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Here is the list of searched books:

Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society
Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Afghanistan: The Soviet War
Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan
Inside Bin Laden
Jihad vs. McWorld
Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan
Taliban
The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan
The Terrorists


                                 These forces have been receiving arms
and materials as well as training from the United States, Iran, China,
 Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

Following the agreement with the USSR,
 4fghanistan concluded treaties with Turkey, Iran, France and Italy.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                    Pakistan appeared to
be far more attractive to Americans than Afghanistan or even Iran in
the late forties as the key nation that could make the United States a
key lever in the stability and security of the Persian GulfSouth Asian
region, and in this major policy decision the United States was strongly
 influenced by the British foreign office.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                                    But
Daoud ended up with a pact with the Shah of Iran which was seen by
others as a move to reduce Soviet influence in the Northern Tier and an
understanding with Pakistans volatile President, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
 to run down the Pushtunistan movement.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                        The Shah of
Iran announced a planned trip to Kabul in June, and Daoud himself
said he would be visiting President Carter in Washington before the
 end of the year.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                           In Iran, the
Shah could hear the first rumblings of a very different Islamic fiinda-
mentalist upheaval that would throw him and his regime out in less
 than a year.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                         The Islamic revolutionary regime of Iran
could not extend to the Afghan fundamentalists as much help as it
 might have done if it had not been locked in a wasting war with Iraq.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

  The political-strategic implications of the intervention were debated
and decided at the Politburo of the CPSU, and this difficult exercise
took into account, as Brezhnev disclosed after the intervention, all
aspects of the traumatic projected Soviet action, especially its impact
on Soviet-American relations, and on political alignments in the
strategic regions of the Persian Gulf, southern Africa and South Asia
The civil war in Afghanistan has continued for five years; it has
involved not only the PDPA and its opponents in Afghanistan, but a
number of external nations, notably the Soviet Union, the United
 States, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and India.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

The great American debacle in Iran pleased
 Ustinov and Gromyko.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                       Soviet pronounce-
ments implied that just as the United States was trying to operate a
comprehensive strategy for Iran, the Persian Gulf, Pakistan and
Afghanistan, so were the Soviets pushing a comprehensive counter-
strategy for the entire area with a view to reducing American influence,
enhancing Moscows own, and turning the regional balance of power,
if not against the United States, then, at least in favour of a Soviet
presence on a par with Americas in regional stability and conflict-
management
The Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan brought out into the
open some of the changes that had already occurred in global and
 regional power equations.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                    In the Middle East, the American military-diplomatic
initiatives in Lebanon ground to a halt, in the Persian Gulf, the two
superpowers were constrained to act along parallel lines to see that the
seemingly unending war between Iraq and Iran did not create a
 situation compelling either, and therefore, both, of them to intervene.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

          The collapse of the Shah of Iran, the Khomeini revolution,
and the hostage crisis seemed to put American vital interests in the
 strategic Persian Gulf in seriousjeopardy.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                             Not only was mutual trust and confidence
completely lacking between Washington and Moscow in December
1979, but both laboured under the fear that the other was about to
embark on military action in Iran that would gravely injure its vital
 security interests.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                          per cent The prices of foodstuff
remained three times lower than in Iran and at least two times lower
than in Pakistan6
With the summit conference of the non-aligned nations in New
Delhi in mind, the PDPA offered, in February 1983, to hold a grand
jirgall with tribal chiefs who had fled to Peshawar, and reiterated its
readiness to settle the Afghan crisis in direct negotiations with Pakistan
 and Iran.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                 The United States had only a skeletal
presence in the country, the influence of the Shah of Iran on Mohammed
162 Afghanistan
 Daoud perturbed neither the Kremlin nor the Afghan nationalists.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

For offers to talk to Pakistan and Iran, seeBakhtar news agency release of
 16 February 1983.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

Gregory Oswald and AnthonyJ.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

As Shias, their loyalty
 to Iran was a major reason for disunity.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                Some followed the Ayatullah
Khomeini of Iran as a political as well as a religious leader, while others
 followed him only as a religious leader.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                 He can do so only when the Islamic funda-
mentalists and the governments of Iran and Pakistan leave the Afghans
to themselves to set up a political leadership in accord with their social
 conventions.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                      An unfortunate
group of sixteen Pakistanis, with two Chinese, two Americans, and an
Egyptian, were arrested in Kabul, accused of being agents to create
 bloody pogroms and murder.7
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                 The government did not mention the
name of Iran, although the Afghan Shiite followers of the Ayatullah
 Khomeini were active in the uprising and had chanted his name.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                               The
promotion of Kishtmand was also important because it would placate
the Shiite Hazaras and improve relations with the Khomeini govern-
 ment of Iran.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                  Premier
Sharif of Pakistan paid a brief visit to Mojaddidi, granting him $io mil-
lion and promising to provide foodstuffs; the Islamic Republic of Iran
 followed suit.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Also, as the guardian of an important frontier
 province, he showed vigilance about the intrigues of Iran.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                          Its original rapid
progress was curbed by the Islamist organizations of Islamic Association and
 the Islamic Party of Hekmatyar (Z.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

      Unlike many Shias, Muhsini follows the Iran-based ayatullah of the Shia de-
nomination only in religious affairs, not in secular affairs: hence the expulsion
of his organization from Iran and his willingness to cooperate with the Afghan
 Sunni resistance organizations in Peshawar (N.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                  They
will bring half of Iran into Afghanistan under the flag of [the] Herat
 division.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Iran and Pakistan have a common plan against us.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

         Maybe you may tell me now what assessments you can offer con-
cerning Pakistan and then Iran? Do you have connections with pro-
gressive-minded people in Iran? Can you tell them that at present
your chief enemy is the United States [?] Iranians are very embittered
against the United States and probably this can be used for propa-
 ganda purposes.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

     Today we have broadcast a statement to the Iranian government
pointing out that Iran interferes in our home affairs in the Herat
 region..
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Do you believe that if Herat falls Pakistan will act the same way as
 Iran does?
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Iran sends service men in civil[ian] clothes to
 Afghanistan.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Judg-
 ing by the example of Iran and Pakistan we see that it is easy to do.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

           [The] Iranian revolution is an example: the people threw
out all Americans and all other peoples too who tried to show them-
 selves as defenders of Iran.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                        Tens of thou-
sands of refugees were fleeing into Pakistan and, to a lesser extent,
 Iran.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

tion against Iran.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                            These do not include
the hundreds of thousands of civilians, many of them refugees in
 Pakistan and Iran, who often double up as partisans.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                The fundamentalists are themselves at
odds as to whether they want a progressive Islamic republic or one as
 radical as Ayatollah Khomeinis Iran.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                  West
~ G-3s from the arms bazaars of Pakistan or brought in
 from Iran are also very popular among guerrilla commanders.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                         When Daoud,
who wanted to ensure his countrys continued non-alignment, refused
to join the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organisation
 
CENTO) with Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Britain and the United
States, the Americans opted for the Pakistanis (also a member of the
South-East Asia Treaty Organisation  SEATO) to whom they
93
Soviet Influence in Afghanistan
 regularly supplied weapons and other forms of support.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Moreover, according to Mohabbat and other sources, ten out of fifteen
Afghan diplomats posted to Iran, Pakistan and India in the summer
 and early autumn of 1981 were in fact KHAD agents.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

As trade decreases with Pakistan, Iran and other coun-
 tries, more goods are being brought down from the USSR via this route.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Khomeini sheiks (mullahs trained at the Shiite holy centres of Qom in
 Iran or Nadjaf in Iraq).
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

           de Gaulle, General 78, 193
Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin 56, 167,
Gaylani, Sayed Ahmad 56,171, 172
169-71, 175,194
Geneva Conventions (1949) 223, 225,
helicopter gunshlps 16, 20, 23, 33,
226,228,230; Protocols (1977)
35, 36,41-3, 45, 60,65,81-5
223,225, 226
passlm, 114,118,127,162,169,
GenghisKhan4,56, 164
220, 233, 239
genocide, migratory 7,35,161,202,
Helmand province 9, 112-1 3, 189-90,
237,248; see also refugees
204; River 94
geology 152-3, 165
Helsinki Watch Group, New York
geopolitical factors 26-8
238
Germany 90,117,120; East 93,117,
Herat 8, 15, 17, 23, 35, 39, 44, 55,
120,122,124,139
74,101, 115-16, 126, 146, 184,
Ghazni 55,171,172,199,204;
196,216,233
Sirdar of 58
Herle, Jean-Denis 143
Giap, Van Nguyen 78
Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party)
Gorbachev, Mikhail 134
(Hekmatyar faction) 56, 169-7 1,
Gorchniski, Mikhail Semyonovich
174-5, 
194,195, 196, 229;
226-7
(Khales faction) 48, 56, 70, 74,
113, 167-9, 194,196,226,227,
lovernment in exile 192-4, 241
241
lovernment officials 7,22,62-3,
73, 82,86, 128, 135,138-40
highways 5,8,15,21,40,60,61,
Great Game 2
93-4,119, 185
Grenada 151,239,240
Hindu Kush 21, 33, 51,76
Grigorenko, Marshal 191
Homer, John Evans 92
Groupe Mujadeddin-e-azad (Group
hospitals 220-1,224-5
of Independent Mujahideen) 74-5
housing shortages 182, 207
Index
254 Index
Khalq/Khalqis5, 9,14,15,22,31,
United Front) 57,74
human rights 121-7 passlm, 190,238;
62,76,97,101-6,110-17,119,
Jalalabad 12, 20, 49, 50, 51, 126,
International Federation of 122
130,135-6,146,151,164, 166,
148,169
humanitarian rights 223-32
172, 174-5, 196, 197, 203
Jamiat-i-IslamI (Islamic Society) 56,
Hungary 26
Khalq 96
74,168, 170, 184, 188, 194,
Hussein, Sayed Djendnal 55,297
Khan, Ismail 55, 68,168, 196
195, 199,241
hydno-electnic power 153-5 passim
Khomeini 27, 29,56, 129, 157, 169,
Japan 90, 120, 239
200; Khominists 57, 66, 199-20 1
Jawana-i-Musalman (Militant Muslim
Ideology 27,57,102,145-8,174,
Khrushchev, Nikita 93
Youth) 56, 78, 166
183
Khyber, Mu Akbai 102,103
Jebhe-ye melii-te Najat-e Afghanistan
India 25,27,28,88,90,92,95,98,
Khyber Tribal Agency 203
(National Front for the Salvation
101,104,139,150,159,228,
kidnappings 59,73, 148, 170,227
of A.) 54,56, 171, 173, 193
235
Kipling, Rudyard 2
Jehani, Ban (vice-president, Kabul
Indian Ocean 26,28,29,159
Kirghiz 46,208-9
TV) 149-50
Indochina 25, 34, 38; see also
Kishtmand, Sultan Ali 96, 105, 107,
Jihad 2,5, 6,52,58, 194
Vietnam
157,235
Jirghas 69,101-2,108, 131-2, 172,
indoctrination 5,63,132,138,
Kissilov, Valery Yunkevich 229
193-4
Kochka Riven 154, 160
142-3,145-8, 174, 237,see also
Komoskaya Pravda 247
job competition 207
propaganda; training
journalists 9-10, 31-2, 38, 128, 151,
Korea, North 67
infiltration, of government 62-3,
168, 187, 189,229,238,243,
Kouli, Mohammad Yazkoulev 229
130; of mujahideen/refugees 118,
248
krasnaya Zvezda 247
124,128-30,193
Jouvenal, Peter 48
Kunar province 107,113, 115,190-1,
inflation 160, 182
Jouzjan province 157
195,211;Valley 33-4,83
informers 62-3
intelligence, mujahldeen 62-3, 67,
Kunduz province 15,42,60,66,160,
Kabul 8, 16, 17,40,44,55, 59,60,
74,82,130; Soviet 14,233
161; River 155
62,64,70,72-6,80, 114,116,
Interdiction tactics 37-9
Kurds/Kurdistan 210,215
117,126,140, 141, 149,152,
International Bureau for Afghanistan,
Kutchis 199
159, 172, 175-82, 216, 234;
Paris 211
Kuwait 8
University 91, 125, 141-5 passim,
interrogations 117, 122,124, 125,
Kuzichkin, Major Vladimir 14
166,see also Radio; airport 12,
126
16,76, 80,94; Polytechnic 145
invasion, Soviet 4,8,9, 1247; cost
Laber, Jeri 238
Kakar, Professor Hassan 125
of 135, 160-1;reasons for 26-9,
land reform 106,111-13,131,132
Kalakani, Mjaid 57
152
Laumonier, Dr Laurence 215-16,
KAM 117,121,122
Iran 22,25, 27-9passlm,88,91,92,
218, 219,221
Kamyan, Mohammed Nabi (Minister
101,157, 159,235; and
I.ayeq,Suleiman 132
of Health) 158
mujahideen 10,54, 56, 57,65,
legal factors 26
Kandahar 8,9, 12, 15, 17-20, 35, 39,
66,115, 129,200-1,235,242;
Libya 67,170
40, 44,57,59, 74, 94, 101,126,
and refugees 7,24,54,128,
literacy programmes 115, 242;
159,204,233
132, 202,209-10
National 146-7
Kar-Kum Canal 155
Iraq 29,92
livestock 207,209,211,214
Karmal see Babrak
iron ore 29, 153, 159
lobbying, international 37, 208,
Karokhel, Hassan Khan 62
irrigation schemes 154-5,242
2434
Kazakhs 208
Islam 6,26-7,31,36,52,55,77,
Logan province 39,65,121,171,221
Kerala 107-10
100,106, 113-14, 131, 145, 149,
losses, civilian 6-7,85, 110,118,
KGB 14,35, 36,41,63,98,99,
169,218,241
1234, 126-7, 178-80; foreign 8,
122,124, 129,130,139, 147,
Islamic Alliance 193; Pan- Union
22, 119-20; government 7,44, 45,
207,208, 245
101; Republic 27, 56, 169; Unity
110; Soviet 7,14-15, 19, 21,34,
KHAD 105, 117, 124-31 passim,
65,193,194, of A. Mujahideen
35,38,44,45,75,83,85,115,
133, 140, 145,147, 164, 180,
55
116,152,236,246-8
182,201,207,220, 222, 229,
Israel 170
Lycee Istiqlal 125, 143, 145, 179;
233
Italy 90
Nejat 99, 145
Khairaton 158-9
van Lynden, Aernout 70
Khales, Younis 48, 56, 70, 168-9,
Jabha Mobarezin 57,118
194, 227, 228
Jabha Motahed-e Mdi (National
Madjnuh, Dr Sayed Burhanudin 141
255
Mahaz-e meW-ye Islami (National
Islamic Front) 56, 171, 172
Makbar, Soi 149
Maihuret, Dr Claude 211
Maniere, Dr Philippe 218
Mansoor, Sayiid 196
Mao-Ze-Dung 41, 78-9
massacres 6-7, 107-10, 123, 126-8
Massoud, Ahmed Shah 55, 62, 68,
69, 76-87, 150, 168, 184-5, 188,
196,221, 233,234
Maximov, Vladimir 191
Mazar-l-Sharif 8, 15, 46, 54, 55, 57,
59, 93, 126, 154, 156, 184, 185
Medecins du Monde 215; sans
Frontieres 198, 211, 215
media 148-51;see also individual
headings
medical organisations 7, 215-23;
supplies 86
MIs see helicopter gunships
Middle East 27, 184,240
MIGs 16,20, 30, 35, 45, 60, 77,
81, 83,113,127,237
migration, nomad 88, 95
militia 61,62,117,125,129-30,
137, 141,142,151, 196; Hazara
198-9
mineral resources 29, 152, 153-8
passim
mines, butterfly 213-14, 238
modernisation 88, 89,92, 100, 104,
183; see also reforms
Mohabbat, Mohammad Daoud 139,
140
Mohammadi, Maulawi 54, 74, 169,
17 1-2
Mohseni, Sheikh Asaf 241
monarchists 172, 173, 194-5
Mongolia 88, 104
morale, army 136, 137; civilian 164;
mujahideen 58; Soviet 247
moutariks 79-81
Mujadeddi, Sibghatullah 54, 56,
171-3
mujahideen 1-4, 6,7, 8, 20,21,23,
30-2, 34, 37-9, 42-5, 48-55,
58-87, 107-13, 119,129, 131-3,
 152, 157, 158, 161-6, 170.1,
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

             6,16-17,25,28,32-5,40,42,
236
Sovietisation 135-61, 236-8
SSD 120, 122, 123
Stalin, Josef 89
strikes 176-8 passlm
students 89, 91,92, 141-5, 147,151,
166, 177-80,218
subversion, Soviet 5,25,28, 35-6,
41-2, 187, 233, 243
Sultani Valley 9
Sunnis 10, 27,54, 196
supply routes 37-8, 634; see also
caravans
Sweden 211,216,242
Switzerland 229-32 passlm
Tadjikistan, Soviet 116,156
Tadjiks 10, 54, 57,58, 66, 68, 133,
199,203; Soviet 145
Takhax province 2,42,66
talks, Geneva 82, 139,193,234,235;
Soviet-mujahldeen 86
Tanaki, President Nun Mohammad
8,22,23,24,31,52,96-8,102,
103,105,106,110,116,117,
119,121,143,153,203
TASS 245
taxation 62,185-6, 198
Technoexport 154
Termez 15, 158, 159
Thiebolt, Mlchel 160
Third World 236,239
Tigr Relief CommIttee 212
torture 7, 117, 121, 122, 124, 125,
126, 128, 170, 179,223
Index
259
trade 159,207
Voice of America (VOA) 81, 148, 188,
traditionalist elements 55, 129,
189, 246
1834
volunteer agencies 7, 10, 205-6, 242
trail, Jihad 634
trainIng 66,68,76,78,79,93, 138,
Wakhan corridor 208-9
225; in Soviet Union 63, 76, 93,
Waltan Palanzaj 148
124, 130, 138, 141, 142, 147-8,
war: Indochina 225; Indo-Pakistan 100;
154,236,237
Iraq-Iran 29, 201; World II 90
treaty, Afghan-SovIet (1921) 88,
Wardak province 55, 172, 184
(1978) 26, 104,244; Afghan-US
Wardak, Col Abdul Rahim 65
90
Wardak, Mohammed Amin 55, 172,
trials, show 125
196
tribal elements 5, 10, 36, 54, 58,
water, irrigation 152, 154-5
69-70,78,97,131-3, 141,183,
Wazinstan, Northern 39
184; MInistry of 124, 131-3
Western interest 23841
truces 132-3; Soviet-mujahIdeen 85-7
wheat 160
Tudeh party 29, 129, 20~
Wikh-e-Zalmaiyan (Enlightened Youth)
Turkestan 30
91, 92, 98
Turkey 92,93,208 209
withdrawal, Soviet 6, 40, 235, 240
Turkmens 46, 54, 133, 203, 208
women 164, 218-19;
TV 148,149,151,239
Democratic  Organisation of A.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                           The mountains emanate
out of the Pamir Knot in the east toward Iran in
 the west and enclose several arid plateaus.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

forms the boundary
 between Afghanistan and Iran.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

Other cities in
 Iran and in Iraq make similar claims.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

    Qandahar independent from Persian rule in 1709
A. D. He ruled for about six years and established
the Ghilzai Dynasty of rulers in Afghanistan and
 in Iran.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                         It ap-
pears that between 3000 and 1000 B. C. this was
a crossroads for those traveling from the Indus
 Valley, Iran, and Mesopotamia.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

tends from the northwest spurs of the Kohe Baba
 range toward the border of Iran.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                             A British military of-
north and constitutes the border between Afghanis -
tan and Iran for 65 miles before it crosses the
 confluence of the Afghan-USSR boundaries.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

    Followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran view the United States as a
land preoccupied with the adulation and worship of money, and Majid
Anaraki, an Iranian who lived for several years in southern California, de-
scribed the United States as a collection of casinos, supermarkets, and
whore-houses linked together by endless highways passing through
XIV 
 .
	Inside Bin Laden

                                         Furthermore, fifty-nine of the
participating Yemenis had been trained in Iran and received weapons via
 the Iranian Embassy in Sana.
	Inside Bin Laden

   baddin Hekmatiyars Hizb-i Islami primarily through the numerous agents
in his own military council, which included representatives not only from
 the Muslim Brotherhood but also from Libya, Iran, and the PLO.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                            In the
mid-198os Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar was known to have visited Libya and
 Iran and was rumored to have visited the PDRY.
	Inside Bin Laden

        Convinced that Pakistans destiny lay in strategic alliances with
such countries as Syria, Iran, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), and
North Korea, Benazir Bhuttos Islamabad reexamined all aspects of Pak-
istans involvement in Afghanistan, and the world of state-sponsored ter-
 rorism became an instrument of crucial significance for Pakistans policy.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                   Controlled
and sponsored by Iran and run via Sudan under the leadership of Sheikh
Turabi, the Islamist International is the realization of Ayatollah Khomeinis
original vision of an ecumenical all-Islamic revolution that does not distin-
 guish between Sunnis and Shiites.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                               The Islamists
have bases and support facilities in Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan,
where they receive advanced military, terrorist, clandestine, and subversion
 training from an international cadre of expert trainers.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                     36 CRISIS AND REBIRTH
Sudans profound shift toward Iran occurred in the early spring of 1991,
in the wake of the Gulf Crisis and particularly because of Saddam Husseins
 failure to conduct the genuine jihad he had promised to wage.
	Inside Bin Laden

In mid-1992 Iran gave Sudan
 an additional $30 million to expedite terrorist training.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                               Most of
them were deployed in Iran, Sudan, and Yemencountries that constituted
 their primary forward bases.
	Inside Bin Laden

For example, in Kenya the Islamic Party, supported by Sudan and Iran,
 emerged as a major power in Mombasa, Kenyas main port.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                    In the aftermath of the
Khartoum conference, over a period of from six to eight weeks, Aidid and
his key military and intelligence aides traveled repeatedly to Iran, Yemen,
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda to acquaint themselves with the other com-
 ponents of the master plan.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                Aidid himself traveled clandestinely at least
twice to both Sudan and Iran in order to discuss strategy and methods of
dealing with the international forces in Somalia as well as to coordinate
the modalities for the arrival of increased aid should the situation escalate
 into military confrontations.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                    In the aftermath of the
Khartoum conference, over a period of from six to eight weeks, Aidid and
his key military and intelligence aides traveled repeatedly to Iran, Yemen,
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda to acquaint themselves with the other com-
 ponents of the master plan.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                Aidid himself traveled clandestinely at least
twice to both Sudan and Iran in order to discuss strategy and methods of
dealing with the international forces in Somalia as well as to coordinate
the modalities for the arrival of increased aid should the situation escalate
 into military confrontations.
	Inside Bin Laden

He established working relations with the intelligence services of Iran
 and Iraq that would prove useful in his rise to the top.
	Inside Bin Laden

radical alliance dominated by the Peoples Republic of China and stretching
 from the Mediterranean to Northeast Asia.
	Inside Bin Laden

              Immediately after her return to power in fall 1993 she
embarked on a series of political moves that would formulate the new
 grand strategy for a postCold War and postGulf Crisis Pakistan.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                        Among
the participants were key intelligence officials from Iran, Sudan, and Syria,
as well as senior commanders from various Islamist organizationsthe
Islamic Action Front (Jordan), the Popular Front for the Liberation of
PalestineGeneral Command, HAMAS (the Palestinian Islamist terrorist
organization operating in Israel and the territories), HizbAllah, Jordanian
 104 .
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                  For several
years a large cadre of Saudi Islamists, from 15,000 to 25,000 fighters strong
and spearheaded by over 5,ooo Saudi Afghans, had been being trained,
prepared, and equipped in camps in Iran, Sudan, Yemen, and Pakistan-
 Afghanistan.
	Inside Bin Laden

This time it was Turabis Sudan, rather than Iran, that moved to the
 forefront of the assault on pro-Western regimes, especially Egypt.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                 Having examined possible
motives of Iraq, Iran, and Israel to strike in Riyadh, al-Hayah concluded
that the Saudi government could have done nothing to warrant such an act
 of terrorism.
	Inside Bin Laden

The two players who acted as the primary catalysts for this
 escalatory process were Osama bin Laden and Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                 Originating from bases in
Iran, Afghanistan-Pakistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, they traveled to Saudi
 170 .
	Inside Bin Laden

                                              Such leaders have included
Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, of World Trade Center fame; Sheikh Abd-
Allah Yussuf Azzam, bin Ladens mentor in Afghanistan; and Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, who inspired Iran and ignited a global Islamist move-
 ment.
	Inside Bin Laden

              The heart of this conspicuous activity [against Egypt] runs
through Afghanistan, Iran, and Sudan, but centers in the mountainous area
of Khorassan in Afghanistan, home to training camps of the new wave of
 Arab Afghans.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                         NEW ALLIES IN THE WAR
high-level Iranian source explained that Tehran resolved to send the mes-
sage to all concerned that Iran was capable of imposing its revolution and
spreading terror to the territory of whoever calls into question its status as
 a key regional player.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                      The turning point occurred in early
February 1998 with the formalization of the strategic cooperation between
 Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Egypt.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                  Since the early 1990S Iran and Sudan have
been engaged in a fierce campaign to consolidate their control over the Red
 Sea and the Horn of Africa.
	Inside Bin Laden

  mid-October, Hashemi-Rafsanjani explained that his visit opened a histori-
cal opportunity for Islamic Iran to help develop and reconstruct the African
 continent.
	Inside Bin Laden

               He noted the vain attempts of the U.S. to pressure African states
against broadening their relations with Iran and concluded that the
African states and people have evaluated the benefits of trade and economic
ties with Islamic Iran and are ready to become free of the self-interested poli-
 cies of the West.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                         For
example, on October 17 Iran Air started a flight to Nairobi via Dubai as the
 first step in a planned extension of services to other African capitals.
	Inside Bin Laden

            Quotations from Hashemi-Rafsanjanis September 1996 speech to
the Shiite community in Tanzania in support of Iran were now used by the
 2.40
	Inside Bin Laden

Najafabadi then called a clandestine meeting at the security and in-
 telligence building in Daraj, Iran.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                 HUMILIATING THE ENEMY
Crown Prince Abdallah initiated the Saudi drive for rapprochement
with Iran when he attended the eighth OIC Summit in Tehran in December
 1997.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                             In early Septem-
ber 1998 the crisis between Iran and the Taliban over the Talibans killing in
August of nine Iranian diplomats and the slaughter of over 4,000 Afghan
Shiites during the fighting in northern Afghanistan almost reached the
 point of a war between Iran and the Taliban.
	Inside Bin Laden

Pakistan and Iran are plagued with acute, seemingly insoluble socioeco-
 nomic problems.
	Inside Bin Laden

                  At the same time because of their strategic develop-
mentsthe acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missilesPakistan
 and Iran are perceived as the leaders of the strategic ascent.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                            As a consequence,
overall, the strategic center within the Hub of Islam has shifted eastward to
 the non-Arabic nations of Iran and Pakistan.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                      GLOSSARY
supreme authority is in the hands of the ulema, with the spiritual leader con-
sidered the ultimate authority of the state and the community Iran is the only
 distinctly Shiite state.
	Inside Bin Laden

                           Arab)
Al-S hira (Lebanon)
Al-Thawarah (Syria)
Al-Vefagh (Iran)
Al-Wafd (Egypt)
Al-Watan (Kuwait)
SOURCES  4I~
Al-Watan (Oman)
Hrvatski Obzor (Croatia)
Duga (Yugoslavia)
Al-Watan (Qatar)
Hrvatski Vojnik (Croatia)
The East-African (Kenya)
Al-Watan al-A rabi (Europe-based
Hurmat (Pakistan)
 Economist (U.K.)
	Inside Bin Laden

              See Weapons of mass
Chamran Savehi, Mahdi
destruction
Arabian Peninsula operations, 154
 Bombings (Islamist).
	Inside Bin Laden

                    See also Khobar Tow-
birth and early life of, 154
ers bombing (1996); U.S. embassy
Committee of Three under, 158
bombings (August 1998)
as Iranian External Intelligence chief,
Aden hotels (1992), 72
in Buenos Aires (1992), 153
153, 154155
in U.S., 154
Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad ~
Chamran Savehi, Mostafa, 154
143145, 
150
Charities, Islamist
in India (i~~), 210211
Khobar Towers, U.S. barracks in
in Balkans, icc
expansion of, 315316
Dhahran (1996), 151, 152, i~8,
as financial tools, 4445
159160, 
i66, 167176, 277, 278
in Iraq, 323
Military Cooperation Program building
Western aid in Somalia criticized by, 6z
135, 136138, 140143
~ 
Chechnya
in Mogadishu (August II, 1993), 8o
dealings in weapons of mass destruction,
Pan American flight 103 (1988), 178
Philippine Airlines ~ 113
328329, 
330
Islamist activities in, 385386
in 
Saudi Arabia (November ,995) (de-
 Chemical weapons.
	Inside Bin Laden

                        See Weapons of mass
fused), 142143, i6i, 163164
destruction
in Tashkent (February 1999), 386
Cheney, Dick, 30
TWA flight 8oo explosion (1996), 152,
Christendom, historic Islamic confrontation
158, 178180, i8z
with, xxi, xii
U.S. embassies (August 1998), zo8, 231271
 CIA.
	Inside Bin Laden

               High Risk
Algeria 
Iran 
Iraq 
Libya 
Nigeria 
Yugoslavia 
TOTAL 
Moderate Risk
Albania
Angola
Argentina
Brazil
Cameroon
China
Commonwealth
of Independent
States*
Congo
Egypt
Gabon
India
The Resource Imperative 
Kuwait
 845.3
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                            THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD
In the moderate-risk group, non-Arab nations account for about
21 million barrels a day (better than a third of global production),
while the Middle East tinderbox (not including high-risk-category
Iraq and Iran) accounts for nearly 13 million more barrels a day, or
 another fifth of world production.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

 MTVs audience, united for all its ideological differences and cul-
tural reluctance by satellite and the United Colors of Benetton,
includes not just Taiwan but China, not only Israel but Iran and
Saudi Arabia, secessionist Georgia as well as progressive Hungary,
io6  THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD
Music Televisions Reach Around the World
Television and MTI2~ Mc Worlds Yoisy Soul  107
Countries that receive Music Television
Countries that do not currently receive Music Television
J. Sinclair, 995
io8  THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD
Brazil no less than Mexico, Bangladesh and Vietnam as well as India
and Hong Kong, and, along with South Korea, North Korea too (see
 map, pages 106107).
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                    1
294  Afleiword
President Rafsanjani of Iran is continuing to reach out to the West
for renewed trade ties, but militants are setting cinemas on fire and
assaulting women on bicycles to display their attachment to the cul-
 ture in whose name he rules.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                          1045, io8;
in Iran, 8283, 207; and trade
agreements, 91
Saudi Arabia, 43, 45, 47, 105, 207
savings and loan industry; 28
Scammell, Michael, 257
SCEEPZ (Santa Cruz Electronic
Export Processing Zone), i8
Schachter; Oscar, 226
Scheer; Robert, iii
Schlesinger; Arthur; Jr., 9
Schmookler, Andrew Bard, 237
Schwab, Klaus, 29495
Schoenhuber; Franz, i8o
Scorsese, Martin, 92
Scott Foresman, 114,126
Scripps-Howard, 124
Seabrook, John, 104
Sears, 76
secularism: destructive elements of,
211
Seghers, Anna, 266
 Seinfeld, Jerry, 12!
	Jihad vs. McWorld

sofication of their Central Asian republics and have always feared
that influences from the south (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan) would
 infiltrate across the border.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

              At first it may seem surprising that the Khalq govern-
ment pursued a strategy of redistribution similar to that adopted by
 the Shah of Iran.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

            However, as in Iran, most of the land belonging to
large owners in Afghanistan was cultivated by sharecroppers or
 tenant farmers.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                              220
ISLAMIC COALITIONS IN BAMYAN
Imaini pirs similarly acknowledged higher authorities in Iraq and
 Iran.*
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

          The Imami pirs of Afghanistan were sometimes called mujtahids (learned
enough to make innovative interpretations), but most people acknowldged that
they were not true mujtahids; all of the true mujtahids, people told me, were in
 Iraq and Iran.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                      These institutions are more typical of many
Afghan villages, as well as of many of the nomadic populations of
 Iran.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

ry of Modern Iran, Iranian Studies 9: 259-304.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

Islam and Authority in Tribal Iran: A Comparative Com-
 ment.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

            See Debts, loans, interest
rates
Interior, Ministry of, 108, 326, 328
Intertribal conflict See Feuds
Iqamat, 147
Iran, 69n, 70, 72, 194, 221, 250, 252,
255, 259, 265
Iraq, 221
Irrigation, 128
 Ishan, 51, 149, 234.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                  41, Jihad; Mujahidin
295; constitutional developments in, Revolutionary Council (BRA), 291,
59; government and policies of, 59, 
171; Kalasha relationship with, 100, Revolutionary Defense Forces, 160
101, 104-5, 109; Khalq-Parcham Reza Shah (of Iran), 176
activities during, 61-62; policies Rish safed, 149, 150, 152
 toward Muslim Youth of, 41,59-61; Roads.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                    Kandahanis have always been great traders as the city
20 ISLAM OIL AND THE NEW GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIA
was located at the intersection of ancient trade routes  eastwards across
the Bolan Pass to Sind, the Arabian Sea and India and westwards to
 Herat and Iran.
	Taliban

              The city was the main crossing point for trade, arts and
crafts between Iran and India and the citys numerous bazaars have been
 famous for centuries.
	Taliban

                               The transport mafia who were trying to
open up routes to smuggle goods between Quetta and Iran and the newly
 independent state of Turkmenistan, found it impossible to do business.
	Taliban

                    Then two days later, with his troops in a blind
panic as the Taliban mobile columns swept through and around them,
40 
TALIBAN
Ismael Khan abandoned Herat fleeing with his commanders and several
 hundred men to Iran.
	Taliban

                                 Iran, Russia and four Central Asian
Republics warned the Taliban not to move north and publicly declared
54 TALIBAN
 they would help rearm the anti-Taliban alliance.
	Taliban

                              Iran was flying in military supplies to a
newly constructed two-mile-long landing strip outside Bamiyan and
Karim Khalili, the leader of Wahadat, spent the winter visiting Tehran,
 Moscow, New Delhi and Ankara looking for more military aid.
	Taliban

Instead of trying to placate their international critics and Iran, the
76 TALIBAN
Taliban launched an offensive from three directions on Bamiyan, which
fell on 13 September 1998 after some Hazara commanders surrendered to
 the Taliban.
	Taliban

                                                               Given their
suspicions, it was not unexpected that the anti-Taliban alliance, Iran and
Russia, should view the Unocal project as an arm of US-CIA foreign
 policy and as the key to US support for the Taliban.
	Taliban

                                                               Given their
suspicions, it was not unexpected that the anti-Taliban alliance, Iran and
Russia, should view the Unocal project as an arm of US-CIA foreign
 policy and as the key to US support for the Taliban.
	Taliban

                                                  General Zia had
dreamed like a Mogul emperor of recreating a Sunni Muslim space
between infidel Hindustan, heretic Ibecause Shia] Iran and Chris-
 tian Russia.2
	Taliban

                        Iran had a natural link with the Tajiks  they
originate from the same ancient race and speak the same language  but
the Iranians had been incensed by Ahmad Shah Masuds brutal attacks
 on the Hazaras in Kabul in 1993.
	Taliban

        In 1993, for the first time, Iran began to give substantial
military aid to the President Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul and the
Uzbek warlord General Rashid Dostum and urged all the ethnic groups
 to join with Rabbani.
	Taliban

Ironically, the Talibans extremism had also helped bring Iran and Saudi
Arabia closer together and weakened Pakistans relationship with both
 countries.
	Taliban

              However, to end its isolation from the West, Iran needed
to demonstrate that it was a responsible and stabilizing member of the
 international community.
	Taliban

                                                   Iran will remain on
the periphery of the world community and its eastern borders will con-
 tinue tobe wracked by instability.
	Taliban

                                             April 
Turkmenistan and Iran sign agreement to build first
27 September
180 miles spur of proposed gas pipeline via Iran to
 Turkey.
	Taliban

Pakistani Foreign Secretary Najmuddin Sheikh in
 Kandahar for talks with Taliban on pipeline.
	Taliban

Senior team from Australias BHP meets with PM
 Nawaz Sharif to push for Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline.
	Taliban

The Australian company BHP proposed to build an overland gas pipeline from
 southern Iran to Baluchistan.
	Taliban

APP, Taliban shut down Iran embassy in Kabul, 2 June 1997.
	Taliban

APP, Taliban warn of retaliation against Iran, 22 September 1997.
	Taliban

APP, Iran says Taliban threat to the region, 14 August 1998.
	Taliban

AFP, Iran presses Nawaz over Afghan policy, 15 June 1997.
	Taliban

Iran based this assessment on the evidence of one Iranian diplomat who had
 escaped the massacre by feigning death.
	Taliban

        131, 134, 136, 1389, 181, 209
UNESCO 9, 113
TAP Pipelines 167
UNICEF 108, 113
Taraki, President Nur Mohammed 13
United Arab Emirates 58
Tariqah 88
United Islamic and National Front for
Tarinkot (Urozgan province) 234
the Salvation of Afghanistan 61
Tashkent 77,85
United Nations (UN) 50,54,61,67,
Tashkhorgan 62
74, 111, 114, 1267, 139, 169
Tazim Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammedi in
Afghanistan 189
Bajaur Agency 194
agencies 59, 64, 71, 103, 113, 1234,
Tehran 66,70
127
see also Iran
aid agencies 2, 62, 70, 72, 77, 101,
 Tehrik-i-Tuleba (Movement of Ta!-
	Taliban

                                                    It also looks at the
factors that have led Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizistan
and India to take up positions opposed to the Taliban and caused
 Turkmenistan to stand on the sidelines.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                              These established the
Ghaznavid dynasty, which ruled from AD 977 to i i86, conquering
north-west India and the Punjab and capturing a large part of Iran,
 including Isfahan, in the process.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

million, went to Iran.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                               Further, much of the population
of Herat had lived as refugees in Iran, where female access to
 education had been provided as a right.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                             87
To summarise, one can see a range of influences in the creed of
the Taliban, drawn from Islamic movements in the Middle East,
 Iran, the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                The Taliban governor of
Herat expressed their position very clearly, in an interview given on
8 October to a correspondent of Voice of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, External Service, Tehran, broadcast in Pashto:
 
It is a matter of pride for all Afghanistan that we have kept our women
 at home ...
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                              Countries such as Iran take steps such as
)banning satellite dishes in a vain attempt to stop American television
However poor a family may be, it will struggle to find a way of
 programmes reaching Iranian viewers.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                         As already
mentioned, for many refugee families in Pakistan and Iran the ban
on female education by the Taliban is a significant factor in their
consideration of the circumstances under which they would return
 to Afghanistan.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                  The Taliban and the international community 123
Other governments, such as those of Sudan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and
 Pakistan, have decreed that women and men should be segregated.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

Pakistan, Iran and the Sudan have largely
 eased restrictions.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                              Agree-
ment was first reached in Peshawar in April 1992, in the presence of
the prime minister of Pakistan and representatives of Iran, Saudi
Arabia and the UN, that a 50-person commission, headed by
Sibghatullah Mujadidi, would take control of Kabul and prepare the
way for the formation of an interim government, to be led by
President Rabbani, who would hold office for a further four months
126
The regional picture 
127
pending the formation of an assembly to elect a president for a
 further two years.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                              In the meantime, Iran
signed an agreement with Turkmenistan in May 1997 to provide for
the construction of a pipeline linking Turkmen gas and oil supplies
 to the Iranian and Turkish networks and thus to Europe.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

Iran is,
 therefore, well ahead in the race.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                          Agreement had already been
reached in May igg6 that Kazakhstan would begin exporting oil
supplies through Iran, delivering crude oil to Iranian refineries on
the Caspian Sea in return for the right to export oil from Irans
 Persian Gulf ports.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

The USAs possible interest in promoting the Taliban has also
 been linked with its opposition to Iran.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                           Until the election, in mid-
1997, of a relatively moderate Iranian president, the USA was in-
evitably concerned at the prospect of Iran acting as the major conduit
 for Central Asian oil supplies.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                               Since the election it has taken a more
relaxed approach and, in July 1997, in spite of its embargo, it opted
not to oppose a pipeline project agreed in May 1997 that will take
  Turkmen gas through Iran to Turkey and Europe.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                We therefore have
a situation where Pakistan and Iran appear to be backing opposing
The Taliban
sides in a civil war, with the CIS states, with the exception of
 Turkmenistan, periodically lending support.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                              Thus, when Dostam
suddenly reappeared in northern Afghanistan in September 1997,
after being ousted from power the previous May, it was rumoured
 that Uzbekistan and Iran had facilitated his return.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

It also hoped
 to counter any influence Iran might have in Afghanistan.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                         In the mean-
time, Afghans will find their own ways of providing education, either
within the home, through small home-based schools serving a limited
number of families, or by having their girls educated in Pakistan or
 Iran.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                              behaviour
complex emergencies, 59
124
of Taliban in, 48; siege of, 16;
corruption, 45, 46, 6i, 71, 73, 92, 139
freedom, individual, 117
taking of, 4, 49, io6, 115, 128
Cyrus the Great, 12
fundamentalism: Christian, 67;
heroin: production of, ~ Taliban
Islamic, 67
position on, 7; trade in, 1401,
dance, restrictions on, 72, 73
Daoud Khan, Muhammad, 22, 23,
43
Gaddafi, Moamar al, 74
Gailani, Pir, 33, 34, 83
highways, construction of, 22
24, 28, 30, 31, 32, 94, 98;
Hindu Shahi dynasty, 13
Gandamak, Treaty of, i8
overthrow of, 24
Hinduism, 78
Dan dialect, 9
gender issues see Taliban, and
Hisb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) party, 31,
Darius the Great, 12
gender issues
33, 34, 82, 84
debt, rural, 24
Geneva Accords (1988), 26, 35
Hisb-e-Islami (Khalis) party, 31, 33,
Delta Oil company, 40
Genghis Khan, 4
83
democracy, ii6
Ghazali, Muhammad, 68, 967; Our
Hisb-e-Wahdat party, 34, 39, 40, 41,
Deoband school of Islamic Studies,
Beginning in Wisdom, 97
46, 53, 54, 55, 83, 134
79, 8,
Ghaznavid dynasty 14
girls: closure of schools, 48;
horse statue, decapitation of, 48
Department for the Promotion of
Virtue and the Prevention of
hospitality codes, 12
education of, 46, 66, 88, 94, 95,
Vice, 45, 63, 73, 77, 8g, 110, 122
g6, g~, g8, io6, 107, 1,5, 119 (in
human rights, III, 119, 122, 130, 149,
~~o; negotiation on issues of, 3;
Dost Muhammad, i6, 17
Iran and Pakistan, 49, 151); role
Taliban abuse of, 2, 124
 Dostam, Rashid, 36, 38, 40, 4!,
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                            47,
of, gg
humanitarian agencies, 3, 6, g;
 48, 50, 5!,
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                    73
Ikhwan brotherhood, 72, 73
Habibullah, son of Abdur-Rahman
g8, 114, 119, 147
illiteracy, 95
drug production, 143
Khan, 19, 20
Imm Reza shrine, bombing of, 134
Durand line, ig, 22
Hadith, 3, 6, 6o, 63; on position of
women, 97
India, 7, 29, 134, 135, 139, 143, 147;
British, 17, 20, 22, 78;
education, 8o, 145; male, go; of girls
hair, style of, 93
Hanafi school of Islam, 21, 23
independence of, ~i; view of
see girls, education of~ perceived
Taliban, 132
Al-Haq, Zia, 29
importance of, ii8xg; religious,
Indonesia, violence of human rights,
i~i; universal provision of, ia,;
Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami, 323
women barred from, 99, 114, 147
Harakat-i-Islami (Muhsini), 34
124
intellectuals, assassination of, 37
Egypt, 63, 67, 68
157
Inter-Services Intelligence
(Pakistan), 34
International Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, ug
International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), ,o8, 122
International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), ,,6, 122
 Iran, 7, I!,
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

              The modern history of anthrax contains accounts of feasts
in Iran, Kazakhstan,the Philippines, Siberia, and various African coun-
tries where infected meat (not cooked enough to kill the anthrax bacte-
 ria) is shared by a large group, some of whom then fall ill.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

            I must thank the Director of the Centre for Policy Research, New
Preface
xii 
Delhi, Dr V. A. Pai Panandikar, for giving me research and secretarial
facilities for writing this volume; the information and cultural affairs
ministry of the Afghan government and the Afghan embassy in New
Delhi for making available a lot ofofficial reports; an Indian friend in the
United States (who does not wish to be identified) for sending me a num-
 ber of the latest books on Afghanistan; and MrM.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                            The
fundamentalists want an assertive central governmentgovernments
 role must be activist, intrusive, doctrinaire.8
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                         However, since the protection of Soviet arms
has proved to be inseparable from the survival of the Marxist regime
and its gradual, slow process of gaining political ground in Afghani-
stan, this volume must pay some attention to the Soviet armed inter-
vention of December 1979 and the American reaction to that landmark
  ev9nt.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                           Yakub Khan, on the other hand asked
the members
to appreciate that we must always keep the objective of a negotiated political
 settlement uppermost in our minds.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                              We have maintained, the statement
said,
that any negotiated political settlement for Afghanistan, besides including the
withdrawal of Soviet troops, the return of the non-aligned and independent
status of Afghanistan, and the return of the refugees, must include self-
 determination for the Afghan people.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                      We have not said how this (the accord)
must come about, but that the issue of how the Afghan people will be allowed
 to form the type of government they wish must be addressed.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

         The underlying assumption of the UN scenario is that a face-saving
148 Afghanistan
agreement in Afghanistan cannot directly address the replacement or modifi-
cation of the Kabul regime as a precondition for Soviet disengagement but
must leave this to paralleled processes of political accommodation before,
 during and after the disengagement period.8
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

Our
 country must think for itself.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                  What had started in 1978 as the Soviets help-
ing out by replacing purged officers and officials had developed into a general
dependence upon them that must having been as galling for Amin as it was
 needed by him.24
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Thus, Ofl 12 December 1979 they decided that Amin
 must go and that they would rule Afghanistan through Karma!
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                In the former kings view,
the resolutions of such jirgas must take into account the viewpoints and
tendencies of all national groups who are engaged in the struggle for the
realization of common goalsin this case, independence, territorial
integrity, restoration of the status of traditional nonalignment, the na-
tional and Islamic identity of our homeland, and the maintenance of the
right to self-determination for the institution of the future government
 through free elections.26
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                    To understand the
war under discussion, we must examine the events on the battlefields,
 for it was on the battlefields that policies were exposed and tested.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

But to wage jehad
 the mujahideen must have weapons.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

In such cases Fariduddin is right in saying that no matter how
 strong you are, you must confess.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Those in charge of the security of Kabul must have been frustrated over
 the renewed activities of the mujahideen.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Its view was that
 the bandits must be eliminated if they persisted.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Nonetheless, figures must be understood to be
 approximate, unless stated otherwise.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Judging from the frequency
 of exchange, the number of the addicts must have been considerable.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                They are told they must now go towards the Indian borden, they
do not want to go, they are obstinate, they want to stay, but are getting des-
 perate, and it seems that now we are reaching the breaking point.6
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

      that we must think together about the issue; Karmal, after his
face darkened, replied, If you leave now, you will have to send in a
 million soldiers next time.2
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                             Originally the destruc-
tion was the dream of General Akhtar Abdur Rahman of the ISI, who
had proclaimed that Kabul must burn?6 But he had uttered those
words when Kabul was in the grip of the Russians; now leaders of the
Islamic groups and their warriors made his dream come true when they
 themselves controlled it.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

We must take counsel about this.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                       According to the
Shias, an imam must be descended from the Prophet through his daughter,
 Fatima; the Sunnis hold that an imam must be elected.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                     In addition, the organisation
must find funds to help support the families of activists who have
 been killed or imprisoned.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                       Even in war people must continue
living, noted one resistance commander from Kabul, If the mujahideen
166 The Afghan Struggle
can offer nothing, there is no doubt that the communists will do every-
 thing to fill the gap if they know it will break us.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                           The Afghans: Getting Their Act Together
While the international community needs to be more forthcoming, so
 must the resistance.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                     According to one British relief coordinator:
Basically, the Afghans must get their act together and not always
 think that it is up to the outside world to help them.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

If they want
 assistance, they must do something for it.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                             Above all, they must
improve their organisation which quite frankly is more often than
 not disastrous.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Sacrifices must be made by both sides to make it
 work.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Ultimately, however, a peaceful solu-
 tion to the conflict must be a diplomatic one.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

All international flights must
 land at Kabul or Qandahar International Airports.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                 Some wheat and barley are grown,
but due to the climate and generally poor soil,
only one crop per year is possible, and often the
 soil must be allowed to rest every other year.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                         A province located in north-
103 
Qishlaq
all Qazis must go through formal training in theol -
ogy and sociology in learning institutions subsidized
 by the Afghan Government.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

These
 are the first words a newborn child must hear.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

     A Muslim, in good faith and in a state of ritual
cleanliness must, at least once in a lifetime, recite
 the above words (preferably in Arabic).
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                   If one is to understand the
value patterns of Afghans, one must understand
 Islam.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

Since a frontal assault is out of the question, the
 United States must be terrorized into withdrawing from the Muslim world.
	Inside Bin Laden

         Islamist leaders may differ on the fine details of what constitutes
a genuine Islamic state, but they all agree that the United States and West-
 ern civilization must first be evicted from their midst.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                   This inaction, observed an Arab official
in private, must be viewed as part of al-Turabis strategy aimed at building
 an Islamic belt around Sudan.
	Inside Bin Laden

Indeed, sacrifices such as detention, torture, and even
 death must be prepared for and accepted.
	Inside Bin Laden

The Algerians must have agreed, as was demonstrated by the bomb-
 ing of the Paris Metro on July z6, 1995.
	Inside Bin Laden

The invaders must be prepared to leave, either dead or alive.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                  Ayatollah
Emami-Kashani warned that the world of Islam, Islamic countries, and Is-
lamic governments must pay attention to the cry of Iran, of the Islamic Re-
 public, which says: We are friends with all of you.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                        223
lamist terrorist organizations, must turn its guns on Israel and the United
 States instead of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or other Arab countries.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                   They know that since
Kenya was the main gateway for those members, there must be a center in
 Kenya, Fazil noted.
	Inside Bin Laden

            Since Owhali, who survived the explosion, does not remember if
either he or the driver activated the bombs fuses, it must have been acti-
 vated by remote control.
	Inside Bin Laden

                   Eliud Mbuthia, former head of the Kenyan police
bomb squad, observed that the bomb must have been made of moldable
 high explosives such as SEMTEX-H.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                Their statement confirmed that new fac-
tors have emerged, that these must be read carefully to realize who was
 272 .
	Inside Bin Laden

The Pakistani Taliban have no
 doubt of the direction their country must take.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                The communiqu concluded
with the reiteration of the warning that the Americans must brace them-
 selves for a ferocious, long war.
	Inside Bin Laden

And Islam stipulates that the blood of martyrs must
 be avenged against those who shed itthe United States.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                 Under
these circumstances Muslims must draw the linein Afghanistanand
with their Arab mujahideen allies block the U.S. encroachment into the
 Muslim world.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                           This means that all individuals of
these two nations, as well as the Jews in occupied Palestine, are belligerent
people and every Muslim must stand against them and must kill and fight
 them.
	Inside Bin Laden

The main effort, at this phase, must target the Jews
 and the Crusaders.
	Inside Bin Laden

They came across the Islamic obligation in the Koran that when they
 reach the age of fifteen, they must get military training.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                   The Jorda-
nian scholars call for action against both local Muslim leaders and their pa-
trons in the West; the Hub of Islam must choose between succumbing to the
 West and fighting for Islam.
	Inside Bin Laden

But the Muslim world must not forget that the NATO bombing is only the
 first step in the U.S. campaign to suppress and enslave Islamist revivalism.
	Inside Bin Laden

                               During this crisis and massacre in the
Balkans we must be a united Muslim community with a united policy and
 agenda.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                  69
markets by aping their ideologies and accommodating their tastes: it
must also be prepared to create global markets by careful planning
 and control.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                               Jack Lang must have
seen the writing on the screen, however; because even while he was
Hollyworid: Mc Worlds Videology 
93
doing battle in the name of culture against the American celluloid
colossus, he was decorating Sylvester Stallone with a Legion of
 Honor.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                     In opposition, literature has
a purpose; in the market, it must vie for dollars, appease popular
 taste, and guarantee profits to publishers.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

The experience sold must be more than just
 a quick lunch.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

      Why must the recent past be taboo? Even the Japanese are permit-
ted their emperor and their cultural superiority and their celebration
of a mostly decensored history including their own version of the
 Day of Infamy.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                   That being the case, its goal
must be economic harmonization with Western Europesome-
thing requiring radical economic reform (a Big Bang as the Poles
 called it) and ongoing economic shock therapy.2
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                Those
new states that, as civil society has been progressively colonized by
organized crime, have been led slowly to discover the positive uses
of power, must contend both with the old state-hating victims of
imperious communism and their new state-hating laissez-faire advi-
sors who urge them to turn the very state institutions by which they
might control rapacious markets into their primary adversary9
Even where states weigh in on behalf of civil society, there is no
surrogate for the polity in the international domaincertainly not
the states weak supranational imitatorsthat has the clout to coun-
tervail multinational corporations and the markets in which they
 operate.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                      Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yeltsins new prime minis-
ter installed after radical reform failed, announced: The period of
market romanticism is over, but he must still figure out how to deal
 with $2.5
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                             Is it a wonder then that
even cosmopolitan Russians express a certain nostalgia for yester-
days Greater Russia? Or that this nostalgia must compete with and
is a distant second to the grasping desire for tomorrows greater mar-
kets? Nationalists resist Western culture, but slogans appear every-
where on behalf of the popular new cigarette West screaming, Test
 the West!
	Jihad vs. McWorld

(always Coke!).
	Jihad vs. McWorld

               Civil society needs a habitation; it must become a real
place that offers the abstract idea of a public voice a palpable geog-
raphy somewhere other than in the twin atlases of government and
 markets.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                  How long a journey it can be for women and men nurtured
in the private sector and used to identifying with one another only
via a cash contract on the one hand, or in terms of Jihads blood fra-
ternity on the other, to find their way to civil society and speak in its
measured public voice, particularly if that voice must also have a
 transnational or international resonance.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

            The affinities that spring from local association must not
barricade the way to regional affections, national identification, and
global alliances, as tribes and clans (whether historical or invented)
 too often do.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                Democracy is to be sure already the sought-after final
outcome for those trying to rescue the planet: but it must also be the
 guiding principle going in.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                   Normative
philosophers like Yael Tamir take a narrower essentialist view, insisting
that we must first define the idea theoretically and then limit actual cases
 to those that conform to the normative concept.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

and Shahrani (in this volume) indicate that most of the land in Nahrin
MARXIST REVOLUTION AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE
Problems of implementing the land reform continue at all levels
It must be mentioned with regret that a number of ministries and
the related departments and the local party and state organs have
not yet understood properly the boundaries of their responsibilities
and still have not made use of the present possibilities for the
realisation of measures taken towards the accomplishment of land
 and water reforms.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                     All
Muslims are required to take part in this form of struggle and must
work with all their intellectual and material abilities for the realiza-
tion of justice and equality between the people and for the spreading
of security and human understanding, both among individuals and
 groups (Muhammad Ismail Ibrahim; quoted in Peters 1979: 118).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

As Peters points out, jihad in the sense of fighting
 is further restricted by the phrase fi sabil Allah, in the way of Allah.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

In the conduct of its duties, the government must be the model
 of moral and ethical excellence.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                      The gov-
ernment must also safeguard peoples freedom and must make sure
 that the necessities of life for its citizens are made available.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                               In the
international arena, it must not only defend the oppressed peoples
and oppose those who thrive on the blood [of the weak] and rob
them of their human rights, but fight with all its strength all those
 powers who try to enslave and impose their will upon them.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                           Other-
wise, such a government does not fulfill its responsibilities and
 must be overthrown (1977: 35-36).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                             Therefore, blood must
always be about equally spilled, and property equally destroyed or
 taken.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

          Tales abound among the insurgents of the intrigues sown by
Gulbudin to increase his own power at the expense of otherwise solid
ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN EASTERN NURISTAN
Parallel to the system of civilian village leaders, Anwar estab-
As stated above, a chosen leader must maintain consensus for
Throughout the fighting the Nuristanis entire supply of weapon-
91
 local military commands.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                Since Kalasha economic production is still predomi-
nantly subsistence-oriented, little cash circulates in~ the village
 economy.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

only in forging a political alliance, but assuming command of it as
R. LINCOLN KEISER
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND SYMBOLISM
As noted, the military success of the people of Darra-iNur
The symbolic linking of Islam with unified political opposition
The notion of kafirism was very powerful in Dana-i Nur (as in
In order to ascertain why a highland leader was successful not
126
THE REBELLION IN DARRA-I NUR
well, we must first understand the differing ecological and social
 structural patterns of the lower and upper areas of the valley.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

only in forging a political alliance, but assuming command of it as
R. LINCOLN KEISER
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND SYMBOLISM
As noted, the military success of the people of Darra-iNur
The symbolic linking of Islam with unified political opposition
The notion of kafirism was very powerful in Dana-i Nur (as in
In order to ascertain why a highland leader was successful not
126
THE REBELLION IN DARRA-I NUR
well, we must first understand the differing ecological and social
 structural patterns of the lower and upper areas of the valley.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                      In addition, however, I believe that we must under-
stand the moral basis for Sheikhanzai political authority in contrast
with that of the central state, and this requires that attention be given
 to Sheikhanzai concepts of religiosity and religious authority.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                               But this must be understood to be contin-
uously at issue both in principle and in the particular case, especially
as these mediations of Islam are presented as alternatives to each
 other.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

All revolutionaries must downgrade their predecessors in order
 to justify their actions.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                     One of Tarakis most often quoted statements
regarding women was that men and women are like the two wings
of a bird (Kabul Times, 3/8/79); in order to fly both wings must
 move, and no great movement can achieve victory without the partic.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                               There must be an
effective law-enforcing apparatus to put into effect each right
 granted ..
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                         In order
to raise the status of women we must first raise the standards of
 their men (6/16/80).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                            The new Great Game must be one
where the aim is to stabilize and settle the region, not increase tensions
210  TALIBAN
 and antagonism.
	Taliban

Turk-
 men insist work must start soon.
	Taliban

               During his trial in 1965, on a charge of sedition that
led to his execution by the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdul
Nasser, he argued: The bonds of ideology and belief are sturdier
than those of patriotism, based on region, and this false distinction
among Muslims on a regional basis is but one expression of crusading
 and Zionist imperialism that must be eradicated.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

 In answer to their critics, the Taliban state that they accept the
)mandatory nature of both female and male education but insist that
 the conditions must be right for that education to take place.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                             In spite of a similar meeting with the
The Taliban
132 The regional picture
president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayer, on 28 October, the
Kazakh president issued a warning that the Afghan conflict must not
 spread beyond its borders.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

               And it followed that the only valid philosophy was
one of ultra-individualism, since philosophy to be valid and
viable must be founded on a known and certain truth, and there
was only one such we could really know: each his own I. There
was no such thing as the natural law predicated by so many
philosophers and on which they constructed their systems, and
there was certainly not a shred of evidence for an immanent
justice assumed by others to justify their plans for establishing
 a system of justice in human societies.
	The Terrorists

                                                    He will
be an implacable enemy of this world; and if he continue to
 live in it, it must be only in order to destroy it...
	The Terrorists

But the work must be done
 systematically and with intelligence and insight.
	The Terrorists

                                                     The first
category, that of the intelligent and important, must be dealt
 with by outright terrorism; that is they must be assassinated.
	The Terrorists

                           He borrowed, from Proudhon and other
Anarchist theorists, ideas for the post-revolutionary world but
was always vague about it; his business was to make the revolu-
 tion which must totally, utterly destroy all existing institutions.
	The Terrorists

                                                             The
Tsar must be executed: the shock of his assassination might
even spark off the coming revolution; in fact, it surely would,
and therefore means of controlling and directing the fury of the
 masses must be prepared.
	The Terrorists

                                                         What he
was calling for was not terrorism (the usual way of dealing with
the man who bid for the lease of a farm from which the tenant
had been evicted was to murder him, an extremism which Parnell
deplored), but boycottrefusal to bid for the leases of such
90
The Irish Case (1)
farms, and the withholding of rents, two measures of resistance
which must, in the long run, beat the rack-renting landlords who
had always been able to count on the support of British govern-
 ments, British police and British troops.
	The Terrorists

      The rebellion was defeated by two things: I have said before
96
The Irish Case (2)
that the condition for the success of a terrorist campaign, or for
a revolutionary uprising, is that the majority of the ordinary
people must be heart and soul with the terrorists or revolution-
aries; but in this case at least as many of the Irish were against
 as for the Sinn Finers.
	The Terrorists

                                                              120
Bakunins Disciples
Here, in the cases of Luccheni, Bresci and Czolgosz, is a
lesson for the practitioners of Direct Terrorism: if your object
is to be certain of killing one particular man or woman, repre-
sentative of, or rather scapegoat for, the oppressing class
(whichever class that may, in the context of time and place, be),
the man or woman chosen for the work must, in his heart, have
 renounced his own life before the deed is done.
	The Terrorists

                               This enabled him to suspend the
operation: the Partys security must come first; to act now
would entail probable failure and the certain loss of valuable
 comrades.
	The Terrorists

                               And the revolutionary idealist
in a materially weak position must remember that though he
eschews terrorism, his opponents will not: thus the Moroccan
co-founder of the Tricontinentalthe international of
African, Asian and Latin American revolutionary organizations
(OSPAAAL)El Mehdi Ben Barka, repudiated terrorism for
his cause, himself fell a victim to the police terrorism of
Mohamed Oufkir (who later tried to have his master, King
Hassan, assassinated) and the French security police, when he
 was kidnapped and murdered in 1965.
	The Terrorists

means have given birth to militant offspring groups composed
of people whom the long failure of the parent movement to
achieve results has driven to the conclusion that they must
resort to propaganda by deed: classic cases of remarkable
individuals in this dilemma are those of Vera Zasulich and
 Sophia Perovskaya.
	The Terrorists

                            He will be an implacable enemy of this
world; and if he continues to live in it, it must be only in order
172
 Guerilleros or Terrorists?
	The Terrorists

He must always be prepared to die and to kill with
 his own hands...
	The Terrorists

                                                                174
How not to do it, and vice versa
Because this case must be argued without reference to custo-
mary morality or customary compassion; because what I am
writing about is war, in which ordinary human decency has
little place, it will be as well to remind the reader that I do not
find it possible to pay the usual lip-service to the convention of
treating terrorism as irredeemably wicked and cruel; it is a
waste of words, ink, space and spirit in the waste of shame
created by the high explosive and fire bombs, the H-bombs and
napalm, the political police terrorism, the crafty economic
manipulations of the established parties in the Capitalist and
 Comitiunist imperialist empires.
	The Terrorists

             There is no shadow of evidence that there is such a
thing in nature: it is, like love, among mans most noble and
beautiful inventions to which, so important to his happiness has
 it become, he has given divine sanction.
	The Terrorists

                                               The industrial and
commercial bourgeoisie generates, for the service of industry, an
 industrial working class.
	The Terrorists

     Special mention must be made of the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Service, an invaluable means for translating Soviet and now Russian
 media.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

Then caretakers must undergo daily medical examination to
 make sure they are not infected.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                          The older
women buried around me here, beneath the light snow, must have been
 vulnerable to infection in some other way.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

He announces in a deep voice that he must have two guar-
 antees from our team.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

             As he demanded the day before, he wants Matthew to write
Dr. Semyonov, the chief of SES, and ask permission for a complete re-
view of the autopsy data, which must be recognized as the property of
 Abramova and Grinberg.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

It is easy to imagine what it must have been
 like here in April 1979.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

Workers, mostly men, must have been sweating
 over the kilns.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

Warm air heated by the ovens below must have risen and rolled
 like a wave as it met the incoming spring wind, carrying the fatal spores.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                         I can only imag-
ine what it must have been like throughout the anthrax outbreak, with
three bodies at a time ready for examination and more outside in the hail
 and in the storage area.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                        On our side, the
older generation like Alex Langmuir, is gone, but the dialogue must con-
 tinue, somehow.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                             Kryuchkov had predicted that the spring and
summer of 1981 will be decisive for the final and complete defeat of the
forces of the counterrevolution:3 hence the program of carrot and stick
 to pacify the land as quickly as possible.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                    But
the islamabad government, which is obvioUSlY reluctant to stick its
neck out without firm guarantees from the United States (which Wash-
ington has no intention of giving) has been reluctant to act too openlY
 as an arms conduit, for fear of Soviet retaliation.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                Printed and bound in Great Britain by
SRP Ltd, Exeter
Editors Preface
Of all the Marxist revolutions in the Third World, the Afghan revolu-
 tion has been most conspicously from above.'
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                       Afghanistan maintained its
History and Political Traditions: The Mona rchy 9
friendly relations with Germany through World War IL This was not
liked by Britain and the USSR but neither wanted to take punitive
 act on against Afghanistan.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

Between 1949 and 1979, American economic aid to
10 Afghanistan
 Afghanistan totalled about $500m.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

But military aid was another matter.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                 In the vacuum left by Britains with-
drawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the Afghan ruling family
envisaged creating an American military connection as crucial defense
 against Soviet power.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                    A Pentagon study in 1949
concluded that Afghanistans geographic location coupled with the realiza-
tion by Afghan leaders of Soviet capabilities presages Soviet control of the
 country whenever the international situation so dictates.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                              It was attended
by 27 delegates, elected a central committee of seven members
There is some dispute as to whether Babrak Karmal or Noor
 Mohammad Taraki was the number one leader of the PDPA.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                                     The
result of all this was that although the RGA (Royal qovemment of
Afghanistan) may not do everything the Soviets wish it to do, it is rare
that the RGA does what the Soviets strongly wish it not to do

2 Afghanistan as a Republic

The Republic of Afghanistan proclaimed by Daoud on 17 July 1973,
with himself declared its Founder, President and Prime Minister,
 became, five years later, the victim of its own political contradictions.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

       Perhaps it was a grave mistake on Daouds part to abolish the
monarchy, for more than a century the one unifying factor in a land
 divided by geography and ethnicity.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

  At Havana, Daoud worked closely with the centrist group in the
Non-Aligned Movement rather than associate himself with the pro-
 Soviet cluster led by Cuba and Vietnam.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                 of Afghanistans political
economy? What was the social base of its ruling class in the republic
founded by Daoud? What kind of relationships prevailed between the
state, the tribe and the periphery? What was the character of the central
bureaucracy, the provincial and rural power structure, the shape of
local government? What impact had modernization had on Afghani-
stans extremely dispersed socio-political structure and its largely tribal
and very diverse population? What role did Islam play in the total life-
style of the people of Afghanistan? An appreciation of the Afghan
political economy in its entirety is necessary to identify what Roderick
Aya has called the political crux of the Afghan revolution, namely, an
open-ended situation of violent struggle wherein one set of contenders
attempts successfully or unsuccessfully to displace another from state
 power.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                More important, even among the Pushtun, the
role of the tribe as a unit of military and political mobilization is often
 assumed rather than demonstrated by research.8
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

There was hardly any village without a transistor radio, which brought
 the world into the huts of the Afghan villager.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

        The Marxists tried to make the best use of the radio but they
were beaten in the propaganda war by external wavelengths for the
simple reason that the villager could neither understand the language
 of the new revolutionary ideology nor was he in a mood to listen.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                                 He
was more quickly and effectively moved by symbols than, by the
Marxist ideology which in 1978-9 was begging for an Afghan language
 that the Afghan villager could understand.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                        By the early
sixties, Taraki was a full-blown Marxist who was converting educated
youth to a political line that saw the Soviet Union as the centre of
 world revolution.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

           The first two Decrees, issued on 30 April and I May,
announced the formation of the thirty-member Revolutionary
Council and named twenty-one members selected by the Council to
 serve in the PDPA Cabinet.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                               Decree No. 3 was issued on 14 May,
abrogating the 1973 constitution framed by Daoud and establishing
legal procedures to be followed until a new constitution could be
 drawn up.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

    Even if land reforms and equal rights for women had been tried by
previous Afghan regimes without success, as some American specialists
on Afghanistan claim,8 there is no doubt that the abolition of rural
indebtedness and usury was entirely new in Afghanistans history~
Poverty and its twin brother indebtedness were widespread in the
50 Afghanistan
 Afghan villages, as we have already noted.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                              By the
time the Marxists took over, the female milieu in Afghanistan was a
mixture of liberal trends and values fighting deep-rooted customs,
traditions and prejudices, often couched in Islamic rhetoric against
 liberating women from their feudal shackles.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                  It was by using the concept of
jihad that Abdur Rahman was able to consolidate the power of the
 central government over the tribes and local chiefs.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

The struggle was fought not over political or ideological issues, because
these issues did not exist, but on elemental passions and prejudices
stirred up by the traditional vested interests, aided and abetted by the
 powerful British entrenched on Afghanistans southern borders.3
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

They want to eliminate ethnic distinctions between Pushcuns and the
non-Pushtun tribes or national groups because they believe these
distinctions are un-Islamic and only weaken the Afghan state by
62 Afghanistan
 keeping its population divided and at war with itself.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                               The
Marxist struggle in Yemen in the sixties was not unduly impeded by
 the Islamic factor.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                  It was supported by a powerful Muslim neighbour
the Egypt of Nasserand opposed by another powerful Islamic power,
 Saudi Arabia.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

              Its military dictator, General Zia-ul Haq, was trying
cautiously to introduce his own variety of islamization modelled by
 and largely on Saudi fundamentalism.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                                 The
Afghan fundamentalists were also affected by the unending, gradually
 escalating IraqIran war.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

In Badakhshan province alone,
 Khalq party membership increased by two hundred.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                            But the
general mood of the Afghan masses was to wait and see what the new
regime would do, how it would behave, whether and in what manner it
would be different from the previous regimes that had prevailed in
distant KabuL One single group of Islamic fundamentalists, led by
 Gulbudin Kikmatyar, broke the general mood of tense waiting.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                       Any attempt to reform such a
68 Afghanistan
system by appealing to the class interests of the poor and landless
 peasants was bound to run into considerable difficulties.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                 This difficulty was
further compounded by the fact that about 15 per cent of the Afghan
population still lived mainly by their nomadic flocks, and knew very
 little of class relationships or ownership patterns.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                       The treaty gave the Soviets legitimacy in assisting
the revolutionary regime to secure internal stability as well as to defend
itself from external intervention or attack On 6 April 1979, a high-
level Soviet delegation led by General Alexei Yepishev, First Deputy
Defence Minister and President of Political Affairs of the Soviet Army
 and Navy, arrived in Kabul.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                By April 1979 Communist
forces had been totally repulsed from eastern Nuristan, six months
72 Afghanistan
later most of the rest of Kunar province was free of Communist
control0 
/
According to Strand?the Nuristanis were angry with the Marxist
regime because it had sacked their people from the Government,
thereby breaking their links with the centr~Nuristanti elites thus lost
their personal ties with government, which they had established
 during the reign of Daoud.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                 Up to 90 per cent of the
Sitami Milli (Maoist) in the province are believed to have been killednot
 only by the mujahidin, but by the Khalqis and Parchamis as well.18
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

Perhaps the most basic difficulty faced by the national government was its
 own weakness at the provincial and subprovincial levels.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

  Taraki sought to downplay the proletarian aspect of the Saur revolu-
tion, while Aminjustified it by describing peasants as potential work-
ers, claiming that the originality of the Afghan revolution lay in its
 making the transition from feudalism to socialism.25
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

              today returned to the beloved country and was warmly and
unprecedently received by tens of thousands of our noble and patriotic
people carrying flowers and revolutionary slogans, glowed a Kabul
 Radio commentator.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                           The Soviet intervention or invasion has
been studied at length by American and other Western scholars and
88 Afghanistan
journalists in the context of the centurys prolonged confrontation
between the Soviet Union and the United States as leaders of two
 contending international political systems.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                  The most forceful advocate of
intervention was the late Suslov; he was supported by Brezhnev,
 American-backed regime.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

               Yuri Andropov expressed considerable doubts
and was perhaps supported by more than one other Politburo
 member.2
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

The Presidents perception was echoed and refined by Drew
 Middleton, military correspondent of The New York Times.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                     The chief political drawback seen by some officials in
Washington is th~t such a step would frighten India and possibly move that
country closer to the Soviet Union, thus shifting the power balance in Asia
 even more toward Russia.2
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

   The traditional cleavage in the subcontinent between Pakistan and
India was deepened by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the
 American response to it.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

        The military regime of Zia-ul Haq was strengthened by the
powerful support it received from the United States, China, Saudi
 Arabia and other states.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

Gradually, over a period of five years, a strong stream of public opinion
developed in Pakistan which regarded the Afghan policy pursued since
January 1980 as having been imposed on Pakistan by the United States,
and this opinion advocated a political settlement of the Afghan crisis
 through direct negotiation between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                     In the discharge of this mission,
unprecedented in Soviet experience, the USSR was pitted against a
formidable array of obstacles: widespread Afghan resistancecall it
counter-revolution or struggle for national liberation; significant
military assistance to the rebels by a group of enemy countries led by
the United States; an incompetent, faction-ridden PDPA which had
neither the organizational base nor the cadre strength to take on the
challenge of revolutionary reconstruction; an outraged and hostile
world public opinion, and, last but by no means least, the Kremlins
own lack of resources and lack of experience in handling a compli-
cated, prolonged guerrilla war situation in a backward, rocky,
 mountainous Third World country.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                  9 Saur Revolution:
With the death of Amin and the take-over by Soviet troops, the Khalq
 phase of the Saur revolution came to an unlamented end.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

       Karmals mandate was twofold: to rectify the errors and mistakes
committed by Amin and Taraki by mellowing the reforms that had
battered the socio-cukural fabric of Afghan society, and to build the
broadest possible support base for the regime; and second, to re-
organize the Afghan army and secret police with Soviet help in the
shortest possible time so that Afghans loyal to the regime could them-
 selves take on the resistance.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                   The controversial
matter of conscription, which had met with considerable resistance
and criticism in the country, was also left to decision by the local
 councils.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

              The minimum age for a peoples deputy was fixed at 18,
despite some opposition, and it was laid down that candidates could
only be nominated by the National Fatherland Front or one or the
 other of its constituent bodies.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                    This was 80,000
more than the figure of 70,000 given by Karmal to a BBC reporter in
 1982.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

    Of the five parties involved in the Afghan problem, the positions of
threethe United States, Pakistan and the Afghan resistanceare
weakened by inherent contradictions and gaps between their avowed
objectives and the resources they are willing to deploy, and are capable
132 Afghanistan
 of deploying, for the achievement of their goals.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                  The United States, on the other hand, has a visceral
problem with the Marxist Government in Afghanistan which it
perceives to be a forced transplant by the Kremlin onto the tradition-
ally non-aligned and ruggedly nationalist soil of Afghanista~ the
American priority therefore is on political change in Kabul, with the
 consent and approval of the resistance.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

          The cost seems to be largely compensated for by economic and
logistical gains: the wholesale import of Afghanistans increasing
136 Afghanistan
supplies of natural gas, the exploitation of the countrys rich mineral
resources, and the installation of a Soviet military presence in the
Persian Gulf region that would counsel caution and restraint for the
builders of a formidable American military strength in that area under
 the Reagan administration.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                                       Few
diplomats place any credence in the Reagan administrations subsequent out-
pouring of assurances voiced by everybody from the President himself to US
Secretary of, State George Shultz and UN Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick
 that the US supports an Afghan settlement through peaceful negotiations.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                 The Soviet position, as explained to the
author by a ranking Indian diplomat as well as by Soviet officials, was
that Yakub had succumbed to American pressure and told Gromyko
that the creation of a stable regime in Kabul was essential to enable the
refugees to return; in other words, Pakistan now insisted that Afghani-
 stans internal affairs be included in the agenda of negotiation.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                General Zia-ul Haq was probably the first head of
state outside the Soviet bloc to announce that he would represent
 Pakistan at the funeral, accompanied by his Foreign Minister.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                             But neither the Presi-
dent of Pakistan nor his Foreign Minister was received by Chernenko
 or any other member of the CPSU Politburo.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

     A commentary in Pravda reviewed disclosures that secret assist-
ance by the CIA to the Afghan rebels had become the largest American
 operation since the Vietnam war.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

The Pravda commentary warned that
 such escalation would be more than matched by the Soviet side.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan were estimated to have increased by
 at least a quarter.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

It stressed that the Soviet Union would still be ready to withdraw its
troops by agreement, and ended its commentary by staring that All
 questions relating to Afghanistan can be solved only by political means.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                                        A
remark by the American ambassador to Pakistan, Dean Hinton, on 1
April, that he was baffled by the thought process of those opposition
parties that advocated direct talks with Kabul, raised volleys of protest
in the Pakistani press, which were echoed several times in the National
 Assembly.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

              It is somewhat surprising, however, that over twenty years of
Soviet influence did not produce a more viable communist party than
the PDPA was in 1978/In fact, the Soviets did not wish to help the PDPA
enlarge its political base beyond that of a respectable pressure group, and
were apparently taken by surprise when the Afghan party captured
 power.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

      Another factor that distinguishes the Afghan revolution from
several other Third World Marxist revolutions is that itw presided
 over by the army.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

It was designed and executed by leaders o t e PDP
 with the help of its dedicated members in the army.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

    The dictatorship of the proletariat, one-party rule, rigid command and
control of the life of the population, even the use of coercion and terror
werejustified by the necessity for rapid and radical remoulding of largely
or almost entirely agricultural societies into fully industrialized ones,
accomplishing in decades what the capitalist industrialized countries
 had done over centuries.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                 In an authoritative analysis ofiranian fundamentalism
in May 1985, Academician R. Ulyanovskiy, a noted CPSU theoretician,
drew the grim conclusion that the Iranian revolution which, in 1978-9,
s  enuine all- eo les festiv was captured 
by the alergy in

 1980 
in collustion wit bourgeois 
business and large landowers'.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                                               
A 
Very Select Personal Bibliography

The literature on Afghanistan is vast, mainly because of the strategic position
occupied by the country between the British-Indian empire and the Russian
 empire.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                      There are about a
dozen histories of Afghanistan, of the British-Indian period, by Indian
 historians.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                         The great bulk of this literature is propaganda from
one or the other of the several perspectives on the Afghan revolution and the
 second cold war generated by the Soviet intervention.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                             The three volumes of Marxist
Governments: 
A Wodd View,edited by Bodgan Szajkowski, General Editor of the
series in which the present book is published, are most useful reading in
 comparative communism.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                                           At least
two useful publications have emerged from Congressional concern over
198 Afghanistan
Afghanistan: East WestRelationsin the Aftermath of Soviet lnvasion ofAfghanistan,
Washington DC, Government Printing Office, lOjanuary 1980; and AnAssess-
ment ofthe Afghanistan Sanctions: Implicationsfor Trade and Diplomacy in the 1980s,
report prepared by Dr John P. Hardt, Congressional Research Service,
 Washington DC, Government Printing Office, April 1981.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                     civil rights 1156
communications xii, xiii, 4, 11, 23,40
conscription 115
conservative Islam 60-1
constitution 1156
Cordovez, D. 122, 133, 140, 143, 147
Cronin, R. P. 103-4, 108-9
Daoud Khan, M.
and Brezhnev 20, 21
and Karmal 44
and Parcham group, 19, 26
and womens rights 51
as President 1729, 30, 1612
as Prime Minister 11, 1213
desertion 102, 106
development plans 123, 125
202 Afghanistan
dowries see marriage customs
 Dupree, L. 17, 26, 28.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                       47, 48, 1656, 168
Durand Line 3
economic aid 23, 75, 123
from China 24
from Iran 22, 23
from USA 4, 910
from USSR 4,8, II, 16, 20, 70, 1235, 129
economic development xixii, 11, 26, 345,
118, 124
education and training xi, 356, 75
armed forces 35, 115, 124, 163
by USSR 12, 16, 137
Egypt 159
and Afghanistan 1,21,61
electoral reform 1215, 1718
Eliot, T. L.jun. 15, 1920, 21, 23, 30
Epishev, A. A. 87
ethnic problems 47, 71, 72, 73, 1645
exchange programmes
armed forces 35, 115, 124, 163
civilians 12, 16, 137
external security 8, 11
factionalism
in PDPA 478, 67, 68, 98, 115, 163
 Flatin,B.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                                                              Before
doing so, I went through the journal that I kept from 1979 until the
 Kabul regime arrested me in i 982.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                     A movement started by which the central government
concentrated power at the expense of a centuries-old traditional system
that assigned power and concessions to secular rural magnates and reli-
 gious groups.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                The consolidation of the nation-state, as well as of his
dynastic rule, made it necessary for Amir Abdur Rahman Khan to build
up a strong standing army aided by an expanded bureaucracy and an
extensive intelligence service, a stupendous task considering the meager
 state income based mainly on an agricultural economy.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

        With his downfall ended Afghanistans first constitution, which
Amanullah had promulgated in 1923, as well as the dynastic rule estab-
 lished by his grandfather Amir Abdur Rahman in i88o.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                       He did not tolerate opposition, although he al-
lowed provincial assemblies and the national parliament to function as
 provided by the constitution.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

       He permitted King Mohammad Zahir, his nephew, to enjoy life,
but not to rule; by contrast, he trained his full nephews, Mohammad
Daoud and Mohammad Naeem, in the art of government by giving
 them responsible positions.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                          With the help of the intelli-
gence service (zabt-e-ahwalat) backed by a strong army, the government
arrested many constitutionalists and other persons, often for no appar-
ent reason; they were detained in filthy prison cells for years without
 trial.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                            Advised by a loya jirga (grand assem-
bly), Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim followed a policy of correct
 neutrality during the war.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

          But the king, though supported by his younger son-in-law and
cousin, Abdul Wali, and others, now had opponents in the persons of
his other first cousins and brothers-in-law, Daoud and Naeem, who had
turned against the new arrangement because it excluded them from poli-
 tics.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                           In addition, the govern-
ment had to meet challenges from the national assemblies and unruly
 students incited by political parties.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

          More important, the confrontational attitude with Pakistan was
abandoned, and after the exchange of visits to Islamabad and Kabul by
leaders of both countries, the ground was prepared for the settlement of
 outstanding issues, including Pashtunistan.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                               STORMING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE
At twenty minutes past seven, Tapa-e-Tajbeg was shelled by rockets
 from the west side.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                   In-
stead of Afghans, the Alpha antiterrorist squad of the KGB, dressed in
Afghan uniforms and commanded by Colonel Boyarinov, had gone into
 operation.2
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

They had a blind faith in the Kremlin rulers and did
 not expect that their supporters would overthrow them by force.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                              Except
for Sarwari, who was from the province of Ghazni bordering the prov-
 ince of Paktia, the others were from Paktia.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                    They had influ-
ence with the army, which was officered by a considerable number of
 persons from Paktia.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

On this point, as well as a number of others that will be described in
 the next chapter, Amins relations with the Soviets became strained.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

         What is known is that Jahandad, who was of the Sabari tribe from
the district of Khost of Paktia Province, had decided that the time had
come to prove his loyalty to the land of his birth and defy the invaders,
 even though they were the Soviets.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Both sides sustained losses until the Afghans
 were finally overcome by some kind of nerve gas.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                 Never before have uni-
formed Afghan military officers been insulted so much as these officers
were by individual men and women, particularly the latter, in public
 places in the city of Kabul for months after the invasion.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                           To escape the
sarcastic remarks of women, these officers avoided going by public buses
 in the city in uniform, as is the custom in Afghanistan.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

            While Amin worked to weaken Taraki by removing Sarwari, Wa-
tanjar, and Gulabzoy from their posts, the latter tried to do away with
 him.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Taraki told his associates that Amin intended to remove him by a
 coup.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                    Amin
asked Taraki to dismiss Sarwari and others from their posts; Taraki pro-
posed a compromise, but by then a compromise had become unwork-
 able.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

By Amins order Taraki
 was detained and, on 9 October, suffocated.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                  By the time
he took over the reins of government, Soviet advisers had obtained for
themselves such a commanding position that
no significant decision was made, no important order issued in either the
civilian ministries in Kabul or the Afghan armed forces without the clearance
 of Soviet advisers.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                           It is not known whether or not
his instruction was general and whether or not it was carried out by all
civilian and military officials; however, by the time of the invasion the
advisers attached to the military section of the Intelligence Department
 were indeed working as advisers only.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

The subsequent claims by Karma!
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                           By making this
statement, the Soviet leaders put themselves into such a position that to
justify their actions they had to tell lies about this as well as related
 issues.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                               On ii December 1979
the Soviet politburo, chaired by Leonid Brezhnev, endorsed the KGB
 view and decided to invade.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                           In the KGBS view, The situation [in Af-
ghanistan] [could] be saved only by the removal of Amin from power
 and the restoration of unity in the ruling party.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Karmal ac-
 cepted the proposal, which was passed by a majority of the votes cast.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                            Sarwari
and Gulabzoy had endeared themselves to the Soviets by helping them
 in the invasion.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                 By the phrase through revolutionary
pathways, Karmal meant his two secret flights aboard Soviet military
 aircraft to the Bagram military airport.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                The Soviets first flew him in on
13 December 1979, when they expected opponents would topple Amin
 by a coup.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                      This was done through an invisible body or coun-
cil, composed of the Soviet ambassador, the local head of the KGB, and
the commander of the Soviet army, and headed by the Soviet supreme
 commander, Marshall Sergei Sokolov.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                       But in contrast
with past resistance movements, which were headed by traditional lead-
ers, in the present resistance leaders emerged from among the modern,
 educated members of Afghan society.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                     They had been organized in politi-
cal parties set up in the 19 6os, a by-product of the transition from a
 traditional to a modern society.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

By 1975 there were 115,12.5
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                            Inside
Afghanistan about twenty groups and regional unions were active by
 July I98I.~
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Nationalist Resistance
Organizations
 It is difficult to pinpoint which resistance groups were nationalist.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                    Most
might be called so, since they defended their homeland against the inva-
sion and stood for the view that the people of Afghanistan alone had
 the right to set up the kind of state they wanted.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                     The whole question centered on the
point of sovereignty: whether it was to be actualized by the Afghans
themselves or determined with the help of foreign might on the basis of
 universalist or internationalist notions.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

The attitude shown toward the jirga by the authorities
 of the host country proved crucial.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                    Pakistan did not want the Afghans to
set up new organizations on its soil; this point had been decreed by the
Consultative Board, a high-level commission concerned with Afghan af-
 fairs and headed by President Zia al-Haq.18
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                      Supported by his followers, a member
of the Gailani family chaired the jirga in violation of its procedures, as
 a result of which the majority boycotted it.2
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Thus failed the first attempt by Afghans to set up a political structure
 along traditional lines at a time of national crisis.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                             In September i 981 elders from western
Afghanistan, led by the former senator Abdul Quddos and the former
deputy president of parliament Abdul Ahad Karzay, attempted to con-
 vene a loya jirga.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                             Specifically,
they also stated that since party politics had disunited Afghans, they
should abandon it in favor of the institution of the jirga, by which their
 forefathers had resolved national problems in critical times.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                 In their view the jirga
was a suicidal attempt by the enemies of Islam and leftist parties?22
More than three thousand influential persons from all over the country
arrived at Quetta, but local authorities requested that they move to the
 smaller town of Pishin for security reasons.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                          He also valued
constructive traditions, in particular the custom of opposing social in-
justice and observing the code of social morality by accepting risk with
 boldness and chivalry (ayyari).
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                           PRELUDE TO URBAN UPRISINGS
The national opposition was marked by two stages: spontaneous, disor-
 ganized urban opposition, and rural guerrilla opposition.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                  Almost simultaneously, groups of people by the thousands
appeared in different quarters of the city: Dasht-e-Barchi, Pul-e-Khishti,
Mohammad Jan Khan Watt, Salang Watt, Jamal Mama, Beni Hissar,
 and Qala-e-Fathullah.4
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

By April 1980 the province of Laghman was divided
 into a number of precincts (houza), each led by a commandant.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                        The
new rudimentary system of administration established by the Islamic
party was in essence the nucleus of the Islamic republic that the Islamists
 intended to set up.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                              After the many uprisings,
particularly during the summer of 1980, units of the invading army, ac-
companied by air power, carried on operations in many parts of the
 country.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                 They em-
ployed sons against fathers by sending them in tanks and warplanes to de-
 stroy their homes and villages.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                   To continue the story in
the words of the elderly man himself:
Advised by a great mulla, the people of our valley opposed the two projects
 of schools and roads.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

   Also, supported by bands of armed mujahideen, the new rulers imposed
~1
heavy fines on both sides of disputes without investigating them as re-
 quired by Islamic laws.28
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                         SUPPRESSION OF NATIONAL CULTURE
Another set of measures adopted by the mujahideen were intended to
suppress or replace customs, traditions, and social conventions with the
 injunctions of the Islamic Sharia.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

           In addition, community elders, those who embodied tradi-
tional and social wisdom, were replaced by scholars of religion and
 Sharia.30
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                      But not all the aid reached the mu-
jahideen: published estimates said between, one-third and one-half of the
aid was diverted by Pakistan or sold by representatives of the mujahid
 groups in Peshawar.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                               Emboldened by the moral force of the jehad
that they were conducting against an atheist invader and strengthened
by weapons, the new leaders acted like independent rulers, showing little
 or no regard for the people whom they ruled.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                   By mid-1981 it was clear that rivalry not cooperation,
ruled the relations of the six mujahid organizations in Logar on all mat-
 ters, including military operations.37
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                They had acquiesced into
submission to the commanders and heads of various organizations, showing
patience and tolerance to the mistreatment they received from some of
 them....
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

They did so because the leaders in Peshawar
 had disappointed them.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

The people had been frustrated by the disunity of the
 organizations and the pressure brought to bear on them by the Russians.42
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                           But this form was meaning-
less, because during the search family members would be pushed inside
a room, the house would be searched by armed men, and members of
 the family would be so terrified that they did not dare complain.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                Translating that view into actuality was
made possible by the state structure, in which the departments of secret
police, public attorney, and special tribunals, dominated apparently by
the official party but in fact by the Soviet Union, worked toward the
 same goal: to realize the domination of the state over individuals.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

homosexual acts, perpetrated not only by them but also by others, in-
 cluding some educated inmates.33
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                        Not
a single group of inmates remained as solid as before, but split into rival
 or hostile subgroups.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Scuffles and quarrels among them became com-
 mon.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                        Ill
Military and
Administrative Measures
for Consolidation of the
Government
Since the Soviet policy was to consolidate the regime, it tried to suppress
 resistance.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

The call-up was accompanied by concessions and bonuses.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

He also stated that in this way regional reaction and world
 imperialism led by American imperialism would be defeated.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

The regime modified the recall by exempting
 university and school teachers as well as students.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                        Before September 1980 it had set
up in the frontier areas a number of military posts garrisoned by men
from different tribes but officered and supervised by the Khalqis of the
 same area.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                     The militiamen, as well as the Khalqis, declined,
arguing that by taking up arms against their own tribes, they had made
them their enemies, and now they had to have the weapons to protect
 themselves.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Supported by the community, the arobaki is a force against disorder.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                  In the present case, the interest of the
tribe was tofight the invaders and their client regime, a decision reached
 by a tribal jirga after the Soviet invasion.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                             However, by
offering money and weapons Fayz Mohammad had persuaded the heads
of the tribe to maintain security in their region and to leave the Sitta
 Kandow Pass open.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                               The Kabul re-
gime tried to capitalize on this difference by resorting to the same tactics
 as it had with the Zadrans.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                  This move of the Malik Qays faction, led at the time by
Aman Beg, was tactical: during a meeting in Peshawar, the two rival
factions had already agreed to leave their enmity aside and fight the in-
 vaders.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                      The Khalqi regime had imprisoned some of his sons
and nephews who were serving the government as military officers and
had bombed his locality; he then took refuge in the mountains and
threatened retaliation unless the prisoners were released and compensa-
 tion (nagha) paid for the damage wrought by the bombing.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

         Among them, particularly among the descendants of Haji
Hassan Khan, many are educated, and Kama had been a town with a
 number of public libraries confiscated by the Khalqis.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Local decisions were made (often the party merely implemented instruc-
tions it received from Moscow) in the party politburo, which was com-
posed of eleven leading members and headed by the general secretary,
 who, in the period under discussion, was Babrak Karmal.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                   These persons deafened the Afghans by preaching that they
toiled for the welfare of toilers, but in actuality, and on instruction from
the Soviets, they devised ways and means to embroil the toilers in wars
 of hatred among themselves so that they themselves could stay in power.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                 Strategically it is also significant,
because it is separated from the rest of the country by the Hindu Kush
 and also because it is close to Central Asia.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Finally, the ministry was financed by Moscow.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                             The first shots of the
mujahideen were followed by a two-hour barrage of heavy guns, rock-
 ets, and small arms by the Soviet forces.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

By 23 Sep-
 tember 1981 the mujahideen had become more active than ever before.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

          On the night of i 8 September 1981 a group of about fifty mujahi-
deen, after announcing their arrival by firing toward the sky, forced their
way into a house and took away three government officials, who were
 said to have been members of the official party.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                  But more important were the Soviets
major military operations, which by then had relieved the city of the
 pressure from the mujahideen.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                   Supported by Soviet
might, the regime acted on the belief that it would accomplish this in
 time.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                      This
statement confirmed the long-circulated rumors that the Soviets in-
tended to suppress the resistance by the wide use of force after the Olym-
 pic games, which were held in Moscow that summer.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

In the plenum Karmal informed his comrades of a deci-
 sion already made by his Soviet comrades in Moscow.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                         The assurance was based on an
assessment of the situation by Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of foreign
 intelligence in Moscow.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

By spending money and exerting pressure, the regime was able
 to summon community elders to meet with him.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Similarly, a resolution calling for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
was passed by the foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries at a
~neeting held early in 1981 in New Delhi; this resolution was particu-
larly notable since the number of pro-Soviet countries in the movement
 was considerable.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                         The proposal
was explained to the Soviet authorities in Moscow in July of the same
year by a mission of the EEC headed by the British Foreign Minister
Lord Carrington; the Soviets called the plan impractical: although
 they did not reject it outright.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Also, shortly after the invasion a group of academics,
 headed by 0.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                The man
who symbolized the Soviet conscience by opposing the war was Andrei
Sakharov, the winner of the Nobel peace prize and a human rights activ-
ist; for his stand, the Soviet government in January 1980 deported him
 to the closed city of Gorky, where he spent seven years in isolation.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                            Elimination of
Opponents by
Nonmilitary Means
One result of the Soviet invasion was the creation of a situation in which
the parties involved in the war justified the destruction of life for the
 slightest of reasons.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

The public corroborated this
 view by their attitude.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                In general, party members were ostra-
cized not only by friends and acquaintances but in some cases even by
 members of their own families.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Some were caught later, but only as a result
 of extensive efforts by KhAD.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                     PARTY CONFERENCE OVERSHADOWED BY
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
Since the foundation of PDPA in 1965, flO party congresses had been
held, although most communist parties hold a congress of elected mem-
 bers every fourth year or so.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                             Frustrated by
the tough resistance and their inability to suppress it expeditiously, the
 Soviets embarked on a program of genocide.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

by actions aimed at undermining the foundation essential to the survival
 of the group as a group.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

               These are retributive genocide, which is based on the desire
for revenge; institutional genocide, which is frequently incidental to mil-
itary conquest; utilitarian genocide, which is motivated by the desire for
material gain; monopolistic genocide, which originates in the desire to
monopolize power; and ideological genocide, which is motivated by the
desire to impose a particular notion of salvation or purification on an
 entire society.7
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                     Chalk and Jonassohn have combined these categories
into a master definition: Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing
in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that
 group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.8
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                 The Renaissance of
Western Europe eroded a similar doctrine held by the Roman Catholic
 church, but nothing of the sort took place in Russia.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                    It also tried to implant abroad by deceit and
violence the truth of communism, of which Afghanistan is the most
 recent example.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                   Despite these qualifications, the
information here does indicate the dimensions of the genocide under-
 taken by the Soviets.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Indiscriminate mass killing of the civilians by the Soviet soldiers dates
from the invasion, although, as already noted, until the February upris-
 2.2.0
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                     Since
hostilities invoke the instinct to kill, whether for an ulterior motive or
in self-defense, combatants often do not confine themselves only to mili-
tary targets, as recommended by the international conventions agreed
 to by member countries of the United Nations.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                             But to kill civilians indis-
criminately, deliberately, and as a matter of policy; to destroy their
sources of livelihood; to force them to flee abroad; to do so without
provocation on the part of the civilians, all in an effort to punish them
for their support of combatant compatriots in conditions under which
the state of war does not officially existthis constitutes a crime, a
crime defined at Nurnberg as devastation not justified by military ne-
 cessity.6
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

               Wars have laws, and as one commentator has put it, the laws
of war have as their objective that the ravages of war should be miti-
gated as far as possible by prohibiting needless cruelties, and other acts
that spread death and destruction and are not reasonably related to the
 conduct of hostilities.17
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                  A number of nomads, arriving at the
area in a truck for the purpose of spending the winter, were welcomed
 by their relatives and locals.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                Strong social bonds, characteristic of the society,
required such functions, which were attended by hundreds of people,
 whether or not invited.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                       In August i 981, as a result of a
two-hour attack by four helicopter gunships on a wedding party in the
village of Jalrez in the upper part of the Maidan Valley, 30 people were
 killed and 7~ wounded.18
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

They have let them-
 selves be seized by the disease of disunity, personal interest, and ambition.6
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                   MASSACRE IN SHAMALI
The region toward the north of Kabul up to the Hindu Kush is called by
 the traditional name of Shamali.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

            Besides the two unfriendly Islamist groups of Hizb (led
by Hekmatyar) and Jamiyyat, the leftist SAMA was also active in the
 region.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

By then the young people had escaped,
 2.42.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

A long, tortuous river valley, Panjsher is inhab-
 ited by Tajiks and a number of Sunni Hazaras.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                The valley is flanked by
high mountains, pierced here and there with habitable caves; indeed, the
caves are so spacious that people sometimes use them as summer quar-
 ters.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

The blockade failed, and grain was imported to Panjsher, although with
 difficulty, from other regions, notably Andarab.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                     In September 1981 the
Soviets undertook their fifth operation against Panjsher; it, too, was re-
 pulsed by the mujahideen.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                     By the time the
hearing was held, the number of cases of the use of chemical agents
had increased, according to Dr. Fraile, to approximately one hundred
 instances, resulting in the deaths of about three thousand people.33
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                        One foreign observer described plastic bombs camou-
flaged to look like stones or leaves:
Soviet helicopters scatter them by the thousands in the fields and on moun-
 tain pass[es].
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

The use of camouflaged mines in civilian areas was outlawed by an
 international convention signed by the Soviet Union in April 1981.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                  He was not defending
his homeland, he was the invader detested by most Afghans, allies or
enemy, and badly trained, fed and accommodated?1 The Soviet fighting
men expected to fight foreign enemies on Afghan soil, but instead they
encountered as adversaries the very men and women for whose protec-
 tion their leaders claimed to have sent them.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                       Epilogue, 1982-1994 1982-1994 
I
The period from 1982 to the present was marked by the replacement in
1986 of Karmal by Najibullah, the withdrawal in 1989 of Soviet troops
after the conclusion in 1988 of the Geneva Accords, and the replace-
 ment in 199Z of the Parchami regime by the Islamic state.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                        With the net-
work of logistical supplies and coordination development through the
seven-party alliance, the Afghan Resistance became a highly efficient
 force by I986.~
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

        As early as 1983 Yuri Andropov, general secretary of the Communist
Party; had told Karmal that he should not count on [an] indefinite and
protracted stay of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan; that it was his obli-
gation to expand the social base of his government by political 10
But Andropov died shortly afterward, and during the brief reign of his
successor, Konstantin Chernenko, the issue was not pursued, and Kar-
 mal did not draw the required conclusion.11
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                       who had brought the calamity of
Soviet troops on the Afghans, found it impossible to expand the social
 base of his government by political means.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                At the time neither
the Soviet Union nor Kabul was willing to expand the social base of
 the regime by including the Islamic groups.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                On 14 April 1988 the
accords, known as the Geneva Accords, were signed by representatives
 of the governments of Pakistan and Kabul.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                               Besides,
Arabs were said to have won him votes by offering gratuities to members
 of the shura.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

               By contrast, Mojaddidi, though mercurial, was a moderate
traditionalist, not an Islamist; he also had a longer anticommunist and
 antiabsolutist stand.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Instructed by the Soviets, the Kabul regime concentrated
 2.72
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                  By
then Sevan, who had met with all the parties concerned, had arranged
 for the transfer of power on 28 April 1992.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

At 2:00 P.M. on 14 April 1992, the militias of Dostum, which had
 been brought to Kabul by air, took positions in the city.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                        Azimi and other Parchami leaders
told him that the militias had been brought to protect Kabul against the
threats posed by Hekmatyar, who had concentrated his men at the citys
 southern limits.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                   A fifty-one-member commission, headed
by Sibgatu~lah Mojaddidi, was to transfer power to itself from the Kabul
 regime.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

    so that the nation is freed from them?94 To calm the mobs, the hosts
did not let diplomats and foreign journalists visit the participants and
created hope among Afghans by giving out that the leaders had been
 warned of being imprisoned unless they came out with a settlement.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                             It originated
in the Islamic state, and specifically in the policies established by Rab-
bani, first as head of the LC and later as head of state, and by Masud as
 the all-powerful figure in the state.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Mojaddidi left the office a frustrated man, alienated by
 the machinations of Rabbani and Masud.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                             It failed because, strictly
speaking, it was not a government: it was actually a commission estab-
lished principally by foreigners, to transfer power in the course of two
294
 months, a short period for such a difficult task.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                        Be-
cause of the absence of the central government, commanders, heads of
political parties, and tribal elders [of the frontiers areasi, backed up by
external powers, derive abundant incomes from opium, custom dues,
 smuggling, and the theft of natural resources.127
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                   The reverend Mawlawi of
Tarakhel even holds that as long as they [the leaders of the groups] are
on the scene, the Afghan crisis will not be 130 The danger to
Afghanistans national sovereignty lies here, and it is real in view of its
 encirclement by self-serving neighbors.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                     The world governments have a moral
responsibility to the Afghans, and it is now time for them to assist in
transforming the poisonous culture into a healthy one by permitting the
 Afghans to institute a national government.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                              By helping to estab-
lish such a government, the world governments, among other things,
would secure millions of men and women throughout the world from
 the dangers of the poisonous culture.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                          The Soviets found him a willing figure in aligning the
minorities against the Pashtun majority in an effort to weaken national solidar-
 ity against the invaders and the regime.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

His family was also
 related to the Mojaddidi family by marriage.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

By this time he had become a member of the central committee of the Parcham
 faction of the PDPA and a close associate of Khybar, his brother-in-law.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

From 1969 tO 1972.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

regime in various capacities of the sec-
 ond rank.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

In Cairo he was influenced by the teachings of the Ikhwan al-
 Muslimin.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

          Following the Soviet invasion and the intensification of resistance,
the association became a major resistance organization throughout the country,
 in particular the Tajik-dominated regions.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                        RATEBZAD, ANAHITA (93-)
A graduate of the Medical College of the University of Kabul, Anahita Ratebzad,
known by her given name, entered politics by working among the educated and
 professional Afghan women.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                   Connected to the Mohammadzay and other fami-
lies with a liberal outlook, Anahita set an example of liberation by organizing
 her female followers around leftist ideas and a promiscuous lifestyle.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

She dissociated
 herself from her husband after she had a daughter and a son by him.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                 Yet this Taraki organized hun-
dreds of educated men around socialism, and after the April coup he allayed the
fears of his countrymen with the simple words of the country folk, lecturing
group after group of their elders that those who had overthrown the rule of the
Mohammadzay tyrants were their sons, determined to do them good by provid-
 ing them home, clothes, and food, the epitome of Bangs dreams.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

           When he was rejected by the peasants for whose emancipation he claimed
he was toiling, Taraki did not hesitate to ask the then unwilling Soviet Union to
 suppress them by the army.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                    Instructed by Amin, he initiated the march of tank forces
from the motorized forces of numbers ~ and i ~ near Pul-e-Charkhi against the
 government.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                      Afghan Refugees in
Pakistan
The following table was compiled by the Chief Commissionerate for Afghan
 Refugees, Islamabad, from figures received from the provincial commissioners.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

163,225 unregistered refugees who have been provided provisional ration cards by CCAR, Quetta, are included i
 1~ 1 A~ A~.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Send us fighting infantry machines [armored personnel-carriers] by
 planes.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

A
 medical physician by profession, Dr. Sharq was Mohammad Daouds associate.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                They cooper-
ated with it at a time when the Soviets had occupied their homeland and were
 killing Afghans by the thousands.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

    At the end of the war, Wendy Batson, a consultant of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees stated, Even those [Afghan~ villages not di-
 rectly affected by the conflict are often as devastated as those that were.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

FATWA Ruling or opinion on legal issues issued by head of the Islamic commu-
 nity, and in his absence by the ulama.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

KHAN Originally a Mongol term signifying prince or ruler; now, head of a tribe
or community with many chiefs working under him; also, an honory title by
 which a man is addressed by others.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Edited by the Committee for International
 Afghanistan Hearing.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

i, E. Afghan Refugees: A Tragedy Created by Communism.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

i, H. Guardianship or Looting of a City? Afghanistan Uournal], pub-
 ished by Afghan Information Center, Peshawar, No. I (April 1994): 66.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                   See
Inquiry on, 249250
Peoples New Democratic Party
Chernenko, Konstantin, 259
Deva, Soviet operations in, 133, 134,
Chile, 29
154, 174, 222, 224
Chilsitun Palace, ~, ~z
Dobandi, 236
China, 1,40, 43, 49, io8, 117, 235
Doshanbay (capital of Tajikistan), 34
Chindawal, i16, ~i8, z8~
Dostum, Abdur Rashid, 272, 274, 275,
Chitral, ~7
i8o, 282, 283, 284, 286, 287, 290,
Choueini, Youssef M., 84
292, 293
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 29,
 DRA.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                 273, 307
Mughulkhel, Mawlawi, 3
Panjsher, 89, 90, i6i, 2o~, 240, 243,
107
Muhsini, Ayatullah Shaykh Asif, 94, i ,8,
Nawaz Sharif, 275, 276, 278, 284
281
z8o, 284, 288; biography of, 312
Panjsheni, Dastagir, 23, 244; biography
Nazarzad, 317
Mujahideen: commanders in politics,
of, 3334
Nazyan Valley, i26, 178
296; control of countryside by, 7~,
Nejat High School, 308
Pankin, Boris, 272
III, 112; disillusionment of people
Parcham (periodical), 310
New Delhi, 194, 316, 317
with, 128, 131, 134; liquidation of
Parcham faction, 13, 15, 30, 33, 34, ~z,
New Generations of Hazaras (political
Khalqis by, 34011; local contributions
53, 55; description of, 5859;
group), 95
to, 127; as local rulers, 127; number
Parcham~Khalq relationship, ~86i,
Niaz Beg (town), 190
of commanders, 263; portrait of, by
6z, 35; reunion with Khalq, 308,
Niazi, Ghulam Mohammad, 8~86, 89;
Soviets, zi6; spirit of jehad of, 188;
biography of, 313
310
suppression of national culture by,
 Parcham regime.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                           Carolyn Wells of the Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies in London and Rachel Lubbock,
formerly of ABC News, Paris, both provided a regular flow of research
material, while French painter Jean-Pierre Blanche kindly lent me the
2 
Introduction
 of powdery dust thrown up by feet and hooves.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

             With the growth of repression by the Khalq, the faction in
power, and the fighting constantly spreading to new fronts in the
countryside, it was evident that something would have to break sooner
or later; another coup perhaps, an army uprising, or even a rebel take-
 over of Kabul.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

           Although officially headed by Taraki, a 62~year~0ld fa-
therly figure described by one Western diplomat as the respectable
element in the Kabul regimes the Khalqi admiflstratbon had become
steadily more barbarous under the influence of Amin, who took over
 the premiershiP in March 1979.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

          Nevertheless, whether promoting Marxist-Leninist revolution in
the Third World or reasserting its control over insubordinate peoples of
 satellite nations, the Kemlin has never adopted a short-term approach.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Since well before the invasion, it had made it clear that it would never
 tolerate a Kabul regime hostile to Soviet regional interests.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                         No matter what he does, com-
mented a Western diplomat in the Afghan capital, Karmal will never be
able to erase from peoples minds that he was put in by the Soviet
 army.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

         Protected by Soviet anti-aircraft guns, tanks and troops, the
building was being used as Karmals official residence until the Presi-
 dential Palace, badly damaged during the takeover, could be repaired.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Over 200 foreign journalists had by nOW gathered in the capital.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                By early 1985, it had risen to the
generally accepted figure of 115,000, with 30,000-40,000 regularly
 deployed for special operations from bases inside Soviet Central Asia.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                         34 The Soviet Strategy
By the end of 1980, most of the valleys 150,000 inhabitants had
 left.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                            the mining
of a road or an attack on a convoy), by razing villages to the ground,
 killing cattle or burning crops.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                         By 1984, communist ambushes
began seriouslY to threaten guerrilla movements, particularlY in the
 eastern and southeastern provinces.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                Shortly afterwards, heavy Soviet
bombardments followed by massive ground attacks were reported in
 Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar and Badakshan provinces.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                       Ever since a
Soviet unit had briefly entered the region eight months earlier and
destroyed one or two villages, killing several men, it had remained
 virtually untouched by war.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

      Bernard Dupaigne, the French ethnologist, who travelled around
46 The Soviet Strategy
much of Afghanistan by bus in the late summer of 1980 on an ordinary
tourist visa, reported bitter animosity and resentment wherever he
 went.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                          Similar
complaints have been voiced by Ethiopians, Angolans and Egyptians
 who, at one time or another, have dealt with Soviet advisers.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Judging by the feelings expressed by Soviet defectors and prisoners of
war held by the mujahideen, much of this certainly has to do with fear
as well as with a general loathing for a country they do not know nor
 wish to sacrifice their lives for.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Figures between 80,000 and
54 The Guerrilla War
 150,000 have been suggested by various observers.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

By establishing field alliances which do not
 reflect the intrigues of Peshawar and by gradually adapting their organ.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

In the wake of the communist revolution, they rapidly reverted to their
64 The Guerrilla War
 former use, except this time mainly by refugees and mujahideen.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                             66 The Guerrilla War
Arms from Abroad
Arms captured from the security forces or brought in by defectors
 represent a major supply source for the internal fronts.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                           By August,
1980, the Russians had taken away anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns
from all but the most reliable Afghan troops because of the abundance
 of army stock that was falling into the hands of the partisans.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                                   The
fact, too, that AK-74 Kalakov assault rifles, carried only by Red army
soldiers, are increasingly common among the mujahideen demonstrates
 in part their ability to capture weapons from the Russians themselves.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

  There was a notable rise in urban guerrilla activities in the capital
throughout much of 1984, ranging from a reportedly heavy rocket and
mortar assault against the Soviet embassy in the early part of the year
76 The Resistance Fronts
to repeated attacks on Kabul airport and the partial razing of the old
 bazaar in ealry November by mujahed rockets.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                           The families
are cared for by the resistance administration and receive indemnity in
80 The Resistance Fronts
 case of the fighters death or incapacity.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                              Apart from
flurries of newspaper and magazine articles, the Panjshairs defiance had
featured in several television documentaries bearing such titles as
 Valley against an Empire by a French team.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

             Strings of helicopter gunships clattered overhead to targets
further up the Panjshair, while congested columns of armoured vehicles
and trucks, headed by tanks equipped with huge rollers to predetonate
mines, ground laboriously along the single dirt road that runs the length
 of the valley.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

         By destroying the road in places where the valley narrowed,
they could prevent heavy armoured vehicles from crawling up the nor-
 mally shallow river bed, thus halting the communist advance.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

         By the time the Red Army troops managed to bulldoze their way
through, scores of Afghans had already defected to the resistance with
their weapons, including nine tanks which were turned against the
 invaders.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                 Their 800 troops at the base
were not permitted to move beyond its perimeter and bad to be
 supplied by helicopter.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

By establishing a truce with Massoud, the Soviets were hoping to
 achieve at least two objectives.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

In the end, it was Massoud who brought the Red Army to check,
 although by rio means mate.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                This was conceded by the Russians, who
terminated the cease-fire some sixteen months later by launching their
 seventh, and largest offensive, against the Panjshair.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                     But this modernisa-
tion programme met with deep suspicion from the peasantry, who regarded
the reforms as an attempt by the central authorities to impinge on their
 traditional independence.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

By the autumn of 1928, the
 mullahs, tribes and ethnic groups were in revolt.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Aided by loyalists, he escaped and made his way to exile
 in Italy.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                Zahir Shah acquiesced, but he maintained his countrys
dignity by ordering only German, Japanese and Italian nationals with-
 out diplomatic status to leave.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

       This involved five-year economic plans, a restructuring of the
armed forces and an attempt to diversify economic ties by looking not
 only to the United States and the West, but also to the Eastern bloc.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                   The Failing Monarchy
The years immediately preceding Daouds 1973 coup detat were
characterised by a violently conservative and religious reaction to the
 influence of the left-wing parties.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Fanatics in Kabul, for example, attacked unveiled women in
 Western dress by throwing acid in their faces.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

In some areas, there were
 even minor armed revolts which were quickly put down by the army.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                           Whatever
104 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan
 the truth, by the evening of 27 April it was all over.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

The Khalq reacted harshly by secretly sentencing several of them to
106 Soviet Influence in Afghanistan
death including Keshtmand and Qadar, who had played a major role in
 both the 1973 and 1978 coups.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                  Reign of the Khalq
Why the Kremlin permitted the pro-Soviet Parcham to be ousted by the
 more nationalist Khalq is unclear.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                                It was
then that the Russians intervened by dispatching squadrons of bombers,
probably Ilyushin II-28s, from Dushanbe, capital of Soviet Tadjikistan
 some 300 miles to the north, to bomb the rebels.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                  By 20 March loyal
Afghan troops, supported by tanks, assault helicopters and Soviet
military personnel, had entered the turmoil-ridden city, where they
confronted the surging crowds, mercilessly shelling and machine-
 gunning anything that moved.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                By the time the revolt was suppressed,
at least several thousand people had been killed or wounded, with some
 reports quoting as many as 30,000  40,000 casualties.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                     The government installed by the
Kremlin was becoming more and more terrorist and arbitrary, recalled
Farid, member of an urban resistance group and a high school student
 at the time.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                                    Key
officers in the armed forces, including dissatisfied communists, led by
 Col.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                     In one incident, a vehicle of the
Magic Bus Company in Amsterdam, one of the last tour operators on
the overland hippy route to India via Afghanistan, was attacked in the
southern part of the country; a Swiss and a Canadian were shot dead
and an Australian seriously injured as bullets fired by unseen gunmen
120 The Communist Overlay
 from the surrounding rocks ripped through the windows.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

A British nurse accosted by mujahideen managed to
 evade a similar fate by crying out: BBC, BBC!
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

      When the Babrak government tried to annul these rights in early
October 1982 to strengthen the security forces, tribal chiefs already
co-operating with the authorities through non-belligerence agreements
 rebelled by holding a large demonstration in the capital.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                 It was costing the Soviet Union well
over $2 billion, possibly as much as $3 billion a year, in occupation
 and economic development support by the end of 1984.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

        Shoot-outs have become so common that it is sometimes not known
for certain whether assassinations have been carried out by the resist-
 ance or one of the PDPA factions.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                  Many party members, particularly
the more nationalist Khalqis, have become disillusioned and deeply
 resent the way they are being treated by the Soviets.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                              Anti-Russian senti-
ment has begun to emerge among Parcham militants angered by high-
 handed Russian attitudes.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

   Kabuls Foreign Ministry, which is nominally headed by Parcham
Shah Mohammed Dost, has its policies unabashedly dictated by the
 Kremlin.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                 All statements issued by the ministry, which is now
composed 90 per cent of party members or officials with high-ranking
 family connections, are prepared by a special team of Soviet advisers.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

During the first months of the occupation, secret state documents
 were systematically sifted by the KGB and then taken away.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                         In one case in Kabul, a young boy and his
mother were stopped at a roadblock by militiamen in search of con-
142 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan
 scripts.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                     According to Jean-
Denis Herle, a French teacher at the Lyce Istiqlal who first arrived in
Kabul in August 1979 and remained during the first year and a half of
the occupation, the pupils were profoundly disturbed by the up-
 heavals in their country.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                              According to Dr Sayed
Mohammad Yusuf Elmi, professor of Islamic Civilisation at Kabul
University who fled with his family to Pakistan in August 1983, at
least four manifestly anti-Islamic subjects have replaced classical
studies and are taught by the Soviets themselves: Historical Mater-
ialism, The History of Revolutionary Movements, Scientific
 Sociology and Dialectical Materialism.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                        During the early stages of the occupation, one
146 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan
British teacher was threatened by the authorities for having explained
to her pupils that most policemen in the United Kingdom do not
 carry guns.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

       Berated for telling imperialist lies by a communist militant,
she was reported to the directorate when she refused to withdraw her
 statement.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

  As one senior Paris-based Soviet diplomat, later expelled by the
French government for spying, told me: It is necessary to create a
148 The Sovietisation of Afghanistan
properly indoctrinated young generation to lead a progressive, new
 Afghanistan.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

          On 14 June 1982, for example, the Kabul media gave copious
coverage to the departure by bus and truck of some 1,000 party mili-
tants, students and militiamen, most of them Khalqis who had been
recruited by the Parchami, to help with the valleys political re-
 education.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                                  Despite
bitter criticism by the families who lost their sons and daughters, there
 was no mention of this in the official media.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

By the end of 1980, however, not a single cubic metre of gas was
 being used in Afghanistan itself.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                  There is perhaps some consolation to
the Afghans in the fact that they are not the only ones to suffer from
 such high-handed treatment by the Kremlin.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                                    In one
incident in Jouzjan province in June 1982, guerrillas blasted the
pipeline causing a fire that lasted for two days despite hectic efforts by
 Soviet and Afghan troops to put it out.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                             Between 1967 and
1976, the French Textile Fibre Development Company managed to
 double Afghan cotton production by improved farming methods.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                            This was flatly denied by
Islamabad, although several years later senior civilian and military
officials with the Bhutto administration privately admitted that they
 had been responsible for the arms, finance and timing of the incident.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                    ile the other groups are left
to bleed, it is argued, Hekmat ar is being boosted by commu t ro-
paganda as the only guerrilla leader o importance, s ould Moscow
 ever want to strike a deal.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                They are also distinguished by the same
intolerance and inexorable desire to further the aims of the party that
 characterised the Khalq during the 1978-79 period.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                 Urban Armed Opposition
By the early summer of 1980, the resistance was making itself increas-
ingly felt in the urban areas, although fighting remained restricted to
 the outskirts of the capital.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                                    As a
result, no anti-government incidents marred the anniversary parade,
which in Eastern bloc style included Afghan soldiers, cadets, police and
party militants marching past the Afghan tricolour flanked by red flags,
 while MIGs and helicopters roared overhead.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                   By the beginning of 1984, the citys
population had nearly tripled from 700,000 before the invasion to over
 two million.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                     As one doctor
from the Paris-based Mdecins sans Frontires(MSF) wrote:
On my arrival two days after the end of the fighting, numerous
villages were still smoking and people were still being injured by
 boobytraps such as explosive pens left behind by the Soviets.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

     Dominated by a majority of traditionalist clerics and Sayeds with
Beheshti at their head, the Shura has had to cope with two diametric-
ally opposed political flanks, causing a substantial disintegration of
 Shura authority.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                         The Pasdaran, who are strictly controlled by
Tehrans Revolutionary Guards to the point of calling for incorpora-
tion within a greater Iranian state, have steadily developed into the
 strongest and best organised of the Hazara fronts.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                             By April 1979 more than
202
203
Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners
100,000 had crossed the border, creating a problem too large for the
 Islamabad government to deal with on its own.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                  With many Pakistanis complaining about
unfair practices, virtually the entire private bus trade in Peshawar has
 been taken over by Afghans who came over with their vehicles and pro.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

          In mid-1984, following a series of bomb incidents involving
loss of life outside buildings frequented by refugees, the Pakistanis
ordered the Afghan political parties to move their headquarters from
 Peshawar to outlying areas.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                             By
doing this you are at least giving the Afghans a chance to stay
Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners 
211
 on, said Dr Claude Maihuret, executive of Mdecins sans Frontire.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                           While men will turn up without hestitation at a
hospital, the most effective way to encounter sick women is to make
village visits and order the hospitalisation of those unable to be treated
at home, but male doctors are usually obliged to carry out diagnoses on
female patients by asking questions without making a physical exam-
 ination.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                           But in
October and November 1981, the Soviets made a concerted effort to
220 Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners
crack down by deliberately bombing three of the French-run hos-
 pitals.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                           They had been hidden by the
mujahideen in a cave-like shelter in the mountains as planes and heli-
 copters bombed only two miles away.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                    in Logar province
south of Kabul since September 1982, Dr Philippe Augoyard, a 29-year-
old paediatrician from Rouen, was picked up by Soviet troops during a
 helicopter raid on several villages where he was treating local civilians.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Two other doctors, a man and a woman, working in the same region
 were pursued by the security forces for a week, but managed to escape.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Four of them died, but the fifth was
 saved by one of the French who later returned to help.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                          All in all, he was interrogated no more than
half an hour by Soviet intelligence officials before being handed over
222 Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners
 to the KHAD.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                               To illus-
trate their intention of never negotiating with the bandits, the Soviets
shot the 50 Afghan prisoners named by the mujahideen just as the Red
 Cross had feared.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                                                   One
possibility was the transfer of captured Soviet personnel to a neutral
country for internment; this would conveniently give the resistance a
 way of abiding by the Geneva Conventions.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

In return, the ICRC would
 have the right to visit mujahed prisoners held by the communists.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

                                           And by maintaining a steady
232 Refugees, Doctors and Prisoners
stream of Soviet prisoners to Switzerland, the guerrillas could draw 
even more attention to the ugly little war Moscow would like the world
 to forget.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

              And although the Soviets have been laying the foundations
for widespread subversion by supporting Baluchi and Pushtun nation-
alists in western Pakistan, it is among the anti-Zia (mainly left-wing)
 political opposition that they can give the regime its worst headaches.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

Historical and Cultural Dictionaries of Asia
edited by Basil C. Hedrick
 1.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

This salt lake is fed by the waters of the
 Ghazni River.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                          Son of Amir Abdul Khan, he
full inauguration of these reforms, culminating in
1929 in the take-over of the central government by
these elements led by the brigand Bachai Saqqao
who for nine months terrorized the Afghan citizenry,
fueled the fires of reaction, and temporarily suc -
ceeded in stifling the reforms of Amir Amanullah
 Khan.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                               In
the south, however, they were soundly defeated at
Maiwand, near Qandahar, by Afghan troops led by
 the governor of Herat, Mohammed Ayub Khan.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                After Amir Mohammed
Yaqub Khans one -year reign, Amir Abdul Rahman
Khan, with the understanding that Afghan foreign
affairs would be controlled by the British, claimed
 the throne of Afghanistan in 1880.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

Kupruk I, II, III, IV) excavated by Louis Dupree.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                  About 30 miles after it passes
Qandahar it is joined by the Arghastan River and
 these two join the Helmand River at Qala Bist.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

          When Zaranj was destroyed during the Arab
invasions, Bost became a major city and remained
a cultural capital until it was destroyed by Sultan
Aluaddin Jahansooz, looted by Genghis Khan, and
ultimately ruined by Tamurlane (see TIMURE LUNG)
 when he demolished the dikes in the 14th century.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

A scarf worn by both the peasant and urban
-C -
 CALENDAR.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                        The Chadari
was outlawed in 1959 under the Premiership of
Mohammed Daud (now the President of the Republic
of Afghanistan) as a step towards further emancipa-
 tion of women in Afghanistan.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

cated west of Kabul and east of Jam, the site of
 the famous minaret of Jam.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                             Forty
steps lead to a chamber (which might have been
used as a throne at ceremonial occasions) which is
 guarded by two lions.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

Temperatures and precipitation are control -
 led by the exchange of air masses.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

      One team member goes over to the other
teams side and is chased back by an opposing
 team member who tries to whip him.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

               Visitors traveling by automobile or
bus can enter Afghanistan from the west through
Islam Qala, west of Herat; through Torkham,
east of Jalalabad; and through Spin Buldak, south-
 east of Qandahar.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

They refer to themselves
 by the geographic area in which they live.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

           Thus, it is not surprising that

buzkashi 
is exclusively played by the ethnic groups
 of northern Afghanistan.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

A prosaic chronicler who lived during the
ing, tup 
dandah 
(a game combining elements of
cricket and stickball), chub 
dandah 
(played by
 GAUTAMA BUDDHA (563-483 B.C.) (SIDDHARTHA).
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                           Gardaiz
played an important strategic role in the conquest
 of Kabul by King Mohammed Nadir Khan.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                              The
town is accessible through secondary roads and by
 airline.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

Though very
 prosperous, he could be satisfied by nothing.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                  Interesting sites are: the Qalai
Qaisar, started by Sultan Alauddin and finished by
Sultan Ghiasuddin; Kalai Sangi, a 12th century
 Ghorid city; and one in Fermis Alakadani.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

           His scholarly works are the most original
contributions provided by a native Afghan historiog-
 rapher.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                          Some
of the treatments and remedies provided by the
 Hakeems are occasionally effective.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

         The journey which took Prophet Mohammed
55 
Herat (Province)
with a population of 85, 000, is about 660 miles
from Kabul via Qandahar, and accessible by paved
 highways and regular air service.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

  Herat was originally built by Alexander the
Great and its political and economic control
shifted many times from one ruling dynasty to
 another over a period of several centuries.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

formed by the Han Rud River.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

He benefitted greatly from the excellent library,
which had been collected at Bokhara by the Saman-
 ida.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                     One of the more important of
the dynasties in Afghan history was the Ghaznavid
 Dynasty founded in 962 by Aiptigin (Aiptegin).
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                                A
great cultural center grew in Ghazni and upwards
of four hundred historians, scientists, and poets
 lived here.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

             During this period the countrys sum-
mer capital was Ghazni and the winter capital was
 Bost (Lashkar-gah) in southwestern Afghanistan.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                     This now
famous and wealthy kingdom was destroyed by
Alauddin of the Ghor, a mountainous region in
 northwest Afghanistan.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

It was dedicated by Sultan Ghiasuddin (1153 -1203).
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

east of Herat, which was dedicated by Sultan
 Ghiasuddin Ghuri (1153-1203).
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

Religious specialists, by performing specific rit-
 uals, may relieve a person of such possessions.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                              The Rig Veda (com-
piled between 1400 and 900 B. C.) refers to this
 city by the name of Kubha.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                          Kabura is the name
used by Ptolemy in the 2nd century B. C. The
 location of the city has changed several times.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

The city was destroyed once by Alauddin
 Jahansooz and later by the British.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                               The
city, with high mountains on each side, at the
time of the Arab invasion in the 7th century A. D.
was accessible only by means of the narrow Guzar-
 gab Pass.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                  During the first and second Al -
ghan Wars, a great deal of fighting took place
here when it was occupied by the British in 1839 -
 42 and in 1879-80.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                     Between
Kabul and Jalalabad, however, the waters are
 held back by three dams.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                               The university is to-
tally subsidized by the state, and is administra-
tively under the jurisdiction of the national minis-
 try of education.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                           Universal education
for all, among other accomplishments, has been
among the plans and programs supported by this
 former King.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                   The 1964 constitution was par-
tially revoked by the Republican Regime after the
 revolution of July 17, 1973.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

Afghanistan, it is separated from the Hindu Kush
 by the Bamyan Valley.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                       Such folk-
lore, as well as poems by well -known poets of
the past, have found their way into the lives of
the people, transmitted orally from generation to
generation by professional minstrels who move
about the country entertaining villagers at tea
houses and by nomadic travellers at major stop-
 ping points (called 
caravansarais)
.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                              -M-
of thought were laid at the Fourth Council of the
 Buddhist Monks, called by Kanishka the Great (ca.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                          This Northern School
was influenced by Hellenism and underwent many
changes from the original Southern School or
 Hinayana, and developed into a new religion.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

tomb and two magnificent towers of victory erected
by Mahmood upon his triumphant return from the
conquest of the Punjab in India in 1026 are all
that remain of a great center built during his
 reign.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

     The rest of the city was burned by Alaud-
din, the World Burner, who not only burned the
city, but purportedly led a rampage on the
Maidan 
82
MANAJAT see KHIWAJA ABDULLAH ANSARI
 populace which killed 70,000 people in seven days.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                        Much
lavish work was performed on the building by
 calligraphers and tilemakers.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

   An individual pursued by his enemies, or other-
wise in apprehension for his life, can seek asylum
with other Pushtuns, who are then required to
protect him as if they had kinship ties with him
 NEOLITHIC.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                         Breaches
in 
nanawati,
, refusal to extend it, or breach of its
rules by either protector or pursuer, are serious
 infractions of pushtunwali.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

The period is also marked by a shift
 from chipped to polished stone tools.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                            It is marked by salt
marshes, desert, and a wind which blows for four
 months (the wind of 120 days).
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                  It is crossed by three major
rivers: the Farah Rud, Khash Rud, and the Hel-
 mand Rivers, all emptying in the Seistan Lake.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                            Large carved wooden
horsemen were often placed over graves in this
area, and efforts are being made by the govern-
 ment to keep this art from disappearing.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

Some of the modernistic structures built by the
reform -minded King Amanullah Khan are located
 in Paghman.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                           During
its course it is joined by the Ghorband River and
 30 miles east of Kabul they join the Kabul River.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                    This pattern of
marriage is particularly designed to facilitate the
cohesiveness of the property held by the groom
 and his patriineage.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

The town is accessible by a modern high-
 way.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

line of wells or shafts connected by tunnels to in-
 tercept the water table.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                         They are the descendants
of the military and administrative personnel left
behind by the Persian King Nadir Shah Afshar in
 the 18th century.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

town is located about 215 miles north of Kabul
 and is reached by paved highway.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                            It
is crossed by two main passes, the Khyber Pass
 (3, 500 feet) and the Paiwar Pass (8, 531 feet).
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                              This rugged area
is bounded by the Pamir Mountains on the north
and the Hindu Kush chain on the Kashmjr border
 to the south.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                    By virtue of their control and

125 
Zangilak Peak
ownership of the land, the Zameen Dar are influ-
ential in community decision-making processes as
well as in the resolution of local conflicts, par-
ticularly over the distribution of water and over
 land.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                       In: 

City and Nation in the Developing World, by

Associates of the American University Field
 Staff.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

                                      
Settlement and Social Change in Asia, 
by Wolfram
 Eberhard.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

              Our mission was clear: to strike at the network of radical
groups affiliated with and funded by Osama bin Laden, perhaps the preem-
 inent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the world today.
	Inside Bin Laden

                    Having consolidated power by the strength of their
swords, the new conquerors-turned-rulers had to prove their uniqueness
 their Islamness.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                    Jihad,
XII 
INTRODUCTION: THE INEVITABLE STRUGGLE
which literally means striving, refers to a holy war undertaken to further
the rule of Islam over contested lands, particularly Muslim lands occupied
by non-Muslims (any land ever conquered by Islam is considered its
forever) and lands with a significant Muslim population controlled by non-
 Muslims.
	Inside Bin Laden

          Then came the Russian wars with Turkey and the conquest of Cen-
tral Asia in the nineteenth century, followed by the Turkish Empires col-
lapse and occupation by Britain in World War I and the ensuing artificial
 redrawing of the Middle Easts map by the imperialist powers.
	Inside Bin Laden

INTRODUCTION: THE INEVITABLE STRUGGLE
 nowhere, all dominated and motivated by the lust for money.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                               In Islamic law apostasy is a
capital crime, and thus the demand for the application of Islam and Islamic
law becomes a political as well as a religious demand, which is frequently
 supported by terrorism and death threats.
	Inside Bin Laden

      For the hard-core Islamists, the lesson of the Gulf Warthat the West
can coerce and defeatis counterbalanced by the legacy of Afghanistan,
where the Soviet Union was ostensibly defeated, and that of Somalia, where
 the United States was driven out by Islamist forces.
	Inside Bin Laden

Meanwhile the Islamists growing hostility toward the Westfueled by the
XVIII 
 .
	Inside Bin Laden

   These sources suppiement the large quantities of open sourcespri-
marily regional mediathat by themselves provide a wealth of data and
 documentation.
	Inside Bin Laden

                  This open-source material includes wire-service reports by
local and international news agencies; articles from local newspapers, peri-
odicals, and newsletters; articles from newspapers, periodicals, and
newsletters of the Arab migr community in Western Europe; articles
from newspapers, periodicals, newsletters, and academic journals in the
United States, Europe, Russia, and other countries; transcripts of broad-
casts by the local electronic media (mostly translated by the U.S. govern-
ments FBIS); and huge quantities of material retrieved through the
 Internet.
	Inside Bin Laden

                             Significant Abbreviations and Organizations
AIM 
Armed Islamic Movement (also known as the International
Legion of Islam)
CDLR 
Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (a London-
based Saudi Islamist organization)
DRA 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
IALHP 
Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places
IAPC 
Islamic Arab Peoples Conference (became PAIC)
1MB 
International Muslim Brotherhood
IRGC 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (sometimes called by the
Persian name Pasdaran)
ISI 
Interservice Intelligence (Pakistani intelligence)
PAIC 
Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (originally called IAPC)
PDRY 
Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)
PlO 
Popular International Organization
PRC 
Peoples Republic of China
UCK 
Kosovo Liberation Army (also known as KLA)
VEVAK Persian acronym for Iranian intelligence
YAR 
Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
Islamic Change Movementthe Jihad Wing in Arabian Peninsula (some-
times referred to only as Islamic Change Movement)
World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders
XXIII
The Radicalization
of an Engineer
NOW IN HIS MID-FORTIES, a university graduate with computer skills,
Osama bin Laden lives with his four wives and some fifteen children in a
 small cave in eastern Afghanistan.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                         Be-
cause of its conservative Islamic character and sudden wealth and influence,
 Saudi Arabia was uniquely influenced by these dynamics.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                              By the late 198os bin Laden
would have branches and recruitment centers in fifty countries, including
the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and some Western European coun-
 tries.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                King Fahd, Crown Prince Abdallah, and Prince
Turki, already convinced of the strategic importance of the situation in Af-
ghanistan for Saudi Arabia, were strongly influenced by bin Ladens convic-
 tion and promised to help the Afghan cause.
	Inside Bin Laden

      By the mid-198os Islamabad already had proof of the strategic value of
subversion from its long experience sponsoring Sikh terrorism and subversion
i6 THE RADICALIZATION OF AN ENGINEER
 against India.
	Inside Bin Laden

                 In 1985 and 1986, as the quantity and quality of weapons
provided by the ISI improved, Sikh terrorism and subversion in the Punjab
 and throughout India showed increased militarization and radicalization.
	Inside Bin Laden

Among the novelties of the revived terrorist campaign were sophisticated
bomb-making techniques identical to those being used by the Afghan mu-
 jahideen.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                     19
away from Saudi Arabia itself and was willing to pay handsomely for the
 services rendered by the IS!.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                             Widely consid-
ered one of the most effective strategic covert operations conducted by the
Soviet Union, this crash also drastically changed the world of interna-
 tional Islamist terrorism.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                These visas were provided, frequently along
with paid airline tickets, to volunteers who lacked proper travel documents
as well as to those who gave false names and were wanted by their govern-
 THE RADICALIZATION OF AN ENGINEER .
	Inside Bin Laden

                     1989, a sophisticated and powerful bomb activated
by remote control exploded underneath Azzams car in a narrow street in
 Peshawar.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                        At
the time there were persistent reports among the Peshawar rumor mills that
the assassination was the work of a Hizb-i Islami special detachment usu-
 ally controlled by the IS!, but no proof was provided.
	Inside Bin Laden

BY THE LATE 198os the world of international terrorism was changing.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                    These men were growing
old and incapacitated, and leaders were being assassinated by both friends
 THE RADICALIZATION OF AN ENGINEER .
	Inside Bin Laden

King Fahd and his coterie panicked
 at the sight of the Iraqi forces streaming into Kuwait.
	Inside Bin Laden

All the senior ulema were categorically against the
 idea, a Saudi official said in a study by exiled Saudi scholar Nawaf Obaid.
	Inside Bin Laden

      Rejected by Riyadh but emboldened by growing popular support,
Osama bin Laden found a place in the tidal wave of anti-Americanism
 swelling through the Islamist communities all over the Muslim world.
	Inside Bin Laden

On the one hand, he con-
 demned Iraq for invading Kuwait and urged its eviction by force.
	Inside Bin Laden

        By siding with the United States and inviting foreign armies to the
sacred lands of Arabia, these Islamists argued, the House of al-Saud effec-
 CRISIS AND REBIRTH .
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                      33
first example of his propensity to advance major issues by building wide
 coalitions that are unified by basic objectives and common denominators.
	Inside Bin Laden

 In the coming decades Turabi would move back and forth between two sit-
uations: Sometimes he would be in a position of power in government, and
sometimes he would assume the posture of a righteous opposition figure
 untarnished by association with military dictatorships.
	Inside Bin Laden

               Specialized training for Egyptian and other Islamist terrorists
was developed by Abbud al-Zumur, an Egyptian former military intelligence
officer then in jail in Egypt for his role in the assassination of Sadat, who
continued to lead a branch of Islamic jihad and delivered his instructions via
 Pakistan.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                        51
198os by Zawahiri for the Islamic Jihad Movement of Abbud al-Zumur of
Egypt was now in charge of foreign liaison, weapon supplies, and financial
 assistance for numerous Jihad organizations operating all over the world.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                  Smaller
groups included the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), which originated
with the Ogadeni and to a lesser degree the Kismayu (of Kenya) clans; the
Somali Salvation Liberation Front (SSLF), which started with the Majer-
teen clan, traditionally oppressed by the Hawiye, and evolved into the
movement of all oppressed miniclans inside central Somalia; the Somali
Democratic Alliance (SDA), originating with the Gedabursi clan; and the
Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), which started with the Rahanwein
 clan.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                With that accomplished, Aidids forces
immediately stormed and by November io successfully seized control of
about fifteen main road junctions and the local roadblocks from free-
 lancer bands.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                  These attacks on
Egypt were only a component of Tehrans surge to regional hegemony,
 made possible by its growing hold over Sudan.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                               The chaos in So-
malia, fractured along tribal lines and immersed in a fierce struggle for self-
determination and power, made segments of the population and their
power-hungry leaders amenable to close cooperation with and susceptible to
 manipulation and exploitation by Turabis people in Khartoum.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                   Islamism
was spreading in the ranks of the various tribal militia in Somalia, and by
 fall 1992 the armed Islamist movements in Somalia were growing fast.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                   The
common denominator is that they are almost wholly guided by al-Turabis
 instructions.
	Inside Bin Laden

                             On December 31 Egyptian intelligence, which was
called in by the Yemeni government to help in the investigation, already had
 72 .
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                       77
Aidid and his senior aides went to Khartoum to take part in special con-
sultations conducted under cover of a special session of the Peoples Arab
 and Islamic Congress chaired by Turabi.
	Inside Bin Laden

(This plan was nar-
 rowly averted by the FBI.)
	Inside Bin Laden

                                              TRIUMPH OVER THE PAPER TIGER
United States had sent the Pakistanis to their death intentionally so thai
Washington would have an excuse to intervene and return in full force,
Khartoum also argued that the singling out of Aidid by the Unitec
Nationsthe Pakistanis operated near Aidids radio station when they
were ambushedconstituted proof that the United Nations was carrying
 out Washingtons anti-Islamist policy.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                           TRIUMPH OVER THE PAPER TIGER
attacks by the Islamist Habar Gidir tribal forces on Somalis considered
 friendly to the United Nations.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                       The new operational
plan anticipated a marked escalation in the popular fighting in Mogadishu
as a cover and facilitator for high-quality terrorist strikes by HizbAllah
 squads.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                    They were organized in recently es-
tablished composite units made up of Somalis led by highly professional
 Iranian Pasdaran, Lebanese, HizbAllah, and Arab Afghan terrorists.
	Inside Bin Laden

This separate and delicate transfer
 of key terrorists was also managed by bin Laden.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                 The most
striking example was Eritrea, which seceded from Ethiopia after a thirty-
year guerrilla war and a referendum that demonstrated overwhelming
 popular support.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                           Another group aspiring to follow
the example set by Eritrea is Somaliland, which declared itself independent
 in 1991.
	Inside Bin Laden

During the 198os this training complex was run by the ISI ostensibly
 for Jalaludin Hakkani, a veteran Afghan mujahideen commander.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                    But by
1994 Hakkani maintained only a guard force of about zoo fighters for the
local ammunition dumps of the Afghan mujahideen, whereas close to 100
Pakistani and more than 30 Arab instructors were training about 400 to 500
 mujahideen from all over the Muslim world.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                            The complex was run in a profes-
sional manner, with all candidates subjected to thorough medical, military
skill, and psychological testing and a security check by veteran 151 experts
 before acceptance.
	Inside Bin Laden

By
 98 .
	Inside Bin Laden

                                    In fact, these were Afghan forces being
held by the ISI in Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan to conduct deniable op-
 erations in both Afghanistan and Kashmir.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                         Islamist international terrorismas
distinct from popular revolts, such as those in Egypt and Algeria, and wars
 by proxy, those in Kashmir and Israelcentered on Europe.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                            EMIR BIN LADEN
of Pakistans image in the United States by, among other methods, publiciz-
 ing its commitment to fighting Islamist terrorism and drug smuggling.
	Inside Bin Laden

EMIR BIN LADEN
 the worship of One Allah and the way of life prescribed by Allah.
	Inside Bin Laden

            The U.S. government confronted Islamabad with precise
114  EMIR BIN LADEN
information about Youssufs hiding placean apartment complex spon-
 sored by a bin Ladenrelated companyafter a tip from a neighbor.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                       Islam-
abad had no alternative but to cooperate or be put on the U.S. terrorism list
 and face stiff sanctions as stipulated by law.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                               All of Youssufs comrades and
other Islamist terrorists dwelling in the complex, however, had been safely
evacuated by the ISI before the U.S.-Pakistani law enforcement detachment
raided the place and captured Youssuf, who was extradited to the United
 States.
	Inside Bin Laden

127
 trained fighters already vetted by Iranian intelligence.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                      In summer 1995 all
the candidates were being trained by Iranian Revolutionary Guard experts
 in camps of al-Quds Forces north of Khartoum.
	Inside Bin Laden

                  At this stage a massive car bomb driven by a martyr-to-be
would close in on the presidential car and either ram it or blow himself up
 near it.
	Inside Bin Laden

          Despite the now heightened alert inside Egypt, the Islamist com-
mand center in Khartoum was able to call back the vast majority of the
teams that had already infiltrated Egypt even before they had been noticed
by the Egyptian security authorities and well before they clashed with
 132 .
	Inside Bin Laden

                          The Islamists intensified their penetration and
takeover of society through what Egypt-born British journalist and Middle
134  INCITING THE REVOLUTION
East expert Adel Darwish calls Islamization by stealtha gradual domi-
 nation of society while conditioning the population to an Islamic regime.
	Inside Bin Laden

The bomb was activated by a sophisticated timing device with a possible
 remote-control backup system.
	Inside Bin Laden

         He pointed out that the bombing was carried out by disgruntled
young people who oppose the Saudi leadership, including some trained in
 military tactics in Afghanistan or elsewhere.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                  INCITING THE REVOLUTION
The first communiqu issued by al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah was a general
statement of opposition to the Mubarak government, designed to stress the
 overall responsibility of the Islamist organizations affiliated with AIM.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                   By late
November, Egyptian intelligence confirmed that the key terrorists involved
in the Egyptian Embassy bombing had safely escaped to Afghanistan,
where they were under the protection of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyars Hizb-i
 Islami in the Samar Kheyl area near Jalalabad.
	Inside Bin Laden

                       Events in the 1990S led to the Wests rediscovery of
Iran: First came the widespread fear of Iraqi-sponsored terrorism during
the Gulf War, followed by spectacular terrorist strikes, such as the World
Trade Center bombing and the assassination in Western Europe of ene-
 mies of the Revolution, traced to Tehran.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                               The aggregate impact of these
events was an increase in Western awareness of and willingness to fight ter-
 rorism, whether sponsored by Iran, Iraq, or any other nation or group.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                   The HizbAllah Interna-
tional was established during a terrorist summit held in Tehran on June
2123, 1996, organized jointly by the Supreme Council for Intelligence Af-
 fairs and IRGC high command.
	Inside Bin Laden

               Tehran was determined to ensure global cooperation, and the
conference was attended by delegates from terrorist organizations through-
 out the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and North America.
	Inside Bin Laden

       Although the power-struggle machinations within the House of al-Saud
had created conditions conducive to a spectacular terrorist strike, the ac-
tual perpetrators came from the ranks of Saudi Islamist Afghan and
Balkan networks, sponsored and sustained by Osama bin Laden but
tightly controlled by Tehran through Iranian and allied intelligence ser-
 vices.
	Inside Bin Laden

                             In early 1996, still the acting king, Abdallah
promised President Assad to increase Saudi support for the Syrian strategic
effort by orchestrating formal Saudi pressure on the Clinton administration
to prevent Israel from bombing the Aleppo facilities and the Syrian missile
 bases and increase Saudi financial assistance to the Syrian strategic buildup.
	Inside Bin Laden

Preparations for the Syrian special operations began immediately.
	Inside Bin Laden

                 The Salman-Nayif faction, whose leaders are responsible for
internal security and claim to have suppressed Islamist militancy in the af-
termath of the 1995 Riyadh bombing, would be shamed by the fact that
there was Islamist terrorism in Saudi Arabia, and the standing of the Sultan
 faction in both Riyadh and Washington would be badly hurt.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                              Initial prepa-
rations had begun by early spring 1996, a joint effort by Syrian and Iranian
 intelligence.
	Inside Bin Laden

      In the meantime, by early 1996, the violence in Karachi, Pakistan, had
reached the level of rebellion, and Islamabad was apprehensive that it might
spread and escalate to the point of overthrowing the Bhutto administra-
 tion.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                  Most of the missing parts and all the
missing bodies are from the area covered by rows 17 to 28just above the
 fuel tankin particular right-side rows 24 and 25.
	Inside Bin Laden

Nitrates, a main component of bombs, are dam-
 aged by fire and seawaterand in TWA8oo both were present.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                          Everybody will be surprised by the
magnitude of the reply, the date and time of which will be determined by the
 mujahideen.
	Inside Bin Laden

Atwan was highly impressed by the quality of bin Ladens key aides and
 commanders.
	Inside Bin Laden

                  Without mentioning any specific government by name, Turabi
elucidated as a theoretical legal option the case being made by the Egyptian
 militant Islamists against the Mubarak government.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                         By then the key
terrorism-sponsoring statesIran, Sudan, and Pakistanhad embarked on
both thorough preparations for the next wave of international terrorism 
 and the formulation of the doctrinal logic and justification for them.
	Inside Bin Laden

destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya by militant Hindu extremists.
	Inside Bin Laden

                      While the Clinton administration was strenuously at-
tempting to convince Congress and the American people of the need to
keep U.S. forces in Bosnia beyond the June 1998 deadlinedespite a prom-
ise explicitly made to Congressthe U.S.-sponsored government in Sara-
jevo was actively preparing for a military confrontation to regain control
over the Republika Srpska (the Serb-controlled parts of Bosnia) by force,
using weapons and training provided by the United States under the Train
214  NEW ALLIES IN THE WAR
 and Equip program.
	Inside Bin Laden

                   The high-level Egyptian-Sudanese contacts show that both
sides are serious about exposing the role of the CIA and the Mossad in con-
spiring against Egypt and Sudan and containing the consequences caused by
 this conspiracy over the past years.
	Inside Bin Laden

They conditioned the next steps on theological bless-
 ings by their respective spiritual leaders.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                   Without the
eviction of the United States from the Middle East and the destruction of
Israel, it would be virtually impossible for the Islamist forces to defeat the
 puppet regimes bolstered by the United States.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                        As proof Bin Laden
pointed to the sorry state of the jihad throughout the Middle East despite
 the heavy casualties suffered by Islamists.
	Inside Bin Laden

         The term Crusaders was used to stress the continuity of threats posed
by foreign forces present in the Middle East, such as the U.S. forces in Saudi
 226 .
	Inside Bin Laden

As a rule, support networks are run by a different group of
 people than operational networks.
	Inside Bin Laden

Not by accident, coun-
 terintelligence activities were centered in Nairobi.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                   THE U.S. EMBASSY BOMBINGS
terrorist, was arrested in Sofia, Bulgaria, by a team of Bulgarian and Amer-
 ican security officials.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                 According
to Islamist sources, Isam Abdul-Tawwab Abdul-Alim was taken by the Bul-
garians to an isolated detention site, where he was kept for two days dur-
ing which he was subjected to investigations by the Bulgarian police and
 American intelligence elements.
	Inside Bin Laden

THE U.S. EMBASSY BOMBINGS
 by the now enraged Islamists.
	Inside Bin Laden

                In three laconic sentences Taha denied that he or
the Islamic Group was member of the World Islamic Front for Jihad
 against Jews and Crusaders organized by bin Laden back in late February.
	Inside Bin Laden

They were refused entry by the U.S. Marines on guard and sent to the back
 entrance.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                             A
couple of the terrorists, then firing on the Kenyan guards, were killed by the
 explosion.
	Inside Bin Laden

Most likely this was done by Fazil from the white
 command vehicle.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                        HUMILIATING THE ENEMY
The new rapprochement was endorsed by the highest echelons in
 Tehran.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                The statement identified
the role of the Front in the Muslim world as that of one of the trenches
pooling the [Muslim] Nations energies in order to perform the duty im-
posed by God, namely the Jihad against the atheists among American
 Christians and Israeli Jews.
	Inside Bin Laden

The Jewish-Crusader al-
 liance led by the United States and Israel is now operating blatantly.
	Inside Bin Laden

                  Although the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews
and Crusaders and the fatwas issued in February 1998 over the signatures
of bin Laden and Zawahiri were very important, they argued, and despite
the explicit call for jihad in them, the bombings in East Africa had been
claimed by the previously unknown Islamic Army for the Liberation of the
 Holy Places.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                       Ac-
cording to surveys done on the ground by Pakistanis, Afghans, and the
British, thirteen of the missiles hit an area called Markaz Khalid bin Wa-
heed, ten missiles hit an area called Markaz Amir Muavia, and five hit a
 base belonging to Jalaludin Hakkani.
	Inside Bin Laden

   According to eyewitness reports, a large number of villagers were killed
not only by flying shrapnel but also by collapsing homes and shattered win-
 dows.
	Inside Bin Laden

                The camps at Zhavara survived two air and ground offen-
sives by the Red Army and couldnt be captured or destroyed despite fre-
 quent air raids and shelling.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                 On August i~ Abdol Rahman, an Afghan
citizen interrogated by Iranian intelligence in Tashkent, Uzbekistan,
claimed that Osama bin Laden toured Mazar-e Sharif, in northern Af-
 ghanistan, for an hour Wednesday [August iz] evening.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                           Abdol Rahman
claimed he had seen how bin Laden arrived at Shadian quarter of Mazar-e
Sharif in a Datsun pickup truck, escorted by a large number of Taliban
 militia.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                        Informed sources in Islamabad and Af-
ghanistan readily acknowledged to al-Sharq al-A wsat, a London-based
paper affiliated with the Salman-Nayif faction in Riyadh, that bin Laden
z88  HUMILIATING THE ENEMY
had left the Khowst region, which was hit by U.S. missiles, two or three days
before the bombing after he received signals from Pakistani sources that
 the United States [might] fire missiles at sites which he frequents.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                    The
sources added that bin Laden was also assured by Islamabad that there
would be no commando raid on him because the United States is not will-
ing to risk sending commandos to the region and because Pakistan would
 not allow the United States to use its territory as a springboard.
	Inside Bin Laden

  It is not difficult to surmise that bin Laden, Zawahiri, and the Islamist
terrorist elite were not harmed because they and the Taliban had been fore-
 warned by Islamabad.
	Inside Bin Laden

           In fact, by the time Islamabad was formally told by Washington,
through General Joseph Ralston, of the U.S. intent to strike bin Laden and
the terrorist camps in Afghanistan, Islamabad had already committed itself
 to protecting the terrorists.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                           With Saudi support so crucial to
consolidating the Pakistani control by proxy of Afghanistan, Islamabad
could not afford to permit the Clinton administration to negate their July
agreement with Prince Turki, who, after all, claimed to have been negotiat-
 ing with Washingtons concurrence.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                       These two embassies that were blown up by
the [Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places] had supervised the
killing of at least 13,000 Somali civilians in the treacherous aggression led by
 the United States against that Muslim country, the statement explained.
	Inside Bin Laden

  The August 1998 operations were not motivated by revenge, however, but
were just punishment for the U.S. Governments injustice against the peo-
 ples of Islam.
	Inside Bin Laden

                  The IALHP urged all Muslims not to get near anything
American in order to avoid a repeat of what happened in Nairobi and so
 that they are not unwittingly affected by the flames of Gods Army.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                He also
noted that none of the Egyptian and Arab Islamists [affiliated with bin
 Laden and Zawahiri] in Afghanistan have been harmed by the U.S. shelling.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                      301
With the growing popularity of bin Laden and the Islamist trend and
promises by Tehran and Islamabad not to challenge the House of al-Sauds
hold on power as long as they pursue an anti-American policy and embark
on the eviction of U.S. forces, both the Abdallah-Faisal and Salman-Nayif
 factions have every incentive to adopt such a policy.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                             They have settled for a se-
ries of quiet guarantees from Riyadh accompanied by some visible initial
 moves.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                 Because bin Laden is now re-
lated to the Pushtun elite by blood, the surrender of him to outsiders, espe-
 cially non-Muslims, is inconceivable.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                           In the Talibans Af-
ghanistan this is a daunting task because of the harsh Islamist rules, such as
312  STRENGTHENING THE ARSENAL
forbidding music and all other forms of entertainment, imposed by the Tal-
 iban on a traditionally free urban population.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                    313
barring a major accident, this new headquarters will become operational
 by the first half of zooc.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                 Contributions from in-
dividuals and other entities throughout the Arabian Peninsula are col-
lected by two separate financial networks, one dominated by Kuwaiti and
 the other by Qatari businessmen.
	Inside Bin Laden

              Whenever possible European businesspeople administer,
perhaps unknowingly, the operations and interests of the Luxembourg
 companies that are owned by local legal firms.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                          STRENGTHENING THE ARSENAL  315
As the sums of money available from the drug trade have increased, bin
Laden and the Russian Mafia have established yet another complex money-
laundering operation described by an insider as an extended and octopus-
like network that uses political names in Asia and Africa in return for
 commissions.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                         Bin Laden makes a commission on
these transactions, which is laundered by the Russian Mafia in countries
 other than Russia and Afghanistan.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                           These entities en-
tice people into the fold of militant and radical Islam by providing food and
316  STRENGTHENING THE ARSENAL
medical and educational services as well as work, religious services, and
 housing projects.
	Inside Bin Laden

Zamin endorses and
 supports the jihad declared by bin Laden.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                          3~3
ghanistan, however, is neither the threat of extradition to the United States
 by the Taliban nor a building conflict with the Talibans leadership.
	Inside Bin Laden

               These activities are financed by Osama bin Ladens charities,
Starting in the mid-199os with a few mosques at al-Fallujah, about 6o miles
west of Baghdad, and Mosul, in Kurdistan, the Islamistsbearded and
wearing their special outfits, which are a combination of traditional Arab
gowns and camouflage militarylike uniformscan now be seen all over
 324 .
	Inside Bin Laden

While in Iraq, Zawahiri was also taken to visit a potential site for bin
Ladens headquarters near al-Fallujah and terrorist training camps run by
 Iraqi intelligence.
	Inside Bin Laden

             In the name of Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri assumed responsibility
for a training camp in the al-Nasiriyah desert established by Iraqi intelli-
 gence in about 1997 for terrorists from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.
	Inside Bin Laden

A unique center for the development of chemical weapons for use by
 Islamist terrorists is also being built within this compound.
	Inside Bin Laden

            Since early summer 1998 Islamist terroristsboth Afghans and Arab
Afghansunder the command of Osama bin Laden and sponsored by
the ISI have been actively preparing for spectacular terrorist strikes using
chemical, bacteriological, and perhaps radiological weapons in a well-
 equipped, fortified compound concealed near Qandahar.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                       331
suitcase bombs near the main cities of the United Statessites and a mode
of operation that can now be taught to bin Ladens terrorists by the former
 SPETSNAZ personnel he has recruited.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                       Colonel Boris Alekseyev, chief of
the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Ecological Center, noted that
once authorized- by a coded radio transmission from Moscow, a single
SPETSNAZ trooper can prepare a suitcase bomb for explosion within half
 an hour.
	Inside Bin Laden

         BY LATE AUGUST 1998, if there were any doubts about what were the
intentions and plans of bin Laden and his followers, Omar Bakri, the head
of al-Muhajiroun, one of the Ishamist organizations in London that consid-
ers itself the mouth, eyes, and ears of Osama bin Laden, provided the an-
 swer.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                        333
Muslim world has embarked on a strategic ascent made possible by the ac-
quisition of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other strategic capa-
 bilities.
	Inside Bin Laden

The impact of these megatrends is further compounded by the
 inherent instability of the most affected parties within the Hub of Islam.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                      The
conservative Arab governmnts are plagued with a crisis of legitimacy that
is compoun,~led by the succession crisis in Saudi Arabia, Iraqs economic
 woes and bellicosity, and Egypts shifting of directions.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                         Re-
jected by the conservative Arab re~gimes, Sudan has been pushed into strate-
 gic alliance with the up-and-comir~g non-Arab forces.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                      The Islamic Movements will con-
tinue their struggle against the corruption of man-made law [that is,
 Western democracy] and the distortion of Islam by the Media.
	Inside Bin Laden

         working sincerely for the domination of the World by Islam
and the Supremacy of Allahs Commands on Earth, which is inevitable,
 the declaration concludes.
	Inside Bin Laden

Jihad is the only solution to
 all the problems faced by the Muslims.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                    What we are doing in
occupied Palestine [is being] done by Kashmiris in Indian-occupied Kash-
 mir, he said.
	Inside Bin Laden

This unusual step was prompted by intelligence that the U.S. em-
 bassy in Riyadh was under threat of an imminent terrorist attack.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                               On October 14 Attorney General
Janet Reno organized a crisis management exercise at FBI headquarters to
plan for a possible terrorist attack by bin Laden against targets in Washing-
 ton and New York.
	Inside Bin Laden

                      The four scenarios examined by the 200 participants
were an assassination attempt on the secretary of state, a car bombing, a
chemical weapons strike on a Washington Redskins football game, and the
 explosion of a device in a federal building.
	Inside Bin Laden

                         As for official Islamabad, the NWFP authorities
appeared to be ignorant about the reported presence of Saudi dissident,
wanted by [the] U.S.A., Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, when they were con-
 tacted by a correspondent from Dawn, a Pakistani newspaper.
	Inside Bin Laden

 In a major step toward legitimizing revenge against the United States by
354  THE BIN LADEN PLANS
establishment Islamism, Tantawi decreed that whoever of the Iraqi
people is killed is a martyr because whoever defends his land, honor, and
 property is a martyr.
	Inside Bin Laden

                  A concurrent theme in the media was the assertion that since
Arab governments were intimidated into passive action and lame protests by
the display of massive American firepower and the resolve to bomb Arabs at
will, it would take dedicated non-state Islamist forces to avenge the American
 crimes and restore Arab/Muslim honor.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                      Street vendors and preachers from
Morocco to the Philippines urged and expected Osama bin Laden to rescue
 Muslim honor by striking out against the United States and its allies.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                       A
demonstration arranged by al-Muhajiroun outside io Downing Street turned
into a scuffle with police, and Scotland Yard arrested six al-Muhajiroun
 members on security-related charges.
	Inside Bin Laden

Muhajiroun member, was arrested by the Yard after he threw an incendiary
 bomb at a military barracks in west London at dawn.
	Inside Bin Laden

By the weekend the Is-
 lamist organizations were reporting a crackdown by the Yard.
	Inside Bin Laden

   Having been exacerbated by the recent bombing of Iraq, Islams real battle
against the reincarnation of the Crusaders onslaught had only begun, the Is-
 lamic Jihad concluded.
	Inside Bin Laden

Anything that can be taken from them by force is considered booty
 for the Muslims.
	Inside Bin Laden

If it is made possible by Almighty God to Muslims, every American
 man is targeted.
	Inside Bin Laden

The kidnappers issued a specific demand that was ig-
 nored by Sanaa.
	Inside Bin Laden

Three Britons and an Australian tourist died, and one Briton, one Ameri-
 can, and one Australian were injuredmost of them by the armys fire.
	Inside Bin Laden

                          Three others, including z8-year-old Zain al-
Abdin Abu Bakar al-Mihdar, the Islamic Jihads leader, known by the nom
 de guerre Abu-al-Hassan, were captured.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                              The sec-
ond demand was to ease the pressure that the government was applying
against some of the mujahideen who are on the run and pursued by secu-
 rity agencies.
	Inside Bin Laden

                     The second demand is missing from all other communiqus
and might have been added by the terrorists in the field, but otherwise the
logic and language used by the Islamic Army are identical to that of bin
 Laden and his followers.
	Inside Bin Laden

377
 a spin on Abu-Hamzahs statements.
	Inside Bin Laden

Some of them may
 be recruited by mujahideen.
	Inside Bin Laden

           The pretense of distance and disengagement from terrorism main-
tained by the London-based Islamist leaders vanished in early January
1999, the moment British security authorities began to examine closely the
activities of the U.K.-based leaders in connection with recent events in
 Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
	Inside Bin Laden

        Taken together, the events in Yemen and Britain clearly demonstrate
the wide acceptance of the principles of jihad as advocated by bin Laden
and the willingness of Islamists to rely on them as religious authorization
 for acts of terrorism.
	Inside Bin Laden

These terrorist groups are controlled by bin Laden follow-
 ers and loyalists.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                 These
sensitive operations concerning Kashmir and other networks deep within
India were run separately by Sheikh Eklakh Ahmed, a Pakistani-Kashmiri
 who himself shuttled in and out of India.
	Inside Bin Laden

Bin Laden in essence calls on the entire Muslim world to rise up against the
existing world order to fight for their right to live as Muslimsrights, he
states, which are being trampled by the Wests intentional spreading of West-
 ernization.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                              The study notes
that the situation throughout the Muslim world has reached a crisis point and
 emphasizes the urgency of reversing this trend by fighting a jihad.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                        Or you move effectively to
seize the power of those rulers and work in earnest with those sincere Muslims
who are working for the re-establishment of the Khilafah state and whatever
follows by our return to our past glory as the greatest Ummah and the most
powerful state which will fight in the path of Allah so that the truth may prevail
 and falsehood shall perish.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                       By late March the first round
of these deployments was completed with the dispatch of fourteen top
 commanders, all longtime comrades in arms of bin Laden, to the West.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                          A Pakistani official
explained that the US and British governments are presently engaged in
punitive strikes against Iraqi people, both military and civilian, while look-
ing the other way on the massacre of the Kosovan Muslims for the last so
many months and therefore would become a target of attack by bin
 Laden, his allies or [other] Islamists.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                           One of their
senior commanders declared that the blood of our supporters will not be
 in vain and we will avenge every martyr by killing ioo Americans.
	Inside Bin Laden

        In mid-April the Islamist leadership thoroughly studied the recent
progress of terrorist forward deployment and preparations and the recovery
of the Egyptian-based networks from the impact of the summer 1998 ar-
 WHATS NEXT? .
	Inside Bin Laden

Participants at the meeting resolved to markedly improve the security and
 counterintelligence measures undertaken by the clandestine networks.
	Inside Bin Laden

       Zawahiri also introduced a new system of code names and channels of
communications developed after the arrest and interrogation of the terror-
 ists by the Egyptians.
	Inside Bin Laden

                        The commanders then went over the entire chain of
command and areas of responsibility to make sure that the new redundant,
resilient modus operandi would withstand future onslaughts by hostile in-
 telligence services, including the arrest and interrogation of senior leaders.
	Inside Bin Laden

By the end of the meeting Zawahiri was satisfied with the status of his net-
 works and approved the activation of several operational plans.
	Inside Bin Laden

     This renewed confidence was expressed in a statement issued in late
April by Zawahiris Jihad Islami in reaction to the harsh sentencing of a
number of Egyptian terrorists, including Zawahiri himself and several
 other key leaders who were tried in absentia.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                            The statement stressed that
the jihad is much bigger and deeper than unfolding events and would not
 be affected by the Cairo trial.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                   The Islamic world in general, in particu-
lar the Arab region, is being swept by a wave of Islamic jihadist rejection,
the Muslim nation is vigorously rejecting the policy of humiliation and op-
pression being pursued against those working to restore Islams sovereignty
over its territory, and it is at the same time determined to firmly and res-
olutely move toward achieving its aim of establishing an Islamic state
 through preaching, jihad, and exposing suspect actions.
	Inside Bin Laden

        These sentiments were echoed in a concurrent statement by Qari Sai-
fullah Akhtar, the central emir of the Harakat Jihad Islami, who is respon-
 sible for the organizations international operations.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                        In these operations the mujahideen
have already demonstrated their fearlessness and all-out commitment to the
 Muslim population.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                         In
order to provide comprehensive support for anticipated combat operations
by the Islamist forces, particularly an elite force of over 500 Arab mu-
jahideen, the Islamists are running more than fifteen private Muslim chari-
 ties and humanitarian organizations in Albania and Kosovo alone.
	Inside Bin Laden

The Islamists conducted several spectacular strikes and
 endured the consequent dragnet by intelligence services all over the world.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                     GLOSSARY  409
Muslim Brotherhood A worldwide conservative Islamist organization
dedicated to propagating the true and fundamental teaching of Islam
in the religious field, the social field (by providing social services, education,
 etc.),
	Inside Bin Laden

and the political field (by establishing Islamic regimes).
	Inside Bin Laden

damage inflicted by, 2832.84
	Inside Bin Laden

It is motivated by profits and driven by the
 aggregate preferences of billions of consumers.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                              As Mr. Barber provocatively puts it:
Belonging by default to McWorld, everyone is a consumer; seeking a
 repository for identity, everyone belongs to some tribe.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                  Government & Opposition
BOOKS BY BENJAMIN R. BARBER
An Aristocracy of Everyone (1992)
The Conquest of Politics (1988)
Strong Democracy (1984)
Marriage Voices (A Novel) (ig8i)
Liberating Feminism (i~~)
The Death of Communal Libe4y (i~7~)
Superman and Common Men (1971)
COLLABORATIONS
The Struggle for Democracy
with Patrick Watson (1989)
The Artist and Political Vision
edited with M. McGrath (1982)
Totalitarianism in Perspective
with C. J. Friedrich and M. Curtis (1969)
Jihad vs.
Mc World
Benjamin R. Barber
Ballantine Books  New York
 Sale of this book without a front cover may be unauthorized.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                     Those who look back see all of the horrors of
the ancient slaughterbench reenacted in disintegral nations like
Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Ossetia, and Rwanda and they declare that noth-
 ing has changed.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                        Our secular eternities are
corrupted, however, race reduced to an insignia of resentment, and
soul sized down to fit the demanding body by which it now measures
 its needs.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                How will peoples who define themselves by the slaughter
of tribal neighbors be persuaded to subscribe to some flimsy artificial
 faith organized around abstract civic ideals or commercial markets?
	Jihad vs. McWorld

Can advertising divert warriors of blood from the genocide required
 by their ancient grievances?
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                              In other times, this
bankrupt political arrangement, sanctioned for a considerable time
by a desperate United Nations Security Council, would carry the
 name anarchy.5
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                           Capitalism
requires consumers with access to markets and a stable political cli-
mate in order to succeed: such conditions may or may not be fos-
tered by democracy, which can be disorderly and even anarchic,
especially in its early stages, and which often pursues public goods
costly to or at odds with private-market imperativesenvironmen-
 talism or full employment for example.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                     Shopping, it is true, has little tolerance for
blue laws, whether dictated by pub-closing British paternalism,
Sabbath-observing Jewish Orthodoxy, or no-Sunday-liquor-sales
Massachusetts Puritanism; but intolerance for blue laws is hardly a
 condition for constitutional faith or a respect for due process.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                       billion worth of pizzas sold in 1991, the
privately owned Dominos earned enough revenues to fund the col-
lective government expenditures of Senegal, Uganda, Bolivia, and
 Iceland.4
	Jihad vs. McWorld

         Toshiba, the General Electric of Japan, boasts in its 1992
annual report that as good corporate citizens they do our part to
ensure that progress continues within the world community but its
citizenshipwhether Japanese or globalis hemmed in on every
side by limits set by the demands of profitability which in turn is
driven by sales in 1992 of $25 billion, only slightly less than
 Argentinas recent government budget.5
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                         The labels are unlikely to
clarify the situation, however, since they reveal (to take just one
example) that Chrysler Corporations Dodge Stealth is built by Mit-
subishi in Nagoya, Japan, while Mitsubishis Eclipse RS is built in
 Normal, Illinois, and features Chrysler engines.8
	Jihad vs. McWorld

The bleak
 prospects of many sub-Saharan countries is epitomized by Ghana.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                    Science and technology, like
Prometheus, cannot be bounded: not by frontiers, not by national
sovereignty They are made possible by cooperation and they com-
 mand interdependence.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                           The worlds nations, having exhausted their
natural bounty one by one, may still fmd a way to survive on the
wings of artifice, but they will do so interdependently and together:
 globally or not at all.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                          Petroleum: The Same Old Story, Only Worse
MANY MINERAL RESOURCES can be recycled or replaced by techno-
logical surrogates, but energy resourcesabove all fossil fuelson
the scale they are currently being consumed around the globe surely
 cannot.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

Yet all of these resources together have made only a small dent
in world petroleum consumptionconsiderably less than the dent
 made by the oil crises and recessions of the seventies and eighties.8
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                     If prices stay low,
experts at the Energy Information Administration predict that
domestic production may fall to about 6 million barrels per day by
2010, while consumption could rise to nearly 24 mfflion barrels per
day, a deficit of 17 or i8 million barrels that could add up to a depen-
 dency on imports of nearly 75 percent of consumption by 2010.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                 Add it up: better than three-fifths
of the worlds current oil production (and almost 93 percent of its
potential production reserves) are controlled by the nations least
likely to be at home in McWorld and most likely to be afflicted with
political, social, and thus economic instability28
The results are equally disconcerting when we rate energy
exporters in the high- and moderate-risk categories on a democracy
 scale.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                          Even as we
secure the macropeace through trade, treaties, law, cooperation, and
common force, the microwars occasioned by Jihads fractious
 parochialisms become of ever greater global significance.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                        3
The Industrial Sector and
the Rise of the East

H 

OW DIFFERENT IS the story when we move from the domain of
dation of any national economy? Manufactured durable goods con-

raw resources to manufactured goodssupposedly the foun-
stitute the traditional industrial sector by which the rise of capitalism
 has generally been measured.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                               The ~American Century celebrated by
L~fs Henry Luce in 1941 ended without ceremony sometime in the
1970S when America crossed the midway point on its sad journey
from being the worlds largest creditor nation to being its largest
debtor nation and when Europe and Japan, well recovered from the
war, began to eat away at Americas leadership in automobile, home
 appliance, electronics, an\d comput~r manufacturing.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                          This unprecedented strategic hegemony
rested almost entirely on the American industrial economy as it
emerged from World War ITan economy that was driven by the
largest and most productive manufacturing and banking companies
 in the world.6
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                        4
From Hard Goods to Soft Goods

W 

HILE MAKING AND selling goods is still the dominant form of
the goods are increasingly associated with or defmed by symbolic

economic activity in the international markets of McWorld,
interactions that belong to the service sector in its postmodern, virtual
 economy manifestations.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                Whereas the old econ-
omy, mirroring hard power, dealt in hard goods aimed at the body, the
 6o .
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                   To
the world, America offers an incoherent and contradictory but
seductive style that is less democratic than physical culture: youth-
ful, rich urban, austere cowboy, Hollywood glamorous, Garden of
Eden unbounded, goodwilled to a fault, socially aware, politically
correct, mall pervaded, and, ironically, often dominated by images of
black ghetto lifeblack, however, as in hip and cool rather than in
 crime-ridden and squalid, baaaad but not bad.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                It has been speculated that video-game
players acquire hand-eye skills critical to certain professionsfighter
pilots, for example, or laboratory technicians handling dangerous
materials by remote control; it has also been speculated that players
may develop diminished capacities in other domains such as imagi-
 nation or human sympathy.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

Seen from the perspective of ~r1~5 intra-American competition, this
shift from products to services mirrors an economy-wide trend and
From Soft Goods to Service 
75
corrects the impression given by high-tech manufacturing that Amer-
 ica is in a steep decline.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

By 1980, the U.S. share
 had fallen to ~6 percent while Japans share had risen to 40 percent.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                              It includes commercial banks where Japan
has long since seized the advantage from America and Europe as
well as entertainment companies where American global leadership
is actually growing and seems secure well into the next century
Examining the service sector affords an oppor~unity to make good
on my rhetorical amalgamation of McDonalds, Macintosh, and
MTVfast food, computer software, and videoby showing how
in this sector McWorld manufactures its own specially tailored
twenty-first-century videology When McDonalds sells Dances with
Wolves and 3urcssic Park videos and sundry movie tie-ins in a vague
celebration of multiculturalism or environmentalism or extinct rep-
tile preservation, or hires Michael Jordan to link its products to
celebrity sport, simple service to the body, I have suggested, is dis-
 placed by complex service to the soul.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

McWorld is a product above
 all of popular culture driven by expansionist commerce.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                            By the
measure of training, income,,prospects, and self-worth, a Burger
King cook hand-grilling mass-produced preformed frozen meat
patties has a good deal more in common with a sweatshop seamstress
machine-stitching cheap frocks than she does with a computer pro-
From Soft Goods to Service 
79
grammer developing virtual reality arcade games, even though the
cook and the programmer are in the service sector while the seam-
 stress is in the manufacturing sector.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                         Distinguished by their varying
constituencies, my three candidates for subservice sectors are:
The traditional service sector, comprising those who serve
people directly with traditional food, transportation, health, and
housing services, including food preparers and servers, hoteliers and
their helpers, airline pilots and train conductors, doctors and social
workers, and all others who deliver services directly to the individual
human bo4y;
The systems facilitation sector, comprising those who serve
the infrastructurethe political, economic, and social systems that
make modern society possible; these include lawyers, accountants,
economists, bankers, insurance people, computer operators, tele-
phone operators, policy specialists, and anyone else who facilitates
the operation and interaction of our national and global systems, all
those who serve the corporate body; and
The new information sector, what I will dub the infotain-
ment telesector, comprising those who create and control the world
of signs and symbols through which all information, communica-
tion, and entertainment are mediated, including wordsmiths and
image-spinners like advertisers, moviemakers, journalists, intellectu-
als, writers, and even computer programmers, as well asto the
degree they are in the sign/image business alsoteachers, preach-
ers, politicians and pundits, and others who minister to the individual
 human and collective corporate soul.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                             Ted Turner and Jane Fonda
are this new ages model couple, while creators like Disney CEO
Michael Eisner and filmmaker Steven Spielberg and superagent
Michael Ovitz and communications czar Michael Malone are its
true captains of industry What they control are not the artifacts (the
cassette tapes or bound manuscripts or arcade game machines or
celluloid that may belong to diverse American or Japanese
multinationals) but the actual words and pictures and sounds and
tastes that make up the ideational/affective realm by which our
physical world of material things is interpreted, controlled, and
 directed.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

  These questions suggest that, after looking at the four distinctive
elements of film, television, books, and theme parks and how they
From Soft Goods to Service 
87
have become at once both internationalized and Americanized, we
will need to take notice of the new merger and acquisitions frenzy in
the information sectora vertical integration frenzy in the name of
free choice and free markets that could result in a monopoly more
perilous to liberty than any dreamed of by mineral and durable
goods megamonopolists like John Rockefeller, Sr., or Andrew
 Carnegie.7
	Jihad vs. McWorld

     American filmmakers conveniently conclude that the market has
spoken; competitors fear they have been silenced by money and mar-
ket muscle and the way in which markets and money privilege uni-
 versal (read: bad) taste.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                            And so Michel Ciment complains in vain
about the moronic/sophomoric movies churned out by Hollywood
for their teenage audiences and tossed like garbage on hundreds of
French screens in the dry summer season,28 while European auteurs
 journey to Hollywood to get rich and famous.29
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                            Hollywood is McWorlds storyteller; and it
inculcates secularism, passivity consumerism, vicariousness, impulse
buying, and an accelerated pace of life, not as a result of its overt
themes and explicit story-lines but by virtue of what Hollywood is
 and how its products are consumed.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                  Stories that pass through the magic lantern and
reappear on a movie or television screen are conditioned by their
 own particular media context.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                     Disney movies and Disneyland are
tied together by gossamer threads that weave mythic stories around
cartoon identities that seem to celebrate multiculturalism even as
they eradicate real difference; seem to turn active engagement into a
new kind of virtual spectator sport; seem to transmute what is sup-
 posed to be sharp curiosity into blunt and reactive consumption.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                         I
102  THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD
The Anglophiia that characterizes so much of American high
 culture is reciprocated by the British in low culture.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                            The communications firms that serve Asia
have not been seduced into diversification by the daunting prospects
 of trying to fmd appropriate programs for India and China.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                     He might seem a threat in China, whereas in
Singaporesatellite dishes are forbidden (but manufactured by the
 army and widely used).
	Jihad vs. McWorld

Meanwhile, though
 mauled by Viacom, QVC has continued to mall television.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                           It is certainly good for the kind of choice
entailed by consumption; but whether it is of any use to civic liberty
 is quite another question.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

             It is hard to know exactly what, beyond simple consump-
tion, the impact of selling ambience by promoting rock music will be
either in America or on the hundred cultures whose youth are now
 tuned in to it.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                            The common currency of sex and violence may
be minted by an uncoerced (if arduously manipulated) private mar-
ket, but it depreciates as quickly as greenbacks minted by a state that
 has gone off the gold standard.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                     8
Teleliterature and the Theme
Parking of McWorld

A 

s SURVIVOR5 OF aging print technologies, books are relics of a
able currency and a faltering bulwark against the new world of

slowly vanishing culture of the worddemocracys indispens-
images and pictures flashed across screens at a speed that thwarts all
 deliberation.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                         Television and
computers are fast, fast, faster, and thus by definition hostile to the
ponderous pace of careful deliberation upon which all public con-
versation and decision making on behalf of the common good is
 premised.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                              Bagdikian notes that after World
War II, 8o percent of American newspapers were independent; by
 1989, 8o percent were owned by chains.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                     In ig8i, twenty corporations
controlled over half of the nations eleven thousand magazines; by
 ig88 those twenty corporations had become three.3
	Jihad vs. McWorld

Bagdikians dominant twenty-three corporations:
 i.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

General Electric (television)
 ~.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                        Mc World as a Theme Park
THERE IS NO better emblem of the transformation of reality by
commerce and the displacement of the actively imaginative reader
by the passively receptive spectator than the commercial theme
 parks that increasingly dot our landscape.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                               Switch (in Eastern coun-
tries) from rice or vegetables to meat and increase fat intake, medical
costs, and the pressure on agriculture (growing grain to feed cattle
that go into the beef we eat is radically inefficient, using up to ten
times more grain than is consumed by humans who make grain their
 diet).
	Jihad vs. McWorld

If any institution is
 irreducibly public by its very defmition, it is government.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                             All three divisions of
Disney derive inspiration from a single set of cartoon images spun
out in endless variations by an Imagineering Department responsible
 for redefining our reality.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                         Each of the
companies in play already was involved in smaller acquisitions and
mergers, which accounts for the variety of entities owned by what is
 technically a movie studio like Paramount.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

billion hostile bid for Time, it already had added to its extensive film
and video properties the publisher Simon & Schuster (itself a pub-
lishing conglomerate including Prentice-Hall), as well as Madison
Square Garden along with the basketball and h~key teams that play
there (the Knicks and Rangers now spun off by new owner Viacom
to still another infotainment company, Chuck Dolans Cablevision
 Systems, with financial backing from ITT).
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                           By the time Paramount was in play at the end
of 1993, by then itself the target of a bidding battle between friendly
(and ultimately victorious) suitor Viacom and unfriendly raider
QVC, its properties also included the Trans-Lux Theater Corpora-
tion, USA network, Famous Music Corporation, the Miss Universe
 organization, and Paramount Theme Parks.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                              Diller went on to Fox
where he established the Fox Television Network and prospered until
 Fox was purchased by Rupert Murdoch in 1992.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                     Personal ambition enhanced by communications syn-
ergy yielded a still higher synergy that, with the help of court deci-
sions critical of Paramounts favoritism toward Viacom, nearly
enabled Barry Duller to complete the unfriendly deal that would have
 let him annex the last major independent studio save Disney.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

QVC, as the hostile would-be buyer of Paramount, is itself then
 owned not only by Barry Difier himself (12.6
	Jihad vs. McWorld

percent) but also by
 John C. Malone (via Malones Liberty Media, which owns 22.2
	Jihad vs. McWorld

Governments have become the targets of alienated and disaffected
clients and are not likely to be regarded as the instruments by
 which citizens can tame wild capitalism for some time.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                           150 THE NEW WORLD OF MCWORLD
And SO the original question reappears: in a world where the
nation-state and its democratic institutions are being fractured and
weakened by the divisive forces of Jihad at the same moment they
are being rendered antiquated and superfluous by the integrating
forces of McWorld, how is democracy to survive? Where on the
vaunted information highway are the roads that will lead to justice or
the pipes that will convey the vox populi? Now that they have dis-
mantled the empire of despots and statist political ideologies, includ-
ing democracy, how can communities defend their common goods
against the empire of profits and cultural monopoly? Which demo-
cratic ideology can contend with the pretense to choice of free
markets so that we can regain the power to choose public goods in
common and thereby free ourselves from the inadvertent public con-
sequences of all the private market choices thaf masquerade as the
whole of freedom? Is deliberative public debate on such questions
even possible where McWorlds communication systems secret pref-
erences that, without any discussion at all, modify public attitudes
 and precipitate private behaviors?
	Jihad vs. McWorld

             More than a hundred years ago, Marx had observed that the
breaking of feudal bonds by modern capitalism had decisively frag-
mented traditional community He spoke of the sundering of all
bonds and prophesied ongoing cultural meltdown: ~All that is solid,
he warned, melts into ait9 A h~Jf century later modernist anxi-
eties had become popularized, so that one of American playwright
William Saroyans characters could repeat over and over again in the
Jihad vs. Mc World orjihad via Mc World?  163
prewar stage classic The Time of Your 14[e, no foundation, all the way
down the line, and expect full sympathy from audiences already
exasperated by modernity even before it had produced the Holo-
 caust and the atomic bomb.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

      Rousseaus acerb portrait of eighteenth-century capital cities cap-
tures the visceral force of the parochial critique: In a big city, thun-
ders Rousseau, full of scheming, idle people without religion or
principle, whose imagination, depraved by sloth, inactivity, the love
of pleasure, and great needs, engenders only monsters and inspires
 only crimes.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                              When
in World War lIthe French national center collapsed and Paris and
the north were occupied by the army of the Third Reich, it was the
periphery under the collaborationist Vichy regime that took on the
 tasks of conservator for France, redefining its spirit along the way.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

             Others see in its work a subtle strategy of national decon-
struction by which the European w~ole nurtures the subnational frag-
ments, all the better to unercut the resistance to wholeness on the part
Jihad Within Mc World: The Democracies 
 of the nation-states.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                        Acadians have
lived successfully along the shores of the Gulf of Saint Lawrence for
nearly four hundred years, and survived their dispersal by the
English following the defeat of France by English armies in North
America in 1763 (when many Acadians found their way to New
 Orleans where, as Cajuns, they established another sanctuary).
	Jihad vs. McWorld

The new nationalists are not daunted by the official shame associ-
 ated with taking Germany too seriously, dead seriously.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                  So the skinhead punk rockers offer a crude but
searingly frank version of views framed more diplomatically by
Franz Schoenhubers far right-wing Republican Party, singing This
 state is ashamed of German history.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                            Chinas dream, says a Western diplomat in
China, is to become another Singapore, where the attraction is
that it has achieved Western living standards without being infected
 by Western political standards.2
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                        i86  THE OLD WORLD OF JIHAD
China specialist Thomas B. Gold is probably right to believe that
the Communist Party is going to concentrate on the things it thinks
it can do bestpresumably political control, media, educationand
 allow the economy to function by some of its own logic.6
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                        Vietnam is still governed by a hegemonic Com-
munist Party, but also sports a five-star Hilton Hotel and seven golf
 courses to which its ranking members receive free memberships.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                             The triple threat of secession by remote
regions, clan feuds at the village level, and relative economic inde-
pendence in the prospering provinces can onlj~ake the central gov-
ernment exceedingly anxiouswhether or not it uses the language
 of Jihad to describe its potential adversaries.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

            Certainly China has been more successful in containing both
internal Jihad and ~xterna1 McWorld than, say, Sri Lanka, where the
government of what was once the island paradise of Ceylon has
been kept busy by a revolt of ethnic Tamils in the north (the so-called
China and the Pacific Rim 
i9i
Liberation Tigers) and by an extremist counter-Jihad among its own
Sinhalese majority;7 or Indonesia, a simmering Asian Yugoslavia
where 350 distinct ethnic groups, most with their own language,
occupy thirteen thousand islands in an archipelago held together pri-
marily by the military force of an authoritarian regime under the
 command of its founder, Suharto.8
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                     It already manufactures small commuter planes and
helicopters, and is hoping to leapfrog other industrialized nations by
 stepping smartly into twenty-first-century high-technology domains.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                          Demography and topography favor frag-
mentation so that for Suharto the struggle is to hold the parts
 together by economic progress and military force.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                 Indeed, the more
communitarian, consensual, even familial character of Japanese
corporate style has been imitated in the West by bemused admirers
 of the Japanese economic miracle that once was.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

   Okinawa, for example, annexed by Japan in 1879 and returned to it
by the United States (who had taken it in World War II) in 1972, has
aroused anxieties in Japan with its attempts at reviving the Old-
 nawan language and the practice of local customs.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                          If domination by a mafia
bureaucracy offered a return to the relative order enjoyed by many
 under the Communist rule, many would embrace it.6
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                       Here was the
only Communist nation to be admired at least a little by left
democrats and idealists in tF~ West, a state brave enough to reject
Stalin, imaginative~ enough to federalize its socialist system and
empower its workers, resourceful enough to bring its hostile ethnic
fragments to heel, prudent enough to forge a pluralist army strong
Jihad Within Mc World: Transitional Democracies
 and loyal to Yugoslavia.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                       Czarist Russia
actually dispatched volunteers in 1877 to support the uprising of
Serbs and Montenegrins against the Turks, and (to oversimplifi,) Ser-
bia returned the favor in 1914 by dragging Russia into World War I
in the cause of its independence from the Austro-Hungarian
 Empire.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

      Serbia today justifies its ethnic outrages in the region by
appeal to anti-Vatican and anti-German sentiments and sulks about
being betrayed by Russia (though a group of Russian volunteers
called the Czars Wolves were involved in the Serbia campaign in
 Bosnia).
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                A quick
glance at the absurdist maps drawn by desperate would-be peace-
keepers trying to stay out of the conflagration without completely
surrendering to brute force will show just how far back poor
Yugoslavia has fallen into a brutal and fractious if also largely imag-
 inary past.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                       In the north-
western Transylvania region, a mifiion and a half Hungarian speak-
ers (of a total Romanian population of 23 million) represent a
potential army in Csurkas campaign for -a greater Hungary
Although they have recently been appeased by new laws permitting
them to use their own language, they still are called Mongolian Van-
 dals by nationalist Romanians.8
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                      In the western Ukraine, Antonescus minions
buried children alive to save bullets and fmally drew the ire of
jihad Within Mc World: Transitional Democracies  203
Adolph Eichmann [sic], who was appalled by the inefficient and
 clumsy brutality of the Romanian camps.22
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                       Late in the war, with the
writing on the wall, Antonescu changed his stripes, but not soon
 enough to avoid execution by the Russians in 1946.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                     But today his
reputation has been refurbished (he appears as the great Patriot),
while Jews are again accused of betraying Romanian national inter-
ests by siding with the Soviets during the Holocaust and thus made
 responsible for precipitating their own liquidation!
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                         For, although

evident than in the Islamic world, where the idea of Jihad has
it is clear that Islam is a complex religion that by no means is syn-
onymous with Jihad, it is relatively inhospitable to democracy and
that inhospitality in turn nurtures conditions favorable to parochial-
ism, antimodernism, exclusiveness, and hostility to othersthe
 characteristics that constitute what I have called Jihad.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                Nevertheless, Jihad is an Islamic term
and is given its animating power by its association not just with fun-
damentalism in general but with Islamic fundamentalism in particu-
lar and with the armed struggles groups like Hamas and Islamic
 Jihad have engaged in.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                    Not the American Jihad
promulgated by the media focused on the World Trade Center
bombers or on Arab-American supporters of Hamasthe Ameri-
 can Jihad about which Stephen Barboza wrote his recent book.6
	Jihad vs. McWorld

   The American Jihad that counts is rather the antiestablishmentarian
fundamentalism of the Christian Right, tcie Jihad of profoundly
antimodern fundamentalist Protestants who rebel against the culture
of disbelief generated by the McWorld that is in their midst;7 the
McWorld they unearth on their prime-time television programming
and rebury on their talk-radio rants; and in the secular public square
where despised liberal politicians undermine their belief systems
 with textbooks that preach evolution and schools that bar prayer.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

     We have a biblical duty we are called by God, to conquer this coun-
try9 These Christian soldiers bring to their ardent campaign
against time and the modern world all the indignation, all the impa-
tience with moral slackness, all the purifying hatred, of the zealots in
 Teheran and Cairo.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                         Groups like Gospel Gangstas and A-i
S.WI.ET. press drive-by shootings into the service of Jesus:
In this scrap the Word of Gods my A-K
Pointed at your Dome
 Cause my aim is strazght, hey...
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                Even responsible American firms like Levi Strauss and Com-
pany, which has developed voluntary Global Sourcing Guidelines
for its overseas facilities, are driven by competition and profits to seek
cheap labor markets, where exploitation is endemic and regulation
 mainly a public relations afterthought.5
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                  The $ii billion in
bilateral assistance promised by Western nations in 1993 and 1994 is
 also aimed at helping Western exporters while the $4.5
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                 billion in real
aid promised by international organizations has been forthcoming
only in dribs and drabsas has been the case throughout Eastern
 Europe, where Western promises have yet to pay off.2
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                   In
practice, however, a large percentage of the new class that makes up
the second sector of the poor, the indigent, and the unemployed are
flotsam and jetsam on the tides of privatization: workers who have
been sloughed off by a system that is more profitable to its new pri-
 vate owners without them.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                  In the milestone elections held at the end of 1993, the
252 
JIHAD VS. MCWORLD
electorate expressed its frustration with the economy first of all by
staying away in droves: over half did not vote at all, achieving in their
first outing a dismal participation rate it took America two centuries
 to achieve.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                Those who did vote vented their resentments by pum-
meling Yeltsins reform parts Russias Choice, for which Yeltsin pru-
dently declined to campaign and which received only 15 percent of
 votes cast.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

           The damage wrought by the frenzied transition to capitalism is
clear in the body politic, but still more obvious in the vulnerability of
Capitalism vs. Democracy in Russia 
253
 the actual Russian body.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

Nationalist folk songs are regularly pushed off the radio by Western
rock music, and not even native Russian rock musicians can with-
 stand the onslaught.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                              There are other important
factors, including the emerging outline of a new civil society and
civic infrastructure focusing on associations that belong neither to
the state nor to the marketplace (see the list, page 235); a young
professional class of academics, lawyers, and civic professionals ded-
258 JIHAD VS. MCWORLD
icated to civil society and the rule of law; a growing interest in a
third sector that cannot be folded into capitalism or state social-
ism; a concern for constitutional issues that go beyond politics; and a
growing sense of the need to support the legislature (even when it is
in the wrong hands) against the arbitrary prerogatives of the exec-
 utive (even when it is occupied by Westernizing market enthusiasts).
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                   i8
The Colonization of East Germany
by McWorld

I 

N THE MONTHS preceding the demolition of the Wall in Berlin as
the wall symbolized, a surprising collection of East German intellec-

well as the abrupt collapse of the government whose despotism
tuals, students, religious leaders, and even some workerssome but
by no means all of them dissidentscollaborated to establish a loose
opposition group to the crumbling rule of the German Democratic
 Republic called J~Teues Forum.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                    Under its new
civic forum name, the group not only led (though by no means con-
The Colonization of East Germany by Mc World 261
stituted by itself) a popular movement that did not so much over-
throw the East German Communist regime as orchestrate its spon-
 taneous collapse.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                       As has happenect elsewhere in the land of McWorld
where the expansion~ of the private sector has drained political sup-
port for the public sector, public monies are not available for projects
The Colonization of East Germany by Mc World  265
 of real reunification.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                         Smug westerners boast they can spot a for-
mer East German just by his or her gait, and are buying up old two-
 cycle Trabent cars that look like toys for their nostalgia collections.4
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                 A culture of advertising, software,
Hollywood movies, MT\~ theme parks, and shopping malls hooped
together by the virtual nexus of the information superhighway closes
 down free spaces.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

         For democracy rests on civil society and citizenship, and
while the new telecommunications technologies are not necessarily
averse to either, they produce neither unless directed by citizens
already living in and dedicated to a civil society
 A Global Civil Society?
	Jihad vs. McWorld

Sovereignty is indeed in a twilight, condemned to a shadow world by
governments myriad postmodern detractorsex-Communist and
 postindustrialist alike.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                     Moreover, it
took the young democratic republic another seventy-five years and
a bloody civil war to confront the issues of slavery and state
 sovereignty left unresolved by the 1789 constitution.6
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                             But this
wifi happen only if markets are not left to determine how these tech-
nologies will be developed and deployed, and if global communica-
tion is disciplined by prudent deliberation and civility How civil
society can be forged in an international environment is an extraor-
 dinary challenge.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                  India has just elected a Parliament dominated by
the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party It also has its first
Hindu nationalist Prime Minister in history (Atal Bihari Vajpayee)
who, amidst fears of Hindi extremism, avows that his favorite
 movie is Walt Disneys The Lion King.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                      Democracy has been unsettled in
these countries by the deep disillusion that has followed the confla-
tion of markets and liberty giving the words of Schwab and Smadja
 their resonance.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                               The standard here is not absolute justice; it asks
only that if a nation consumes more than its fair share by population, it justify
that usage by its economic productivity
304 
APPENDIX A
 JEDI TABLE 2.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

      Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Free
Press, 1992), although he is far less pleased by his prognosis in his book than
he seemed in the original National Interest essay that occasioned all the con-
troversy; and Walter B. Wriston, Twilight of Sovereignty (New York: Scrib-
 ners, 1992).
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                       Yet 20 percent
of the aircraft will be built by Japanese firms in Japan (Mitsubishi,
Kawasaki, and Fuji Heavy Industries), engines will come from Rolls-
Royce (as well as two American companies), wing flaps are to be manu-
316 
Jiotes for Pages 2526
factured by Alenia in Italy, Brazils Embraer will make the fin and
wingtip assemblies, while literally hundreds of other companies in
Korea, Singapore, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere will be involved in
 smaller ways.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

penetrate markets ever since accommodating the Nazis (who were claim-
ing Coke was a Jewish-American company because it sold Kosher-
stamped bottles) by passing out samples at Hitler Youth rallies, and
accommodating Stalin by decaramelizing White Coke and shipping fifty
 cases in clear bottles with red-star-embossed white caps for his approval.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                 By 1975, however; television
Jsf otes for Pages 93~~ 
329
and rising prices had driven ticket sales down to only 128 million, while the
number of screens available had been reduced to around thirty-two hun-
 dred.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

(All figures are from information provided by the Statis-
 tical Department of the Spitzenorganisation der Filmwirtschaft e.V
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                  According to Jon Wieners account in The Yation, Foner
had complained about the editing and context of the speech delivered by
the Lincoln robot at Disneys Anaheim Hall of Presidents, a speech that
Jvotes for Pages 136145 339
 omitted any reference to slavery.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

   Thus the U.S. Business and Industrial Council is fighting the WTO provi-
sions of GATT, which it fears is an official surrender by the United States
 to foreign governments.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

      Quoted by Vance Packard in his early classic on consumption, The Waste
Makers (New York: David McKay, 1960), and cited again by Alan Durning
in his excellent study for the Woridwatch Institute called How Much Is
Enough: The Consumer Society and the Future of Earth (New York: W. W. Norton
 & Company, 1992), pp. 2122.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

        The attempt by the more numerous but weaker developing nations in
1974 to institute a new international economic order through U.N. Res-
olution 3201 was made a mockery of by the refusal of powerful First World
356  JVotesforPages226229
 nations to take an interest.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

 Article 24/I of the Basic Law discussing the power of integration, states
that the Federation may by legislation transfer sovereign powers to inter-
JfotesforPages23o235 357
 national institutions.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

It was replaced by a new Europe Article in 1992.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                A cartoon by Margulies hits the mark when it depicts one
Solidarity veteran standing in front of a Warsaw market after the 1990
elections in which Solidarity won overwhelmingly, and saying to another:
 Ive had it with bread lines, food shortages, and scarce housing...
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                  Its
time we got rid of this rotten government, only to be reminded by his
 comrade, WE ARE the government!
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                U domination by a mafia bureaucracy offered a return to
the relative order enjoyed by many under the communist rule, many would
JVotes for Pages 25 72 63 365
 embrace it.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                 See also international-
Habibie, B. J., 9,
images: and advertising, 6163, 67, 69
Hachette, 12627
ization; spec~fic topic
imperialism, 167
Glowacki, Janusz, 254
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 124, 126
India, i8, 184, 191; advertising in,
hard technology, 72, 7375
Gluck, Fred, 49
62; and confederalism, 289; and
HarperColliris Publishers, 103, 114, 427
Goizueta, Roberto C., 69
economic issues, 35, 55; infotain-
Gold, Thomas B., i86
hate groups, 214
ment in, 90, 94, 103, 405, io8; and
Goodyear Tire and Rubber, 57
Hauser Communications, 142
resources, 43, 44, 47, 48
Havel, Vaclav, 275
Gore, Al, 113, 149
Indonesia, 70, 90, 91, i8~, 187, 191
Havemann, Robert, 261
Gouiran, Gerard, 17475
industrialism, 5058
government: and alienation of citi-
Hayek, Friedrich, 236
infantilism, 93
zens, 280; characteristics of, 276;
Hazard, Paul, i~g
infomercials, 6465, 8~86, 146
Hearst, 124
and education, ii~ fundamental-
information superhighway: access
istss views of, 214; intervention by,
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 6
to, 448; aims of, iooIoi; and con-
7, 2829, 31, 90, 96, 98; and
Heinkman, Jack, 224
glomerates, 273; and democracy,
Henzler, Herbert, i~g
monopolies, 282; and private sec-
iso; and hard goods-service sector
 tor, 28!;
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                          See also
by, 1o3; and Gingrich, i~g; global
publishers/publishing; spec~/ic
16162; and democracy, 184; and
influence of, 114, 115; and homo-
fundamentalist religions, 20915;
newspaper or publisher
geneity of television, 1034; and
and Jihad and McWorld, 1112,
Nextel, 143
 mergers, 146; as a personality, 145.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                      See Germany
out by; 8~, 104, 121, 12526, 143,
Turner Broadcasting System, 125,
14647, 
148
Western European Language
Vidal, Gore, 112
Bureau, 172
141, 142, 147
Turner; Ted, 8i, i~
video games, 74, 187
Westernization/Americanization,
 TVGuzde, 103, 114.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

      The assumption that Afghanistan is primarily a tribally organized
society is a result of both overgeneralization and confusion between
the system of agnatic descent for organizing social relations and tribe
5
M. NAZIF SHAHRANI
 as a unit of military and political mobilization in the current conflict.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                     For Western researchers the tendency to equate the society of
Afghanistan with that of the Pashtuns is further encouraged by the fact that there
were many published accounts on the Pashtuns of the British-Indian North-West
 Frontier.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

           During this century a few rebellious Pashtun tribes have
been suppressed, disarmed by the government, and forcibly relocated
 in the north (see Katz in this volume).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                          Most of the non-Pashtun popu-
lation, particularly in the northern, western, and central parts of the
country, was disarmed by the government in the 1890s and again
 after the 1929 civil war.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                       (The most obvious
instance of this kind of rural recalcitrance in this volume is presented
 by Tavakolian on the Sheikhanzai Pashtun in western Afghanistan.)
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

    Furthermore, it is important to note that from 1929 to 1975 all
major rebellions against the government were instigated entirely by
 the Pashtun.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                         On the whole, their attitude
toward the state has been ambivalent, characterized by neither active
 support nor active hostility.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                           that
would lead to the creation of a new and just democratic society
in Afghanistan, where the exploitation of man by man, hunger,
poverty, unemployment and illiteracy would be wiped out forever
 (Muradov 1981: 180).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                       8] had been
the subjects of repeated efforts at reform by previous governments
dating back to the 1880sand the efforts had shown little success
 [see also N. Tapper, N. Dupree, and L. Dupree in this volume].)
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

   *LO*JJS Dupree (1973: 147, chart 11) provides the following average estimates
(excluding Shiburghan province) of the distribution of agricultural land by form
 of tenure in the country in 1963: sharecropped13.8
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

This figure seems negligible
 by comparison to Glukhodeds.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

             the deficit of land in reaching the aim proclaimed
by the reform was estimated at 230,000 to 350,000 hectares, re-
 calculated on the first group basis.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

In actual fact, this deficit was
 considerably greater.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                        Secondly, the very classifi-
cation of lands used for dividing them into equal plots, although it
made it possible to compare lands varying in quality, was by no
 means always suitable for their mass distribution in small plots.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                It
can hardly be considered feasible to create a peasant holding by
granting a formerly landless peasant a 5 to 6-hectare plot of dry
land of the sixth or seventh group, whose development is extremely
 difficult.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

      Critical of the governments land reform policies, Glukhoded says,
The implementation of this principle [equalized land distribution] is
not justified by any theoretical considerations or practical experience
 (1981: 240).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

              He further states that such a course of transformations
in the [Afghan] village is by no means similar to the solution of the
agrarian question even within the framework of democratic transfor-
 mations (1981: 243).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

  In addition to land confiscation and redistribution, the agrarian
reform envisaged the creation of large-scale mechanized state farms
(presumably in the 13 million ha owned by the state) and various
 types of cooperatives.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                     Mukherjee reports that by the summer of 1981
some 1,210 agricultural cooperatives with 183,000 peasant mem-
bers, 9 artisan cooperatives with 10,000 members, and 4 consumer
20
cooperatives had been formed, successfully making [peasants] more
 and more homogeneous as a class entity (1981: 19).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

ulation (see L. Dupree, Beattie, Shahrani, Keiser, and Katz in this
 volume).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

..
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                      26
MARXIST REVOLUTION AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE
Journalists and Western commentators generally present the
Afghan conflict essentially as a religious war waged by traditional re-
ligious leaders and fundamentalist mullahs (learned men) and their
faithful horde of tribal and rural followers against the invading Soviet
 forces and the urban-based atheist Khalq-Parcham government.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                 West-
ern writers use the same Islamic terms employed by Afghan resistance
groups to identify the resistance effort and its participantsjihad and
 mujahidin (holy war and freedom fighters).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                    Clearly such ob-
servers have disregarded a large body of mujahidin publications con-
 cerning the nature of jihad.t
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                          Rudolph Peters states the
following: Western powers often justified their colonial expansion by the idea
of a mission civilisatrie; it served their interests if Moslem society was depicted
 as backward and Islam as a religion of bloodthirsty, lecherous fanatics.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

(On the Soviet policy toward Islam in the Soviet Union,
 see Bennigsen and Lemercier.Quelquejay
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

       Furthermore, the imitation of Western lifestyles and ideas
was often accompanied by direct or indirect attacks on Islam (see
 Rodinson 1979).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

            Many local magnates (ashkhasi sarshinas or ashkhasi
namdar) were appointed or elected by the court to the two nomi-
 nal houses of parliament, Majlis.i
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

         the Helmand and Nangarhar Valleys projects and Kandahar
M. NAZIF SHAHRANI
The factor which irrevocably influenced the policies and ulti-
In 1956 the Soviet Union offered substantial amounts of military
By the mid 1950s the monarchy launched a program for nation-
To accomplish its goals the government needed the help of its
36
 International Airport].
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                        Most of the projects were selected by non-
economic criteria and did not pass the necessary feasibility tests
 (Zekrya 1976: 212-13).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                    Only a very small segment of
the populationprimarily government officials, army officers, and
the urban merchant class, who were also well represented in the
 bureaucracybenefited economically.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                    The majority of rural people
and urban poor were not affected by the plans or were influenced
 negatively.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                By the mid-1970s
more than 800,000 Afghan youth were attending some 4,000 schools
and over 600,000 had completed some formal education (see Chu
 et al.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                         For the fortunate few who had
already joined the lower ranks of the civil and military services, the
prospects for job mobility within an already top-heavy bureaucracy
 largely manned by the old official elite seemed bleak.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                   Paradoxically, at a time when the Musahiban rulers
had achieved their long-sought goal of firmly controlling traditional
political forces, the educated Afghans who had been trained by the
regime to broaden its base of support were beginning to pose a strong
 political challenge.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                          MARXIST REVOLUTION AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE
Under constant pressure from the government, Muslim Youth
Long considered by Islamic-minded youth to be a friend of the
Like the Muslim Youth movement, many of Daouds other polit-
The assumption of power by the Khalq-Parcham touched off the
41
M. NAZIF SHAHRANI
THE ARMED RESISTANCE: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS
Within a few months of assuming power, the Khalq-Parcham
party faced steadily growing armed opposition in many urban as well
 as rural areas.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                     Mujahidin
leaders who emphasize the Islamic concept of umma, a community
 and brotherhood of all Muslims, largely consider ethnicityanon-issue.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                  Such unchanging
inner necessities and the way Islam has addressed them are under-
scored by Rabbani:
 First I should explain a common misunderstanding.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                    The departure of the mujahidin from the familiar
leadership pattern of other liberation movements is considered by
many Western researchers to be a sign of weakness and evidence of
the chaos they believe traditionally reigned in Afghanistan (see for
example Azoy 1982, N. Newell and R. Newell 1981, and Chaliand
 1982).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                   Parcham had been considered by many
as the most pro-Soviet of the leftist parties; military officers (even
those trained in the USSR) tended to be more nationalist than social-
ist, more pro-Afghan than pro-Soviet, so they usually gravitated to
 Khalq.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                          Corruption,
tyranny, and plunder had been the way of life in the fake republic of
Daoud*
The DRA did not invent repression and torture in Afghanistan;
however, although previous regimes could not claim high ratings in
human rights, the DRA went far beyond the allowable bounds of
 cultural deviance by Afghan standards.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                               65
LOUIS DUPREE
REVOLTS
Except for sporadic attacks from Pakistan by the Hizb-i Islami
(Islamic Party), a dissident Muslim fundamentalist group led by
Engineer Gulbudin Hikmatyar, most of the opposition was quiet in
Afghanistan from the April coup until late August-early September
 1978.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                   MARXIST REGIMES AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE
The DRA government responded to tribal threats by requesting
Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, leader of one of the numerous Afghan
The special relationship had never been put into writing or
REFUGEES AND RUSSIANS
Fundamentally the Soviets had two choices regarding Afghani-
*While foreign intervention is not the focus here, it is worth noting that
69
 they would take such a hazardous step (L.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

They were consi ere by NATO 
an e rest of the


world as part of the Soviet 
bloc c jn members 
of the Warsaw Pact,

 but Afghanistan was not.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

Soviet statistics alone indicate that by 2000 A.D. the total
 population of the USSR will be 53 percent non-Russian.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                              The Soviets reacted
by shipping most of the Muslim troops back to Central Asia by the
 end of February 1980.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                    By April 1979
Communist forces had been totally repulsed from eastern Nuristan;
six months later most of the rest of Kunar province was free of
 Communist control.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                           Although there are ethnographically
*I conducted field research with the Kom in 1967-69 and 1973-74, partially
aided by grants from the South Asia Program of Cornell University, the Wenner-
80
ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN EASTERN NURISTAN
interesting differences between the sociopolitical systems of the vari-
ous Nuristani peoples, the details of the Kom system presented here
 are largely representative of a common Nuristani pattern.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                               86
ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN EASTERN NURISTAN
At the time, Anwars arrest was regarded as a temporary pre-
caution taken by the new regime, which was detaining most higher-
 ranking civil servants of the deposed government.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                These bonds, which grew stronger during the
decades following their conquest in the 1890s by Amir Abdur
 Rahman, were characterized by loyalty, respect, and mutual benefit.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                        DAVID J. KATZ
In its details the case of Vygal Valley Kalasha differs from
Despite its distinctiveness, certain condusions can be drawn from
VIygal Valley Kalasha did not and do not value more the
118
THE REBELLION IN DARRA-I NUR
THE REBELLION: QUESTIONS AND PARADOXES
On 27 April 1978, Afghan Communist revolutionaries led by
Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin overthrew the govern-
ment of Muhammad Daoud, thus ending the rule of the Muhammad-
zai, the Pashtun royal lineage that had dominated Afghan politics for
 one hundred and fifty years.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

           Lacking legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans and handi-
capped by narrow, doctrinaire views, officials of the Communist
regime quickly succeeded in alienating large sections of the popula-
 tion.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                              By early winter 1979 it was apparent
that the Afghan military was incapable of containing the rebellion
 despite massive Soviet aid.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                        In this struggle an often
ragtag, poorly armed assortment of peasants, tribesmen, and urban
dwellers divided by ideological and ethnic differences has so far
 proven a match for the Soviet Union.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                By building a political alliance that spanned tribal and
factional differences and creating a military organization that crosscut
earlier political divisions, Mir Beg successfully altered the political
 structure in a fundamental manner.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

The Afghan military was supplied by the Soviet Union with
 modern small arms, tanks, fighter bombers, and helicopter gunships.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

The army was advised by military personnel from Eastern Europe
 well trained in techniques of modern warfare.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                        DAVID J. KATZ
In its details the case of Vygal Valley Kalasha differs from
Despite its distinctiveness, certain condusions can be drawn from
VIygal Valley Kalasha did not and do not value more the
118
THE REBELLION IN DARRA-I NUR
THE REBELLION: QUESTIONS AND PARADOXES
On 27 April 1978, Afghan Communist revolutionaries led by
Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin overthrew the govern-
ment of Muhammad Daoud, thus ending the rule of the Muhammad-
zai, the Pashtun royal lineage that had dominated Afghan politics for
 one hundred and fifty years.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

           Lacking legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans and handi-
capped by narrow, doctrinaire views, officials of the Communist
regime quickly succeeded in alienating large sections of the popula-
 tion.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                              By early winter 1979 it was apparent
that the Afghan military was incapable of containing the rebellion
 despite massive Soviet aid.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                        In this struggle an often
ragtag, poorly armed assortment of peasants, tribesmen, and urban
dwellers divided by ideological and ethnic differences has so far
 proven a match for the Soviet Union.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                By building a political alliance that spanned tribal and
factional differences and creating a military organization that crosscut
earlier political divisions, Mir Beg successfully altered the political
 structure in a fundamental manner.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

The Afghan military was supplied by the Soviet Union with
 modern small arms, tanks, fighter bombers, and helicopter gunships.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

The army was advised by military personnel from Eastern Europe
 well trained in techniques of modern warfare.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

After the Afghan conquest of the area in the late nineteenth century
such warfare was not tolerated by the central government, and the
 government was generally strong enough to suppress most of it.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

ritual contexts and the need to achieve a sense of self (as
 argued by Cohen) is particularly important.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                              It is crucial to our
analysis that one understand the causes and motivations behind the
different decisions made by various segments of Badakhshans popu-
 lation in response to national political developments.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                       140
RESPONSES TO THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN BADAKHSHAN
Islamic political movements and not simply religious in nature (see
the introduction above); second, the initial force behind the armed
resistance and its leadership originated in the major urban centers
(not the rural areas, as has been frequently claimed), but for tactical
reasons the resistanceconsidered by Afghans to be an Islamic war of
liberation, or jihadhas been fought to a large extent in the country-
side; finally, the principal actors in the struggle for control of politi-
cal power in this conflict are the newly educated elite (urban and
rural, religious and secular), not the agrarian tribesmen, peasants, and
 nomads fighting a central government for their own narrow interests.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                              Generally the intervention of such media-
tors is preferred for two reasons: in most instances they do not expect
payment, and the court system is corrupt and run by outsiders
 mostly Pashtuns.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                         During his
freshman year he was given a scholarship by the government to study
154
RESPONSES TO THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN BADAKHSHAN
physics at the American University in Beirut (AUB)the first student
 from Badakhshan to go overseas for higher education.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

         In 1961 he was transferred to the newly created Institute
of Education, which was organized and maintained by the U.S. Agen-
 cy for International Development (AID).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                    Thus the Afghan
monarchy communicated one thing effectively to its people (whether
by means of the traditional ulama or the modern media): the Islamic
 foundation of state authority.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                           He may know Sadis Rose
Garden by heart and still understand not one syllable of the news
 given over the Afghan radio (1981: 51).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

* However, this type of arbab
 served a function by handling criminal cases.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                       Most important (as noted), the administra-
tive structure had been designed by the Musahibans to keep order,
 not to implement change.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                               In the face of general opposition,
sparked by different incidents in each region, the PDPA responded
 with military force./While
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                        civil
war broke out, the Afghan army was depleted by massive deser-
 tions.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

Perhaps the most basic difficulty faced by the national govern-
 ment was its own weakness at the provincial and subprovincial levels.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                           Both soon announced programs of sweeping
change for Afghanistan, and both were supported by a young, edu-
cated urban class which planned to use the old government structure
 as an instrument for change.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                            By doing so the decrees
intended effect was not only to prohibit payment of brideprice, but
 also to force people to spend less on their wedding celebrations.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                   Moreover, famffies whjch had a male
member betrothed but not yet married at the time the decree was
issued were also directly affected by itbecause the usual practice was
 for half the brideprice to be paid al~ the ti.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                      The same kind of problem
was faced by a young man who had agreed to pay a brideprice of
 70,000 afs.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                     By banning bridepriceand es-
pecially by declaring that women could marry whom they pleased-
it threatened to undermine the strict control over women on which
 the maintenance of male honor depended.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                       Holdings in
excess of the amounts specified were to be confiscated by the Land
 Reforms Department (Article 9).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

     ~By contrast with Decree No. 8, compensation was to be paid to the owners
of land which was expropriated over a period of twenty-five years at 2 percent
 interest (Article X).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                               Some people had probably
;een the writing on the wall after the coup in April 1978 and reduced
the size of their estates by either transferring title to parts of them
 to relatives or simply selling them.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                        the landless casual laborers
because the larger estates were mostly cultivated by sharecroppers,
not managed as single units worked by wage-earning laborers, and, as
noted above, it was the sharecroppers who were to be given priority
 when land was redistributed.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                              The subgovernor then asked the laborer
whether he would testify to the truth of his claim by taking an oath
 on the Quran.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                        As noted, the demonstrations essentially
attracted only people who were employed by the government, and
the jargon used in the speeches tended to confuse rather than to
 enlighten.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

              Understandably terms such as feudalist, imperialist,
and even democratic did not mean very much to most people, and
the traditional wariness and mistrust of government were not going
 to be overcome by rhetoric alone.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                 At the same time, the attempt
to speed up the adjudication of minor disputes was welcomed by
 many people, as was the attack on bribery.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                  For
example, in December 1980 Radio Kabul reported that a group of
rebels who had for some time been engaged in robbery and murder
in the district of Nahrin, Baghlan province, were recently crushed by
the security forces and party activists (BBC Summary of World
 Broadcasts, 12118/80).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                        CONCLUSION
Most of the domestic policies pursued by the Khalq government
rapidly to modernize Afghan society were not particularly original
and did not differ significantly from the attempts at social and
 economic reform of various rulers during the last one hundred years.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                  More than half a century later,
Sultan Muhammad Khan wrote the following:
At the time of the accession of the present Amir [Abdur Rahman]
to the throne of Kabul, he found the most arbitrary and fantastic
powers being exercised in the administration of the state by the
 clergy of Islam.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                               The distinction between religion and
politics became important in the seventeenth century, when the word
religious, meaning the worshipful appreciation of God, changed
 to mean adherence to a system of beliefs defined by a church.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                   By
the end of the century many people had come to feel that the be-
liefs and practices associated with a particular church differed from
those associated with the affairs of state (see W. C. Smith 1963:
 ch.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

     In such cases it is sociologically interesting to investigate how
far and how explicitly ethnicity and symbols of ethnic differentiation
are usedand by whomto perpetuate or to change the class situa-
 tion.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                            Saripul district is named
after its administrative center, a market town of about 20,000 people
and the seat of a subgovernor (hakim or wuluswal) whose jurisdiction
extends officially over 10-12,000 square kilometers of rough country
 inhabited by a population of some 150,000.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

    *Fieldwork in north-central Afghanistan in 1970-71 and 1972 was conducted
jointly with Nancy Tapper as a Social Science Research Council project (HR
1141/1) and was also supported by the School of Oriental and African Studies
(SOAS); a survey trip in 1968 was financed by a grant from the Nuffield Foun-
 dation.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

             Now the river valleys near Saripul are cultivated to the
full; moreover, dry-farming of the surrounding steppe and mountain
slopes has spread rapidly at the expense of pasture, although in many
 places this new farming is a very risky enterprise.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                    Like Afghanistan
as a whole, the region now depends for survival on a successful dry-
 farmed wheat crop.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                     In a good year Saripul can export a surplus, but
after bad years, like 1970 and 1971, famine threatens as wheat prices
are grossly inflated, not only because of the bad local harvest, but
also as a result of speculation and of the immigration of destitute
 peoples from even less fortunate areas to the west.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                       By 1970 there
was a population saturation in the region, given the water resources
 available.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

       A further reflection of the growth of population was the emer-
gence by the early 1970s of a fourfold class structure: a traditional
elite of landowners, tribal chiefs, wealthy merchants, and other re-
gional leaders; a bourgeoisie of independent propertied tribesmen
and peasants and established traders and artisans; a propertyless and
dependent rural and urban proletariat; and anew intelligentsia of
young, educated townspeople, especially teachers and some officials
 (including some educated and even employed in Kabul).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                        They often
OPPOSITION TO THE KHANS
The domination of the Nazarzai khans has not remained un-
term used by Durrani for Parsiwans is Opra; see N. Tapper
241
RICHARD TAPPER
revolutionthe Uzbeks, Turkmens, and Aymaqs of Saripul rose against
the Nazarzai khans and drove them into the mountains, setting
 up a supporter of Bacha-i Saqaw as governor in the town.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                 He was arrested and sentenced to four years injail,
but after having served a few months in considerable comfort, he was
released on payment of 100 jiribs of land to each of the bereaved
families;* a public peacemaking ceremony in Saripul followed, ac-
 companied by a two-day buzkachi tournament (see Azoy 1982).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                The
outcome of this case was generally reckoned to be a victory for the
Uzbeks and dishonor for the Pashtun khans; manyPashtuns, however,
maintained that by their standards the acceptance of compensation
 was dishonorable.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                    Nonetheless, the Uzbeks would probably not have
achieved even this limited success if they had not been represented
 by their own powerful leaders.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                 By the early 1970s Uzbeks, Hazarahs,
and Aymaqs of the region had such leaders, often able to defend their
 followers interests effectively when threatened.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

The shift has been accompanied by
 new forms of confrontation.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                    There have been numerous incidents of violence; in
two notorious cases, the murders of Baluch and Maliki tribesmen by
thugs said to have been hired by Nazarzai khans were followed by un-
successful efforts by the khans of the victims groups to exact justice
 from the government.t
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                    Governments since April 1978 have
promoted the idea of a revolution of the masses against feudal and
tribal oppression and reaction, while the ethnic heterogeneity of the
 country was formally recognized in Decree No. 4 of May 1978.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                             If the
Taraki regime had promoted its reformseven those affecting land
tenure and marriageunder an ideology of Islamic socialism, it could
 have won much popular support in the Saripul area.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                             246
SOUTHERN AFGHAMSTAN
PART V
WESTERN AND
A STUDY OF INDIGENOUS AUTHORITY AND FOREIGN RULE
 Islam in rural Afghanistan.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                           Thus far
the Sheikhanzai of Afghanistan have countered such attempts by
their ability to maintain political autonomy and a high degree of
economic independence (though not self-sufficiency) through
pastoral nomadism, segmentary lineage organization, and a merger of
 religious and political authority, at the local level.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                       There is no subjugation or rule by an elite,
or even by a majority because unanimity of opinion is the objective
 of tribal assemblies.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                       TAVAKOLIAN
SHEIKHANZAI RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY
Quite unlike the stereotypes maintained about them by urban
and sedentary populations, and unlike accounts of nomads in other
 portions of the Muslim world (e.g.,
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

    While regular prayer five times a day is by no means
universalany more than it is among any other Muslim
populationprayer is common among both young and old men,
 and even among women, who say their prayers in their tents.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

It is instructive that in both of the latter instances, the extension
of central governmental rule has been facilitated by the cooptation,
 or simple replacement, of tribal leaders by government representatives.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                   Afghan identifications with Islam
have obscurities for observers who frequently, sometimes explicitly,
attribute the obscurity to Afghans themselves as insincere or fana-
tical or both by highlighting the more accessible fact that Afghans
 make such charges against each other.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                        Fieldwork in Afghanistan
between 1971 and 1974 was financially supported by U.S. National Science
Foundation grant no. GS-30275 and archival research at the India Office Library,
 London, in 1980 by the Etnografisk Museum of the University of Oslo.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                But missing from such
partial, implicitly partisan accounts of Afghan views are additional
data which lie more in the background than in the foreground of
their discourse about the configuration of Muslim capacities, and
analytically subordinating specific structural properties to general
functions of religion as an institution or process underestimates
more telling data about how Islam operates in conjunction with
other local aspects of identities rather than as a univalent partisan
 interest.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

Variously implicit or self-evident for Afghans, such data can
 be elusive, and not only because their expression is often allusive.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

Many do not appear to be about religion at all.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                           No
important initiativeand especially no social oneis undertaken
 without dedication in the name of God (bismilah); infidel!
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

(kafir, one who denies or rejects Gods revelation) is among the
 commonest charges exchanged in Afghan disputes.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                 It is not the point
of departure but of escalation from which there is no turning back
by placing opposition beyond the ultimate mortal pale, until opposi-
 tion is resolved in mutual submission to a larger interest.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                        The Durrani
restoration under Nadir Shah was initially supported by Ahmadzai
Ghilzai, some of whom had been punished with exile to northern
Afghanistan by Amanullah for taking part in a revolt against him in
 1924; but Nadirs claims were resisted by many Ghilzai.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                 By 1939 all Ghilzai
tribes had formally accepted the Durrani restoration, although until
1973 certain groups enjoyed de jure exemptions from conscription
and taxation and de facto freedom from having officials stationed in
 much of their territory.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                              These services include
schools (established at many constabulary posts), government
monopolies for assuring certain supplies (often in competition
with nomad-borne trade of Ghilzai who brought cloth, sugar, and
industrial products back from their winter migrations to India), the
expansion of roads and bazaars (served by road traffic, which made
 caravans obsolete), and (recently) development projects.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                Between Abdur Rahmans attempts to assume personally the
ulamid function and the later institutional isolation of ulamid
interests, a longer-term shifting balance of influences is suggested in
the observation by Kakar:
The position of the mullas was strengthened very much in the
nineteenth century, especially during the Second Anglo-Afghan
War when some mullas for the first time in many centuries emerged
as leaders of the campaigns and in many cases offered more sound
military opposition to the British than either the sardars or tribal
 elders did (1979: 153).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                  272
HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM
It would seem that the situation confronted by Abdur Rahman and
in the Durrani restoration of the 193Os was not, therefore, straight-
forwardly traditional, but rather there was a radical prominence of
 Muslim functionaries in the political field.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

 In spite of demographic and political flux, the account of tribal
distributions given by Elphinstone over a century and a half ago
remains a good guide, especially to those of the Ghilzai homelands
 (see Anderson 1975).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                           Tribal structure may even have been enhanced
in recent years by a diminution of its functions to local relevance for
 land tenure and to generalized communal identifications.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

        Formally tribe (qawm) is formulated as the sons of one father,
whose landed estate is divided among them and whose character
(huy) is shared by them as a body which is localized in continuous
segments, replicating this form and called variously khel or *~zai, as
 in Sulayman Khel or Ghilzai.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                               Patriineal inheritance of land by males
only assures the association of any segment with a territory, which is
 thought of as a subsidiary portion of the overall homeland (watan).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                              By
holding that Qays went to Mecca and received Islam directly from
Muhammad, who called him Abdur Rashid, avghan deny having any
 pre-Islamic past or equivocal history of conversion.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                 The
claim for a unique mediation of Islam, analytically speaking, is an
identification of Pakhtunness with Islam, but it is limited by other
mediations through shariat and tariqat, which diminish a common
 sense of being already Muslim.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                             While this feeling may be heightened
by the alienation of mullahs from their clienteleand many Ghilzai
complain that the mullahs are not ours any morethis is not only
 a modern phenomenon.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                              More
fundamentally, it is a recognition that other mediations of Islam
diverge from their own when contexts are not definable exclusively
 by qawmwali (tribalism, in the sense of possessing tribe).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                         Thus, as an
approximation of the malangs way, some ordinary tribesmen,
particularly second sons and younger brothers who have reason to
feel shortchanged in tribal society, may be more or less secretly or
 occasionally drawn to Sufi devotions.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

     Sufi devotion provides a means which fits the situation in which
many partially alienated tribesmen find themselves, but for others it
 located along margins between tribal watan.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                 But Sufism tends to
become an alternative to qawm when qawm is reckoned a failure for
securing the comprehensive totality which sunnat implies, to fail as
umma, or a specifically Muslim community, or to have become too
 much of the world by unraveling in individual pursuits.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                             In Ghilzai terms, nominal brothers enjoy
an original equality with respect to each other that is defined by an
abstracted ancestor, in whom they are united, just as the equality of
Muslims rests on their mutual subsumption under God as His crea-
 tion.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

By this reckoning, tribalism becomes a this-worldly counterpart
of creation and, when Muslimas avghan tribes are presumed to
 bea form of salvation.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                               Accordingly, mullahs
and qazi are freely referred to as devils (shaytan) for meddling in
tribal affairs or interjecting themselves between tribesmen by mis-
 chievously taking things into their own hands.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                  280
HOW AFGHANS DEFINE THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM
Given the relative rise of religious figures in the late nineteenth
century and subsequent efforts by government to coopt at least some
and to neutralize others, salutary examples abound in which tribes-
men can point to religious functionaries interjecting themselves into
factional disputes and exacerbatingsometimes creatingconifict
through their own rivalries for congregations, influence, and endow-
 ments.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                              There is a continuity between the individual
tribesman who becomes in some measure, either temporarily or
partially, Sufi or who drops out altogether as malang in a personal
jihad al- aqi, the larger collective undertaking of jihad against heretics
(traditionally, for Ghilzai, the Shia Hazara, but also usurpatory
governments) and unbelievers such as the former Kafir of what is
now Nuristan, and opposition to British suzerainty on the NOrth-
 West Frontier led by a series of mullahs, faqir and akhund.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                             In tribal experience, shariat emphasizes
hierarchy between Muslims by shifting equality into the ultimate
future through continuously problematizing what is already
resolved in the primordial submission of Qays to the most direct form
 of revelation available to ordinary humans.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

Tariqat resolves in the opposite direction by shifting asymmetry to
an ultimate God-man relation and emphasizing here-and-now equality
 through social disengagement.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                      By contrast, the organizational
expression of shariat through qazi and mullahs is personally removed
but socially immediate, even intrusive, and for that potentially com-
 petitive in authorizing what is Islamic between Muslims.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                               Louis
Dupree notes that a 1950 law banning ostentatious life-crises
ceremonies prohibits many of the expensive aspects of birth, circum-
294
 
 
CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF ABOLITION OF BRIDEPRICE
cision, marriage and burial rituals (1973:209), and Knabe gives
details of how the Marriage Law of 1971 was a further attempt by
lawmakers to curb the indebtedness which arises from the costs of
marriage (1977a: 164), which are a burden for Afghan society as a
 whole (1977a: 149).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                  While the marriages made by a wealthy household may
confirm its strength, they may also reveal weaknesses of which others
 will take advantage.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                                 The
conversion clearly compromises the honor of the wife-givers, who are
very unwilling to take goods from the even lower sphere of produce
 (e.g.,
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                     Persian-speaking
groups such as Aymaqs, Arabs, Tajiks, and Hazarahs and Turkic-
speaking Uzbeks and Turkmens are differentiated from the Durrani
by basic features of social organization as well as language, custom,
 and (in the case of the Hazarahs) religion.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                        The ethnic boundary with
such groups is marked for the Durrani by a plethora of criteria,
among which the ban on hypogamy, while it remains fundamental
 from the Durrani point of view, is simply taken for granted.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                          Indeed it
is made more or less irrelevant in this context by the other groups
 own conceptions of both ethnic identity and marriage.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                    For example, Beattie has described how marriage
arrangements in progress were simply halted by the decrees prohibi-
 tion of marriage payments (p.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

           Moreover, women suffer a diminution of value in their
own eyes and those of their husbands and brothers by being given
 away free (see N. Tapper 1981).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

      If the prohibition on brideprice payments and other expenses of
marriage continues to be enforced in the absence of other funda-
mental changes, one can expect that the traditional function of the
institution of marriage in effecting and communicating status changes
 within a community will be replaced by an alternative system.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

Social inequality would persist, probably on the same scale as in
traditional Afghan society, but would be revealed and manipulated
 by other means.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                           He granted freedom to wives in cases of
nonsupport by husbands and authorized the mahr (a gift of property
or money promised by a groom at the time of marriage; a wife may
demand it at any time, particularly when abandoned, separated, or
 divorced).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                  Dupree 1979d),
many looked forward with anticipation to new programs unshackled
 by precedent.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                          She wrote, taught, and acted as political
adviser and stood with her brothers at the bastion of Kandahar when
 the city was besieged in 1738 by Persias Nadir Afshar.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                The PDPA accused the Welfare Association of being run
by aristocratic women for their personal satisfaction without concern
 for the real issues facing women.*
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

          On the other hand, one can understand her rancor toward the
elitists, for she too had been a victim of the shabby treatment meted
 out to women by the old society.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                        The DRA claimed that Daoud had been
scared stiff of the growth of the democratic movement of women, using every
means to prevent it The so-called Womens Association, set up by well-known
court appointees, tried to deflect women from genuine class struggle (Kabul
 Times, 3/10/79).
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                               REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC AND AFGHAN WOMEN
Dr. Anahita joined the leftist PDPA when it was founded by
Dr. Anahita was rewarded for her loyal party work in 1976,
On the one hand, Dr. Anahita symbolizes the success women
*The Welfare Association was called the Afghan Womens Institute during
315
NANCY HATCH DUPREE
contradictions inherent in an emancipation stymied by family stric-
 tures and entrenched social customs.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                       REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC AND AFGHAN WOMEN
In sum the KOAW was primarily enlisted to continue womens
The KOAW cadres used heavy-handed tactics to harass illiterate
As dissension continued to mount, the PDPA initiated steps to
 *Quoted by Dr. Anahita 1980.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                       The girl or her guardian shall not take cash or
323
full consent of the parties involved: (a) No one shall force marriage;
(b) No one shall prevent the free marriage of a widow or force her
into marriage because of family relationships [the leveritej or patri-
archal ties; (c) No one shall prevent legal marriages on the pretext
 of engagement, forced engagement expenses, or by using force.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                            The Working Subcommittee,
the Subcommittee for Regulating Administrative Affairs, and the
Subcommittee for Ensuring Judicial Justice had no female represen-
tativesa deplorable situation since the need to effectively guarantee
womens legal rights by etadicating legal injustices and implementing
Decree No. 7 should have been a primary goal of the DRAs legisla-
 tion.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                              On 27 December Amin was
killed; the airlifts recommenced, accompanied by a massive land inva-
 sion from Soviet Central Asia.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

     Instead, International Womens Solidarity Day (IWSD), initiated
by the International Conference of Women Socialists in 1910 in
Copenhagen, would be observed on 8 March each year because it
marked the solidarity of women in their struggle against tyranny
and imperialism, discrimination and racism, and highlighted freedom
 and equality (Kabul Times, 6/17/78).*
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                  At its strongest, the Afghan
army never consisted of more than 100,000 men, and by May 1980
 desertions had considerably depleted its ranks.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

Journal published in Peshawar by Hizb-i Islami.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

Weekly newspaper published in Wiesbaden, Germany, by Hizb-i Islami.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                         See Peoples Republic of China
Chindawul, 222
Chiqin, 148
Chitral (Pakistan), 89, 143
Christianity, 227n, 294
Class, 230-46; and class interests,
11, 165, 180-81; and inequality, 38,
40; and marriage reforms, 305; and
576
peasants, 21; and Saur Revolution, 72, 275; and litigation procedures,
169n, 204, 321 104; as perceived by Sheikhanzai,
 Clergy.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                       See Debts, loans, interest rates
Badakhshan, 141-43; in Darra-iNur, Cuba, 169
121, 127-28; in development plans Cures (by religious dignitaries), 151
of 1950s, 36-37; effects on revolu- Czechoslovakia, 70
tion of, 88-89, 121, 162; lack of,
10; in northwest Afghanistan, 256; Da Islami Jahad da Para da Kunar da
 in Nuristan, 88-89, 100, 103, 108; Qaumuno Ettthad.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                            See Marxists 
Conscription (military): in Badakhshan, Daoud, Muhammad: anti-corruption
149; and bribery, 200; in Darra-i campaigns of, 199-200;coup against
Nur, 124, 125;exemptions from, 9, (1978), 119; coup by (1973), 41,
36, 177, 271; in Imam Sahib, 174, 58, 78, 80; and emancipation for
175; in Nabrin, 197; among Sheik- women, 196, 295, 308-9, 315, 324;
hanzai, 252, 257, 262; in V~ygal and foreign aid, 36;Khalqpropagan-
Valley, 100, 105 
Corruption and bribery: under Ama- position, 157; and literacy courses,
nullah, 32; among arbabs, 175, 203; 321n; and Muslim opposition, 41,
in Badakhshan, 149-50, 153; in 110, 159; and nomad opposition,
Darra-i Nur, 123-24, 125, 127, 132; 262-63; ouster of, 43; reform pro-
in Imam Sahib, 173, 174; and jihad, grams of, 65; relations with Kalasha,
28; Khalq-Parcham policies against, 108, 109, 111; and Republic of
22-23, 195-200 passim, 203, 313; Afghanistan, 59-62, 100, 124, 175,
 mujahidin policies against, 55, 115; 245.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                See also Revolution- 
ary Defense Forces 
Dihqan, 238 
Din, 31, 276, 279, 281 
Diniy khaluk, 276, 279 
Dirham, 292n, 323 
Disputes: arising from DRA land re- 
forms, 189; government involvement 
in, 108-6,252; informal abjudication 
of, 198-99; mitigated by traditional 
local leaders, 51, 83-85, 127-31, 
150-53, 173-74, 259-60, 278, 285- 
 86; in pir networks, 223-24.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

    Quran, 71, 267, 270, 274, 280, 282; 
instruction of, 258, 259, 277; and 
legal reforms for women, 294, 306, 
309; oaths on, 86, 198, 199; and 
pakhtunwali, 276; political direc- 
lives of, 55; and Sharia,, 278; verses 
on fighting in, 28 
Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 32,46,54, 154, 
157-59, 161, 164-65 
Radio and television (foreign), 65n, 69 
Radio Kabul (Radio Afghanistan), 65, 
167, 200; broadcast of Parchami 
plot on, 64; educational programs 
for women on, 331; Khalq-Parchaxn 
reforms on, 12, 312; reports of re- 
sistance in Nahrin on, 205 
Rafi, Colonel M., 201 
Ragh (In Badakhshan), 145 
Rahman, Abdur (Amir): conquest of 
Badakhshanby, 139n, 148; conquest 
of Nuristan by, 78, 94, 98, 99, 268; 
conquest of Turkistan by, 232-33, 
235; land appropriations of, 22n; 
marriage reforms of, 190, 207, 294,
306-7, 324; and Pashtun settlement
in north, 235, 250-53; policy of
direct rule of, 171, 196-97, 212,
252-53, 270n, 271; and role of
Islam in government, 31, 165, 200,
268-69, 27 1-73, 285; weakening of
mullahs by, 212, 271
Rahman, Abdur (Mawlawi), 168
Rahman Qul, Haji, 160
 Raids.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                          See Feuds
Ramazan, 88, 258
Rashid, Abdur, 274
Rashid, Qays Abdur, 241
Rasul Khan, Ghulam, 242
Ratib, Ahmad, 314
Ratibzad, Anahita, 64n, 319, 821n,
326n; address to Kabul teachers
by, 312-13; biography of, 314-16;
chair of International Conference
of Women, 337-39; interview with
Soviet Woman, 330; on literacy
training, 331;party and government
appointments of, 316, 317, 327,
336, 337, 339; views on M. Amin
of, 327-28
Reforms (policies and programs): of
 Amanullah, 33, 176, 294, 307.8;
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

See Mulish(s); Pir; by Safi Pakhtuns, 100-101, 112,
Ruhani,~ Sheikh; Ulama 
 Relocation.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

See Sedentarization and 263, 265; by Sitami Milli, 160, 163,
resettlement 
 Republic of Afghanistan (1973.78),
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

See Sedentarization and See also Akhundzadah; Miyan; P1,;
resettlement Sheikh; Sufi
Resistance (to foreign invasions): 
 against British-India, 71, 283; by among (Marxist view), 16-17; agri.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                Rubin, author
of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan and The Search for
Peace in Afghanistan
This is an impressive analysis of the Taliban movementin
Afghanistan, of its background and impact on that country,
and of the wider regionaLand geopolitical implications of the
 Talibans advent to power.
	Taliban

                                  It would be hard to see how
anyone could rival the range and detail of this account: this
 bids well to be the leading book on the subject.Fred
	Taliban

     Halliday, author of Revolution and World Politics: The Rise
and Fall of the Sixth Great Power
[Rashid] covers the origin and rise of the Thliban, its concepts
of Islam on questions of gender roles and drugs, and the
importance of the country to the development of energy
 resources in the region.
	Taliban

.
	Taliban

                                                        He
reveals anation with a rich culture of contradictions and
complexities that have never been fathomed by its numerous
 conquerors.Booklist
	Taliban

                                                                 Later,
in Kabul, a crowd chased and tried to kill me when I arrived moments
after a rocket fired by Hikmetyar had killed two small boys in the Mic-
 royan housing complex.
	Taliban

                                                                 Abdullali
4 ~ TALIBAN
was tried and sentenced to death, first by the Islamic High Court of Kand-
 ahar and then on appeal by the Taliban Supreme Court.
	Taliban

                                                       These were trials
without lawyers where the accused is presumed guilty and expected to
defend himselL
The Talibans Interpretation of the Sharia or Islamic law demanded the
execution of the murderer by the victims family, but not before a last-
minute appeal is made by the judge to the victims relatives to spare the
 murderer.
	Taliban

                                 But how much of this interpretation
of Islami~ law by the Taliban is owed to the Sharia and how much is
owed to the Pashtun tribal code of behaviour or Pashtunwali, is what
is disputed by many Muslim theologians, both inside Afghanistan and
 beyond.
	Taliban

Western Afghanistan was dominated by speakers of Persian or Dan as the
 Afghan Persian dialect is known.
	Taliban

                             Dan was also spoken by the Hazaras in
central Afghanistan, who were converted to Shiism by the Persians,
 thereby becoming the largest Shia group in an otherwise Sunni territory.
	Taliban

The rulers themselves could claim that they were elected by the tribes
 represented in the Jirga.
	Taliban

                                                         Formal communica-
tions to foreign embassies in Islamabad were frequently dictated by Pakis-
 tani advisers.
	Taliban

                   The highway, built by the Russians in the 1950s
skirted through the brush and sands of one of the hottest and most
 waterless deserts in the world.
	Taliban

But even Islamabad was surprised by the rapid Taliban
 advance.
	Taliban

       By late February 1995 after heavy fighting they captured Nimroz
and Farah, two of the provinces controlled by Ismael Khan and advanced
 on the former Soviet airbase at Shindand, south of Herat.
	Taliban

                                                         The Kabul
regime was clearly worried by the Taliban advance and Ismael Khans
 failure to hold the line against them.
	Taliban

                                                      KABUL 1996:
COMMANDER OF THE
FAITHFUL

Traveling 

by jeep, truck arid horseback hundreds of Afghan mullahs
By 20 March more than 1,200 Pashtun religious leaders from south,
 
began to descend on Kandahar in the cool spring weather of 1996.
	Taliban

                                                         They were housed
and fed in government offices, the old fort and the covered bazaar, which
were turned into enormous dormitories by the simple act of throwing
 hundreds of carpets on the floor so that the mullahs could sleep.
	Taliban

                         Iran had also set up five training camps near
Meshad for some 5,000 fighters led by the former Herat Governor Ismael
 Khan.
	Taliban

                                                                The
Tahban set up a six-man Shura to rule Kabul, which was dominated by
 Durrani Pashtuns and did not include a single Kabuli.
	Taliban

                                                   Headed by Mullah
Mohammed Rabbani, the Shura included Mullah Mohammed Ghaus as
Foreign Minister, Mullah Amir Khan Muttaqi as Information Minister,
Mullah Syed Ohayasuddin Agha, Mullah Fazil Mohammed and Mullah
 Abdul Razaq.
	Taliban

                    Thousands of Pakistani students and Afghans from the
refugee camps began to arrive daily in Kandahar and Kabul on buses hired
 by Pakistans Islamic parties.
	Taliban

Bolstered by this fresh support, the Taliban launched an attack in west-
 ern Afghanistan, moving northwards from Herat into Baghdis province.
	Taliban

                                                          60 TALIBAN
The Ghilzais, who had dominated the anti-Soviet war effort were not
prepared to be used as cannon fodder by the Taliban without adequate
 representation in the Durrani-dominated Taliban Shuras.
	Taliban

                                             More than three-quarters of a
million people had been displaced by the recent fighting  in the north
around Mazar, on the Herat front and around Kabul  creating a new
refugee crisis at a time when UN agencies were trying to persuade refugees
 still living in Pakistan to return home.
	Taliban

                                        Moreover, the divisions inside
Afghanistan were manipulated and exacerbated by its neighbours, as all
 countries stepped up aid to their various Afghan proxies.
	Taliban

And the UN remained deeply frustrated by the Tali-
 ban siege of the Hazarajat.
	Taliban

      Demoralized by Dostums desertion, more Uzbek commanders guarding
the western road into Mazar also accepted bribes, thereby exposing the
 1,500 strong Hazara force just outside the city to a surprise Taliban attack.
	Taliban

By 10.00
	Taliban

                            As tens of thousands of civilians tried
to escape Mazar by foot in long columns over the next few days, the
 Taliban killed dozens more in aerial bombardments.
	Taliban

                                          In one village near Bamiyan 50
old men, who were left behind after the younger population escaped, were
 killed by the Taliban.6
	Taliban

                                                               Pakistan was
the only country that did not support the resolution, calling it biased and
 by now Pakistan was as internationally isolated as the Taliban.
	Taliban

The Pakistani Jainaat in turn was inspired by the Ikhwan ul Muslimeen
or the Muslim Brotherhood which was set up in Egypt in 1928 with the
 aim of bringing about an Islamic revolution and creating an Islamic state.
	Taliban

                                                                 A few
Deobandi madrassas were established by the Afghan state, but they were
 not hugely popular even in the Pashtun belt.
	Taliban

                                                  SECRET SOCIETY: THE
TALIBANS POLITICAL AND
MILITARY ORGANIZATION

I 

f there was a single inspiration and hope for peace amongst ordinary
through a collective political leadership, which was consultative and

Afghans after the Taliban emerged, it was the fact that they governed
 consensus-building, rather than dominated by one individual.
	Taliban

                                                             The Tali-
ban Shura in Kandahar claimed it was following the early Islamic model
where discussion was followed by a consensus amongst the believers and
 sensitivity and accessibility to the public were deemed important.
	Taliban

               By December 1998, UNICEF reported that the countrys educa-
tional system was in a state of total collapse with nine in ten girls and
 two in three boys not enrolled in school.6
	Taliban

                                                                      At
a playground set up by Save the Children in the battered, half-destroyed
Microyan housing complex, rake-thin Afghan children played grimly on
 the newly installed swings.
	Taliban

                          It was a playground littered with reminders of
the war  discarded artillery shell cases, a destroyed tank with a gaping
 bole where the turret once was and trees lopped down by rocket fire.
	Taliban

                            They meticulously hoed the soil to uproot weeds,
sprinkled fertilizer and repaired irrigation ditches destroyed by the Soviet
 army in the 1980s to provide water to the fields.
	Taliban

                                              By 1997, UNDCP and the US
120 
TALIBAN
estimated that 96 per cent of Afghan heroin came from areas under Tali-
 ban co~itrol.
	Taliban

     Industry and trade became increasingly financed by laundered drugs
money and the black economy, which accounted for between 30 and 50
122 TALIBAN
per cent of the total Pakistan economy, was heavily subsidised by drugs
 money.
	Taliban

                    I asked him if he was not playing with fire by inviting
Muslim radicals from Islamic countries, who were ostensibly allies of Paki-
 stan.
	Taliban

                 A new Islamic Ummah, they argued, could be forged by
the sacrifices and blood of a new generation of martyrs and more such
 victories.
	Taliban

                                                                 Bin
Laden does more harm than good, Masud said in 1997 after he had been
 ousted from Kabul by the Taliban.7
	Taliban

Hostility towards America is a religious duty and we hope to
 be rewarded for it by God, he said.
	Taliban

                                                According to the FBI,
GLOBAL JIHAD: THE ARAB-AFGHANS AND OSAMA BIN LADEN 
137
militants in Yemen who kidnapped 16 Western tourists in December 1998
 were funded by Bin Laden.7
	Taliban

            As for Pakistan there are some governmental departments,
which, by the Grace of God, respond to the Islamic sentiments of the
 masses in Pakistan.
	Taliban

                             In their meeting, Mullah Omar refuse
to d~ so and then insulted Prince Turki by abusing the Saudi Rova
GLOBAL JIHAD: THE ARAB-AFGHANS AND OSAMA BIN LADEN 139
 Family.
	Taliban

The social and economic dissatisfaction amongst young people
 is unrecognized by the regime.
	Taliban

                         By keeping the conflict in Afghanistan on the
boil Russia keeps the region unstable and has the excuse to maintain a
 military presence in the CARs.
	Taliban

                                                        President Niya-
zov was flattered by the attention Buigheroni paid him, when no other
Western oil executive even appeared at his door, and the two men struck
 up a warm friendship.
	Taliban

                                                       Certainly the Tat-
iban appear to serve the US policy of isolating Iran by creating a firmly
Sunni buffer on Irans border and potentially providing security for trade
routes and pipelines that would break Irans monopoly on Central Asias
 southern trade routes, wrote Reuters.22
	Taliban

We are going through it line by line so that nobody can
 accuse us of trying to dupe the Taliban.
	Taliban

                                           We will get the same contract
approved by the opposition groups so it will be an all-Afghan agreement,
 a senior Bridas executive told me.2
	Taliban

                                Unocal had declined to negotiate a
contract until there was a recognized government in KabuL
Meanwhile Unocal had donated US$900,000 to the Centre of
Afghanistan Studies at the University of Omaha, Nebraska which was
 headed by Thomas Gouttierre, a veteran Afghanistan academic.
	Taliban

                                                                   The
Centre set up a training and humanitarian aid programme for the
Afghans, opening a school in Kandahar which was run by Gerald Board-
man, who in the 1980s had run the Peshawar office of the US Agency
for International Development providing cross-border assistance to the
 Mujaheddin.
	Taliban

                                                          Pakistan and
Turkmenistan were forced to sign a new contract with Unocal extending
the companys deadline by another year to start the project by December
 1988.
	Taliban

                                 The pipeline of US military aid to the
Mujaheddin was never replaced by a pipeline of international humanitar-
ian aid that could have been an inducement for the warlords to make
 peace and rebuild the country.
	Taliban

                 Was it preferable to rely on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to
180 TALIBAN
deliver the Taliban and obtain a temporary Afghan concensus in the
old-fashioned way by reconquering the country? Or was it preferable for
the USA to engage in peacemaking and bring the Afghan ethnic groups
and factions together to form a broad-based government, which might
ensure lasting stability? Although Washingtons broad-brush policy was
to support a widely based, multi-ethnic government in Kabul, the USA
for a time believed in the Taliban and when it ceased to do so, it was not
 willing to rein in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
	Taliban

                    This included 600,000 tons of wheat, diesel, petroleum
and kerosene fuel which was partly paid for by Saudi Arabia, arms and
ammunition, ariel bombs, maintenance and spare parts for its Soviet-era
military equipment such as tanks and heavy artillery, repairs and mainten-
164 
TALIBAN
 with the Taliban.
	Taliban

                                                       Certainly the Tat-
than appear to serve the US policy of isolating Iran by creating a firmly
Sunni buffer on Irans border and potentially providing security for trade
routes and pipelines that would break Irans monopoly on Central Asias
 southern trade routes, wrote Reuters.22
	Taliban

We are going through it line by line so that nobody can
 accuse us of trying to dupe the Taliban.
	Taliban

                                           We will get the same contract
approved by the opposition groups so it will be an all-Afghan agreement,
 a senior Bridas executive told me.2
	Taliban

                                Unocal had declined to negotiate a
contract until there was a recognized government in KabuL
Meanwhile Unocal had donated US$900,000 to the Centre of
Afghanistan Studies at the University of Omaha, Nebraska which was
 headed by Thomas Gouttierre, a veteran Afghanistan academic.
	Taliban

                                                                   The
Centre set up a training and humanitarian aid programme for the
Afghans, opening a school in Kandahar which was run by Gerald Board-
man, who in the 1980s had run the Peshawar office of the US Agency
for International Development providing cross-border assistance to the
 Mujaheddin.
	Taliban

                                                          Pakistan and
Turkmenistan were forced to sign a new contract with Unocal extending
the companys deadline by another year to start the project by December
 1988.
	Taliban

                                 The pipeline of US military aid to the
Mujaheddin was never replaced by a pipeline of international humanitar-
ian aid that could have been an inducement for the warlords to make
 peace and rebuild the country.
	Taliban

                 Was it preferable to rely on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to
180 TALIBAN
deliver the Taliban and obtain a temporary Afghan concensus in the
old-fashioned way by reconquering the country? Or was it preferable for
the USA to engage in peacemaking and bring the Afghan ethnic groups
and factions together to form a broad-based government, which might
ensure lasting stability? Although Washingtons broad-brush policy was
to support a widely based, multi-ethnic government in Kabul, the USA
for a time believed in the Taliban and when it ceased to do so, it was not
 willing to rein in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
	Taliban

                    This included 600,000 tons of wheat, diesel, petroleum
and kerosene fuel which was partly paid for by Saudi Arabia, arms and
ammunition, ariel bombs, maintenance and spare parts for its Soviet-era
military equipment such as tanks and heavy artillery, repairs and mainten-
184 TALIBAN
ance of the Talibans airforce and airport operations, road building, elec-
 tricity supply in Kandahar and salaries.
	Taliban

by enlisting the help of government minis-
186 TAUBAN
 ters or the transport mafia.
	Taliban

                            At other times they would defy the federal
government by gaining support from the provincial governments in Balu-
 chistari and the NWFP.
	Taliban

188 TALIBAN
 By running both Afghan policy and operations, the IS!
	Taliban

                     The agencys operatives in Afghanistan were all Pash-
run officers, while many were also motivated by strong Islamic fundament-
 alist leanings.
	Taliban

                                                               calculated
that by recognizing the Taliban government, it would force hostile neigh-
bours to deal with the Taliban and need Islainabad to improve their own
 relationships with the Taliban.
	Taliban

                                                         The Taliban are
funded by transporters to open the roads for smuggling and this mafia is
 now making and breaking governments in Afghanistan and in Pakistan.
	Taliban

         Pakistani society is now more fractured, inundated with soph-
isticated weapons, brutalized due to growing civic violence and over-
whelmed by the spread of narcotics, wrote American historian Paul Ken-
 nedy.7
	Taliban

                                            King Fahd expressed happi-
ness at the good measures taken by the Taliban and over the imposition
 of Sharia in our country, Rabbani said.3
	Taliban

     Iranian planes in gross violation of all internationally accepted norms
204 TALIBAN
intrude our countrys air space to airlift supplies to airports controlled by
 the opposition.
	Taliban

a Pashtun south under the Taliban and a non-Pashtun
 north divided by the Hindu Kush mountains.,
	Taliban

leaving Kabul contested by
 the two sides.
	Taliban

                                       The Central Asian states will not be
able to deliver their energy and mineral exports by the shortest routes
and as their economies crash, they will face an Islamic upsurge and instab-
 ility.
	Taliban

                         Otherwise these women will be threatened, investig-
218 -~ TALIBAN
ated and severely punished as well as the family elders by the forces of the
 Religious Police (Munkrat).
	Taliban

tured by Taliban.
	Taliban

Taliban say they will award pipeline contract to the
 company which starts work first.
	Taliban

International Court of Arbitration in Paris rules in
favour of Bridas on case to release monies owed by
Turkmen government for refined products provided
 to Keimir refinery.
	Taliban

Unocal asks Pakistan for an extension for achieving
 financial closure by October 1998.
	Taliban

Islamic charitable fund raised from taxes paid by the public.
	Taliban

All-enveloping head-to-toe veil worn by Afghan women under the
 Taliban.
	Taliban

Legal ruling issued by ulema.
	Taliban

Halal.
	Taliban

The ritual Islamic way to kill an animal, by slitting its throat and
 letting the blood pour out.
	Taliban

Babur, Babur-Nama, translated by Nette Beveridge, Sang-e-Meel Publications,
 Lahore 1979.
	Taliban

                                                           APPENDIX 6  247
Rawlinson, Henry, England and Russia in the East, 1875, Reprinted by Indus
 Publications, Karachi 1989.
	Taliban

He was captured by Dostums troops in Mazar in May, 1997 and
 later freed.
	Taliban

      The consortium was led by PSG International, a joint venture by two US
companies Bechtel Enterprises and General Electric Capital Structured Fmance
Group
258 -~ NOTES
 13.
	Taliban

The Qatar proposal was an undersea pipeline across the Gulf to Baluchistan.
	Taliban

Kissingers comments were quoted to me by Bridas executives in Islamabad
 February 1997.
	Taliban

     Those hired by the oil companies working in the Caspian included Zbigniew
Brzezinski, a former NSC Adviser, former Assistant Defence Secretary Richard
Armitage, former Chief of Staff John Sununu, former Senate majority leader
Howard Baker, former Secretaries of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Henry Kiss-
 inger.
	Taliban

Letter sent by John Imle to Carlos Bulgheroni on 11 October 1995 and sub-
 mitted in court by Bridas.
	Taliban

The latter was copied by the Taliban.
	Taliban

         The result was a fatwa issued by the most powerful ulema leader, Sheikh
Abdul Aziz Bin Bar which read, Even though the Americans are, in the conser-
vative religious view, equivalent to non-believers as they are not Muslims, they
 deserve support because they are here to defend Islam.
	Taliban

            Along with, other human rights groups, Amnesty International,
the International PEN, and scholars and human rights activists in Eu-
rope and the United States (among them the late Professor Joseph
Fletcher of Harvard University, Dr. Crystal A. Leslie of the Medical Cen-
ter of Boston University, and, in particular, Professor Felix Ermacora,
the special rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Commis-
sion on Afghanistan) pressured the Kabul regime by continually writing
 to it about him.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                                JBLICATIONS
)OKS
fghan, Afghanistan, and Afghans and the Organization of the State in India,
Persia, and Afghanistan (Dan)
fghanistan: A Study in Internal Political Developments, 18801896
he Afghan Problem (Dan)
he Afghans in the Spring of 1987 at War with the Russians (Pashto)
he Geneva Compromise on Afghanistan (Pashto)
~overnment and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Abd al-Rahman
Khan, 18801901
he Second Anglo-Afghan War (Dan)
RTICLES
Constitutional History of Afghanistan
The Fall of the Afghan Monarchy in 1973
Trends in Modern Afghan History
The Pacification of the Hazaras of Afghanistan
RANSLATIONS INTO PASHTO AND DARI
 ~n Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, by M. Elphinstone (i vols.)
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

          r~he British Approach to Politics, by M. Stewart
rhe Contemporary World, by W. MacNeil
~eiters on Literature, by M. Gorky
~4edieval Europe, by S. Painter
rhe Real World of Democracy, by C. B. Macpherson
What Is History? by E. H. Carr
Composition: 
Graphic Composition, Inc.
Text: 
11/13 Bembo
Display: 
Bembo
Printing and binding: Thomson-Shore, Inc.
About the author
Peter Marsden has a degree in Modern Arabic and worked for
 a number of years as.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                   KARACHI LAHORE ISLAMABAD
Peter Marsden
w
Oxford University Press
0
Zed Books Ltd
LONDON & NEW YORK
The Taliban: War, religion and the new order in Afghanistan
was first published by Zed Books Ltd, 7 Cynthia Street,
London NI 9JF, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue,
 New York, rw 10010, USA in 1998.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

July: King Zahir Shah overthrown by Daoud through a
 military coup.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

    Should one be influenced by what Islamic scholars are saying as to
what is or is not consistent with the Quran and the reported sayings
of the Prophet Muhammad, the Hadith? Should one look to women
within the population of Islamic scholars and other intellectuals to
indicate what may be reasonable norms? Alternatively, should one
draw on the perspectives and values of those living in the rural areas
of Afghanistan, both women and men? In so doing, how does one
take on board the diversity of perspectives and values from village to
 village, province to province and one ethnic group to another?
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

     Chapter II considers the apparent support for the Taliban by
elements within Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and, possibly, the USA,
 noting the often conflicting agendas in operation.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                        The process of reconstruction
8
The nature of Afghanistan
9
has been assisted by the resources and engineering skills provided by
 humanitarian agencies.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                              Finally, Zahir
The Taliban
24 The nature of Afghanistan
Shah was deposed in July 1973 by his cousin and former prime
 minister, Daoud.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

The jihad legitimised, in religious terms, the large-scale exodus of
a significant proportion of the population to neighbouring Islamic
27
The Taliban
28 The Mujahidin
countries, in that Afghanistan had been transgressed by a secular
 force and therefore 
ceased to be Islamic
.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                  A proportion were settled in camps
along the border, from which they were given support by the Iranian
government to cross the border into Afghanistan to fight against the
 Soviet forces (BAAG, 1997).
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                    He is an ethnic
Pushtun, possibly descended from the Pushtuns relocated to northern
 Afghanistan at the end of the last century by Abdur-Rahman.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                                   
Ittihad-i-Islam was 
formed by Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf, a former theology
The Taliban
32 The Mujahidin
lecturer from Kabul University and a fluent Arabic speaker, who
served as Rabbanis deputy in the early Islamist movement within the
 university.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

            Imprisoned for his activities by the PDPA regime of 1978
79, he was released as part of the amnesty that followed the Soviet
invasion and fled to Pakistan, where he established his own Islamist
 party.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                     It has, however, demonstrated strong op-
position to the Shia minority in Afghanistan, echoing Riyadhs
 competition with Tehran for pre-eminence within the Islamic world.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

The Afgan National Liberation Front was established by Sibghatullah
Mujadidi in 1980, and is one of the three parties referred to as
traditionalist b virtue of its absence of ideology and of its power
 base within the rural society of Afghanistan.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                            Although he comes from a
conservative tradition and has been a strong advocate for the return
of King Zahir Shah, he was active in radical Islamic circles during
the 1950S and ig6os, establishing contact with the Muslim Brother-
hood in Egypt, and was jailed for four and a half years by Daoud in
 1959 for campaigning against a visit by Khrushchev.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

       The other Shia party, another Harakat-i-Islami, is led
The Mujahidin 
35
by Sheikh Assef Muhsini, whose following has been among urban
 educated Shias.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

      However, the overtures made by the Najibullah government
to Mujahidin commanders and traditional leaders throughout the
 country further undermined the unity of the movement.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                    Dostam, who had
up to that point been in alliance with Hekmatyar and Hisb-e-Wahdat,
was not impressed by the new arrangement and rejected appeals that
 he also join.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

However, Rabbani, Masoud and Hekmatyar managed
 to govern for a few months before they were ousted by the Taliban.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                                     
Hekmatyar marked his brief period in office by cautiously introducing


a number of policies aimed at increasing the conformity of the

 population to what he re arded as Islamic requirements.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                       It was also made clear that
 up of an

appropriate Islamic curriculum by 
religious scholars, and that this
process could start only when the Taliban had control of the whole
any representation
of the human or animal form In order to enforce these bans,
 televisions and tapes were symbolically displayed in public places.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

Government troops launched a major offensive and were
 able to retake the area within a month of its capture by the Taliban.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

The Taliban then surprised all observers by forcing them-
The Taliban
50 The warriors of God
 selves through the apparently impenetrable Sarobi Gorge.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                   It is still not known
whether this hanging was authorised by the Taliban leadership or
carried out spontaneously by enthusiastic followers, or whether others,
with old scores to settle, took the opportunity created by the situation
 to wreak their revenge.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                             51
The Taliban responded to the alliance by opening up a new front
 in north-western Afghanistan.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                       Appeals
were made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
for people to be allowed to return to their homes north of the
 capital, but these were rejected.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                            Further
The Taliban
54
evidence of this was provided by the announced defection of another
opposition commander, this time one of Masouds men who con-
 trolled the Salang Pass.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

             It has been noted that countries affected by chronic civil
V
conflict  often referred to within the humanitarian aid world as

complex emergencies  produce Christian and Islamic revivalist
movements in which efforts are made to return to what are regarded
as the absolute truths of the religion, and to eradicate any influences
 that have appeared to weaken religious belief.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

   Negative stereotyping in the West in relation to the Islamic world
The Taliban
6o I The Taliban creed
has, therefore, provoked negative stereotyping of the West by radical
 Islamic movements.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                       An interesting consequence of
this process is seen in France, where the growth of radical Islam in
response to the disadvantages and alienation experienced by the
Muslim population has created an ardent defence of secular values
by those challenging freedom of religious expression and, in par- 
ticular, the use of the veil by Muslim women resident in France)
 Secularism is thus arousing the same fervour as radicalised religion.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

    Further clarification of the Taliban creed was given in a broadcast
The Taliban
62 
by the Talibans Voice of Sharia radio station on 5 November 1996:
The Taliban, who have emerged from the masses of the people, have
started their struggle to deliver their compatriots from pain and hard-
ship, to ensure complete peace and security across the country by
collecting weapons, by doing away with feudal principalities here and
there in the country and by creating a powerful Islamic government
 in Afghanistan.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                      In justifying
their albeit limited use in Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, Sher
Muhammad Stanakzai, the acting foreign minister, speaking on Voice
of Sharia Radio, said, on 20 November:
By the enforcement of Sharia Hudud, we have made safe the lives
 and property of millions of people from Herat tojalalabad and Kabul.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                       Examples of excesses by radical
groups throughout the world are used, implicitly, to brand all Muslims
 as extremists.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                               They would have been
provided with military training by the Mujahidin parties present in
the camps, together with the basic Islamic education given in the
 camp madrasahs.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

     The Wahhabi ideology was adopted by Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul
The Taliban
72 Earlier Islamic movements
Rahman Al-Saud, a descendant of the early Wahhabi leaders, in
 the early part of the twentieth century.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                             He sought to transform the
nomadic tribes inhabiting central Arabia, who had reverted to the use
of tribal law and practised pre-Islamic rituals, into a unified Islamic
umma by replacing loyalty to the tribe with loyalty to Islam and to its
 leader, the Imam.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

             Abdul Aziz proclaimed himself king of Saudi Arabia in
1932 and established a dynasty legitimised by Islam, that has con-
 tinued up to the present time.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                               There is also apparent in the Iranian
revolution and in the Taliban movement, as with the Muslim Brother-
hood, a significant level of participation by young people, with the
result that these movements have benefited from the radicalism,
passion and uncompromising purity characteristic of certain strands
 of youth.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

A key role was played in this process by
 Sayyad Ahmed Barely (17861831), who came from north-east India.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

From the 1950s onwards, additional madrasahs were set up
 by the Islamist parties and by the Wahhabis.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

   This has manifested itself in struggles for influence and
power between Ulema and tribal leaders, the latter backed by
 mullahs.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                   There are four main elements to 
their policy: a ban on the employment of women, except in the 
health sector; a temporary halt to formal female education pending 
the drawing up of an appropriate curriculum; the imposition of 
strict dress codes on both women and men requiring women to wear 
88
The gender policies of the Taliban
89
burqas and men to wear beards, unstyled hair, turbans and shaiwar
kameez; and the introduction of strict controls on the movement of
women outside the home so that women are always separated from
 male strangers or are escorted by male relatives.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                  The present cur-
riculum, which was drafted by the Mujahidin parties and therefore
could be seen as already consistent with Islam, is not regarded as
 acceptable.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                                 There
were, nevertheless, statements by senior people within the Taliban
that girls schools in Kabul might open by the spring of 1997, building
on the small initiatives in areas such as Paktia, Ghazni and Kandahar,
 where girls schools are already operating.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                          The periodic
practice by some elements within the Taliban, particularly the religi-
ous police, of beating women with sticks in the street if they do not
comply has had an enormous impact on the mobility of the female
 population.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                   There has also been a marked decline in women and
children attending health facilities and this has been aggravated by
moves to require women to attend only one hospital in Kabul
 designated for their use.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                     The Taliban
Being predominantly Pushtun and rural in their composition, they
were inevitably influenced by the code of honour prescribed in
Pushtun law, which determined that women should live in purdah
 and be protected from the outside world.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                            The dialogue with the
humanitarian agencies
The benefits of the economic assistance provided by the Soviet
Union, the USA and Europe during the post-war years were quickly
lost as the Soviet forces reduced highways to pot-holed obstacle
courses and devastated agriculture through sustained bombing cam-
 paigns.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                  The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan created equally
102
The dialogue with the humanitarian agencies 103
strong reactions in the Islamic world, alarmed by an assault on fellow
 Muslims by a secular force.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                           Many of the solidarity committees organ-
ised themselves to deliver relief supplies to Afghanistan, and they
were joined by established aid organisations from both the Islamic
 world and the West.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

   A consensus emerged between the agencies that dialogue should be
maintained and that agencies should engage in discussion with the
Taliban as to how the needs of vulnerable elements in the community
The Taliban
io8
 could be met by the authorities and the agencies working together.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

  The Islamic world feels resentful at the power the West is able to
exert and is particularly paranoid about the all-pervasive influence
The Taliban
of Western culture and about the erosion and undermining of
 indigenous cultures by it.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                          The Taliban have gone even
farther by banning televisions, although they have cited the Islamic
 prohibition on the visual representation of the human form as
justification
When the UN makes statements on the basis of internationally
accepted Human Rights Conventions, movements such as the Taliban
 are sceptical.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                                      It
would be helpful if research could be undertaken to establish what
The Taliban and the international community 121
roles could be played by relatively uneducated women under present
economic circumstances if there were no restrictions on their employ-
ment, and to establish the possibility of flexibility on the part of the
Taliban as to whether some roles could be consistent with their moral
 code.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                             The Taliban
122
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women of September 1981 states that:
the term discrimination against women shall mean any distinction,
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental free-
doms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil and any other
 field.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                         The discussions between the Taliban and inter-
national agencies over the summer of 1997 about whether women
should be permitted to secure health care only in one hospital,
specifically designated for women, did not relate to the principle of
whether women are permitted access to health care, which is accepted
by the Taliban, but to the possibility that resources might be provided
 on a much smaller scale to female health care.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

The presence of humanit-
 lowed by people in the West.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                        One may counter this by stating that the USA
has a potential interest in the development of oil and gas pipelines
through Afghanistan and in a reduction in both opium production
 and the training of terrorists there.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                    However, the relative costs of
Central Asian oil may prove too high, a reduction in the Afghan
production of opium may be offset by an expansion elsewhere in the
world and the USA may find some way or other of tackling the
 training of terrorists in Afghanistan.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

       This was brought to an end only by the mediation of the former
head of Pakistans Inter-services Intelligence, who had played a major
role in supporting the seven Mujahidin parties during the period of
 Soviet occupation.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                            This recruitment process was augmented by
The Taliban 
134
appeals to tribal leaders in the Pushtun areas of Afghanistan, and to
those in the refugee camps, to send some of their young men to
 fight.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                         A statement by the leader of
the Islamic opposition movement in Tajikistan that he did not rule
out an agreement with the Taliban, in support of the long-standing
Tajik insurgency from Afghanistan, will have done nothing to reassure
 them.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                             Before
the Taliban takeover of Kabul an Argentinian company, Bridas,
obtained the right to extract gas from Turkmenistans oilfields, but
The Taliban
140 The regional picture
the Turkmen government was then offered a better deal by an
American company, UNOCAL, and reneged on its agreement with
 Bridas.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                            Notwithstanding this
agreement, the Taliban announced on 28 August that they favoured
the terms offered by the Argentinian company, Bridas, and that
 negotiations were in their final stages for a contract to be signed.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

Production increased by 25 per cent during 1997,
 having vacillated in previous years.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

Saudi Arabia saw the opportunity presented by the Soviet
 occupation of Afghanistan to expand its influence there.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                                                       However, it is
important at least to acknowledge the differential power relationship
between the West and the Islamic world and the consequently
 dominant position held by Western values.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                            Governments can act positively by placing
discrimination on the grounds of religion as high on the political
agenda as discrimination on the grounds of gender, race or sexuality,
 and they can also take active steps to counter Islamophobia.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                             135, 138
20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34,
Maududi, Abdul Ala, 5, 8i, 82, 94,
education, 105
39, 42, 44, 49, 66, 78, 8o, 8,, 86,
North-West Frontier Province, 79
99, 39
92, g8, 135, 142, t46, 148
Mazar-i-Sharif, 10, 36, 41, 47, 6,,
Pushtunistan, 23; proposal for
1,2; airport, 22 (attack on, 55);
oil, Central Asian, 131
assembly, 22
Pushtunwali code of conduct, 85,
oil and gas pipelines, 7, 134; from
attitude of population to
Taliban, 54; taking of, 53
86, g~ tension with Islam, 86;
Central Asia, 145; from Iran, 140;
Mazari, Abdul Mi, 34, 46
from Turkmenistan, 136, 140;
variance with Sharia law, 85
Iranian, 137; through
Mecca, conquered by Abdul Aziz,
Qadir, Haji, 41, 53
723
Afghanistan, 124, 129, 131, 137,
Quran, 3, 6, 43, 6o, 68, 76, 82, ii6;
migration, to towns and cities, g
39, 4
 Omar, Mullah Muhammad, i6, 3!,
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

                              S
L JJ
Copyright  1974 by Edward Hyams
 All rights reserved.
	The Terrorists

                                                         Index
18
31
41
53
68
80
94
110
122
143
164
174
183
190
Part One
The Theorists
Chapter 1
The Uses of Terrorism
All established governments of whatever political persuasion,
epoch or part of the world, when attacked by a campaign of
terrorism, persist in asserting that their opponents will gain
nothing by such methods; but, very inconsistently, they them-
selves employ terrorist methods in campaigns of counter-
terrorism, like that of the British Government with the Black-
and-Tans in Ireland in the 1920s, the CIA operations iii Latin
America in the 1950s and 1960s or operations of the My Lai
 type in Vietnam.
	The Terrorists

      Let us take the common-sense arguments first: that denial of
the right to use violence against the State would lead to the
conclusion that whereas Adolf Hitler had a right to use violence
against millions of German citizens and against other states, by
virtue of his office as Chancellor of the Third Reich, no group of
German dissidents could possibly have the right to use terrorism
literally the only means of changing the government of their
14
The Uses of Terrorism
country which was open to Germans between 1933 and 1944
 to get rid of him and his Nazis.
	The Terrorists

                                   If that denial be sustained it
would not have been right for Japanese radicals to try to prevent
the rape of south-east Asia by the Emperor Hirohito and his
generals, by mounting a campaign of terrorism against them;
it would not have been right for any group of Italians to try to
restore democratic freedoms to their own countrymen, and
national freedom to Greece, Albania and Ethiopia, by trying to
assassinate Mussolini and the Fascist Grand Council, or, by
creating a state of chaos by terrorism, to have discredited the
Fascist government with the Italian people; it would not have
been right for any group of Russians to use against the atrocious
tyranny of Joseph Stalin, the methods used by the Populists
 against the less atrocious tyranny of the Tsars.
	The Terrorists

    No judge has yet clearly laid down what should be understood
by an offence of a political character, and there is little case
law to refer to; but it seems clear enough, at least to the lay
16
The Uses of Terrorism
 mind; and in Rex v.
	The Terrorists

                                     Anarchism was, as they say,
in the air during the middle fifty years of the nineteenth cen-
tury: it was governed by ideals; Stirner dispensed with them and
found himself left withHimself, and a himself which admitted
 of no rule but self-interest.
	The Terrorists

                                    Nechayev began with the Self;
treated it as raw material; and believed that by processing it it
could be made into a merciless instrument of revolutionary
 terrorism.
	The Terrorists

                          This does not mean that any sort of human
society was impossible: when every man is bent on fighting his
own corner for the I which is his sole knowable own, there
will be a kind of balance of forces of egotism, a sort of union
enforced by the tension between clearly asserted, deliberately
accepted, ownnesses: and out of that would necessarily emerge
20
The Terrorist Ego
expedient arrangements for the living of a life in common with
others, as it were a tacit treaty of millions of mutually balancing
 Egos.
	The Terrorists

                                                               26
The Terrorist Ego
How, in practice, is this dedicated being to be conjured out of
a man with ordinary feelings and inhibitionsthe feat which
Nechayev himself attempted at such terrible cost to the integrity
of his original purpose? Chiefly by the practice of what in the
common way would be called crime, though always with the
 great and single cause in mind.
	The Terrorists

                                                  In short, the
dangerous enemy is the thoughtful liberal who, by introducing a
measure of reform, may cool off the revolutionary ardour of the
masses; whereas the real brute in power will, by refusing all
sensible reform and continuing to abuse his power by oppressive
behaviour, be a hidden and unwitting ally of the revolutionary
 terrorist.
	The Terrorists

           In category three Nechayev includes all those people
who, although neither intelligent nor competent, have influence
 by reason of rank or wealth.
	The Terrorists

                                                        Then there
is a category of what Nechayev calls doctrinaire revolutionaries,
who talk much but act not at all; by using their own avowed
aims to force them into action, they can be driven to take part in
militant demonstrations in the course of which a majority will be
killed by the governments soldiers and police; the survivors will
emerge from this ordeal as hardened and experienced revolution-
aries, committed by their past violence to the cause they no
 longer dare to abandon.
	The Terrorists

                                                    Two of his
acts should be mentioned: when Bakunin wanted to get out of
completing the translation of Das Kapital, a commission which
had been procured for him by friends who were aware of his
desperate poverty, but did not want to return the advance pay-
ment he had received, that meant cheating a young enthusiast
who, because Bakunin had no civil status in Switzerland and
 could not enter into a contract, stood in for him.
	The Terrorists

My italics: and, by and large, Bakunins revolutionary policy
32
The Terrorism of the Pure in Heart
 for the rest of his life.
	The Terrorists

                                                   At Nicho-
layevsk he managed to get aboard an American ship and in her
went to Japan, and thence by way of San Francisco and New
 York, to London, and so to Herzens house in Paddington.
	The Terrorists

                   Marx was less afraid of workers who called
themselves Anarchists than of Bakunin as a leader challenging
 his own control of the International.
	The Terrorists

                   It is useless for those who admire Bakunin the
anarchist but are unable to stomach Bakunin the terrorist to
try to exonerate their hero by putting the blame for this kind of
 thing on Nechayev.
	The Terrorists

                                                         Some of
them, moreover, were no mere theorists: a group of Mosts
42
The Apostle of the Bomb
Berlin followers, led by a printer named Reinsdorf (a surprising
number of militant Anarchists have been printers), tried to blow
up the German Kaiser with a bomb, and paid, though they
 failed, with their lives.
	The Terrorists

                                  It began to seem that Johann
Most had not preached in vain; and indeed, had the native-born
American workers, who were not much less ruthlessly exploited
than the immigrants, followed the suit led by the immigrants,
Chicago and perhaps other cities of the Union would have had a
46
The Apostle of the Bomb
real revolution on their hands, although it would have had no
chance of success against the U.S. Army, which would have
 been put at the disposal of the bosses.
	The Terrorists

                                                          Para-
military action against a government or a policy may easily be
dismissed by the authorities as mere banditry and, as such, may
 have found no place in the history books.
	The Terrorists

                             Germany has indeed a long history of
secret terrorist societies, from the medieval Holy Vehm, which
tried to bring social order out of chaos by punishing injustices
when the ruling barons and princes were unable or unwilling
to do so, down to the Nationalist Bunds of the nineteenth century
 arising out of partisan resistance to the armies of Bonaparte.
	The Terrorists

                 Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, who obtained Carbonari
support for his political party, is supposed to have been con-
strained, when later he was French emperor, to go to the help of
Piedmont in her struggle to liberate and unite Italy, by his oath
as a Carbonaro; and to have been condemned to death by the
society when he defended the Popes temporalities against the
Italian Army, though the societys agent, Orsini, failed in his
 mission of execution.
	The Terrorists

To undertake the organization of revolutionary activity in
 all territories inhabited by Serbs.
	The Terrorists

           P~/emont was the public face of Black Hand and was
subsidized by Apis, probably out of the Secret Service funds,
and was supported by Narodna Odbrana, whose views it propa-
 gated.
	The Terrorists

                                                        He was in
search of good anti-Semitic propaganda material for provoking
pogroms: he had the book rewritten by a competent hack,
replacing Montesquieu and Machiavelli by a coven of rabbis,
and this plagiarism, entitled The Protocols of the Learned Elders
 of Zion, was distributed, c.
	The Terrorists

                                                  The subsequent
career of that work is a matter of history: in 1920 it was taken
seriously by, among others, the London Tbnes which, however,
 subsequently published the proof that it was a forgery.
	The Terrorists

                                        Moreover, the Tsar was
helping the liberals to take over the landlords serfs and turn
 them into exploited wage slaves by his emancipation edicts.
	The Terrorists

                                   In 1865 Ishutin founded a secret
society, called Organization, with agents, usually schoolmasters
and librarians, to preach Socialism and promote revolution all
over Russia; but at the heart of it was a sort of ultra-clandestine
central committee, known to its members as Hell, whose
business was not only to direct Organization, but also to rescue
political prisoners from prison by coups de main; to assassinate
the more obnoxious landlords; and, above all, to assassinate the
 Tsar.
	The Terrorists

   Its programme, drawn up in 1876, envisaged social and
72
The Populists
economic reform brought about by violent revolution, the
 revolutionary situation to be created by agitation and terrorism.
	The Terrorists

By their own actions the Government forced Land and Liberty
 to place greater emphasis on the use of terrorism.
	The Terrorists

                                                        In 18778 a
series of trials of demonstrators, strikers and propagandists took
place in St Petersburg and Moscow, partly with the aim of
widening the gulf between the revolutionaries and liberals
seeking constitutional reform, by demonstrating the red peril
 of insurrection.
	The Terrorists

    By 1873 she was engaged in distributing social and political
textbooks, and even some of the new socially significant novels,
to the factory workers of the capital, and she took part in the
76
The Populists
 v Narod movement of the following summer.
	The Terrorists

                                               But she was among
those revolutionary intellectuals who at last lost patience with
the propagandist approach; moreover, by the time of the forma-
tion of Peoples Will she was living with Zhelyabov and thus
 knew all the details of the plans to assassinate the Tsar.
	The Terrorists

                                                       The lowest
sentiment of contempt which a freeman can feel is that excited
by a wretched serf, who has been polished and educated to a
full sense of the degradation of his position, yet is without the
 manhood to do more than utter piteous lamentations.
	The Terrorists

                                                       One such very
senior officer, Colonel Ferguson-Smyth, a Divisional Comman-
der, was shot dead by a terrorist, at the bar of his club in Cork, a
 few days after issuing an order of that kind.
	The Terrorists

     Collins was informed of this service by his London spies who
104
The Irish Case (2)
told him that the men were aal ex-officers, or seconded officers,
that they had been given the specific task of breaking up the
 Dublin IRA organization, and had a licence to kill.
	The Terrorists

The Black-and-Tans drove the crowd
 before them, then lined them up and began to search them.
	The Terrorists

                                      But the Anarchist workers
groupstrade unions, co-operatives and associations of artisans
did not begin with terrorism; on the contrary, like the Russian
Populists, their ambition was to achieve the liberation~ and
economic freedom of the working class by peaceful means, and
their ultimate weapon was to be not civil war, but the General
 Strike.
	The Terrorists

         It was the use of armed force, of soldiers, to crush the
strikes by which the Anarchist leaders tried to get higher wages,
shorter hours and better working conditions for a working class
and peasantry whose poverty and misery were exceeded only by
those of the Irish peasants, that drove the Spanish Anarchists to
 the use of terrorism.
	The Terrorists

                                                        For some
years following the appointment of the first Cnovas govern-
ment there was a decline in terrorist activity, and in the early
1880s the Civil Guard succeeded in mutilating and very nearly
exterminating the working-class Anarchist movement by means
of the imaginary Black Hand secret society described in Chap-
ter 5, although the Federation of Workers was never completely
 broken.
	The Terrorists

      The bombs were stuffed with iron nails (an anti-personnel
design copied by the IRA in Ulster in 19712), and eighty-
four members of parliament were more or less seriously injured,
 though none died.
	The Terrorists

                          The terrorist Ravachol, who had been a
robber and murderer before he decided to serve the revolutionary
cause by violence, started a reign of terror in Paris in 1892 by
bombing the apartments of judges or magistrates who had been
 exceptionally harsh with political prisoners.
	The Terrorists

                                          On the other hand
Emile Henry, like Santiago Salvador, waged war on the
bourgeoisie at large by tossing a bomb into the crowded Caf
 Terminus, killing and injuring scores of people.
	The Terrorists

                                                 His execution
for this crime in 1894 was avenged within a month by the
assassination of President Sadi Carnot who, poor man, was only
president because Clemenceau had insisted on supporting
 la plus bte of the candidates.
	The Terrorists

                                               The employers
celebrated their victory by sacking their union workers and
replacing them with blacklegs from the inexhaustible pool of
 half-starved peasants.
	The Terrorists

                      As a consequence of this disaster, the
militant Anarchists withdrew from the Federation on the
grounds that the General Strike was not an effective weapon,
and launched a campaign of terrorism carried on by small
 groups of what we should call urban (but also rural) guerrillas.
	The Terrorists

                                                        An Anar-
chist terrorist, Mateo Morral, son of a rich cotton manufac-
turer, seized the opportunity to put one man to death for the
people: he tried to toss a bouquet of flowers, in which a bomb
was concealed, into the royal carriage; it missed the bride and
bridegroom, but killed the leading pair of horses of their team,
splashing the new queen with blood, and killed twenty-six people
and injured a hundred, directly or indirectly, for some of the
114
Bakunins Disciples
injuries were caused by people being knocked down and
 trampled by the stampeding crowd.
	The Terrorists

  Did he himself shop them? It is by no means impossible, for, if
the killing of Sergei had been yet another triumph for Azev the
terrorist, it was a setback for Azev the police spy, and he might
well feel that he needed a spectacular success with his Okhrana
 employers.
	The Terrorists

                       Their information came from a local
barrister, Dmitri Bogrov by name, who claimed that he knew
 by sight the man who would make the attempt.
	The Terrorists

                            Keeping the Middle East quiet meant
appeasing the Arabs; Mussolini had made a bid for their
support by declaring himselfabsurdly enough to be sure but
one never knew what might impress the Arabs, and there had
been a time when the British upper class did not find the atti-
tudinizing of this straw Caesar ludicrousthe Protector of
 Islam.
	The Terrorists

                                                             His
ambition was to wage open war on the British; it may be said
148
The Palestine Case
that he had the temperament of a terrorist, but it is fact that,
given his determination to fight Britain and his conviction that
though Germany was the arch-enemy of the diaspora Jews, the
arch-enemy of Zion and Gods will to make Israel an 4empire
was British imperialism, terrorism was forced on him, not
 chosen by him.
	The Terrorists

                                                               But
he had the sensitive intuitions of the first-class police counter-
terrorist; he also had a kind of sense of humour, for the two
officers he sent to the flat were both Jews; and both of them were
 killed by the explosion.
	The Terrorists

               New members were not admitted unless known to and
vouched for by two old members; and before the potential
156
The Palestine Case
recruit was even approached and sounded, he was trailed for
days, even weeks, so that his contacts, tastes, social behaviour
 were known.
	The Terrorists

              Induction into the FF1 took place in a pitch-dark
room: the recruit could see nothing; he could only hear a voice
which asked him certain terrible questions: did he fully under-
stand and accept that, if he joined, he would become an outcast
from ordinary society, with every mans hand against him, none
to look to for help? Did he face the fact that if caught by the
British he would be tortured? And the methods of torture used
 would then be described.
	The Terrorists

                   One important factor the terrorists were not, of
course, responsible for: the hideous revelations, at the end of the
war, of what had been done to the Jews by the Nazis, acts long
known to governments but unknown or only suspected by the
people of the world at large, made it extremely difficult for any
power to seem to be oppressing the Jews or denying them that
national refuge which, now demonstrably, no people needed
 more urgently.
	The Terrorists

          The Arabs, believing that they could take it
away from them by forceit had been well known for many
 centuries that the Jews cannot fightreceived a terrible shock.
	The Terrorists

      During the past quarter of a century the Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary cause has, especially in what is called the Third
World, been sustained by groups or bands of militants com-
 monly and collectively, if ungranimatically, known as guerrillas.
	The Terrorists

        They have waged war as best they could on the military and
civil dictatorships usually sustained by the United States through
the agency of the CIA in Latin America and Asia; and from time
to time on the great oligarchies disguised as democracies, that is
to say on the champions and beneficiaries of imperialist capital-
 ism.
	The Terrorists

by the bombing of open cities, the use of napalm
 and the threat of nuclear strikes.
	The Terrorists

                                 Terrorism used for social or
political ends is guerrilla warfare continued by other means,
just as the atom-bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima was inter-
 national warfare continued by terrorism.
	The Terrorists

                    The League of Black Revolutionary Workers in
the Detroit motor-car industry is a case in point: strong enough
 to make propaganda films (e.g.
	The Terrorists

                                      Finally Got the News) and pub-
lish a periodical; and with, as its aim, to seize political power by
putting the means of production into the hands of the workers,
it has confined its militant action to fomenting and leading
strikes: for the real anarchist, who believes with Bakunin that
 destruction is also a way of creation, is a rare animal.
	The Terrorists

       It has repeatedly happened that large popular movements
dedicated to bringing about radical social changes by peaceful
170
 Guerileros or Terrorists?
	The Terrorists

                                The Populist movement fathered the
Peoples Will which assassinated Tsar Alexander II; and in due
course the Socialist-Revolutionary Party which itself gave rise to
Organization for Combat, whose extraordinary operations,
 directed by the double agent Azev, we have already glanced at.
	The Terrorists

             The Puerto Rican Marxist-Leninist MPI (Pro-Independence
Movement) led by Juan Mari-Bras, advocating peaceful means
of preparing the revolution at least until the stage of insurrection
en masse is attained, nevertheless gave rise to the CAL (Armed
Commandos of Liberation), which operates by terrorist sabo-
 tage.
	The Terrorists

                                                            The
terrorist Quebec Liberation Army was an offshoot of the pacific
Quebec Liberation Front and was never repudiated by the large
 and relatively respectable Mouvement de Liberation Populaire.
	The Terrorists

                                                              Their
principal aim being propaganda by deed to draw attention to
their desperate condition and the justice of their cause, they have
 not hesitated to victimize people of many nationalities.
	The Terrorists

                                                And of course
they are criminals: as Bakunin said, the bandits are the true
 revolutionaries.
	The Terrorists

            Florentine Brotherhood, 356
Glenveagh evictions, 87, 88
Forster, E. M., 151
Goddard, Lord Chief Justice, 17
Forster, W. E. (Irish Secretary of
Goldman, Emma (Anarchist), 11819
State), 91
Gordon, General Chinese, 53
FPAS (Iraqi), 169
Gtz (Russian revolutionary), 125,
France, Anarchism in, 39, 634, 112
127
113
Goulding, Cathal, 180
, Charbonnerie founded in, 578
Governments terrorism, 9, 166, 175
, democracy in, 183
Grabe~, Trilko (Serbian terrorist), 63
, Freemasonry in, 54
Greece, repression in, 15, 16
, Russian revolutionaries in, 124
Greenwood, Sir Hamar, 102
, strikes in, 164, 172
Griffith, Arthur, 108, 109
, terrorism in, 23
Grinevitsky, Ignaty Yoakimovich
Franco, General, 64, 116
(Russian assassin), 77, 78
Franco-Prussian War, 39
Grivas, General George, 179
Frank, Gerold, 146
Guerrillas, 164173 passim
Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 62, 63,
Guevara, Che, 180
133, 156
Franz Josef, Emperor, 59-60
Haganah, 13, 144, 145, 147, 150, 158,
Freedom Fighters for Israel: see FF1
162, 171
Freemasonry, 54-5
Hakim, Eliahu (Jewish assassin),
Freien or Freigelassen (young Hegel-
1612
ians), 19
Hassan, King, 167
FRELIMO, 168
Hazit (Jewish journal), 156, 158,
French Revolution, 23, 184, 185
159-60 quoted
Friedman-Yellin (Jewish freedom
Hegel, Georg, 18, 19, 32
fighter), 152, 154, 156, 157, 158
Henry, Emile (French assassin), 113
Froude, James A., 84
Herzen, Alexander, 23, 24, 31, 68
Hijacking, 174, 176, 1778
Gaitan, Jorge Eliacem (Colombian
Hirohito, Emperor, 15
Liberal leader), 168
Hiroshima, 1512, 166, 185
Galdos, Hugo Blanco (Peruvian
Hitler, Adolf, 14, 22, 148
guerrilla), 1667
Ho Chi Mm, 22
Gapon, Father George, 1323, 136
Hoche, General Louis, 83
193
Index
Holy Vehm, 54
[Ishutin] at Moscow University, 68
Korans justification of war, 14
Home Rule (Irish), 94
 
Kotlyarevsky (Russian prosecutor),
How the Revolutionary Question Pre-
quoted, 69
 
74
sents Itself (Bakunin) quoted, 38
becomes revolutionary, 69-70
 
Kraft (Russian revolutionary), 127,
opposes liberalism, 70-1
 
128
Ii Biondino (Italian terrorist), 119-20
founds Organization, 71
Israel, Republic of, 13, 162
Kropotkin, Prince Ptr, 44, 118, 134
lid, Danilo (Serbian terrorist), 62,63
, 
Ku-Klux-Klan, 13, 657
 Immanent justice, 15 fn.,
	The Terrorists

  R. Fitzgerald, is reprinted by permission of
Doubleday, a division of Bantam Doubleday Dell
 Publishing Group, Inc. The quotation in Chap.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                            E. M. Kayden, is
reprinted by permission of the University of
Colorado Foundation, Inc.
University of California Press
Berkeley and Los Angeles, California
 University of California Press, Ltd.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                   London, England
First Paperback Printing zooi
 1999 by the Regents
of the University of California
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
 Guillemin, Jeanne, 1943.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

          In both studies, if there was the likelihood of being rebuffed or
seen as a threat by one or more government agencies or individuals, there
was also the freedom to keep up the scientific investigation until the mys-
 tery was solved.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

According to Soviet reports, by the time it was over, at
 least sixty-four people had died from this rare disease.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                       According to the few published reports of cases,
fatal gastrointestinal anthrax and inhalation anthrax are characterized
 by similar initial symptoms.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

         This account of the outbreak was translated by the CIA and made
available to American reporters just in time to rock the BWC review ses-
 sion.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                         In a briefing on Sverdlovsk for President Jimmy
Carter by Central Intelligence Director Stansfield Turner, the amount of
anthrax released in the outbreak was estimated at seventy kilograms, an
 amount that could seriously infect tens of thousands of square miles.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

According to the desk clerk, it is now owned by its employees.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                          It added a fourth
vector, insect bites, a caution based on Soviet evidence for anthrax trans-
 mission by horseflies.3
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                             He asserts it is being wrongfully with-
held by Dr. Nikiforovs son, who is also named Vladimir and is also a
Moscow physician, a toxicologist who co-authored a text on botulism
 with his father.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                                  Moscow
CONFLICTING VISIONS
The precedent that Pyotr Burgasov leans on for explaining the Sverdlovsk
deaths is the 1927 anthrax epidemic in Yaroslavl, 250 kilometers north-
 east of Moscow, which is known to have been caused by infected meat.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

       But as the deadly infection ran its course, the victims tempera-
ture usually declined sharply and there was unexpected cardiac collapse
accompanied by sudden chilling of the limbs, cyanosis, and a fast and
 thready pulse.2
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                         Reaching again into his folder,
Burgasov takes out a signed statement by the manager of a grain prod-
ucts factory located in the village of Aramil, a few kilometers south of
 Sverdlovsk.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                 27
MOSCOW: 
CONFLICTING VISIONS
90
5

~ ~

6 7

8 9 /0,1 /
 FIGURE 1.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

is a negation of everything that has already been
 achieved by physicians, a negation of medicine itself.13
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                              Much of this work builds
on the discovery in the 1950S by British biochemist Harry Smith of the
three components of anthrax that combine to make it deadly: protec-
 tive antigen, lethal factor, and edema factor.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                Is it possible that some basic honesty, a need for truth-
telling, has emerged as part of the glasnost spirit? On the last pages of
Gogols novel Dead Souls, the Russian prince exhorts his officials to put
aside dishonesty by appealing to those who still have a Russian heart
 and who have still some understanding of the word honour.21
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                         Sverdlov, not the Romanovs, would be memorial-
ized by the city of Sverdlovsk and by the region (Sverdlovsk oblast) as
 well.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

As he recalls, a few early animal cases were
 followed by others.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

        By her account, then, the slides the young Nikiforov showed
us in Moscow, or some portion of them, belong neither to him nor to
 Dr. Burgasov.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                 According to Dr. Abramova, she was in charge of the au-
topsies and ordered the photographs, so the slides belong to her and, by
 extension, to her collaborator, Dr. Grinberg.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                        An inexperienced fisherman didnt
have buoys to mark his lobster traps and had not thought to triangulate,
 that is, to identify their location by multiple points.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

Matthew, Shelokov, Hugh-Jones, and
 I have been driven there by Professor Borisov.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                  In 1979, the victims were
reportedly buried at the outskirts of the cemetery, but this area has since
 been overtaken and surrounded by newer graves.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

The only way to dis-
 cover the right sector is by reading the dates inscribed on each monument.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

The cases are desig-
 nated by number.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

  Now it is a question only of what the slides under the microscope, the
70
ABRAMOVAS TREASURE
71
real tissues, may reveal about portal of entry, whether by inhalation or
 by eating tainted meat.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

Matthew continues by assuring him that he will write Semyonov if nec-
essary and also do everything he can to get the Grinberg-Abramova pa-
 per published in English, with them as authors.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                              But are
the documents accurate? We can disprove or prove the epizootic expla-
 nation only by investigating in the affected villages.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                            In the in-
terim, public health workers came and gave tetracycline pills to Komin
 and his wife, but not to their son, who was only an infant.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                 She is younger by a
decade or so than Dr. Burgasov, who stumbled fortuitously into medi-
 cine.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

I say to Yampolskaya
 that, above all, the families affected by the epidemic are owed the truth.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                Even as the letter to General Kharechko
(translated into Russian by Shelokov) is sent off the next day, we know
almost nothing about Soviet involvement in anthrax research and ab-
 solutely nothing about what was going on at Compound 19 in 1979.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

           Among the four victims we have traced, Anna Komina is the ear-
liest case, not by the date of her death, but by the date of the onset of
 her illness, April ~.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                     At that time, the
authority of the Extraordinary Commission at the Sverdlovsk city level
was taken over by the oblast-level commission, under the direction of
 Dr. Burgasov.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

After that, the SES records about the outbreak were ap-
 propriated by this higher commission, and they subsequently disappeared.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

Third, the neighborhoods most affected by the disease had to be can-
 vassed and warned of the danger of contamination.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                               118
PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN
Yampolskaya and I both know that her sons body was autopsied by
Abramova and Grinberg on May 14 and soon after assessed as yet an-
 other case of classic anthrax.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                                  120
PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE PAIN
Shelokov embellishes on this bad news by warning that if we dare defy
 this refusal, our passports will be confiscated.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

We begin our excursion
 by driving to the low bluff where Compound 19 sits.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                             Is she de-
scribing the nightmare scenario of public sales of experimental animals
 killed by anthrax? Not likely.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

The ap-
 pointment was confirmed by telephone this morning.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                                 She
was taught by a woman whose own teachers were Irish missionary nuns
in Manchuria; she meets weekly with a book group to practice English
 conversation.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

But the apart-
 ment has been sold by Nikolaevs son, who has moved away.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                                      As we
stand outside, a train roars by, not more than fifty feet beyond the fence,
 and stops conversation.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                On the menu is fish he has caught that morning and plat-
ters of fresh vegetables, dumplings, and fruit prepared by his daughter,
 a physician who, like Yampolskaya, specializes in infectious diseases.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                Yablokov is personally
convinced that the outbreak was caused by an accident at Military Com-
 pound 19, where research on anthrax was being conducted.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                                     166
MOSCOW REDUX
An unnamed representative from Minister Yablokovs office tells the press
what we were to hear a week later, that secret documents from Sverdlovsk
were held in the KGB archives until December 1990, when a decree is-
 sued by the Soviet Council of Ministers ordered their destruction.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                             Anastasia
Myasnikova, aged sixty-three or sixty-four in April 1979, lived alone
and died alone, with no medical records left behind; she is barely re-
 membered by the neighbors in her apartment building.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

Fortunately, by
 asking more questions, he soon discovered his wife was alive.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

              On July 4, two days after our Brookings debriefing, the Uni-
fication Churchs Washington Times reports that in secret debriefings in
1990 a Soviet defector to Britain, a high-level scientist in a BW program,
caused Western intelligence to more than double its estimate of Soviet
(and by extension Russian) biological weapons production capabilities
 and the number of BW storage facilities run by the military.8
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

 Boris Yeltsin is regarded by Western intelligence sources as even less in
194
MANIFESTATION
control of far-flung military facilities than his predecessor,7 not an en-
 couraging thought if Russia has inherited a BW behemoth.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                          Their re-
cruits are legions of impoverished young Moslem men, deracinated by
 war, with no future but firing AK-47s or setting off bombs.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                             MANIFESTATION
196
Its rooms were hermetically sealed, with negative pressure recorded by
manometers; a special filter and ventilation system controlled the release
 of any aerosols from the chamber.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

Our driver rams the car in
 front of us and is immediately rear-ended by the car behind us.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                                    Having
been in a taxi accident in New York some years before, I feel all the hor-
ror of being hurtled forward, but we are only roughly jostled by the dou-
 ble impact.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

But our
 driver insists we abide by the law and wait for the police to arrive.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

An
 hour goes by.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

Automobiles, buses,
 and trucks zoom by.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                 The fifth disinfection, as recommended by the Moscow
[veterinary] experts, was made with adding i percent chlorofos to the
 solution of caustic soda.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

               donation is bein~
offered by the woman at the left
 Yekaterinburg, 1992.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                                    While
we were in Abramovo, Ilona has confirmed by telephone that two of them
were in Chkalovskiy at the beginning of April 1979, taking their required
 military reserve courses at Compound 32..
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                     In all, ten of the victims Chernich cites were
autopsied by Abramova and Grinberg, and all were unambiguously con-
 firmed as having died of anthrax.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                               Meanwhile, he is grateful for the med-
ical articles and copies of the Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin
222
DO NO EVIL, SEE NO EVIL
(edited by Matthew and Julian Robinson) and the copy of our draft ar-
 ticle we sent in advance.3
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                 By Iraqs own admission to UNSCOM, it had produced six
thousand liters of anthrax slurry and had deployed fifty bombs and ten
 al Hussein missile warheads filled with it.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                           Despite these resources it took
six days to discern the outbreak and nine days (until April ii) to confirm
 the diagnosis, by which time many victims were dead or dying.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

          Two years before the press caught on, the research had been
presented and discussed by the lead author of the article, Dr. Andrey
Pomerantsev, at the Second International Workshop on Anthrax, held in
 Winchester, England.5
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                            It is domi-
260
RETURN TO YEKATERINBURG
nated by three long soapstone tables on wooden legs, biers really, with
 a three-inch edge.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                                      Each
table has on top of it a tray of instruments on four legs and is lit by an
 adjustable round lamp.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

And what poor, wretched bodies, infected by
 dreaded anthrax bacteria, devasted by toxic shock.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

              One typical response by a Soviet official in 1986 was communicated
via Dr. Martin Kaplan, Secretary-General of the Pugwash Conferences on Sci-
ence and World Affairs: I do not consider it expedient to organize this trip be-
 cause of a lack of questions for discussion (A.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

 account for the scarcity of inhalation anthrax in the presence of virulent an-
thrax bacilli in the dust and air which is being inhaled by the workers of thi~
 plant.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

Nor can he explain the relatively very few cutaneous cases, except by ap-
 parent individual immunity.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                F., Maria (survivor), 175
control population, iii
F., Valeriy (survivor), 175
316
INDEX INDEX
family clusters, lack of, z6, 6465
Gusev, Yuriy, 212
Ipatiev, N. N., 37
family interviews, 1213, 58; challenges
Ipatiev House, ioi, Iii, z6~
Gusterson, Hugh, 176
and, ~6, 5759, 97, 100; epizootic
Iraq, 24344
and, 7778, 2023; by Ilona Niko-
Hanna, Philip, 253
Israelyan, Viktor, 8
Harris, Elisa, 179, i8z
nova, 169170, 2078; last visit to
Ivanov, Vasiliy (victim), 173
Chkalovskiy and, 26366; narratives
Henderson, D. A., 30, 17980, i8z, 246
Hersch, S., 2911114
from, 8~88, 1025, 12629, 138,
Jackson, Paul, 254
Hingley, Ronald, ~
Japan: biological weapons and, 6, 249,
14146, 2078, 209, 210; outliers
Holton, Gerald, 250
z8ini6; bioterrorism in, 244
and, 2013, 2079, 2IO~ summary of
Homer, 23
information from, i 8o8 i; Sysertskiy
K., Nikolay (survivor), 175
rayon and, 7778; tragedy of epidemic
Hospital 20, 113
Kaplan, Bela, 21920
and, 117, 127, 154, i6o, 2o4; value
Hospital 24, 13132
Kass, Leon, 288n3
of, 23 334
Hospital 40, 109, ii8, 133, 144, 25960
fatalism, 6768, 135, 136
hospital records, 31, 32
Kaufman, Arnold, 93
fatality rate, I, 8, 241
Hughes, Everett C., 284n3
KGB: folder on military activity, i6i6z,
fateful moments, 878 8
Hugh-Jones, Martin, 30, 32, 6o, 6,,
16465; list of victims and, 16870,
Feast in Time of Plague (Pushkin), z66
6z, 69, 77, 94, ii6, ii8, 122, 124,
17375, 
26870, 27375
Fokina, Lilia (victim), 6~, 210
i6z; geographic locations-sad, 32,
Kharechko, A. T., 77, 94, 107, 14748,
Fort Detrick, Maryland, 187, 199, 253;
8o, 129; meat-processing factory and,
261
Khudyakov, Nikolay (victim), ~6, 64, 89,
anthrax research at, ~, io8, 176, 189,
125; as member of team, z, i6, 22;
tissue samples and, 252
24142
103
Friedlander, Arthur, 189, 254
Hussein, Saddam, 194
Klipnitzer, Yakov, io~6, 132, 234, 260
Fyodosov, Vitaliy (victim), 172, 2089,
Huxsoll, David, 252
Klyestov, Ivan (victim), 170
Koch, Robert, ~, 53
237
Iliad (Homer), 23
Kolkhozes (collective farms), 40
gangster cemetery in Yekaterinburg,
Ilyenko, Margarita, io6, 121, 13135,
Komelskikh, Andrey (victim), 170, 174,
270
222, 264
140, 234, 260
industrialized nations, anthrax outbreaks
gastrointestinal anthrax: characteristics
Komin, Yuriy, 868 8, 89, 264
of outbreaks of, ~ diagnostic charac-
in, 34
Komina, Anna (victim), ~6, 63, 83,
infected-meat explanation, 1314, ,6,
teristics of, 17, 1819; Yaroslavl epi-
8~88, 109, 16970, 174, 212, 213,
223; Burgasovs case for, i~, 2330;
 demic and, 14, 2324.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

          See also entries for victims
safety of, 85; renaming of, 3 839;
Turner, Stansfield, 9
by name
second visit to, 198228; third visit
Vinogradov~ Dmitriy (victim), 64, 104,
to, 254; Tuberculosis and Pulmonary
United Nations, 9, 1848 5, 190, 194,
105, 109, 128, 213, 214, 215
Diseases Unit in, 50; during World
Virgil, 3
244
 War II, 3 940.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                        85 Minerals
of chrome, copper, lead, zinc, uranium, man-
ganese, asbestos, gold, silver, iron, sulfur, mica,
 nickel, slate, salt, and lapis lazuli.
	Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan

In practice, though, interrogators
 did not observe these limits, sometimes going so far as to kill detainees.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                       For they abjure
the very idea of nations or any other parochialism that limits them in
 time or space.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                       Dragged reluctantly from a past
defined by culture and tribe into a future where velocity is becoming
an identity all its own, they are accelerating toward the limits of
naturethe speed of light that defines the interactions of
cyberspacein quest of a palliative to (or is it a catalyst for?) their
 restlessness.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                  When economistic reformers think about
government at all, it is in terms of negative constitutionalismpoli-
tics as antipolitics, law as a set of limits on popular rule rather than
 as a set of populist enabling principles.3
	Jihad vs. McWorld

The weaknesses of local administration were disguised because
 its limits were rarely tested.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

MAXIMAL LIMITS OF THE COALITION
 The maximal unit of Islamic coalition in Bamyan was the sect.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

One of these was a book binder by trade, a revolu-
 tionary agitator and journalist by vocation, Johann Most.
	The Terrorists

               Their association with government and often spatial isolation
from their communities resulted in the gradual weakening of their ties and
60 Afghanistan
credibility as community leaders, creating a parallel structure to deal with
 community concerns.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

A great deal of emphasis was given
 to the mobilization of women and children.
	Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society

                        The rising group from the second generation
of the dynasty had concluded that a strong government was needed to
 deal with the new situation.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

                                                                     Be-
fore that, Kabul had allowed the provincial governments as well as busi-
nessmen of the area to deal with the Soviet Central Asian Republics
 directly, a unique concession.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Then, as Commander Abdul Haq predicts, Maybe one day they
 will have to send hundreds of thousands of troops to deal with that.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

A Red Cross Deal: Prisoner Transfers
 Red Cross officials persisted in their attempts to find a solution.
	Afghanistan: The Soviet War

He was told that this deal alone would net him a profit of $90 mil-
 lion.
	Inside Bin Laden

The deal was completed in the first days of
 February.
	Inside Bin Laden

These facilities
 had been dormant since the deal with Abu-Umar al-Amriki.
	Inside Bin Laden

                        The crown princes visit led to a series of bilateral
agreements, such as the resumption of direct scheduled flights between the
two countries, the signing of a $15 million industrial cooperation deal, and
the formation of a joint economic committee to formulate strategies to
 raise the price of oil.
	Inside Bin Laden

                 The strike was yet another proof of the duplicity of the
Clinton administration, no different from the unilateral violation of the
 deal agreed on with Abu-Umar al-Amriki.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                          It
was clear to all that the United States was far from ready to deal with a
spectacular terrorist strike even at a time when intelligence indicated that
 bin Laden was planning strikes in Washington and/or New York.
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                                    The oper-
ation was organized in accordance with the bin LadenISI deal of spring
1998, according to which the Islamists would carry out spectacular terrorist
strikes in the heart of India in return for the ISIs support, protection, and
 sponsorship.
	Inside Bin Laden

                        policies of, 9293
Karimov (attempted), 386
in Somalia, 73, 74
Egyptian Embassy bombing and, 150
King Faisal, 45
Al-Rashidi, Ali
escalating attacks against, 149-150
Mubarak (attempted), 121135, 215
accidental death of, 234
ISI purged by, 146148
the Pope (planned), 113
East African networks established by, 233
ISI support to terrorists and, 187
Sadat, 121
in Somalia, 8384, 8~, 233
Atwan, Abdul-Bari
Islamists deal with, 109
Al-Safir, i8xi8z
legend of the coup against, 145148
American Harvest of Blood article by,
Al-S hab (Egyptian paper), 214216
Prince Turki deals with, 107
26 9270
Al-Shihabi, 346347, 362
return to power, 92
on bin Ladens Afghan bases, 198199
Al-Umari, Salman, 282
state-sponsored terrorism of, 24
bin Ladens personal message to, 293
America and the Third World War, 388
Bikahi, Sheikh, 102
on bombing of Iraq (December 1998),
American Harvest of Blood article,
Billah, Mustansir, Brigadier, arrest of,
352353
on U.S. globalism, 390
269270
145146
Amini, Ayatollah Ibrahim, 22
Bin Baz, Abdul-Aziz, Grand Mufti Sheikh,
Australian Olympic Games operations,
Among the Believers, xiv
401402
30
Amsterdam core of bin Ladens financial
Awali, Muhammad Hassan, 76, 84
Bin Laden, Muhammad (father), 23
system, 313
Bin Laden, Muhammad (son), 309310
Azma, al-, 33
Anaraki, Majid, xiiixiv
 Bin Laden, Osama bin Muhammad.
	Inside Bin Laden

                           See Al-Rashidi,
communique of October 1997, 210
Ali
401402
Step Forward and in the Right Direc-
Balkan war operations, ioo
Basaev, Shamil, 386
tion statement (February 1998),
bin Laden plans
Bashir, Omar, General
bombing attacks on U.S. facilities
l~n Ladens expulsion from Sudan
228229
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberatio~ of
and, i86
overseas (199899), 386387
Armenia (ASALA), 365
buildup of terrorist assets, 390391
Islamist efforts of, 32, 33, 35
Asakir, Jahh Riyadh, 88
Prince Sultans deal for bin Ladens evic-
communiques issued after U.S. bomb-
ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Lib-
ing of Iraq, 358359
tion, 164
eration of Armenia), 365
defined, 343
rise to power, 35
Assad, Prince, i6ii6z, i6~
HAMAS cooperation, 365366
U.S. intervention in Sudan expected by, 8i
 INDEX .
	Inside Bin Laden

                                                 And join up, conjure
a little synergy: make a deal with Bill Gates, chairman of Microsoft,
 to produce interactive, multimedia entertainment products.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                 The newspapers compared the deal pro-
jected by this triumvirate to the founding of United Artists by Mary
Pickford and her friends sixty years ago, but that would be to com-
pare a flotilla of battleships to a couple of cap-gun-toting kids in a
 rowboat.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

million deal (now set aside) for an unwritten book by the
 Speaker but the meeting itself.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

       debt assumption
and buyout of Cokes
49 percent holding)
Time Inc. creates
$14
Time Warner
(Paramount tried
to interdict this deal
via hostile offer for
Time, Inc.!)
 $6.i
	Jihad vs. McWorld

    Inc. as prelude to
Bell-Atlantic merger,
repurchases Liberty
after earlier spin-off
Bell Atlantic
$26
(deal in jeopardy)
Motorola
 $1.76
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                  billion from NYNEX, which had just struck another
synergistic deal with the Tomem Corporation in Japan to develop
cable and interactive television therethe Baby Bells were looking
for product to pump through their telephone wires and cellular sys-
 tems.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

              Diller also was moved, if a little reluctantly, to rely
on John C. Malone, one of the richest men in America and the
acknowledged King of Cable, a controlling force in the countrys
largest cable system, Tele-Communications (itself later involved in a
gargantuan plan to merge with Bell Atlantic for $33 billion, although
that deal may fall through), and in Liberty Media, a television
programmer that owns Black Entertainment Television and the
 Family Channel and is itself a 22.5
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                                                     ~
China has another problem as well: how to enforce its ideologi-
cally motivated centralist edicts on regions with a great deal of geo-
graphical autonomy that (as instructed) are motivated more by
economics than ideology and that often ignore political edicts in
favor of market edicts, since the two come from the same central
 government, but stand in sharp contradiction.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                            228 JIHAD VS. MCWORLD
In his compelling book urging an end to laissez-faire ideology in
global economics, Robert Kuttner calls for a true world central
bank that would require the ceding of a substantial degree of
monetary sovereignty, which in turn would mean giving up a good
 deal of policymaking sovereignty as well.5
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                     It is not too little faith in
democratic man and woman but a great deal of faith in the power of
the mind machines of McWorlds software producers that leads me
 to suspect the autonomy of consumer choice.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                       As in other countries, Germany still is home to
a great deal of filmmaking, as many as three thousand productions each
 year.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

Thomas L. Friedman, A Peace Deal Today Really Is a Bargain, The New
York Times, September i I, 1994, Section 4, p. I.
 8.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                              See also
Olympic Games, 174, 183, 294
Motown, 141
spec~flc nation-state
Oman, 43, 4~, 47
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 8
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
ONeill, Michael J., ,i,
Mozambique, 55
Organization), 227
Organization for Economic Cooper-
MT\~ 78, 194, 275; and advertising,
NBC Network, 141
ation and Development (OECD),
64, 104; and Americanization of
Netherlands, 9
global television, 1o3; and books,
34, 43
Yeues Forum, i8i, 26061,262,278
121; and consumption, logb; as
Orgintz, Eileen, 134
Nevzorov, Aleksandr, G., 256
creator of cultural values, 1045,
Ornstein, Norman, 122
New Deal, 238
io8, 1o9bo; and democracy,
Ortega y Gasset, Jose, i6o
New and Electronic Data, 114
1089; and diversity vs. universality,
Ossi Park (Germany), 13334, 265
ii~i6; indigenous-language pro-
New Line Cinema, 142
Ovitz, Michael, 62, 66, 8i, 145
Yew Republic, 294
gramming of; io~ as infomercials,
Yew York magazine, I 14
146; internationalization of, 1045,
Yew York Post, 103
io8; lyrics of, ,,o, III; messages of,
Pakistan, 55, 105, 207
Yew York Times, 6~6i, 89
Palmer; Geoffrey, 22627
10910; as mindless, log; number
The Yew York Times Boo/c Review, 120,
of viewers of, 1o45; and politics,
Panasonic, 141
121
1o9II; and satellites, 1045, io8
Pandemonium prophets, 299
New York Times Company, 124, 145
Paramount Communications: and
multiculturalism, 9, II, 97
The Yew Yorker, 126
 multinational corporations.
	Jihad vs. McWorld

                                             Despite the use of Islamic
terms, a great deal of confusion remains about the meaning, purpose,
and structure of jihad in general and the armed struggle in Afghanistan
 in particular.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

          For example, a great deal was made of the fact that T.E. Lawrence,
under the pseudonym of Shaw, happened to be stationed at the time at an R.AF
 base in the North-West Frontier Province.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                                                              That is,
he sought central government intervention in local political affairs
with a rival ethnic group; he hoped through this action to consolidate
local support for his political leadership by demonstrating to the
Sheikhanzai that he could deal with the government and demon-
 strating to the government that he represented the Sheikhanzai.
	Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan

                  When it appeared that Washington was planning another
military strike against Bin Laden, the Taliban tried to cut a deal with
Washington  to allow him to leave the country in exchange for US
 recognition.
	Taliban

               A new team of US diplomats began to deal with Afghanistan
in both Washington and Islamabad and the new US Assistant Secretary
for South Asia, Karl Inderfurth, knew Afghanistan as a former journalist
 and was much closer to Albright than Raphel was to Christopher.
	Taliban

               A new team of US diplomats began to deal with Afghanistan
in both Washington and Islamabad and the new US Assistant Secretary
for South Asia, Karl Inderfurth, knew Afghanistan as a former journalist
 and was much closer to Albright than Raphel was to Christopher.
	Taliban

                         There are also reports that Najibullah was hoping to
do a deal with the Taliban because of their common ethnic origins and that he
 left the compound voluntarily.
	Taliban

                                                              It would
then be possible for negotiations to be somewhat less constrained by
abstract notions of, for instance, Western or Islamic values and to be
The Taliban
152
based on a dialogue between two groups of people with different
perspectives who seek to explore whether or not a deal is achievable,
 while accepting that it may not be.
	The Taliban: Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan

The assassination of Lord Moyne served to focus the attention
of the whole world on the breakdown of law and order in
 Palestine, and Britains failure to deal with it.
	The Terrorists

                        Burgasov comments he never even hears it; I take
that to mean that he is alone with his thoughts a good deal and can shut
 out bad noises.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

                                                We are on the track
of a rumor we heard in Abramovo that the postmistress there, named
CHKALOVSKIY: 
THE FINAL PIECES
210
Anna, knows a good deal about the outbreak, and we want to find any
 military victims we can.
	Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

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