathering in Kansas City in 1989, for example, attracted the militant Egyptian Islamic leader Yousef al-Qaradhawi, Tawfiq Mustapha of the Muslim Liberation Party of Jordan, Fighting Terrorism 95 Abdullah Anas of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, Rashid Ghannushi of the Tunisian fundamentalist group Al-Nahdha, and Sheikh Mohammed Siyyam of the Pal- estinian Hamas. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Thus, while the United States struggles to deal with the rising threat of domestic terrorism at home, a new tide of international terrorism has arisen, constructing a worldwide network of hate, possessing weapons, money, and safe havens of unprecedented scope. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Gaza district is a narrow strip of land along the Mediterranean some forty miles southwest of Tel Aviv, with a population of about 800,000 Pales- tinian Arabs, half of them refugees, and with a history of terrorism which competes with that of Lebanon. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It was there that, in 1994, Yasir Arafat and tens of thousands of his followers arrived, triumphantly wav- ing assault rifles and PLO flags, declaring Arafat to be Fighting Terrorism 103 “President of Palestine,” calling for continued jihad until the liberation of Jerusalem, and imposing their corrupt and despotic order on the Arab residents of the area. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
If one needs a textbook case on how not to fight ter- rorism, Gaza is it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It tried to subcontract the job of fighting terrorism to someone else—in this case to the terrorists themselves. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It promised safe passage for terrorists by exempting PLO VIPs from inspection at the border crossings from Egypt and Jordan, thus enabling the smuggling Fighting Terrorism 111 of terrorists into Gaza and Jericho, and from there into Israel itself.’6 Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
All these errors produced one essential outcome: Gaza became a zone in which terrorism could operate without fear of retribution. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It is not hard to see that under such conditions all the sundry terrorists and demented loonies in North America would flock to Wichita, quickly transforming it into the terrorist capital of the continent, and another head of the hydra of international terrorism as well. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The creation of even semi-free enclaves for terrorists—where the authorities struggle against a substantial pro-terrorist sympathy in the population— such as in Northern Ireland or in the Basque region of Spain, creates horrendous conditions for the security services trying to uproot terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fighting Terrorism 113 A momentary suspension of terrorist attacks is not to be confounded with actual dismantling of terrorist ca- pacities, and many Israelis, familiar as they are with the endless stratagems of the terrorist organizations, do not confuse the two. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Thus the fostering of public education for coexistence and reconciliation, so indispens- able for inducing the psychological changes needed to prevent a future renewal of terrorism and war, are starkly and painfully absent in the PLO domains. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It can serve in the future as a clearinghouse and stepping-stone for a flexible terrorism launched in mu!- Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fighting Terrorism 119 Above all, such a PLO—Hamas state is likely to eventu- ally deteriorate into a new avatar of the PLO terror-state in Lebanon, which was responsible for the exportation of terrorism far beyond the Middle East, serving as a con- venient relay station and launching ground for the grow- ing Islamic terrorism against Western targets. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Iran has two nuclear reactor sites. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Power Fighting Terrorism 123 has its own logic, and such a quantum leap in the power of Islamic radicalism would attract to it millions of new adherents around the world, and much new political sup- port—both that produced by adulation and that pro- duced by fear—throughout the Middle East and far beyond it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
He could have made it clear that he was prepared to strike at the Allied forces with nuclear weap- ons; or that he would destroy a neighboring capital like Riyadh; or that he would destroy the oil-loading facilities of the Persian Gulf~ or that he would bomb the Straits of Hormuz, wreaking a catastrophe that would have closed down the sea lanes to much of the world’s oil— just as he had no compunction about pouring billions of barrels of oil into the Gulf as a warning to the Allies, in the process inventing a new form of ecological terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
One does not have to be an expert in international terrorism to sense that this rising tide of Islamic terrorism is qualitatively different from the terrorism which the West has had to face up until now. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For it derives from a highly irrational cultural source, militant Islam, which differs profoundly from that other anti-Western doctri- Fighting Terrorism 125 naire militancy, Communism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
If this happens, international terrorism could undergo an incredible transformation in which not in- dividual citizens or buildings are threatened or demol- ished but entire cities are held hostage. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Western Fighting Terrorism 127 nations woke up almost too late to its incendiary nature, and to the danger it posed to civilization. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Our civilization and our culture would have come to an end. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
VII 129 The second wave of international terrorism, that of the 1990s, is the direct result of all these developments. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And the growth of militant Islamic terrorism, with indepen- dent states in the Middle East serving as its launching ground and bases of Islamic militants in the West offer- ing alternate bridgeheads, has already been felt in the West in more ways than one. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The leaders of the democracies must solicit the understanding and sup- port of the public and its elected representatives for vig- orous policies against terrorism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Action on the inter- national level against terrorism impedes its domestic offshoots, and vice versa. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It is the offending terrorist regimes which provide today’s international terrorists with the moral and material sup- Fighting Terrorism 131 port without which they would not dare attack Western societies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What follows is a series of measures which could be effectively undertaken by democracies to stamp out terrorism within their own borders. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu Impose sanctions on suppliers of nuclear technology to terrorist states. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The United States Congress has successfully pressed for enforcement of other standards of international behavior by denying preferred trade status and other economic favors to states limiting free emigration, sponsoring terrorism, or trafficking in drugs. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Countries which have international trading regulations so liberal that they can trade in nuclear death will find themselves having to Fighting Terrorism 133 change their laws or feel the pain where it matters to them most—in their pocketbooks. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This tested measure has not been applied in any serious fashion to the twin sources of today’s militant Islamic terrorism, Iran and Sudan. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Those regimes have consciously backed off from the energetic sponsorship of terrorism that characterized their conduct in the 1970s and 1980s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The U.S. State Department’s own 1994 report on terrorism mentions among these groups Ahmed Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP— GC), Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Japanese Red Army, and the Kurdish PKK.’ Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The ten- dency to try and bribe Syria to desist from its support Fighting Terrorism 135 for terrorism—with American aid and Israeli concessions on the Golan Heights—is the exact opposite of what is needed. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Over a dozen terrorist groups are openly housed in Damascus, and many have training facilities in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Both the Soviet Union’s Iron Curtain and South Africa’s odi- ous system of racial laws were eventually brought down by a firm Western policy of linking sanctions to an im- provement in Soviet and South African policies, and there is no reason that a much less powerful state such as Syria should be any less responsive when faced with determined pressure over a protracted period. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As in the case of the PLO in Gaza, the most that can be hoped for from buying off Syria is a tactical cessation of its proxy terrorism aimed at extracting the latest round of concessions; in this case, the terror inev- itably resumes once these concessions have been digested and it looks like the next round is to be had. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The ces- sation of terrorism must therefore be a clear-cut demand, backed up by sanctions and with no prizes attached. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
As with all international efforts, the vigorous application of sanctions to terrorist states must be led by the United States, whose leaders must choose the correct sequence, timing, and circumstances for these actions. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Efforts must be made to stop terrorism from areas that are less than indepen- dent states but nevertheless serve as breeding grounds for terrorists. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Here, the local PLO authority is perfectly capable of undertaking a variety of measures that would totally dismantle rather than buy off Gaza-based terrorist organizations, but refuses to do so. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What characterizes all these enclaves is the pro- fessed claim of the local government that it is unable to prevent the terrorism launched from its domain. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In countries repeatedly assaulted by terrorism, a thorough review of the legal measures gov- erning the battle against terrorism may become a neces- sity from time to time. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Revise legislation to enable greater surveillance and Legislation should be reviewed and if necessary Fighting Terrorism 139 revised to facilitate the part, depending on the facing each society and traditions. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Whether such an approach can have the intended effect of stopping fund-raising for terrorism in America re- mains to be seen. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
If the security services cannot research which groups may be dangerous be- fore they strike, there is little hope of being able to Benjamin Netanyahu following measures in all or degree of the terrorist threat its particular culture and legal 140 prevent terrorism from springing up again and again. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Fighting Terrorism 141 • Tighten immigration laws. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Strict and prompt judicial oversight of such actions can serve as a sufficient deterrent to most government abuses, but it is important to experiment as many democracies have done with the particular regula- tions. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In an age in which the power of the weap- ons which individuals may obtain grows incredibly from one year to the next, and in which information about how to obtain and use such weapons can be instantly transmitted by electronic mail from any part of the world, an active internal-security policy and aggressive counter-terrorism actions are becoming a crucial part of the mandate of every government, and officials must learn to rise to this challenge. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Legal powers are of Fighting Terrorism 143 must be studied and understood, groups preaching vio- lence must be penetrated and catalogued, and groups ac- tually preparing for it must be uprooted. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
important policies which must be adopted in the face of terrorism is the refusal to release convicted terrorists from prisons. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Greater 144 ferent kind of gun battle, in which the goal is to hold their fire rather than to unleash it. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But in the case of a prolonged and sustained campaign lasting months or years, the natural disgust of the public with the terrorist’s message begins to break down and is often replaced by a willingness to accom- modate terrorist demands. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The leaders of Western countries may choose in- stead to avoid taking the tough decisions and continue doing business as usual; they may adopt few or none of these measures, believing that the new wave of terrorism will somehow dissipate of its own accord. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Terrorism has the unfortunate quality of expanding to fill the vacuum left to it by passivity or weakness. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Of course, much of this program is laced with obstacles that only purposeful determination may over- come. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1986). Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Christian Lochte, “Fighting Terrorism in the Federal Re- public of Germany” in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, p. 173. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Joseph W. Bishop, “Legal Measures to Control Terrorism in Democracies,” in Benjamin Netanyahu, ed., Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Interna- tional Terrorism: Challenge and Response (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1981), p. 301. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Quoted in Walter Berns, “Constitutional Power and the Defense of Free Government,” in Terrorism: How the West Can Win. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Hydra of Carnage: International Links of Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1986), pp. 477—568, 609—20. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Benjamin Netanyahu, “Defining Terrorism,” in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, pp. 16—17, 23. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994 (Washington: State De- partment, April 1995), pp. 23—24. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The latter include the movement’s understanding of the nature of the conflict as a doctrinal, cultural, and political one, its perspective on the parties to the conflict (Zionism, Judaism, the Arabs, Muslims, and the West), and the bic], a series of documents from the third year of the intifada, issued by the Hamas information office, but with no publisher or date of publication listed. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One of the movement’s leaders summed up Hamas’s efforts: “It was calling for war while everyone was marching toward peace.”6 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
When the government announced it was applying shariah, Hamas telegraphed its congratulations, calling it a step toward “the restoration of the dignity and impregnability of the ummah and the liberation of lands of the Muslims from colonialists and Zionists.”57 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The movement also called for an end to inter-Arab conflicts for the sake of the Arab ummah as a whole, to which narrow state inter- ests should take second place.66 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is a “revolutionary Islamic state”; it has had a remark- able history of concern with the Palestinian cause ever since the revolu- tion of 1979 brought the Islamic Republic into being; and it supports and places special emphasis on Islamic movements in Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
First was the rise in the power of the move- ment, which attracted international attention from politicians and the media and which in turn required a response from Hamas in a language that could be understood and acceptable. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
time, see Jawad Al-Hamad, “Taradud al-nathra al-amrikiyya ila harakat hamas: iqamat am al-itiham bil-irhab” [The American vacillating view of the Hamas movement: Establish rela- tions or accuse it of terrorism?], Al-Hayat, 23 January 1994. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Washington released Abu Marzouq in May 1997, after Israel dropped its extradition request out of fear of retaliation by Hamas if the United States handed him over. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Fur- thermore, the adoption of an obviously repressive policy toward nonmil- itary religious institutions in a region where the Islamic tide was rising would intensify the feeling of enmity for Israel in the region. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The most noteworthy aspect of Hamas’s activities in this respect has been the strength of Hamas’s grass-roots support among the poor and the middle classes, the result of years of perseverance, of feeling the pulse of the man in the street, and sharing in ordinary people’s concerns. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Similarly, the American administration keeps Syria on its list of coun- tries that support terrorism, or those that fail to fight the spread of drugs, as an instrument to pressure Syria to drop its demand for a comprehen- sive solution on all fronts. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Israeli authorities have been engaging in terrorist prac- tices and wide-ranging transgressions against the human rights of the Palestinian people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They once shot 400 bullets into the body of the martyr Yasir al-Namrouti on 18 July 1992, a clear expression of savagery, barbarism, and terrorism, as the body did not require all these bullets to ensure its death. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
But the escalation of Zionist repression and terrorism pushed it to defend itself and the Pales- tinian people with more effective means, including military confrontations with the armed pillars of occupation. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is in harmony with international approaches to fighting terrorism and strength- ening respect for human rights and spreading freedom and democracy all over the world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hezbollah has realised that its years of self-imposed Hezbollah 42 underground existence have hurt its image, which has always been associated with terrorism and fanaticism. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It had also exalted some of the acts of terrorism committed against Western targets. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He explained that the groups were part of Hezbollah’s ‘secret security apparatus’ and that their sole mission was to penalise the West by whatever means available: they were the Party of God’s hidden hand of terrorism. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Islamic Republic was determined never again to be caught in a position where the West held proof of its involvement in such acts of terrorism. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Congress had banned the sale of American arms to countries which sponsored terrorism, but Robert McFarlane, head of the National Security Council, had hatched the plan of trading arms to Iran in exchange for the hostages. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
During the six-week trial, the word ‘terrorism’ was omitted Hezbollah 128 from the indictments and the Iranian connection was disregarded. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
I have suffered at the hands of terrorism, yet I understand why people do so, I understand why Hezbollah does that, I understand. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Perhaps the most striking denunciation came in a live message from an old Muslim Lebanese woman who said she had fled Hezbollah 200 her village in South Lebanon with no money in hand and walked for three days to get to Beirut, where, seething with anger, she had headed for a radio station to broadcast ‘a message to President Clinton who accuses us of terrorism’ on its live talk show. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
is a message for America, Britain and France, but mainly the US which is the master of terrorism and which has taught the world the art of terrorism and corruption.Where Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He declared that the Shiites had the potential ‘for a kind of terrorism that we had not yet experienced. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
If, as a result of the war in Lebanon, we replace PLO terrorism with Shiite terrorism we have done the worst thing in our struggle against terrorism.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Nikoladze took his own advice and went for a time to work in St. Petersburg for a private railroad company. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As the year closed, Pravda announced that several of the most highly placed Caucasian Communists—Enukidze, Orakhelashvili, and diplomat Lev Karakhan—had been executed for terrorism, espionage, and bourgeois nationalism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
While the reduction of police terrorism and decentralization of political power undeniably shaped social developments to a degree, the basic contours of the extrapolitical tendencies had already been well established in the Stalin revolution. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Georgians were forced to accept a cold recognition of the new power of the old imperial center in Transcaucasian politics. The Making of the Georgian Nation
One of his sons had married a Jewish woman.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Similarly, after the beginning of the Intifada, when the Palestinian under- ground leadership produced regular leaflets calling for strikes and boycotts, a group of what journalist Saleh Atta calls “Orientalists, Arabists and special- ists in Palestinian affairs in the army and military government” began pro- ducing and distributing fake leaflets in the name of the Intifada leadership. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Atta analyzed the forgeries: “A general characteristic of these leaflets is their radical national presentation,” he observed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At the same time, the Iberians retained their traditional cultural links with Iran, then ruled by the Parthian dynasty of the Arsacids, sworn foes of the Romans. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The routes where local trade ran were the same routes along which incense moved in pre-Islamic times and dates, salt, and pilgrims have moved at most times since; the traditions, partly set in literature, of South Arabian genealogy were known in fragments everywhere (the names of places and of major groups, save the Prophet’s kin, all attach to Qahtan, “the father of the Southern Arabs”). A History of Modern Yemen
The standard histories attach perhaps undue importance to missions sent to Iraq in the 1930S in search of technical expertise. A History of Modern Yemen
and physical educa- tion.”64 A History of Modern Yemen
That claim was opposed, as we sa~ by those who felt historical identity and political unity bore no simple relation. A History of Modern Yemen
The conflict with FLOSY did not prevent the NLF from con- tinuing the struggle in the hinterland in 1966 and 1967; this mainly involved the political mobilisation of the people, but in Hadramawt a significant left-wing political movement took place in that period, and made socialist reforms in land tenure and social organisation. Comtemporary Yemen
‘While Arab policy was fumbling about in the false hope that it attached to successive American administrations, Zionist extremists in the form of rightist parties were tightening their grip on the policy and admin- istration of the Zionist entity. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He promotes all the great nobles in such an advantageous manner that they forget their fatherland and their religion to attach themselves to him. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Five miles from Kutaisi is the monastery of Gelati, to which in mediaeval times was attached an academy renowned as a centre of learning. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Little wonder that Luarsab and Darejan Tatkaridze became proverb- ial figures of fun, or that many a Georgian squire should have cursed Ilia and his clever young friends as harbingers of ruin and destroyers of traditional values. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Georgian ém:grés After Orjonikidze’s death and Makharadze’s recantation, there was none of Stalin’s old associates among the Georgian Bol- sheviks who could question his omniscience or bring up the various unsavoury episodes in his revolutionary past. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Beneath and between, or off to one side of; two foreign empires were 3—4 million Yemenis, most of whom were Sunnis attached to the Shafi’i school of Islamic law. A History of Modern Yemen
By the end of the nineteenth century the Qu~aytT Sultanate held nearly all the coastline with a lesser Kathirl state inland, and each had a stretch of Wadi Hadramawt, while to their east, filling most of the margin of what traditionally was Yemen, lay Mahrah.43 A History of Modern Yemen
Actually there was no shortage in the 1930S of ShafiCi shaykhs or of Zaydi merchants, and ShafiCis were probably the majority of army regulars through the 194os, but freelance (barrãni) soldiers from the Zaydi north attached themselves to officials as enforcers and tax-collectors, and these are remembered in Lower Yemen still as a “Zaydi army”. A History of Modern Yemen
~ The sole distinction which carries through unambiguously in the record is that between soldiers attached to the Egyptian cause and others. A History of Modern Yemen
Little was raised internally, almost none from direct taxation of remittance wealth, and most came from foreign aid and debt, a system of relations among banks and governments which attached only loosely to local needs. A History of Modern Yemen
Almost before the civil war ended (Chapter 4) tribes and shaykhs attached to the royalists had switched allegiance to the socialist South (Qasim Munassir of Khawlan was a famous case), and the attachments of such figures as Mujähid al-Quhali of ‘lyal Yazid were now to trace a path with the NDF that makes sense in terms of local history and personal loyalty but none in terms that most political science recognises. A History of Modern Yemen
Saudi stipends to shaykhs in Upper Yemen were large; on occasion, funds and weapons reached their rivals from Southern sources. A History of Modern Yemen
In most ethno- graphic accounts until then one heard of household economies somehow attached to farming. A History of Modern Yemen
- having covered the floors with the most splendid rugs; and attached to every qdt-chewing room was a sitting room with splendid furniture for drinking sessions after the chew. A History of Modern Yemen
To some, Aden’s state still seemed, at least potentially, a model of equality and order, but increasingly one heard of fawda or “chaos” of a kind the South had attributed to Northerners: soldiers simply not turning up if they did not feel like it, payments being made outside official channels, deals being done that made sense at local level but not in terms of socialism. A History of Modern Yemen
Kuwait, having for years helped Yemen with few strings attached, had reason to feel aggrieved; Saudi Arabia, already discontented if not alarmed by unification before the war, turned more fiercely than any against Yemen’s government and the dislike of Saudi rulers for Yemen’s president gained the colouring of feud. A History of Modern Yemen
Nu’man was then attached to al-Badr’s retinue (Douglas20 1987: 161). A History of Modern Yemen
THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE This small unit, responsible for forging passports, visas, immigra- tion stamps, and diverse documents, used to be an independent body but, since the move to Libya, has been attached to the Intelli- gence Directorate and, like the principal committees of that direc- torate, is based in Libya, close to Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
A couple of weeks after the attacks, Abu Nidal issued a communiqué in the name of the Cells of the Arab Fedayeen, yet another fictitious organization, in which he claimed that the targets had been “nests of foreign spies.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Aziz Bey, as he was known, made no major changes in adminis- tration during his Yemen years. Comtemporary Yemen
Other state monopolies attached to the Public Debt Administration such as tobacco and general salt tax drained off another 2 million kurus in 1902 (3.8 Comtemporary Yemen
(5) In the civil service, education and training, and human resource development, NIPA played a leading role. Comtemporary Yemen
(x) Criminal Procedure and Civil Procedure are expected in 1983, though they are in force as rules issued by the Ministry of Justice under powers conferred on the Minister of Justice by the Penal Code and civil courts. Comtemporary Yemen
Turkish administrative district. Comtemporary Yemen
Chapter five is followed by the conclusion to the study. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Despite the lengthy discussion of the PLO, the text of the Charter does not offer a true and clear position concerning the legitimacy attached to the PLO’s representation of the Palestinian people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
My own position is that more significance should be attached to the fact that since being founded at the end of 1987, Hamas has based its rela- tions with the Christians on mutual respect and has adhered to the gen- eral line of policy to which the movement committed itself. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The resolutions also included a call to create a special confederation between Jordan and Pales- tine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In celebration of their Chris- tian faith, Georgian monarchs and feudal lords ordered and patronized the construction of churches and monasteries. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In Tiflis Georgian nobles and Russian officers mingled together in the liflis Noble Assembly and the restaurant attached to the club, where foreign and Russian newspapers could be read. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In that case we should be [treated as] an opposition which has the right to its own institutions that may not be encroached upon. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Throughout the history of Arabia, he argues, large- scale divisions have been recognised, each attaching to a circulation system. A History of Modern Yemen
He learned English well, married an Englishwoman, and had several children by her, including male twins. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Although dated, the article by Stanko Guldescu, ‘Marxism Comes tc Yemen’, Communist Affairs, vol. Comtemporary Yemen
His father, Count Simon Vorontsov, had been for many years Russian ambassador to England, and was noted for his ad- herence to British Tory principles and his attachment to the younger Pitt. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In 1848, that same Georgian aristocracy which had plotted together less than two decades previously to exterminate the Russian garrison and administration was sending a loyal address to the Tsar, protesting undying attachment to the Russian father- land. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
During the Turkish invasion under Omar Pasha in i8~ ~ -~6, the Regent of Mm- grelia, Catherine Dadiani, showed attachment to the Russian 95 cause, and organized a militia to help drive out the intruders. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Jews claim, moreover, an emotional attachment to the land of their historic ancestors. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Banna plantations were confiscated by the Israeli government. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Though it is unusual to make acknowledgement to places, I cannot fin- ish these lines of gratitude without expressing my special attachment to one of the dearest places to me in Cambridge: the library of Queens’ Col- lege. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As Hamas sees it, a referendum is the only mechanism that reasonably can lead to a national consensus or even a quasi-consensus on the issues that will determine the fate of the Palestinian people. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheila Carapico’s Sanaani friends provide an insight. A History of Modern Yemen
In 1721, the Caucasus was suddenly affected by an international crisis. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Only an entirely new approach can reawaken the fidelity which an odious system has almost extinguished.’25 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In i 8z6, the Persian Army launched a surprise attack on Georgia and the Karabagh. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Qazi Mullah met his death in a Russian attack on the Murid stronghold of Gimri, and was succeeded as Imam by Hamzat Bek. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The first important engagement was in fact an attack on Kakheti by the Imam Shamil with io,ooo or more mountaineers in August i 8~ ~, but this was beaten off by a Russian force under Prince Argutinsky-Dolgorukov. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In July 1904, Governor-General Golitsyn, who had been wounded in a terrorist attack, left the Caucasus on leave, never to return. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
THE STORM GATHERS: 1894—1904 ‘45 CHAPTER VII GEORGIA IN THE 1905 Russia and Japan — Bolsheviks and Mensheviks — Bloodj Sundqy The Gurian communes — The Georgian Church Militant — Mas- sacre at Tbilisi Town Hall — W’itte and the Duma — The Tsar regains the upper hand — The Cossacks take over — Blood and fire REVOLUTION in Georgia — The Friends of Georgia Committee Russia and Japan ON 5 FEBRUARY 1904, after months of mounting tension in the Far East, the Japanese had launched their famous night attack on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The new premier set himself on the one hand to crush revolu- tion throughout the Russian Empire, and on the other, to carry through economic reforms which he regarded as over- due. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Huge crowds followed the cortege from Saguramo to Tbilisi. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In spite of the lateness of the season and the remonstrances of his advisers, Enver insisted on launching the attack without delay. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
He mustered his forces for a counter-attack, defeated and virtually destroyed the Turkish 9th and ioth Corps and then repulsed the iith Corps from its advanced position. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In January 1920, conferences took place between the Georgian and Azerbaijani delegates and the British Imperial General Staff to discuss problems of defence in the event of an A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 220 attack by Soviet Russia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
While these talks were proceeding, on 27 April 1920, the Red Army launched its lightning attack on Baku. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At that moment, the Eleventh Red Army was poised ready for a full-scale attack. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
General Odishelidze represented to his government in January 1921 that in the event of a Russian attack, his front line forces would be outnumbered two to one. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Before launching the attack, therefore, Gekker recommended that an understanding be reached with the Kemalists at Ankara, with whom the Kremlin was already friendly, and that reinforcements and stores be massed in Soviet Azerbaijan all ready for a propitious moment to invade the Georgian Republic. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
‘The above-men- tioned points are brought to your attention not in order to demonstrate the impossibility of an attack on Georgia, but because I consider that this attack should be launched only after careful preparation, in order to finish as rapidly as possible with those Tbilisi people’.”2 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Russian attack on Georgia produced unexpected repercussions in neighbouring Armenia, where the nationalists rose in force, marched on Erivan and overthrew the Bolshevik régime there. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Old women in the audience, some of whom had fed and sheltered Stalin when he was hiding from the Tsarist secret police, shouted: ‘Accursed one, renegade, traitor!’ A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The next day, he stormed into Tbilisi Party Headquarters and made a furious attack on Philip Makharadze, whom he professed to hold personally responsible for his humiliation. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the middle of these moves, on 9 March 1923, Lenin suffered the third attack of his illness, from which he never recovered; his death took place on 21 January 1924. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The importance which Stalin attached to the activities of the Georgian émigrés was displayed in 1938, when the Soviet embassy in Paris brought effectual pressure to bear on a pusillanimous French government to ban a celebra- tion of the 75oth anniversary of the Georgian national poet Shota Rustaveli, which was to have been held at the Sorbonne. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Imam claimed the right to appoint judges for the Zaydi school of law (the government could appoint even non-Yemeni judges for other schools if it wished, though non-Muslims were not to be placed above Muslims); the waqf or prop- erty gifted for religious ends, was to be under Ya~ya’s control; Zaydis were to pay their taxes to him, directly or through local leaders, and he was to submit a tithe to the Turkish government; neither side was to attack the other’s borders. A History of Modern Yemen
What in fact was going on, of course, was that local concerns were more compelling than the aims of foreign governments. A History of Modern Yemen
A Kuwaiti maga- zine at the turn of 1965—6 published four illustrated pieces on Haçlramawt.55 A History of Modern Yemen
The country was under attack from elsewhere. A History of Modern Yemen
President Carter of the United States was under attack at the time as “soft on communism”, someone in Washington gained a name by 150 A history of modern Yemen knowing where Yemen was, and suddenly Yemen was in the world press: huge aircraft shuttled in and out of Sanaa bringing tanks to see off the communist threat, such extravagant weapons as wire-guided anti-tank missiles were shipped to North Yemen (about i8 months was needed to learn to use these; one may wonder at the logic, but most in fact stayed in Saudi hands), and an American aircraft carrier was stationed off South Arabia. A History of Modern Yemen
1969 1970 1972 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 rg86 1987 1988 ig8g 1990 Saudis attack Wadfah. A History of Modern Yemen
One of those involved in the initial attack on the peasants was apparently Salih, stepfather of the later president, ‘Ai ‘Abdullah Salih. A History of Modern Yemen
28 Trevaskis to Secretary of State for Colonies, 20 Apr. 1964, CO 1055/194. A History of Modern Yemen
clearer to Jorde. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Perhaps it was this spirit of abject contrition that caused Hisham Harb to waive the sanctions and to send Jorde instead on a weapons course, where he perfected his knowledge of the Browning, Scorpion, M16, Kalashnikov, and also of an American-built RPG. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Jorde was not sure whether it was a promotion or a punish- ment when, a short while later, Harb issued him a Tunisian pass- port in the name of Sha’ban Abd al-Majid Belqassim and sent him to photograph and report on Jewish synagogues in Istanbul. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was plain to Jorde that Abu Nidal was planning to mount an attack, very probably an assassination, against a Saudi target in Thailand. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
No doubt he would have pressed his attack on Saudi interests over the years had his various state sponsors—Iraq in the l970s and Syria in the early 1980s—not forbidden it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Western Europe, where effective counterterrorist mea- sures had been introduced, was becoming a dangerous place for terrorists, driving Abu Nidal to look for less well policed countries. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He would have shadowy partners in Thailand, although he could only guess at their identity and location. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He was instructed to send his preliminary find- ings about the Saudi embassy personnel by coded letter, written in invisible ink and addressed to a certain Sulayman Taha, P.O. Box 83476, Tripoli, Libya. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Be that as it may, no more payments were forthcoming. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Iyad’s chief bodyguard, Fu’ad al-Najjar, had not arrived with his master but came an hour or so later, as he had gone to settle some problem with his landlord. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Salah Khalaf) escapes an assassination attempt in Belgrade by Abu Nidal agents. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
sels and another well-known dove, is killed by an Abu Nidal gunman. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Muhammad Awda), the Fatah guerrilla commander, narrowly survives an attack on his life in Warsaw by an Abu Nidal gunman. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestinian struggle was being conducted. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The battles between the Jordanian army and the fedayeen raged on for ten days with the dead and wounded piling up in the streets, but Fatah’s desperate cries for help were ignored in Bagh- dad. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But he had made his mark. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the larger aims of the Paris operation were more complex. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When he feels personally threatened, he goes berserk.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Fatah may also have felt the need to clip the wings of a rival organization that was becoming a significant force in Lebanon, an especially sensitive theater of operations for Fatah. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In turn, the operations themselves had, by this time, very little to do with defending the Palestinian cause and a great deal to do with squabbles between Arab states and among Palestinians themselves. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
to a Palestinian attack that month on its Mediterranean coast, when a small force of guerrillas landed from two rubber dinghies and hijacked two civilian buses. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
After a while, he gave away his accomplices, who in turn revealed the addresses of Abu Nidal’s safe houses in Beirut and the names of the men who ran them. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The five were condemned to death, but sentence was never carried out. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
An internal negotiating committee tried at the start to patch things up between Allush and Abu Nidal, but the latter was unfor- giving. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In addition to being the boss of a secret outfit, he was also something of a diplomat and politician, receiving visitors at his house and dealing with people face-to-face. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In April 1985, there was an attack on the Jordanian embassy in Rome and on a Jordanian aircraft at Athens airport. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was attacked by the Libyan army and overwhelmed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Asba was followed in Tripoli by Ali al-Farra (code-named Dr. Kamal), one of Abu Nidal’s most trusted associates: His residence in Libya signaled that Abu Nidal had now made Libya his principal base. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On Fatah’s written instructions, he began an intelligence relationship with the CIA station chief in Beirut, with the result that the former Black September terrorist who had once wanted to attack American targets now became the guardian of the American embassy in Beirut during the civil war and the overseer of the safe evacuation of American civilians in 1976. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In January 1970, he mounted an attack on a busload of El Al passengers at the Munich airport. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
They continued to attack us. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On July 27, 1981, a month before the attack on the Vienna synagogue, the prominent Fatah commander Abu Dawud nar- rowly escaped death in Warsaw. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Tunis in 1990, he gave me his account of the incident. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But as it was too late to see anyone that day, he had gone to take a sauna in the health club before wandering upstairs to the café on the first floor. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Dr. Awad was given a twenty-five-year sentence. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal had merely wanted to hide guns in Britain—for future use. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As it happened, he was carrying $5 million in notes, which Abu Nidal had asked him to deposit in one of the organization’s numbered accounts. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He sensed—and rightly so—that Abu Nizar, who had run the show in his long absence, had become a powerful figure in his own right, with a personal following swollen by the influx of new recruits in Lebanon. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But he was not wholly trusted and, in fact, faced interrogation in 1987, which resulted in a heart attack. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
IMMUNITY FROM ATTACK A curious aspect of Abu Nidal’s activities, especially in Lebanon, also attracted my attention and fed my suspicions. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But he made it clear, Abu Bakr added, that he did not want his part in the affair to come out. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The casual wickedness of his as- saults was shocking—the grenade attack on tourists at the Café de Paris in Rome in September 1985; the hijack of an Egyptian airliner in November 1985, which ended in a massacre at Valletta; the attack on El Al ticket counters at the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985; the slaughter of Pan Am passengers in Karachi and of worshipers in an Istanbul synagogue in September 1986. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hurok, who was promoting Soviet artists in Amer- ica. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
the battleship New Jersey attack Syrian-backed forces in the Lebanese mountains. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
tions with an asterisk): In a speech at the conference on June 26, 1984, Israel’s defense I continued my list (once again marking Abu Nidal’s opera- June 29, 1984-The same month in which it mounts its new counter-terrorism propaganda campaign, Israel intercepts a ferry boat sailing in international waters from Cyprus to Beirut and detains nine passengers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
minister, Moshe Arens, called for the closing of all PLO offices around the world because they are “nothing more than support centers for terrorist operations.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
July 18, 1984-Israel intercepts a Lebanese merchant ship off the port of Tripoli, escorts it to Haifa, and interrogates the crew. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The blow fell at precisely this moment, and it was inevitable that the PLO would assume that the object of the attack had been to force Italy and Austria, undei pressure from their own public opinion, to sever their ties with the PLO. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As for the rocket-and-mortar attack on Britain’s Akrotiri. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The only gunman to survive the Rome attack had lost his father, a taxi driver, in the Sabra and Shatila camp massacres. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Another, who died in the attack, was a certain Muhammad Nazzal who, I was told, was actually in possession of a valid Lebanese passport and a visa for the United States, where he hoped to start a new life. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But shortly before the agreed date for the attack, Abu Nidal changed his mind, Jealous of Jibril, or perhaps fearing that Jibril’s group had been penetrated and might expose him, Abu Nidal de- cided to go ahead on his own. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When Abu lyad told me this, I could not believe—and still cannot believe—that the Israelis would deliberately attack El Al ticket counters and kill their own people. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Libya’s involvement with Abu Nidal, he believed, had undermined its security and exposed it to physical attack. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As with so many Abu Nidal operations, the Karachi hijack was a criminal act that served no conceivable Palestinian purpose and was probably meant to avenge the U.S. attack on Libya the previous April. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Yet he also managed to give the impression of being shy and self-conscious, speaking in a soft voice and looking down at the carpet. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In fact, the Suda- nese opposition had no interest in seeing a foreign group that resorted to contemptible terrorist methods assume the mantle of Sudanese nationalism in its name and was incensed at Abu Nidal’s attempt to exploit its struggle. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He claimed that such loose talk risked destroying them all. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“You keep your pride,” he would say. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
reasonably comfortable captivity in a Libyan seaside villa that Qaddafi had put at their disposal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It was not until January 8, 1991, that the last four hostages, Emmanuel Houtekins, his wife, and two daughters, were released in Beirut—having been flown from Libya to Syria and then driven to southern Lebanon, to sustain the fiction that they had been held not by Qaddafi but by Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He himself is under sentence of death in Italy for the attack on the El Al ticket counter at the Rome airport. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But his killing of a Jordanian diplomat in Ankara and his attack on the Istanbul synagogue roused the Turks against him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In Portugal, Muhammad Hussein Rashid, a member of the hit team sent to kill Isam Sartawi in Portugal, guffawed in court when he heard that he had been sentenced to only three years. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
When in Libya, he would endeavor to work into his communiqués the name of Umar al-Mukhtar, the hero of Libya’s struggle against the Italians in the 1920s. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Nor did Hizballah play any part in Abu Nidal’s attack on the Greek cruise ship City of Poros as is sometimes alleged. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Because that attack, on July 11, 1988, took place in the final stages of the Iraq-Iran war, only a few days after the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian civilian airliner over the Gulf with the loss of 290 lives, many jumped to the conclusion it was an act of revenge in which Hizballah and Abu Nidal had joined forces. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Their agenda stated: no to intra-Palestinian killings; no to the language of blood and to futile foreign operations; yes to the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians; yes to full support for the in- tifada. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Anxious to limit the damage, he sent a delegation to Algiers in October 1989 to offer Abu Bakr Swiss visas for himself and his family, full expenses, and a cash bonus of half a million dollars if he would agree to end their quarrel. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Passions were inflamed, for Muslims view the Harem al-Sharif as their third holiest shrine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The six selected commandos had a box of dynamite and detonators, which they were going to sneak across the largely unguarded border and put next to the canal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He also allowed the Palestinians, who held siz- able demonstrations in Cairo and Gaza after the attack, to organize raids.13 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sharon answered with another Gaza raid on August 22, and Nasser allowed the fedayeen to attack, beginning their own cross-border killings three days later, again almost always against civilians.’5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
11 and 12, 1955 when an armored column attacked near the Sea of Galilee, an attack that even the hawkish Ben-Gurion described as “too successful.”2° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Instead of avoiding El Al, Jews supported the airline, and bookings increased.5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A whole team set about gathering details, drawing maps, taking photos, analyzing difficul- ties. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Six months after the first hijack, the day after Christmas, members of the PFLP attacked an El Al jet while it was on the tarmac at Athens airport. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They set off bombs at El Al offices in several European cities, and in the November 27, 1969, grenade attack in Athens they killed a two-year-old boy and injured fourteen.15 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They lived in a dream world, calling each other comrade and thinking they were working to regain their homeland. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Vienna and forced it to Tel Aviv, where it was scheduled to go, right into the lion’s den. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Hassan then decided to stage the attack because the Olympic Committee ignored what the PLO felt was a legitimate request.1’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A PFLP official had gone to Japan and established con- tact with the Japanese Red Army in early 1971, and three of their members had volunteered for a suicide attack as part of their struggle against worldwide imperialism. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Khartoum action followed the December 28, 1972, Black Septem- ber takeover of the Israeli embassy in Bangkok in which they demanded the release of 36 prisoners in Israeli jails. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Yaacov Rak and Michael Marhoub, in Lyon with false passports; one of these He was coming home late at night, carrying a bag of groceries and a Mossad agents disguised as telephone repairmen planted a small bomb There is a report that the French police later arrested two armed Israelis, 6. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After following their victim for two days, the Israelis decided to attack one night as he and his very pregnant Norwegian wife were walking home from a film. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Black September vs. Mossad 76 do not wage war on the backs of our children”). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They avoided Swissair and Air France planes next to the Pan Am and climbed the stairs of a Lufthansa, demanding that they be flown to safety—which they were, going to Athens and demanding the release of two of their cohorts who were responsible for the August attack at the airport. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They again demanded the release not only of Abu Daoud from Jordan, but also of the gunmen who took part in the Khartoum operation to free Abu Daoud, plus two of their members imprisoned in Holland and the five gunmen who took part in the Christmas 1973 attack on the Rome airport, all spectacular events. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel made official and public noises about giving terrorists a haven; journalists called France cowardly.7 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The other three gunmen were tortured and executed the following day. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Four FRC gunmen walked into the lobby mid-morning with suitcases. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The government knew that Iraq had given the gun- men weapons and that Abu Nida! had trained them.8 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Right after the 1978 New Year an Arab with a Palestinian accent called Hammami and made an appointment to see him that same day. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As Sebai was coming out of the Hilton Hotel in Nicosia, two cars rushed up, and armed men from the FRC, Samir Khadar and Zayeed Hussein Ahmed Au, ran out and shot him at close range in front of the hotel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Rashid quietly slipped out of the country, eventually settling in Libya. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This was followed by an April 1979 FRC airport attack in Brussels demonstrating a similar proportion of malicious incompetence. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal claims the action was his, but that seems doubtful. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The second attack would probably not have happened had it not been for a five-day conference in support of the Palestinian people that had taken place in Lisbon the week before, featuring a speech by Arafat, who also hoped to open an office in Lisbon. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the attack on the ambassador, Peres was able to tell the Portuguese that they “learned the real nature of the PLO” and ask Portugal to ban the PLO.5 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Besides creating a climate of anti—Semitism, this action seemed timed to stop the European Community’s recognition of the PLO. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The murder occurred in the morning as he left his house and went to his car. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Following the usual procedure, the three arrived separately in Vienna. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The actual killer was a Palestinian who was recruited in Iraq. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the middle of the year, there was another attack by an FRC Palestin- ian on an Orthodox Jewish school. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The terrorist, Said Nasser, who traveled to Belgium on a fake Moroccan passport, went to the school and threw two grenades at the children as they were preparing to go on a day tour. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Some terrorism experts believed that Nasser did act on his own, but individuals cannot obtain grenades in a foreign country, know the location of their targets from abroad, and buy fake passports. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The European Community failed to recognize the PLO. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On May Day, 1981, the FRC struck in Vienna, killing the head of the Israel-Austria Friendship League, Heinz Nittal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Rosan told Said that his duty as a brave Palestinian was to shoot the man that got into a certain car. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu ‘Isah, slightly wounded in the attack, fell on Sartawi in an outpour- ing of grief. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The group will continue to work from Damascus until former United States president Jimmy Carter on a private visit presents Syrian president Assad a confidential report from Pakistani president Zia al-Haq about FRC’s murderous 1986 attack on a Pan American Jumbo. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A caller in London where the FRC had financial offices claimed it was a Black September oper- ation.’° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
tourists, and British Airways offices. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The FRC temporarily stopped attacking Jordanian embassies until just after the November 1984 PNC meeting, but what followed compensated for the eleven months of quiet. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They immediately unleashed one of their students who had been given a scholarship to study in Rumania, Ahmed al-Hersh. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Meanwhile, the PLO denied it had anything to do with the attack, which it condemned. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Larnaca attack was apparently sanctioned by Abu Jihad when he got news that Esther Pultzur was in Cyprus. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The bombing in Tunis killed more people than all of FRC’s operations during the heyday. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The bombing rad- icalized the Palestinians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But it makes no sense. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1990 when the PLF sent boatloads of com- mandos to raid the beaches of Tel Aviv, the Israelis knew exactly what was hap- pening and casually stopped all the attackers, then used the failed attack to pressure the United States to end its dialogue with the PLO. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The main FRC attack during the heyday came at the peak of the Christ- mas season, when gunmen opened fire on travelers at the Rome and Vienna airports. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He claimed he was briefed by Syrian intelli- gence on how to set the bomb on the plane, that he was paid US $12,000 by Syria to undertake the attack at Heathrow, and that he was in touch with the Syrian Embassy in London. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Sowan appeared in London, where he began talking to people in the PLO office, claiming to hold a degree in civil engineering from Beirut and to belong to Fatah, trying to strike up relationships. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But someone in the office who served in the same prison as Sowan’s brother became suspicious when Sowan asked his rank in Fatah. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
“No one asks a question like that except a collabora- tor,” he told Sowan, directing him to leave the office. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Questionable 1980s 163 164 Arab and Israeli Terrorism Abu Bakr shuffled back and forth between Abu Nidal and the Fatah lead- ership, trying to rectify the split between the two. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
What must it be like to have a long chat with someone who planted a bomb in your car seven years before,’° who speaks nothing but insults about your organization and killed your closest friends? During that meeting Abu Nidal confessed to Abu lyad that he had Israeli agents in his organization. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He is a big man, standing with the pack and smil- ing. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Jihad was well guarded, but his villa was vulnerable to a sea attack, and that evening he gave most of his guards the night off. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Left to right: Mohammed al-Tamimi, Mohammed Ibheis, and Marwan al-Kayyali. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Fedayeen Cells, were Lebanese recruits. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The action is often reported as an FRC attack—FRC claims it—but out- side of the stupidity of the action, it does not resemble previous FRC attacks. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
But an anonymous caller to NBC-TV in New York—the FRC never had anyone there—claimed that the attack was carried out by Abu Nidal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In Greece since 1974 not one November 17 member has been caught though the organization has assassinated at least 15 diplomats and Greek officials. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When the Achille Lauro was commandeered by Palestinians, Italian cab- inet minister Guilio Amato said that the Reagan administration kept pres- suring the Italian government to attack the ship even though, in Reagan’s words, it “would be a high-risk operation.”’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The United States encouraged Egypt to attack the hijacked plane, asked the Maltese to delay the plane’s takeoff—the hijackers asked only for fuel—and gave logistic support to the Egyptians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Cartoons, articles, and documentaries fea- tured bloodthirsty, dagger-waving fanatics ready to pounce on civilized val- ues. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel and Palestine Report speculates that Israel helped to plan or execute it because the truck had to pass several checkpoints, a complicated operation.27 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Swedish prosecutor, Torsten Jonsson, had issued a warrant for Khader’s arrest a year before the Poros attack. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The City of Poros attack was the culmination of years of Mossad and FRC One PLO leader claimed that Abu Nidal killed Nimri as a favor to Syria. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On June 16, 1990, Fatah raided FRC positions in two Lebanese refugee camps, Rashidia and Em al-Hilweh, killing several FRC fighters, including FRC commander Omar Hamid. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Bombing villages as revenge is clearly not the same as defending a border against armed attack. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1992 Lieutenant-General Ehud Barak said that during the first five years of the Intifada 100,000 Palestinians had been through prison,6 a remarkable statistic given that the imprisonable male population is under 500,000. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
22. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Komoto’s older brother participated in another hijack, and his wife, Okudaira, and another man named Maruoka Osamu were on the Tel Aviv attack. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Husham Mohammed Rajih was sentenced on October 22, 1982, to life for the killing of Nittal and the synagogue attack, and Bahij Mohammed Younis was sentenced to life for killing Nittal. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Marwan Hassan was the third person involved in the syna- gogue attack. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 14, says only that Force 17 was implicated in the attack. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Middle East International, no. 377, 8 June 1990, P. 8: Rabin said that they knew about it from the beginning, which meant that they had plants in the group. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Guardian, 18 December 1990, P. 17: Abu Abbas claimed that the raid was retaliation for the killing of eight Palestinian workers ten days prior. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
By Blood and Fire: The Attack on the King David Hotel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
What distinguished these clashes from the The Rise of the National Liberation Front 51 52 The Rise of the National Liberation Front earlier tribal revolts and attacks on the British in Aden was the organisation behind them. Comtemporary Yemen
Fighting tactics were gradually learnt — attack and withdrawal, the spread of force, fortifications and camouflage; new weapons were also introduced.’8 Comtemporary Yemen
He described The PDR Y: Three Designs for Independence 67 68 The PDR Y: Three Designs for Independence such operations as ‘savage, cowardly terror’. Comtemporary Yemen
The armed struggle in Aden took the form of ‘hit and hide’ in the beginning — by attack- ing patrols and British soldiers. Comtemporary Yemen
Before founding the NLF the leader- ship of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) had negotiations with al-Asnag, trying to persuade him to contribute to the armed struggle, but he had resolutely refused.22 Comtemporary Yemen
Of equal importance to this technical restructuring has been the political change: the imposition on the armed forces of party con- trol, through the introduction of commissars and the appointment of the top military commanders from among former organisers of the guerrilla movement. Comtemporary Yemen
Foreign Relations The alliance with the Soviet Union is a guarantee of the South Yemeni regime’s survival, both through the provision of aid to the Yemeni armed forces, and through the fact that the Soviet Union would seek to a limited degree to protect the PDRY in the event of an all-out attack. Comtemporary Yemen
The first meeting of the Tripartite Supreme Council, the highest organ of the alliance, was held in Aden in May 1982 and presided over by Mi Nasir Muhammad. Comtemporary Yemen
Aden set out to help the republicans by sending troops to San’a’ and by launching a relief attack in the Baihan area. Comtemporary Yemen
Though one may quibble with this definition, for example by broadening “political ends” to include ideological or religious motives, it nonethe- less captures the essence of terrorism—the purposeful attack on the innocent, those who are hors de combat, outside the field of legitimate conflict. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
That is why the terrorists’ message has limited sway in capturing a broad following from among the democratic citizenry of the society they attack. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Periodically, radical splinters of this move- ment, from tax resisters to gun freaks, have had violent run-ins with federal agents. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Many questions about the Oklahoma City bombing remain unanswered at the time of this writing, including who McVeigh’s accomplices were and where he got the cash he used to plan his attack. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In a modern democracy, the terrorist is most often alone, hunted, despised, and without means. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Well remembered is the warrior group of the celebrated ultra-nationalist novelist Yukio Mishima, who in 1970 attempted a takeover of the gov- ernment as unfeasible as it was public, only to commit suicide before the watching eyes of his nation. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The sarin attack was of course a far more serious event, drawing the attention of the world because of the extraordinary deadliness of the menace. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Unlike the volunteers in the war against Franco, the Islamic resis- tance won, offering proof of the innate faithful suprem- acy of Islam over the infidel powers. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In many cases these providential warriors have since been in search of the next step on the road to the triumph of Islam. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
And as the Muslim communities in the West continue to grow, a widening fringe of their member- ship invariably becomes susceptible to infection by the message of militant Islam. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Istanbul itself has been the site of repeated acts of terrorism against Jewish and Israeli targets, including the Iraqi-backed 1986 gre- nade and machine-gun attack of the Abu Nidal organi- zation against the crowded Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, in which twenty-one people died. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
This was fol- lowed in 1995 with a grenade attack on Istanbul’s Beit El synagogue, which fortunately did not claim any lives because two of the grenades failed to explode. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Most of the European governments are loath to address the issue and do not do so unless a particularly violent attack takes place. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
I begin with actions which must be taken on the in- ternational level, because, as I have repeatedly stressed throughout, this is where the main danger comes from. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The con- ference gradually was taken over by “the establishment” and was used by the Jordanian and Saudi regimes to attack Nasir’s regime in Egypt. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is not the policy of Hamas to attack or undermine the interests or possessions of various states.”22 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Not only was there no influ- ential ally for the Palestinians—or for Hamas—at the level of major pow- ers, but also for Hamas there was no regional ally with any real influence over the fate of the Palestinian cause. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Sheikh Yassin, interview in Sawt al-haq walhuriyya, 5 January 1990. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
During this period, both parties will undertake not to attack one another. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One can find many similar texts in numerous leaflets, such as Peri- odic statements no. 65 of 11 October 1990 and no. 81 of 1 December 1991, as well as in the 13 April 1990 statement condemning a Zionist assault on the property of a Greek Orthodox church in the holy city of Jerusalem and the subsequent attack on the monks who demonstrated in protest against the first attack. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In this release, Hamas expressed its solidar- ity with and support for the Christian community, especially considering that the attack occurred during the Greek Orthodox Easter observances. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Third, Hamas is not at war with any Arab or Islamic party; therefore, its policy is not to attack any Arab or Islamic party. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Since then, Hamas has developed its relations with the Sudanese regime so that it has become Hamas’s strongest ally in the Arab world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas’s political discourse and its information releases always respond to internal changes in Sudan. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “Congratulations on the Application of the Islamic Shariah in Sudan,” dated 13 February 1991. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
89. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
As the coun- try descended into a brutal civil war among Islamic factions, the once attractive paradigm of Afghanistan lost its appeal to many Islamist activists in the world. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
A more sharply worded statement by the official spokesman for the move- ment spoke of “the Russian invasion of Chechnya as part and parcel of the global offensive against Muslims perpetrated by the Serbs in Bosnia, the Hindus in Kashmir, the Jews in Palestine, and others elsewhere.”98 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas leaflet, “Statement on the Attack by the Indian Forces on the Muslims of Kash- mir,” dated 25 October 1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas considers Palestine to be the battleground against the Zionist enemy and is careful not to transfer that conflict to foreign soil. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Ibid. delivered letters from the movement’s top leadership containing a unified text laying out its political position, explaining its military practices, and reiterating that it was engaged in a struggle “to liberate the land and defend the people.” HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Their attack suddenly descended on the area after Saladin al-Ayyubi defeated the Crusaders. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Then the Crusaders knew that it was impossible to defeat the Muslims except by preparing the ground with an ideological attack to confuse their thoughts, stain their heritage, and defame their history; after this a military attack could occur. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
That paved the way for the imperialist attack in which rance to neglect a single one of these circles, because Palestine is an Islamic land accommodating the first qibla [direction to face during prayer] and the third holiest sanctuary, from whence the ascent of the Prophet (may peace be upon him) took place. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
And does the falcon fly with- out wings? The Arab Countries and Islamic Governments ARTICLE 28: The Zionist invasion is a vicious attack that does not have pity and uses all low and despicable methods to fulfill its desires. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Contrary to what the forces of occupation do to our people, we do not engage in mutilation, defacement, or over-killing. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949—1993. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
He had always told me to be prepared for receiving news of his martyrdom.That Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When I asked him why, he confided in me that he would be carrying out a martyr’s attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Two days before his departure Salah told me that if he did not get the go-ahead to carry out the attack he would go to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
We left the South where we had been staying for the last couple of months and where he was obviously planning and studying the details and area of the forthcoming attack and drove back to Beirut. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The day the news of the attack broke in Beirut, Maha was at her in-laws, two floors below her flat, chatting with Salah’s brother: I heard that an operation against the enemy had taken place. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Really I don’t feel like I have totally lost him, because I see him daily in my sleep. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While it was not a demand for an all-out war against the Israelis, the moderate sheikh’s cry was the first Hezbollah 18 official call for confrontation and one which would soon be reiterated by others. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s Islamic Resistance had begun to operate out in the open and claimed responsibility for the attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Syria’s blessing, Amal began to attack the camps. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They are using every kind of attack in the book.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
These motorcycle guys come into the area at very short notice before the actual attack is to take place, because they have already got the weapons in position.They Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The local fighters until that moment don’t even know about the attack, let alone where it is scheduled. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Other military experts in the area who have observed the group’s progress over the years, and who spoke on condition they remain anonymous, attributed the changes in the Islamic Resistance’s performance to its success in combining the art of Hezbollah 40 guerrilla warfare with the tactics of a conventional war: The main characteristics of a guerrilla-type war are usually a fixed target, the light-calibre weapons used, the element of surprise, the limited duration of the attack and the small geographical area in which the scene of the attack usually takes place. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
These days they set the trap and wait around for the arrival of the enemy’s back-up to launch another attack or engage in a fight with them. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The attack on Musawi coincided with a period when Hezbollah’s influence had begun to stagnate. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Woodward draws from the memoirs of William Casey, the head of the CIA agency, reporting that Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington at the time, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan AbdelAziz, financed the American agency with the sum of three million dollars to carry out the attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
CIA denied this, but that did little to ease the outrage of the clergyman’s supporters, who called for American blood beneath a banner covering the demolished building which said: ‘Made in the USA’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When news of the attack reached Beirut there was widespread jubilation and rounds of gunfire echoed in the streets. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah did not formally exist in 1982, but it claims the attack as one of its own. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
At the time of the attack, members of the Beirut CIA were holding a meeting with the agency’s leading Middle East experts. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
US Under-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told a congressional investigating committee that the attack was ‘virtually impossible to defend against if the driver was prepared to commit suicide’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Nevertheless, Washington reasserted its commitment to Lebanon and President Reagan declared: ‘This criminal attack against our diplomatic mission will not deter us from continuing with our goal to achieve peace in the area and we shall carry on with what we know to be right.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He could not have been more accurate. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
In its manifesto, Hezbollah calls the attack on the American Embassy ‘the first punishment’ and it lists the MNF bombings as further punishments. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Damascus shared the Soviet intelligence with the Iranians and the decision was made to attack the US embassy in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
One point on which they were both in total agreement was that they would not carry out the attack themselves: the job had to be done by their Lebanese surrogates. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A human bomb was the ultimate method of attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A few days before the attack, the vehicle was transported across the Syrian checkpoints and into Beirut’s teeming southern suburbs. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Americans had just confirmed the Shiites’ belief that they harboured bad intentions towards the Muslim population when they had ordered ships from their flotilla, off the shores of Lebanon’s Mediterranean coast, to open fire.The Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Ten days later a carbon copy of the attack was launched against the Israelis in the second attack on their headquarters, in a different location, in the southern coastal city of Tyre. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Prior to the attack, she had disappeared for a year and her family had assumed that she had run away with a man. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
I sing, Hui~v1AN BoMJ3s 91 am now planted in the earth of the South irrigating and quenching her with my blood and my love for her. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While France blamed Syria for the attack, officials and Lebanese intelligence claim that the murder was carried out by Shiite extremists belonging to the al-Dawa organisation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Buckley had been assigned to Beirut in 1983 following the attack on the US embassy, which had decimated the CIA’s operatives in Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s security apparatus was involved in the ensuing investigation and arrested several Lebanese, including a woman, who admitted that she had been trained and hired by Mossad to carry out the attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
While no one else has been able to verify the story, Farid claims that freelance kidnappers intended to sell Molinari to EXPORT OF A RiwoLu-noN 121 one of the groups and that he had a heart attack as he was being driven to his cell. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Farid reports that the men responsible for Molinari’s abduction would always refer to him as the hostage ‘who never made it to captivity because of his heart attack’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Six key foreign and Kuwaiti installations were the targets in what might have been the worst terrorist attack of the century had the bombs’ rigging not been faulty. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Although the programme compensated families whose homes were destroyed during the attack, many felt that the amounts offered were insufficient and still had to rely on Hezbollah’s teams to ensure the complete repair of their homes. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The crowd was vast, but the number of relatives who had come to mourn their dead was strikingly small for a Shiite funeral: entire families had been wiped out in the attack on the base and few were left to pay their respects. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
A UN investigation, published the following month, concluded that it was ‘unlikely’ that the Israelis had hit the base in error. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The attack on Qana was a particularly bloody moment from a grim historical repetition that had enveloped the South of Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah also lost one of its fighters in the attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The attack caused material damage but there were no casualties. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Binyamin Netanyahu opposed the policy of exchanging territory for peace and. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Wailing ambulances raced to the scene of attack as screeching cars sped out of the neighbourhood. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It showed a man who had lost his wife and two of his daughters in the attack, running with blood pouring down his face. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Abbas thought that the Israelis would respect the ambulance signs and not attack the vehicle. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
She refused for the very reasons that had driven her out of the city in the first place and instead promised to leave the village and to head to the lakeside town of Qaroun, also in the Bekaa Valley, which was not under attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The area was under attack and a missile fired by the heli- copters was directed at the entrance of the building. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Following the attack on the ambulance, the UN Security Council finally agreed to convene. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The attack killed a mother, her seven children and her intended son-in-law The youngest was Nour, whose name means ‘Light’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hassan was still at the airport waiting to board the Middle EastAirline plane, when news of the attack broke. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Lebanon would plunge into its darkest Hezbollah 192 moments later that afternoon during the Israeli artillery assault on the UN outpost in Qana. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
For exactly seventeen minutes, the UN base of the Fijian contingent was pounded by seventeen incoming Israeli shells, thirteen of which landed directly inside the base and hit the two makeshift shelters under which 850 civilians had taken refuge from Israel’s military offensive against their homes and villages. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It did stress, however, that both sides should not attack civilians. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Martyr’s attack. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
During the Hittite period Georgia entered the Bronze Age (the Middle Bronze Age in Transcaucasia is dated from 2000 B.C. to 1200 B.C.), and there is evidence of considerable economic development and increased commerce among the tribes. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He demanded that Aleksandre II of Kakheti and Giorgi X of Kartli (1599—1 605) participate in these campaigns, and the Georgian kings joined the shah 49Twilight of the Georgian Kingdoms SO THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIES against the Turks. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When peasants continued to attack landlords and refused to work for the nobles, the military moved in and forcibly imposed an armed peace.4 The Making of the Georgian Nation
From Chavchavadze’s journal I first learned of the existence of Belinskii, Dobroliubov, Proudhon, and Bastiat. The Making of the Georgian Nation
A dual attack on the gentry nationalism of iveria and the residual influences of populism was carried out in the legal press and through propaganda among students. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The effects of this defeat on worker morale are difficult to judge, but the very scale of the strike changed the nature of labor activity and official response. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Though Transcaucasian workers never reached the level of strike activity or political expression in 1913—1914 that Russian workers in the capitals achieved, on the very eve of the war the oil workers of Baku called a general strike that lasted for over two months and had reverberations in other parts of the country. The Making of the Georgian Nation
However, in a few places the Mensheviks managed to involve part of the peasant masses in the. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This kind of economic reductionism was typical of Soviet officials who attempted to argue that the Menshevik uprising was “artificial,” or that whatever discontent might have existed, the actual cause of insurrection was the decision by outsiders to launch an open attack on the Soviet order. The Making of the Georgian Nation
This would be stupid and reactionary It is impossible to transfer mechanically the examples of collective farm construction in developed areas to underdeveloped areas. The Making of the Georgian Nation
86.5% The Making of the Georgian Nation
Rather than attack professional historians, Beria turned on Makharadze, who was both one of the first Marxists in Transcaucasia and a prolific writer on the early years of social democracy. The Making of the Georgian Nation
That same month articles appeared about the inadequacy of the work of the new Armenian party leadership, which probably reflected on Beria not keeping his Transcaucasian house in order. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On September 8, Stalin wrote to the bureau of the Armenian Central Committee, accusing it of covering up enemies of the Armenian people. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Several were sent to guard the Soviet-Turkish border in anticipation that Turkey might exploit Germany’s successes and attack Caucasia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Charles Fairbanks, Jr., adds to this argument by pointing out that Stalin’s anti-Jewish campaign, the “Doctors’ Plot,” and the persecution of Czech Communists Slansky and Geminder were also connected with his attack on Beria.84 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Not only corruption but officially condoned nationalism—what Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone calls “orthodox nationalism”—became the target of attack in the public statements of Shevardnadze. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In May and again in June 1992, “Zviadists” rallied in Tbilisi, and armed men clashed in the streets. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Za dva goda. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The effectiveness of the Russian Army in this sector was ‘I weakened by the presence within it of thousands of deported Poles who, abominably treated, were constantly on the verge 73 of mutiny. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Whenever it came to a clash, it was the workers and not the nobles or capitalists whom the Cossacks attacked with their guns and whips. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
With police connivance, Black-Hundred bands of the Society of Patriots run by the priests Gorodtsev and Vostor- gov launched a wave of pogroms against Jews all over theI country, including Odessa, Rostov and other large towns. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A new Turkish force, the Second Army, attacked the Russians from the south-west in the Lake Van sector, but was firmly held. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
A Russian-sponsored Ossete force crossed the border from Vladikavkaz in June 1920 and attacked the Georgian Army and People’s Guard. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The territory of the Ossetes straddles the Daryal Pass and extends on the Russian side well into North Caucasia. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The insurgents were Armenians and Russians, who attacked local Georgian military posts. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In the I840s Aden was twice attacked injihdds led by men claiming supernatural power. A History of Modern Yemen
Many Shafi’i divines were as suspicious of venerating saints as were Zaydis, and this seems, perhaps oddly, not to have been a burning issue (the best remembered protest in fact was from the Zaydi poet al- Zubayrl). A History of Modern Yemen
The power of the Arab Nationalist “summons” turned on transistor radios. A History of Modern Yemen
The Imam meanwhile attacked emigration by requiring that migrants guarantee a replacement on their fields. A History of Modern Yemen
The agreement was railroaded through (only four out of twelve elected members of Aden State’s government supported the deci- sion: ex officio or appointed members made up the numbers), and even then a day’s delay would have made it impossible. A History of Modern Yemen
ShafiCi shaykhs who aligned themselves with al-Al?mar (Zaydi) and Nucman (ShafiCi) now found themselves attacked by troops from (Zaydi) Sanaa to the delight of the (ShafiCi) left. A History of Modern Yemen
Within the South, Islamic practice had been brutally attacked in the early 1970s, when for instance the tombs of saints in Hadramawt were desecrated and many preachers and scholars murdered. A History of Modern Yemen
Immediately after the fighting of 1994 a group of them descended on Aden and attacked the tombs of saints there. A History of Modern Yemen
The rem- nants of the YSP boycotted the process. A History of Modern Yemen
Years later a passing car flicked a stone at him and, thinking he was being attacked, he opened fire, killing a Zaydi officer. A History of Modern Yemen
Jorde had pushed him hard to run and jump, and Mas’ud had hated him for it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
As he saw it, the Saudis had struck a deal with him and had then failed to honor it. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Second, a “supervisor” would fly in at the appropriate mo- ment, examine the target in greater detail, make a feasibility study, and, after close consultation with the command back at base, call in a third component. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Syria, for its part, had two main objectives in dealing with Abu Nidal: First, it saw him as a potential ally in the bitter war it was then waging against the Muslim Brotherhood—a war of militant Islamic terror and Ba’athist counterterror that had developed into the gravest challenge Assad’s regime had yet faced. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The mutineers were suspicious of Arafat’s flirtation with “peace plans” and of his talks with King Hussein to establish a common negotiat- ing stance. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Britain broke off diplomatic rela- tions and, after a nine-day siege of the People’s Bureau, expelled the whole of its staff. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
On June 15, 1978, Ali Yassin, Fatah’s representative in Kuwait and a noted moderate, was shot to death in his home; on August 3, 1978, Izz al-Din Qalaq, PLO representative in France, a cultured, soft-spoken, and dedicated Palestinian who had made a considerable impression on French opinion, was murdered in Paris; and two days after that, on August 5, gunmen attacked the PLO office in Islamabad, killing four people but missing Yusif Abu Hantash, the PLO representative. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Austrian security services have established, without any doubt, that a right-hand man of Abu Nidal not only killed the municipal councillor Heinz Nittal on May 1, 1981, and attacked the synagogue in Vienna in August, but also murdered, on June 1, Naim Khudr, the repre- sentative of the PLO in Brussels . Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Manara Press, which bought material from free-lance writers and sold it to news agencies and newspapers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Hindawi was known to Dr. Haidar, the Syrian ambassador in London. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In simultaneous attacks at 8 P.M. local time on May 15, 1988, a five-man hit team attacked two “soft” targets in Khartoum—the Sudan Club, reserved for British and Commonwealth citizens, which they machine-gunned, and the Akropole Hotel, an old Greek-run establishment, where they hurled a rucksack full of grenades into the restaurant, killing a Sudanese waiter, a Sudanese general, and five Britons: Sally Rock- ett, a thirty-two-year-old teacher, and a family of four, Christopher and Clare Rolfe, both in their mid-thirties, and their two children, aged three and one. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Some of his former colleagues told me that he had “sold” the operation to Qaddafi as a means to embarrass, and perhaps even overthrow, the new government that Prime Minister Sadiq al- Mahdi had formed a few days earlier, on May 11, 1988. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Having been attacked by the United States a few months earlier, and in constant fear of hostile penetration along their two thousand kilometers of exposed Mediterranean coastline, the Lib- yans were more than jumpy. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Several killers of PLO representatives in Europe have been released after serving just a few years in jail. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He often went on holiday to Hungary and appears to have had three main reasons for cultivating the Eastern Euro- peans: key members, he was anxious to conclude security agreements with Eastern European intelligence services. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
If so, let me shake his hand. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The next day, a Friday and the eve of the Prophet’s birthday, Islamic clerics at al-Aqsa mosque preached fire. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Jews in loose-fitting European pants and short sleeve shirts attacked Palestinian villages to make it known that the settlers were there to stay. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Thurston Clarke’s book about the incident contains a picture showing a large bloodstain from a body that was catapulted by the explosion and smashed against the YMCA across the street.22 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Similar to the leaflets produced in 1936, they attacked moderate Palestinians, calling them names such as “the symphony of the surrendering voices” and urging people to expand the Intifada into armed struggle.7 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When Jewish extremists killed or maimed sev- eral Arab mayors on June 2, 1980, Israelis suggested they were attacked by rival Palestinians.25 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Haddad knew the West better than others—he spoke perfect English and monitored how each event in the Palestine conflict was covered in the press—but he was trying to impress the West from an Eastern mentality. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
From this incident Algeria gained the reputation of Middle East negotiator. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israelis struck back two days later, not at the PFLP but at the Beirut Airport, where a team of commandos helicoptered in and destroyed 13 Arab planes. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The oppor- tunist government in Iraq rounded up 14 people, including nine Jews—one the leader of the Jewish community—and hanged them on trumped-up charges of spying, muting the uproar over the Beirut raid.’° Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, the international hijackings, where the planes were firebombed, causing over $25 million worth of damage, was an entirely different matter (PFLP leaders did not want the planes destroyed, again demonstrating their weak leadership). Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Japanese Red Army accelerated the cycle of Middle East violence when they attacked the Tel Aviv airport in June 1972. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Israelis collaborated with paid Lebanese and Palestinian agents, who helped an advance party rent cars and secure a harbor where the commandos could land. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
On June 1, 1976, the Syrian PLA with their Christian supporters attacked the PLO and its allies at Tal al-Zaitar on the outskirts of Beirut, leveling the camp. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Syrian soldiers stormed the building, killing four hostages and one gunman. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Four Arab gunmen attacked the El Al counter. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The other two were both arrested, and the one from Iraq confessed that he had also killed Nittal.1’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He had no future until an Abu Nidal recruiter offered him more than elaborate slogans about winning back Palestine through armed struggle; he paid him two and a half times as much money as the other Palestinian groups pay their fighters. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As usual in Greece, no one was caught. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Heyday 157 158 Arab and Israeli Terrorism police guards ran to the scene and also began shooting. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
At the left end of the group stands Abu Abbas, who had gained infamy from his Achille Lauro episode. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This time a lone gunman went to the Bombay airport and attacked a bus carrying an Italian flight crew, wounding a pilot. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Had the Italians attacked the cruise liner it might have resulted in dozens of people being killed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Because the soldiers encircled the plane and came at it from all sides, they also killed each other as they attacked. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Shia attacked several Kuwaiti targets beginning in 1985, including the bloody hijacking of a Kuwait Airlines jumbo in 1988, demanding the release of 17 comrades in Kuwaiti prison who had been convicted on Decem- ber 12, 1983, of other terrorist attacks against the state. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Perhaps if either the Jews or the Arabs had not been passionate about their cause they could have abandoned it. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Noam Chomsky, “Middle East Terrorism and the American Ideological System” in Said and Hitchins, p. 127. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
This call was quite unrealistic: the two groups had been fighting up to the moment of the British withdrawal, and FLOSY leaders had then to flee to exile in North Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Comtemporary Yemen
The Brotherhood was critical of Jordan’s strong ties to the West, and it staged demonstrations in 1954 to protest the presence of British officers in the Jordanian army [the Arab Legion]. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Legrain, “Al-Intikhabat al-tullabiyya fi al-dhafa al-gharbiyya,” pp. 2 13—57. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
In practice, the fatwa has been degraded and is no longer of any practical use: the American-led Western alliance that attacked Iraq had manyfat- was in its favor, and Iraq fought back against the alliance using another set of fatwas. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It has supported the right of Muslims in Kashmir to self- determination. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
of the Madrid-Washington process and the signing of the Oslo Agreement, the crimes of the government of the terrorist Rabin against our people have multiplied, as have stringent security measures including collective pun- ishment and military closure of all areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The Israelis’ headquarters were attacked for a second time a year later, but they were not the only target. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
More fuel was thrown upon the flames when the Lebanese army’s Commander Brigadier Ibrahim Tannous claimed that his units were being attacked by Iranians and Palestinians and warned that the government was in danger of collapsing. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
When the multinational forces were attacked in October, Syria and Iran did not in fact specify a target. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The State Department and the CIA claims that Iran has been behind 1,000 deaths in 200 terrorist strikes since 1 979** French targets were being attacked from as early as 1980 by the Guards’ apparatus. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Immediately behind the villa shown is the home of a Lebanese minister critical of Israel’s occupation of the security zone. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Militiamen had not bothered the foreign press corps in the past and had never attacked its members intentionally even at the height of the civil war. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Several British journalists in Beirut were verbally attacked for their country’s position. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It has presented itself as a champion of the oppressed and has attacked government corruption. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Greeks attacked the defenders of the pass from above, drove them off, and then “descended into the plain on the farther side and reached villages full of many good things.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Greeks, in need of provisions, attacked one of the fortresses but were held off for a time by defenders hurling stones and boulders. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Pompey marched first into Colchis, where he was attacked in the rear by Iberians and Caucasian Albanians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
sultan and the largely Muslim merchants of Tbilisi, Gandja, and Dmanisi. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The Seijuks in Armenia were attacked and pushed back into Anatolia, and the Georgians set up client states on their frontier. The Making of the Georgian Nation
As early as 1860 Niko Nikoladze discerned this tendency in his first published article, “Do We Need the Georgian Lan- guage?” This painful question was addressed in the first influential and long-lived Georgian journal, tsiskani (Dawn), which appeared briefly from 1852 to 1853 under the editorship of playwright Giorgi Eristavi (1811—1864) and enjoyed a longer run (1857—1875) under Ivane Kereselidze (1829—1883). The Making of the Georgian Nation
The very word Gruziia (“Georgia” in Russian) was prohibited in print. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By campaigning against all Armenians rather than just the ruling party~ the opposition produced a backlash among the electors and assured its own defeat. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Bolsheviks, many of them former soldiers, began agitating in these areas and organized armed detachments of peasants, one of which attacked (but Revolution and Republic 197 198 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA failed to take) the town of Zugdidi on June 27. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Although Georgia hoped to remain neutral in the Russian civil war, then raging between the pro-Bolshevik forces of central Russia and the anti-Soviet White armies, the antipathy between former tsarist officers and the social democrats who headed the Georgian government soon turned into open conflict. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Other speakers denied that they had been coerced to renounce Menshevism, but it seemed clear that two years of Bolshevism in Georgia and the probability that Russian backing would keep the new government in power made recantation a more realistic alternative to holding unfurled the Menshevik flag. The Making of the Georgian Nation
On October 31 the Central Committee in Moscow sent down a highly critical resolution on economic work in Transcaucasia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
When Mamulia, Sukhishvili, Okujava, and others defended their policies at the Eighth Congress of the Georgian party (January 1932), they were attacked by Meladze, a spokesman for Beria, for “right opportunism” in their agri- cultural work. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Skrypnyk was dismissed as commissar of education in Ukraine, and on July 6, 1933, after being attacked in the press, he killed himself. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In January 1934 Beria announced to the Georgian party congress that a “Georgian national center” had been discovered. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Party chief Mgeladze told the delegates that “the idealization of the past by the writer Gamsakhurdia is an expression of bourgeois nationalism, the essence of which is concealed in an attempt to isolate and close itself off in the confines of national narrow- mindedness without seeing what is bringing closer together and uniting the laborers of all the nationalities of the Soviet Union.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Artists, writers, and film-makers were attacked for exploiting themes with nationalist overtones. The Making of the Georgian Nation
By 1991 his contradictory policies ended in chaos and collapse, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and a long period of social turmoil and political drift. The Making of the Georgian Nation
They are, in this respect, perpetually “on show.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
In such a context there is little role for the state or for any centrally-organized hierarchy.61 The Making of the Georgian Nation
In March 1993, while Abkhaz forces attacked Sukhumi, Russian aircraft bombed the city. The Making of the Georgian Nation
One should look at the past through the eyes of the future, or the study of the past becomes an end in itself” (Zaria vostoka, February 8, 1974; CDSP 26, no. 8 [March 20, 1974]: 3). The Making of the Georgian Nation
The same author also gives the opening formula deemed appropriate for use in official despatches from the Egyptian Sultan to the King of Georgia: ‘May God make permanent the felicity of the exalted presence, the presence of the great monarch, the hero, the bold, the lion, the illustrious, the attacker, the dauntless, the enthroned, the crowned, a scholar in his community, just to his subjects, the successor of the Greek kings, Sultan of the Georgians, treasure of the kingdom of the seas and gulfs, protector of the homeland of the knights, THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE ‘9 the heir of his fathers in thrones and crowns, bulwark of the lands of Asia Minor and Iran, offspring of the Hellenes, the quintessence of the kings of the Syrians, the successor of the sons of thrones and crowns, the strengthener of Christianity, supporter of the religion of Jesus, the anointed leader of the Christian heroes, who glorifies Jerusalem by sincere purpose, the pillar of the sons of baptism, the helper of the Bab who is the Pope of Rome, the lover of the Mus- lims, the best of close companions, and the friend of Kings and Sultans.”° A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
In March 1984, a bomb exploded outside the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman, and in November of that year the Jordanian chargé d’affaires in Athens narrowly es- caped being shot when his attacker’s gun jammed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But who was my attacker? I was curious to find out. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Some are killers. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The next broke my jaw—I had to keep my mouth shut for five months while it was being rebuilt. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The large device threw metal fragments into the bodies of about two dozen British, German, Brazilian, and Argentinean tourists.20 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
According to an FRC official, the attacker was supposed to hit a Pan American crew bus, but he could not tell the difference between a Pan Am and an Italian crew, demonstrating the mental abilities of FRC per- sonnel. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The workers fired on the attackers from roofs, windows and cellars. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Kvinitadze and his cadets put up a fight, killing two of the attackers and capturing three others, who were sentenced to death by court martial and shot. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
During attacks by the Stern and Irgun militias against the British, the attackers disguised them- selves in police uniform,12 but when the only enemy became the Arabs, Israelis used Arab disguise. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Abu Nidal often took credit for operations in the name of Black September. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
When Sadat discovered that the plane had returned to Cyprus, he ordered a planeload of commandos to storm it. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Cypriots discovered Egypt’s plan and ordered their National Guard to sur- round and protect their plane, and the Egyptians found themselves having to fight not the Palestinian killers but Cypriot soldiers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
His FRC handler gave him his weapon and his instructions. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
O’Ballance, Arab Guerilla Power, p. 28, notes that although the Syrians helped the group, they would not permit the attackers to use Syria as a base. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As soon as he noticed that he was being watched, he ran down an empty area and dropped the box he was holding. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The British withdrawal The British military representatives in Georgia at first tended to identify themselves with Denikin’s neo-imperialist fantasies. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
The Idrisis had only usurped an area which they cut off from Yemen’s lands when under Turkish rule. A History of Modern Yemen
The struggle was in large part directed against Saudi influence and pursued in terms of grand theory. A History of Modern Yemen
26 What follows is drawn from Flugariyyah 1973 and Yüsufi 1976. A History of Modern Yemen
Abu lyad told me that when Abu Mazin started to rebuke Abu Nidal for the Paris operation, an Iraqi official present at the meeting inter- rupted him brusquely. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
“It’s no book at all,” he told Qaddafi. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It’s useless to say who started the violence and who was counter-attacking. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Given Israel’s history of Arab disguise, we need to examine such an assump- tion.55 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1963, however, the Arabs discovered that the project had been restarted, and Egypt’s President Nasser, who dominated the Arab world, convened a special meeting of the Arab League to deal with the issue. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The gunmen had no time to dictate their demands; orders from the gov- ernment, probably directly from the king’s mouth, came immediately. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Syrian factions—Saika, AhmedJabril, and later Abu Musa—had lit- tle support from the Palestinians and did not exist outside Syria. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In the summer of 1978 a lone FRC gunman assassinated the PLO rep- resentative in Kuwait, Ali Nasser Yassine. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
An anonymous caller to AFP in Paris declared that Arab Revolutionary Brigades had struck, a name popular with Abu Nidal during this period.9 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The NLF’s most important activities were, however, the gradual takeover of the sultanates of the Federation as it collapsed, the British withdrew their forces and the former sultans escaped abroad. Comtemporary Yemen
That was the first expan- sion of the original Egyptian Brotherhood beyond the borders of Egypt. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This is to be achieved by attacking the Zionist entity, which is the bridge- head of imperialism in the region, while drawing external support from the main body of Jihad forces, the entire umma.. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The PLO has acknowledged the power of Hamas and officially invited it to join the PLO and the PNC. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Second, Hamas was committed to attacking only “legitimate military targets,” and in the early years up to 1994 it did not target civilians. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
We would welcome any evenhanded mediation you might offer. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
This has really disturbed Israelis, whose politicians and prime minister have publicly stated on several occasions that no matter how much they have threatened Hezbollah they have only succeeded in rallying further support for it — even when they have used the policy of purposely attacking civilians in a bid to turn them against the group. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Many Lebanese saw Hezbollah as the only body determined to fight the occupation and able to challenge the might of the region’s superpower. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
- Now it is essential to bring the matter to a peaceful end by force of arms, not hesitating before the most extreme measures’° The tsar advised Vorontsov-Dashkov not to listen to the conciliatory Krym- Girei and suggested that the best place for Starosel’skii was hanging from a willow. The Making of the Georgian Nation
While the party and police attempted to contain the movement, attacking Gamsakhurdia in the press and breaking up meetings and demon- strations on the anniversary of Georgian independence (May 26, 1988), moderate intellectuals formed the semi-official Shota Rustaveli Society to support the policies of glasnost’ and perestroika. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Stephen F. Jones, “Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Georgian Soviet Socialist For evidence of the growing nationalism in the Georgian intelligentsia, see In 1986, for example, articles appeared in the Georgian press attacking Islam 4. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He learnt also A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA 48 that the Persians were massing a large army in Azerbaijan to the south, in preparation for an onslaught on the Russian dominions in the Caucasus. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Parts of Guria were occupied, but attacks on the towns of Akhaltsikhe, Adsquri and Akhalkalaki were repulsed. A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
At this very moment, I have received from Ozurgeti almost simultaneously telegrams relating to two attacks on village constables, resulting in one of them being wounded, and their arms being stolen, also two attacks on village courtrooms, two attempted murders of village headmen, and the assassination of the nobleman Urushadze.’78 A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
Confusions in British thinking are evident from the language of post- war reports (such terms as “insolence” and “disobedience” become common, though the chiefs were supposedly independent) and from the direction of air action, which became fiercer. A History of Modern Yemen
1973) mentions attacks on the shaykhs of al-~Arqab near MaI~iwit. A History of Modern Yemen
‘Abd al-Ghani Mutahhar (Northern merchant), 83, 104, 107, io8 ‘Abd al-Latif bin Qayid, see al-Rajih, ‘Abd al- Latif ‘Abd al-Nasir (of Egypt), see Näsir ‘Abd al-Raqib bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (Northern soldier), 115—17, 244 n.25 ‘Abdali sultans of Lahj, see Lahj ‘Abduh, Muhammad (Islamic reformer), 47, 173 Abduirab, Habib (writer), 121—2 ‘AbTdah (tribe), 29, 91, 117, i8o Abu Lahum family (Nihm), 86, 108, 128, ~ Dirham (Northern soldier), 128 Muhammad ‘Air (politician), 165 Sinan (shaykh), 86, io6, 115, 122, 125, 192, 595—6 Aba Ra’s family (Dhu MuI~ammad), 32, 38, 57, 68 Amin (shaykh), 93 Qasim (shaykh), 83 Abn Shawarib, Mujahid (shaykh in Hashid), 1555, 115, 528, 136, 195—6 Abyan, 63, 74, 75, 77, 121, 123, 195, 597 and Aden politics, i68 Development Board, 62—3, 77 Aden and the British, 3, 4, 9—10, 54, 58, 72, 8~—6, 99 Index agreements with hinterland, 9, 38, 6o, 87, 97 demonstrations, strikes and riots, 71, 83, 113 economy, so, 71, 118—19 leading families, 72—3, 100 merchants, ,o8, 123 nationalism, 54—6, 58—9, 85—6 “new class”, 72, 73 oil refinery, 71, 74 politics, 72—3, 99, 500, 113 population, 4, 10, 26, 58—9, 71—2, 76, 85—6, 100, ii8 terrorist attacks, 100, 509, 110—lI trades union (see also ATUC), 71—2, 86, io8 union with hinterland (1963), 87—8, 97, 100 Aden post-independence, 120—I, 152, 187, 191, 597—8 capital of South Yemen, 117—18, 534, 546, 194 crisis (1986), 169—70 economy, ii8, 134—5, 557, i68—g, 171, 191, 245 fl.40 A History of Modern Yemen
He wanted to know about smug- glers, then he asked Jorde to keep an eye on student agitators in the town, and finally, when Abu Nidal opened an office in Algiers, which it was feared might be used to plan attacks on visiting Pales- tinians, Jorde was sent to Spain and from there to Beirut to pene- trate the organization. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
My aim in the narrative that follows is to paint as accurate a portrait as possible of Abu Nidal and of the clandestine outfit he has headed for the past seventeen years. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Palestinian protest at the influx of Jews was crushed for a genera- tion. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But before we go, may I just say that we were upset by the decision not to support us in Jordan—no doubt taken without your knowledge.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
He said he wanted the hijackers handed over to me on the morrow. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In October 1983, the Jordanian ambassador to New Delhi was assassinated and his col- league in Rome wounded, in separate gun attacks; in November, a Jordanian official was killed and another seriously wounded in Athens, and three explosive devices were found and defused in Amman; in December, a Jordanian consular official was killed and another wounded in Madrid. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
was a possible case of the kind of collaboration between the Mos- sad and Abu Nidal that Abu lyad had been trying to tell me about, assuming that Ostrovsky’s Mossad assassin was in fact al-Rashidi. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The possibility that There was a further twist to the Khudr story, which made me In the two years before the storming of the Vienna synagogue, to bomb an exhibition about Jerusalem, staged at a Salzburg hotel by the local Jewish community, had also failed. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The true cause of death was not given. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It had barely managed to avoid the consequences of his terrorist attacks on Jordan and on the Gulf sheikhdoms, but it would be a different matter if he set off bombs in Europe. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Moreover, Israel has bombed, shelled, and dynamited Lebanese towns and villages, intercepted vessels in international waters and aircraft in international airspace, launched long-range raids against Baghdad and Tunis, and kid- napped, tortured, and imprisoned many suspected opponents. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Tyre is blown up, killing sixty-seven Israelis—part of a rising tide of hit-and-run attacks by the Lebanese resistance. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ROME AND VIENNA The most spectacular of Abu Nidal’s operations at this time—and the most destructive to the Palestinian cause—were the attacks in late December 1985 on the El Al ticket counters at Rome and Vienna airports. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Libyan news agency, JANA, hailed the attacks as “heroic operations car- ried out by the sons of the martyrs of Sabra and Shatila.” Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
His anti-British operations, for example, were carried out in the name of the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems; the Rome and Vienna operations were claimed by the Cells of the Arab Fedayeen; the bomb attacks on Kuwaiti cafés were ostensibly the work of the Arab Revolutionary Brigades; and the hijack of the Egyptian airliner was the work of the Organization of Egyptian Revolutionaries. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Abu Nidal is said to have made several attempts to kill him there. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
But the communiqué, several pages long, went on to discuss political and economic conditions in the Sudan as if to imply that the Suda- nese opposition had been involved in the attacks. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
were arrested and sentenced to death, but the sentences were not Four days after the Nicosia bomb, Abu Nidal’s gunmen struck Abu Nidal tried to justify the attacks to his colleagues by The operation, which was strongly condemned by both the Five of Abu Nidal’s young fanatics, aged twenty-two to thirty, ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE / 263 PATRICK SEALE / carried out. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In the wake of this, Cypriot opinion turned against the Palestinians, the island authorities tightened their controls over Palestinians coming in and out, and several resident Palestinians were thrown out. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
The Rolfes were Quaker aid workers who had arrived in the Sudan two months earlier, after spending three years with Somali refugees. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
In return, Abu Nidal pledged that he would not bring arms into France, mount attacks on targets in France, or use French territory as a springboard for operations elsewhere. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
THE EASTERN EUROPEAN HAVEN The familiar charge that communist Eastern Europe helped Abu Nidal and other Palestinian terrorists mount attacks in the West is overstated. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
Strikingly cadaverous in face and body, with a stern, inward- the much less powerful job of head of the Organization Directorate); • engineering the organization’s expulsion from Syria in June 1987 by mounting terrorist attacks in Rome, Vienna, Kara- chi, and Istanbul without the Syrians’ knowledge or ap- proval; • splitting the organization between Lebanon and Libya, the better to control it; • demoting Abd al-Rahman Isa in 1987 from head of the Intelligence Directorate to junior cadre and replacing him by Mustafa Awad (Alaa) in Lebanon and Au al-Farra (Dr. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
It took some deft mediation by the then head of Algerian intelligence, Lakhal Ayyat, and a senior Algerian diplomat, Lakh- dar Brahimi (now Algeria’s foreign minister), for a meeting to be arranged between Abu lyad and Abu Nidal in a villa close to the Residence des Pins. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
ing months of 1987, the period in which he destroyed his own forces in Lebanon, killings that may have been inspired in part by fear that Abu lyad was stirring up his comrades against him. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
From there, perhaps we will be able to conclude whether bombings, assassination, the tak- ing of hostages, and other attacks on civilians advanced or hurt the terrorists’ cause. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Ben- Gurion tells us, “Despite continuing Arab attacks, not one of the enemy ever entered a Jewish settlement.... Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The leaders of this unknown cell duplicated copies of the communique on a second-hand mimeograph machine in their austere Em al-Hilweh office; then Arafat sent two people to Beirut to hand-deliver the copies to all the newspapers, who happily carried the story on their front pages the next morn- ing. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
They telephoned the canal con- struction crew, who were equally mystified by the news of this spectacular and daring raid. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
That year the United States Federal Aviation Administration produced a “behavior profile” of potential hijackers, but they never made it public. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
After the Khartoum disaster those involved in Black September were given other functions, thereby eliminating future organized Americans have become used to thinking of Israelis as the good guys and Arabs as the bad guys.... Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Adwan, a bright intellectual who headed the information department and coordinated activities in the occupied territories, had spoken out against terrorist attacks on civilians. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
However, in the 1980s his organization launched attacks on European Jews, and he spoke against Jews with a Nazilike fervor. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Egypt restricted the rights of the 40,000 Palestinians in the country and almost broke relations with the PLO.’9 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Kreisky’s Socialist party canceled its May Day celebrations in honor of Nittal, who had been party secretary.12 Arab and Israeli Terrorism
As he was stopped at a red light, a young Palestinian named Said Salman, equipped with a machine gun and grenade, attacked the car, killing the man and injuring one of his daughters. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel blamed the PLO for the incident. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The technical aspects of the operation were left to Murad, head of the intelligence department responsible for outside opera- tions, but the idea for the operation came from either Abu Nidal or Dr. Ghas- san. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A few days later a Jordanian chargé was also attacked in Athens. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Jordan’s embassies and airlines, succeeding in killing diplomats in Madrid, Bucharest, Athens, and Ankara. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The next day in Rome the Jordanian ambassador, Taysir Alaedin Toukah, and his Egyptian driver were wounded when an FRC car came alongside theirs and opened fire Chicago gangland style. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The attack received far more publicity than the Israeli expulsion a day earlier of 18 ex-prisoners released in an exchange, contrary to the exchange’s terms.2’ Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel made diplomatic protests against the sale; Abu Nidal threw bombs. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Israel blamed the PLO, saying that terrorists had killed three innocent holiday makers. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
The Americans never attempted any similar action against the real international terror group, the FRC. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Some journalists speculated that the Rome and Vienna attacks were retaliation for bombing the PLO in Tunis, an incredible idea, since Abu Nidal, who goes around killing PLO leaders, is hardly interested in evening their score. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Originally attacks were planned on three airports, Rome, Vienna, and Frankfurt, but Frankfurt had to be can- celed at the last minute for technical reasons. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Since the beginning of President Reagan’s first term there had been at least 16 attacks against Americans in Europe by Mid- dle Eastern and left-wing groups,’° but the United States chose to ignore the other attacks and concentrate on Gadaffi. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
It appeared to be an insane period involving indiscriminate acts of death and destruction, but analysis shows that most acts were orderly and directed. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
He offered his services to the PLO and did small jobs for them,2’ meeting Abd al-Rahim Mustafa, a not-too-bright mem- ber of Force 17, the security branch of the PLO headed by Abu Tayib, a semi- literate who worked from Amman until he was dismissed in 1991. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
A few feet away is Abu Bakr, a third the size of Abu Abbas, his arms folded on his chest, a disgusted look on his face because he hates Abu Abbas so much he does not want to stand next to him. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
FRC does not attack Israeli embassies or use women. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
(3) Killing of other Arabs: attacks on diplomats and embassies, Jordanian and Syrian for political reasons, Saudi and Emirates for extortion. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
(4) Attacks against the West: tourists and airlines. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
(5) Attacks against Jews in Europe and Istanbul. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
There is no rea- son to believe that Abu Nidal sold any great quantity of weapons during that war. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Greece asked that its soil not be used for the exploits of others. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In reality his job, launch- ing military operations against Israel in the occupied territories, had a big title but involved little activity. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Equally, military attacks by legitimate armies cannot be considered in the same light as terrorist actions. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
49), Alex Schmid argues that the majority of terrorist attacks are “based on a rational choice and therefore remain open to rational analysis.” Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Those attacks sent 500,000—800,000 51. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Michael Curtis et al., Arab and Israeli Terrorism
PLO intelligence found that the Mossad was planning a series of attacks against synagogues and otherJewish targets, and they passed the information to European authorities. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
D.A. Pluchinsky, “Middle Eastern Terrorist Activity in Western Europe in 1985: A Diagnosis and Prognosis” in Wilkinson and Stewart, p. 174, counts 233 terrorist incidents between 1980 and 1985 and finds 62 percent were against Arabs/Palestinians, 17 percent against Israel/Jews, and 5 percent against the United States. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
Chapter 20 trying to form. Arab and Israeli Terrorism
In 1964 and 1965 the NLF extended its struggle to Dhala’, Dathina and Awdhali, as well as beginning armed struggle in Aden itself in August 1964. Comtemporary Yemen
For the first time a single organisation was involved simultaneously both in Aden and the interior, hitting the British and the amirates they supported in a two-pronged attack: armed struggle in the interior had a mainly political impact and went side-by-side with political infiltration and education in the amirates; the objective was to undermine these puppet authorities and this was so successful that, when the time came in 1967, they all fell without any resistance. Comtemporary Yemen
The start of armed struggle in a naturally fortified region, the Radfan mountains, gave it a good chance of survival, especially in the first phase when it was isolated from the outer world. Comtemporary Yemen
In this context we come across statements in British secret reports such as Egyptian commander Murtaji preferring to operate inside the Western Protectorate instead of conducting border operations, or Radfan fighters carrying out as many operations as possible for the sole purpose of collecting money and weapons.’4 Comtemporary Yemen
The Saudis also worry about the dispute over their undefined borders with North Yemen. Comtemporary Yemen
Acknowledgments (Ii Preface I The Plague of Domestic Terrorism II The Question of Civil Liberties III The l980s: Successes Against International Terrorism IV The l990s: The Rise of Militant Islam in America and the World V The Gaza Syndrome VI The Specter of Nuclear Terrorism VII What Is to Be Done Notes CONTENTS liii 3 7 27 51 75 99 121 129 149 I FIGHTING TERRORISM How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists Terrorism is back—with a vengeance. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Indeed, in the rush of anxiety following the Oklahoma bombing, there was considerable concern in the United States that this bombing was a harbinger of a future wave of terrorist attacks against American society. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The Ku Klux Klan, after all, engaged in violent attacks against black Americans and others. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
and government attacks on Christian Ameri- cans,” and calls on its members to “buy ammo now. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
It has developed laws of war which proscribe, even in wartime, the initiation of de- liberate attacks on defenseless civilians. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
By 1982 the FALN had reached a peak of logistical capabilities, executing no fewer than twenty-five separate terrorist attacks in- cluding bombings of civilian targets and violent armed robberies. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In it, Hexel and Hepp re- nounced the traditional Nazi hostility toward Soviet Communism, identifying American imperialism as a hos- tile occupying force from which West Germany had to be freed through a “liberation struggle” by a renewed Nazism. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Cooperating openly with the PLO, and less openly as well with European terrorist factions, most of its attacks were carried out beyond Ja- pan’s borders. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
For possibly the first time in decades, a concerted anti-terror effort was conducted simultaneously by the governments of virtually every democratic nation. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
By the close of the 1940s, a terrorist group called Volante Rosa was carrying out attacks and assassinations against government targets in Italy, and fleeing to Czechoslovakia when they felt threatened by the authorities. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Hizballah is presently the major terrorist force in south Lebanon, launching incessant attacks against Israel’s northern bor- der. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Thus, one of the co-conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing was assisted by a formidable yet hith- erto unnoticed Islamic group in Denmark. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
If America has started to take note of the problem of militant Islamic activities within its borders, this has come about only after particularly spectacular attacks by these groups within the United States itself. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The subsequent police investigation discovered forty-seven boxes of papers in his home, mostly in Arabic, that the police assumed were “religious materials” of no relevance to the case. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
Equally, it became apparent that far from taking action against terrorist organizations in Gaza, the PLO presided Benjamin Netanyahu 104 over a fantastic explosion of anti-Israel terrorism from Gaza that threatened to turn its mini-state there into a replica of the PLO mini-state in the Lebanon of the 1970s. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
What is less well known is that the more deadly of these attacks, those that require fairly sophisticated explosives and planning, are seldom carried out by soli- tary individuals. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
In short, suicide attacks require a sig- nificant infrastructure, and the people who provide it are anything but suicidal. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
A few~ ministers in the Labor government echoed these doubts, thereby contributing to a growing mood of public skep. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
But the resistance of a society to ter- rorist blackmail may likewise be strengthened by counter- terrorist education, which clearly puts forth what the terrorists are trying to achieve, elucidates the immorality of their methods, and explains the necessity of resisting them. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists
The common image of Hamas in the West, even among intellectuals and politicians, is that of a terrorist organization involved in suicide bombings and attacks on passenger buses. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
One of the most prominent Brotherhood members in Jordan, Yusuf al-’Azm, explained that policy in these terms: “The Brethren did not rebel against the king; they observed a truce with him because they could not fight on all fronts at once. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas made clear, however, that its attacks on the PLO and its charges about the PLO having sold out the Palestinian people were leveled not at the organization as a whole but rather at its “power-usurping” leadership. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas extended a warm welcome to the police officers and, because the PA had failed to make preparations for their housing and basic necessities, provided accommo- dations for them at its own school buildings and charitable societies. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Although the assassi- nation produced a charged atmosphere once again, and unknown dangers loomed, it seemed briefly that developments were headed in a new direction. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
The first was in April 1994, when Jordan announced it was withdrawing the passports of Nazzal and Ibrahim Ghosheh, both Jordanian citizens, after Nazzal declared in Amman that Hamas was embarking on armed attacks inside the heart- land of Palestine. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hamas sent an official delegation to Iran in October 1991, signaling an important upgrading of relations. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It is evident that Hamas’s use of the language of international legitimacy was prompted by the international condemnation of its armed attacks. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
They were followed in February and March 1996 by another series of bus attacks in Jerusalem, ‘Asqalan, and Tel Aviv to avenge the assassination of Yahya ‘Ayyash. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
responsible for any attacks against Israelis carried out from areas under its control. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It should be noted that Hamas regarded settlers in the West Bank and Gaza as legitimate military targets both for being armed and for their con- tinual attacks against unarmed Palestinian civilians. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
1. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It never attacks any of them, except those who show hostility toward it or stand in its way in order to stop the movement or frustrate its efforts. HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
Hezbollah’s Islamic Resistance, however, became more visible as it increased its attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
It had also charged them with being accessories to a conspiracy against it and threatened to launch attacks against their troops in the South. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Their attacks had all the elements and ingredients of military operations.’ Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Most attacks are planned by a military leadership which also includes local political figures. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On several occasions, Goksel recalled, the locals’ reactions on hearing of the elite force’s attacks have created problems. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
the militant guerrifias launch their raids and attacks, a hidden cameraman films them from a distance. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He described the group’s priorities and activities in its first months of formation in an interview with the newspaper Al-S afir: The main effort at the time went into mustering and attracting young men and setting up military camps where they could be trained and organised into small groups capable of carrying out resistance attacks against the occupying force. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
first being the banding together of young men, training and organising them into small groups and then dispatching them to the occupied areas from where they were instructed to carry out attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The attacks were intended to be messages and they usually occurred late at night and after closing hours. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Following the failure of the attempt, Woodward relates that the Saudis paid Fadlallah two million dollars in humanitarian aid for Shiite refugees in an apparent bid to halt any retaliatory attacks against the US and Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Between 1982 and 1985 there were at least thirty similar attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
An unknown organisation named Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attacks in telephone calls to the news agency Agence France Presse. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
‘Violence will remain our only way,’ declared the caller. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Islamic Jihad declared that it was willing to send 2,000 fighters to martyrdom to expel the Israelis and that it was preparing for attacks all over the world. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah’s leaders like to boast of having a long list of young Shiites eager to lay down their lives in martyr attacks, al-A mah~ya al-istishhaadzya, as they call it. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They passionately defend the practice and dislike the term suicide attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
An edict was duly passed which allowed the fighters to carry out the attacks despite the presence of the Muslim prisoners. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
But in truth there is no difference between their attacks Hezbollah 92 and ours. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Whether one attacks by planes or by car bombs the objective is the same. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
did not consider our attacks to be suicide... Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
it had no distinct public figures, no one particular leader or chieftain to arrest, no offices and worse still no specific address against which counter-attacks or retaliations could be launched. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Islamic Jihad’s operations usually bore the hallmarks of the Guards’ training: their attacks and abductions were obviously well researched and conducted with precision. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The affair confirms the direct involvement of the Guards’ special security apparatus in the kidnapping of Western hostages and suggests that Buckley’s abduction was not a spontaneous local act but a pre-planned operation. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
On 12 December 1983, six weeks after the attacks on the multinational forces in Lebanon, a chain of explosions had rocked the Gulf state of Kuwait. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
They were known as the Kuwait 17 and had been charged with orchestrating a devastating bombing campaign. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Kuwaiti attacks shook the country and its neighbouring states to the core. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its members were vehemently opposed to Saddam’s regime and the Guards recruited them to carry out attacks against Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime and against the rulers of some of the oil-rich Gulf states. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Sabbah, the Emir of Kuwait, revealed that his government had been threatened with further terrorist attacks if the men were not released. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
He reiterated his conviction that the estimated 200,000 refugees would ultimately pressure the Lebanese authorities and the Syrian government to put an end to Hezbollah’s attacks against his troops. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hamas adopted Hezbollah’s lethal methods and killed sixty-two people in four different human bomb attacks. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hezbollah 178 There was no logic, no precision and most of all no justifica- tion for the destruction of the homes, roads, electrical supplies and water tanks of Lebanon. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Hariri reiterated that the attacks against the Israelis inside the ‘security zone’ would continue, since the people of Lebanon had a legitimate right and duty to ‘resist’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Sheikh also appeared to justify Hamas and Hezbollah’s human bomb attacks when he said that no blame could fall on ‘the oppressed who resisted and chose death’. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
The Kashkai had participated in the destruction of the Hittite empire, then moved westward, where they came up against the Assyrians. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The viceroy’s liberalism was rejected by protsarist demonstrators, and the administration was unable to curb attacks by Cossacks in Kutaisi and Batumi. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Within days an armed insurrection broke out in Moscow, and simultaneously workers and peasants in the Baltic provinces rose in revolt. The Making of the Georgian Nation
He insisted that the fundamental form of the collec- tive farm was to be the “agricultural artel,” rather than the more extreme commune or the moderate “cooperative with joint labor.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Attacks were carried out on party officials and organizers. The Making of the Georgian Nation
From the time of the infamous Shakhty trial of engineers (May—June 1928) until Stalin’s speech calling for respectful treat- ment of the specialists (June 23, 1931), the intelligentsia, particularly “bour- geois-specialists,” engineers and technicians, was treated as a class enemy by the party and state. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Throughout the Soviet Union attacks on Old Bolsheviks and intellectuals continued into 1935. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In March and April 1936, Zaria vostoka featured several articles critical of formalism in the arts. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The criticism that attended his works did not prevent the novelist from being officially recognized and honored or being required to participate in public, even political, events. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In November 1938, for example, Gamsakhurdia and other leading writers and artists, among them playwright Shalva Dadiani (1874—1959), painter Lado Gudiashvili (1896—1980), and sculptor Iakov Nikoladze (1876—1951) at- tended a public meeting in Tbilisi to protest the Nazi attacks on the Jews in Germany.64 The Making of the Georgian Nation
Ethnic discrimination and attacks on nationalism went hand in hand with an aggressive promotion of Russian culture and nationalism. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The attacks on nationalism hit the Georgian intelligentsia, and at the Fifteenth Congress of the Georgian Communist Party in September 1952, Georgian writers, critics, artists, and film-makers were criticized. The Making of the Georgian Nation
The strongest attacks were reserved for that most ideological of sciences, the study of history42 Both the chauvinism of Geqrgians toward ethnic minorities within Georgia and of the minorities themselves came under fire. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Moderates The Georgian Road to Independence 323 324 REVOLUTIONARY AND SOVIET GEORGIA formed the Georgian Popular Front (sakhalkho pronti), with the ultimate goal of “the creation of a free and democratic society and restoration of Georgia’s complete state independence” to be achieved “within the frame- work of existing legislation.” The Making of the Georgian Nation
Frequent attacks on Islam in the Georgian press targeted Ajars, but not the Azerbaijanis living in Georgia. The Making of the Georgian Nation
Elizabeth Fuller, “Islam in Adzharia,” Radio Liberty Research, RL 221/86, June 4, 1986, pp. 1—4; “The Georgian Press Again Attacks Islam,” ibid., RL 8 1/87, February 24, 1987, pp. 1—4. The Making of the Georgian Nation
In early 1985, a massive car bomb, meant for Fadlallah, exploded at a building near the cleric’s house in Bir al-Abed. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Its inclination was to invite leaders of political parties together with Federation Ministers, i.e. the national forces not taking part in the armed revolution. Comtemporary Yemen
However, the realisation of this sought-after balance needs much effort, and it also needs the co-operation of many sectors to attain good results. Comtemporary Yemen
The students eligible to follow this course are those who attain ‘Excellent’ or ‘Very good’ in their first degree. Comtemporary Yemen
Theory and Practice 231 232 whoever promises to help if he is elected.”56 HAMAS: Political Thought and Practice
It sometimes takes power and force to attain those rights. Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance
Andreev, Russian Communist, 262 Andronik, Armenian partisan com- mander, 202 Andronikashvili, General Alexander, executed by Communists, 241 Ankara, 184, 230, 233—4 Antioch, 13 Antoni II, Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia, deposed by Russia, ~6 Apkhaidze, Shalva, Georgian poet, i88 Arabia, Arabs, 12, 14, 19, 26, 28, 178 Aragvi, river, Ii, 23 Aragvispireli, Shio, Georgian writer, 187 Araxes, river, 55, 6, Architecture, 21 Ardahan, 6, 61—2, 104, 184, 202, 208, 234 Ardaziani, Lavrenti, Georgian novelist, 87—88 Ardebil, 6o Argentine Republic, 220 Argonauts, 2, 23 Argutinsky.Dolgorukov, A Modern History of Soviet Georgia
I had recently spent ten hours talking to Ahmad Jibri! Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
rine barracks near Beirut airport kills 241 men. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
March 1984-William Buckley, CIA station chief in Bei- rut, is kidnapped and killed in June. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire
williamj@tenbase2.com