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Here is the list of searched books:Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
These forces have been receiving arms and materials as well as training from the United States, Iran, China, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Following the agreement with the USSR, 4fghanistan concluded treaties with Turkey, Iran, France and Italy. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Pakistan appeared to be far more attractive to Americans than Afghanistan or even Iran in the late forties as the key nation that could make the United States a key lever in the stability and security of the Persian GulfSouth Asian region, and in this major policy decision the United States was strongly influenced by the British foreign office. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society But Daoud ended up with a pact with the Shah of Iran which was seen by others as a move to reduce Soviet influence in the Northern Tier and an understanding with Pakistans volatile President, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to run down the Pushtunistan movement. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The Shah of Iran announced a planned trip to Kabul in June, and Daoud himself said he would be visiting President Carter in Washington before the end of the year. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society In Iran, the Shah could hear the first rumblings of a very different Islamic fiinda- mentalist upheaval that would throw him and his regime out in less than a year. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The Islamic revolutionary regime of Iran could not extend to the Afghan fundamentalists as much help as it might have done if it had not been locked in a wasting war with Iraq. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The political-strategic implications of the intervention were debated and decided at the Politburo of the CPSU, and this difficult exercise took into account, as Brezhnev disclosed after the intervention, all aspects of the traumatic projected Soviet action, especially its impact on Soviet-American relations, and on political alignments in the strategic regions of the Persian Gulf, southern Africa and South Asia The civil war in Afghanistan has continued for five years; it has involved not only the PDPA and its opponents in Afghanistan, but a number of external nations, notably the Soviet Union, the United States, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and India. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The great American debacle in Iran pleased Ustinov and Gromyko. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Soviet pronounce- ments implied that just as the United States was trying to operate a comprehensive strategy for Iran, the Persian Gulf, Pakistan and Afghanistan, so were the Soviets pushing a comprehensive counter- strategy for the entire area with a view to reducing American influence, enhancing Moscows own, and turning the regional balance of power, if not against the United States, then, at least in favour of a Soviet presence on a par with Americas in regional stability and conflict- management The Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan brought out into the open some of the changes that had already occurred in global and regional power equations. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society In the Middle East, the American military-diplomatic initiatives in Lebanon ground to a halt, in the Persian Gulf, the two superpowers were constrained to act along parallel lines to see that the seemingly unending war between Iraq and Iran did not create a situation compelling either, and therefore, both, of them to intervene. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The collapse of the Shah of Iran, the Khomeini revolution, and the hostage crisis seemed to put American vital interests in the strategic Persian Gulf in seriousjeopardy. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Not only was mutual trust and confidence completely lacking between Washington and Moscow in December 1979, but both laboured under the fear that the other was about to embark on military action in Iran that would gravely injure its vital security interests. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society per cent The prices of foodstuff remained three times lower than in Iran and at least two times lower than in Pakistan6 With the summit conference of the non-aligned nations in New Delhi in mind, the PDPA offered, in February 1983, to hold a grand jirgall with tribal chiefs who had fled to Peshawar, and reiterated its readiness to settle the Afghan crisis in direct negotiations with Pakistan and Iran. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The United States had only a skeletal presence in the country, the influence of the Shah of Iran on Mohammed 162 Afghanistan Daoud perturbed neither the Kremlin nor the Afghan nationalists. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society For offers to talk to Pakistan and Iran, seeBakhtar news agency release of 16 February 1983. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Gregory Oswald and AnthonyJ. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society As Shias, their loyalty to Iran was a major reason for disunity. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Some followed the Ayatullah Khomeini of Iran as a political as well as a religious leader, while others followed him only as a religious leader. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 He can do so only when the Islamic funda- mentalists and the governments of Iran and Pakistan leave the Afghans to themselves to set up a political leadership in accord with their social conventions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 An unfortunate group of sixteen Pakistanis, with two Chinese, two Americans, and an Egyptian, were arrested in Kabul, accused of being agents to create bloody pogroms and murder.7 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The government did not mention the name of Iran, although the Afghan Shiite followers of the Ayatullah Khomeini were active in the uprising and had chanted his name. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The promotion of Kishtmand was also important because it would placate the Shiite Hazaras and improve relations with the Khomeini govern- ment of Iran. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Premier Sharif of Pakistan paid a brief visit to Mojaddidi, granting him $io mil- lion and promising to provide foodstuffs; the Islamic Republic of Iran followed suit. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Also, as the guardian of an important frontier province, he showed vigilance about the intrigues of Iran. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Its original rapid progress was curbed by the Islamist organizations of Islamic Association and the Islamic Party of Hekmatyar (Z. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Unlike many Shias, Muhsini follows the Iran-based ayatullah of the Shia de- nomination only in religious affairs, not in secular affairs: hence the expulsion of his organization from Iran and his willingness to cooperate with the Afghan Sunni resistance organizations in Peshawar (N. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 They will bring half of Iran into Afghanistan under the flag of [the] Herat division. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Iran and Pakistan have a common plan against us. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Maybe you may tell me now what assessments you can offer con- cerning Pakistan and then Iran? Do you have connections with pro- gressive-minded people in Iran? Can you tell them that at present your chief enemy is the United States [?] Iranians are very embittered against the United States and probably this can be used for propa- ganda purposes. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Today we have broadcast a statement to the Iranian government pointing out that Iran interferes in our home affairs in the Herat region.. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Do you believe that if Herat falls Pakistan will act the same way as Iran does? Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Iran sends service men in civil[ian] clothes to Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Judg- ing by the example of Iran and Pakistan we see that it is easy to do. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 [The] Iranian revolution is an example: the people threw out all Americans and all other peoples too who tried to show them- selves as defenders of Iran. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Tens of thou- sands of refugees were fleeing into Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Iran. Afghanistan: The Soviet War tion against Iran. Afghanistan: The Soviet War These do not include the hundreds of thousands of civilians, many of them refugees in Pakistan and Iran, who often double up as partisans. Afghanistan: The Soviet War The fundamentalists are themselves at odds as to whether they want a progressive Islamic republic or one as radical as Ayatollah Khomeinis Iran. Afghanistan: The Soviet War West ~ G-3s from the arms bazaars of Pakistan or brought in from Iran are also very popular among guerrilla commanders. Afghanistan: The Soviet War When Daoud, who wanted to ensure his countrys continued non-alignment, refused to join the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organisation CENTO) with Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Britain and the United States, the Americans opted for the Pakistanis (also a member of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation SEATO) to whom they 93 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan regularly supplied weapons and other forms of support. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Moreover, according to Mohabbat and other sources, ten out of fifteen Afghan diplomats posted to Iran, Pakistan and India in the summer and early autumn of 1981 were in fact KHAD agents. Afghanistan: The Soviet War As trade decreases with Pakistan, Iran and other coun- tries, more goods are being brought down from the USSR via this route. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Khomeini sheiks (mullahs trained at the Shiite holy centres of Qom in Iran or Nadjaf in Iraq). Afghanistan: The Soviet War de Gaulle, General 78, 193 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin 56, 167, Gaylani, Sayed Ahmad 56,171, 172 169-71, 175,194 Geneva Conventions (1949) 223, 225, helicopter gunshlps 16, 20, 23, 33, 226,228,230; Protocols (1977) 35, 36,41-3, 45, 60,65,81-5 223,225, 226 passlm, 114,118,127,162,169, GenghisKhan4,56, 164 220, 233, 239 genocide, migratory 7,35,161,202, Helmand province 9, 112-1 3, 189-90, 237,248; see also refugees 204; River 94 geology 152-3, 165 Helsinki Watch Group, New York geopolitical factors 26-8 238 Germany 90,117,120; East 93,117, Herat 8, 15, 17, 23, 35, 39, 44, 55, 120,122,124,139 74,101, 115-16, 126, 146, 184, Ghazni 55,171,172,199,204; 196,216,233 Sirdar of 58 Herle, Jean-Denis 143 Giap, Van Nguyen 78 Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) Gorbachev, Mikhail 134 (Hekmatyar faction) 56, 169-7 1, Gorchniski, Mikhail Semyonovich 174-5, 194,195, 196, 229; 226-7 (Khales faction) 48, 56, 70, 74, 113, 167-9, 194,196,226,227, lovernment in exile 192-4, 241 241 lovernment officials 7,22,62-3, 73, 82,86, 128, 135,138-40 highways 5,8,15,21,40,60,61, Great Game 2 93-4,119, 185 Grenada 151,239,240 Hindu Kush 21, 33, 51,76 Grigorenko, Marshal 191 Homer, John Evans 92 Groupe Mujadeddin-e-azad (Group hospitals 220-1,224-5 of Independent Mujahideen) 74-5 housing shortages 182, 207 Index 254 Index Khalq/Khalqis5, 9,14,15,22,31, United Front) 57,74 human rights 121-7 passlm, 190,238; 62,76,97,101-6,110-17,119, Jalalabad 12, 20, 49, 50, 51, 126, International Federation of 122 130,135-6,146,151,164, 166, 148,169 humanitarian rights 223-32 172, 174-5, 196, 197, 203 Jamiat-i-IslamI (Islamic Society) 56, Hungary 26 Khalq 96 74,168, 170, 184, 188, 194, Hussein, Sayed Djendnal 55,297 Khan, Ismail 55, 68,168, 196 195, 199,241 hydno-electnic power 153-5 passim Khomeini 27, 29,56, 129, 157, 169, Japan 90, 120, 239 200; Khominists 57, 66, 199-20 1 Jawana-i-Musalman (Militant Muslim Ideology 27,57,102,145-8,174, Khrushchev, Nikita 93 Youth) 56, 78, 166 183 Khyber, Mu Akbai 102,103 Jebhe-ye melii-te Najat-e Afghanistan India 25,27,28,88,90,92,95,98, Khyber Tribal Agency 203 (National Front for the Salvation 101,104,139,150,159,228, kidnappings 59,73, 148, 170,227 of A.) 54,56, 171, 173, 193 235 Kipling, Rudyard 2 Jehani, Ban (vice-president, Kabul Indian Ocean 26,28,29,159 Kirghiz 46,208-9 TV) 149-50 Indochina 25, 34, 38; see also Kishtmand, Sultan Ali 96, 105, 107, Jihad 2,5, 6,52,58, 194 Vietnam 157,235 Jirghas 69,101-2,108, 131-2, 172, indoctrination 5,63,132,138, Kissilov, Valery Yunkevich 229 193-4 Kochka Riven 154, 160 142-3,145-8, 174, 237,see also Komoskaya Pravda 247 job competition 207 propaganda; training journalists 9-10, 31-2, 38, 128, 151, Korea, North 67 infiltration, of government 62-3, 168, 187, 189,229,238,243, Kouli, Mohammad Yazkoulev 229 130; of mujahideen/refugees 118, 248 krasnaya Zvezda 247 124,128-30,193 Jouvenal, Peter 48 Kunar province 107,113, 115,190-1, inflation 160, 182 Jouzjan province 157 195,211;Valley 33-4,83 informers 62-3 intelligence, mujahldeen 62-3, 67, Kunduz province 15,42,60,66,160, Kabul 8, 16, 17,40,44,55, 59,60, 74,82,130; Soviet 14,233 161; River 155 62,64,70,72-6,80, 114,116, Interdiction tactics 37-9 Kurds/Kurdistan 210,215 117,126,140, 141, 149,152, International Bureau for Afghanistan, Kutchis 199 159, 172, 175-82, 216, 234; Paris 211 Kuwait 8 University 91, 125, 141-5 passim, interrogations 117, 122,124, 125, Kuzichkin, Major Vladimir 14 166,see also Radio; airport 12, 126 16,76, 80,94; Polytechnic 145 invasion, Soviet 4,8,9, 1247; cost Laber, Jeri 238 Kakar, Professor Hassan 125 of 135, 160-1;reasons for 26-9, land reform 106,111-13,131,132 Kalakani, Mjaid 57 152 Laumonier, Dr Laurence 215-16, KAM 117,121,122 Iran 22,25, 27-9passlm,88,91,92, 218, 219,221 Kamyan, Mohammed Nabi (Minister 101,157, 159,235; and I.ayeq,Suleiman 132 of Health) 158 mujahideen 10,54, 56, 57,65, legal factors 26 Kandahar 8,9, 12, 15, 17-20, 35, 39, 66,115, 129,200-1,235,242; Libya 67,170 40, 44,57,59, 74, 94, 101,126, and refugees 7,24,54,128, literacy programmes 115, 242; 159,204,233 132, 202,209-10 National 146-7 Kar-Kum Canal 155 Iraq 29,92 livestock 207,209,211,214 Karmal see Babrak iron ore 29, 153, 159 lobbying, international 37, 208, Karokhel, Hassan Khan 62 irrigation schemes 154-5,242 2434 Kazakhs 208 Islam 6,26-7,31,36,52,55,77, Logan province 39,65,121,171,221 Kerala 107-10 100,106, 113-14, 131, 145, 149, losses, civilian 6-7,85, 110,118, KGB 14,35, 36,41,63,98,99, 169,218,241 1234, 126-7, 178-80; foreign 8, 122,124, 129,130,139, 147, Islamic Alliance 193; Pan- Union 22, 119-20; government 7,44, 45, 207,208, 245 101; Republic 27, 56, 169; Unity 110; Soviet 7,14-15, 19, 21,34, KHAD 105, 117, 124-31 passim, 65,193,194, of A. Mujahideen 35,38,44,45,75,83,85,115, 133, 140, 145,147, 164, 180, 55 116,152,236,246-8 182,201,207,220, 222, 229, Israel 170 Lycee Istiqlal 125, 143, 145, 179; 233 Italy 90 Nejat 99, 145 Khairaton 158-9 van Lynden, Aernout 70 Khales, Younis 48, 56, 70, 168-9, Jabha Mobarezin 57,118 194, 227, 228 Jabha Motahed-e Mdi (National Madjnuh, Dr Sayed Burhanudin 141 255 Mahaz-e meW-ye Islami (National Islamic Front) 56, 171, 172 Makbar, Soi 149 Maihuret, Dr Claude 211 Maniere, Dr Philippe 218 Mansoor, Sayiid 196 Mao-Ze-Dung 41, 78-9 massacres 6-7, 107-10, 123, 126-8 Massoud, Ahmed Shah 55, 62, 68, 69, 76-87, 150, 168, 184-5, 188, 196,221, 233,234 Maximov, Vladimir 191 Mazar-l-Sharif 8, 15, 46, 54, 55, 57, 59, 93, 126, 154, 156, 184, 185 Medecins du Monde 215; sans Frontieres 198, 211, 215 media 148-51;see also individual headings medical organisations 7, 215-23; supplies 86 MIs see helicopter gunships Middle East 27, 184,240 MIGs 16,20, 30, 35, 45, 60, 77, 81, 83,113,127,237 migration, nomad 88, 95 militia 61,62,117,125,129-30, 137, 141,142,151, 196; Hazara 198-9 mineral resources 29, 152, 153-8 passim mines, butterfly 213-14, 238 modernisation 88, 89,92, 100, 104, 183; see also reforms Mohabbat, Mohammad Daoud 139, 140 Mohammadi, Maulawi 54, 74, 169, 17 1-2 Mohseni, Sheikh Asaf 241 monarchists 172, 173, 194-5 Mongolia 88, 104 morale, army 136, 137; civilian 164; mujahideen 58; Soviet 247 moutariks 79-81 Mujadeddi, Sibghatullah 54, 56, 171-3 mujahideen 1-4, 6,7, 8, 20,21,23, 30-2, 34, 37-9, 42-5, 48-55, 58-87, 107-13, 119,129, 131-3, 152, 157, 158, 161-6, 170.1, Afghanistan: The Soviet War 6,16-17,25,28,32-5,40,42, 236 Sovietisation 135-61, 236-8 SSD 120, 122, 123 Stalin, Josef 89 strikes 176-8 passlm students 89, 91,92, 141-5, 147,151, 166, 177-80,218 subversion, Soviet 5,25,28, 35-6, 41-2, 187, 233, 243 Sultani Valley 9 Sunnis 10, 27,54, 196 supply routes 37-8, 634; see also caravans Sweden 211,216,242 Switzerland 229-32 passlm Tadjikistan, Soviet 116,156 Tadjiks 10, 54, 57,58, 66, 68, 133, 199,203; Soviet 145 Takhax province 2,42,66 talks, Geneva 82, 139,193,234,235; Soviet-mujahldeen 86 Tanaki, President Nun Mohammad 8,22,23,24,31,52,96-8,102, 103,105,106,110,116,117, 119,121,143,153,203 TASS 245 taxation 62,185-6, 198 Technoexport 154 Termez 15, 158, 159 Thiebolt, Mlchel 160 Third World 236,239 Tigr Relief CommIttee 212 torture 7, 117, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 170, 179,223 Index 259 trade 159,207 Voice of America (VOA) 81, 148, 188, traditionalist elements 55, 129, 189, 246 1834 volunteer agencies 7, 10, 205-6, 242 trail, Jihad 634 trainIng 66,68,76,78,79,93, 138, Wakhan corridor 208-9 225; in Soviet Union 63, 76, 93, Waltan Palanzaj 148 124, 130, 138, 141, 142, 147-8, war: Indochina 225; Indo-Pakistan 100; 154,236,237 Iraq-Iran 29, 201; World II 90 treaty, Afghan-SovIet (1921) 88, Wardak province 55, 172, 184 (1978) 26, 104,244; Afghan-US Wardak, Col Abdul Rahim 65 90 Wardak, Mohammed Amin 55, 172, trials, show 125 196 tribal elements 5, 10, 36, 54, 58, water, irrigation 152, 154-5 69-70,78,97,131-3, 141,183, Wazinstan, Northern 39 184; MInistry of 124, 131-3 Western interest 23841 truces 132-3; Soviet-mujahIdeen 85-7 wheat 160 Tudeh party 29, 129, 20~ Wikh-e-Zalmaiyan (Enlightened Youth) Turkestan 30 91, 92, 98 Turkey 92,93,208 209 withdrawal, Soviet 6, 40, 235, 240 Turkmens 46, 54, 133, 203, 208 women 164, 218-19; TV 148,149,151,239 Democratic Organisation of A. Afghanistan: The Soviet War The mountains emanate out of the Pamir Knot in the east toward Iran in the west and enclose several arid plateaus. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan forms the boundary between Afghanistan and Iran. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Other cities in Iran and in Iraq make similar claims. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Qandahar independent from Persian rule in 1709 A. D. He ruled for about six years and established the Ghilzai Dynasty of rulers in Afghanistan and in Iran. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan It ap- pears that between 3000 and 1000 B. C. this was a crossroads for those traveling from the Indus Valley, Iran, and Mesopotamia. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan tends from the northwest spurs of the Kohe Baba range toward the border of Iran. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan A British military of- north and constitutes the border between Afghanis - tan and Iran for 65 miles before it crosses the confluence of the Afghan-USSR boundaries. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran view the United States as a land preoccupied with the adulation and worship of money, and Majid Anaraki, an Iranian who lived for several years in southern California, de- scribed the United States as a collection of casinos, supermarkets, and whore-houses linked together by endless highways passing through XIV . Inside Bin Laden Furthermore, fifty-nine of the participating Yemenis had been trained in Iran and received weapons via the Iranian Embassy in Sana. Inside Bin Laden baddin Hekmatiyars Hizb-i Islami primarily through the numerous agents in his own military council, which included representatives not only from the Muslim Brotherhood but also from Libya, Iran, and the PLO. Inside Bin Laden In the mid-198os Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar was known to have visited Libya and Iran and was rumored to have visited the PDRY. Inside Bin Laden Convinced that Pakistans destiny lay in strategic alliances with such countries as Syria, Iran, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea, Benazir Bhuttos Islamabad reexamined all aspects of Pak- istans involvement in Afghanistan, and the world of state-sponsored ter- rorism became an instrument of crucial significance for Pakistans policy. Inside Bin Laden Controlled and sponsored by Iran and run via Sudan under the leadership of Sheikh Turabi, the Islamist International is the realization of Ayatollah Khomeinis original vision of an ecumenical all-Islamic revolution that does not distin- guish between Sunnis and Shiites. Inside Bin Laden The Islamists have bases and support facilities in Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, where they receive advanced military, terrorist, clandestine, and subversion training from an international cadre of expert trainers. Inside Bin Laden 36 CRISIS AND REBIRTH Sudans profound shift toward Iran occurred in the early spring of 1991, in the wake of the Gulf Crisis and particularly because of Saddam Husseins failure to conduct the genuine jihad he had promised to wage. Inside Bin Laden In mid-1992 Iran gave Sudan an additional $30 million to expedite terrorist training. Inside Bin Laden Most of them were deployed in Iran, Sudan, and Yemencountries that constituted their primary forward bases. Inside Bin Laden For example, in Kenya the Islamic Party, supported by Sudan and Iran, emerged as a major power in Mombasa, Kenyas main port. Inside Bin Laden In the aftermath of the Khartoum conference, over a period of from six to eight weeks, Aidid and his key military and intelligence aides traveled repeatedly to Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda to acquaint themselves with the other com- ponents of the master plan. Inside Bin Laden Aidid himself traveled clandestinely at least twice to both Sudan and Iran in order to discuss strategy and methods of dealing with the international forces in Somalia as well as to coordinate the modalities for the arrival of increased aid should the situation escalate into military confrontations. Inside Bin Laden In the aftermath of the Khartoum conference, over a period of from six to eight weeks, Aidid and his key military and intelligence aides traveled repeatedly to Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda to acquaint themselves with the other com- ponents of the master plan. Inside Bin Laden Aidid himself traveled clandestinely at least twice to both Sudan and Iran in order to discuss strategy and methods of dealing with the international forces in Somalia as well as to coordinate the modalities for the arrival of increased aid should the situation escalate into military confrontations. Inside Bin Laden He established working relations with the intelligence services of Iran and Iraq that would prove useful in his rise to the top. Inside Bin Laden radical alliance dominated by the Peoples Republic of China and stretching from the Mediterranean to Northeast Asia. Inside Bin Laden Immediately after her return to power in fall 1993 she embarked on a series of political moves that would formulate the new grand strategy for a postCold War and postGulf Crisis Pakistan. Inside Bin Laden Among the participants were key intelligence officials from Iran, Sudan, and Syria, as well as senior commanders from various Islamist organizationsthe Islamic Action Front (Jordan), the Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command, HAMAS (the Palestinian Islamist terrorist organization operating in Israel and the territories), HizbAllah, Jordanian 104 . Inside Bin Laden For several years a large cadre of Saudi Islamists, from 15,000 to 25,000 fighters strong and spearheaded by over 5,ooo Saudi Afghans, had been being trained, prepared, and equipped in camps in Iran, Sudan, Yemen, and Pakistan- Afghanistan. Inside Bin Laden This time it was Turabis Sudan, rather than Iran, that moved to the forefront of the assault on pro-Western regimes, especially Egypt. Inside Bin Laden Having examined possible motives of Iraq, Iran, and Israel to strike in Riyadh, al-Hayah concluded that the Saudi government could have done nothing to warrant such an act of terrorism. Inside Bin Laden The two players who acted as the primary catalysts for this escalatory process were Osama bin Laden and Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran. Inside Bin Laden Originating from bases in Iran, Afghanistan-Pakistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, they traveled to Saudi 170 . Inside Bin Laden Such leaders have included Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, of World Trade Center fame; Sheikh Abd- Allah Yussuf Azzam, bin Ladens mentor in Afghanistan; and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who inspired Iran and ignited a global Islamist move- ment. Inside Bin Laden The heart of this conspicuous activity [against Egypt] runs through Afghanistan, Iran, and Sudan, but centers in the mountainous area of Khorassan in Afghanistan, home to training camps of the new wave of Arab Afghans. Inside Bin Laden NEW ALLIES IN THE WAR high-level Iranian source explained that Tehran resolved to send the mes- sage to all concerned that Iran was capable of imposing its revolution and spreading terror to the territory of whoever calls into question its status as a key regional player. Inside Bin Laden The turning point occurred in early February 1998 with the formalization of the strategic cooperation between Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Egypt. Inside Bin Laden Since the early 1990S Iran and Sudan have been engaged in a fierce campaign to consolidate their control over the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Inside Bin Laden mid-October, Hashemi-Rafsanjani explained that his visit opened a histori- cal opportunity for Islamic Iran to help develop and reconstruct the African continent. Inside Bin Laden He noted the vain attempts of the U.S. to pressure African states against broadening their relations with Iran and concluded that the African states and people have evaluated the benefits of trade and economic ties with Islamic Iran and are ready to become free of the self-interested poli- cies of the West. Inside Bin Laden For example, on October 17 Iran Air started a flight to Nairobi via Dubai as the first step in a planned extension of services to other African capitals. Inside Bin Laden Quotations from Hashemi-Rafsanjanis September 1996 speech to the Shiite community in Tanzania in support of Iran were now used by the 2.40 Inside Bin Laden Najafabadi then called a clandestine meeting at the security and in- telligence building in Daraj, Iran. Inside Bin Laden HUMILIATING THE ENEMY Crown Prince Abdallah initiated the Saudi drive for rapprochement with Iran when he attended the eighth OIC Summit in Tehran in December 1997. Inside Bin Laden In early Septem- ber 1998 the crisis between Iran and the Taliban over the Talibans killing in August of nine Iranian diplomats and the slaughter of over 4,000 Afghan Shiites during the fighting in northern Afghanistan almost reached the point of a war between Iran and the Taliban. Inside Bin Laden Pakistan and Iran are plagued with acute, seemingly insoluble socioeco- nomic problems. Inside Bin Laden At the same time because of their strategic develop- mentsthe acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missilesPakistan and Iran are perceived as the leaders of the strategic ascent. Inside Bin Laden As a consequence, overall, the strategic center within the Hub of Islam has shifted eastward to the non-Arabic nations of Iran and Pakistan. Inside Bin Laden GLOSSARY supreme authority is in the hands of the ulema, with the spiritual leader con- sidered the ultimate authority of the state and the community Iran is the only distinctly Shiite state. Inside Bin Laden Arab) Al-S hira (Lebanon) Al-Thawarah (Syria) Al-Vefagh (Iran) Al-Wafd (Egypt) Al-Watan (Kuwait) SOURCES 4I~ Al-Watan (Oman) Hrvatski Obzor (Croatia) Duga (Yugoslavia) Al-Watan (Qatar) Hrvatski Vojnik (Croatia) The East-African (Kenya) Al-Watan al-A rabi (Europe-based Hurmat (Pakistan) Economist (U.K.) Inside Bin Laden See Weapons of mass Chamran Savehi, Mahdi destruction Arabian Peninsula operations, 154 Bombings (Islamist). Inside Bin Laden See also Khobar Tow- birth and early life of, 154 ers bombing (1996); U.S. embassy Committee of Three under, 158 bombings (August 1998) as Iranian External Intelligence chief, Aden hotels (1992), 72 in Buenos Aires (1992), 153 153, 154155 in U.S., 154 Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad ~ Chamran Savehi, Mostafa, 154 143145, 150 Charities, Islamist in India (i~~), 210211 Khobar Towers, U.S. barracks in in Balkans, icc expansion of, 315316 Dhahran (1996), 151, 152, i~8, as financial tools, 4445 159160, i66, 167176, 277, 278 in Iraq, 323 Military Cooperation Program building Western aid in Somalia criticized by, 6z 135, 136138, 140143 ~ Chechnya in Mogadishu (August II, 1993), 8o dealings in weapons of mass destruction, Pan American flight 103 (1988), 178 Philippine Airlines ~ 113 328329, 330 Islamist activities in, 385386 in Saudi Arabia (November ,995) (de- Chemical weapons. Inside Bin Laden See Weapons of mass fused), 142143, i6i, 163164 destruction in Tashkent (February 1999), 386 Cheney, Dick, 30 TWA flight 8oo explosion (1996), 152, Christendom, historic Islamic confrontation 158, 178180, i8z with, xxi, xii U.S. embassies (August 1998), zo8, 231271 CIA. Inside Bin Laden High Risk Algeria Iran Iraq Libya Nigeria Yugoslavia TOTAL Moderate Risk Albania Angola Argentina Brazil Cameroon China Commonwealth of Independent States* Congo Egypt Gabon India The Resource Imperative Kuwait 845.3 Jihad vs. McWorld THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD In the moderate-risk group, non-Arab nations account for about 21 million barrels a day (better than a third of global production), while the Middle East tinderbox (not including high-risk-category Iraq and Iran) accounts for nearly 13 million more barrels a day, or another fifth of world production. Jihad vs. McWorld MTVs audience, united for all its ideological differences and cul- tural reluctance by satellite and the United Colors of Benetton, includes not just Taiwan but China, not only Israel but Iran and Saudi Arabia, secessionist Georgia as well as progressive Hungary, io6 THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD Music Televisions Reach Around the World Television and MTI2~ Mc Worlds Yoisy Soul 107 Countries that receive Music Television Countries that do not currently receive Music Television J. Sinclair, 995 io8 THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD Brazil no less than Mexico, Bangladesh and Vietnam as well as India and Hong Kong, and, along with South Korea, North Korea too (see map, pages 106107). Jihad vs. McWorld 1 294 Afleiword President Rafsanjani of Iran is continuing to reach out to the West for renewed trade ties, but militants are setting cinemas on fire and assaulting women on bicycles to display their attachment to the cul- ture in whose name he rules. Jihad vs. McWorld 1045, io8; in Iran, 8283, 207; and trade agreements, 91 Saudi Arabia, 43, 45, 47, 105, 207 savings and loan industry; 28 Scammell, Michael, 257 SCEEPZ (Santa Cruz Electronic Export Processing Zone), i8 Schachter; Oscar, 226 Scheer; Robert, iii Schlesinger; Arthur; Jr., 9 Schmookler, Andrew Bard, 237 Schwab, Klaus, 29495 Schoenhuber; Franz, i8o Scorsese, Martin, 92 Scott Foresman, 114,126 Scripps-Howard, 124 Seabrook, John, 104 Sears, 76 secularism: destructive elements of, 211 Seghers, Anna, 266 Seinfeld, Jerry, 12! Jihad vs. McWorld sofication of their Central Asian republics and have always feared that influences from the south (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan) would infiltrate across the border. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan At first it may seem surprising that the Khalq govern- ment pursued a strategy of redistribution similar to that adopted by the Shah of Iran. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan However, as in Iran, most of the land belonging to large owners in Afghanistan was cultivated by sharecroppers or tenant farmers. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan 220 ISLAMIC COALITIONS IN BAMYAN Imaini pirs similarly acknowledged higher authorities in Iraq and Iran.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The Imami pirs of Afghanistan were sometimes called mujtahids (learned enough to make innovative interpretations), but most people acknowldged that they were not true mujtahids; all of the true mujtahids, people told me, were in Iraq and Iran. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan These institutions are more typical of many Afghan villages, as well as of many of the nomadic populations of Iran. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan ry of Modern Iran, Iranian Studies 9: 259-304. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Islam and Authority in Tribal Iran: A Comparative Com- ment. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan See Debts, loans, interest rates Interior, Ministry of, 108, 326, 328 Intertribal conflict See Feuds Iqamat, 147 Iran, 69n, 70, 72, 194, 221, 250, 252, 255, 259, 265 Iraq, 221 Irrigation, 128 Ishan, 51, 149, 234. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan 41, Jihad; Mujahidin 295; constitutional developments in, Revolutionary Council (BRA), 291, 59; government and policies of, 59, 171; Kalasha relationship with, 100, Revolutionary Defense Forces, 160 101, 104-5, 109; Khalq-Parcham Reza Shah (of Iran), 176 activities during, 61-62; policies Rish safed, 149, 150, 152 toward Muslim Youth of, 41,59-61; Roads. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Kandahanis have always been great traders as the city 20 ISLAM OIL AND THE NEW GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIA was located at the intersection of ancient trade routes eastwards across the Bolan Pass to Sind, the Arabian Sea and India and westwards to Herat and Iran. Taliban The city was the main crossing point for trade, arts and crafts between Iran and India and the citys numerous bazaars have been famous for centuries. Taliban The transport mafia who were trying to open up routes to smuggle goods between Quetta and Iran and the newly independent state of Turkmenistan, found it impossible to do business. Taliban Then two days later, with his troops in a blind panic as the Taliban mobile columns swept through and around them, 40 TALIBAN Ismael Khan abandoned Herat fleeing with his commanders and several hundred men to Iran. Taliban Iran, Russia and four Central Asian Republics warned the Taliban not to move north and publicly declared 54 TALIBAN they would help rearm the anti-Taliban alliance. Taliban Iran was flying in military supplies to a newly constructed two-mile-long landing strip outside Bamiyan and Karim Khalili, the leader of Wahadat, spent the winter visiting Tehran, Moscow, New Delhi and Ankara looking for more military aid. Taliban Instead of trying to placate their international critics and Iran, the 76 TALIBAN Taliban launched an offensive from three directions on Bamiyan, which fell on 13 September 1998 after some Hazara commanders surrendered to the Taliban. Taliban Given their suspicions, it was not unexpected that the anti-Taliban alliance, Iran and Russia, should view the Unocal project as an arm of US-CIA foreign policy and as the key to US support for the Taliban. Taliban Given their suspicions, it was not unexpected that the anti-Taliban alliance, Iran and Russia, should view the Unocal project as an arm of US-CIA foreign policy and as the key to US support for the Taliban. Taliban General Zia had dreamed like a Mogul emperor of recreating a Sunni Muslim space between infidel Hindustan, heretic Ibecause Shia] Iran and Chris- tian Russia.2 Taliban Iran had a natural link with the Tajiks they originate from the same ancient race and speak the same language but the Iranians had been incensed by Ahmad Shah Masuds brutal attacks on the Hazaras in Kabul in 1993. Taliban In 1993, for the first time, Iran began to give substantial military aid to the President Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul and the Uzbek warlord General Rashid Dostum and urged all the ethnic groups to join with Rabbani. Taliban Ironically, the Talibans extremism had also helped bring Iran and Saudi Arabia closer together and weakened Pakistans relationship with both countries. Taliban However, to end its isolation from the West, Iran needed to demonstrate that it was a responsible and stabilizing member of the international community. Taliban Iran will remain on the periphery of the world community and its eastern borders will con- tinue tobe wracked by instability. Taliban April Turkmenistan and Iran sign agreement to build first 27 September 180 miles spur of proposed gas pipeline via Iran to Turkey. Taliban Pakistani Foreign Secretary Najmuddin Sheikh in Kandahar for talks with Taliban on pipeline. Taliban Senior team from Australias BHP meets with PM Nawaz Sharif to push for Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. Taliban The Australian company BHP proposed to build an overland gas pipeline from southern Iran to Baluchistan. Taliban APP, Taliban shut down Iran embassy in Kabul, 2 June 1997. Taliban APP, Taliban warn of retaliation against Iran, 22 September 1997. Taliban APP, Iran says Taliban threat to the region, 14 August 1998. Taliban AFP, Iran presses Nawaz over Afghan policy, 15 June 1997. Taliban Iran based this assessment on the evidence of one Iranian diplomat who had escaped the massacre by feigning death. Taliban 131, 134, 136, 1389, 181, 209 UNESCO 9, 113 TAP Pipelines 167 UNICEF 108, 113 Taraki, President Nur Mohammed 13 United Arab Emirates 58 Tariqah 88 United Islamic and National Front for Tarinkot (Urozgan province) 234 the Salvation of Afghanistan 61 Tashkent 77,85 United Nations (UN) 50,54,61,67, Tashkhorgan 62 74, 111, 114, 1267, 139, 169 Tazim Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammedi in Afghanistan 189 Bajaur Agency 194 agencies 59, 64, 71, 103, 113, 1234, Tehran 66,70 127 see also Iran aid agencies 2, 62, 70, 72, 77, 101, Tehrik-i-Tuleba (Movement of Ta!- Taliban It also looks at the factors that have led Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizistan and India to take up positions opposed to the Taliban and caused Turkmenistan to stand on the sidelines. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan These established the Ghaznavid dynasty, which ruled from AD 977 to i i86, conquering north-west India and the Punjab and capturing a large part of Iran, including Isfahan, in the process. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan million, went to Iran. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Further, much of the population of Herat had lived as refugees in Iran, where female access to education had been provided as a right. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan 87 To summarise, one can see a range of influences in the creed of the Taliban, drawn from Islamic movements in the Middle East, Iran, the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The Taliban governor of Herat expressed their position very clearly, in an interview given on 8 October to a correspondent of Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, External Service, Tehran, broadcast in Pashto: It is a matter of pride for all Afghanistan that we have kept our women at home ... The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Countries such as Iran take steps such as )banning satellite dishes in a vain attempt to stop American television However poor a family may be, it will struggle to find a way of programmes reaching Iranian viewers. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan As already mentioned, for many refugee families in Pakistan and Iran the ban on female education by the Taliban is a significant factor in their consideration of the circumstances under which they would return to Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The Taliban and the international community 123 Other governments, such as those of Sudan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, have decreed that women and men should be segregated. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Pakistan, Iran and the Sudan have largely eased restrictions. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Agree- ment was first reached in Peshawar in April 1992, in the presence of the prime minister of Pakistan and representatives of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UN, that a 50-person commission, headed by Sibghatullah Mujadidi, would take control of Kabul and prepare the way for the formation of an interim government, to be led by President Rabbani, who would hold office for a further four months 126 The regional picture 127 pending the formation of an assembly to elect a president for a further two years. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan In the meantime, Iran signed an agreement with Turkmenistan in May 1997 to provide for the construction of a pipeline linking Turkmen gas and oil supplies to the Iranian and Turkish networks and thus to Europe. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Iran is, therefore, well ahead in the race. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Agreement had already been reached in May igg6 that Kazakhstan would begin exporting oil supplies through Iran, delivering crude oil to Iranian refineries on the Caspian Sea in return for the right to export oil from Irans Persian Gulf ports. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The USAs possible interest in promoting the Taliban has also been linked with its opposition to Iran. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Until the election, in mid- 1997, of a relatively moderate Iranian president, the USA was in- evitably concerned at the prospect of Iran acting as the major conduit for Central Asian oil supplies. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Since the election it has taken a more relaxed approach and, in July 1997, in spite of its embargo, it opted not to oppose a pipeline project agreed in May 1997 that will take Turkmen gas through Iran to Turkey and Europe. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan We therefore have a situation where Pakistan and Iran appear to be backing opposing The Taliban sides in a civil war, with the CIS states, with the exception of Turkmenistan, periodically lending support. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Thus, when Dostam suddenly reappeared in northern Afghanistan in September 1997, after being ousted from power the previous May, it was rumoured that Uzbekistan and Iran had facilitated his return. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan It also hoped to counter any influence Iran might have in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan In the mean- time, Afghans will find their own ways of providing education, either within the home, through small home-based schools serving a limited number of families, or by having their girls educated in Pakistan or Iran. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan behaviour complex emergencies, 59 124 of Taliban in, 48; siege of, 16; corruption, 45, 46, 6i, 71, 73, 92, 139 freedom, individual, 117 taking of, 4, 49, io6, 115, 128 Cyrus the Great, 12 fundamentalism: Christian, 67; heroin: production of, ~ Taliban Islamic, 67 position on, 7; trade in, 1401, dance, restrictions on, 72, 73 Daoud Khan, Muhammad, 22, 23, 43 Gaddafi, Moamar al, 74 Gailani, Pir, 33, 34, 83 highways, construction of, 22 24, 28, 30, 31, 32, 94, 98; Hindu Shahi dynasty, 13 Gandamak, Treaty of, i8 overthrow of, 24 Hinduism, 78 Dan dialect, 9 gender issues see Taliban, and Hisb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) party, 31, Darius the Great, 12 gender issues 33, 34, 82, 84 debt, rural, 24 Geneva Accords (1988), 26, 35 Hisb-e-Islami (Khalis) party, 31, 33, Delta Oil company, 40 Genghis Khan, 4 83 democracy, ii6 Ghazali, Muhammad, 68, 967; Our Hisb-e-Wahdat party, 34, 39, 40, 41, Deoband school of Islamic Studies, Beginning in Wisdom, 97 46, 53, 54, 55, 83, 134 79, 8, Ghaznavid dynasty 14 girls: closure of schools, 48; horse statue, decapitation of, 48 Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of hospitality codes, 12 education of, 46, 66, 88, 94, 95, Vice, 45, 63, 73, 77, 8g, 110, 122 g6, g~, g8, io6, 107, 1,5, 119 (in human rights, III, 119, 122, 130, 149, ~~o; negotiation on issues of, 3; Dost Muhammad, i6, 17 Iran and Pakistan, 49, 151); role Taliban abuse of, 2, 124 Dostam, Rashid, 36, 38, 40, 4!, The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan 47, of, gg humanitarian agencies, 3, 6, g; 48, 50, 5!, The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan 73 Ikhwan brotherhood, 72, 73 Habibullah, son of Abdur-Rahman g8, 114, 119, 147 illiteracy, 95 drug production, 143 Khan, 19, 20 Imm Reza shrine, bombing of, 134 Durand line, ig, 22 Hadith, 3, 6, 6o, 63; on position of women, 97 India, 7, 29, 134, 135, 139, 143, 147; British, 17, 20, 22, 78; education, 8o, 145; male, go; of girls hair, style of, 93 Hanafi school of Islam, 21, 23 independence of, ~i; view of see girls, education of~ perceived Taliban, 132 Al-Haq, Zia, 29 importance of, ii8xg; religious, Indonesia, violence of human rights, i~i; universal provision of, ia,; Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami, 323 women barred from, 99, 114, 147 Harakat-i-Islami (Muhsini), 34 124 intellectuals, assassination of, 37 Egypt, 63, 67, 68 157 Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan), 34 International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ug International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ,o8, 122 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), ,,6, 122 Iran, 7, I!, The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The modern history of anthrax contains accounts of feasts in Iran, Kazakhstan,the Philippines, Siberia, and various African coun- tries where infected meat (not cooked enough to kill the anthrax bacte- ria) is shared by a large group, some of whom then fall ill. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak I must thank the Director of the Centre for Policy Research, New Preface xii Delhi, Dr V. A. Pai Panandikar, for giving me research and secretarial facilities for writing this volume; the information and cultural affairs ministry of the Afghan government and the Afghan embassy in New Delhi for making available a lot ofofficial reports; an Indian friend in the United States (who does not wish to be identified) for sending me a num- ber of the latest books on Afghanistan; and MrM. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The fundamentalists want an assertive central governmentgovernments role must be activist, intrusive, doctrinaire.8 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society However, since the protection of Soviet arms has proved to be inseparable from the survival of the Marxist regime and its gradual, slow process of gaining political ground in Afghani- stan, this volume must pay some attention to the Soviet armed inter- vention of December 1979 and the American reaction to that landmark ev9nt. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Yakub Khan, on the other hand asked the members to appreciate that we must always keep the objective of a negotiated political settlement uppermost in our minds. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society We have maintained, the statement said, that any negotiated political settlement for Afghanistan, besides including the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the return of the non-aligned and independent status of Afghanistan, and the return of the refugees, must include self- determination for the Afghan people. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society We have not said how this (the accord) must come about, but that the issue of how the Afghan people will be allowed to form the type of government they wish must be addressed. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The underlying assumption of the UN scenario is that a face-saving 148 Afghanistan agreement in Afghanistan cannot directly address the replacement or modifi- cation of the Kabul regime as a precondition for Soviet disengagement but must leave this to paralleled processes of political accommodation before, during and after the disengagement period.8 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Our country must think for itself. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society What had started in 1978 as the Soviets help- ing out by replacing purged officers and officials had developed into a general dependence upon them that must having been as galling for Amin as it was needed by him.24 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Thus, Ofl 12 December 1979 they decided that Amin must go and that they would rule Afghanistan through Karma! Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In the former kings view, the resolutions of such jirgas must take into account the viewpoints and tendencies of all national groups who are engaged in the struggle for the realization of common goalsin this case, independence, territorial integrity, restoration of the status of traditional nonalignment, the na- tional and Islamic identity of our homeland, and the maintenance of the right to self-determination for the institution of the future government through free elections.26 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 To understand the war under discussion, we must examine the events on the battlefields, for it was on the battlefields that policies were exposed and tested. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 But to wage jehad the mujahideen must have weapons. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In such cases Fariduddin is right in saying that no matter how strong you are, you must confess. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Those in charge of the security of Kabul must have been frustrated over the renewed activities of the mujahideen. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Its view was that the bandits must be eliminated if they persisted. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Nonetheless, figures must be understood to be approximate, unless stated otherwise. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Judging from the frequency of exchange, the number of the addicts must have been considerable. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 They are told they must now go towards the Indian borden, they do not want to go, they are obstinate, they want to stay, but are getting des- perate, and it seems that now we are reaching the breaking point.6 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 that we must think together about the issue; Karmal, after his face darkened, replied, If you leave now, you will have to send in a million soldiers next time.2 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Originally the destruc- tion was the dream of General Akhtar Abdur Rahman of the ISI, who had proclaimed that Kabul must burn?6 But he had uttered those words when Kabul was in the grip of the Russians; now leaders of the Islamic groups and their warriors made his dream come true when they themselves controlled it. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 We must take counsel about this. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 According to the Shias, an imam must be descended from the Prophet through his daughter, Fatima; the Sunnis hold that an imam must be elected. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In addition, the organisation must find funds to help support the families of activists who have been killed or imprisoned. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Even in war people must continue living, noted one resistance commander from Kabul, If the mujahideen 166 The Afghan Struggle can offer nothing, there is no doubt that the communists will do every- thing to fill the gap if they know it will break us. Afghanistan: The Soviet War The Afghans: Getting Their Act Together While the international community needs to be more forthcoming, so must the resistance. Afghanistan: The Soviet War According to one British relief coordinator: Basically, the Afghans must get their act together and not always think that it is up to the outside world to help them. Afghanistan: The Soviet War If they want assistance, they must do something for it. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Above all, they must improve their organisation which quite frankly is more often than not disastrous. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Sacrifices must be made by both sides to make it work. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Ultimately, however, a peaceful solu- tion to the conflict must be a diplomatic one. Afghanistan: The Soviet War All international flights must land at Kabul or Qandahar International Airports. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Some wheat and barley are grown, but due to the climate and generally poor soil, only one crop per year is possible, and often the soil must be allowed to rest every other year. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan A province located in north- 103 Qishlaq all Qazis must go through formal training in theol - ogy and sociology in learning institutions subsidized by the Afghan Government. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan These are the first words a newborn child must hear. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan A Muslim, in good faith and in a state of ritual cleanliness must, at least once in a lifetime, recite the above words (preferably in Arabic). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan If one is to understand the value patterns of Afghans, one must understand Islam. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Since a frontal assault is out of the question, the United States must be terrorized into withdrawing from the Muslim world. Inside Bin Laden Islamist leaders may differ on the fine details of what constitutes a genuine Islamic state, but they all agree that the United States and West- ern civilization must first be evicted from their midst. Inside Bin Laden This inaction, observed an Arab official in private, must be viewed as part of al-Turabis strategy aimed at building an Islamic belt around Sudan. Inside Bin Laden Indeed, sacrifices such as detention, torture, and even death must be prepared for and accepted. Inside Bin Laden The Algerians must have agreed, as was demonstrated by the bomb- ing of the Paris Metro on July z6, 1995. Inside Bin Laden The invaders must be prepared to leave, either dead or alive. Inside Bin Laden Ayatollah Emami-Kashani warned that the world of Islam, Islamic countries, and Is- lamic governments must pay attention to the cry of Iran, of the Islamic Re- public, which says: We are friends with all of you. Inside Bin Laden 223 lamist terrorist organizations, must turn its guns on Israel and the United States instead of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or other Arab countries. Inside Bin Laden They know that since Kenya was the main gateway for those members, there must be a center in Kenya, Fazil noted. Inside Bin Laden Since Owhali, who survived the explosion, does not remember if either he or the driver activated the bombs fuses, it must have been acti- vated by remote control. Inside Bin Laden Eliud Mbuthia, former head of the Kenyan police bomb squad, observed that the bomb must have been made of moldable high explosives such as SEMTEX-H. Inside Bin Laden Their statement confirmed that new fac- tors have emerged, that these must be read carefully to realize who was 272 . Inside Bin Laden The Pakistani Taliban have no doubt of the direction their country must take. Inside Bin Laden The communiqu concluded with the reiteration of the warning that the Americans must brace them- selves for a ferocious, long war. Inside Bin Laden And Islam stipulates that the blood of martyrs must be avenged against those who shed itthe United States. Inside Bin Laden Under these circumstances Muslims must draw the linein Afghanistanand with their Arab mujahideen allies block the U.S. encroachment into the Muslim world. Inside Bin Laden This means that all individuals of these two nations, as well as the Jews in occupied Palestine, are belligerent people and every Muslim must stand against them and must kill and fight them. Inside Bin Laden The main effort, at this phase, must target the Jews and the Crusaders. Inside Bin Laden They came across the Islamic obligation in the Koran that when they reach the age of fifteen, they must get military training. Inside Bin Laden The Jorda- nian scholars call for action against both local Muslim leaders and their pa- trons in the West; the Hub of Islam must choose between succumbing to the West and fighting for Islam. Inside Bin Laden But the Muslim world must not forget that the NATO bombing is only the first step in the U.S. campaign to suppress and enslave Islamist revivalism. Inside Bin Laden During this crisis and massacre in the Balkans we must be a united Muslim community with a united policy and agenda. Inside Bin Laden 69 markets by aping their ideologies and accommodating their tastes: it must also be prepared to create global markets by careful planning and control. Jihad vs. McWorld Jack Lang must have seen the writing on the screen, however; because even while he was Hollyworid: Mc Worlds Videology 93 doing battle in the name of culture against the American celluloid colossus, he was decorating Sylvester Stallone with a Legion of Honor. Jihad vs. McWorld In opposition, literature has a purpose; in the market, it must vie for dollars, appease popular taste, and guarantee profits to publishers. Jihad vs. McWorld The experience sold must be more than just a quick lunch. Jihad vs. McWorld Why must the recent past be taboo? Even the Japanese are permit- ted their emperor and their cultural superiority and their celebration of a mostly decensored history including their own version of the Day of Infamy. Jihad vs. McWorld That being the case, its goal must be economic harmonization with Western Europesome- thing requiring radical economic reform (a Big Bang as the Poles called it) and ongoing economic shock therapy.2 Jihad vs. McWorld Those new states that, as civil society has been progressively colonized by organized crime, have been led slowly to discover the positive uses of power, must contend both with the old state-hating victims of imperious communism and their new state-hating laissez-faire advi- sors who urge them to turn the very state institutions by which they might control rapacious markets into their primary adversary9 Even where states weigh in on behalf of civil society, there is no surrogate for the polity in the international domaincertainly not the states weak supranational imitatorsthat has the clout to coun- tervail multinational corporations and the markets in which they operate. Jihad vs. McWorld Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yeltsins new prime minis- ter installed after radical reform failed, announced: The period of market romanticism is over, but he must still figure out how to deal with $2.5 Jihad vs. McWorld Is it a wonder then that even cosmopolitan Russians express a certain nostalgia for yester- days Greater Russia? Or that this nostalgia must compete with and is a distant second to the grasping desire for tomorrows greater mar- kets? Nationalists resist Western culture, but slogans appear every- where on behalf of the popular new cigarette West screaming, Test the West! Jihad vs. McWorld (always Coke!). Jihad vs. McWorld Civil society needs a habitation; it must become a real place that offers the abstract idea of a public voice a palpable geog- raphy somewhere other than in the twin atlases of government and markets. Jihad vs. McWorld How long a journey it can be for women and men nurtured in the private sector and used to identifying with one another only via a cash contract on the one hand, or in terms of Jihads blood fra- ternity on the other, to find their way to civil society and speak in its measured public voice, particularly if that voice must also have a transnational or international resonance. Jihad vs. McWorld The affinities that spring from local association must not barricade the way to regional affections, national identification, and global alliances, as tribes and clans (whether historical or invented) too often do. Jihad vs. McWorld Democracy is to be sure already the sought-after final outcome for those trying to rescue the planet: but it must also be the guiding principle going in. Jihad vs. McWorld Normative philosophers like Yael Tamir take a narrower essentialist view, insisting that we must first define the idea theoretically and then limit actual cases to those that conform to the normative concept. Jihad vs. McWorld and Shahrani (in this volume) indicate that most of the land in Nahrin MARXIST REVOLUTION AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE Problems of implementing the land reform continue at all levels It must be mentioned with regret that a number of ministries and the related departments and the local party and state organs have not yet understood properly the boundaries of their responsibilities and still have not made use of the present possibilities for the realisation of measures taken towards the accomplishment of land and water reforms. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan All Muslims are required to take part in this form of struggle and must work with all their intellectual and material abilities for the realiza- tion of justice and equality between the people and for the spreading of security and human understanding, both among individuals and groups (Muhammad Ismail Ibrahim; quoted in Peters 1979: 118). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan As Peters points out, jihad in the sense of fighting is further restricted by the phrase fi sabil Allah, in the way of Allah. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In the conduct of its duties, the government must be the model of moral and ethical excellence. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The gov- ernment must also safeguard peoples freedom and must make sure that the necessities of life for its citizens are made available. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In the international arena, it must not only defend the oppressed peoples and oppose those who thrive on the blood [of the weak] and rob them of their human rights, but fight with all its strength all those powers who try to enslave and impose their will upon them. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Other- wise, such a government does not fulfill its responsibilities and must be overthrown (1977: 35-36). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Therefore, blood must always be about equally spilled, and property equally destroyed or taken. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Tales abound among the insurgents of the intrigues sown by Gulbudin to increase his own power at the expense of otherwise solid ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN EASTERN NURISTAN Parallel to the system of civilian village leaders, Anwar estab- As stated above, a chosen leader must maintain consensus for Throughout the fighting the Nuristanis entire supply of weapon- 91 local military commands. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Since Kalasha economic production is still predomi- nantly subsistence-oriented, little cash circulates in~ the village economy. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan only in forging a political alliance, but assuming command of it as R. LINCOLN KEISER POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND SYMBOLISM As noted, the military success of the people of Darra-iNur The symbolic linking of Islam with unified political opposition The notion of kafirism was very powerful in Dana-i Nur (as in In order to ascertain why a highland leader was successful not 126 THE REBELLION IN DARRA-I NUR well, we must first understand the differing ecological and social structural patterns of the lower and upper areas of the valley. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan only in forging a political alliance, but assuming command of it as R. LINCOLN KEISER POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND SYMBOLISM As noted, the military success of the people of Darra-iNur The symbolic linking of Islam with unified political opposition The notion of kafirism was very powerful in Dana-i Nur (as in In order to ascertain why a highland leader was successful not 126 THE REBELLION IN DARRA-I NUR well, we must first understand the differing ecological and social structural patterns of the lower and upper areas of the valley. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In addition, however, I believe that we must under- stand the moral basis for Sheikhanzai political authority in contrast with that of the central state, and this requires that attention be given to Sheikhanzai concepts of religiosity and religious authority. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan But this must be understood to be contin- uously at issue both in principle and in the particular case, especially as these mediations of Islam are presented as alternatives to each other. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan All revolutionaries must downgrade their predecessors in order to justify their actions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan One of Tarakis most often quoted statements regarding women was that men and women are like the two wings of a bird (Kabul Times, 3/8/79); in order to fly both wings must move, and no great movement can achieve victory without the partic. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan There must be an effective law-enforcing apparatus to put into effect each right granted .. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In order to raise the status of women we must first raise the standards of their men (6/16/80). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The new Great Game must be one where the aim is to stabilize and settle the region, not increase tensions 210 TALIBAN and antagonism. Taliban Turk- men insist work must start soon. Taliban During his trial in 1965, on a charge of sedition that led to his execution by the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdul Nasser, he argued: The bonds of ideology and belief are sturdier than those of patriotism, based on region, and this false distinction among Muslims on a regional basis is but one expression of crusading and Zionist imperialism that must be eradicated. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan In answer to their critics, the Taliban state that they accept the )mandatory nature of both female and male education but insist that the conditions must be right for that education to take place. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan In spite of a similar meeting with the The Taliban 132 The regional picture president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayer, on 28 October, the Kazakh president issued a warning that the Afghan conflict must not spread beyond its borders. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan And it followed that the only valid philosophy was one of ultra-individualism, since philosophy to be valid and viable must be founded on a known and certain truth, and there was only one such we could really know: each his own I. There was no such thing as the natural law predicated by so many philosophers and on which they constructed their systems, and there was certainly not a shred of evidence for an immanent justice assumed by others to justify their plans for establishing a system of justice in human societies. The Terrorists He will be an implacable enemy of this world; and if he continue to live in it, it must be only in order to destroy it... The Terrorists But the work must be done systematically and with intelligence and insight. The Terrorists The first category, that of the intelligent and important, must be dealt with by outright terrorism; that is they must be assassinated. The Terrorists He borrowed, from Proudhon and other Anarchist theorists, ideas for the post-revolutionary world but was always vague about it; his business was to make the revolu- tion which must totally, utterly destroy all existing institutions. The Terrorists The Tsar must be executed: the shock of his assassination might even spark off the coming revolution; in fact, it surely would, and therefore means of controlling and directing the fury of the masses must be prepared. The Terrorists What he was calling for was not terrorism (the usual way of dealing with the man who bid for the lease of a farm from which the tenant had been evicted was to murder him, an extremism which Parnell deplored), but boycottrefusal to bid for the leases of such 90 The Irish Case (1) farms, and the withholding of rents, two measures of resistance which must, in the long run, beat the rack-renting landlords who had always been able to count on the support of British govern- ments, British police and British troops. The Terrorists The rebellion was defeated by two things: I have said before 96 The Irish Case (2) that the condition for the success of a terrorist campaign, or for a revolutionary uprising, is that the majority of the ordinary people must be heart and soul with the terrorists or revolution- aries; but in this case at least as many of the Irish were against as for the Sinn Finers. The Terrorists 120 Bakunins Disciples Here, in the cases of Luccheni, Bresci and Czolgosz, is a lesson for the practitioners of Direct Terrorism: if your object is to be certain of killing one particular man or woman, repre- sentative of, or rather scapegoat for, the oppressing class (whichever class that may, in the context of time and place, be), the man or woman chosen for the work must, in his heart, have renounced his own life before the deed is done. The Terrorists This enabled him to suspend the operation: the Partys security must come first; to act now would entail probable failure and the certain loss of valuable comrades. The Terrorists And the revolutionary idealist in a materially weak position must remember that though he eschews terrorism, his opponents will not: thus the Moroccan co-founder of the Tricontinentalthe international of African, Asian and Latin American revolutionary organizations (OSPAAAL)El Mehdi Ben Barka, repudiated terrorism for his cause, himself fell a victim to the police terrorism of Mohamed Oufkir (who later tried to have his master, King Hassan, assassinated) and the French security police, when he was kidnapped and murdered in 1965. The Terrorists means have given birth to militant offspring groups composed of people whom the long failure of the parent movement to achieve results has driven to the conclusion that they must resort to propaganda by deed: classic cases of remarkable individuals in this dilemma are those of Vera Zasulich and Sophia Perovskaya. The Terrorists He will be an implacable enemy of this world; and if he continues to live in it, it must be only in order 172 Guerilleros or Terrorists? The Terrorists He must always be prepared to die and to kill with his own hands... The Terrorists 174 How not to do it, and vice versa Because this case must be argued without reference to custo- mary morality or customary compassion; because what I am writing about is war, in which ordinary human decency has little place, it will be as well to remind the reader that I do not find it possible to pay the usual lip-service to the convention of treating terrorism as irredeemably wicked and cruel; it is a waste of words, ink, space and spirit in the waste of shame created by the high explosive and fire bombs, the H-bombs and napalm, the political police terrorism, the crafty economic manipulations of the established parties in the Capitalist and Comitiunist imperialist empires. The Terrorists There is no shadow of evidence that there is such a thing in nature: it is, like love, among mans most noble and beautiful inventions to which, so important to his happiness has it become, he has given divine sanction. The Terrorists The industrial and commercial bourgeoisie generates, for the service of industry, an industrial working class. The Terrorists Special mention must be made of the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Informa- tion Service, an invaluable means for translating Soviet and now Russian media. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Then caretakers must undergo daily medical examination to make sure they are not infected. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak The older women buried around me here, beneath the light snow, must have been vulnerable to infection in some other way. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak He announces in a deep voice that he must have two guar- antees from our team. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak As he demanded the day before, he wants Matthew to write Dr. Semyonov, the chief of SES, and ask permission for a complete re- view of the autopsy data, which must be recognized as the property of Abramova and Grinberg. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak It is easy to imagine what it must have been like here in April 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Workers, mostly men, must have been sweating over the kilns. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Warm air heated by the ovens below must have risen and rolled like a wave as it met the incoming spring wind, carrying the fatal spores. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak I can only imag- ine what it must have been like throughout the anthrax outbreak, with three bodies at a time ready for examination and more outside in the hail and in the storage area. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak On our side, the older generation like Alex Langmuir, is gone, but the dialogue must con- tinue, somehow. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Kryuchkov had predicted that the spring and summer of 1981 will be decisive for the final and complete defeat of the forces of the counterrevolution:3 hence the program of carrot and stick to pacify the land as quickly as possible. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 But the islamabad government, which is obvioUSlY reluctant to stick its neck out without firm guarantees from the United States (which Wash- ington has no intention of giving) has been reluctant to act too openlY as an arms conduit, for fear of Soviet retaliation. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Printed and bound in Great Britain by SRP Ltd, Exeter Editors Preface Of all the Marxist revolutions in the Third World, the Afghan revolu- tion has been most conspicously from above.' Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Afghanistan maintained its History and Political Traditions: The Mona rchy 9 friendly relations with Germany through World War IL This was not liked by Britain and the USSR but neither wanted to take punitive act on against Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Between 1949 and 1979, American economic aid to 10 Afghanistan Afghanistan totalled about $500m. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society But military aid was another matter. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society In the vacuum left by Britains with- drawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the Afghan ruling family envisaged creating an American military connection as crucial defense against Soviet power. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society A Pentagon study in 1949 concluded that Afghanistans geographic location coupled with the realiza- tion by Afghan leaders of Soviet capabilities presages Soviet control of the country whenever the international situation so dictates. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society It was attended by 27 delegates, elected a central committee of seven members There is some dispute as to whether Babrak Karmal or Noor Mohammad Taraki was the number one leader of the PDPA. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The result of all this was that although the RGA (Royal qovemment of Afghanistan) may not do everything the Soviets wish it to do, it is rare that the RGA does what the Soviets strongly wish it not to do 2 Afghanistan as a Republic The Republic of Afghanistan proclaimed by Daoud on 17 July 1973, with himself declared its Founder, President and Prime Minister, became, five years later, the victim of its own political contradictions. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Perhaps it was a grave mistake on Daouds part to abolish the monarchy, for more than a century the one unifying factor in a land divided by geography and ethnicity. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society At Havana, Daoud worked closely with the centrist group in the Non-Aligned Movement rather than associate himself with the pro- Soviet cluster led by Cuba and Vietnam. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society of Afghanistans political economy? What was the social base of its ruling class in the republic founded by Daoud? What kind of relationships prevailed between the state, the tribe and the periphery? What was the character of the central bureaucracy, the provincial and rural power structure, the shape of local government? What impact had modernization had on Afghani- stans extremely dispersed socio-political structure and its largely tribal and very diverse population? What role did Islam play in the total life- style of the people of Afghanistan? An appreciation of the Afghan political economy in its entirety is necessary to identify what Roderick Aya has called the political crux of the Afghan revolution, namely, an open-ended situation of violent struggle wherein one set of contenders attempts successfully or unsuccessfully to displace another from state power. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society More important, even among the Pushtun, the role of the tribe as a unit of military and political mobilization is often assumed rather than demonstrated by research.8 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society There was hardly any village without a transistor radio, which brought the world into the huts of the Afghan villager. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The Marxists tried to make the best use of the radio but they were beaten in the propaganda war by external wavelengths for the simple reason that the villager could neither understand the language of the new revolutionary ideology nor was he in a mood to listen. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society He was more quickly and effectively moved by symbols than, by the Marxist ideology which in 1978-9 was begging for an Afghan language that the Afghan villager could understand. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society By the early sixties, Taraki was a full-blown Marxist who was converting educated youth to a political line that saw the Soviet Union as the centre of world revolution. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The first two Decrees, issued on 30 April and I May, announced the formation of the thirty-member Revolutionary Council and named twenty-one members selected by the Council to serve in the PDPA Cabinet. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Decree No. 3 was issued on 14 May, abrogating the 1973 constitution framed by Daoud and establishing legal procedures to be followed until a new constitution could be drawn up. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Even if land reforms and equal rights for women had been tried by previous Afghan regimes without success, as some American specialists on Afghanistan claim,8 there is no doubt that the abolition of rural indebtedness and usury was entirely new in Afghanistans history~ Poverty and its twin brother indebtedness were widespread in the 50 Afghanistan Afghan villages, as we have already noted. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society By the time the Marxists took over, the female milieu in Afghanistan was a mixture of liberal trends and values fighting deep-rooted customs, traditions and prejudices, often couched in Islamic rhetoric against liberating women from their feudal shackles. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society It was by using the concept of jihad that Abdur Rahman was able to consolidate the power of the central government over the tribes and local chiefs. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The struggle was fought not over political or ideological issues, because these issues did not exist, but on elemental passions and prejudices stirred up by the traditional vested interests, aided and abetted by the powerful British entrenched on Afghanistans southern borders.3 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society They want to eliminate ethnic distinctions between Pushcuns and the non-Pushtun tribes or national groups because they believe these distinctions are un-Islamic and only weaken the Afghan state by 62 Afghanistan keeping its population divided and at war with itself. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The Marxist struggle in Yemen in the sixties was not unduly impeded by the Islamic factor. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society It was supported by a powerful Muslim neighbour the Egypt of Nasserand opposed by another powerful Islamic power, Saudi Arabia. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Its military dictator, General Zia-ul Haq, was trying cautiously to introduce his own variety of islamization modelled by and largely on Saudi fundamentalism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The Afghan fundamentalists were also affected by the unending, gradually escalating IraqIran war. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society In Badakhshan province alone, Khalq party membership increased by two hundred. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society But the general mood of the Afghan masses was to wait and see what the new regime would do, how it would behave, whether and in what manner it would be different from the previous regimes that had prevailed in distant KabuL One single group of Islamic fundamentalists, led by Gulbudin Kikmatyar, broke the general mood of tense waiting. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Any attempt to reform such a 68 Afghanistan system by appealing to the class interests of the poor and landless peasants was bound to run into considerable difficulties. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society This difficulty was further compounded by the fact that about 15 per cent of the Afghan population still lived mainly by their nomadic flocks, and knew very little of class relationships or ownership patterns. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The treaty gave the Soviets legitimacy in assisting the revolutionary regime to secure internal stability as well as to defend itself from external intervention or attack On 6 April 1979, a high- level Soviet delegation led by General Alexei Yepishev, First Deputy Defence Minister and President of Political Affairs of the Soviet Army and Navy, arrived in Kabul. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society By April 1979 Communist forces had been totally repulsed from eastern Nuristan, six months 72 Afghanistan later most of the rest of Kunar province was free of Communist control0 / According to Strand?the Nuristanis were angry with the Marxist regime because it had sacked their people from the Government, thereby breaking their links with the centr~Nuristanti elites thus lost their personal ties with government, which they had established during the reign of Daoud. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Up to 90 per cent of the Sitami Milli (Maoist) in the province are believed to have been killednot only by the mujahidin, but by the Khalqis and Parchamis as well.18 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Perhaps the most basic difficulty faced by the national government was its own weakness at the provincial and subprovincial levels. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Taraki sought to downplay the proletarian aspect of the Saur revolu- tion, while Aminjustified it by describing peasants as potential work- ers, claiming that the originality of the Afghan revolution lay in its making the transition from feudalism to socialism.25 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society today returned to the beloved country and was warmly and unprecedently received by tens of thousands of our noble and patriotic people carrying flowers and revolutionary slogans, glowed a Kabul Radio commentator. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The Soviet intervention or invasion has been studied at length by American and other Western scholars and 88 Afghanistan journalists in the context of the centurys prolonged confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States as leaders of two contending international political systems. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The most forceful advocate of intervention was the late Suslov; he was supported by Brezhnev, American-backed regime. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Yuri Andropov expressed considerable doubts and was perhaps supported by more than one other Politburo member.2 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The Presidents perception was echoed and refined by Drew Middleton, military correspondent of The New York Times. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The chief political drawback seen by some officials in Washington is th~t such a step would frighten India and possibly move that country closer to the Soviet Union, thus shifting the power balance in Asia even more toward Russia.2 Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The traditional cleavage in the subcontinent between Pakistan and India was deepened by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the American response to it. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The military regime of Zia-ul Haq was strengthened by the powerful support it received from the United States, China, Saudi Arabia and other states. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Gradually, over a period of five years, a strong stream of public opinion developed in Pakistan which regarded the Afghan policy pursued since January 1980 as having been imposed on Pakistan by the United States, and this opinion advocated a political settlement of the Afghan crisis through direct negotiation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society In the discharge of this mission, unprecedented in Soviet experience, the USSR was pitted against a formidable array of obstacles: widespread Afghan resistancecall it counter-revolution or struggle for national liberation; significant military assistance to the rebels by a group of enemy countries led by the United States; an incompetent, faction-ridden PDPA which had neither the organizational base nor the cadre strength to take on the challenge of revolutionary reconstruction; an outraged and hostile world public opinion, and, last but by no means least, the Kremlins own lack of resources and lack of experience in handling a compli- cated, prolonged guerrilla war situation in a backward, rocky, mountainous Third World country. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society 9 Saur Revolution: With the death of Amin and the take-over by Soviet troops, the Khalq phase of the Saur revolution came to an unlamented end. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Karmals mandate was twofold: to rectify the errors and mistakes committed by Amin and Taraki by mellowing the reforms that had battered the socio-cukural fabric of Afghan society, and to build the broadest possible support base for the regime; and second, to re- organize the Afghan army and secret police with Soviet help in the shortest possible time so that Afghans loyal to the regime could them- selves take on the resistance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The controversial matter of conscription, which had met with considerable resistance and criticism in the country, was also left to decision by the local councils. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The minimum age for a peoples deputy was fixed at 18, despite some opposition, and it was laid down that candidates could only be nominated by the National Fatherland Front or one or the other of its constituent bodies. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society This was 80,000 more than the figure of 70,000 given by Karmal to a BBC reporter in 1982. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Of the five parties involved in the Afghan problem, the positions of threethe United States, Pakistan and the Afghan resistanceare weakened by inherent contradictions and gaps between their avowed objectives and the resources they are willing to deploy, and are capable 132 Afghanistan of deploying, for the achievement of their goals. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The United States, on the other hand, has a visceral problem with the Marxist Government in Afghanistan which it perceives to be a forced transplant by the Kremlin onto the tradition- ally non-aligned and ruggedly nationalist soil of Afghanista~ the American priority therefore is on political change in Kabul, with the consent and approval of the resistance. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The cost seems to be largely compensated for by economic and logistical gains: the wholesale import of Afghanistans increasing 136 Afghanistan supplies of natural gas, the exploitation of the countrys rich mineral resources, and the installation of a Soviet military presence in the Persian Gulf region that would counsel caution and restraint for the builders of a formidable American military strength in that area under the Reagan administration. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Few diplomats place any credence in the Reagan administrations subsequent out- pouring of assurances voiced by everybody from the President himself to US Secretary of, State George Shultz and UN Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick that the US supports an Afghan settlement through peaceful negotiations. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The Soviet position, as explained to the author by a ranking Indian diplomat as well as by Soviet officials, was that Yakub had succumbed to American pressure and told Gromyko that the creation of a stable regime in Kabul was essential to enable the refugees to return; in other words, Pakistan now insisted that Afghani- stans internal affairs be included in the agenda of negotiation. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society General Zia-ul Haq was probably the first head of state outside the Soviet bloc to announce that he would represent Pakistan at the funeral, accompanied by his Foreign Minister. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society But neither the Presi- dent of Pakistan nor his Foreign Minister was received by Chernenko or any other member of the CPSU Politburo. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society A commentary in Pravda reviewed disclosures that secret assist- ance by the CIA to the Afghan rebels had become the largest American operation since the Vietnam war. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The Pravda commentary warned that such escalation would be more than matched by the Soviet side. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan were estimated to have increased by at least a quarter. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society It stressed that the Soviet Union would still be ready to withdraw its troops by agreement, and ended its commentary by staring that All questions relating to Afghanistan can be solved only by political means. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society A remark by the American ambassador to Pakistan, Dean Hinton, on 1 April, that he was baffled by the thought process of those opposition parties that advocated direct talks with Kabul, raised volleys of protest in the Pakistani press, which were echoed several times in the National Assembly. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society It is somewhat surprising, however, that over twenty years of Soviet influence did not produce a more viable communist party than the PDPA was in 1978/In fact, the Soviets did not wish to help the PDPA enlarge its political base beyond that of a respectable pressure group, and were apparently taken by surprise when the Afghan party captured power. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Another factor that distinguishes the Afghan revolution from several other Third World Marxist revolutions is that itw presided over by the army. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society It was designed and executed by leaders o t e PDP with the help of its dedicated members in the army. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The dictatorship of the proletariat, one-party rule, rigid command and control of the life of the population, even the use of coercion and terror werejustified by the necessity for rapid and radical remoulding of largely or almost entirely agricultural societies into fully industrialized ones, accomplishing in decades what the capitalist industrialized countries had done over centuries. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society In an authoritative analysis ofiranian fundamentalism in May 1985, Academician R. Ulyanovskiy, a noted CPSU theoretician, drew the grim conclusion that the Iranian revolution which, in 1978-9, s enuine all- eo les festiv was captured by the alergy in 1980 in collustion wit bourgeois business and large landowers'. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society A Very Select Personal Bibliography The literature on Afghanistan is vast, mainly because of the strategic position occupied by the country between the British-Indian empire and the Russian empire. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society There are about a dozen histories of Afghanistan, of the British-Indian period, by Indian historians. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The great bulk of this literature is propaganda from one or the other of the several perspectives on the Afghan revolution and the second cold war generated by the Soviet intervention. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The three volumes of Marxist Governments: A Wodd View,edited by Bodgan Szajkowski, General Editor of the series in which the present book is published, are most useful reading in comparative communism. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society At least two useful publications have emerged from Congressional concern over 198 Afghanistan Afghanistan: East WestRelationsin the Aftermath of Soviet lnvasion ofAfghanistan, Washington DC, Government Printing Office, lOjanuary 1980; and AnAssess- ment ofthe Afghanistan Sanctions: Implicationsfor Trade and Diplomacy in the 1980s, report prepared by Dr John P. Hardt, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, Government Printing Office, April 1981. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society civil rights 1156 communications xii, xiii, 4, 11, 23,40 conscription 115 conservative Islam 60-1 constitution 1156 Cordovez, D. 122, 133, 140, 143, 147 Cronin, R. P. 103-4, 108-9 Daoud Khan, M. and Brezhnev 20, 21 and Karmal 44 and Parcham group, 19, 26 and womens rights 51 as President 1729, 30, 1612 as Prime Minister 11, 1213 desertion 102, 106 development plans 123, 125 202 Afghanistan dowries see marriage customs Dupree, L. 17, 26, 28. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society 47, 48, 1656, 168 Durand Line 3 economic aid 23, 75, 123 from China 24 from Iran 22, 23 from USA 4, 910 from USSR 4,8, II, 16, 20, 70, 1235, 129 economic development xixii, 11, 26, 345, 118, 124 education and training xi, 356, 75 armed forces 35, 115, 124, 163 by USSR 12, 16, 137 Egypt 159 and Afghanistan 1,21,61 electoral reform 1215, 1718 Eliot, T. L.jun. 15, 1920, 21, 23, 30 Epishev, A. A. 87 ethnic problems 47, 71, 72, 73, 1645 exchange programmes armed forces 35, 115, 124, 163 civilians 12, 16, 137 external security 8, 11 factionalism in PDPA 478, 67, 68, 98, 115, 163 Flatin,B. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society Before doing so, I went through the journal that I kept from 1979 until the Kabul regime arrested me in i 982. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 A movement started by which the central government concentrated power at the expense of a centuries-old traditional system that assigned power and concessions to secular rural magnates and reli- gious groups. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The consolidation of the nation-state, as well as of his dynastic rule, made it necessary for Amir Abdur Rahman Khan to build up a strong standing army aided by an expanded bureaucracy and an extensive intelligence service, a stupendous task considering the meager state income based mainly on an agricultural economy. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 With his downfall ended Afghanistans first constitution, which Amanullah had promulgated in 1923, as well as the dynastic rule estab- lished by his grandfather Amir Abdur Rahman in i88o. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 He did not tolerate opposition, although he al- lowed provincial assemblies and the national parliament to function as provided by the constitution. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 He permitted King Mohammad Zahir, his nephew, to enjoy life, but not to rule; by contrast, he trained his full nephews, Mohammad Daoud and Mohammad Naeem, in the art of government by giving them responsible positions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 With the help of the intelli- gence service (zabt-e-ahwalat) backed by a strong army, the government arrested many constitutionalists and other persons, often for no appar- ent reason; they were detained in filthy prison cells for years without trial. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Advised by a loya jirga (grand assem- bly), Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim followed a policy of correct neutrality during the war. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 But the king, though supported by his younger son-in-law and cousin, Abdul Wali, and others, now had opponents in the persons of his other first cousins and brothers-in-law, Daoud and Naeem, who had turned against the new arrangement because it excluded them from poli- tics. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In addition, the govern- ment had to meet challenges from the national assemblies and unruly students incited by political parties. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 More important, the confrontational attitude with Pakistan was abandoned, and after the exchange of visits to Islamabad and Kabul by leaders of both countries, the ground was prepared for the settlement of outstanding issues, including Pashtunistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 STORMING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE At twenty minutes past seven, Tapa-e-Tajbeg was shelled by rockets from the west side. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In- stead of Afghans, the Alpha antiterrorist squad of the KGB, dressed in Afghan uniforms and commanded by Colonel Boyarinov, had gone into operation.2 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 They had a blind faith in the Kremlin rulers and did not expect that their supporters would overthrow them by force. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Except for Sarwari, who was from the province of Ghazni bordering the prov- ince of Paktia, the others were from Paktia. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 They had influ- ence with the army, which was officered by a considerable number of persons from Paktia. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 On this point, as well as a number of others that will be described in the next chapter, Amins relations with the Soviets became strained. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 What is known is that Jahandad, who was of the Sabari tribe from the district of Khost of Paktia Province, had decided that the time had come to prove his loyalty to the land of his birth and defy the invaders, even though they were the Soviets. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Both sides sustained losses until the Afghans were finally overcome by some kind of nerve gas. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Never before have uni- formed Afghan military officers been insulted so much as these officers were by individual men and women, particularly the latter, in public places in the city of Kabul for months after the invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 To escape the sarcastic remarks of women, these officers avoided going by public buses in the city in uniform, as is the custom in Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 While Amin worked to weaken Taraki by removing Sarwari, Wa- tanjar, and Gulabzoy from their posts, the latter tried to do away with him. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Taraki told his associates that Amin intended to remove him by a coup. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Amin asked Taraki to dismiss Sarwari and others from their posts; Taraki pro- posed a compromise, but by then a compromise had become unwork- able. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By Amins order Taraki was detained and, on 9 October, suffocated. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By the time he took over the reins of government, Soviet advisers had obtained for themselves such a commanding position that no significant decision was made, no important order issued in either the civilian ministries in Kabul or the Afghan armed forces without the clearance of Soviet advisers. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 It is not known whether or not his instruction was general and whether or not it was carried out by all civilian and military officials; however, by the time of the invasion the advisers attached to the military section of the Intelligence Department were indeed working as advisers only. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The subsequent claims by Karma! Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By making this statement, the Soviet leaders put themselves into such a position that to justify their actions they had to tell lies about this as well as related issues. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 On ii December 1979 the Soviet politburo, chaired by Leonid Brezhnev, endorsed the KGB view and decided to invade. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In the KGBS view, The situation [in Af- ghanistan] [could] be saved only by the removal of Amin from power and the restoration of unity in the ruling party. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Karmal ac- cepted the proposal, which was passed by a majority of the votes cast. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Sarwari and Gulabzoy had endeared themselves to the Soviets by helping them in the invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By the phrase through revolutionary pathways, Karmal meant his two secret flights aboard Soviet military aircraft to the Bagram military airport. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The Soviets first flew him in on 13 December 1979, when they expected opponents would topple Amin by a coup. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 This was done through an invisible body or coun- cil, composed of the Soviet ambassador, the local head of the KGB, and the commander of the Soviet army, and headed by the Soviet supreme commander, Marshall Sergei Sokolov. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 But in contrast with past resistance movements, which were headed by traditional lead- ers, in the present resistance leaders emerged from among the modern, educated members of Afghan society. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 They had been organized in politi- cal parties set up in the 19 6os, a by-product of the transition from a traditional to a modern society. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By 1975 there were 115,12.5 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Inside Afghanistan about twenty groups and regional unions were active by July I98I.~ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Nationalist Resistance Organizations It is difficult to pinpoint which resistance groups were nationalist. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Most might be called so, since they defended their homeland against the inva- sion and stood for the view that the people of Afghanistan alone had the right to set up the kind of state they wanted. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The whole question centered on the point of sovereignty: whether it was to be actualized by the Afghans themselves or determined with the help of foreign might on the basis of universalist or internationalist notions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The attitude shown toward the jirga by the authorities of the host country proved crucial. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Pakistan did not want the Afghans to set up new organizations on its soil; this point had been decreed by the Consultative Board, a high-level commission concerned with Afghan af- fairs and headed by President Zia al-Haq.18 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Supported by his followers, a member of the Gailani family chaired the jirga in violation of its procedures, as a result of which the majority boycotted it.2 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Thus failed the first attempt by Afghans to set up a political structure along traditional lines at a time of national crisis. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In September i 981 elders from western Afghanistan, led by the former senator Abdul Quddos and the former deputy president of parliament Abdul Ahad Karzay, attempted to con- vene a loya jirga. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Specifically, they also stated that since party politics had disunited Afghans, they should abandon it in favor of the institution of the jirga, by which their forefathers had resolved national problems in critical times. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In their view the jirga was a suicidal attempt by the enemies of Islam and leftist parties?22 More than three thousand influential persons from all over the country arrived at Quetta, but local authorities requested that they move to the smaller town of Pishin for security reasons. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 He also valued constructive traditions, in particular the custom of opposing social in- justice and observing the code of social morality by accepting risk with boldness and chivalry (ayyari). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 PRELUDE TO URBAN UPRISINGS The national opposition was marked by two stages: spontaneous, disor- ganized urban opposition, and rural guerrilla opposition. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Almost simultaneously, groups of people by the thousands appeared in different quarters of the city: Dasht-e-Barchi, Pul-e-Khishti, Mohammad Jan Khan Watt, Salang Watt, Jamal Mama, Beni Hissar, and Qala-e-Fathullah.4 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By April 1980 the province of Laghman was divided into a number of precincts (houza), each led by a commandant. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The new rudimentary system of administration established by the Islamic party was in essence the nucleus of the Islamic republic that the Islamists intended to set up. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 After the many uprisings, particularly during the summer of 1980, units of the invading army, ac- companied by air power, carried on operations in many parts of the country. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 They em- ployed sons against fathers by sending them in tanks and warplanes to de- stroy their homes and villages. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 To continue the story in the words of the elderly man himself: Advised by a great mulla, the people of our valley opposed the two projects of schools and roads. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Also, supported by bands of armed mujahideen, the new rulers imposed ~1 heavy fines on both sides of disputes without investigating them as re- quired by Islamic laws.28 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 SUPPRESSION OF NATIONAL CULTURE Another set of measures adopted by the mujahideen were intended to suppress or replace customs, traditions, and social conventions with the injunctions of the Islamic Sharia. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In addition, community elders, those who embodied tradi- tional and social wisdom, were replaced by scholars of religion and Sharia.30 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 But not all the aid reached the mu- jahideen: published estimates said between, one-third and one-half of the aid was diverted by Pakistan or sold by representatives of the mujahid groups in Peshawar. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Emboldened by the moral force of the jehad that they were conducting against an atheist invader and strengthened by weapons, the new leaders acted like independent rulers, showing little or no regard for the people whom they ruled. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By mid-1981 it was clear that rivalry not cooperation, ruled the relations of the six mujahid organizations in Logar on all mat- ters, including military operations.37 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 They had acquiesced into submission to the commanders and heads of various organizations, showing patience and tolerance to the mistreatment they received from some of them.... Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 They did so because the leaders in Peshawar had disappointed them. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The people had been frustrated by the disunity of the organizations and the pressure brought to bear on them by the Russians.42 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 But this form was meaning- less, because during the search family members would be pushed inside a room, the house would be searched by armed men, and members of the family would be so terrified that they did not dare complain. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Translating that view into actuality was made possible by the state structure, in which the departments of secret police, public attorney, and special tribunals, dominated apparently by the official party but in fact by the Soviet Union, worked toward the same goal: to realize the domination of the state over individuals. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 homosexual acts, perpetrated not only by them but also by others, in- cluding some educated inmates.33 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Not a single group of inmates remained as solid as before, but split into rival or hostile subgroups. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Scuffles and quarrels among them became com- mon. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Ill Military and Administrative Measures for Consolidation of the Government Since the Soviet policy was to consolidate the regime, it tried to suppress resistance. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The call-up was accompanied by concessions and bonuses. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 He also stated that in this way regional reaction and world imperialism led by American imperialism would be defeated. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The regime modified the recall by exempting university and school teachers as well as students. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Before September 1980 it had set up in the frontier areas a number of military posts garrisoned by men from different tribes but officered and supervised by the Khalqis of the same area. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The militiamen, as well as the Khalqis, declined, arguing that by taking up arms against their own tribes, they had made them their enemies, and now they had to have the weapons to protect themselves. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Supported by the community, the arobaki is a force against disorder. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In the present case, the interest of the tribe was tofight the invaders and their client regime, a decision reached by a tribal jirga after the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 However, by offering money and weapons Fayz Mohammad had persuaded the heads of the tribe to maintain security in their region and to leave the Sitta Kandow Pass open. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The Kabul re- gime tried to capitalize on this difference by resorting to the same tactics as it had with the Zadrans. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 This move of the Malik Qays faction, led at the time by Aman Beg, was tactical: during a meeting in Peshawar, the two rival factions had already agreed to leave their enmity aside and fight the in- vaders. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The Khalqi regime had imprisoned some of his sons and nephews who were serving the government as military officers and had bombed his locality; he then took refuge in the mountains and threatened retaliation unless the prisoners were released and compensa- tion (nagha) paid for the damage wrought by the bombing. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Among them, particularly among the descendants of Haji Hassan Khan, many are educated, and Kama had been a town with a number of public libraries confiscated by the Khalqis. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Local decisions were made (often the party merely implemented instruc- tions it received from Moscow) in the party politburo, which was com- posed of eleven leading members and headed by the general secretary, who, in the period under discussion, was Babrak Karmal. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 These persons deafened the Afghans by preaching that they toiled for the welfare of toilers, but in actuality, and on instruction from the Soviets, they devised ways and means to embroil the toilers in wars of hatred among themselves so that they themselves could stay in power. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Strategically it is also significant, because it is separated from the rest of the country by the Hindu Kush and also because it is close to Central Asia. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Finally, the ministry was financed by Moscow. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The first shots of the mujahideen were followed by a two-hour barrage of heavy guns, rock- ets, and small arms by the Soviet forces. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By 23 Sep- tember 1981 the mujahideen had become more active than ever before. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 On the night of i 8 September 1981 a group of about fifty mujahi- deen, after announcing their arrival by firing toward the sky, forced their way into a house and took away three government officials, who were said to have been members of the official party. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 But more important were the Soviets major military operations, which by then had relieved the city of the pressure from the mujahideen. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Supported by Soviet might, the regime acted on the belief that it would accomplish this in time. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 This statement confirmed the long-circulated rumors that the Soviets in- tended to suppress the resistance by the wide use of force after the Olym- pic games, which were held in Moscow that summer. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In the plenum Karmal informed his comrades of a deci- sion already made by his Soviet comrades in Moscow. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The assurance was based on an assessment of the situation by Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of foreign intelligence in Moscow. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By spending money and exerting pressure, the regime was able to summon community elders to meet with him. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Similarly, a resolution calling for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was passed by the foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries at a ~neeting held early in 1981 in New Delhi; this resolution was particu- larly notable since the number of pro-Soviet countries in the movement was considerable. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The proposal was explained to the Soviet authorities in Moscow in July of the same year by a mission of the EEC headed by the British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington; the Soviets called the plan impractical: although they did not reject it outright. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Also, shortly after the invasion a group of academics, headed by 0. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The man who symbolized the Soviet conscience by opposing the war was Andrei Sakharov, the winner of the Nobel peace prize and a human rights activ- ist; for his stand, the Soviet government in January 1980 deported him to the closed city of Gorky, where he spent seven years in isolation. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Elimination of Opponents by Nonmilitary Means One result of the Soviet invasion was the creation of a situation in which the parties involved in the war justified the destruction of life for the slightest of reasons. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The public corroborated this view by their attitude. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In general, party members were ostra- cized not only by friends and acquaintances but in some cases even by members of their own families. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Some were caught later, but only as a result of extensive efforts by KhAD. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 PARTY CONFERENCE OVERSHADOWED BY TERRORIST ACTIVITIES Since the foundation of PDPA in 1965, flO party congresses had been held, although most communist parties hold a congress of elected mem- bers every fourth year or so. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Frustrated by the tough resistance and their inability to suppress it expeditiously, the Soviets embarked on a program of genocide. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 by actions aimed at undermining the foundation essential to the survival of the group as a group. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 These are retributive genocide, which is based on the desire for revenge; institutional genocide, which is frequently incidental to mil- itary conquest; utilitarian genocide, which is motivated by the desire for material gain; monopolistic genocide, which originates in the desire to monopolize power; and ideological genocide, which is motivated by the desire to impose a particular notion of salvation or purification on an entire society.7 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Chalk and Jonassohn have combined these categories into a master definition: Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.8 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The Renaissance of Western Europe eroded a similar doctrine held by the Roman Catholic church, but nothing of the sort took place in Russia. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 It also tried to implant abroad by deceit and violence the truth of communism, of which Afghanistan is the most recent example. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Despite these qualifications, the information here does indicate the dimensions of the genocide under- taken by the Soviets. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Indiscriminate mass killing of the civilians by the Soviet soldiers dates from the invasion, although, as already noted, until the February upris- 2.2.0 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Since hostilities invoke the instinct to kill, whether for an ulterior motive or in self-defense, combatants often do not confine themselves only to mili- tary targets, as recommended by the international conventions agreed to by member countries of the United Nations. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 But to kill civilians indis- criminately, deliberately, and as a matter of policy; to destroy their sources of livelihood; to force them to flee abroad; to do so without provocation on the part of the civilians, all in an effort to punish them for their support of combatant compatriots in conditions under which the state of war does not officially existthis constitutes a crime, a crime defined at Nurnberg as devastation not justified by military ne- cessity.6 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Wars have laws, and as one commentator has put it, the laws of war have as their objective that the ravages of war should be miti- gated as far as possible by prohibiting needless cruelties, and other acts that spread death and destruction and are not reasonably related to the conduct of hostilities.17 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 A number of nomads, arriving at the area in a truck for the purpose of spending the winter, were welcomed by their relatives and locals. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Strong social bonds, characteristic of the society, required such functions, which were attended by hundreds of people, whether or not invited. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In August i 981, as a result of a two-hour attack by four helicopter gunships on a wedding party in the village of Jalrez in the upper part of the Maidan Valley, 30 people were killed and 7~ wounded.18 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 They have let them- selves be seized by the disease of disunity, personal interest, and ambition.6 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 MASSACRE IN SHAMALI The region toward the north of Kabul up to the Hindu Kush is called by the traditional name of Shamali. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Besides the two unfriendly Islamist groups of Hizb (led by Hekmatyar) and Jamiyyat, the leftist SAMA was also active in the region. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By then the young people had escaped, 2.42. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 A long, tortuous river valley, Panjsher is inhab- ited by Tajiks and a number of Sunni Hazaras. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The valley is flanked by high mountains, pierced here and there with habitable caves; indeed, the caves are so spacious that people sometimes use them as summer quar- ters. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The blockade failed, and grain was imported to Panjsher, although with difficulty, from other regions, notably Andarab. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In September 1981 the Soviets undertook their fifth operation against Panjsher; it, too, was re- pulsed by the mujahideen. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By the time the hearing was held, the number of cases of the use of chemical agents had increased, according to Dr. Fraile, to approximately one hundred instances, resulting in the deaths of about three thousand people.33 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 One foreign observer described plastic bombs camou- flaged to look like stones or leaves: Soviet helicopters scatter them by the thousands in the fields and on moun- tain pass[es]. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The use of camouflaged mines in civilian areas was outlawed by an international convention signed by the Soviet Union in April 1981. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 He was not defending his homeland, he was the invader detested by most Afghans, allies or enemy, and badly trained, fed and accommodated?1 The Soviet fighting men expected to fight foreign enemies on Afghan soil, but instead they encountered as adversaries the very men and women for whose protec- tion their leaders claimed to have sent them. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Epilogue, 1982-1994 1982-1994 I The period from 1982 to the present was marked by the replacement in 1986 of Karmal by Najibullah, the withdrawal in 1989 of Soviet troops after the conclusion in 1988 of the Geneva Accords, and the replace- ment in 199Z of the Parchami regime by the Islamic state. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 With the net- work of logistical supplies and coordination development through the seven-party alliance, the Afghan Resistance became a highly efficient force by I986.~ Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 As early as 1983 Yuri Andropov, general secretary of the Communist Party; had told Karmal that he should not count on [an] indefinite and protracted stay of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan; that it was his obli- gation to expand the social base of his government by political 10 But Andropov died shortly afterward, and during the brief reign of his successor, Konstantin Chernenko, the issue was not pursued, and Kar- mal did not draw the required conclusion.11 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 who had brought the calamity of Soviet troops on the Afghans, found it impossible to expand the social base of his government by political means. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 At the time neither the Soviet Union nor Kabul was willing to expand the social base of the regime by including the Islamic groups. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 On 14 April 1988 the accords, known as the Geneva Accords, were signed by representatives of the governments of Pakistan and Kabul. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Besides, Arabs were said to have won him votes by offering gratuities to members of the shura. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By contrast, Mojaddidi, though mercurial, was a moderate traditionalist, not an Islamist; he also had a longer anticommunist and antiabsolutist stand. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Instructed by the Soviets, the Kabul regime concentrated 2.72 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By then Sevan, who had met with all the parties concerned, had arranged for the transfer of power on 28 April 1992. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 At 2:00 P.M. on 14 April 1992, the militias of Dostum, which had been brought to Kabul by air, took positions in the city. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Azimi and other Parchami leaders told him that the militias had been brought to protect Kabul against the threats posed by Hekmatyar, who had concentrated his men at the citys southern limits. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 A fifty-one-member commission, headed by Sibgatu~lah Mojaddidi, was to transfer power to itself from the Kabul regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 so that the nation is freed from them?94 To calm the mobs, the hosts did not let diplomats and foreign journalists visit the participants and created hope among Afghans by giving out that the leaders had been warned of being imprisoned unless they came out with a settlement. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 It originated in the Islamic state, and specifically in the policies established by Rab- bani, first as head of the LC and later as head of state, and by Masud as the all-powerful figure in the state. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Mojaddidi left the office a frustrated man, alienated by the machinations of Rabbani and Masud. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 It failed because, strictly speaking, it was not a government: it was actually a commission estab- lished principally by foreigners, to transfer power in the course of two 294 months, a short period for such a difficult task. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Be- cause of the absence of the central government, commanders, heads of political parties, and tribal elders [of the frontiers areasi, backed up by external powers, derive abundant incomes from opium, custom dues, smuggling, and the theft of natural resources.127 Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The reverend Mawlawi of Tarakhel even holds that as long as they [the leaders of the groups] are on the scene, the Afghan crisis will not be 130 The danger to Afghanistans national sovereignty lies here, and it is real in view of its encirclement by self-serving neighbors. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The world governments have a moral responsibility to the Afghans, and it is now time for them to assist in transforming the poisonous culture into a healthy one by permitting the Afghans to institute a national government. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By helping to estab- lish such a government, the world governments, among other things, would secure millions of men and women throughout the world from the dangers of the poisonous culture. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 The Soviets found him a willing figure in aligning the minorities against the Pashtun majority in an effort to weaken national solidar- ity against the invaders and the regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 His family was also related to the Mojaddidi family by marriage. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 By this time he had become a member of the central committee of the Parcham faction of the PDPA and a close associate of Khybar, his brother-in-law. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 From 1969 tO 1972. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 regime in various capacities of the sec- ond rank. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 In Cairo he was influenced by the teachings of the Ikhwan al- Muslimin. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Following the Soviet invasion and the intensification of resistance, the association became a major resistance organization throughout the country, in particular the Tajik-dominated regions. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 RATEBZAD, ANAHITA (93-) A graduate of the Medical College of the University of Kabul, Anahita Ratebzad, known by her given name, entered politics by working among the educated and professional Afghan women. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Connected to the Mohammadzay and other fami- lies with a liberal outlook, Anahita set an example of liberation by organizing her female followers around leftist ideas and a promiscuous lifestyle. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 She dissociated herself from her husband after she had a daughter and a son by him. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Yet this Taraki organized hun- dreds of educated men around socialism, and after the April coup he allayed the fears of his countrymen with the simple words of the country folk, lecturing group after group of their elders that those who had overthrown the rule of the Mohammadzay tyrants were their sons, determined to do them good by provid- ing them home, clothes, and food, the epitome of Bangs dreams. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 When he was rejected by the peasants for whose emancipation he claimed he was toiling, Taraki did not hesitate to ask the then unwilling Soviet Union to suppress them by the army. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Instructed by Amin, he initiated the march of tank forces from the motorized forces of numbers ~ and i ~ near Pul-e-Charkhi against the government. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Afghan Refugees in Pakistan The following table was compiled by the Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, Islamabad, from figures received from the provincial commissioners. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 163,225 unregistered refugees who have been provided provisional ration cards by CCAR, Quetta, are included i 1~ 1 A~ A~. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Send us fighting infantry machines [armored personnel-carriers] by planes. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 A medical physician by profession, Dr. Sharq was Mohammad Daouds associate. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 They cooper- ated with it at a time when the Soviets had occupied their homeland and were killing Afghans by the thousands. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 At the end of the war, Wendy Batson, a consultant of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated, Even those [Afghan~ villages not di- rectly affected by the conflict are often as devastated as those that were. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 FATWA Ruling or opinion on legal issues issued by head of the Islamic commu- nity, and in his absence by the ulama. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 KHAN Originally a Mongol term signifying prince or ruler; now, head of a tribe or community with many chiefs working under him; also, an honory title by which a man is addressed by others. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Edited by the Committee for International Afghanistan Hearing. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 i, E. Afghan Refugees: A Tragedy Created by Communism. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 i, H. Guardianship or Looting of a City? Afghanistan Uournal], pub- ished by Afghan Information Center, Peshawar, No. I (April 1994): 66. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 See Inquiry on, 249250 Peoples New Democratic Party Chernenko, Konstantin, 259 Deva, Soviet operations in, 133, 134, Chile, 29 154, 174, 222, 224 Chilsitun Palace, ~, ~z Dobandi, 236 China, 1,40, 43, 49, io8, 117, 235 Doshanbay (capital of Tajikistan), 34 Chindawal, i16, ~i8, z8~ Dostum, Abdur Rashid, 272, 274, 275, Chitral, ~7 i8o, 282, 283, 284, 286, 287, 290, Choueini, Youssef M., 84 292, 293 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 29, DRA. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 273, 307 Mughulkhel, Mawlawi, 3 Panjsher, 89, 90, i6i, 2o~, 240, 243, 107 Muhsini, Ayatullah Shaykh Asif, 94, i ,8, Nawaz Sharif, 275, 276, 278, 284 281 z8o, 284, 288; biography of, 312 Panjsheni, Dastagir, 23, 244; biography Nazarzad, 317 Mujahideen: commanders in politics, of, 3334 Nazyan Valley, i26, 178 296; control of countryside by, 7~, Nejat High School, 308 Pankin, Boris, 272 III, 112; disillusionment of people Parcham (periodical), 310 New Delhi, 194, 316, 317 with, 128, 131, 134; liquidation of Parcham faction, 13, 15, 30, 33, 34, ~z, New Generations of Hazaras (political Khalqis by, 34011; local contributions 53, 55; description of, 5859; group), 95 to, 127; as local rulers, 127; number Parcham~Khalq relationship, ~86i, Niaz Beg (town), 190 of commanders, 263; portrait of, by 6z, 35; reunion with Khalq, 308, Niazi, Ghulam Mohammad, 8~86, 89; Soviets, zi6; spirit of jehad of, 188; biography of, 313 310 suppression of national culture by, Parcham regime. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Carolyn Wells of the Inter- national Institute for Strategic Studies in London and Rachel Lubbock, formerly of ABC News, Paris, both provided a regular flow of research material, while French painter Jean-Pierre Blanche kindly lent me the 2 Introduction of powdery dust thrown up by feet and hooves. Afghanistan: The Soviet War With the growth of repression by the Khalq, the faction in power, and the fighting constantly spreading to new fronts in the countryside, it was evident that something would have to break sooner or later; another coup perhaps, an army uprising, or even a rebel take- over of Kabul. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Although officially headed by Taraki, a 62~year~0ld fa- therly figure described by one Western diplomat as the respectable element in the Kabul regimes the Khalqi admiflstratbon had become steadily more barbarous under the influence of Amin, who took over the premiershiP in March 1979. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Nevertheless, whether promoting Marxist-Leninist revolution in the Third World or reasserting its control over insubordinate peoples of satellite nations, the Kemlin has never adopted a short-term approach. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Since well before the invasion, it had made it clear that it would never tolerate a Kabul regime hostile to Soviet regional interests. Afghanistan: The Soviet War No matter what he does, com- mented a Western diplomat in the Afghan capital, Karmal will never be able to erase from peoples minds that he was put in by the Soviet army. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Protected by Soviet anti-aircraft guns, tanks and troops, the building was being used as Karmals official residence until the Presi- dential Palace, badly damaged during the takeover, could be repaired. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Over 200 foreign journalists had by nOW gathered in the capital. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By early 1985, it had risen to the generally accepted figure of 115,000, with 30,000-40,000 regularly deployed for special operations from bases inside Soviet Central Asia. Afghanistan: The Soviet War 34 The Soviet Strategy By the end of 1980, most of the valleys 150,000 inhabitants had left. Afghanistan: The Soviet War the mining of a road or an attack on a convoy), by razing villages to the ground, killing cattle or burning crops. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By 1984, communist ambushes began seriouslY to threaten guerrilla movements, particularlY in the eastern and southeastern provinces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Shortly afterwards, heavy Soviet bombardments followed by massive ground attacks were reported in Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar and Badakshan provinces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Ever since a Soviet unit had briefly entered the region eight months earlier and destroyed one or two villages, killing several men, it had remained virtually untouched by war. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Bernard Dupaigne, the French ethnologist, who travelled around 46 The Soviet Strategy much of Afghanistan by bus in the late summer of 1980 on an ordinary tourist visa, reported bitter animosity and resentment wherever he went. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Similar complaints have been voiced by Ethiopians, Angolans and Egyptians who, at one time or another, have dealt with Soviet advisers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Judging by the feelings expressed by Soviet defectors and prisoners of war held by the mujahideen, much of this certainly has to do with fear as well as with a general loathing for a country they do not know nor wish to sacrifice their lives for. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Figures between 80,000 and 54 The Guerrilla War 150,000 have been suggested by various observers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By establishing field alliances which do not reflect the intrigues of Peshawar and by gradually adapting their organ. Afghanistan: The Soviet War In the wake of the communist revolution, they rapidly reverted to their 64 The Guerrilla War former use, except this time mainly by refugees and mujahideen. Afghanistan: The Soviet War 66 The Guerrilla War Arms from Abroad Arms captured from the security forces or brought in by defectors represent a major supply source for the internal fronts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By August, 1980, the Russians had taken away anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns from all but the most reliable Afghan troops because of the abundance of army stock that was falling into the hands of the partisans. Afghanistan: The Soviet War The fact, too, that AK-74 Kalakov assault rifles, carried only by Red army soldiers, are increasingly common among the mujahideen demonstrates in part their ability to capture weapons from the Russians themselves. Afghanistan: The Soviet War There was a notable rise in urban guerrilla activities in the capital throughout much of 1984, ranging from a reportedly heavy rocket and mortar assault against the Soviet embassy in the early part of the year 76 The Resistance Fronts to repeated attacks on Kabul airport and the partial razing of the old bazaar in ealry November by mujahed rockets. Afghanistan: The Soviet War The families are cared for by the resistance administration and receive indemnity in 80 The Resistance Fronts case of the fighters death or incapacity. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Apart from flurries of newspaper and magazine articles, the Panjshairs defiance had featured in several television documentaries bearing such titles as Valley against an Empire by a French team. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Strings of helicopter gunships clattered overhead to targets further up the Panjshair, while congested columns of armoured vehicles and trucks, headed by tanks equipped with huge rollers to predetonate mines, ground laboriously along the single dirt road that runs the length of the valley. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By destroying the road in places where the valley narrowed, they could prevent heavy armoured vehicles from crawling up the nor- mally shallow river bed, thus halting the communist advance. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By the time the Red Army troops managed to bulldoze their way through, scores of Afghans had already defected to the resistance with their weapons, including nine tanks which were turned against the invaders. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Their 800 troops at the base were not permitted to move beyond its perimeter and bad to be supplied by helicopter. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By establishing a truce with Massoud, the Soviets were hoping to achieve at least two objectives. Afghanistan: The Soviet War In the end, it was Massoud who brought the Red Army to check, although by rio means mate. Afghanistan: The Soviet War This was conceded by the Russians, who terminated the cease-fire some sixteen months later by launching their seventh, and largest offensive, against the Panjshair. Afghanistan: The Soviet War But this modernisa- tion programme met with deep suspicion from the peasantry, who regarded the reforms as an attempt by the central authorities to impinge on their traditional independence. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By the autumn of 1928, the mullahs, tribes and ethnic groups were in revolt. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Aided by loyalists, he escaped and made his way to exile in Italy. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Zahir Shah acquiesced, but he maintained his countrys dignity by ordering only German, Japanese and Italian nationals with- out diplomatic status to leave. Afghanistan: The Soviet War This involved five-year economic plans, a restructuring of the armed forces and an attempt to diversify economic ties by looking not only to the United States and the West, but also to the Eastern bloc. Afghanistan: The Soviet War The Failing Monarchy The years immediately preceding Daouds 1973 coup detat were characterised by a violently conservative and religious reaction to the influence of the left-wing parties. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Fanatics in Kabul, for example, attacked unveiled women in Western dress by throwing acid in their faces. Afghanistan: The Soviet War In some areas, there were even minor armed revolts which were quickly put down by the army. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Whatever 104 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan the truth, by the evening of 27 April it was all over. Afghanistan: The Soviet War The Khalq reacted harshly by secretly sentencing several of them to 106 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan death including Keshtmand and Qadar, who had played a major role in both the 1973 and 1978 coups. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Reign of the Khalq Why the Kremlin permitted the pro-Soviet Parcham to be ousted by the more nationalist Khalq is unclear. Afghanistan: The Soviet War It was then that the Russians intervened by dispatching squadrons of bombers, probably Ilyushin II-28s, from Dushanbe, capital of Soviet Tadjikistan some 300 miles to the north, to bomb the rebels. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By 20 March loyal Afghan troops, supported by tanks, assault helicopters and Soviet military personnel, had entered the turmoil-ridden city, where they confronted the surging crowds, mercilessly shelling and machine- gunning anything that moved. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By the time the revolt was suppressed, at least several thousand people had been killed or wounded, with some reports quoting as many as 30,000 40,000 casualties. Afghanistan: The Soviet War The government installed by the Kremlin was becoming more and more terrorist and arbitrary, recalled Farid, member of an urban resistance group and a high school student at the time. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Key officers in the armed forces, including dissatisfied communists, led by Col. Afghanistan: The Soviet War In one incident, a vehicle of the Magic Bus Company in Amsterdam, one of the last tour operators on the overland hippy route to India via Afghanistan, was attacked in the southern part of the country; a Swiss and a Canadian were shot dead and an Australian seriously injured as bullets fired by unseen gunmen 120 The Communist Overlay from the surrounding rocks ripped through the windows. Afghanistan: The Soviet War A British nurse accosted by mujahideen managed to evade a similar fate by crying out: BBC, BBC! Afghanistan: The Soviet War When the Babrak government tried to annul these rights in early October 1982 to strengthen the security forces, tribal chiefs already co-operating with the authorities through non-belligerence agreements rebelled by holding a large demonstration in the capital. Afghanistan: The Soviet War It was costing the Soviet Union well over $2 billion, possibly as much as $3 billion a year, in occupation and economic development support by the end of 1984. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Shoot-outs have become so common that it is sometimes not known for certain whether assassinations have been carried out by the resist- ance or one of the PDPA factions. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Many party members, particularly the more nationalist Khalqis, have become disillusioned and deeply resent the way they are being treated by the Soviets. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Anti-Russian senti- ment has begun to emerge among Parcham militants angered by high- handed Russian attitudes. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Kabuls Foreign Ministry, which is nominally headed by Parcham Shah Mohammed Dost, has its policies unabashedly dictated by the Kremlin. Afghanistan: The Soviet War All statements issued by the ministry, which is now composed 90 per cent of party members or officials with high-ranking family connections, are prepared by a special team of Soviet advisers. Afghanistan: The Soviet War During the first months of the occupation, secret state documents were systematically sifted by the KGB and then taken away. Afghanistan: The Soviet War In one case in Kabul, a young boy and his mother were stopped at a roadblock by militiamen in search of con- 142 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan scripts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War According to Jean- Denis Herle, a French teacher at the Lyce Istiqlal who first arrived in Kabul in August 1979 and remained during the first year and a half of the occupation, the pupils were profoundly disturbed by the up- heavals in their country. Afghanistan: The Soviet War According to Dr Sayed Mohammad Yusuf Elmi, professor of Islamic Civilisation at Kabul University who fled with his family to Pakistan in August 1983, at least four manifestly anti-Islamic subjects have replaced classical studies and are taught by the Soviets themselves: Historical Mater- ialism, The History of Revolutionary Movements, Scientific Sociology and Dialectical Materialism. Afghanistan: The Soviet War During the early stages of the occupation, one 146 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan British teacher was threatened by the authorities for having explained to her pupils that most policemen in the United Kingdom do not carry guns. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Berated for telling imperialist lies by a communist militant, she was reported to the directorate when she refused to withdraw her statement. Afghanistan: The Soviet War As one senior Paris-based Soviet diplomat, later expelled by the French government for spying, told me: It is necessary to create a 148 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan properly indoctrinated young generation to lead a progressive, new Afghanistan. Afghanistan: The Soviet War On 14 June 1982, for example, the Kabul media gave copious coverage to the departure by bus and truck of some 1,000 party mili- tants, students and militiamen, most of them Khalqis who had been recruited by the Parchami, to help with the valleys political re- education. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Despite bitter criticism by the families who lost their sons and daughters, there was no mention of this in the official media. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By the end of 1980, however, not a single cubic metre of gas was being used in Afghanistan itself. Afghanistan: The Soviet War There is perhaps some consolation to the Afghans in the fact that they are not the only ones to suffer from such high-handed treatment by the Kremlin. Afghanistan: The Soviet War In one incident in Jouzjan province in June 1982, guerrillas blasted the pipeline causing a fire that lasted for two days despite hectic efforts by Soviet and Afghan troops to put it out. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Between 1967 and 1976, the French Textile Fibre Development Company managed to double Afghan cotton production by improved farming methods. Afghanistan: The Soviet War This was flatly denied by Islamabad, although several years later senior civilian and military officials with the Bhutto administration privately admitted that they had been responsible for the arms, finance and timing of the incident. Afghanistan: The Soviet War ile the other groups are left to bleed, it is argued, Hekmat ar is being boosted by commu t ro- paganda as the only guerrilla leader o importance, s ould Moscow ever want to strike a deal. Afghanistan: The Soviet War They are also distinguished by the same intolerance and inexorable desire to further the aims of the party that characterised the Khalq during the 1978-79 period. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Urban Armed Opposition By the early summer of 1980, the resistance was making itself increas- ingly felt in the urban areas, although fighting remained restricted to the outskirts of the capital. Afghanistan: The Soviet War As a result, no anti-government incidents marred the anniversary parade, which in Eastern bloc style included Afghan soldiers, cadets, police and party militants marching past the Afghan tricolour flanked by red flags, while MIGs and helicopters roared overhead. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By the beginning of 1984, the citys population had nearly tripled from 700,000 before the invasion to over two million. Afghanistan: The Soviet War As one doctor from the Paris-based Mdecins sans Frontires(MSF) wrote: On my arrival two days after the end of the fighting, numerous villages were still smoking and people were still being injured by boobytraps such as explosive pens left behind by the Soviets. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Dominated by a majority of traditionalist clerics and Sayeds with Beheshti at their head, the Shura has had to cope with two diametric- ally opposed political flanks, causing a substantial disintegration of Shura authority. Afghanistan: The Soviet War The Pasdaran, who are strictly controlled by Tehrans Revolutionary Guards to the point of calling for incorpora- tion within a greater Iranian state, have steadily developed into the strongest and best organised of the Hazara fronts. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By April 1979 more than 202 203 Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners 100,000 had crossed the border, creating a problem too large for the Islamabad government to deal with on its own. Afghanistan: The Soviet War With many Pakistanis complaining about unfair practices, virtually the entire private bus trade in Peshawar has been taken over by Afghans who came over with their vehicles and pro. Afghanistan: The Soviet War In mid-1984, following a series of bomb incidents involving loss of life outside buildings frequented by refugees, the Pakistanis ordered the Afghan political parties to move their headquarters from Peshawar to outlying areas. Afghanistan: The Soviet War By doing this you are at least giving the Afghans a chance to stay Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners 211 on, said Dr Claude Maihuret, executive of Mdecins sans Frontire. Afghanistan: The Soviet War While men will turn up without hestitation at a hospital, the most effective way to encounter sick women is to make village visits and order the hospitalisation of those unable to be treated at home, but male doctors are usually obliged to carry out diagnoses on female patients by asking questions without making a physical exam- ination. Afghanistan: The Soviet War But in October and November 1981, the Soviets made a concerted effort to 220 Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners crack down by deliberately bombing three of the French-run hos- pitals. Afghanistan: The Soviet War They had been hidden by the mujahideen in a cave-like shelter in the mountains as planes and heli- copters bombed only two miles away. Afghanistan: The Soviet War in Logar province south of Kabul since September 1982, Dr Philippe Augoyard, a 29-year- old paediatrician from Rouen, was picked up by Soviet troops during a helicopter raid on several villages where he was treating local civilians. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Two other doctors, a man and a woman, working in the same region were pursued by the security forces for a week, but managed to escape. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Four of them died, but the fifth was saved by one of the French who later returned to help. Afghanistan: The Soviet War All in all, he was interrogated no more than half an hour by Soviet intelligence officials before being handed over 222 Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners to the KHAD. Afghanistan: The Soviet War To illus- trate their intention of never negotiating with the bandits, the Soviets shot the 50 Afghan prisoners named by the mujahideen just as the Red Cross had feared. Afghanistan: The Soviet War One possibility was the transfer of captured Soviet personnel to a neutral country for internment; this would conveniently give the resistance a way of abiding by the Geneva Conventions. Afghanistan: The Soviet War In return, the ICRC would have the right to visit mujahed prisoners held by the communists. Afghanistan: The Soviet War And by maintaining a steady 232 Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners stream of Soviet prisoners to Switzerland, the guerrillas could draw even more attention to the ugly little war Moscow would like the world to forget. Afghanistan: The Soviet War And although the Soviets have been laying the foundations for widespread subversion by supporting Baluchi and Pushtun nation- alists in western Pakistan, it is among the anti-Zia (mainly left-wing) political opposition that they can give the regime its worst headaches. Afghanistan: The Soviet War Historical and Cultural Dictionaries of Asia edited by Basil C. Hedrick 1. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan This salt lake is fed by the waters of the Ghazni River. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Son of Amir Abdul Khan, he full inauguration of these reforms, culminating in 1929 in the take-over of the central government by these elements led by the brigand Bachai Saqqao who for nine months terrorized the Afghan citizenry, fueled the fires of reaction, and temporarily suc - ceeded in stifling the reforms of Amir Amanullah Khan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan In the south, however, they were soundly defeated at Maiwand, near Qandahar, by Afghan troops led by the governor of Herat, Mohammed Ayub Khan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan After Amir Mohammed Yaqub Khans one -year reign, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, with the understanding that Afghan foreign affairs would be controlled by the British, claimed the throne of Afghanistan in 1880. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Kupruk I, II, III, IV) excavated by Louis Dupree. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan About 30 miles after it passes Qandahar it is joined by the Arghastan River and these two join the Helmand River at Qala Bist. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan When Zaranj was destroyed during the Arab invasions, Bost became a major city and remained a cultural capital until it was destroyed by Sultan Aluaddin Jahansooz, looted by Genghis Khan, and ultimately ruined by Tamurlane (see TIMURE LUNG) when he demolished the dikes in the 14th century. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan A scarf worn by both the peasant and urban -C - CALENDAR. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan The Chadari was outlawed in 1959 under the Premiership of Mohammed Daud (now the President of the Republic of Afghanistan) as a step towards further emancipa- tion of women in Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan cated west of Kabul and east of Jam, the site of the famous minaret of Jam. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Forty steps lead to a chamber (which might have been used as a throne at ceremonial occasions) which is guarded by two lions. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Temperatures and precipitation are control - led by the exchange of air masses. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan One team member goes over to the other teams side and is chased back by an opposing team member who tries to whip him. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Visitors traveling by automobile or bus can enter Afghanistan from the west through Islam Qala, west of Herat; through Torkham, east of Jalalabad; and through Spin Buldak, south- east of Qandahar. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan They refer to themselves by the geographic area in which they live. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Thus, it is not surprising that buzkashi is exclusively played by the ethnic groups of northern Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan A prosaic chronicler who lived during the ing, tup dandah (a game combining elements of cricket and stickball), chub dandah (played by GAUTAMA BUDDHA (563-483 B.C.) (SIDDHARTHA). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Gardaiz played an important strategic role in the conquest of Kabul by King Mohammed Nadir Khan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan The town is accessible through secondary roads and by airline. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Though very prosperous, he could be satisfied by nothing. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Interesting sites are: the Qalai Qaisar, started by Sultan Alauddin and finished by Sultan Ghiasuddin; Kalai Sangi, a 12th century Ghorid city; and one in Fermis Alakadani. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan His scholarly works are the most original contributions provided by a native Afghan historiog- rapher. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Some of the treatments and remedies provided by the Hakeems are occasionally effective. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan The journey which took Prophet Mohammed 55 Herat (Province) with a population of 85, 000, is about 660 miles from Kabul via Qandahar, and accessible by paved highways and regular air service. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Herat was originally built by Alexander the Great and its political and economic control shifted many times from one ruling dynasty to another over a period of several centuries. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan formed by the Han Rud River. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan He benefitted greatly from the excellent library, which had been collected at Bokhara by the Saman- ida. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan One of the more important of the dynasties in Afghan history was the Ghaznavid Dynasty founded in 962 by Aiptigin (Aiptegin). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan A great cultural center grew in Ghazni and upwards of four hundred historians, scientists, and poets lived here. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan During this period the countrys sum- mer capital was Ghazni and the winter capital was Bost (Lashkar-gah) in southwestern Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan This now famous and wealthy kingdom was destroyed by Alauddin of the Ghor, a mountainous region in northwest Afghanistan. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan It was dedicated by Sultan Ghiasuddin (1153 -1203). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan east of Herat, which was dedicated by Sultan Ghiasuddin Ghuri (1153-1203). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Religious specialists, by performing specific rit- uals, may relieve a person of such possessions. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan The Rig Veda (com- piled between 1400 and 900 B. C.) refers to this city by the name of Kubha. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Kabura is the name used by Ptolemy in the 2nd century B. C. The location of the city has changed several times. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan The city was destroyed once by Alauddin Jahansooz and later by the British. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan The city, with high mountains on each side, at the time of the Arab invasion in the 7th century A. D. was accessible only by means of the narrow Guzar- gab Pass. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan During the first and second Al - ghan Wars, a great deal of fighting took place here when it was occupied by the British in 1839 - 42 and in 1879-80. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Between Kabul and Jalalabad, however, the waters are held back by three dams. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan The university is to- tally subsidized by the state, and is administra- tively under the jurisdiction of the national minis- try of education. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Universal education for all, among other accomplishments, has been among the plans and programs supported by this former King. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan The 1964 constitution was par- tially revoked by the Republican Regime after the revolution of July 17, 1973. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Afghanistan, it is separated from the Hindu Kush by the Bamyan Valley. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Such folk- lore, as well as poems by well -known poets of the past, have found their way into the lives of the people, transmitted orally from generation to generation by professional minstrels who move about the country entertaining villagers at tea houses and by nomadic travellers at major stop- ping points (called caravansarais) . Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan -M- of thought were laid at the Fourth Council of the Buddhist Monks, called by Kanishka the Great (ca. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan This Northern School was influenced by Hellenism and underwent many changes from the original Southern School or Hinayana, and developed into a new religion. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan tomb and two magnificent towers of victory erected by Mahmood upon his triumphant return from the conquest of the Punjab in India in 1026 are all that remain of a great center built during his reign. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan The rest of the city was burned by Alaud- din, the World Burner, who not only burned the city, but purportedly led a rampage on the Maidan 82 MANAJAT see KHIWAJA ABDULLAH ANSARI populace which killed 70,000 people in seven days. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Much lavish work was performed on the building by calligraphers and tilemakers. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan An individual pursued by his enemies, or other- wise in apprehension for his life, can seek asylum with other Pushtuns, who are then required to protect him as if they had kinship ties with him NEOLITHIC. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Breaches in nanawati, , refusal to extend it, or breach of its rules by either protector or pursuer, are serious infractions of pushtunwali. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan The period is also marked by a shift from chipped to polished stone tools. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan It is marked by salt marshes, desert, and a wind which blows for four months (the wind of 120 days). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan It is crossed by three major rivers: the Farah Rud, Khash Rud, and the Hel- mand Rivers, all emptying in the Seistan Lake. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Large carved wooden horsemen were often placed over graves in this area, and efforts are being made by the govern- ment to keep this art from disappearing. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Some of the modernistic structures built by the reform -minded King Amanullah Khan are located in Paghman. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan During its course it is joined by the Ghorband River and 30 miles east of Kabul they join the Kabul River. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan This pattern of marriage is particularly designed to facilitate the cohesiveness of the property held by the groom and his patriineage. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan The town is accessible by a modern high- way. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan line of wells or shafts connected by tunnels to in- tercept the water table. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan They are the descendants of the military and administrative personnel left behind by the Persian King Nadir Shah Afshar in the 18th century. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan town is located about 215 miles north of Kabul and is reached by paved highway. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan It is crossed by two main passes, the Khyber Pass (3, 500 feet) and the Paiwar Pass (8, 531 feet). Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan This rugged area is bounded by the Pamir Mountains on the north and the Hindu Kush chain on the Kashmjr border to the south. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan By virtue of their control and 125 Zangilak Peak ownership of the land, the Zameen Dar are influ- ential in community decision-making processes as well as in the resolution of local conflicts, par- ticularly over the distribution of water and over land. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan In: City and Nation in the Developing World, by Associates of the American University Field Staff. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Settlement and Social Change in Asia, by Wolfram Eberhard. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan Our mission was clear: to strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Osama bin Laden, perhaps the preem- inent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the world today. Inside Bin Laden Having consolidated power by the strength of their swords, the new conquerors-turned-rulers had to prove their uniqueness their Islamness. Inside Bin Laden Jihad, XII INTRODUCTION: THE INEVITABLE STRUGGLE which literally means striving, refers to a holy war undertaken to further the rule of Islam over contested lands, particularly Muslim lands occupied by non-Muslims (any land ever conquered by Islam is considered its forever) and lands with a significant Muslim population controlled by non- Muslims. Inside Bin Laden Then came the Russian wars with Turkey and the conquest of Cen- tral Asia in the nineteenth century, followed by the Turkish Empires col- lapse and occupation by Britain in World War I and the ensuing artificial redrawing of the Middle Easts map by the imperialist powers. Inside Bin Laden INTRODUCTION: THE INEVITABLE STRUGGLE nowhere, all dominated and motivated by the lust for money. Inside Bin Laden In Islamic law apostasy is a capital crime, and thus the demand for the application of Islam and Islamic law becomes a political as well as a religious demand, which is frequently supported by terrorism and death threats. Inside Bin Laden For the hard-core Islamists, the lesson of the Gulf Warthat the West can coerce and defeatis counterbalanced by the legacy of Afghanistan, where the Soviet Union was ostensibly defeated, and that of Somalia, where the United States was driven out by Islamist forces. Inside Bin Laden Meanwhile the Islamists growing hostility toward the Westfueled by the XVIII . Inside Bin Laden These sources suppiement the large quantities of open sourcespri- marily regional mediathat by themselves provide a wealth of data and documentation. Inside Bin Laden This open-source material includes wire-service reports by local and international news agencies; articles from local newspapers, peri- odicals, and newsletters; articles from newspapers, periodicals, and newsletters of the Arab migr community in Western Europe; articles from newspapers, periodicals, newsletters, and academic journals in the United States, Europe, Russia, and other countries; transcripts of broad- casts by the local electronic media (mostly translated by the U.S. govern- ments FBIS); and huge quantities of material retrieved through the Internet. Inside Bin Laden Significant Abbreviations and Organizations AIM Armed Islamic Movement (also known as the International Legion of Islam) CDLR Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (a London- based Saudi Islamist organization) DRA Democratic Republic of Afghanistan IALHP Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places IAPC Islamic Arab Peoples Conference (became PAIC) 1MB International Muslim Brotherhood IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (sometimes called by the Persian name Pasdaran) ISI Interservice Intelligence (Pakistani intelligence) PAIC Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (originally called IAPC) PDRY Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) PlO Popular International Organization PRC Peoples Republic of China UCK Kosovo Liberation Army (also known as KLA) VEVAK Persian acronym for Iranian intelligence YAR Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Islamic Change Movementthe Jihad Wing in Arabian Peninsula (some- times referred to only as Islamic Change Movement) World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders XXIII The Radicalization of an Engineer NOW IN HIS MID-FORTIES, a university graduate with computer skills, Osama bin Laden lives with his four wives and some fifteen children in a small cave in eastern Afghanistan. Inside Bin Laden Be- cause of its conservative Islamic character and sudden wealth and influence, Saudi Arabia was uniquely influenced by these dynamics. Inside Bin Laden By the late 198os bin Laden would have branches and recruitment centers in fifty countries, including the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and some Western European coun- tries. Inside Bin Laden King Fahd, Crown Prince Abdallah, and Prince Turki, already convinced of the strategic importance of the situation in Af- ghanistan for Saudi Arabia, were strongly influenced by bin Ladens convic- tion and promised to help the Afghan cause. Inside Bin Laden By the mid-198os Islamabad already had proof of the strategic value of subversion from its long experience sponsoring Sikh terrorism and subversion i6 THE RADICALIZATION OF AN ENGINEER against India. Inside Bin Laden In 1985 and 1986, as the quantity and quality of weapons provided by the ISI improved, Sikh terrorism and subversion in the Punjab and throughout India showed increased militarization and radicalization. Inside Bin Laden Among the novelties of the revived terrorist campaign were sophisticated bomb-making techniques identical to those being used by the Afghan mu- jahideen. Inside Bin Laden 19 away from Saudi Arabia itself and was willing to pay handsomely for the services rendered by the IS!. Inside Bin Laden Widely consid- ered one of the most effective strategic covert operations conducted by the Soviet Union, this crash also drastically changed the world of interna- tional Islamist terrorism. Inside Bin Laden These visas were provided, frequently along with paid airline tickets, to volunteers who lacked proper travel documents as well as to those who gave false names and were wanted by their govern- THE RADICALIZATION OF AN ENGINEER . Inside Bin Laden 1989, a sophisticated and powerful bomb activated by remote control exploded underneath Azzams car in a narrow street in Peshawar. Inside Bin Laden At the time there were persistent reports among the Peshawar rumor mills that the assassination was the work of a Hizb-i Islami special detachment usu- ally controlled by the IS!, but no proof was provided. Inside Bin Laden BY THE LATE 198os the world of international terrorism was changing. Inside Bin Laden These men were growing old and incapacitated, and leaders were being assassinated by both friends THE RADICALIZATION OF AN ENGINEER . Inside Bin Laden King Fahd and his coterie panicked at the sight of the Iraqi forces streaming into Kuwait. Inside Bin Laden All the senior ulema were categorically against the idea, a Saudi official said in a study by exiled Saudi scholar Nawaf Obaid. Inside Bin Laden Rejected by Riyadh but emboldened by growing popular support, Osama bin Laden found a place in the tidal wave of anti-Americanism swelling through the Islamist communities all over the Muslim world. Inside Bin Laden On the one hand, he con- demned Iraq for invading Kuwait and urged its eviction by force. Inside Bin Laden By siding with the United States and inviting foreign armies to the sacred lands of Arabia, these Islamists argued, the House of al-Saud effec- CRISIS AND REBIRTH . Inside Bin Laden 33 first example of his propensity to advance major issues by building wide coalitions that are unified by basic objectives and common denominators. Inside Bin Laden In the coming decades Turabi would move back and forth between two sit- uations: Sometimes he would be in a position of power in government, and sometimes he would assume the posture of a righteous opposition figure untarnished by association with military dictatorships. Inside Bin Laden Specialized training for Egyptian and other Islamist terrorists was developed by Abbud al-Zumur, an Egyptian former military intelligence officer then in jail in Egypt for his role in the assassination of Sadat, who continued to lead a branch of Islamic jihad and delivered his instructions via Pakistan. Inside Bin Laden 51 198os by Zawahiri for the Islamic Jihad Movement of Abbud al-Zumur of Egypt was now in charge of foreign liaison, weapon supplies, and financial assistance for numerous Jihad organizations operating all over the world. Inside Bin Laden Smaller groups included the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), which originated with the Ogadeni and to a lesser degree the Kismayu (of Kenya) clans; the Somali Salvation Liberation Front (SSLF), which started with the Majer- teen clan, traditionally oppressed by the Hawiye, and evolved into the movement of all oppressed miniclans inside central Somalia; the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), originating with the Gedabursi clan; and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), which started with the Rahanwein clan. Inside Bin Laden With that accomplished, Aidids forces immediately stormed and by November io successfully seized control of about fifteen main road junctions and the local roadblocks from free- lancer bands. Inside Bin Laden These attacks on Egypt were only a component of Tehrans surge to regional hegemony, made possible by its growing hold over Sudan. Inside Bin Laden The chaos in So- malia, fractured along tribal lines and immersed in a fierce struggle for self- determination and power, made segments of the population and their power-hungry leaders amenable to close cooperation with and susceptible to manipulation and exploitation by Turabis people in Khartoum. Inside Bin Laden Islamism was spreading in the ranks of the various tribal militia in Somalia, and by fall 1992 the armed Islamist movements in Somalia were growing fast. Inside Bin Laden The common denominator is that they are almost wholly guided by al-Turabis instructions. Inside Bin Laden On December 31 Egyptian intelligence, which was called in by the Yemeni government to help in the investigation, already had 72 . Inside Bin Laden 77 Aidid and his senior aides went to Khartoum to take part in special con- sultations conducted under cover of a special session of the Peoples Arab and Islamic Congress chaired by Turabi. Inside Bin Laden (This plan was nar- rowly averted by the FBI.) Inside Bin Laden TRIUMPH OVER THE PAPER TIGER United States had sent the Pakistanis to their death intentionally so thai Washington would have an excuse to intervene and return in full force, Khartoum also argued that the singling out of Aidid by the Unitec Nationsthe Pakistanis operated near Aidids radio station when they were ambushedconstituted proof that the United Nations was carrying out Washingtons anti-Islamist policy. Inside Bin Laden TRIUMPH OVER THE PAPER TIGER attacks by the Islamist Habar Gidir tribal forces on Somalis considered friendly to the United Nations. Inside Bin Laden The new operational plan anticipated a marked escalation in the popular fighting in Mogadishu as a cover and facilitator for high-quality terrorist strikes by HizbAllah squads. Inside Bin Laden They were organized in recently es- tablished composite units made up of Somalis led by highly professional Iranian Pasdaran, Lebanese, HizbAllah, and Arab Afghan terrorists. Inside Bin Laden This separate and delicate transfer of key terrorists was also managed by bin Laden. Inside Bin Laden The most striking example was Eritrea, which seceded from Ethiopia after a thirty- year guerrilla war and a referendum that demonstrated overwhelming popular support. Inside Bin Laden Another group aspiring to follow the example set by Eritrea is Somaliland, which declared itself independent in 1991. Inside Bin Laden During the 198os this training complex was run by the ISI ostensibly for Jalaludin Hakkani, a veteran Afghan mujahideen commander. Inside Bin Laden But by 1994 Hakkani maintained only a guard force of about zoo fighters for the local ammunition dumps of the Afghan mujahideen, whereas close to 100 Pakistani and more than 30 Arab instructors were training about 400 to 500 mujahideen from all over the Muslim world. Inside Bin Laden The complex was run in a profes- sional manner, with all candidates subjected to thorough medical, military skill, and psychological testing and a security check by veteran 151 experts before acceptance. Inside Bin Laden By 98 . Inside Bin Laden In fact, these were Afghan forces being held by the ISI in Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan to conduct deniable op- erations in both Afghanistan and Kashmir. Inside Bin Laden Islamist international terrorismas distinct from popular revolts, such as those in Egypt and Algeria, and wars by proxy, those in Kashmir and Israelcentered on Europe. Inside Bin Laden EMIR BIN LADEN of Pakistans image in the United States by, among other methods, publiciz- ing its commitment to fighting Islamist terrorism and drug smuggling. Inside Bin Laden EMIR BIN LADEN the worship of One Allah and the way of life prescribed by Allah. Inside Bin Laden The U.S. government confronted Islamabad with precise 114 EMIR BIN LADEN information about Youssufs hiding placean apartment complex spon- sored by a bin Ladenrelated companyafter a tip from a neighbor. Inside Bin Laden Islam- abad had no alternative but to cooperate or be put on the U.S. terrorism list and face stiff sanctions as stipulated by law. Inside Bin Laden All of Youssufs comrades and other Islamist terrorists dwelling in the complex, however, had been safely evacuated by the ISI before the U.S.-Pakistani law enforcement detachment raided the place and captured Youssuf, who was extradited to the United States. Inside Bin Laden 127 trained fighters already vetted by Iranian intelligence. Inside Bin Laden In summer 1995 all the candidates were being trained by Iranian Revolutionary Guard experts in camps of al-Quds Forces north of Khartoum. Inside Bin Laden At this stage a massive car bomb driven by a martyr-to-be would close in on the presidential car and either ram it or blow himself up near it. Inside Bin Laden Despite the now heightened alert inside Egypt, the Islamist com- mand center in Khartoum was able to call back the vast majority of the teams that had already infiltrated Egypt even before they had been noticed by the Egyptian security authorities and well before they clashed with 132 . Inside Bin Laden The Islamists intensified their penetration and takeover of society through what Egypt-born British journalist and Middle 134 INCITING THE REVOLUTION East expert Adel Darwish calls Islamization by stealtha gradual domi- nation of society while conditioning the population to an Islamic regime. Inside Bin Laden The bomb was activated by a sophisticated timing device with a possible remote-control backup system. Inside Bin Laden He pointed out that the bombing was carried out by disgruntled young people who oppose the Saudi leadership, including some trained in military tactics in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Inside Bin Laden INCITING THE REVOLUTION The first communiqu issued by al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah was a general statement of opposition to the Mubarak government, designed to stress the overall responsibility of the Islamist organizations affiliated with AIM. Inside Bin Laden By late November, Egyptian intelligence confirmed that the key terrorists involved in the Egyptian Embassy bombing had safely escaped to Afghanistan, where they were under the protection of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyars Hizb-i Islami in the Samar Kheyl area near Jalalabad. Inside Bin Laden Events in the 1990S led to the Wests rediscovery of Iran: First came the widespread fear of Iraqi-sponsored terrorism during the Gulf War, followed by spectacular terrorist strikes, such as the World Trade Center bombing and the assassination in Western Europe of ene- mies of the Revolution, traced to Tehran. Inside Bin Laden The aggregate impact of these events was an increase in Western awareness of and willingness to fight ter- rorism, whether sponsored by Iran, Iraq, or any other nation or group. Inside Bin Laden The HizbAllah Interna- tional was established during a terrorist summit held in Tehran on June 2123, 1996, organized jointly by the Supreme Council for Intelligence Af- fairs and IRGC high command. Inside Bin Laden Tehran was determined to ensure global cooperation, and the conference was attended by delegates from terrorist organizations through- out the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and North America. Inside Bin Laden Although the power-struggle machinations within the House of al-Saud had created conditions conducive to a spectacular terrorist strike, the ac- tual perpetrators came from the ranks of Saudi Islamist Afghan and Balkan networks, sponsored and sustained by Osama bin Laden but tightly controlled by Tehran through Iranian and allied intelligence ser- vices. Inside Bin Laden In early 1996, still the acting king, Abdallah promised President Assad to increase Saudi support for the Syrian strategic effort by orchestrating formal Saudi pressure on the Clinton administration to prevent Israel from bombing the Aleppo facilities and the Syrian missile bases and increase Saudi financial assistance to the Syrian strategic buildup. Inside Bin Laden Preparations for the Syrian special operations began immediately. Inside Bin Laden The Salman-Nayif faction, whose leaders are responsible for internal security and claim to have suppressed Islamist militancy in the af- termath of the 1995 Riyadh bombing, would be shamed by the fact that there was Islamist terrorism in Saudi Arabia, and the standing of the Sultan faction in both Riyadh and Washington would be badly hurt. Inside Bin Laden Initial prepa- rations had begun by early spring 1996, a joint effort by Syrian and Iranian intelligence. Inside Bin Laden In the meantime, by early 1996, the violence in Karachi, Pakistan, had reached the level of rebellion, and Islamabad was apprehensive that it might spread and escalate to the point of overthrowing the Bhutto administra- tion. Inside Bin Laden Most of the missing parts and all the missing bodies are from the area covered by rows 17 to 28just above the fuel tankin particular right-side rows 24 and 25. Inside Bin Laden Nitrates, a main component of bombs, are dam- aged by fire and seawaterand in TWA8oo both were present. Inside Bin Laden Everybody will be surprised by the magnitude of the reply, the date and time of which will be determined by the mujahideen. Inside Bin Laden Atwan was highly impressed by the quality of bin Ladens key aides and commanders. Inside Bin Laden Without mentioning any specific government by name, Turabi elucidated as a theoretical legal option the case being made by the Egyptian militant Islamists against the Mubarak government. Inside Bin Laden By then the key terrorism-sponsoring statesIran, Sudan, and Pakistanhad embarked on both thorough preparations for the next wave of international terrorism and the formulation of the doctrinal logic and justification for them. Inside Bin Laden destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya by militant Hindu extremists. Inside Bin Laden While the Clinton administration was strenuously at- tempting to convince Congress and the American people of the need to keep U.S. forces in Bosnia beyond the June 1998 deadlinedespite a prom- ise explicitly made to Congressthe U.S.-sponsored government in Sara- jevo was actively preparing for a military confrontation to regain control over the Republika Srpska (the Serb-controlled parts of Bosnia) by force, using weapons and training provided by the United States under the Train 214 NEW ALLIES IN THE WAR and Equip program. Inside Bin Laden The high-level Egyptian-Sudanese contacts show that both sides are serious about exposing the role of the CIA and the Mossad in con- spiring against Egypt and Sudan and containing the consequences caused by this conspiracy over the past years. Inside Bin Laden They conditioned the next steps on theological bless- ings by their respective spiritual leaders. Inside Bin Laden Without the eviction of the United States from the Middle East and the destruction of Israel, it would be virtually impossible for the Islamist forces to defeat the puppet regimes bolstered by the United States. Inside Bin Laden As proof Bin Laden pointed to the sorry state of the jihad throughout the Middle East despite the heavy casualties suffered by Islamists. Inside Bin Laden The term Crusaders was used to stress the continuity of threats posed by foreign forces present in the Middle East, such as the U.S. forces in Saudi 226 . Inside Bin Laden As a rule, support networks are run by a different group of people than operational networks. Inside Bin Laden Not by accident, coun- terintelligence activities were centered in Nairobi. Inside Bin Laden THE U.S. EMBASSY BOMBINGS terrorist, was arrested in Sofia, Bulgaria, by a team of Bulgarian and Amer- ican security officials. Inside Bin Laden According to Islamist sources, Isam Abdul-Tawwab Abdul-Alim was taken by the Bul- garians to an isolated detention site, where he was kept for two days dur- ing which he was subjected to investigations by the Bulgarian police and American intelligence elements. Inside Bin Laden THE U.S. EMBASSY BOMBINGS by the now enraged Islamists. Inside Bin Laden In three laconic sentences Taha denied that he or the Islamic Group was member of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders organized by bin Laden back in late February. Inside Bin Laden They were refused entry by the U.S. Marines on guard and sent to the back entrance. Inside Bin Laden A couple of the terrorists, then firing on the Kenyan guards, were killed by the explosion. Inside Bin Laden Most likely this was done by Fazil from the white command vehicle. Inside Bin Laden HUMILIATING THE ENEMY The new rapprochement was endorsed by the highest echelons in Tehran. Inside Bin Laden The statement identified the role of the Front in the Muslim world as that of one of the trenches pooling the [Muslim] Nations energies in order to perform the duty im- posed by God, namely the Jihad against the atheists among American Christians and Israeli Jews. Inside Bin Laden The Jewish-Crusader al- liance led by the United States and Israel is now operating blatantly. Inside Bin Laden Although the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders and the fatwas issued in February 1998 over the signatures of bin Laden and Zawahiri were very important, they argued, and despite the explicit call for jihad in them, the bombings in East Africa had been claimed by the previously unknown Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places. Inside Bin Laden Ac- cording to surveys done on the ground by Pakistanis, Afghans, and the British, thirteen of the missiles hit an area called Markaz Khalid bin Wa- heed, ten missiles hit an area called Markaz Amir Muavia, and five hit a base belonging to Jalaludin Hakkani. Inside Bin Laden According to eyewitness reports, a large number of villagers were killed not only by flying shrapnel but also by collapsing homes and shattered win- dows. Inside Bin Laden The camps at Zhavara survived two air and ground offen- sives by the Red Army and couldnt be captured or destroyed despite fre- quent air raids and shelling. Inside Bin Laden On August i~ Abdol Rahman, an Afghan citizen interrogated by Iranian intelligence in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, claimed that Osama bin Laden toured Mazar-e Sharif, in northern Af- ghanistan, for an hour Wednesday [August iz] evening. Inside Bin Laden Abdol Rahman claimed he had seen how bin Laden arrived at Shadian quarter of Mazar-e Sharif in a Datsun pickup truck, escorted by a large number of Taliban militia. Inside Bin Laden Informed sources in Islamabad and Af- ghanistan readily acknowledged to al-Sharq al-A wsat, a London-based paper affiliated with the Salman-Nayif faction in Riyadh, that bin Laden z88 HUMILIATING THE ENEMY had left the Khowst region, which was hit by U.S. missiles, two or three days before the bombing after he received signals from Pakistani sources that the United States [might] fire missiles at sites which he frequents. Inside Bin Laden The sources added that bin Laden was also assured by Islamabad that there would be no commando raid on him because the United States is not will- ing to risk sending commandos to the region and because Pakistan would not allow the United States to use its territory as a springboard. Inside Bin Laden It is not difficult to surmise that bin Laden, Zawahiri, and the Islamist terrorist elite were not harmed because they and the Taliban had been fore- warned by Islamabad. Inside Bin Laden In fact, by the time Islamabad was formally told by Washington, through General Joseph Ralston, of the U.S. intent to strike bin Laden and the terrorist camps in Afghanistan, Islamabad had already committed itself to protecting the terrorists. Inside Bin Laden With Saudi support so crucial to consolidating the Pakistani control by proxy of Afghanistan, Islamabad could not afford to permit the Clinton administration to negate their July agreement with Prince Turki, who, after all, claimed to have been negotiat- ing with Washingtons concurrence. Inside Bin Laden These two embassies that were blown up by the [Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places] had supervised the killing of at least 13,000 Somali civilians in the treacherous aggression led by the United States against that Muslim country, the statement explained. Inside Bin Laden The August 1998 operations were not motivated by revenge, however, but were just punishment for the U.S. Governments injustice against the peo- ples of Islam. Inside Bin Laden The IALHP urged all Muslims not to get near anything American in order to avoid a repeat of what happened in Nairobi and so that they are not unwittingly affected by the flames of Gods Army. Inside Bin Laden He also noted that none of the Egyptian and Arab Islamists [affiliated with bin Laden and Zawahiri] in Afghanistan have been harmed by the U.S. shelling. Inside Bin Laden 301 With the growing popularity of bin Laden and the Islamist trend and promises by Tehran and Islamabad not to challenge the House of al-Sauds hold on power as long as they pursue an anti-American policy and embark on the eviction of U.S. forces, both the Abdallah-Faisal and Salman-Nayif factions have every incentive to adopt such a policy. Inside Bin Laden They have settled for a se- ries of quiet guarantees from Riyadh accompanied by some visible initial moves. Inside Bin Laden Because bin Laden is now re- lated to the Pushtun elite by blood, the surrender of him to outsiders, espe- cially non-Muslims, is inconceivable. Inside Bin Laden In the Talibans Af- ghanistan this is a daunting task because of the harsh Islamist rules, such as 312 STRENGTHENING THE ARSENAL forbidding music and all other forms of entertainment, imposed by the Tal- iban on a traditionally free urban population. Inside Bin Laden 313 barring a major accident, this new headquarters will become operational by the first half of zooc. Inside Bin Laden Contributions from in- dividuals and other entities throughout the Arabian Peninsula are col- lected by two separate financial networks, one dominated by Kuwaiti and the other by Qatari businessmen. Inside Bin Laden Whenever possible European businesspeople administer, perhaps unknowingly, the operations and interests of the Luxembourg companies that are owned by local legal firms. Inside Bin Laden STRENGTHENING THE ARSENAL 315 As the sums of money available from the drug trade have increased, bin Laden and the Russian Mafia have established yet another complex money- laundering operation described by an insider as an extended and octopus- like network that uses political names in Asia and Africa in return for commissions. Inside Bin Laden Bin Laden makes a commission on these transactions, which is laundered by the Russian Mafia in countries other than Russia and Afghanistan. Inside Bin Laden These entities en- tice people into the fold of militant and radical Islam by providing food and 316 STRENGTHENING THE ARSENAL medical and educational services as well as work, religious services, and housing projects. Inside Bin Laden Zamin endorses and supports the jihad declared by bin Laden. Inside Bin Laden 3~3 ghanistan, however, is neither the threat of extradition to the United States by the Taliban nor a building conflict with the Talibans leadership. Inside Bin Laden These activities are financed by Osama bin Ladens charities, Starting in the mid-199os with a few mosques at al-Fallujah, about 6o miles west of Baghdad, and Mosul, in Kurdistan, the Islamistsbearded and wearing their special outfits, which are a combination of traditional Arab gowns and camouflage militarylike uniformscan now be seen all over 324 . Inside Bin Laden While in Iraq, Zawahiri was also taken to visit a potential site for bin Ladens headquarters near al-Fallujah and terrorist training camps run by Iraqi intelligence. Inside Bin Laden In the name of Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri assumed responsibility for a training camp in the al-Nasiriyah desert established by Iraqi intelli- gence in about 1997 for terrorists from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Inside Bin Laden A unique center for the development of chemical weapons for use by Islamist terrorists is also being built within this compound. Inside Bin Laden Since early summer 1998 Islamist terroristsboth Afghans and Arab Afghansunder the command of Osama bin Laden and sponsored by the ISI have been actively preparing for spectacular terrorist strikes using chemical, bacteriological, and perhaps radiological weapons in a well- equipped, fortified compound concealed near Qandahar. Inside Bin Laden 331 suitcase bombs near the main cities of the United Statessites and a mode of operation that can now be taught to bin Ladens terrorists by the former SPETSNAZ personnel he has recruited. Inside Bin Laden Colonel Boris Alekseyev, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Ecological Center, noted that once authorized- by a coded radio transmission from Moscow, a single SPETSNAZ trooper can prepare a suitcase bomb for explosion within half an hour. Inside Bin Laden BY LATE AUGUST 1998, if there were any doubts about what were the intentions and plans of bin Laden and his followers, Omar Bakri, the head of al-Muhajiroun, one of the Ishamist organizations in London that consid- ers itself the mouth, eyes, and ears of Osama bin Laden, provided the an- swer. Inside Bin Laden 333 Muslim world has embarked on a strategic ascent made possible by the ac- quisition of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other strategic capa- bilities. Inside Bin Laden The impact of these megatrends is further compounded by the inherent instability of the most affected parties within the Hub of Islam. Inside Bin Laden The conservative Arab governmnts are plagued with a crisis of legitimacy that is compoun,~led by the succession crisis in Saudi Arabia, Iraqs economic woes and bellicosity, and Egypts shifting of directions. Inside Bin Laden Re- jected by the conservative Arab re~gimes, Sudan has been pushed into strate- gic alliance with the up-and-comir~g non-Arab forces. Inside Bin Laden The Islamic Movements will con- tinue their struggle against the corruption of man-made law [that is, Western democracy] and the distortion of Islam by the Media. Inside Bin Laden working sincerely for the domination of the World by Islam and the Supremacy of Allahs Commands on Earth, which is inevitable, the declaration concludes. Inside Bin Laden Jihad is the only solution to all the problems faced by the Muslims. Inside Bin Laden What we are doing in occupied Palestine [is being] done by Kashmiris in Indian-occupied Kash- mir, he said. Inside Bin Laden This unusual step was prompted by intelligence that the U.S. em- bassy in Riyadh was under threat of an imminent terrorist attack. Inside Bin Laden On October 14 Attorney General Janet Reno organized a crisis management exercise at FBI headquarters to plan for a possible terrorist attack by bin Laden against targets in Washing- ton and New York. Inside Bin Laden The four scenarios examined by the 200 participants were an assassination attempt on the secretary of state, a car bombing, a chemical weapons strike on a Washington Redskins football game, and the explosion of a device in a federal building. Inside Bin Laden As for official Islamabad, the NWFP authorities appeared to be ignorant about the reported presence of Saudi dissident, wanted by [the] U.S.A., Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, when they were con- tacted by a correspondent from Dawn, a Pakistani newspaper. Inside Bin Laden In a major step toward legitimizing revenge against the United States by 354 THE BIN LADEN PLANS establishment Islamism, Tantawi decreed that whoever of the Iraqi people is killed is a martyr because whoever defends his land, honor, and property is a martyr. Inside Bin Laden A concurrent theme in the media was the assertion that since Arab governments were intimidated into passive action and lame protests by the display of massive American firepower and the resolve to bomb Arabs at will, it would take dedicated non-state Islamist forces to avenge the American crimes and restore Arab/Muslim honor. Inside Bin Laden Street vendors and preachers from Morocco to the Philippines urged and expected Osama bin Laden to rescue Muslim honor by striking out against the United States and its allies. Inside Bin Laden A demonstration arranged by al-Muhajiroun outside io Downing Street turned into a scuffle with police, and Scotland Yard arrested six al-Muhajiroun members on security-related charges. Inside Bin Laden Muhajiroun member, was arrested by the Yard after he threw an incendiary bomb at a military barracks in west London at dawn. Inside Bin Laden By the weekend the Is- lamist organizations were reporting a crackdown by the Yard. Inside Bin Laden Having been exacerbated by the recent bombing of Iraq, Islams real battle against the reincarnation of the Crusaders onslaught had only begun, the Is- lamic Jihad concluded. Inside Bin Laden Anything that can be taken from them by force is considered booty for the Muslims. Inside Bin Laden If it is made possible by Almighty God to Muslims, every American man is targeted. Inside Bin Laden The kidnappers issued a specific demand that was ig- nored by Sanaa. Inside Bin Laden Three Britons and an Australian tourist died, and one Briton, one Ameri- can, and one Australian were injuredmost of them by the armys fire. Inside Bin Laden Three others, including z8-year-old Zain al- Abdin Abu Bakar al-Mihdar, the Islamic Jihads leader, known by the nom de guerre Abu-al-Hassan, were captured. Inside Bin Laden The sec- ond demand was to ease the pressure that the government was applying against some of the mujahideen who are on the run and pursued by secu- rity agencies. Inside Bin Laden The second demand is missing from all other communiqus and might have been added by the terrorists in the field, but otherwise the logic and language used by the Islamic Army are identical to that of bin Laden and his followers. Inside Bin Laden 377 a spin on Abu-Hamzahs statements. Inside Bin Laden Some of them may be recruited by mujahideen. Inside Bin Laden The pretense of distance and disengagement from terrorism main- tained by the London-based Islamist leaders vanished in early January 1999, the moment British security authorities began to examine closely the activities of the U.K.-based leaders in connection with recent events in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Inside Bin Laden Taken together, the events in Yemen and Britain clearly demonstrate the wide acceptance of the principles of jihad as advocated by bin Laden and the willingness of Islamists to rely on them as religious authorization for acts of terrorism. Inside Bin Laden These terrorist groups are controlled by bin Laden follow- ers and loyalists. Inside Bin Laden These sensitive operations concerning Kashmir and other networks deep within India were run separately by Sheikh Eklakh Ahmed, a Pakistani-Kashmiri who himself shuttled in and out of India. Inside Bin Laden Bin Laden in essence calls on the entire Muslim world to rise up against the existing world order to fight for their right to live as Muslimsrights, he states, which are being trampled by the Wests intentional spreading of West- ernization. Inside Bin Laden The study notes that the situation throughout the Muslim world has reached a crisis point and emphasizes the urgency of reversing this trend by fighting a jihad. Inside Bin Laden Or you move effectively to seize the power of those rulers and work in earnest with those sincere Muslims who are working for the re-establishment of the Khilafah state and whatever follows by our return to our past glory as the greatest Ummah and the most powerful state which will fight in the path of Allah so that the truth may prevail and falsehood shall perish. Inside Bin Laden By late March the first round of these deployments was completed with the dispatch of fourteen top commanders, all longtime comrades in arms of bin Laden, to the West. Inside Bin Laden A Pakistani official explained that the US and British governments are presently engaged in punitive strikes against Iraqi people, both military and civilian, while look- ing the other way on the massacre of the Kosovan Muslims for the last so many months and therefore would become a target of attack by bin Laden, his allies or [other] Islamists. Inside Bin Laden One of their senior commanders declared that the blood of our supporters will not be in vain and we will avenge every martyr by killing ioo Americans. Inside Bin Laden In mid-April the Islamist leadership thoroughly studied the recent progress of terrorist forward deployment and preparations and the recovery of the Egyptian-based networks from the impact of the summer 1998 ar- WHATS NEXT? . Inside Bin Laden Participants at the meeting resolved to markedly improve the security and counterintelligence measures undertaken by the clandestine networks. Inside Bin Laden Zawahiri also introduced a new system of code names and channels of communications developed after the arrest and interrogation of the terror- ists by the Egyptians. Inside Bin Laden The commanders then went over the entire chain of command and areas of responsibility to make sure that the new redundant, resilient modus operandi would withstand future onslaughts by hostile in- telligence services, including the arrest and interrogation of senior leaders. Inside Bin Laden By the end of the meeting Zawahiri was satisfied with the status of his net- works and approved the activation of several operational plans. Inside Bin Laden This renewed confidence was expressed in a statement issued in late April by Zawahiris Jihad Islami in reaction to the harsh sentencing of a number of Egyptian terrorists, including Zawahiri himself and several other key leaders who were tried in absentia. Inside Bin Laden The statement stressed that the jihad is much bigger and deeper than unfolding events and would not be affected by the Cairo trial. Inside Bin Laden The Islamic world in general, in particu- lar the Arab region, is being swept by a wave of Islamic jihadist rejection, the Muslim nation is vigorously rejecting the policy of humiliation and op- pression being pursued against those working to restore Islams sovereignty over its territory, and it is at the same time determined to firmly and res- olutely move toward achieving its aim of establishing an Islamic state through preaching, jihad, and exposing suspect actions. Inside Bin Laden These sentiments were echoed in a concurrent statement by Qari Sai- fullah Akhtar, the central emir of the Harakat Jihad Islami, who is respon- sible for the organizations international operations. Inside Bin Laden In these operations the mujahideen have already demonstrated their fearlessness and all-out commitment to the Muslim population. Inside Bin Laden In order to provide comprehensive support for anticipated combat operations by the Islamist forces, particularly an elite force of over 500 Arab mu- jahideen, the Islamists are running more than fifteen private Muslim chari- ties and humanitarian organizations in Albania and Kosovo alone. Inside Bin Laden The Islamists conducted several spectacular strikes and endured the consequent dragnet by intelligence services all over the world. Inside Bin Laden GLOSSARY 409 Muslim Brotherhood A worldwide conservative Islamist organization dedicated to propagating the true and fundamental teaching of Islam in the religious field, the social field (by providing social services, education, etc.), Inside Bin Laden and the political field (by establishing Islamic regimes). Inside Bin Laden damage inflicted by, 2832.84 Inside Bin Laden It is motivated by profits and driven by the aggregate preferences of billions of consumers. Jihad vs. McWorld As Mr. Barber provocatively puts it: Belonging by default to McWorld, everyone is a consumer; seeking a repository for identity, everyone belongs to some tribe. Jihad vs. McWorld Government & Opposition BOOKS BY BENJAMIN R. BARBER An Aristocracy of Everyone (1992) The Conquest of Politics (1988) Strong Democracy (1984) Marriage Voices (A Novel) (ig8i) Liberating Feminism (i~~) The Death of Communal Libe4y (i~7~) Superman and Common Men (1971) COLLABORATIONS The Struggle for Democracy with Patrick Watson (1989) The Artist and Political Vision edited with M. McGrath (1982) Totalitarianism in Perspective with C. J. Friedrich and M. Curtis (1969) Jihad vs. Mc World Benjamin R. Barber Ballantine Books New York Sale of this book without a front cover may be unauthorized. Jihad vs. McWorld Those who look back see all of the horrors of the ancient slaughterbench reenacted in disintegral nations like Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Ossetia, and Rwanda and they declare that noth- ing has changed. Jihad vs. McWorld Our secular eternities are corrupted, however, race reduced to an insignia of resentment, and soul sized down to fit the demanding body by which it now measures its needs. Jihad vs. McWorld How will peoples who define themselves by the slaughter of tribal neighbors be persuaded to subscribe to some flimsy artificial faith organized around abstract civic ideals or commercial markets? Jihad vs. McWorld Can advertising divert warriors of blood from the genocide required by their ancient grievances? Jihad vs. McWorld In other times, this bankrupt political arrangement, sanctioned for a considerable time by a desperate United Nations Security Council, would carry the name anarchy.5 Jihad vs. McWorld Capitalism requires consumers with access to markets and a stable political cli- mate in order to succeed: such conditions may or may not be fos- tered by democracy, which can be disorderly and even anarchic, especially in its early stages, and which often pursues public goods costly to or at odds with private-market imperativesenvironmen- talism or full employment for example. Jihad vs. McWorld Shopping, it is true, has little tolerance for blue laws, whether dictated by pub-closing British paternalism, Sabbath-observing Jewish Orthodoxy, or no-Sunday-liquor-sales Massachusetts Puritanism; but intolerance for blue laws is hardly a condition for constitutional faith or a respect for due process. Jihad vs. McWorld billion worth of pizzas sold in 1991, the privately owned Dominos earned enough revenues to fund the col- lective government expenditures of Senegal, Uganda, Bolivia, and Iceland.4 Jihad vs. McWorld Toshiba, the General Electric of Japan, boasts in its 1992 annual report that as good corporate citizens they do our part to ensure that progress continues within the world community but its citizenshipwhether Japanese or globalis hemmed in on every side by limits set by the demands of profitability which in turn is driven by sales in 1992 of $25 billion, only slightly less than Argentinas recent government budget.5 Jihad vs. McWorld The labels are unlikely to clarify the situation, however, since they reveal (to take just one example) that Chrysler Corporations Dodge Stealth is built by Mit- subishi in Nagoya, Japan, while Mitsubishis Eclipse RS is built in Normal, Illinois, and features Chrysler engines.8 Jihad vs. McWorld The bleak prospects of many sub-Saharan countries is epitomized by Ghana. Jihad vs. McWorld Science and technology, like Prometheus, cannot be bounded: not by frontiers, not by national sovereignty They are made possible by cooperation and they com- mand interdependence. Jihad vs. McWorld The worlds nations, having exhausted their natural bounty one by one, may still fmd a way to survive on the wings of artifice, but they will do so interdependently and together: globally or not at all. Jihad vs. McWorld Petroleum: The Same Old Story, Only Worse MANY MINERAL RESOURCES can be recycled or replaced by techno- logical surrogates, but energy resourcesabove all fossil fuelson the scale they are currently being consumed around the globe surely cannot. Jihad vs. McWorld Yet all of these resources together have made only a small dent in world petroleum consumptionconsiderably less than the dent made by the oil crises and recessions of the seventies and eighties.8 Jihad vs. McWorld If prices stay low, experts at the Energy Information Administration predict that domestic production may fall to about 6 million barrels per day by 2010, while consumption could rise to nearly 24 mfflion barrels per day, a deficit of 17 or i8 million barrels that could add up to a depen- dency on imports of nearly 75 percent of consumption by 2010. Jihad vs. McWorld Add it up: better than three-fifths of the worlds current oil production (and almost 93 percent of its potential production reserves) are controlled by the nations least likely to be at home in McWorld and most likely to be afflicted with political, social, and thus economic instability28 The results are equally disconcerting when we rate energy exporters in the high- and moderate-risk categories on a democracy scale. Jihad vs. McWorld Even as we secure the macropeace through trade, treaties, law, cooperation, and common force, the microwars occasioned by Jihads fractious parochialisms become of ever greater global significance. Jihad vs. McWorld 3 The Industrial Sector and the Rise of the East H OW DIFFERENT IS the story when we move from the domain of dation of any national economy? Manufactured durable goods con- raw resources to manufactured goodssupposedly the foun- stitute the traditional industrial sector by which the rise of capitalism has generally been measured. Jihad vs. McWorld The ~American Century celebrated by L~fs Henry Luce in 1941 ended without ceremony sometime in the 1970S when America crossed the midway point on its sad journey from being the worlds largest creditor nation to being its largest debtor nation and when Europe and Japan, well recovered from the war, began to eat away at Americas leadership in automobile, home appliance, electronics, an\d comput~r manufacturing. Jihad vs. McWorld This unprecedented strategic hegemony rested almost entirely on the American industrial economy as it emerged from World War ITan economy that was driven by the largest and most productive manufacturing and banking companies in the world.6 Jihad vs. McWorld 4 From Hard Goods to Soft Goods W HILE MAKING AND selling goods is still the dominant form of the goods are increasingly associated with or defmed by symbolic economic activity in the international markets of McWorld, interactions that belong to the service sector in its postmodern, virtual economy manifestations. Jihad vs. McWorld Whereas the old econ- omy, mirroring hard power, dealt in hard goods aimed at the body, the 6o . Jihad vs. McWorld To the world, America offers an incoherent and contradictory but seductive style that is less democratic than physical culture: youth- ful, rich urban, austere cowboy, Hollywood glamorous, Garden of Eden unbounded, goodwilled to a fault, socially aware, politically correct, mall pervaded, and, ironically, often dominated by images of black ghetto lifeblack, however, as in hip and cool rather than in crime-ridden and squalid, baaaad but not bad. Jihad vs. McWorld It has been speculated that video-game players acquire hand-eye skills critical to certain professionsfighter pilots, for example, or laboratory technicians handling dangerous materials by remote control; it has also been speculated that players may develop diminished capacities in other domains such as imagi- nation or human sympathy. Jihad vs. McWorld Seen from the perspective of ~r1~5 intra-American competition, this shift from products to services mirrors an economy-wide trend and From Soft Goods to Service 75 corrects the impression given by high-tech manufacturing that Amer- ica is in a steep decline. Jihad vs. McWorld By 1980, the U.S. share had fallen to ~6 percent while Japans share had risen to 40 percent. Jihad vs. McWorld It includes commercial banks where Japan has long since seized the advantage from America and Europe as well as entertainment companies where American global leadership is actually growing and seems secure well into the next century Examining the service sector affords an oppor~unity to make good on my rhetorical amalgamation of McDonalds, Macintosh, and MTVfast food, computer software, and videoby showing how in this sector McWorld manufactures its own specially tailored twenty-first-century videology When McDonalds sells Dances with Wolves and 3urcssic Park videos and sundry movie tie-ins in a vague celebration of multiculturalism or environmentalism or extinct rep- tile preservation, or hires Michael Jordan to link its products to celebrity sport, simple service to the body, I have suggested, is dis- placed by complex service to the soul. Jihad vs. McWorld McWorld is a product above all of popular culture driven by expansionist commerce. Jihad vs. McWorld By the measure of training, income,,prospects, and self-worth, a Burger King cook hand-grilling mass-produced preformed frozen meat patties has a good deal more in common with a sweatshop seamstress machine-stitching cheap frocks than she does with a computer pro- From Soft Goods to Service 79 grammer developing virtual reality arcade games, even though the cook and the programmer are in the service sector while the seam- stress is in the manufacturing sector. Jihad vs. McWorld Distinguished by their varying constituencies, my three candidates for subservice sectors are: The traditional service sector, comprising those who serve people directly with traditional food, transportation, health, and housing services, including food preparers and servers, hoteliers and their helpers, airline pilots and train conductors, doctors and social workers, and all others who deliver services directly to the individual human bo4y; The systems facilitation sector, comprising those who serve the infrastructurethe political, economic, and social systems that make modern society possible; these include lawyers, accountants, economists, bankers, insurance people, computer operators, tele- phone operators, policy specialists, and anyone else who facilitates the operation and interaction of our national and global systems, all those who serve the corporate body; and The new information sector, what I will dub the infotain- ment telesector, comprising those who create and control the world of signs and symbols through which all information, communica- tion, and entertainment are mediated, including wordsmiths and image-spinners like advertisers, moviemakers, journalists, intellectu- als, writers, and even computer programmers, as well asto the degree they are in the sign/image business alsoteachers, preach- ers, politicians and pundits, and others who minister to the individual human and collective corporate soul. Jihad vs. McWorld Ted Turner and Jane Fonda are this new ages model couple, while creators like Disney CEO Michael Eisner and filmmaker Steven Spielberg and superagent Michael Ovitz and communications czar Michael Malone are its true captains of industry What they control are not the artifacts (the cassette tapes or bound manuscripts or arcade game machines or celluloid that may belong to diverse American or Japanese multinationals) but the actual words and pictures and sounds and tastes that make up the ideational/affective realm by which our physical world of material things is interpreted, controlled, and directed. Jihad vs. McWorld These questions suggest that, after looking at the four distinctive elements of film, television, books, and theme parks and how they From Soft Goods to Service 87 have become at once both internationalized and Americanized, we will need to take notice of the new merger and acquisitions frenzy in the information sectora vertical integration frenzy in the name of free choice and free markets that could result in a monopoly more perilous to liberty than any dreamed of by mineral and durable goods megamonopolists like John Rockefeller, Sr., or Andrew Carnegie.7 Jihad vs. McWorld American filmmakers conveniently conclude that the market has spoken; competitors fear they have been silenced by money and mar- ket muscle and the way in which markets and money privilege uni- versal (read: bad) taste. Jihad vs. McWorld And so Michel Ciment complains in vain about the moronic/sophomoric movies churned out by Hollywood for their teenage audiences and tossed like garbage on hundreds of French screens in the dry summer season,28 while European auteurs journey to Hollywood to get rich and famous.29 Jihad vs. McWorld Hollywood is McWorlds storyteller; and it inculcates secularism, passivity consumerism, vicariousness, impulse buying, and an accelerated pace of life, not as a result of its overt themes and explicit story-lines but by virtue of what Hollywood is and how its products are consumed. Jihad vs. McWorld Stories that pass through the magic lantern and reappear on a movie or television screen are conditioned by their own particular media context. Jihad vs. McWorld Disney movies and Disneyland are tied together by gossamer threads that weave mythic stories around cartoon identities that seem to celebrate multiculturalism even as they eradicate real difference; seem to turn active engagement into a new kind of virtual spectator sport; seem to transmute what is sup- posed to be sharp curiosity into blunt and reactive consumption. Jihad vs. McWorld I 102 THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD The Anglophiia that characterizes so much of American high culture is reciprocated by the British in low culture. Jihad vs. McWorld The communications firms that serve Asia have not been seduced into diversification by the daunting prospects of trying to fmd appropriate programs for India and China. Jihad vs. McWorld He might seem a threat in China, whereas in Singaporesatellite dishes are forbidden (but manufactured by the army and widely used). Jihad vs. McWorld Meanwhile, though mauled by Viacom, QVC has continued to mall television. Jihad vs. McWorld It is certainly good for the kind of choice entailed by consumption; but whether it is of any use to civic liberty is quite another question. Jihad vs. McWorld It is hard to know exactly what, beyond simple consump- tion, the impact of selling ambience by promoting rock music will be either in America or on the hundred cultures whose youth are now tuned in to it. Jihad vs. McWorld The common currency of sex and violence may be minted by an uncoerced (if arduously manipulated) private mar- ket, but it depreciates as quickly as greenbacks minted by a state that has gone off the gold standard. Jihad vs. McWorld 8 Teleliterature and the Theme Parking of McWorld A s SURVIVOR5 OF aging print technologies, books are relics of a able currency and a faltering bulwark against the new world of slowly vanishing culture of the worddemocracys indispens- images and pictures flashed across screens at a speed that thwarts all deliberation. Jihad vs. McWorld Television and computers are fast, fast, faster, and thus by definition hostile to the ponderous pace of careful deliberation upon which all public con- versation and decision making on behalf of the common good is premised. Jihad vs. McWorld Bagdikian notes that after World War II, 8o percent of American newspapers were independent; by 1989, 8o percent were owned by chains. Jihad vs. McWorld In ig8i, twenty corporations controlled over half of the nations eleven thousand magazines; by ig88 those twenty corporations had become three.3 Jihad vs. McWorld Bagdikians dominant twenty-three corporations: i. Jihad vs. McWorld General Electric (television) ~. Jihad vs. McWorld Mc World as a Theme Park THERE IS NO better emblem of the transformation of reality by commerce and the displacement of the actively imaginative reader by the passively receptive spectator than the commercial theme parks that increasingly dot our landscape. Jihad vs. McWorld Switch (in Eastern coun- tries) from rice or vegetables to meat and increase fat intake, medical costs, and the pressure on agriculture (growing grain to feed cattle that go into the beef we eat is radically inefficient, using up to ten times more grain than is consumed by humans who make grain their diet). Jihad vs. McWorld If any institution is irreducibly public by its very defmition, it is government. Jihad vs. McWorld All three divisions of Disney derive inspiration from a single set of cartoon images spun out in endless variations by an Imagineering Department responsible for redefining our reality. Jihad vs. McWorld Each of the companies in play already was involved in smaller acquisitions and mergers, which accounts for the variety of entities owned by what is technically a movie studio like Paramount. Jihad vs. McWorld billion hostile bid for Time, it already had added to its extensive film and video properties the publisher Simon & Schuster (itself a pub- lishing conglomerate including Prentice-Hall), as well as Madison Square Garden along with the basketball and h~key teams that play there (the Knicks and Rangers now spun off by new owner Viacom to still another infotainment company, Chuck Dolans Cablevision Systems, with financial backing from ITT). Jihad vs. McWorld By the time Paramount was in play at the end of 1993, by then itself the target of a bidding battle between friendly (and ultimately victorious) suitor Viacom and unfriendly raider QVC, its properties also included the Trans-Lux Theater Corpora- tion, USA network, Famous Music Corporation, the Miss Universe organization, and Paramount Theme Parks. Jihad vs. McWorld Diller went on to Fox where he established the Fox Television Network and prospered until Fox was purchased by Rupert Murdoch in 1992. Jihad vs. McWorld Personal ambition enhanced by communications syn- ergy yielded a still higher synergy that, with the help of court deci- sions critical of Paramounts favoritism toward Viacom, nearly enabled Barry Duller to complete the unfriendly deal that would have let him annex the last major independent studio save Disney. Jihad vs. McWorld QVC, as the hostile would-be buyer of Paramount, is itself then owned not only by Barry Difier himself (12.6 Jihad vs. McWorld percent) but also by John C. Malone (via Malones Liberty Media, which owns 22.2 Jihad vs. McWorld Governments have become the targets of alienated and disaffected clients and are not likely to be regarded as the instruments by which citizens can tame wild capitalism for some time. Jihad vs. McWorld 150 THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD And SO the original question reappears: in a world where the nation-state and its democratic institutions are being fractured and weakened by the divisive forces of Jihad at the same moment they are being rendered antiquated and superfluous by the integrating forces of McWorld, how is democracy to survive? Where on the vaunted information highway are the roads that will lead to justice or the pipes that will convey the vox populi? Now that they have dis- mantled the empire of despots and statist political ideologies, includ- ing democracy, how can communities defend their common goods against the empire of profits and cultural monopoly? Which demo- cratic ideology can contend with the pretense to choice of free markets so that we can regain the power to choose public goods in common and thereby free ourselves from the inadvertent public con- sequences of all the private market choices thaf masquerade as the whole of freedom? Is deliberative public debate on such questions even possible where McWorlds communication systems secret pref- erences that, without any discussion at all, modify public attitudes and precipitate private behaviors? Jihad vs. McWorld More than a hundred years ago, Marx had observed that the breaking of feudal bonds by modern capitalism had decisively frag- mented traditional community He spoke of the sundering of all bonds and prophesied ongoing cultural meltdown: ~All that is solid, he warned, melts into ait9 A h~Jf century later modernist anxi- eties had become popularized, so that one of American playwright William Saroyans characters could repeat over and over again in the Jihad vs. Mc World orjihad via Mc World? 163 prewar stage classic The Time of Your 14[e, no foundation, all the way down the line, and expect full sympathy from audiences already exasperated by modernity even before it had produced the Holo- caust and the atomic bomb. Jihad vs. McWorld Rousseaus acerb portrait of eighteenth-century capital cities cap- tures the visceral force of the parochial critique: In a big city, thun- ders Rousseau, full of scheming, idle people without religion or principle, whose imagination, depraved by sloth, inactivity, the love of pleasure, and great needs, engenders only monsters and inspires only crimes. Jihad vs. McWorld When in World War lIthe French national center collapsed and Paris and the north were occupied by the army of the Third Reich, it was the periphery under the collaborationist Vichy regime that took on the tasks of conservator for France, redefining its spirit along the way. Jihad vs. McWorld Others see in its work a subtle strategy of national decon- struction by which the European w~ole nurtures the subnational frag- ments, all the better to unercut the resistance to wholeness on the part Jihad Within Mc World: The Democracies of the nation-states. Jihad vs. McWorld Acadians have lived successfully along the shores of the Gulf of Saint Lawrence for nearly four hundred years, and survived their dispersal by the English following the defeat of France by English armies in North America in 1763 (when many Acadians found their way to New Orleans where, as Cajuns, they established another sanctuary). Jihad vs. McWorld The new nationalists are not daunted by the official shame associ- ated with taking Germany too seriously, dead seriously. Jihad vs. McWorld So the skinhead punk rockers offer a crude but searingly frank version of views framed more diplomatically by Franz Schoenhubers far right-wing Republican Party, singing This state is ashamed of German history. Jihad vs. McWorld Chinas dream, says a Western diplomat in China, is to become another Singapore, where the attraction is that it has achieved Western living standards without being infected by Western political standards.2 Jihad vs. McWorld i86 THE OLD WORLD OF JIHAD China specialist Thomas B. Gold is probably right to believe that the Communist Party is going to concentrate on the things it thinks it can do bestpresumably political control, media, educationand allow the economy to function by some of its own logic.6 Jihad vs. McWorld Vietnam is still governed by a hegemonic Com- munist Party, but also sports a five-star Hilton Hotel and seven golf courses to which its ranking members receive free memberships. Jihad vs. McWorld The triple threat of secession by remote regions, clan feuds at the village level, and relative economic inde- pendence in the prospering provinces can onlj~ake the central gov- ernment exceedingly anxiouswhether or not it uses the language of Jihad to describe its potential adversaries. Jihad vs. McWorld Certainly China has been more successful in containing both internal Jihad and ~xterna1 McWorld than, say, Sri Lanka, where the government of what was once the island paradise of Ceylon has been kept busy by a revolt of ethnic Tamils in the north (the so-called China and the Pacific Rim i9i Liberation Tigers) and by an extremist counter-Jihad among its own Sinhalese majority;7 or Indonesia, a simmering Asian Yugoslavia where 350 distinct ethnic groups, most with their own language, occupy thirteen thousand islands in an archipelago held together pri- marily by the military force of an authoritarian regime under the command of its founder, Suharto.8 Jihad vs. McWorld It already manufactures small commuter planes and helicopters, and is hoping to leapfrog other industrialized nations by stepping smartly into twenty-first-century high-technology domains. Jihad vs. McWorld Demography and topography favor frag- mentation so that for Suharto the struggle is to hold the parts together by economic progress and military force. Jihad vs. McWorld Indeed, the more communitarian, consensual, even familial character of Japanese corporate style has been imitated in the West by bemused admirers of the Japanese economic miracle that once was. Jihad vs. McWorld Okinawa, for example, annexed by Japan in 1879 and returned to it by the United States (who had taken it in World War II) in 1972, has aroused anxieties in Japan with its attempts at reviving the Old- nawan language and the practice of local customs. Jihad vs. McWorld If domination by a mafia bureaucracy offered a return to the relative order enjoyed by many under the Communist rule, many would embrace it.6 Jihad vs. McWorld Here was the only Communist nation to be admired at least a little by left democrats and idealists in tF~ West, a state brave enough to reject Stalin, imaginative~ enough to federalize its socialist system and empower its workers, resourceful enough to bring its hostile ethnic fragments to heel, prudent enough to forge a pluralist army strong Jihad Within Mc World: Transitional Democracies and loyal to Yugoslavia. Jihad vs. McWorld Czarist Russia actually dispatched volunteers in 1877 to support the uprising of Serbs and Montenegrins against the Turks, and (to oversimplifi,) Ser- bia returned the favor in 1914 by dragging Russia into World War I in the cause of its independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Jihad vs. McWorld Serbia today justifies its ethnic outrages in the region by appeal to anti-Vatican and anti-German sentiments and sulks about being betrayed by Russia (though a group of Russian volunteers called the Czars Wolves were involved in the Serbia campaign in Bosnia). Jihad vs. McWorld A quick glance at the absurdist maps drawn by desperate would-be peace- keepers trying to stay out of the conflagration without completely surrendering to brute force will show just how far back poor Yugoslavia has fallen into a brutal and fractious if also largely imag- inary past. Jihad vs. McWorld In the north- western Transylvania region, a mifiion and a half Hungarian speak- ers (of a total Romanian population of 23 million) represent a potential army in Csurkas campaign for -a greater Hungary Although they have recently been appeased by new laws permitting them to use their own language, they still are called Mongolian Van- dals by nationalist Romanians.8 Jihad vs. McWorld In the western Ukraine, Antonescus minions buried children alive to save bullets and fmally drew the ire of jihad Within Mc World: Transitional Democracies 203 Adolph Eichmann [sic], who was appalled by the inefficient and clumsy brutality of the Romanian camps.22 Jihad vs. McWorld Late in the war, with the writing on the wall, Antonescu changed his stripes, but not soon enough to avoid execution by the Russians in 1946. Jihad vs. McWorld But today his reputation has been refurbished (he appears as the great Patriot), while Jews are again accused of betraying Romanian national inter- ests by siding with the Soviets during the Holocaust and thus made responsible for precipitating their own liquidation! Jihad vs. McWorld For, although evident than in the Islamic world, where the idea of Jihad has it is clear that Islam is a complex religion that by no means is syn- onymous with Jihad, it is relatively inhospitable to democracy and that inhospitality in turn nurtures conditions favorable to parochial- ism, antimodernism, exclusiveness, and hostility to othersthe characteristics that constitute what I have called Jihad. Jihad vs. McWorld Nevertheless, Jihad is an Islamic term and is given its animating power by its association not just with fun- damentalism in general but with Islamic fundamentalism in particu- lar and with the armed struggles groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad have engaged in. Jihad vs. McWorld Not the American Jihad promulgated by the media focused on the World Trade Center bombers or on Arab-American supporters of Hamasthe Ameri- can Jihad about which Stephen Barboza wrote his recent book.6 Jihad vs. McWorld The American Jihad that counts is rather the antiestablishmentarian fundamentalism of the Christian Right, tcie Jihad of profoundly antimodern fundamentalist Protestants who rebel against the culture of disbelief generated by the McWorld that is in their midst;7 the McWorld they unearth on their prime-time television programming and rebury on their talk-radio rants; and in the secular public square where despised liberal politicians undermine their belief systems with textbooks that preach evolution and schools that bar prayer. Jihad vs. McWorld We have a biblical duty we are called by God, to conquer this coun- try9 These Christian soldiers bring to their ardent campaign against time and the modern world all the indignation, all the impa- tience with moral slackness, all the purifying hatred, of the zealots in Teheran and Cairo. Jihad vs. McWorld Groups like Gospel Gangstas and A-i S.WI.ET. press drive-by shootings into the service of Jesus: In this scrap the Word of Gods my A-K Pointed at your Dome Cause my aim is strazght, hey... Jihad vs. McWorld Even responsible American firms like Levi Strauss and Com- pany, which has developed voluntary Global Sourcing Guidelines for its overseas facilities, are driven by competition and profits to seek cheap labor markets, where exploitation is endemic and regulation mainly a public relations afterthought.5 Jihad vs. McWorld The $ii billion in bilateral assistance promised by Western nations in 1993 and 1994 is also aimed at helping Western exporters while the $4.5 Jihad vs. McWorld billion in real aid promised by international organizations has been forthcoming only in dribs and drabsas has been the case throughout Eastern Europe, where Western promises have yet to pay off.2 Jihad vs. McWorld In practice, however, a large percentage of the new class that makes up the second sector of the poor, the indigent, and the unemployed are flotsam and jetsam on the tides of privatization: workers who have been sloughed off by a system that is more profitable to its new pri- vate owners without them. Jihad vs. McWorld In the milestone elections held at the end of 1993, the 252 JIHAD VS. MCWORLD electorate expressed its frustration with the economy first of all by staying away in droves: over half did not vote at all, achieving in their first outing a dismal participation rate it took America two centuries to achieve. Jihad vs. McWorld Those who did vote vented their resentments by pum- meling Yeltsins reform parts Russias Choice, for which Yeltsin pru- dently declined to campaign and which received only 15 percent of votes cast. Jihad vs. McWorld The damage wrought by the frenzied transition to capitalism is clear in the body politic, but still more obvious in the vulnerability of Capitalism vs. Democracy in Russia 253 the actual Russian body. Jihad vs. McWorld Nationalist folk songs are regularly pushed off the radio by Western rock music, and not even native Russian rock musicians can with- stand the onslaught. Jihad vs. McWorld There are other important factors, including the emerging outline of a new civil society and civic infrastructure focusing on associations that belong neither to the state nor to the marketplace (see the list, page 235); a young professional class of academics, lawyers, and civic professionals ded- 258 JIHAD VS. MCWORLD icated to civil society and the rule of law; a growing interest in a third sector that cannot be folded into capitalism or state social- ism; a concern for constitutional issues that go beyond politics; and a growing sense of the need to support the legislature (even when it is in the wrong hands) against the arbitrary prerogatives of the exec- utive (even when it is occupied by Westernizing market enthusiasts). Jihad vs. McWorld i8 The Colonization of East Germany by McWorld I N THE MONTHS preceding the demolition of the Wall in Berlin as the wall symbolized, a surprising collection of East German intellec- well as the abrupt collapse of the government whose despotism tuals, students, religious leaders, and even some workerssome but by no means all of them dissidentscollaborated to establish a loose opposition group to the crumbling rule of the German Democratic Republic called J~Teues Forum. Jihad vs. McWorld Under its new civic forum name, the group not only led (though by no means con- The Colonization of East Germany by Mc World 261 stituted by itself) a popular movement that did not so much over- throw the East German Communist regime as orchestrate its spon- taneous collapse. Jihad vs. McWorld As has happenect elsewhere in the land of McWorld where the expansion~ of the private sector has drained political sup- port for the public sector, public monies are not available for projects The Colonization of East Germany by Mc World 265 of real reunification. Jihad vs. McWorld Smug westerners boast they can spot a for- mer East German just by his or her gait, and are buying up old two- cycle Trabent cars that look like toys for their nostalgia collections.4 Jihad vs. McWorld A culture of advertising, software, Hollywood movies, MT\~ theme parks, and shopping malls hooped together by the virtual nexus of the information superhighway closes down free spaces. Jihad vs. McWorld For democracy rests on civil society and citizenship, and while the new telecommunications technologies are not necessarily averse to either, they produce neither unless directed by citizens already living in and dedicated to a civil society A Global Civil Society? Jihad vs. McWorld Sovereignty is indeed in a twilight, condemned to a shadow world by governments myriad postmodern detractorsex-Communist and postindustrialist alike. Jihad vs. McWorld Moreover, it took the young democratic republic another seventy-five years and a bloody civil war to confront the issues of slavery and state sovereignty left unresolved by the 1789 constitution.6 Jihad vs. McWorld But this wifi happen only if markets are not left to determine how these tech- nologies will be developed and deployed, and if global communica- tion is disciplined by prudent deliberation and civility How civil society can be forged in an international environment is an extraor- dinary challenge. Jihad vs. McWorld India has just elected a Parliament dominated by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party It also has its first Hindu nationalist Prime Minister in history (Atal Bihari Vajpayee) who, amidst fears of Hindi extremism, avows that his favorite movie is Walt Disneys The Lion King. Jihad vs. McWorld Democracy has been unsettled in these countries by the deep disillusion that has followed the confla- tion of markets and liberty giving the words of Schwab and Smadja their resonance. Jihad vs. McWorld The standard here is not absolute justice; it asks only that if a nation consumes more than its fair share by population, it justify that usage by its economic productivity 304 APPENDIX A JEDI TABLE 2. Jihad vs. McWorld Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 1992), although he is far less pleased by his prognosis in his book than he seemed in the original National Interest essay that occasioned all the con- troversy; and Walter B. Wriston, Twilight of Sovereignty (New York: Scrib- ners, 1992). Jihad vs. McWorld Yet 20 percent of the aircraft will be built by Japanese firms in Japan (Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Fuji Heavy Industries), engines will come from Rolls- Royce (as well as two American companies), wing flaps are to be manu- 316 Jiotes for Pages 2526 factured by Alenia in Italy, Brazils Embraer will make the fin and wingtip assemblies, while literally hundreds of other companies in Korea, Singapore, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere will be involved in smaller ways. Jihad vs. McWorld penetrate markets ever since accommodating the Nazis (who were claim- ing Coke was a Jewish-American company because it sold Kosher- stamped bottles) by passing out samples at Hitler Youth rallies, and accommodating Stalin by decaramelizing White Coke and shipping fifty cases in clear bottles with red-star-embossed white caps for his approval. Jihad vs. McWorld By 1975, however; television Jsf otes for Pages 93~~ 329 and rising prices had driven ticket sales down to only 128 million, while the number of screens available had been reduced to around thirty-two hun- dred. Jihad vs. McWorld (All figures are from information provided by the Statis- tical Department of the Spitzenorganisation der Filmwirtschaft e.V Jihad vs. McWorld According to Jon Wieners account in The Yation, Foner had complained about the editing and context of the speech delivered by the Lincoln robot at Disneys Anaheim Hall of Presidents, a speech that Jvotes for Pages 136145 339 omitted any reference to slavery. Jihad vs. McWorld Thus the U.S. Business and Industrial Council is fighting the WTO provi- sions of GATT, which it fears is an official surrender by the United States to foreign governments. Jihad vs. McWorld Quoted by Vance Packard in his early classic on consumption, The Waste Makers (New York: David McKay, 1960), and cited again by Alan Durning in his excellent study for the Woridwatch Institute called How Much Is Enough: The Consumer Society and the Future of Earth (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), pp. 2122. Jihad vs. McWorld The attempt by the more numerous but weaker developing nations in 1974 to institute a new international economic order through U.N. Res- olution 3201 was made a mockery of by the refusal of powerful First World 356 JVotesforPages226229 nations to take an interest. Jihad vs. McWorld Article 24/I of the Basic Law discussing the power of integration, states that the Federation may by legislation transfer sovereign powers to inter- JfotesforPages23o235 357 national institutions. Jihad vs. McWorld It was replaced by a new Europe Article in 1992. Jihad vs. McWorld A cartoon by Margulies hits the mark when it depicts one Solidarity veteran standing in front of a Warsaw market after the 1990 elections in which Solidarity won overwhelmingly, and saying to another: Ive had it with bread lines, food shortages, and scarce housing... Jihad vs. McWorld Its time we got rid of this rotten government, only to be reminded by his comrade, WE ARE the government! Jihad vs. McWorld U domination by a mafia bureaucracy offered a return to the relative order enjoyed by many under the communist rule, many would JVotes for Pages 25 72 63 365 embrace it. Jihad vs. McWorld See also international- Habibie, B. J., 9, images: and advertising, 6163, 67, 69 Hachette, 12627 ization; spec~fic topic imperialism, 167 Glowacki, Janusz, 254 Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 124, 126 India, i8, 184, 191; advertising in, hard technology, 72, 7375 Gluck, Fred, 49 62; and confederalism, 289; and HarperColliris Publishers, 103, 114, 427 Goizueta, Roberto C., 69 economic issues, 35, 55; infotain- Gold, Thomas B., i86 hate groups, 214 ment in, 90, 94, 103, 405, io8; and Goodyear Tire and Rubber, 57 Hauser Communications, 142 resources, 43, 44, 47, 48 Havel, Vaclav, 275 Gore, Al, 113, 149 Indonesia, 70, 90, 91, i8~, 187, 191 Havemann, Robert, 261 Gouiran, Gerard, 17475 industrialism, 5058 government: and alienation of citi- Hayek, Friedrich, 236 infantilism, 93 zens, 280; characteristics of, 276; Hazard, Paul, i~g infomercials, 6465, 8~86, 146 Hearst, 124 and education, ii~ fundamental- information superhighway: access istss views of, 214; intervention by, Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 6 to, 448; aims of, iooIoi; and con- 7, 2829, 31, 90, 96, 98; and Heinkman, Jack, 224 glomerates, 273; and democracy, Henzler, Herbert, i~g monopolies, 282; and private sec- iso; and hard goods-service sector tor, 28!; Jihad vs. McWorld See also by, 1o3; and Gingrich, i~g; global publishers/publishing; spec~/ic 16162; and democracy, 184; and influence of, 114, 115; and homo- fundamentalist religions, 20915; newspaper or publisher geneity of television, 1034; and and Jihad and McWorld, 1112, Nextel, 143 mergers, 146; as a personality, 145. Jihad vs. McWorld See Germany out by; 8~, 104, 121, 12526, 143, Turner Broadcasting System, 125, 14647, 148 Western European Language Vidal, Gore, 112 Bureau, 172 141, 142, 147 Turner; Ted, 8i, i~ video games, 74, 187 Westernization/Americanization, TVGuzde, 103, 114. Jihad vs. McWorld The assumption that Afghanistan is primarily a tribally organized society is a result of both overgeneralization and confusion between the system of agnatic descent for organizing social relations and tribe 5 M. NAZIF SHAHRANI as a unit of military and political mobilization in the current conflict. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan For Western researchers the tendency to equate the society of Afghanistan with that of the Pashtuns is further encouraged by the fact that there were many published accounts on the Pashtuns of the British-Indian North-West Frontier. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan During this century a few rebellious Pashtun tribes have been suppressed, disarmed by the government, and forcibly relocated in the north (see Katz in this volume). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Most of the non-Pashtun popu- lation, particularly in the northern, western, and central parts of the country, was disarmed by the government in the 1890s and again after the 1929 civil war. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan (The most obvious instance of this kind of rural recalcitrance in this volume is presented by Tavakolian on the Sheikhanzai Pashtun in western Afghanistan.) Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Furthermore, it is important to note that from 1929 to 1975 all major rebellions against the government were instigated entirely by the Pashtun. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan On the whole, their attitude toward the state has been ambivalent, characterized by neither active support nor active hostility. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan that would lead to the creation of a new and just democratic society in Afghanistan, where the exploitation of man by man, hunger, poverty, unemployment and illiteracy would be wiped out forever (Muradov 1981: 180). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan 8] had been the subjects of repeated efforts at reform by previous governments dating back to the 1880sand the efforts had shown little success [see also N. Tapper, N. Dupree, and L. Dupree in this volume].) Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan *LO*JJS Dupree (1973: 147, chart 11) provides the following average estimates (excluding Shiburghan province) of the distribution of agricultural land by form of tenure in the country in 1963: sharecropped13.8 Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan This figure seems negligible by comparison to Glukhodeds. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan the deficit of land in reaching the aim proclaimed by the reform was estimated at 230,000 to 350,000 hectares, re- calculated on the first group basis. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In actual fact, this deficit was considerably greater. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Secondly, the very classifi- cation of lands used for dividing them into equal plots, although it made it possible to compare lands varying in quality, was by no means always suitable for their mass distribution in small plots. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan It can hardly be considered feasible to create a peasant holding by granting a formerly landless peasant a 5 to 6-hectare plot of dry land of the sixth or seventh group, whose development is extremely difficult. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Critical of the governments land reform policies, Glukhoded says, The implementation of this principle [equalized land distribution] is not justified by any theoretical considerations or practical experience (1981: 240). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan He further states that such a course of transformations in the [Afghan] village is by no means similar to the solution of the agrarian question even within the framework of democratic transfor- mations (1981: 243). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In addition to land confiscation and redistribution, the agrarian reform envisaged the creation of large-scale mechanized state farms (presumably in the 13 million ha owned by the state) and various types of cooperatives. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Mukherjee reports that by the summer of 1981 some 1,210 agricultural cooperatives with 183,000 peasant mem- bers, 9 artisan cooperatives with 10,000 members, and 4 consumer 20 cooperatives had been formed, successfully making [peasants] more and more homogeneous as a class entity (1981: 19). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan ulation (see L. Dupree, Beattie, Shahrani, Keiser, and Katz in this volume). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan .. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan 26 MARXIST REVOLUTION AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE Journalists and Western commentators generally present the Afghan conflict essentially as a religious war waged by traditional re- ligious leaders and fundamentalist mullahs (learned men) and their faithful horde of tribal and rural followers against the invading Soviet forces and the urban-based atheist Khalq-Parcham government. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan West- ern writers use the same Islamic terms employed by Afghan resistance groups to identify the resistance effort and its participantsjihad and mujahidin (holy war and freedom fighters). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Clearly such ob- servers have disregarded a large body of mujahidin publications con- cerning the nature of jihad.t Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Rudolph Peters states the following: Western powers often justified their colonial expansion by the idea of a mission civilisatrie; it served their interests if Moslem society was depicted as backward and Islam as a religion of bloodthirsty, lecherous fanatics. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan (On the Soviet policy toward Islam in the Soviet Union, see Bennigsen and Lemercier.Quelquejay Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Furthermore, the imitation of Western lifestyles and ideas was often accompanied by direct or indirect attacks on Islam (see Rodinson 1979). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Many local magnates (ashkhasi sarshinas or ashkhasi namdar) were appointed or elected by the court to the two nomi- nal houses of parliament, Majlis.i Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan the Helmand and Nangarhar Valleys projects and Kandahar M. NAZIF SHAHRANI The factor which irrevocably influenced the policies and ulti- In 1956 the Soviet Union offered substantial amounts of military By the mid 1950s the monarchy launched a program for nation- To accomplish its goals the government needed the help of its 36 International Airport]. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Most of the projects were selected by non- economic criteria and did not pass the necessary feasibility tests (Zekrya 1976: 212-13). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Only a very small segment of the populationprimarily government officials, army officers, and the urban merchant class, who were also well represented in the bureaucracybenefited economically. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The majority of rural people and urban poor were not affected by the plans or were influenced negatively. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By the mid-1970s more than 800,000 Afghan youth were attending some 4,000 schools and over 600,000 had completed some formal education (see Chu et al. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan For the fortunate few who had already joined the lower ranks of the civil and military services, the prospects for job mobility within an already top-heavy bureaucracy largely manned by the old official elite seemed bleak. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Paradoxically, at a time when the Musahiban rulers had achieved their long-sought goal of firmly controlling traditional political forces, the educated Afghans who had been trained by the regime to broaden its base of support were beginning to pose a strong political challenge. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan MARXIST REVOLUTION AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE Under constant pressure from the government, Muslim Youth Long considered by Islamic-minded youth to be a friend of the Like the Muslim Youth movement, many of Daouds other polit- The assumption of power by the Khalq-Parcham touched off the 41 M. NAZIF SHAHRANI THE ARMED RESISTANCE: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS Within a few months of assuming power, the Khalq-Parcham party faced steadily growing armed opposition in many urban as well as rural areas. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Mujahidin leaders who emphasize the Islamic concept of umma, a community and brotherhood of all Muslims, largely consider ethnicityanon-issue. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Such unchanging inner necessities and the way Islam has addressed them are under- scored by Rabbani: First I should explain a common misunderstanding. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The departure of the mujahidin from the familiar leadership pattern of other liberation movements is considered by many Western researchers to be a sign of weakness and evidence of the chaos they believe traditionally reigned in Afghanistan (see for example Azoy 1982, N. Newell and R. Newell 1981, and Chaliand 1982). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Parcham had been considered by many as the most pro-Soviet of the leftist parties; military officers (even those trained in the USSR) tended to be more nationalist than social- ist, more pro-Afghan than pro-Soviet, so they usually gravitated to Khalq. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Corruption, tyranny, and plunder had been the way of life in the fake republic of Daoud* The DRA did not invent repression and torture in Afghanistan; however, although previous regimes could not claim high ratings in human rights, the DRA went far beyond the allowable bounds of cultural deviance by Afghan standards. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan 65 LOUIS DUPREE REVOLTS Except for sporadic attacks from Pakistan by the Hizb-i Islami (Islamic Party), a dissident Muslim fundamentalist group led by Engineer Gulbudin Hikmatyar, most of the opposition was quiet in Afghanistan from the April coup until late August-early September 1978. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan MARXIST REGIMES AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE The DRA government responded to tribal threats by requesting Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, leader of one of the numerous Afghan The special relationship had never been put into writing or REFUGEES AND RUSSIANS Fundamentally the Soviets had two choices regarding Afghani- *While foreign intervention is not the focus here, it is worth noting that 69 they would take such a hazardous step (L. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan They were consi ere by NATO an e rest of the world as part of the Soviet bloc c jn members of the Warsaw Pact, but Afghanistan was not. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Soviet statistics alone indicate that by 2000 A.D. the total population of the USSR will be 53 percent non-Russian. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The Soviets reacted by shipping most of the Muslim troops back to Central Asia by the end of February 1980. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By April 1979 Communist forces had been totally repulsed from eastern Nuristan; six months later most of the rest of Kunar province was free of Communist control. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Although there are ethnographically *I conducted field research with the Kom in 1967-69 and 1973-74, partially aided by grants from the South Asia Program of Cornell University, the Wenner- 80 ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN EASTERN NURISTAN interesting differences between the sociopolitical systems of the vari- ous Nuristani peoples, the details of the Kom system presented here are largely representative of a common Nuristani pattern. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan 86 ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN EASTERN NURISTAN At the time, Anwars arrest was regarded as a temporary pre- caution taken by the new regime, which was detaining most higher- ranking civil servants of the deposed government. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan These bonds, which grew stronger during the decades following their conquest in the 1890s by Amir Abdur Rahman, were characterized by loyalty, respect, and mutual benefit. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan DAVID J. KATZ In its details the case of Vygal Valley Kalasha differs from Despite its distinctiveness, certain condusions can be drawn from VIygal Valley Kalasha did not and do not value more the 118 THE REBELLION IN DARRA-I NUR THE REBELLION: QUESTIONS AND PARADOXES On 27 April 1978, Afghan Communist revolutionaries led by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin overthrew the govern- ment of Muhammad Daoud, thus ending the rule of the Muhammad- zai, the Pashtun royal lineage that had dominated Afghan politics for one hundred and fifty years. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Lacking legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans and handi- capped by narrow, doctrinaire views, officials of the Communist regime quickly succeeded in alienating large sections of the popula- tion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By early winter 1979 it was apparent that the Afghan military was incapable of containing the rebellion despite massive Soviet aid. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In this struggle an often ragtag, poorly armed assortment of peasants, tribesmen, and urban dwellers divided by ideological and ethnic differences has so far proven a match for the Soviet Union. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By building a political alliance that spanned tribal and factional differences and creating a military organization that crosscut earlier political divisions, Mir Beg successfully altered the political structure in a fundamental manner. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The Afghan military was supplied by the Soviet Union with modern small arms, tanks, fighter bombers, and helicopter gunships. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The army was advised by military personnel from Eastern Europe well trained in techniques of modern warfare. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan DAVID J. KATZ In its details the case of Vygal Valley Kalasha differs from Despite its distinctiveness, certain condusions can be drawn from VIygal Valley Kalasha did not and do not value more the 118 THE REBELLION IN DARRA-I NUR THE REBELLION: QUESTIONS AND PARADOXES On 27 April 1978, Afghan Communist revolutionaries led by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin overthrew the govern- ment of Muhammad Daoud, thus ending the rule of the Muhammad- zai, the Pashtun royal lineage that had dominated Afghan politics for one hundred and fifty years. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Lacking legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans and handi- capped by narrow, doctrinaire views, officials of the Communist regime quickly succeeded in alienating large sections of the popula- tion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By early winter 1979 it was apparent that the Afghan military was incapable of containing the rebellion despite massive Soviet aid. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In this struggle an often ragtag, poorly armed assortment of peasants, tribesmen, and urban dwellers divided by ideological and ethnic differences has so far proven a match for the Soviet Union. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By building a political alliance that spanned tribal and factional differences and creating a military organization that crosscut earlier political divisions, Mir Beg successfully altered the political structure in a fundamental manner. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The Afghan military was supplied by the Soviet Union with modern small arms, tanks, fighter bombers, and helicopter gunships. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The army was advised by military personnel from Eastern Europe well trained in techniques of modern warfare. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan After the Afghan conquest of the area in the late nineteenth century such warfare was not tolerated by the central government, and the government was generally strong enough to suppress most of it. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan ritual contexts and the need to achieve a sense of self (as argued by Cohen) is particularly important. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan It is crucial to our analysis that one understand the causes and motivations behind the different decisions made by various segments of Badakhshans popu- lation in response to national political developments. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan 140 RESPONSES TO THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN BADAKHSHAN Islamic political movements and not simply religious in nature (see the introduction above); second, the initial force behind the armed resistance and its leadership originated in the major urban centers (not the rural areas, as has been frequently claimed), but for tactical reasons the resistanceconsidered by Afghans to be an Islamic war of liberation, or jihadhas been fought to a large extent in the country- side; finally, the principal actors in the struggle for control of politi- cal power in this conflict are the newly educated elite (urban and rural, religious and secular), not the agrarian tribesmen, peasants, and nomads fighting a central government for their own narrow interests. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Generally the intervention of such media- tors is preferred for two reasons: in most instances they do not expect payment, and the court system is corrupt and run by outsiders mostly Pashtuns. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan During his freshman year he was given a scholarship by the government to study 154 RESPONSES TO THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN BADAKHSHAN physics at the American University in Beirut (AUB)the first student from Badakhshan to go overseas for higher education. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In 1961 he was transferred to the newly created Institute of Education, which was organized and maintained by the U.S. Agen- cy for International Development (AID). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Thus the Afghan monarchy communicated one thing effectively to its people (whether by means of the traditional ulama or the modern media): the Islamic foundation of state authority. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan He may know Sadis Rose Garden by heart and still understand not one syllable of the news given over the Afghan radio (1981: 51). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan * However, this type of arbab served a function by handling criminal cases. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Most important (as noted), the administra- tive structure had been designed by the Musahibans to keep order, not to implement change. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In the face of general opposition, sparked by different incidents in each region, the PDPA responded with military force./While Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan civil war broke out, the Afghan army was depleted by massive deser- tions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Perhaps the most basic difficulty faced by the national govern- ment was its own weakness at the provincial and subprovincial levels. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Both soon announced programs of sweeping change for Afghanistan, and both were supported by a young, edu- cated urban class which planned to use the old government structure as an instrument for change. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By doing so the decrees intended effect was not only to prohibit payment of brideprice, but also to force people to spend less on their wedding celebrations. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Moreover, famffies whjch had a male member betrothed but not yet married at the time the decree was issued were also directly affected by itbecause the usual practice was for half the brideprice to be paid al~ the ti. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The same kind of problem was faced by a young man who had agreed to pay a brideprice of 70,000 afs. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By banning bridepriceand es- pecially by declaring that women could marry whom they pleased- it threatened to undermine the strict control over women on which the maintenance of male honor depended. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Holdings in excess of the amounts specified were to be confiscated by the Land Reforms Department (Article 9). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan ~By contrast with Decree No. 8, compensation was to be paid to the owners of land which was expropriated over a period of twenty-five years at 2 percent interest (Article X). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Some people had probably ;een the writing on the wall after the coup in April 1978 and reduced the size of their estates by either transferring title to parts of them to relatives or simply selling them. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan the landless casual laborers because the larger estates were mostly cultivated by sharecroppers, not managed as single units worked by wage-earning laborers, and, as noted above, it was the sharecroppers who were to be given priority when land was redistributed. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The subgovernor then asked the laborer whether he would testify to the truth of his claim by taking an oath on the Quran. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan As noted, the demonstrations essentially attracted only people who were employed by the government, and the jargon used in the speeches tended to confuse rather than to enlighten. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Understandably terms such as feudalist, imperialist, and even democratic did not mean very much to most people, and the traditional wariness and mistrust of government were not going to be overcome by rhetoric alone. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan At the same time, the attempt to speed up the adjudication of minor disputes was welcomed by many people, as was the attack on bribery. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan For example, in December 1980 Radio Kabul reported that a group of rebels who had for some time been engaged in robbery and murder in the district of Nahrin, Baghlan province, were recently crushed by the security forces and party activists (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12118/80). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan CONCLUSION Most of the domestic policies pursued by the Khalq government rapidly to modernize Afghan society were not particularly original and did not differ significantly from the attempts at social and economic reform of various rulers during the last one hundred years. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan More than half a century later, Sultan Muhammad Khan wrote the following: At the time of the accession of the present Amir [Abdur Rahman] to the throne of Kabul, he found the most arbitrary and fantastic powers being exercised in the administration of the state by the clergy of Islam. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The distinction between religion and politics became important in the seventeenth century, when the word religious, meaning the worshipful appreciation of God, changed to mean adherence to a system of beliefs defined by a church. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By the end of the century many people had come to feel that the be- liefs and practices associated with a particular church differed from those associated with the affairs of state (see W. C. Smith 1963: ch. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In such cases it is sociologically interesting to investigate how far and how explicitly ethnicity and symbols of ethnic differentiation are usedand by whomto perpetuate or to change the class situa- tion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Saripul district is named after its administrative center, a market town of about 20,000 people and the seat of a subgovernor (hakim or wuluswal) whose jurisdiction extends officially over 10-12,000 square kilometers of rough country inhabited by a population of some 150,000. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan *Fieldwork in north-central Afghanistan in 1970-71 and 1972 was conducted jointly with Nancy Tapper as a Social Science Research Council project (HR 1141/1) and was also supported by the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS); a survey trip in 1968 was financed by a grant from the Nuffield Foun- dation. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Now the river valleys near Saripul are cultivated to the full; moreover, dry-farming of the surrounding steppe and mountain slopes has spread rapidly at the expense of pasture, although in many places this new farming is a very risky enterprise. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Like Afghanistan as a whole, the region now depends for survival on a successful dry- farmed wheat crop. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In a good year Saripul can export a surplus, but after bad years, like 1970 and 1971, famine threatens as wheat prices are grossly inflated, not only because of the bad local harvest, but also as a result of speculation and of the immigration of destitute peoples from even less fortunate areas to the west. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By 1970 there was a population saturation in the region, given the water resources available. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan A further reflection of the growth of population was the emer- gence by the early 1970s of a fourfold class structure: a traditional elite of landowners, tribal chiefs, wealthy merchants, and other re- gional leaders; a bourgeoisie of independent propertied tribesmen and peasants and established traders and artisans; a propertyless and dependent rural and urban proletariat; and anew intelligentsia of young, educated townspeople, especially teachers and some officials (including some educated and even employed in Kabul). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan They often OPPOSITION TO THE KHANS The domination of the Nazarzai khans has not remained un- term used by Durrani for Parsiwans is Opra; see N. Tapper 241 RICHARD TAPPER revolutionthe Uzbeks, Turkmens, and Aymaqs of Saripul rose against the Nazarzai khans and drove them into the mountains, setting up a supporter of Bacha-i Saqaw as governor in the town. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan He was arrested and sentenced to four years injail, but after having served a few months in considerable comfort, he was released on payment of 100 jiribs of land to each of the bereaved families;* a public peacemaking ceremony in Saripul followed, ac- companied by a two-day buzkachi tournament (see Azoy 1982). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The outcome of this case was generally reckoned to be a victory for the Uzbeks and dishonor for the Pashtun khans; manyPashtuns, however, maintained that by their standards the acceptance of compensation was dishonorable. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Nonetheless, the Uzbeks would probably not have achieved even this limited success if they had not been represented by their own powerful leaders. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By the early 1970s Uzbeks, Hazarahs, and Aymaqs of the region had such leaders, often able to defend their followers interests effectively when threatened. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The shift has been accompanied by new forms of confrontation. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan There have been numerous incidents of violence; in two notorious cases, the murders of Baluch and Maliki tribesmen by thugs said to have been hired by Nazarzai khans were followed by un- successful efforts by the khans of the victims groups to exact justice from the government.t Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Governments since April 1978 have promoted the idea of a revolution of the masses against feudal and tribal oppression and reaction, while the ethnic heterogeneity of the country was formally recognized in Decree No. 4 of May 1978. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan If the Taraki regime had promoted its reformseven those affecting land tenure and marriageunder an ideology of Islamic socialism, it could have won much popular support in the Saripul area. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan 246 SOUTHERN AFGHAMSTAN PART V WESTERN AND A STUDY OF INDIGENOUS AUTHORITY AND FOREIGN RULE Islam in rural Afghanistan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Thus far the Sheikhanzai of Afghanistan have countered such attempts by their ability to maintain political autonomy and a high degree of economic independence (though not self-sufficiency) through pastoral nomadism, segmentary lineage organization, and a merger of religious and political authority, at the local level. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan There is no subjugation or rule by an elite, or even by a majority because unanimity of opinion is the objective of tribal assemblies. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan TAVAKOLIAN SHEIKHANZAI RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY Quite unlike the stereotypes maintained about them by urban and sedentary populations, and unlike accounts of nomads in other portions of the Muslim world (e.g., Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan While regular prayer five times a day is by no means universalany more than it is among any other Muslim populationprayer is common among both young and old men, and even among women, who say their prayers in their tents. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan It is instructive that in both of the latter instances, the extension of central governmental rule has been facilitated by the cooptation, or simple replacement, of tribal leaders by government representatives. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Afghan identifications with Islam have obscurities for observers who frequently, sometimes explicitly, attribute the obscurity to Afghans themselves as insincere or fana- tical or both by highlighting the more accessible fact that Afghans make such charges against each other. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Fieldwork in Afghanistan between 1971 and 1974 was financially supported by U.S. National Science Foundation grant no. GS-30275 and archival research at the India Office Library, London, in 1980 by the Etnografisk Museum of the University of Oslo. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan But missing from such partial, implicitly partisan accounts of Afghan views are additional data which lie more in the background than in the foreground of their discourse about the configuration of Muslim capacities, and analytically subordinating specific structural properties to general functions of religion as an institution or process underestimates more telling data about how Islam operates in conjunction with other local aspects of identities rather than as a univalent partisan interest. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Variously implicit or self-evident for Afghans, such data can be elusive, and not only because their expression is often allusive. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Many do not appear to be about religion at all. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan No important initiativeand especially no social oneis undertaken without dedication in the name of God (bismilah); infidel! Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan (kafir, one who denies or rejects Gods revelation) is among the commonest charges exchanged in Afghan disputes. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan It is not the point of departure but of escalation from which there is no turning back by placing opposition beyond the ultimate mortal pale, until opposi- tion is resolved in mutual submission to a larger interest. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The Durrani restoration under Nadir Shah was initially supported by Ahmadzai Ghilzai, some of whom had been punished with exile to northern Afghanistan by Amanullah for taking part in a revolt against him in 1924; but Nadirs claims were resisted by many Ghilzai. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By 1939 all Ghilzai tribes had formally accepted the Durrani restoration, although until 1973 certain groups enjoyed de jure exemptions from conscription and taxation and de facto freedom from having officials stationed in much of their territory. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan These services include schools (established at many constabulary posts), government monopolies for assuring certain supplies (often in competition with nomad-borne trade of Ghilzai who brought cloth, sugar, and industrial products back from their winter migrations to India), the expansion of roads and bazaars (served by road traffic, which made caravans obsolete), and (recently) development projects. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Between Abdur Rahmans attempts to assume personally the ulamid function and the later institutional isolation of ulamid interests, a longer-term shifting balance of influences is suggested in the observation by Kakar: The position of the mullas was strengthened very much in the nineteenth century, especially during the Second Anglo-Afghan War when some mullas for the first time in many centuries emerged as leaders of the campaigns and in many cases offered more sound military opposition to the British than either the sardars or tribal elders did (1979: 153). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan 272 HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM It would seem that the situation confronted by Abdur Rahman and in the Durrani restoration of the 193Os was not, therefore, straight- forwardly traditional, but rather there was a radical prominence of Muslim functionaries in the political field. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In spite of demographic and political flux, the account of tribal distributions given by Elphinstone over a century and a half ago remains a good guide, especially to those of the Ghilzai homelands (see Anderson 1975). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Tribal structure may even have been enhanced in recent years by a diminution of its functions to local relevance for land tenure and to generalized communal identifications. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Formally tribe (qawm) is formulated as the sons of one father, whose landed estate is divided among them and whose character (huy) is shared by them as a body which is localized in continuous segments, replicating this form and called variously khel or *~zai, as in Sulayman Khel or Ghilzai. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Patriineal inheritance of land by males only assures the association of any segment with a territory, which is thought of as a subsidiary portion of the overall homeland (watan). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By holding that Qays went to Mecca and received Islam directly from Muhammad, who called him Abdur Rashid, avghan deny having any pre-Islamic past or equivocal history of conversion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The claim for a unique mediation of Islam, analytically speaking, is an identification of Pakhtunness with Islam, but it is limited by other mediations through shariat and tariqat, which diminish a common sense of being already Muslim. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan While this feeling may be heightened by the alienation of mullahs from their clienteleand many Ghilzai complain that the mullahs are not ours any morethis is not only a modern phenomenon. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan More fundamentally, it is a recognition that other mediations of Islam diverge from their own when contexts are not definable exclusively by qawmwali (tribalism, in the sense of possessing tribe). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Thus, as an approximation of the malangs way, some ordinary tribesmen, particularly second sons and younger brothers who have reason to feel shortchanged in tribal society, may be more or less secretly or occasionally drawn to Sufi devotions. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Sufi devotion provides a means which fits the situation in which many partially alienated tribesmen find themselves, but for others it located along margins between tribal watan. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan But Sufism tends to become an alternative to qawm when qawm is reckoned a failure for securing the comprehensive totality which sunnat implies, to fail as umma, or a specifically Muslim community, or to have become too much of the world by unraveling in individual pursuits. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In Ghilzai terms, nominal brothers enjoy an original equality with respect to each other that is defined by an abstracted ancestor, in whom they are united, just as the equality of Muslims rests on their mutual subsumption under God as His crea- tion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By this reckoning, tribalism becomes a this-worldly counterpart of creation and, when Muslimas avghan tribes are presumed to bea form of salvation. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Accordingly, mullahs and qazi are freely referred to as devils (shaytan) for meddling in tribal affairs or interjecting themselves between tribesmen by mis- chievously taking things into their own hands. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan 280 HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM Given the relative rise of religious figures in the late nineteenth century and subsequent efforts by government to coopt at least some and to neutralize others, salutary examples abound in which tribes- men can point to religious functionaries interjecting themselves into factional disputes and exacerbatingsometimes creatingconifict through their own rivalries for congregations, influence, and endow- ments. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan There is a continuity between the individual tribesman who becomes in some measure, either temporarily or partially, Sufi or who drops out altogether as malang in a personal jihad al- aqi, the larger collective undertaking of jihad against heretics (traditionally, for Ghilzai, the Shia Hazara, but also usurpatory governments) and unbelievers such as the former Kafir of what is now Nuristan, and opposition to British suzerainty on the NOrth- West Frontier led by a series of mullahs, faqir and akhund. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan In tribal experience, shariat emphasizes hierarchy between Muslims by shifting equality into the ultimate future through continuously problematizing what is already resolved in the primordial submission of Qays to the most direct form of revelation available to ordinary humans. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Tariqat resolves in the opposite direction by shifting asymmetry to an ultimate God-man relation and emphasizing here-and-now equality through social disengagement. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan By contrast, the organizational expression of shariat through qazi and mullahs is personally removed but socially immediate, even intrusive, and for that potentially com- petitive in authorizing what is Islamic between Muslims. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Louis Dupree notes that a 1950 law banning ostentatious life-crises ceremonies prohibits many of the expensive aspects of birth, circum- 294 CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF ABOLITION OF BRIDEPRICE cision, marriage and burial rituals (1973:209), and Knabe gives details of how the Marriage Law of 1971 was a further attempt by lawmakers to curb the indebtedness which arises from the costs of marriage (1977a: 164), which are a burden for Afghan society as a whole (1977a: 149). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan While the marriages made by a wealthy household may confirm its strength, they may also reveal weaknesses of which others will take advantage. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The conversion clearly compromises the honor of the wife-givers, who are very unwilling to take goods from the even lower sphere of produce (e.g., Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Persian-speaking groups such as Aymaqs, Arabs, Tajiks, and Hazarahs and Turkic- speaking Uzbeks and Turkmens are differentiated from the Durrani by basic features of social organization as well as language, custom, and (in the case of the Hazarahs) religion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The ethnic boundary with such groups is marked for the Durrani by a plethora of criteria, among which the ban on hypogamy, while it remains fundamental from the Durrani point of view, is simply taken for granted. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Indeed it is made more or less irrelevant in this context by the other groups own conceptions of both ethnic identity and marriage. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan For example, Beattie has described how marriage arrangements in progress were simply halted by the decrees prohibi- tion of marriage payments (p. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Moreover, women suffer a diminution of value in their own eyes and those of their husbands and brothers by being given away free (see N. Tapper 1981). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan If the prohibition on brideprice payments and other expenses of marriage continues to be enforced in the absence of other funda- mental changes, one can expect that the traditional function of the institution of marriage in effecting and communicating status changes within a community will be replaced by an alternative system. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Social inequality would persist, probably on the same scale as in traditional Afghan society, but would be revealed and manipulated by other means. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan He granted freedom to wives in cases of nonsupport by husbands and authorized the mahr (a gift of property or money promised by a groom at the time of marriage; a wife may demand it at any time, particularly when abandoned, separated, or divorced). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Dupree 1979d), many looked forward with anticipation to new programs unshackled by precedent. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan She wrote, taught, and acted as political adviser and stood with her brothers at the bastion of Kandahar when the city was besieged in 1738 by Persias Nadir Afshar. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The PDPA accused the Welfare Association of being run by aristocratic women for their personal satisfaction without concern for the real issues facing women.* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan On the other hand, one can understand her rancor toward the elitists, for she too had been a victim of the shabby treatment meted out to women by the old society. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The DRA claimed that Daoud had been scared stiff of the growth of the democratic movement of women, using every means to prevent it The so-called Womens Association, set up by well-known court appointees, tried to deflect women from genuine class struggle (Kabul Times, 3/10/79). Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC AND AFGHAN WOMEN Dr. Anahita joined the leftist PDPA when it was founded by Dr. Anahita was rewarded for her loyal party work in 1976, On the one hand, Dr. Anahita symbolizes the success women *The Welfare Association was called the Afghan Womens Institute during 315 NANCY HATCH DUPREE contradictions inherent in an emancipation stymied by family stric- tures and entrenched social customs. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC AND AFGHAN WOMEN In sum the KOAW was primarily enlisted to continue womens The KOAW cadres used heavy-handed tactics to harass illiterate As dissension continued to mount, the PDPA initiated steps to *Quoted by Dr. Anahita 1980. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The girl or her guardian shall not take cash or 323 full consent of the parties involved: (a) No one shall force marriage; (b) No one shall prevent the free marriage of a widow or force her into marriage because of family relationships [the leveritej or patri- archal ties; (c) No one shall prevent legal marriages on the pretext of engagement, forced engagement expenses, or by using force. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan The Working Subcommittee, the Subcommittee for Regulating Administrative Affairs, and the Subcommittee for Ensuring Judicial Justice had no female represen- tativesa deplorable situation since the need to effectively guarantee womens legal rights by etadicating legal injustices and implementing Decree No. 7 should have been a primary goal of the DRAs legisla- tion. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan On 27 December Amin was killed; the airlifts recommenced, accompanied by a massive land inva- sion from Soviet Central Asia. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Instead, International Womens Solidarity Day (IWSD), initiated by the International Conference of Women Socialists in 1910 in Copenhagen, would be observed on 8 March each year because it marked the solidarity of women in their struggle against tyranny and imperialism, discrimination and racism, and highlighted freedom and equality (Kabul Times, 6/17/78).* Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan At its strongest, the Afghan army never consisted of more than 100,000 men, and by May 1980 desertions had considerably depleted its ranks. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Journal published in Peshawar by Hizb-i Islami. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Weekly newspaper published in Wiesbaden, Germany, by Hizb-i Islami. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan See Peoples Republic of China Chindawul, 222 Chiqin, 148 Chitral (Pakistan), 89, 143 Christianity, 227n, 294 Class, 230-46; and class interests, 11, 165, 180-81; and inequality, 38, 40; and marriage reforms, 305; and 576 peasants, 21; and Saur Revolution, 72, 275; and litigation procedures, 169n, 204, 321 104; as perceived by Sheikhanzai, Clergy. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan See Debts, loans, interest rates Badakhshan, 141-43; in Darra-iNur, Cuba, 169 121, 127-28; in development plans Cures (by religious dignitaries), 151 of 1950s, 36-37; effects on revolu- Czechoslovakia, 70 tion of, 88-89, 121, 162; lack of, 10; in northwest Afghanistan, 256; Da Islami Jahad da Para da Kunar da in Nuristan, 88-89, 100, 103, 108; Qaumuno Ettthad. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan See Marxists Conscription (military): in Badakhshan, Daoud, Muhammad: anti-corruption 149; and bribery, 200; in Darra-i campaigns of, 199-200;coup against Nur, 124, 125;exemptions from, 9, (1978), 119; coup by (1973), 41, 36, 177, 271; in Imam Sahib, 174, 58, 78, 80; and emancipation for 175; in Nabrin, 197; among Sheik- women, 196, 295, 308-9, 315, 324; hanzai, 252, 257, 262; in V~ygal and foreign aid, 36;Khalqpropagan- Valley, 100, 105 Corruption and bribery: under Ama- position, 157; and literacy courses, nullah, 32; among arbabs, 175, 203; 321n; and Muslim opposition, 41, in Badakhshan, 149-50, 153; in 110, 159; and nomad opposition, Darra-i Nur, 123-24, 125, 127, 132; 262-63; ouster of, 43; reform pro- in Imam Sahib, 173, 174; and jihad, grams of, 65; relations with Kalasha, 28; Khalq-Parcham policies against, 108, 109, 111; and Republic of 22-23, 195-200 passim, 203, 313; Afghanistan, 59-62, 100, 124, 175, mujahidin policies against, 55, 115; 245. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan See also Revolution- ary Defense Forces Dihqan, 238 Din, 31, 276, 279, 281 Diniy khaluk, 276, 279 Dirham, 292n, 323 Disputes: arising from DRA land re- forms, 189; government involvement in, 108-6,252; informal abjudication of, 198-99; mitigated by traditional local leaders, 51, 83-85, 127-31, 150-53, 173-74, 259-60, 278, 285- 86; in pir networks, 223-24. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Quran, 71, 267, 270, 274, 280, 282; instruction of, 258, 259, 277; and legal reforms for women, 294, 306, 309; oaths on, 86, 198, 199; and pakhtunwali, 276; political direc- lives of, 55; and Sharia,, 278; verses on fighting in, 28 Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 32,46,54, 154, 157-59, 161, 164-65 Radio and television (foreign), 65n, 69 Radio Kabul (Radio Afghanistan), 65, 167, 200; broadcast of Parchami plot on, 64; educational programs for women on, 331; Khalq-Parchaxn reforms on, 12, 312; reports of re- sistance in Nahrin on, 205 Rafi, Colonel M., 201 Ragh (In Badakhshan), 145 Rahman, Abdur (Amir): conquest of Badakhshanby, 139n, 148; conquest of Nuristan by, 78, 94, 98, 99, 268; conquest of Turkistan by, 232-33, 235; land appropriations of, 22n; marriage reforms of, 190, 207, 294, 306-7, 324; and Pashtun settlement in north, 235, 250-53; policy of direct rule of, 171, 196-97, 212, 252-53, 270n, 271; and role of Islam in government, 31, 165, 200, 268-69, 27 1-73, 285; weakening of mullahs by, 212, 271 Rahman, Abdur (Mawlawi), 168 Rahman Qul, Haji, 160 Raids. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan See Feuds Ramazan, 88, 258 Rashid, Abdur, 274 Rashid, Qays Abdur, 241 Rasul Khan, Ghulam, 242 Ratib, Ahmad, 314 Ratibzad, Anahita, 64n, 319, 821n, 326n; address to Kabul teachers by, 312-13; biography of, 314-16; chair of International Conference of Women, 337-39; interview with Soviet Woman, 330; on literacy training, 331;party and government appointments of, 316, 317, 327, 336, 337, 339; views on M. Amin of, 327-28 Reforms (policies and programs): of Amanullah, 33, 176, 294, 307.8; Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan See Mulish(s); Pir; by Safi Pakhtuns, 100-101, 112, Ruhani,~ Sheikh; Ulama Relocation. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan See Sedentarization and 263, 265; by Sitami Milli, 160, 163, resettlement Republic of Afghanistan (1973.78), Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan See Sedentarization and See also Akhundzadah; Miyan; P1,; resettlement Sheikh; Sufi Resistance (to foreign invasions): against British-India, 71, 283; by among (Marxist view), 16-17; agri. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan Rubin, author of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan and The Search for Peace in Afghanistan This is an impressive analysis of the Taliban movementin Afghanistan, of its background and impact on that country, and of the wider regionaLand geopolitical implications of the Talibans advent to power. Taliban It would be hard to see how anyone could rival the range and detail of this account: this bids well to be the leading book on the subject.Fred Taliban Halliday, author of Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power [Rashid] covers the origin and rise of the Thliban, its concepts of Islam on questions of gender roles and drugs, and the importance of the country to the development of energy resources in the region. Taliban . Taliban He reveals anation with a rich culture of contradictions and complexities that have never been fathomed by its numerous conquerors.Booklist Taliban Later, in Kabul, a crowd chased and tried to kill me when I arrived moments after a rocket fired by Hikmetyar had killed two small boys in the Mic- royan housing complex. Taliban Abdullali 4 ~ TALIBAN was tried and sentenced to death, first by the Islamic High Court of Kand- ahar and then on appeal by the Taliban Supreme Court. Taliban These were trials without lawyers where the accused is presumed guilty and expected to defend himselL The Talibans Interpretation of the Sharia or Islamic law demanded the execution of the murderer by the victims family, but not before a last- minute appeal is made by the judge to the victims relatives to spare the murderer. Taliban But how much of this interpretation of Islami~ law by the Taliban is owed to the Sharia and how much is owed to the Pashtun tribal code of behaviour or Pashtunwali, is what is disputed by many Muslim theologians, both inside Afghanistan and beyond. Taliban Western Afghanistan was dominated by speakers of Persian or Dan as the Afghan Persian dialect is known. Taliban Dan was also spoken by the Hazaras in central Afghanistan, who were converted to Shiism by the Persians, thereby becoming the largest Shia group in an otherwise Sunni territory. Taliban The rulers themselves could claim that they were elected by the tribes represented in the Jirga. Taliban Formal communica- tions to foreign embassies in Islamabad were frequently dictated by Pakis- tani advisers. Taliban The highway, built by the Russians in the 1950s skirted through the brush and sands of one of the hottest and most waterless deserts in the world. Taliban But even Islamabad was surprised by the rapid Taliban advance. Taliban By late February 1995 after heavy fighting they captured Nimroz and Farah, two of the provinces controlled by Ismael Khan and advanced on the former Soviet airbase at Shindand, south of Herat. Taliban The Kabul regime was clearly worried by the Taliban advance and Ismael Khans failure to hold the line against them. Taliban KABUL 1996: COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL Traveling by jeep, truck arid horseback hundreds of Afghan mullahs By 20 March more than 1,200 Pashtun religious leaders from south, began to descend on Kandahar in the cool spring weather of 1996. Taliban They were housed and fed in government offices, the old fort and the covered bazaar, which were turned into enormous dormitories by the simple act of throwing hundreds of carpets on the floor so that the mullahs could sleep. Taliban Iran had also set up five training camps near Meshad for some 5,000 fighters led by the former Herat Governor Ismael Khan. Taliban The Tahban set up a six-man Shura to rule Kabul, which was dominated by Durrani Pashtuns and did not include a single Kabuli. Taliban Headed by Mullah Mohammed Rabbani, the Shura included Mullah Mohammed Ghaus as Foreign Minister, Mullah Amir Khan Muttaqi as Information Minister, Mullah Syed Ohayasuddin Agha, Mullah Fazil Mohammed and Mullah Abdul Razaq. Taliban Thousands of Pakistani students and Afghans from the refugee camps began to arrive daily in Kandahar and Kabul on buses hired by Pakistans Islamic parties. Taliban Bolstered by this fresh support, the Taliban launched an attack in west- ern Afghanistan, moving northwards from Herat into Baghdis province. Taliban 60 TALIBAN The Ghilzais, who had dominated the anti-Soviet war effort were not prepared to be used as cannon fodder by the Taliban without adequate representation in the Durrani-dominated Taliban Shuras. Taliban More than three-quarters of a million people had been displaced by the recent fighting in the north around Mazar, on the Herat front and around Kabul creating a new refugee crisis at a time when UN agencies were trying to persuade refugees still living in Pakistan to return home. Taliban Moreover, the divisions inside Afghanistan were manipulated and exacerbated by its neighbours, as all countries stepped up aid to their various Afghan proxies. Taliban And the UN remained deeply frustrated by the Tali- ban siege of the Hazarajat. Taliban Demoralized by Dostums desertion, more Uzbek commanders guarding the western road into Mazar also accepted bribes, thereby exposing the 1,500 strong Hazara force just outside the city to a surprise Taliban attack. Taliban By 10.00 Taliban As tens of thousands of civilians tried to escape Mazar by foot in long columns over the next few days, the Taliban killed dozens more in aerial bombardments. Taliban In one village near Bamiyan 50 old men, who were left behind after the younger population escaped, were killed by the Taliban.6 Taliban Pakistan was the only country that did not support the resolution, calling it biased and by now Pakistan was as internationally isolated as the Taliban. Taliban The Pakistani Jainaat in turn was inspired by the Ikhwan ul Muslimeen or the Muslim Brotherhood which was set up in Egypt in 1928 with the aim of bringing about an Islamic revolution and creating an Islamic state. Taliban A few Deobandi madrassas were established by the Afghan state, but they were not hugely popular even in the Pashtun belt. Taliban SECRET SOCIETY: THE TALIBANS POLITICAL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION I f there was a single inspiration and hope for peace amongst ordinary through a collective political leadership, which was consultative and Afghans after the Taliban emerged, it was the fact that they governed consensus-building, rather than dominated by one individual. Taliban The Tali- ban Shura in Kandahar claimed it was following the early Islamic model where discussion was followed by a consensus amongst the believers and sensitivity and accessibility to the public were deemed important. Taliban By December 1998, UNICEF reported that the countrys educa- tional system was in a state of total collapse with nine in ten girls and two in three boys not enrolled in school.6 Taliban At a playground set up by Save the Children in the battered, half-destroyed Microyan housing complex, rake-thin Afghan children played grimly on the newly installed swings. Taliban It was a playground littered with reminders of the war discarded artillery shell cases, a destroyed tank with a gaping bole where the turret once was and trees lopped down by rocket fire. Taliban They meticulously hoed the soil to uproot weeds, sprinkled fertilizer and repaired irrigation ditches destroyed by the Soviet army in the 1980s to provide water to the fields. Taliban By 1997, UNDCP and the US 120 TALIBAN estimated that 96 per cent of Afghan heroin came from areas under Tali- ban co~itrol. Taliban Industry and trade became increasingly financed by laundered drugs money and the black economy, which accounted for between 30 and 50 122 TALIBAN per cent of the total Pakistan economy, was heavily subsidised by drugs money. Taliban I asked him if he was not playing with fire by inviting Muslim radicals from Islamic countries, who were ostensibly allies of Paki- stan. Taliban A new Islamic Ummah, they argued, could be forged by the sacrifices and blood of a new generation of martyrs and more such victories. Taliban Bin Laden does more harm than good, Masud said in 1997 after he had been ousted from Kabul by the Taliban.7 Taliban Hostility towards America is a religious duty and we hope to be rewarded for it by God, he said. Taliban According to the FBI, GLOBAL JIHAD: THE ARAB-AFGHANS AND OSAMA BIN LADEN 137 militants in Yemen who kidnapped 16 Western tourists in December 1998 were funded by Bin Laden.7 Taliban As for Pakistan there are some governmental departments, which, by the Grace of God, respond to the Islamic sentiments of the masses in Pakistan. Taliban In their meeting, Mullah Omar refuse to d~ so and then insulted Prince Turki by abusing the Saudi Rova GLOBAL JIHAD: THE ARAB-AFGHANS AND OSAMA BIN LADEN 139 Family. Taliban The social and economic dissatisfaction amongst young people is unrecognized by the regime. Taliban By keeping the conflict in Afghanistan on the boil Russia keeps the region unstable and has the excuse to maintain a military presence in the CARs. Taliban President Niya- zov was flattered by the attention Buigheroni paid him, when no other Western oil executive even appeared at his door, and the two men struck up a warm friendship. Taliban Certainly the Tat- iban appear to serve the US policy of isolating Iran by creating a firmly Sunni buffer on Irans border and potentially providing security for trade routes and pipelines that would break Irans monopoly on Central Asias southern trade routes, wrote Reuters.22 Taliban We are going through it line by line so that nobody can accuse us of trying to dupe the Taliban. Taliban We will get the same contract approved by the opposition groups so it will be an all-Afghan agreement, a senior Bridas executive told me.2 Taliban Unocal had declined to negotiate a contract until there was a recognized government in KabuL Meanwhile Unocal had donated US$900,000 to the Centre of Afghanistan Studies at the University of Omaha, Nebraska which was headed by Thomas Gouttierre, a veteran Afghanistan academic. Taliban The Centre set up a training and humanitarian aid programme for the Afghans, opening a school in Kandahar which was run by Gerald Board- man, who in the 1980s had run the Peshawar office of the US Agency for International Development providing cross-border assistance to the Mujaheddin. Taliban Pakistan and Turkmenistan were forced to sign a new contract with Unocal extending the companys deadline by another year to start the project by December 1988. Taliban The pipeline of US military aid to the Mujaheddin was never replaced by a pipeline of international humanitar- ian aid that could have been an inducement for the warlords to make peace and rebuild the country. Taliban Was it preferable to rely on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to 180 TALIBAN deliver the Taliban and obtain a temporary Afghan concensus in the old-fashioned way by reconquering the country? Or was it preferable for the USA to engage in peacemaking and bring the Afghan ethnic groups and factions together to form a broad-based government, which might ensure lasting stability? Although Washingtons broad-brush policy was to support a widely based, multi-ethnic government in Kabul, the USA for a time believed in the Taliban and when it ceased to do so, it was not willing to rein in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Taliban This included 600,000 tons of wheat, diesel, petroleum and kerosene fuel which was partly paid for by Saudi Arabia, arms and ammunition, ariel bombs, maintenance and spare parts for its Soviet-era military equipment such as tanks and heavy artillery, repairs and mainten- 164 TALIBAN with the Taliban. Taliban Certainly the Tat- than appear to serve the US policy of isolating Iran by creating a firmly Sunni buffer on Irans border and potentially providing security for trade routes and pipelines that would break Irans monopoly on Central Asias southern trade routes, wrote Reuters.22 Taliban We are going through it line by line so that nobody can accuse us of trying to dupe the Taliban. Taliban We will get the same contract approved by the opposition groups so it will be an all-Afghan agreement, a senior Bridas executive told me.2 Taliban Unocal had declined to negotiate a contract until there was a recognized government in KabuL Meanwhile Unocal had donated US$900,000 to the Centre of Afghanistan Studies at the University of Omaha, Nebraska which was headed by Thomas Gouttierre, a veteran Afghanistan academic. Taliban The Centre set up a training and humanitarian aid programme for the Afghans, opening a school in Kandahar which was run by Gerald Board- man, who in the 1980s had run the Peshawar office of the US Agency for International Development providing cross-border assistance to the Mujaheddin. Taliban Pakistan and Turkmenistan were forced to sign a new contract with Unocal extending the companys deadline by another year to start the project by December 1988. Taliban The pipeline of US military aid to the Mujaheddin was never replaced by a pipeline of international humanitar- ian aid that could have been an inducement for the warlords to make peace and rebuild the country. Taliban Was it preferable to rely on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to 180 TALIBAN deliver the Taliban and obtain a temporary Afghan concensus in the old-fashioned way by reconquering the country? Or was it preferable for the USA to engage in peacemaking and bring the Afghan ethnic groups and factions together to form a broad-based government, which might ensure lasting stability? Although Washingtons broad-brush policy was to support a widely based, multi-ethnic government in Kabul, the USA for a time believed in the Taliban and when it ceased to do so, it was not willing to rein in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Taliban This included 600,000 tons of wheat, diesel, petroleum and kerosene fuel which was partly paid for by Saudi Arabia, arms and ammunition, ariel bombs, maintenance and spare parts for its Soviet-era military equipment such as tanks and heavy artillery, repairs and mainten- 184 TALIBAN ance of the Talibans airforce and airport operations, road building, elec- tricity supply in Kandahar and salaries. Taliban by enlisting the help of government minis- 186 TAUBAN ters or the transport mafia. Taliban At other times they would defy the federal government by gaining support from the provincial governments in Balu- chistari and the NWFP. Taliban 188 TALIBAN By running both Afghan policy and operations, the IS! Taliban The agencys operatives in Afghanistan were all Pash- run officers, while many were also motivated by strong Islamic fundament- alist leanings. Taliban calculated that by recognizing the Taliban government, it would force hostile neigh- bours to deal with the Taliban and need Islainabad to improve their own relationships with the Taliban. Taliban The Taliban are funded by transporters to open the roads for smuggling and this mafia is now making and breaking governments in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Taliban Pakistani society is now more fractured, inundated with soph- isticated weapons, brutalized due to growing civic violence and over- whelmed by the spread of narcotics, wrote American historian Paul Ken- nedy.7 Taliban King Fahd expressed happi- ness at the good measures taken by the Taliban and over the imposition of Sharia in our country, Rabbani said.3 Taliban Iranian planes in gross violation of all internationally accepted norms 204 TALIBAN intrude our countrys air space to airlift supplies to airports controlled by the opposition. Taliban a Pashtun south under the Taliban and a non-Pashtun north divided by the Hindu Kush mountains., Taliban leaving Kabul contested by the two sides. Taliban The Central Asian states will not be able to deliver their energy and mineral exports by the shortest routes and as their economies crash, they will face an Islamic upsurge and instab- ility. Taliban Otherwise these women will be threatened, investig- 218 -~ TALIBAN ated and severely punished as well as the family elders by the forces of the Religious Police (Munkrat). Taliban tured by Taliban. Taliban Taliban say they will award pipeline contract to the company which starts work first. Taliban International Court of Arbitration in Paris rules in favour of Bridas on case to release monies owed by Turkmen government for refined products provided to Keimir refinery. Taliban Unocal asks Pakistan for an extension for achieving financial closure by October 1998. Taliban Islamic charitable fund raised from taxes paid by the public. Taliban All-enveloping head-to-toe veil worn by Afghan women under the Taliban. Taliban Legal ruling issued by ulema. Taliban Halal. Taliban The ritual Islamic way to kill an animal, by slitting its throat and letting the blood pour out. Taliban Babur, Babur-Nama, translated by Nette Beveridge, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore 1979. Taliban APPENDIX 6 247 Rawlinson, Henry, England and Russia in the East, 1875, Reprinted by Indus Publications, Karachi 1989. Taliban He was captured by Dostums troops in Mazar in May, 1997 and later freed. Taliban The consortium was led by PSG International, a joint venture by two US companies Bechtel Enterprises and General Electric Capital Structured Fmance Group 258 -~ NOTES 13. Taliban The Qatar proposal was an undersea pipeline across the Gulf to Baluchistan. Taliban Kissingers comments were quoted to me by Bridas executives in Islamabad February 1997. Taliban Those hired by the oil companies working in the Caspian included Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former NSC Adviser, former Assistant Defence Secretary Richard Armitage, former Chief of Staff John Sununu, former Senate majority leader Howard Baker, former Secretaries of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Henry Kiss- inger. Taliban Letter sent by John Imle to Carlos Bulgheroni on 11 October 1995 and sub- mitted in court by Bridas. Taliban The latter was copied by the Taliban. Taliban The result was a fatwa issued by the most powerful ulema leader, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Bin Bar which read, Even though the Americans are, in the conser- vative religious view, equivalent to non-believers as they are not Muslims, they deserve support because they are here to defend Islam. Taliban Along with, other human rights groups, Amnesty International, the International PEN, and scholars and human rights activists in Eu- rope and the United States (among them the late Professor Joseph Fletcher of Harvard University, Dr. Crystal A. Leslie of the Medical Cen- ter of Boston University, and, in particular, Professor Felix Ermacora, the special rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Commis- sion on Afghanistan) pressured the Kabul regime by continually writing to it about him. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan JBLICATIONS )OKS fghan, Afghanistan, and Afghans and the Organization of the State in India, Persia, and Afghanistan (Dan) fghanistan: A Study in Internal Political Developments, 18801896 he Afghan Problem (Dan) he Afghans in the Spring of 1987 at War with the Russians (Pashto) he Geneva Compromise on Afghanistan (Pashto) ~overnment and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan, 18801901 he Second Anglo-Afghan War (Dan) RTICLES Constitutional History of Afghanistan The Fall of the Afghan Monarchy in 1973 Trends in Modern Afghan History The Pacification of the Hazaras of Afghanistan RANSLATIONS INTO PASHTO AND DARI ~n Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, by M. Elphinstone (i vols.) The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan r~he British Approach to Politics, by M. Stewart rhe Contemporary World, by W. MacNeil ~eiters on Literature, by M. Gorky ~4edieval Europe, by S. Painter rhe Real World of Democracy, by C. B. Macpherson What Is History? by E. H. Carr Composition: Graphic Composition, Inc. Text: 11/13 Bembo Display: Bembo Printing and binding: Thomson-Shore, Inc. About the author Peter Marsden has a degree in Modern Arabic and worked for a number of years as. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan KARACHI LAHORE ISLAMABAD Peter Marsden w Oxford University Press 0 Zed Books Ltd LONDON & NEW YORK The Taliban: War, religion and the new order in Afghanistan was first published by Zed Books Ltd, 7 Cynthia Street, London NI 9JF, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, rw 10010, USA in 1998. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan July: King Zahir Shah overthrown by Daoud through a military coup. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Should one be influenced by what Islamic scholars are saying as to what is or is not consistent with the Quran and the reported sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, the Hadith? Should one look to women within the population of Islamic scholars and other intellectuals to indicate what may be reasonable norms? Alternatively, should one draw on the perspectives and values of those living in the rural areas of Afghanistan, both women and men? In so doing, how does one take on board the diversity of perspectives and values from village to village, province to province and one ethnic group to another? The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Chapter II considers the apparent support for the Taliban by elements within Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and, possibly, the USA, noting the often conflicting agendas in operation. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The process of reconstruction 8 The nature of Afghanistan 9 has been assisted by the resources and engineering skills provided by humanitarian agencies. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Finally, Zahir The Taliban 24 The nature of Afghanistan Shah was deposed in July 1973 by his cousin and former prime minister, Daoud. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The jihad legitimised, in religious terms, the large-scale exodus of a significant proportion of the population to neighbouring Islamic 27 The Taliban 28 The Mujahidin countries, in that Afghanistan had been transgressed by a secular force and therefore ceased to be Islamic . The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan A proportion were settled in camps along the border, from which they were given support by the Iranian government to cross the border into Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet forces (BAAG, 1997). The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan He is an ethnic Pushtun, possibly descended from the Pushtuns relocated to northern Afghanistan at the end of the last century by Abdur-Rahman. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Ittihad-i-Islam was formed by Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf, a former theology The Taliban 32 The Mujahidin lecturer from Kabul University and a fluent Arabic speaker, who served as Rabbanis deputy in the early Islamist movement within the university. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Imprisoned for his activities by the PDPA regime of 1978 79, he was released as part of the amnesty that followed the Soviet invasion and fled to Pakistan, where he established his own Islamist party. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan It has, however, demonstrated strong op- position to the Shia minority in Afghanistan, echoing Riyadhs competition with Tehran for pre-eminence within the Islamic world. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The Afgan National Liberation Front was established by Sibghatullah Mujadidi in 1980, and is one of the three parties referred to as traditionalist b virtue of its absence of ideology and of its power base within the rural society of Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Although he comes from a conservative tradition and has been a strong advocate for the return of King Zahir Shah, he was active in radical Islamic circles during the 1950S and ig6os, establishing contact with the Muslim Brother- hood in Egypt, and was jailed for four and a half years by Daoud in 1959 for campaigning against a visit by Khrushchev. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The other Shia party, another Harakat-i-Islami, is led The Mujahidin 35 by Sheikh Assef Muhsini, whose following has been among urban educated Shias. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan However, the overtures made by the Najibullah government to Mujahidin commanders and traditional leaders throughout the country further undermined the unity of the movement. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Dostam, who had up to that point been in alliance with Hekmatyar and Hisb-e-Wahdat, was not impressed by the new arrangement and rejected appeals that he also join. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan However, Rabbani, Masoud and Hekmatyar managed to govern for a few months before they were ousted by the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Hekmatyar marked his brief period in office by cautiously introducing a number of policies aimed at increasing the conformity of the population to what he re arded as Islamic requirements. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan It was also made clear that up of an appropriate Islamic curriculum by religious scholars, and that this process could start only when the Taliban had control of the whole any representation of the human or animal form In order to enforce these bans, televisions and tapes were symbolically displayed in public places. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Government troops launched a major offensive and were able to retake the area within a month of its capture by the Taliban. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The Taliban then surprised all observers by forcing them- The Taliban 50 The warriors of God selves through the apparently impenetrable Sarobi Gorge. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan It is still not known whether this hanging was authorised by the Taliban leadership or carried out spontaneously by enthusiastic followers, or whether others, with old scores to settle, took the opportunity created by the situation to wreak their revenge. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan 51 The Taliban responded to the alliance by opening up a new front in north-western Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Appeals were made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for people to be allowed to return to their homes north of the capital, but these were rejected. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Further The Taliban 54 evidence of this was provided by the announced defection of another opposition commander, this time one of Masouds men who con- trolled the Salang Pass. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan It has been noted that countries affected by chronic civil V conflict often referred to within the humanitarian aid world as complex emergencies produce Christian and Islamic revivalist movements in which efforts are made to return to what are regarded as the absolute truths of the religion, and to eradicate any influences that have appeared to weaken religious belief. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Negative stereotyping in the West in relation to the Islamic world The Taliban 6o I The Taliban creed has, therefore, provoked negative stereotyping of the West by radical Islamic movements. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan An interesting consequence of this process is seen in France, where the growth of radical Islam in response to the disadvantages and alienation experienced by the Muslim population has created an ardent defence of secular values by those challenging freedom of religious expression and, in par- ticular, the use of the veil by Muslim women resident in France) Secularism is thus arousing the same fervour as radicalised religion. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Further clarification of the Taliban creed was given in a broadcast The Taliban 62 by the Talibans Voice of Sharia radio station on 5 November 1996: The Taliban, who have emerged from the masses of the people, have started their struggle to deliver their compatriots from pain and hard- ship, to ensure complete peace and security across the country by collecting weapons, by doing away with feudal principalities here and there in the country and by creating a powerful Islamic government in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan In justifying their albeit limited use in Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, Sher Muhammad Stanakzai, the acting foreign minister, speaking on Voice of Sharia Radio, said, on 20 November: By the enforcement of Sharia Hudud, we have made safe the lives and property of millions of people from Herat tojalalabad and Kabul. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Examples of excesses by radical groups throughout the world are used, implicitly, to brand all Muslims as extremists. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan They would have been provided with military training by the Mujahidin parties present in the camps, together with the basic Islamic education given in the camp madrasahs. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The Wahhabi ideology was adopted by Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul The Taliban 72 Earlier Islamic movements Rahman Al-Saud, a descendant of the early Wahhabi leaders, in the early part of the twentieth century. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan He sought to transform the nomadic tribes inhabiting central Arabia, who had reverted to the use of tribal law and practised pre-Islamic rituals, into a unified Islamic umma by replacing loyalty to the tribe with loyalty to Islam and to its leader, the Imam. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Abdul Aziz proclaimed himself king of Saudi Arabia in 1932 and established a dynasty legitimised by Islam, that has con- tinued up to the present time. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan There is also apparent in the Iranian revolution and in the Taliban movement, as with the Muslim Brother- hood, a significant level of participation by young people, with the result that these movements have benefited from the radicalism, passion and uncompromising purity characteristic of certain strands of youth. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan A key role was played in this process by Sayyad Ahmed Barely (17861831), who came from north-east India. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan From the 1950s onwards, additional madrasahs were set up by the Islamist parties and by the Wahhabis. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan This has manifested itself in struggles for influence and power between Ulema and tribal leaders, the latter backed by mullahs. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan There are four main elements to their policy: a ban on the employment of women, except in the health sector; a temporary halt to formal female education pending the drawing up of an appropriate curriculum; the imposition of strict dress codes on both women and men requiring women to wear 88 The gender policies of the Taliban 89 burqas and men to wear beards, unstyled hair, turbans and shaiwar kameez; and the introduction of strict controls on the movement of women outside the home so that women are always separated from male strangers or are escorted by male relatives. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The present cur- riculum, which was drafted by the Mujahidin parties and therefore could be seen as already consistent with Islam, is not regarded as acceptable. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan There were, nevertheless, statements by senior people within the Taliban that girls schools in Kabul might open by the spring of 1997, building on the small initiatives in areas such as Paktia, Ghazni and Kandahar, where girls schools are already operating. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The periodic practice by some elements within the Taliban, particularly the religi- ous police, of beating women with sticks in the street if they do not comply has had an enormous impact on the mobility of the female population. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan There has also been a marked decline in women and children attending health facilities and this has been aggravated by moves to require women to attend only one hospital in Kabul designated for their use. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The Taliban Being predominantly Pushtun and rural in their composition, they were inevitably influenced by the code of honour prescribed in Pushtun law, which determined that women should live in purdah and be protected from the outside world. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The dialogue with the humanitarian agencies The benefits of the economic assistance provided by the Soviet Union, the USA and Europe during the post-war years were quickly lost as the Soviet forces reduced highways to pot-holed obstacle courses and devastated agriculture through sustained bombing cam- paigns. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan created equally 102 The dialogue with the humanitarian agencies 103 strong reactions in the Islamic world, alarmed by an assault on fellow Muslims by a secular force. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Many of the solidarity committees organ- ised themselves to deliver relief supplies to Afghanistan, and they were joined by established aid organisations from both the Islamic world and the West. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan A consensus emerged between the agencies that dialogue should be maintained and that agencies should engage in discussion with the Taliban as to how the needs of vulnerable elements in the community The Taliban io8 could be met by the authorities and the agencies working together. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The Islamic world feels resentful at the power the West is able to exert and is particularly paranoid about the all-pervasive influence The Taliban of Western culture and about the erosion and undermining of indigenous cultures by it. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The Taliban have gone even farther by banning televisions, although they have cited the Islamic prohibition on the visual representation of the human form as justification When the UN makes statements on the basis of internationally accepted Human Rights Conventions, movements such as the Taliban are sceptical. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan It would be helpful if research could be undertaken to establish what The Taliban and the international community 121 roles could be played by relatively uneducated women under present economic circumstances if there were no restrictions on their employ- ment, and to establish the possibility of flexibility on the part of the Taliban as to whether some roles could be consistent with their moral code. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The Taliban 122 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina- tion Against Women of September 1981 states that: the term discrimination against women shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental free- doms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil and any other field. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The discussions between the Taliban and inter- national agencies over the summer of 1997 about whether women should be permitted to secure health care only in one hospital, specifically designated for women, did not relate to the principle of whether women are permitted access to health care, which is accepted by the Taliban, but to the possibility that resources might be provided on a much smaller scale to female health care. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The presence of humanit- lowed by people in the West. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan One may counter this by stating that the USA has a potential interest in the development of oil and gas pipelines through Afghanistan and in a reduction in both opium production and the training of terrorists there. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan However, the relative costs of Central Asian oil may prove too high, a reduction in the Afghan production of opium may be offset by an expansion elsewhere in the world and the USA may find some way or other of tackling the training of terrorists in Afghanistan. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan This was brought to an end only by the mediation of the former head of Pakistans Inter-services Intelligence, who had played a major role in supporting the seven Mujahidin parties during the period of Soviet occupation. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan This recruitment process was augmented by The Taliban 134 appeals to tribal leaders in the Pushtun areas of Afghanistan, and to those in the refugee camps, to send some of their young men to fight. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan A statement by the leader of the Islamic opposition movement in Tajikistan that he did not rule out an agreement with the Taliban, in support of the long-standing Tajik insurgency from Afghanistan, will have done nothing to reassure them. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Before the Taliban takeover of Kabul an Argentinian company, Bridas, obtained the right to extract gas from Turkmenistans oilfields, but The Taliban 140 The regional picture the Turkmen government was then offered a better deal by an American company, UNOCAL, and reneged on its agreement with Bridas. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Notwithstanding this agreement, the Taliban announced on 28 August that they favoured the terms offered by the Argentinian company, Bridas, and that negotiations were in their final stages for a contract to be signed. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Production increased by 25 per cent during 1997, having vacillated in previous years. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Saudi Arabia saw the opportunity presented by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to expand its influence there. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan However, it is important at least to acknowledge the differential power relationship between the West and the Islamic world and the consequently dominant position held by Western values. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan Governments can act positively by placing discrimination on the grounds of religion as high on the political agenda as discrimination on the grounds of gender, race or sexuality, and they can also take active steps to counter Islamophobia. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan 135, 138 20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, Maududi, Abdul Ala, 5, 8i, 82, 94, education, 105 39, 42, 44, 49, 66, 78, 8o, 8,, 86, North-West Frontier Province, 79 99, 39 92, g8, 135, 142, t46, 148 Mazar-i-Sharif, 10, 36, 41, 47, 6,, Pushtunistan, 23; proposal for 1,2; airport, 22 (attack on, 55); oil, Central Asian, 131 assembly, 22 Pushtunwali code of conduct, 85, oil and gas pipelines, 7, 134; from attitude of population to Taliban, 54; taking of, 53 86, g~ tension with Islam, 86; Central Asia, 145; from Iran, 140; Mazari, Abdul Mi, 34, 46 from Turkmenistan, 136, 140; variance with Sharia law, 85 Iranian, 137; through Mecca, conquered by Abdul Aziz, Qadir, Haji, 41, 53 723 Afghanistan, 124, 129, 131, 137, Quran, 3, 6, 43, 6o, 68, 76, 82, ii6; migration, to towns and cities, g 39, 4 Omar, Mullah Muhammad, i6, 3!, The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan S L JJ Copyright 1974 by Edward Hyams All rights reserved. The Terrorists Index 18 31 41 53 68 80 94 110 122 143 164 174 183 190 Part One The Theorists Chapter 1 The Uses of Terrorism All established governments of whatever political persuasion, epoch or part of the world, when attacked by a campaign of terrorism, persist in asserting that their opponents will gain nothing by such methods; but, very inconsistently, they them- selves employ terrorist methods in campaigns of counter- terrorism, like that of the British Government with the Black- and-Tans in Ireland in the 1920s, the CIA operations iii Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s or operations of the My Lai type in Vietnam. The Terrorists Let us take the common-sense arguments first: that denial of the right to use violence against the State would lead to the conclusion that whereas Adolf Hitler had a right to use violence against millions of German citizens and against other states, by virtue of his office as Chancellor of the Third Reich, no group of German dissidents could possibly have the right to use terrorism literally the only means of changing the government of their 14 The Uses of Terrorism country which was open to Germans between 1933 and 1944 to get rid of him and his Nazis. The Terrorists If that denial be sustained it would not have been right for Japanese radicals to try to prevent the rape of south-east Asia by the Emperor Hirohito and his generals, by mounting a campaign of terrorism against them; it would not have been right for any group of Italians to try to restore democratic freedoms to their own countrymen, and national freedom to Greece, Albania and Ethiopia, by trying to assassinate Mussolini and the Fascist Grand Council, or, by creating a state of chaos by terrorism, to have discredited the Fascist government with the Italian people; it would not have been right for any group of Russians to use against the atrocious tyranny of Joseph Stalin, the methods used by the Populists against the less atrocious tyranny of the Tsars. The Terrorists No judge has yet clearly laid down what should be understood by an offence of a political character, and there is little case law to refer to; but it seems clear enough, at least to the lay 16 The Uses of Terrorism mind; and in Rex v. The Terrorists Anarchism was, as they say, in the air during the middle fifty years of the nineteenth cen- tury: it was governed by ideals; Stirner dispensed with them and found himself left withHimself, and a himself which admitted of no rule but self-interest. The Terrorists Nechayev began with the Self; treated it as raw material; and believed that by processing it it could be made into a merciless instrument of revolutionary terrorism. The Terrorists This does not mean that any sort of human society was impossible: when every man is bent on fighting his own corner for the I which is his sole knowable own, there will be a kind of balance of forces of egotism, a sort of union enforced by the tension between clearly asserted, deliberately accepted, ownnesses: and out of that would necessarily emerge 20 The Terrorist Ego expedient arrangements for the living of a life in common with others, as it were a tacit treaty of millions of mutually balancing Egos. The Terrorists 26 The Terrorist Ego How, in practice, is this dedicated being to be conjured out of a man with ordinary feelings and inhibitionsthe feat which Nechayev himself attempted at such terrible cost to the integrity of his original purpose? Chiefly by the practice of what in the common way would be called crime, though always with the great and single cause in mind. The Terrorists In short, the dangerous enemy is the thoughtful liberal who, by introducing a measure of reform, may cool off the revolutionary ardour of the masses; whereas the real brute in power will, by refusing all sensible reform and continuing to abuse his power by oppressive behaviour, be a hidden and unwitting ally of the revolutionary terrorist. The Terrorists In category three Nechayev includes all those people who, although neither intelligent nor competent, have influence by reason of rank or wealth. The Terrorists Then there is a category of what Nechayev calls doctrinaire revolutionaries, who talk much but act not at all; by using their own avowed aims to force them into action, they can be driven to take part in militant demonstrations in the course of which a majority will be killed by the governments soldiers and police; the survivors will emerge from this ordeal as hardened and experienced revolution- aries, committed by their past violence to the cause they no longer dare to abandon. The Terrorists Two of his acts should be mentioned: when Bakunin wanted to get out of completing the translation of Das Kapital, a commission which had been procured for him by friends who were aware of his desperate poverty, but did not want to return the advance pay- ment he had received, that meant cheating a young enthusiast who, because Bakunin had no civil status in Switzerland and could not enter into a contract, stood in for him. The Terrorists My italics: and, by and large, Bakunins revolutionary policy 32 The Terrorism of the Pure in Heart for the rest of his life. The Terrorists At Nicho- layevsk he managed to get aboard an American ship and in her went to Japan, and thence by way of San Francisco and New York, to London, and so to Herzens house in Paddington. The Terrorists Marx was less afraid of workers who called themselves Anarchists than of Bakunin as a leader challenging his own control of the International. The Terrorists It is useless for those who admire Bakunin the anarchist but are unable to stomach Bakunin the terrorist to try to exonerate their hero by putting the blame for this kind of thing on Nechayev. The Terrorists Some of them, moreover, were no mere theorists: a group of Mosts 42 The Apostle of the Bomb Berlin followers, led by a printer named Reinsdorf (a surprising number of militant Anarchists have been printers), tried to blow up the German Kaiser with a bomb, and paid, though they failed, with their lives. The Terrorists It began to seem that Johann Most had not preached in vain; and indeed, had the native-born American workers, who were not much less ruthlessly exploited than the immigrants, followed the suit led by the immigrants, Chicago and perhaps other cities of the Union would have had a 46 The Apostle of the Bomb real revolution on their hands, although it would have had no chance of success against the U.S. Army, which would have been put at the disposal of the bosses. The Terrorists Para- military action against a government or a policy may easily be dismissed by the authorities as mere banditry and, as such, may have found no place in the history books. The Terrorists Germany has indeed a long history of secret terrorist societies, from the medieval Holy Vehm, which tried to bring social order out of chaos by punishing injustices when the ruling barons and princes were unable or unwilling to do so, down to the Nationalist Bunds of the nineteenth century arising out of partisan resistance to the armies of Bonaparte. The Terrorists Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, who obtained Carbonari support for his political party, is supposed to have been con- strained, when later he was French emperor, to go to the help of Piedmont in her struggle to liberate and unite Italy, by his oath as a Carbonaro; and to have been condemned to death by the society when he defended the Popes temporalities against the Italian Army, though the societys agent, Orsini, failed in his mission of execution. The Terrorists To undertake the organization of revolutionary activity in all territories inhabited by Serbs. The Terrorists P~/emont was the public face of Black Hand and was subsidized by Apis, probably out of the Secret Service funds, and was supported by Narodna Odbrana, whose views it propa- gated. The Terrorists He was in search of good anti-Semitic propaganda material for provoking pogroms: he had the book rewritten by a competent hack, replacing Montesquieu and Machiavelli by a coven of rabbis, and this plagiarism, entitled The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, was distributed, c. The Terrorists The subsequent career of that work is a matter of history: in 1920 it was taken seriously by, among others, the London Tbnes which, however, subsequently published the proof that it was a forgery. The Terrorists Moreover, the Tsar was helping the liberals to take over the landlords serfs and turn them into exploited wage slaves by his emancipation edicts. The Terrorists In 1865 Ishutin founded a secret society, called Organization, with agents, usually schoolmasters and librarians, to preach Socialism and promote revolution all over Russia; but at the heart of it was a sort of ultra-clandestine central committee, known to its members as Hell, whose business was not only to direct Organization, but also to rescue political prisoners from prison by coups de main; to assassinate the more obnoxious landlords; and, above all, to assassinate the Tsar. The Terrorists Its programme, drawn up in 1876, envisaged social and 72 The Populists economic reform brought about by violent revolution, the revolutionary situation to be created by agitation and terrorism. The Terrorists By their own actions the Government forced Land and Liberty to place greater emphasis on the use of terrorism. The Terrorists In 18778 a series of trials of demonstrators, strikers and propagandists took place in St Petersburg and Moscow, partly with the aim of widening the gulf between the revolutionaries and liberals seeking constitutional reform, by demonstrating the red peril of insurrection. The Terrorists By 1873 she was engaged in distributing social and political textbooks, and even some of the new socially significant novels, to the factory workers of the capital, and she took part in the 76 The Populists v Narod movement of the following summer. The Terrorists But she was among those revolutionary intellectuals who at last lost patience with the propagandist approach; moreover, by the time of the forma- tion of Peoples Will she was living with Zhelyabov and thus knew all the details of the plans to assassinate the Tsar. The Terrorists The lowest sentiment of contempt which a freeman can feel is that excited by a wretched serf, who has been polished and educated to a full sense of the degradation of his position, yet is without the manhood to do more than utter piteous lamentations. The Terrorists One such very senior officer, Colonel Ferguson-Smyth, a Divisional Comman- der, was shot dead by a terrorist, at the bar of his club in Cork, a few days after issuing an order of that kind. The Terrorists Collins was informed of this service by his London spies who 104 The Irish Case (2) told him that the men were aal ex-officers, or seconded officers, that they had been given the specific task of breaking up the Dublin IRA organization, and had a licence to kill. The Terrorists The Black-and-Tans drove the crowd before them, then lined them up and began to search them. The Terrorists But the Anarchist workers groupstrade unions, co-operatives and associations of artisans did not begin with terrorism; on the contrary, like the Russian Populists, their ambition was to achieve the liberation~ and economic freedom of the working class by peaceful means, and their ultimate weapon was to be not civil war, but the General Strike. The Terrorists It was the use of armed force, of soldiers, to crush the strikes by which the Anarchist leaders tried to get higher wages, shorter hours and better working conditions for a working class and peasantry whose poverty and misery were exceeded only by those of the Irish peasants, that drove the Spanish Anarchists to the use of terrorism. The Terrorists For some years following the appointment of the first Cnovas govern- ment there was a decline in terrorist activity, and in the early 1880s the Civil Guard succeeded in mutilating and very nearly exterminating the working-class Anarchist movement by means of the imaginary Black Hand secret society described in Chap- ter 5, although the Federation of Workers was never completely broken. The Terrorists The bombs were stuffed with iron nails (an anti-personnel design copied by the IRA in Ulster in 19712), and eighty- four members of parliament were more or less seriously injured, though none died. The Terrorists The terrorist Ravachol, who had been a robber and murderer before he decided to serve the revolutionary cause by violence, started a reign of terror in Paris in 1892 by bombing the apartments of judges or magistrates who had been exceptionally harsh with political prisoners. The Terrorists On the other hand Emile Henry, like Santiago Salvador, waged war on the bourgeoisie at large by tossing a bomb into the crowded Caf Terminus, killing and injuring scores of people. The Terrorists His execution for this crime in 1894 was avenged within a month by the assassination of President Sadi Carnot who, poor man, was only president because Clemenceau had insisted on supporting la plus bte of the candidates. The Terrorists The employers celebrated their victory by sacking their union workers and replacing them with blacklegs from the inexhaustible pool of half-starved peasants. The Terrorists As a consequence of this disaster, the militant Anarchists withdrew from the Federation on the grounds that the General Strike was not an effective weapon, and launched a campaign of terrorism carried on by small groups of what we should call urban (but also rural) guerrillas. The Terrorists An Anar- chist terrorist, Mateo Morral, son of a rich cotton manufac- turer, seized the opportunity to put one man to death for the people: he tried to toss a bouquet of flowers, in which a bomb was concealed, into the royal carriage; it missed the bride and bridegroom, but killed the leading pair of horses of their team, splashing the new queen with blood, and killed twenty-six people and injured a hundred, directly or indirectly, for some of the 114 Bakunins Disciples injuries were caused by people being knocked down and trampled by the stampeding crowd. The Terrorists Did he himself shop them? It is by no means impossible, for, if the killing of Sergei had been yet another triumph for Azev the terrorist, it was a setback for Azev the police spy, and he might well feel that he needed a spectacular success with his Okhrana employers. The Terrorists Their information came from a local barrister, Dmitri Bogrov by name, who claimed that he knew by sight the man who would make the attempt. The Terrorists Keeping the Middle East quiet meant appeasing the Arabs; Mussolini had made a bid for their support by declaring himselfabsurdly enough to be sure but one never knew what might impress the Arabs, and there had been a time when the British upper class did not find the atti- tudinizing of this straw Caesar ludicrousthe Protector of Islam. The Terrorists His ambition was to wage open war on the British; it may be said 148 The Palestine Case that he had the temperament of a terrorist, but it is fact that, given his determination to fight Britain and his conviction that though Germany was the arch-enemy of the diaspora Jews, the arch-enemy of Zion and Gods will to make Israel an 4empire was British imperialism, terrorism was forced on him, not chosen by him. The Terrorists But he had the sensitive intuitions of the first-class police counter- terrorist; he also had a kind of sense of humour, for the two officers he sent to the flat were both Jews; and both of them were killed by the explosion. The Terrorists New members were not admitted unless known to and vouched for by two old members; and before the potential 156 The Palestine Case recruit was even approached and sounded, he was trailed for days, even weeks, so that his contacts, tastes, social behaviour were known. The Terrorists Induction into the FF1 took place in a pitch-dark room: the recruit could see nothing; he could only hear a voice which asked him certain terrible questions: did he fully under- stand and accept that, if he joined, he would become an outcast from ordinary society, with every mans hand against him, none to look to for help? Did he face the fact that if caught by the British he would be tortured? And the methods of torture used would then be described. The Terrorists One important factor the terrorists were not, of course, responsible for: the hideous revelations, at the end of the war, of what had been done to the Jews by the Nazis, acts long known to governments but unknown or only suspected by the people of the world at large, made it extremely difficult for any power to seem to be oppressing the Jews or denying them that national refuge which, now demonstrably, no people needed more urgently. The Terrorists The Arabs, believing that they could take it away from them by forceit had been well known for many centuries that the Jews cannot fightreceived a terrible shock. The Terrorists During the past quarter of a century the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary cause has, especially in what is called the Third World, been sustained by groups or bands of militants com- monly and collectively, if ungranimatically, known as guerrillas. The Terrorists They have waged war as best they could on the military and civil dictatorships usually sustained by the United States through the agency of the CIA in Latin America and Asia; and from time to time on the great oligarchies disguised as democracies, that is to say on the champions and beneficiaries of imperialist capital- ism. The Terrorists by the bombing of open cities, the use of napalm and the threat of nuclear strikes. The Terrorists Terrorism used for social or political ends is guerrilla warfare continued by other means, just as the atom-bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima was inter- national warfare continued by terrorism. The Terrorists The League of Black Revolutionary Workers in the Detroit motor-car industry is a case in point: strong enough to make propaganda films (e.g. The Terrorists Finally Got the News) and pub- lish a periodical; and with, as its aim, to seize political power by putting the means of production into the hands of the workers, it has confined its militant action to fomenting and leading strikes: for the real anarchist, who believes with Bakunin that destruction is also a way of creation, is a rare animal. The Terrorists It has repeatedly happened that large popular movements dedicated to bringing about radical social changes by peaceful 170 Guerileros or Terrorists? The Terrorists The Populist movement fathered the Peoples Will which assassinated Tsar Alexander II; and in due course the Socialist-Revolutionary Party which itself gave rise to Organization for Combat, whose extraordinary operations, directed by the double agent Azev, we have already glanced at. The Terrorists The Puerto Rican Marxist-Leninist MPI (Pro-Independence Movement) led by Juan Mari-Bras, advocating peaceful means of preparing the revolution at least until the stage of insurrection en masse is attained, nevertheless gave rise to the CAL (Armed Commandos of Liberation), which operates by terrorist sabo- tage. The Terrorists The terrorist Quebec Liberation Army was an offshoot of the pacific Quebec Liberation Front and was never repudiated by the large and relatively respectable Mouvement de Liberation Populaire. The Terrorists Their principal aim being propaganda by deed to draw attention to their desperate condition and the justice of their cause, they have not hesitated to victimize people of many nationalities. The Terrorists And of course they are criminals: as Bakunin said, the bandits are the true revolutionaries. The Terrorists Florentine Brotherhood, 356 Glenveagh evictions, 87, 88 Forster, E. M., 151 Goddard, Lord Chief Justice, 17 Forster, W. E. (Irish Secretary of Goldman, Emma (Anarchist), 11819 State), 91 Gordon, General Chinese, 53 FPAS (Iraqi), 169 Gtz (Russian revolutionary), 125, France, Anarchism in, 39, 634, 112 127 113 Goulding, Cathal, 180 , Charbonnerie founded in, 578 Governments terrorism, 9, 166, 175 , democracy in, 183 Grabe~, Trilko (Serbian terrorist), 63 , Freemasonry in, 54 Greece, repression in, 15, 16 , Russian revolutionaries in, 124 Greenwood, Sir Hamar, 102 , strikes in, 164, 172 Griffith, Arthur, 108, 109 , terrorism in, 23 Grinevitsky, Ignaty Yoakimovich Franco, General, 64, 116 (Russian assassin), 77, 78 Franco-Prussian War, 39 Grivas, General George, 179 Frank, Gerold, 146 Guerrillas, 164173 passim Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 62, 63, Guevara, Che, 180 133, 156 Franz Josef, Emperor, 59-60 Haganah, 13, 144, 145, 147, 150, 158, Freedom Fighters for Israel: see FF1 162, 171 Freemasonry, 54-5 Hakim, Eliahu (Jewish assassin), Freien or Freigelassen (young Hegel- 1612 ians), 19 Hassan, King, 167 FRELIMO, 168 Hazit (Jewish journal), 156, 158, French Revolution, 23, 184, 185 159-60 quoted Friedman-Yellin (Jewish freedom Hegel, Georg, 18, 19, 32 fighter), 152, 154, 156, 157, 158 Henry, Emile (French assassin), 113 Froude, James A., 84 Herzen, Alexander, 23, 24, 31, 68 Hijacking, 174, 176, 1778 Gaitan, Jorge Eliacem (Colombian Hirohito, Emperor, 15 Liberal leader), 168 Hiroshima, 1512, 166, 185 Galdos, Hugo Blanco (Peruvian Hitler, Adolf, 14, 22, 148 guerrilla), 1667 Ho Chi Mm, 22 Gapon, Father George, 1323, 136 Hoche, General Louis, 83 193 Index Holy Vehm, 54 [Ishutin] at Moscow University, 68 Korans justification of war, 14 Home Rule (Irish), 94 Kotlyarevsky (Russian prosecutor), How the Revolutionary Question Pre- quoted, 69 74 sents Itself (Bakunin) quoted, 38 becomes revolutionary, 69-70 Kraft (Russian revolutionary), 127, opposes liberalism, 70-1 128 Ii Biondino (Italian terrorist), 119-20 founds Organization, 71 Israel, Republic of, 13, 162 Kropotkin, Prince Ptr, 44, 118, 134 lid, Danilo (Serbian terrorist), 62,63 , Ku-Klux-Klan, 13, 657 Immanent justice, 15 fn., The Terrorists R. Fitzgerald, is reprinted by permission of Doubleday, a division of Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. The quotation in Chap. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak E. M. Kayden, is reprinted by permission of the University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak London, England First Paperback Printing zooi 1999 by the Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Guillemin, Jeanne, 1943. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak In both studies, if there was the likelihood of being rebuffed or seen as a threat by one or more government agencies or individuals, there was also the freedom to keep up the scientific investigation until the mys- tery was solved. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak According to Soviet reports, by the time it was over, at least sixty-four people had died from this rare disease. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak According to the few published reports of cases, fatal gastrointestinal anthrax and inhalation anthrax are characterized by similar initial symptoms. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak This account of the outbreak was translated by the CIA and made available to American reporters just in time to rock the BWC review ses- sion. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak In a briefing on Sverdlovsk for President Jimmy Carter by Central Intelligence Director Stansfield Turner, the amount of anthrax released in the outbreak was estimated at seventy kilograms, an amount that could seriously infect tens of thousands of square miles. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak According to the desk clerk, it is now owned by its employees. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak It added a fourth vector, insect bites, a caution based on Soviet evidence for anthrax trans- mission by horseflies.3 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak He asserts it is being wrongfully with- held by Dr. Nikiforovs son, who is also named Vladimir and is also a Moscow physician, a toxicologist who co-authored a text on botulism with his father. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Moscow CONFLICTING VISIONS The precedent that Pyotr Burgasov leans on for explaining the Sverdlovsk deaths is the 1927 anthrax epidemic in Yaroslavl, 250 kilometers north- east of Moscow, which is known to have been caused by infected meat. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak But as the deadly infection ran its course, the victims tempera- ture usually declined sharply and there was unexpected cardiac collapse accompanied by sudden chilling of the limbs, cyanosis, and a fast and thready pulse.2 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Reaching again into his folder, Burgasov takes out a signed statement by the manager of a grain prod- ucts factory located in the village of Aramil, a few kilometers south of Sverdlovsk. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak 27 MOSCOW: CONFLICTING VISIONS 90 5 ~ ~ 6 7 8 9 /0,1 / FIGURE 1. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak is a negation of everything that has already been achieved by physicians, a negation of medicine itself.13 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Much of this work builds on the discovery in the 1950S by British biochemist Harry Smith of the three components of anthrax that combine to make it deadly: protec- tive antigen, lethal factor, and edema factor. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Is it possible that some basic honesty, a need for truth- telling, has emerged as part of the glasnost spirit? On the last pages of Gogols novel Dead Souls, the Russian prince exhorts his officials to put aside dishonesty by appealing to those who still have a Russian heart and who have still some understanding of the word honour.21 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Sverdlov, not the Romanovs, would be memorial- ized by the city of Sverdlovsk and by the region (Sverdlovsk oblast) as well. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak As he recalls, a few early animal cases were followed by others. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak By her account, then, the slides the young Nikiforov showed us in Moscow, or some portion of them, belong neither to him nor to Dr. Burgasov. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak According to Dr. Abramova, she was in charge of the au- topsies and ordered the photographs, so the slides belong to her and, by extension, to her collaborator, Dr. Grinberg. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak An inexperienced fisherman didnt have buoys to mark his lobster traps and had not thought to triangulate, that is, to identify their location by multiple points. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Matthew, Shelokov, Hugh-Jones, and I have been driven there by Professor Borisov. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak In 1979, the victims were reportedly buried at the outskirts of the cemetery, but this area has since been overtaken and surrounded by newer graves. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak The only way to dis- cover the right sector is by reading the dates inscribed on each monument. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak The cases are desig- nated by number. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Now it is a question only of what the slides under the microscope, the 70 ABRAMOVAS TREASURE 71 real tissues, may reveal about portal of entry, whether by inhalation or by eating tainted meat. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Matthew continues by assuring him that he will write Semyonov if nec- essary and also do everything he can to get the Grinberg-Abramova pa- per published in English, with them as authors. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak But are the documents accurate? We can disprove or prove the epizootic expla- nation only by investigating in the affected villages. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak In the in- terim, public health workers came and gave tetracycline pills to Komin and his wife, but not to their son, who was only an infant. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak She is younger by a decade or so than Dr. Burgasov, who stumbled fortuitously into medi- cine. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak I say to Yampolskaya that, above all, the families affected by the epidemic are owed the truth. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Even as the letter to General Kharechko (translated into Russian by Shelokov) is sent off the next day, we know almost nothing about Soviet involvement in anthrax research and ab- solutely nothing about what was going on at Compound 19 in 1979. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Among the four victims we have traced, Anna Komina is the ear- liest case, not by the date of her death, but by the date of the onset of her illness, April ~. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak At that time, the authority of the Extraordinary Commission at the Sverdlovsk city level was taken over by the oblast-level commission, under the direction of Dr. Burgasov. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak After that, the SES records about the outbreak were ap- propriated by this higher commission, and they subsequently disappeared. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Third, the neighborhoods most affected by the disease had to be can- vassed and warned of the danger of contamination. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak 118 PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN Yampolskaya and I both know that her sons body was autopsied by Abramova and Grinberg on May 14 and soon after assessed as yet an- other case of classic anthrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak 120 PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN Shelokov embellishes on this bad news by warning that if we dare defy this refusal, our passports will be confiscated. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak We begin our excursion by driving to the low bluff where Compound 19 sits. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Is she de- scribing the nightmare scenario of public sales of experimental animals killed by anthrax? Not likely. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak The ap- pointment was confirmed by telephone this morning. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak She was taught by a woman whose own teachers were Irish missionary nuns in Manchuria; she meets weekly with a book group to practice English conversation. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak But the apart- ment has been sold by Nikolaevs son, who has moved away. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak As we stand outside, a train roars by, not more than fifty feet beyond the fence, and stops conversation. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak On the menu is fish he has caught that morning and plat- ters of fresh vegetables, dumplings, and fruit prepared by his daughter, a physician who, like Yampolskaya, specializes in infectious diseases. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Yablokov is personally convinced that the outbreak was caused by an accident at Military Com- pound 19, where research on anthrax was being conducted. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak 166 MOSCOW REDUX An unnamed representative from Minister Yablokovs office tells the press what we were to hear a week later, that secret documents from Sverdlovsk were held in the KGB archives until December 1990, when a decree is- sued by the Soviet Council of Ministers ordered their destruction. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Anastasia Myasnikova, aged sixty-three or sixty-four in April 1979, lived alone and died alone, with no medical records left behind; she is barely re- membered by the neighbors in her apartment building. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Fortunately, by asking more questions, he soon discovered his wife was alive. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak On July 4, two days after our Brookings debriefing, the Uni- fication Churchs Washington Times reports that in secret debriefings in 1990 a Soviet defector to Britain, a high-level scientist in a BW program, caused Western intelligence to more than double its estimate of Soviet (and by extension Russian) biological weapons production capabilities and the number of BW storage facilities run by the military.8 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Boris Yeltsin is regarded by Western intelligence sources as even less in 194 MANIFESTATION control of far-flung military facilities than his predecessor,7 not an en- couraging thought if Russia has inherited a BW behemoth. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Their re- cruits are legions of impoverished young Moslem men, deracinated by war, with no future but firing AK-47s or setting off bombs. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak MANIFESTATION 196 Its rooms were hermetically sealed, with negative pressure recorded by manometers; a special filter and ventilation system controlled the release of any aerosols from the chamber. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Our driver rams the car in front of us and is immediately rear-ended by the car behind us. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Having been in a taxi accident in New York some years before, I feel all the hor- ror of being hurtled forward, but we are only roughly jostled by the dou- ble impact. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak But our driver insists we abide by the law and wait for the police to arrive. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak An hour goes by. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Automobiles, buses, and trucks zoom by. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak The fifth disinfection, as recommended by the Moscow [veterinary] experts, was made with adding i percent chlorofos to the solution of caustic soda. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak donation is bein~ offered by the woman at the left Yekaterinburg, 1992. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak While we were in Abramovo, Ilona has confirmed by telephone that two of them were in Chkalovskiy at the beginning of April 1979, taking their required military reserve courses at Compound 32.. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak In all, ten of the victims Chernich cites were autopsied by Abramova and Grinberg, and all were unambiguously con- firmed as having died of anthrax. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Meanwhile, he is grateful for the med- ical articles and copies of the Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin 222 DO NO EVIL, SEE NO EVIL (edited by Matthew and Julian Robinson) and the copy of our draft ar- ticle we sent in advance.3 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak By Iraqs own admission to UNSCOM, it had produced six thousand liters of anthrax slurry and had deployed fifty bombs and ten al Hussein missile warheads filled with it. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Despite these resources it took six days to discern the outbreak and nine days (until April ii) to confirm the diagnosis, by which time many victims were dead or dying. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Two years before the press caught on, the research had been presented and discussed by the lead author of the article, Dr. Andrey Pomerantsev, at the Second International Workshop on Anthrax, held in Winchester, England.5 Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak It is domi- 260 RETURN TO YEKATERINBURG nated by three long soapstone tables on wooden legs, biers really, with a three-inch edge. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Each table has on top of it a tray of instruments on four legs and is lit by an adjustable round lamp. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak And what poor, wretched bodies, infected by dreaded anthrax bacteria, devasted by toxic shock. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak One typical response by a Soviet official in 1986 was communicated via Dr. Martin Kaplan, Secretary-General of the Pugwash Conferences on Sci- ence and World Affairs: I do not consider it expedient to organize this trip be- cause of a lack of questions for discussion (A. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak account for the scarcity of inhalation anthrax in the presence of virulent an- thrax bacilli in the dust and air which is being inhaled by the workers of thi~ plant. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak Nor can he explain the relatively very few cutaneous cases, except by ap- parent individual immunity. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak F., Maria (survivor), 175 control population, iii F., Valeriy (survivor), 175 316 INDEX INDEX family clusters, lack of, z6, 6465 Gusev, Yuriy, 212 Ipatiev, N. N., 37 family interviews, 1213, 58; challenges Ipatiev House, ioi, Iii, z6~ Gusterson, Hugh, 176 and, ~6, 5759, 97, 100; epizootic Iraq, 24344 and, 7778, 2023; by Ilona Niko- Hanna, Philip, 253 Israelyan, Viktor, 8 Harris, Elisa, 179, i8z nova, 169170, 2078; last visit to Ivanov, Vasiliy (victim), 173 Chkalovskiy and, 26366; narratives Henderson, D. A., 30, 17980, i8z, 246 Hersch, S., 2911114 from, 8~88, 1025, 12629, 138, Jackson, Paul, 254 Hingley, Ronald, ~ Japan: biological weapons and, 6, 249, 14146, 2078, 209, 210; outliers Holton, Gerald, 250 z8ini6; bioterrorism in, 244 and, 2013, 2079, 2IO~ summary of Homer, 23 information from, i 8o8 i; Sysertskiy K., Nikolay (survivor), 175 rayon and, 7778; tragedy of epidemic Hospital 20, 113 Kaplan, Bela, 21920 and, 117, 127, 154, i6o, 2o4; value Hospital 24, 13132 Kass, Leon, 288n3 of, 23 334 Hospital 40, 109, ii8, 133, 144, 25960 fatalism, 6768, 135, 136 hospital records, 31, 32 Kaufman, Arnold, 93 fatality rate, I, 8, 241 Hughes, Everett C., 284n3 KGB: folder on military activity, i6i6z, fateful moments, 878 8 Hugh-Jones, Martin, 30, 32, 6o, 6,, 16465; list of victims and, 16870, Feast in Time of Plague (Pushkin), z66 6z, 69, 77, 94, ii6, ii8, 122, 124, 17375, 26870, 27375 Fokina, Lilia (victim), 6~, 210 i6z; geographic locations-sad, 32, Kharechko, A. T., 77, 94, 107, 14748, Fort Detrick, Maryland, 187, 199, 253; 8o, 129; meat-processing factory and, 261 Khudyakov, Nikolay (victim), ~6, 64, 89, anthrax research at, ~, io8, 176, 189, 125; as member of team, z, i6, 22; tissue samples and, 252 24142 103 Friedlander, Arthur, 189, 254 Hussein, Saddam, 194 Klipnitzer, Yakov, io~6, 132, 234, 260 Fyodosov, Vitaliy (victim), 172, 2089, Huxsoll, David, 252 Klyestov, Ivan (victim), 170 Koch, Robert, ~, 53 237 Iliad (Homer), 23 Kolkhozes (collective farms), 40 gangster cemetery in Yekaterinburg, Ilyenko, Margarita, io6, 121, 13135, Komelskikh, Andrey (victim), 170, 174, 270 222, 264 140, 234, 260 industrialized nations, anthrax outbreaks gastrointestinal anthrax: characteristics Komin, Yuriy, 868 8, 89, 264 of outbreaks of, ~ diagnostic charac- in, 34 Komina, Anna (victim), ~6, 63, 83, infected-meat explanation, 1314, ,6, teristics of, 17, 1819; Yaroslavl epi- 8~88, 109, 16970, 174, 212, 213, 223; Burgasovs case for, i~, 2330; demic and, 14, 2324. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak See also entries for victims safety of, 85; renaming of, 3 839; Turner, Stansfield, 9 by name second visit to, 198228; third visit Vinogradov~ Dmitriy (victim), 64, 104, to, 254; Tuberculosis and Pulmonary United Nations, 9, 1848 5, 190, 194, 105, 109, 128, 213, 214, 215 Diseases Unit in, 50; during World Virgil, 3 244 War II, 3 940. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak 85 Minerals of chrome, copper, lead, zinc, uranium, man- ganese, asbestos, gold, silver, iron, sulfur, mica, nickel, slate, salt, and lapis lazuli. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan In practice, though, interrogators did not observe these limits, sometimes going so far as to kill detainees. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 For they abjure the very idea of nations or any other parochialism that limits them in time or space. Jihad vs. McWorld Dragged reluctantly from a past defined by culture and tribe into a future where velocity is becoming an identity all its own, they are accelerating toward the limits of naturethe speed of light that defines the interactions of cyberspacein quest of a palliative to (or is it a catalyst for?) their restlessness. Jihad vs. McWorld When economistic reformers think about government at all, it is in terms of negative constitutionalismpoli- tics as antipolitics, law as a set of limits on popular rule rather than as a set of populist enabling principles.3 Jihad vs. McWorld The weaknesses of local administration were disguised because its limits were rarely tested. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan MAXIMAL LIMITS OF THE COALITION The maximal unit of Islamic coalition in Bamyan was the sect. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan One of these was a book binder by trade, a revolu- tionary agitator and journalist by vocation, Johann Most. The Terrorists Their association with government and often spatial isolation from their communities resulted in the gradual weakening of their ties and 60 Afghanistan credibility as community leaders, creating a parallel structure to deal with community concerns. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society A great deal of emphasis was given to the mobilization of women and children. Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society The rising group from the second generation of the dynasty had concluded that a strong government was needed to deal with the new situation. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Be- fore that, Kabul had allowed the provincial governments as well as busi- nessmen of the area to deal with the Soviet Central Asian Republics directly, a unique concession. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 Then, as Commander Abdul Haq predicts, Maybe one day they will have to send hundreds of thousands of troops to deal with that. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 A Red Cross Deal: Prisoner Transfers Red Cross officials persisted in their attempts to find a solution. Afghanistan: The Soviet War He was told that this deal alone would net him a profit of $90 mil- lion. Inside Bin Laden The deal was completed in the first days of February. Inside Bin Laden These facilities had been dormant since the deal with Abu-Umar al-Amriki. Inside Bin Laden The crown princes visit led to a series of bilateral agreements, such as the resumption of direct scheduled flights between the two countries, the signing of a $15 million industrial cooperation deal, and the formation of a joint economic committee to formulate strategies to raise the price of oil. Inside Bin Laden The strike was yet another proof of the duplicity of the Clinton administration, no different from the unilateral violation of the deal agreed on with Abu-Umar al-Amriki. Inside Bin Laden It was clear to all that the United States was far from ready to deal with a spectacular terrorist strike even at a time when intelligence indicated that bin Laden was planning strikes in Washington and/or New York. Inside Bin Laden The oper- ation was organized in accordance with the bin LadenISI deal of spring 1998, according to which the Islamists would carry out spectacular terrorist strikes in the heart of India in return for the ISIs support, protection, and sponsorship. Inside Bin Laden policies of, 9293 Karimov (attempted), 386 in Somalia, 73, 74 Egyptian Embassy bombing and, 150 King Faisal, 45 Al-Rashidi, Ali escalating attacks against, 149-150 Mubarak (attempted), 121135, 215 accidental death of, 234 ISI purged by, 146148 the Pope (planned), 113 East African networks established by, 233 ISI support to terrorists and, 187 Sadat, 121 in Somalia, 8384, 8~, 233 Atwan, Abdul-Bari Islamists deal with, 109 Al-Safir, i8xi8z legend of the coup against, 145148 American Harvest of Blood article by, Al-S hab (Egyptian paper), 214216 Prince Turki deals with, 107 26 9270 Al-Shihabi, 346347, 362 return to power, 92 on bin Ladens Afghan bases, 198199 Al-Umari, Salman, 282 state-sponsored terrorism of, 24 bin Ladens personal message to, 293 America and the Third World War, 388 Bikahi, Sheikh, 102 on bombing of Iraq (December 1998), American Harvest of Blood article, Billah, Mustansir, Brigadier, arrest of, 352353 on U.S. globalism, 390 269270 145146 Amini, Ayatollah Ibrahim, 22 Bin Baz, Abdul-Aziz, Grand Mufti Sheikh, Australian Olympic Games operations, Among the Believers, xiv 401402 30 Amsterdam core of bin Ladens financial Awali, Muhammad Hassan, 76, 84 Bin Laden, Muhammad (father), 23 system, 313 Bin Laden, Muhammad (son), 309310 Azma, al-, 33 Anaraki, Majid, xiiixiv Bin Laden, Osama bin Muhammad. Inside Bin Laden See Al-Rashidi, communique of October 1997, 210 Ali 401402 Step Forward and in the Right Direc- Balkan war operations, ioo Basaev, Shamil, 386 tion statement (February 1998), bin Laden plans Bashir, Omar, General bombing attacks on U.S. facilities l~n Ladens expulsion from Sudan 228229 Armenian Secret Army for the Liberatio~ of and, i86 overseas (199899), 386387 Armenia (ASALA), 365 buildup of terrorist assets, 390391 Islamist efforts of, 32, 33, 35 Asakir, Jahh Riyadh, 88 Prince Sultans deal for bin Ladens evic- communiques issued after U.S. bomb- ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Lib- ing of Iraq, 358359 tion, 164 eration of Armenia), 365 defined, 343 rise to power, 35 Assad, Prince, i6ii6z, i6~ HAMAS cooperation, 365366 U.S. intervention in Sudan expected by, 8i INDEX . Inside Bin Laden And join up, conjure a little synergy: make a deal with Bill Gates, chairman of Microsoft, to produce interactive, multimedia entertainment products. Jihad vs. McWorld The newspapers compared the deal pro- jected by this triumvirate to the founding of United Artists by Mary Pickford and her friends sixty years ago, but that would be to com- pare a flotilla of battleships to a couple of cap-gun-toting kids in a rowboat. Jihad vs. McWorld million deal (now set aside) for an unwritten book by the Speaker but the meeting itself. Jihad vs. McWorld debt assumption and buyout of Cokes 49 percent holding) Time Inc. creates $14 Time Warner (Paramount tried to interdict this deal via hostile offer for Time, Inc.!) $6.i Jihad vs. McWorld Inc. as prelude to Bell-Atlantic merger, repurchases Liberty after earlier spin-off Bell Atlantic $26 (deal in jeopardy) Motorola $1.76 Jihad vs. McWorld billion from NYNEX, which had just struck another synergistic deal with the Tomem Corporation in Japan to develop cable and interactive television therethe Baby Bells were looking for product to pump through their telephone wires and cellular sys- tems. Jihad vs. McWorld Diller also was moved, if a little reluctantly, to rely on John C. Malone, one of the richest men in America and the acknowledged King of Cable, a controlling force in the countrys largest cable system, Tele-Communications (itself later involved in a gargantuan plan to merge with Bell Atlantic for $33 billion, although that deal may fall through), and in Liberty Media, a television programmer that owns Black Entertainment Television and the Family Channel and is itself a 22.5 Jihad vs. McWorld ~ China has another problem as well: how to enforce its ideologi- cally motivated centralist edicts on regions with a great deal of geo- graphical autonomy that (as instructed) are motivated more by economics than ideology and that often ignore political edicts in favor of market edicts, since the two come from the same central government, but stand in sharp contradiction. Jihad vs. McWorld 228 JIHAD VS. MCWORLD In his compelling book urging an end to laissez-faire ideology in global economics, Robert Kuttner calls for a true world central bank that would require the ceding of a substantial degree of monetary sovereignty, which in turn would mean giving up a good deal of policymaking sovereignty as well.5 Jihad vs. McWorld It is not too little faith in democratic man and woman but a great deal of faith in the power of the mind machines of McWorlds software producers that leads me to suspect the autonomy of consumer choice. Jihad vs. McWorld As in other countries, Germany still is home to a great deal of filmmaking, as many as three thousand productions each year. Jihad vs. McWorld Thomas L. Friedman, A Peace Deal Today Really Is a Bargain, The New York Times, September i I, 1994, Section 4, p. I. 8. Jihad vs. McWorld See also Olympic Games, 174, 183, 294 Motown, 141 spec~flc nation-state Oman, 43, 4~, 47 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 8 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty ONeill, Michael J., ,i, Mozambique, 55 Organization), 227 Organization for Economic Cooper- MT\~ 78, 194, 275; and advertising, NBC Network, 141 ation and Development (OECD), 64, 104; and Americanization of Netherlands, 9 global television, 1o3; and books, 34, 43 Yeues Forum, i8i, 26061,262,278 121; and consumption, logb; as Orgintz, Eileen, 134 Nevzorov, Aleksandr, G., 256 creator of cultural values, 1045, Ornstein, Norman, 122 New Deal, 238 io8, 1o9bo; and democracy, Ortega y Gasset, Jose, i6o New and Electronic Data, 114 1089; and diversity vs. universality, Ossi Park (Germany), 13334, 265 ii~i6; indigenous-language pro- New Line Cinema, 142 Ovitz, Michael, 62, 66, 8i, 145 Yew Republic, 294 gramming of; io~ as infomercials, Yew York magazine, I 14 146; internationalization of, 1045, Yew York Post, 103 io8; lyrics of, ,,o, III; messages of, Pakistan, 55, 105, 207 Yew York Times, 6~6i, 89 Palmer; Geoffrey, 22627 10910; as mindless, log; number The Yew York Times Boo/c Review, 120, of viewers of, 1o45; and politics, Panasonic, 141 121 1o9II; and satellites, 1045, io8 Pandemonium prophets, 299 New York Times Company, 124, 145 Paramount Communications: and multiculturalism, 9, II, 97 The Yew Yorker, 126 multinational corporations. Jihad vs. McWorld Despite the use of Islamic terms, a great deal of confusion remains about the meaning, purpose, and structure of jihad in general and the armed struggle in Afghanistan in particular. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan For example, a great deal was made of the fact that T.E. Lawrence, under the pseudonym of Shaw, happened to be stationed at the time at an R.AF base in the North-West Frontier Province. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan That is, he sought central government intervention in local political affairs with a rival ethnic group; he hoped through this action to consolidate local support for his political leadership by demonstrating to the Sheikhanzai that he could deal with the government and demon- strating to the government that he represented the Sheikhanzai. Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan When it appeared that Washington was planning another military strike against Bin Laden, the Taliban tried to cut a deal with Washington to allow him to leave the country in exchange for US recognition. Taliban A new team of US diplomats began to deal with Afghanistan in both Washington and Islamabad and the new US Assistant Secretary for South Asia, Karl Inderfurth, knew Afghanistan as a former journalist and was much closer to Albright than Raphel was to Christopher. Taliban A new team of US diplomats began to deal with Afghanistan in both Washington and Islamabad and the new US Assistant Secretary for South Asia, Karl Inderfurth, knew Afghanistan as a former journalist and was much closer to Albright than Raphel was to Christopher. Taliban There are also reports that Najibullah was hoping to do a deal with the Taliban because of their common ethnic origins and that he left the compound voluntarily. Taliban It would then be possible for negotiations to be somewhat less constrained by abstract notions of, for instance, Western or Islamic values and to be The Taliban 152 based on a dialogue between two groups of people with different perspectives who seek to explore whether or not a deal is achievable, while accepting that it may not be. The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan The assassination of Lord Moyne served to focus the attention of the whole world on the breakdown of law and order in Palestine, and Britains failure to deal with it. The Terrorists Burgasov comments he never even hears it; I take that to mean that he is alone with his thoughts a good deal and can shut out bad noises. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak We are on the track of a rumor we heard in Abramovo that the postmistress there, named CHKALOVSKIY: THE FINAL PIECES 210 Anna, knows a good deal about the outbreak, and we want to find any military victims we can. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak