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Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Formosa general manager Shih Ming-teh, fearing that he would be murdered upon arrest, sought refuge with the head of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, Reverend Kao Chun-ming.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Index 225
Index
Aboriginal people, 4, 6, 75 American Institute in Taiwan, 107 American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), 107
Amnesty International, 117, 118 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, (APEC), 161
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), 154, 161, 168,191,192
Baum, Julian, 164, 188
Beijing, 1, 2, 7, 106, 107, 153, 154, 155, 161, 168, 169, 170, 174, 175, 176, 179, 190, 191, 192, 193
Brazil, 3, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19 Broadcasting Corporation of China, 65,73
Cabinet, 187
Capital Daily (Shoudu Ribao), 129 Carter, Jimmy, 26, 107, 116 censorship, 74
Central Daily News (Chongyang Ribao), 65
Central Election Commission, 44,118 Chang Chun-hong,115,117
Chen Che-ran, 162
Chen Ming-tong, 15, 32, 36, 72, 84, 85, 114, 135, 149
Chen Shui-bian, 44, 172 Chen Ting-ran, 172 Chen Yi, 38, 56, 58, 182 Chen Yi-yam, 182
Cheng Cheng-kung (Koxinga), 5
Cheng Tun-jen, 156
Chiang Cheng-kuo, 3, 8, 10, 24, 25, 29, 31, 32, 61, 80, 103, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128, 130, 131, 148, 149, 150,178
Chiang Kai-shek, 5, 6, 24, 30, 38, 61, 67,75,103,106,108,112 Chiang Nan see Henry Liu
Chiang Wei-kuo, 150 Chiayi, 37
Chien Fu (Frederick Chien), 168 China Democratic Party, 105, 106 China Television (CTV), 73 China Youth Corps, 72, 87
Chinese Communist Party, 5, 55, 65, 106
Chinese New Party, 2, 31, 129, 167 Chinese Television Service (CTS), 73 Chu Yun-ham, 11, 23, 30, 86, 141, 165, 189,193
Chungli, 115, 125
civil war, 5, 8, 17, 21, 29, 60, 62, 65, 70,154
Clean Election Coalition, 143 chentelism, 44, 46, 92, 141, 143, 177, 186
Clinton, Bill, 191 constituent service, 117, 120 constitution, 9, 16, 18, 19, 29, 47, 48, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 70, 71, 81, 109, 113, 126, 128, 131, 137, 155, 157, 161, 183, 184
Control Yom, 61, 95, 110, 152, 161, 175
Copper, John, 122,137
Cornell University, 77, 169 corporatism, 12, 74, 75 corruption, 24, 27, 55, 56, 57, 59, 67, 88, 92, 146, 149, 164, 167, 171, 174,177,185,186
Council of Grand Justices, 29, 152, 156 county executive, 26, 66, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 94, 96, 97, 101, 115, 116, 122, 123, 139, 142, 143, 145, 186, 187
cross-strait relations, 191 Curtis, Gerald, 49
Dangwai (Tangwai), 27, 29, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122123124,125,126,127,128,133:134: 139, 141, 144
Dangwai Public Policy Association, 123
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 1, 2, 23, 29, 30, 31, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 51, 52, 53, 86, 94, 95, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 113, 114, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141,142,143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174,176,181,182,183,185,186, 187,188,189,192
democratization, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 18, 24, 25, 26, 32, 54, 64, 105, 112,113,114,119,120,122,134, 137, 140, 146, 151, 189, 192, 193 Dickson, Bruce, 24, 25, 112
district magnitude, 39, 40, 44 dividing the vote, 41
Eighties, The (Bashi Niandai), 117, 126 Election and Recall law, 127
elections, 12, 15, 26, 29, 33, 44, 50, 81, 104, 113, 114, 116, 118, 127, 131, 133, 138, 140, 143, 146, 156, 162, 174, 177, 180
elections, executive, 32, 44, 57, 85, 100,101,112,125,170,188 elections, legislative, 14, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31,32,39,40,43,44,52,82,83t 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 118, 119, 122,
123, 128, 131, 136, 137, 138, 141, 142,143,144,146,149,157,158, 160,162,163,164,165,172,173, 189
elections, plebiscitary, 14, 27, 28, 31, 180
elections, primary, 133, 134, 135, 183 elections, supplementary, 19, 24, 26, 27, 29, 63, 70, 82, 110, 112, 132, 133, 141, 149, 188, 156, 180 elections, township and village, 18, 22, 100,171,180
entrepreneurs, 69, 93, 141, 189 Examination Yuan,61
Executive Yom, 48, 61, 128, 129, 154, 185
Fang Su-min, 123
Farmers' Association, 77, 78, 79, 80, 87,88,95
February 28 Incident, 15, 57, 58, 68, 73, 179, 193
Fei Hsi-ping, 105, 126 floating voters, 42 foreign aid, 67
foreign investment, 69 Formosa faction, 117, 118, 192 Formosa Magazine (Meilidao), 117 Free China Fortnightly (Ziyou Zhongguo), 103, 104, 105, 114,180
full nomination, 41
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 161
golden oxen, 149, 163, 175 Government Information Office (GIO), 72, 128, 129
Green Party, 129
Hakka, 5, 6, 73, 115
Han Pei-tsun, 2, 151, 167, 174, 182 Henry Liu (Chiang Nan), 124 Hoklo, 5, 6
Hong Kong, 107,129,153,161 Hsieh Chang-ting, 1, 174 Hsieh Tung-min, 111
Hsu Hsin-liang, 26, 115, 117, 125, 138, 157
Hsu Huo-yam, 142
226 Index
Index 227
Hsu Shao-tan, 138 Hsu Yung-ming,156 Hu, Jason, 154
Hu Fu, 11, 12, 23, 26, 29, 30, 47, 48, 141, 178, 189
Huang Hsin-chieh, 114, 116,117 Huang Teh-fu, 29, 32, 77 Human rights, 17, 124 Huntington, Samuel, 9, 11, 178
import substitution, 69 industry, 68, 124 Intellectual, The (DaXue), 109, 110 iron ballots, 41, 141, 145, 166, 167
Japan, 5, 8, 34, 35, 36, 39, 43, 49, 55, 56, 67, 84, 92, 109, 110, 167, 186 Jaw Shao-kong, 163, 166, 172
Jiang Zemin, 191, 192, 193 Judicial Yuan, 61
Kang Ning-hsiang, 114, 116, 117, 123, 126, 128, 129
Kao Chun-ming,117
Kao Yu-shu, 105,106,110 Kaohsiung, 26, 27, 55, 58, 61, 66, 73, 80, 87, 89, 90, 99, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 123, 124, 125, 133, 138, 139,147,153,161,171,172 Keelung, 55, 58, 106, 143
Kerr, George, 38, 55 Kinmen (Quemoy), 4 Koo Chen-fu, 168, 191 Koo-Wang talks, 169 Korean War, 6, 59 Koxinga see Cheng Ch'eng-kung Kuan Chung, 64,133, 134,149 Koo, Julian (Kuo Cheng-liang), 192 Kuo Yu-hsin, 104, 106
Kuomintang (KMT), 1, 3, 2, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97, 99,100,101,102,103,104,105,
106, 114, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145,146,147,148,149,150,151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182,183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189
Labor Party, 129, 132
labor unions, 35, 75, 76, 141 Lamounier, Bolivar, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 103,126,147,178,180,181 land reform, 68, 69, 88
Law on the Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians, 132 Lee Huan, 115,125
Lee Teng-hui, 1, 10, 29, 61, 70, 121, 122, 131, 132, 148, 150, 151, 160, 164, 167, 168, 169, 174, 175, 176, 182
Legislative Yuan, 11, 19, 24, 27, 30, 32, 35, 44, 47, 48, 50, 61, 62, 63, 82, 83, 101, 105, 110, 118, 123, 125, 127, 128,132, 133,137, 138,139, 147, 152, 156, 158, 162, 163, 167, 170, 180, 183, 184, 186, 187, 188, 189; see also elections, legislative legitimacy, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 58, 60, 82, 85, 106, 110, 112, 149, 151, 175, 178, 179, 180, 189, 193
Lei Chen, 17, 18, 71, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 113, 114, 180 Leninism, 64
Li Hsiao-feng, 116
Li Hsi-kun, 143, 145, 146 Li Wan-chu, 105
Lien Chan, 1, 167, 168, 170, 174, 185 Lin Cheng-yi, 192
Lin Chia-lung, 141 Lin Feng-Cheng, 143 Lin Jih-wen, 36, 44 Lin Yang-kang, 2, 150, 174, 176 Lin Yi-hsiung, 115, 117, 118, 123
Liu 1-chou, 30, 42, 52, 191 Local Elections Improvement Association, 104
local factions, 21, 33, 51, 83, 84, 85, 86, 101, 116, 149, 171
Lu Ya-li, 184
Lui Fei-lung, 46, 144
Macao, 161
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), 154, 161, 168, 170
Mainlanders, 6, 56, 59, 64, 67, 81, 105, 109, 111, 113, 120, 123, 127, 136, 151, 153, 193
Mainstream Faction, 151, 155, 156, 160,161,162,166,167,174 Mandarin, 6, 59, 72, 73
martial law, 21, 63, 70, 71, 74, 82,114, 116, 119, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131, 133
maverick (unauthorized candidate), 51, 85, 143, 159
Maat (Matsu), 4
middle class, 8, 140, 141, 163, 188 military, 72
military instructors (jiaoguan), 72 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 155 mobilization, 3, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 50, 52, 63, 64, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 83, 85, 88, 91, 99, 100, 101,102, 120, 134, 140, 141, 143,144, 149, 153, 154, 158, 159, 160, 161, 166, 171, 174, 181
mobilizational authoritarianism, 3, 8, 10, 12, 65, 80, 81, 84, 101, 119, 120,133
modernization theory, 140 Moody, Peter, 126 Moon, Eric, 51
Myers, Ramon, 24, 38
National Affairs Conference (NAC), 10, 151, 152, 153, 185
National Assembly, 19, 26, 39, 44, 47, 50, 53, 61, 63, 77, 78, 79, 108, 110, 116, 118, 127, 132, 137, 150, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 163, 168, 174, 175, 176, 180, 183, 185,186
National Development Conference, 185,186
National Taiwan University, 11, 43, 44, 71, 109,145, 174
National Unification Guidelines, 154 Nationalist Party see Kuomintang New KMT Alliance, 31,167
New Parry, 2, 31, 102, 129, 167, 168, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 182, 183,189
New Tide faction, 136, 137, 152, 157, 158,192
New York Times, 158 Nixon, Richard, 17,107 nomination, 31, 41, 82, 97, 135, 144,
145, 150, 151,163, 164, 189 Nonmainstream Faction, 150, 151, 155, 156, 161, 163, 166, 167, 168, 170
nuclear power, 149,170,172
one country, two systems, 107, 190, 191
'Opening through elections', 12, 15
Parliamentarians, 132 partial nomination, 41 party identification, 14, 19, 29, 30, 43, 49, 86, 93, 141, 142, 181, 182 patronage, 42, 47, 48, 49, 54, 73, 79, 84, 91, 92, 104, 112, 148
Peng Ming-min, 1, 71, 174,176 Pingtung, 37
pirate radio, 149
plebiscitary elections see elections, plebiscitary
Policy Coordination Committees, 65 political parties, 21, 28-9, 45, 50, 52, 63, 71, 82, 99, 125, 129, 131, 133, 149,156,157,158,163,183,188; see also Kuomintang, Democratic Progressive Party, New Party
pork barreling, 46
pragmatic diplomacy, 153, 154, 155, 157, 160, 161, 162, 168, 169, 190, 191
Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, 117 primary elections
see
elections, primary Provincial Government, 73
228 Index
Przeworski, Adam, 9
Qiandao Lake, 169
Qing Dynasty, 5, 17, 55, 59, 60 Quemoy see Kinmen
responsibility zone, 41, 42, 44, 52, 83, 96, 97, 164
Retrocession, 5, 38, 193
Robinson, James A.,51,162,164,188 Rochon, Thomas, 43
seat bonus, 23, 44, 52, 120, 123, 127, 147, 158, 160, 181 self-determination, 35, 122, 127, 174, 189,191
senior legislators, 27, 29, 47, 63, 80, 82, 118,131,132,152,156
Senkaku Islands see Tiaoyutai Islands Shanghai Communique, 107
Shih Ming-teh, 117, 118, 152 Singapore, 168
single non-transferable voting in multimember districts (SVMM/SNTV), 21, 23, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 4647, 50, 51, 52,54,83,84,93,99:101,120, 123, 125, 132, 135, 145, 147, 159, 173,186, 188
small and medium enterprises, 69, 70 Social Democratic Parry, 129, 132, 158 socio-economic development, 141 Soong Chu-yu (James Soong), 165,
170,171,172,185 Sound of
the
storm, The 115 South Korea, 155,161
special municipalities, 61, 62, 171 Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), 154,161,168,191,192
Su Chi, 161
Sun Yat-sen, 1, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18, 59, 61, 65, 72, 75, 80,167
Sunshine Bill, 184
supplementary elections see elections, supplementary
Taichung, 37, 115, 185
Tainan, 37, 47, 86, 89, 94, 95, 97, 99, 104, 106, 115
Taipei, 1, 4, 30, 35, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 50,52,55,57,58,61,71,72,88, 89,92,99,106,107,114,119,121, 125,126,133, 136, 137, 138, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 153, 154, 155, 161,163,168,169,171,172,173, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192
Taiwan Culture Society, 35
Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC), 70, 104, 125, 128
Taiwan independence, 2,108, 109, 113, 122, 126, 127, 128, 140, 157, 160, 169, 174, 181, 190, 191 Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM), 108
Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), 160
Taiwan Provincial Assembly, 18 Taiwan Relations Act, 107 Taiwan Strait, 4, 57, 59, 154, 175 Taiwan Television, 65, 73, 155 Taiwanese, 2, 5, 6, 75 15, 16, 18, 25, 26, 31,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 132, 137, 140, 141, 142, 146, 147, 148,149,150, 152, 153,156,160, 163,168,169,172,174,175,176, 179,180,181,182,183,185,186, 189,190,191,193
Taiwanization, 54, 111, 112, 113, 122, 127,189
Tangwai see Dangwai
Taoyuan, 99, 115, 116, 138, 143 technocrats, 67, 69
Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion, 63, 110, 152, 153, 183 Tenth Credit Cooperative, 125 The Third Wave, 9,178 Three Nos, 107
Ttananmen Incident, 107 Tiaoyutai Islands, 109, 110 tiau-a-ka, 42, 46, 49, 51, 78, 87, 88, 89,
90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 120, 121, 134, 140, 141, 143, 144, 148, 170, 186 ticket-splitting, 120, 142
Tien Hung-mao, 71, 73, 184 Ting T'ing-yu, 141 Truman, Harry S., 59 Twenty-first Century Foundation, 143 Tzu Chi Buddhist Movement, 175
unification, 31, 107, 122, 127, 139, 154, 157, 161, 167, 174, 190, 191, 192,193
United Daily
News
(Lianhe Bao), 65, 155
United Nations (UN), 10, 27, 17, 60, 106, 107, 153, 155, 156, 157, 160, 162, 163, 168
United States of America, 6, 10, 7, 49, 55, 56, 59, 60, 67, 69, 70, 81, 92, 107, 116, 124, 129, 155, 168, 169, 175,187
village executive, 19, 170, 187
vote brokers, 47, 51, 78, 79, 84, 87, 93, 102
vote buying, 45, 46, 78, 94, 95, 97, 98,
Index 229
99, 101, 102, 120, 131, 135, 143, 146, 149, 164, 171, 186
voter turn-our, 183
Wang Chinn-hsuan, 163, 166 Wang Daohan, 168,191 Washington Post, 126
Wei Tao-ming, 58
White Tenor, 25, 58, 105, 108, 112, 178
Winckler, 61, 112 Wisdom Club, 167 Wives and Lawyers Faction, 119 Workers Party, 129
World Trade Organization, 161 World United Formosans for Independence,138
Wu San-lien, 104, 106
Yang Tai-shuenn, 43, 101, 134, 142, 143
You Ching, 139, 145, 146
Yu Chen Yueh-ying, 66,123, 139 Yu Cheng-hsien, 89,139
Yu Ling-ya, 139
Yu Teng-fa, 89, 116, 123, 139
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The Judicial Yuan organizes the court system of the
ROC,
while the Control Yuan monitors the actions of civil servants.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Eight Formosa staffers were court-martialed on sedition charges; thirty-three other activists faced trial in civilian courts.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Because he did not hand over Shih to the
118 Politics in Taiwan
authorities Reverend Kao was court-martialed, which outraged religious and human rights organizations worldwide.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
All but three of the Kaohsiung defendants - including all of those court-martialed - were convicted.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
10 Dec 1979
Kaohsiung Incident: violent encounter between police
and demonstrators at a rally in Kaohsiung City spon
sored by Formosa magazine leads to the arrest of more
than forty dissidents; eight are court-martialed.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Successful tiau-a-ka look forward to being courted by candidates in future elections, earning them both prestige and material benefits.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
With martial law lifted, the civilian courts operated freely, without military interference (although political interfer
ence was a continuing problem).
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
14 Bolivar Lamounier, 'Authoritarian Brazil Revisited: The Impact of Elections on the Abertura,' in Alfred Stepan, ed.,
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Sun asserted that democratic governance - complete with constitutional supremacy, separation of powers and other institutional arrangements associated with Euro-American liberal democracies - was the appropriate model for China's long-term political development.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Since its constitu
tion defines the nation as all of China, the legitimacy of the ROC state depends upon maintaining the notion that the separation of Taiwan and the mainland is temporary.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
0
The regime, for its part, insisted that the separation of Taiwan from the rest of China justified emergency provisions that overrode key provisions of the constitution.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
14
The status quo entails political autonomy for Taiwan, but eschews formal separation from China.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
No part of this book may be reprinted or
3
Party-state authoritarianism in the pre-reform
reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
era (1945-1972)
55
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
4
Electoral mobilization in the pre-reform era (1945-1972)
81
writing from the publishers.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The next day, 76 percent of Taiwan's eligible voters exercised their right to select their country's head of state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The presiden
tial election truly was historic: For the first time ever, citizens of a Chinese state were entrusted with the ultimate political choice.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In 1949, Mao Zedong declared a new state on the mainland: the People's Republic of China.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Thus, the institutions of state that the Kuomintang-led government set up on Taiwan were transferred directly from the mainland, including an administrative apparatus designed to rule the entire country.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The purpose of this study is to describe the nature of that state and its
8 Politics in Taiwan
voting for
democracy
9
evolution over time.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
If the existence of the ROC as a country is debated, the existence of the ROC state - the institutions of government through which the ROC exercises jurisdiction over its territory and people - cannot be denied.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
But the unions they joined were not independent advocates of workers' interests, but organizations established, funded and guided by the ruling party and the state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The ROC state that established itself on Taiwan in 1949 was far from the democracy Sun envisioned.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Nonetheless, over the next five decades, that state evolved, slowly at times, quickly at other times, until it came to resemble very closely the democracies on which it was modeled.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Even as a state of emergency suspended many of its provisions, the constitution stood as an unfulfilled democratic promise.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
10 Politics in Taiwan
Voting for democracy 11
This state of affairs might have continued indefinitely.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In a study like this one, the existence of regular elections does not in itself qualify a state as democratic.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In particular, we need a way of addressing two fundamental questions: Why would an authoritarian state institute elections? And how, specifically, do elections help bring about democratization? Fortunately, Bolivar Lamounier's work on political reform in Brazil provides a framework for exploring these questions.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Meanwhile, authoritarian institu
tions - the insulation of the central government from popular pressure, one-party politics, corporatism, and so on - ensured that policy-making would remain under the control of KNIT leaders in the party and state - or so it seemed.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Even before the watershed
Voting for democracy 13
1974 elections, Brazil was in a period of liberalization: authoritarian pres
sures were easing, and the state was allowing a wider range of political activity.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
As Lamounier points out, legitimacy is at least as important to state employees (such as police, soldiers and public servants) as it is to ordinary citizens, because they are the people who must enforce the rules and carry out policy decisions.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The search for a legitimacy formula also is influenced by international forces, including international models, international opinion and a state's particular inter
national role and entanglements.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The second question Lamounier addressed is: Why would an authori
tarian regime institute elections? Brazil's military regime perceived elections as a safe, moderate way to offer a legitimacy formula that was consistent with Brazilian history and ideology, but would not commit the state to any particular substantive policy outcomes.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
This event, dubbed the February 28 (or 2-28) Incident, created a wedge of distrust between the Taiwanese, who constituted about 85 percent of Taiwan's
16 Politics in Taiwan
Voting for democracy 17
population, and the Mainlander minority that dominated the ROC state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
It immediately set to work creating a one-party state that placed a mainland-born political elite above the native-born Taiwanese.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Of course, the fact that many Taiwanese no longer accepted the KMT's reasons for maintaining an authoritarian state need not have brought that system down; the KNIT could have resorted to repression.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
To hold patty, state and society together, the search for legitimacy continued, and pressure for democratization increased.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Martial law not only gave the government broad powers to arrest and imprison dissenters, but also imposed a complete ban on the formation of new political parties, effectively enshrining the KMT regime as a one-party state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Martial law also allowed the state to control the mass media.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Their performance was interpreted widely as a state
ment of sympathy and support for the Formosa group, and a gesture of protest against the regime's heavy-handed treatment of dissidents.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
As President Chiang Ching-kuo gradually assumed his father's roles in the KMT party and ROC state in the 1970s he guided a subtle shift in priorities.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Politicians and voters alike favored the continu
ation and expansion of reform, creating upward pressure on the party-state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Elections inculcated Taiwanese citizens with partisanship and democratic values; they created opportunities to send pro-reform messages to the regime; they altered the balance of power between hard-liners and reformers and between state and society.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
For a clientelistic system to work, there must be a point at which inter
actions between citizens and the state acquire their particularistic character.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Every state action, no matter how obligatory or automatic, is portrayed as a favor by an individual public official to some small group of citizens, and their grat
itude is manifested as political support.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Another factor contributing to the prevalence of clientelistic, candidate-oriented voting in Taiwan is the distribution of power within the ROC state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Once again, the source of central control is the
ROC
consti
tution, which provides for a unitary state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
60
0-24 2549 50-74 7599 100-124 125-149 150174 175199
200+
%
Of owta
3 Party-state authoritarianism in the pre-reform era (1945-1972)
The Japanese surrender in December 1945 opened a new chapter in Taiwan's history.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Aboard were the 62nd and
56 Politics in Taiwan
Party-state authoritarianism 1945-1972 57
70th Divisions of the Chinese Nationalist Army, numbering in excess of 12,000 men.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
58 Politics in
Taiwan
Party-state authoritarianism
1945-1972 59
In negotiations with the Taipei leaders, administrator-general Chen Yi took a conciliatory line, but when the Nationalist authorities (reinforced by troops from the mainland) returned to island in early March, they exacted a terrible revenge.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In theory, then, the ROC state is a democracy.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Thus, the discussion of the ROC state which follows is a description of a system democratic in theory but authoritarian in practice.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Given that the ROC state is defined as all of China, its sojourn on Taiwan creates a number of consti
tutional problems.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The ROC constitution was written for a state that encompassed all of the territory controlled by the Chinese government at the height of the Qing Dynasty.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Although warlordism, Japanese occupation and civil war prevented the ROC state from exercising its authority in all of the territory it claimed, its sovereignty was recognized internationally.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In the same period, Taiwan's relations with other
Party-state authoritarianism 1945-1972 61
nations deteriorated.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The Examination Yuan administers the civil service examina
tions used to select personnel for state agencies.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In theory, then, the ROC is a decentralized state with democratically elected executives and legislatures at each level of government.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
If legislation is required,
Executive
(Zhanga)
Provincial govemorb City executive (mayor)' County executive City executive (mayor) Town executive Township executive City executive
Ward head Village head Neighborhood head
Party-state authoritarianism 1945-1972 63
party members of the Legislative Yuan are asked to fulfill the formalities.'
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Under these provisions, Taiwan was in practice a one-party state under Kuomintang leadership.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In the execu
tive and judicial branches, KMT members belong to party cells within
Party-state authoritarianism 1945-1972 65
their administrative organs.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
not as necessi
ties of the revolutionary state but as temporary measures arising from the condition of civil war between the KMT and CCP IChinese Communist Party] regimes.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The imple
mentation of regular, competitive local elections coincided with plans to strengthen the party's hold on the ROC state and Taiwanese society.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
By the mid-1990s, it was the world's fourteenth largest merchandise trading
Party-state authoritarianism 1945-1972 67
entity; internationally, only China and Japan had larger foreign exchange reserves.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The benefit of being an outsider regime was that the state did not have to bend to the will of local capitalists and social luminaries.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Party-state authoritarianism 1945-1972 69
Their rising social position increased their confidence and willingness to participate in political and social activities.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Although the gulf between the ROC state and Taiwanese society was costly in political and human rights terms, it paradoxically proved to be a boon to the island's economy.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The state used direct subsidies, tariffs and price supports to encourage large companies and heavy industries to replace imports with products made in Taiwan.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Firms in basic industries, including steel, cement, and petroleum refining, were wholly or partially state-owned.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Import substitution created opportunities for entrepreneurs, managers, industrial workers and workers in up-stream sectors, but these economic sectors were the products of state policy, not its producers.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
As Gold put it, 'the state bureaucracy, not tied to the bourgeoisie but increasingly committed to capitalist development, retained its hegemonic position and acted in the bourgeoisie's interest without allowing itself to become its instrument '
26
In other words, the bureaucracy's autonomy allowed it to evaluate and implement policy with an eye to national development, rather than the particular interests of powerful corporations and individuals.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The state's favoritism toward large and government-owned firms - at the expense of SMEs - was to become an important source of friction between the state and Taiwanese society.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Martial law also stipulated military
Party-state authoritarianism 1945-1972 71
trials for certain crimes, sharply limiting civil liberties and due process.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The campaign to promote Mandarin succeeded, but the effort to wipe out Taiwanese failed; what the regime created was a bilingual nation in which
Party-state authoritarianism 1945-1972 73
more than three-quarters of the population speaks both Mandarin and Taiwanese (or Mandarin and Hakka).
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In that year, the regime issued strict regu
lations limiting the length of newspapers and requiring them to register with the state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
According to media expert Lee Chin-chuan, 'the party-state ...
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Party-state corporatism
A more subtle, but nonetheless powerful, form of state power was the KMT regime's control of organizations.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Until the late 1970s, nearly all politically relevant groups in Taiwan were organized by the party or the state organs it controlled.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Recognizing the necessity for social organiza
tion, the regime created groups that the party-state could use to facilitate social and political (especially electoral) mobilization.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The overwhelming social, economic and political predominance of party-state sponsored organizations retarded the development of independent interest groups and political pluralism.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The state is merely a referee among these independent groups.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
A contrasting model of group behavior is corporatism, in which the state
Party-state authoritarianism 1945-1972 75
itself sponsors and supervises groups.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Ruth B. Collier and David Collier define corporatism in terms of three types of state action:
1 state structuring of groups that produces a system of officially sanc
tioned, non-competitive, compulsory interest associations,
2 state
subsidy
of these groups, and
3 state-imposed constraints on demand-making, leadership, and internal governance 35
Corporatism's defining characteristics - state structuring, state subsidy and state control - describe Taiwan's interest group system well.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Most politi
cally active groups originated with the ROC party-state and were sustained by it.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The most important group in ROC politics is, of course, the Kuomintang; it is impossible to say where the party ends and the state begins.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
This is why Taiwan's network of officially sanctioned organizations is best described as party-state corporatism.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Since the reform era began, groups have emerged which are independent of the party and state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
But their resources and influence still do not approach that of their state
sponsored counterparts.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The notion of party-state corporatism is consistent with Nationalist ideology and organizational theory.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
ROC leaders since Sun Yat-sen have emphasized mobilization as one of the party-state's central tasks.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
With the parry-state's blessing came the exclusive right to organize a profession or group.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Among general managers of these groups, 95 percent were KMT members and more than half had experience as party cadres
39
As a result, the associations became far more effective at communicating the state's policies to their members than articulating or promoting the members' interests vis-a-vis the state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Parry-state authoritarianism 1945-1972 77
telling rank-and-file voters what to do was a touchy business.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
To illustrate in detail the organizational and political character of party-state sponsored corporatist associations and their role in Taiwan's clientele system, we turn now to a case study of an organization which is not only extremely important politically, but also in many ways is the paradigmatic corporatist group: the Farmers' Association.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Mr As instructions to the Farmers' Association workers emphasize persuasion, persistence and vote buying, but these are not the only sources
Party-state authoritarianism 1945-1972 79
of influence the groups enjoy over their members.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The party-state was losing ground to indifference, international opinion was shifting toward the PRC (making repression more costly), senior legislators were dying off, Taiwanese businessmen were
fee
y
lj
eo
ic
muscle more strongly.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
To gain that support, it adopted a strategy of political mobilization; that is, controlled participation that integrated Taiwanese into the state without relinquishing the KMT's policy-making monopoly.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Elections have their roots in the ROC constitution, but the KNIT government might well have used the state of emergency to avoid elec
tions, just
as
it negated other constitutional provisions.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
They gave the KNIT ammunition to use against liberal critics and, more importantly, they helped cement the relationship between Mainlanders and the state and draw the Taiwanese into the political system, without actually handing over power to either group.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
They believed Taiwan's only hope for freedom lay in replacing the ROC government with a Taiwanese state with no territorial claim to mainland China.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
A new generation of leaders under Chiang Ching-kuo recognized that the greatest challenge facing the KMT party-state was not mainland recovery, which was no longer a realistic near-term goal, but survival.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
As long as dissidents did not violate the state's basic tenets - adherence to the constitution and rejec
tion of communism and Taiwan independence - the government would find it difficult to silence them.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
When publications went too far, state censors closed them down, only to see them reopen under new titles.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Elections, in contrast, offered the opposition a chance to work within the system to publicize its reformist message and to begin to penetrate the organs of the state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
30
The result was that the Dangwai once again centered its campaign on the twin themes of democratization and ethnic justice - although the definition of ethnic justice was beginning to shift from the Taiwanization of the state (in terms of both personnel and priorities) toward self-determination.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In
Political reform 1972-1988 127
particular, the early Dangwai demand for 'Taiwanization' of the ROC state and ethnic parity between Taiwanese and Mainlanders lost much of its appeal as the KMT's own Taiwanization efforts matured.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The DPP also wanted the state to relin
quish its monopoly on television and radio broadcasting.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
And it proposed profound revisions to the ROC constitution that would refocus the state's mission toward the island of Taiwan itself and de-emphasize the goal of mainland recovery.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Immediately after Chiang's death, many observers predicted Lee would be unable to consolidate his position as head of the ROC state and the Nationalist Party.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The New Tide faction rejected this approach, however, and in its own statement of principles called for bringing about independence by 'using peaceful methods to carry out the ratification of a new constitution by the Taiwanese people, electing a new National Assembly and creating a new state.'
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The state
ments associated most often with the KMT were strongly positive: 'stands for unification' (56 percent of respondents chose this statement), 'is moderately reformist' (44 percent), 'pushes for democracy' (38 percent), 'has sole governing power' (28 percent), and 'fights for freedom and
140 Politics in Taiwan
human rights' (26 percent).
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
As people move from a life of bare subsistence to one of middle
class comfort, their willingness to be ordered about by an authoritarian state declines.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
A modem economy diminishes citizens' dependence on the state, while improved access to education and information makes citizens aware of their relationship to the state and helps them imagine how it might be different.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
These findings gain support from a study by Hu Fu and Chu Yun-ham, who found that 'KMT candidates drew relatively more votes from state employees, farmers, and housewives and retirees ...
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
What was more striking was his finding that KMT vote shares in predominantly Mainlander areas increased with the level of socioeco
nomic development That is, 'Although by itself, high socio-economic development hurts the KMT in neighborhoods and villages with high Mainlander population, it actually benefits the KMT'
3
o
These studies describe a society in which support for the KMT 'is not defined by capitalist production relations but by state power.'
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
31
In other words, a social sector's loyalty to the ruling party reflects the degree to which that population is integrated into the KMT's party-state and its mobilizational networks.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Lin found that even workers were only weakly identified with the Dangwai, in part because their membership in state-sponsored corporatist labor unions kept most within the mobilization system's reach.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
While elevating the status and power of local factions may not seem like a posi
tive step to most advocates of democratization, the challenges facing the
The
watershed
elections of 1989 147
KNIT in the 1989 elections showed that the society had become more autonomous from the state, and was forcing the regime to respond to the interests of social forces, as they themselves defined them.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
But for the KMT, its shrinking majority was a troubling trend, suggesting a crisis of legitimacy not only for the party but for the very state it had founded.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The NAC was, in short an extra-constitu-
issues, including direct election of the provincial governor and Taipei and
tional institution created to negotiate the conditions of a
,) Kaohsiung mayors and popular election of the president (although dele
post-authoritarian state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Reforms of state institutions followed, and the KMT touted them at home and abroad as evidence that it was living up to the name 'Free China.'
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Here, too, the underlying dynamic was rooted in the ballot box: as elections became more competitive, Taiwan's society became stronger, relative to the state.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
As long as electoral competition existed within the confines of a dominant patty system, the state prevailed; its leaders defined the parameters in which political activity could occur.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Two factors played an especially important role in creating this state of affairs.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
After forty years in a state of war, relations between Taipei and Beijing began to thaw in the late 1980s.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The PRC is struggling to implement economic reforms, such as downsizing state-owned enterprises, that could spark civil unrest.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
6 See, for example, Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in
the
Taiwan Miracle, Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 1986; Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the
Republic
of
China, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1989; Daniel Metraux, Taiwan's Political and Economic Growth in the Late
Twentieth-Century,
Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter, Edwin Mellen Press, 1991; Peter R. Moody, Political Change on Taiwan: A Study
of
Ruling Party
Adaptability,
New York, Praeger, 1992; Jauhsieh Joseph Wu, Taiwan's Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1995; Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, The First Chinese Democracy: Political
Life
in the Republic of China on Taiwan, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998; Hung-mao Tien, ed.,
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In particular, the fact that three of the island's four broadcast television stations are linked to state agencies is an important shortcoming.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
This approach urges foreign governments to recognize Taiwan for both moral and practical reasons, because it is a democratic state, an economic power
house and a cooperative international player.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
28 See, for example, Joseph Bmco, 'Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage, and the State in Local Politics,' Ethnology, 31:2 (1992), pp. 157-183; Chao Yung-mao, A Survey
of
Taiwan's Local Politics and Local Construction (Taiwan difang pain yu difang jianshe zhi zhanuang), Taipei, Te-hsin-shih Publishers, 1978; Bruce J. Jacobs, 'Preliminary Model of Particularistic Ties in Chinese Political Alliances: kan-ch'ing and kuan-hsi in a rural Taiwanese Township,' China Quarterly.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
4 Chen Ming-tong and Lin Jih-wen, 'The Origins of Taiwan's Local Elections and the Changing Relations between State and Society' (Taiwan difang xuanju de giyuan yu guojia shehui guanxi zhuanbian) in Chen Ming-tong and Zheng Yungnian, eds, Basic Level Elections and Socio-Political Change on Both Sides of the Strait(Liang an jiceng xuanju yu zhengzhi shehui biangian) Taipei, Yuedan Publishing Company, 1998, p. 30.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
49 Edwin A. Winckler, 'Roles Linking State and Society,' in Hill Gates and Emily Martin Ahern, eds, The Anthropology
of
Taiwanese Society, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1981, p. 68.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
3 Party-state authoritarianism in the pre-reform era (1945-1972)
1 Li Hsiao-feng, Forty Years
of
Taiwan's Democracy Movement (Taiwan minzhu yundong sishi nian), Taipei, Independence Evening Post, 1987, p. 27.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
25 Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in
the
Taiwan Miracle, Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 1986, p. 66.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Gold, Thomas B., State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle, Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 1986.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
DeGlopper, Donald R., Lukang: Commerce and Community in a Chinese City, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Clientelism and local politics
Bosco, Joseph, 'Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage, and the State in Local Poli
tics,' Ethnology, 31:2 (1992), pp. 157-183.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In the United States, 1 have benefited greatly from the wisdom and support of Ambassador Richard Walker and Professor James Myers at the
Acknowledgments ix
University of South Carolina, Professor William C. Kirby of Harvard University, Professor Alan Wachman of Tufts University, Ms Nancy Hearst of the East Asian Research Center at Harvard University, Professor Jean C. Oi, Professor Roderick MacFarquhar, and my colleagues in the Department of Political Science at Davidson College.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
At first, most observers believed the communists would advance quickly to Taiwan to take the island, but the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 brought the ROC on Taiwan under the protective umbrella of the United States.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In Taiwan's case, the regime faced severe internal and external threats - the loss of support from the United States and the United Nations, financial scandals, popular dissatisfaction - that brought its long-term survival into question.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
[Japan's elec
tion] law has inhibited the development of new political techniques similar to those that have developed in the United States and Western Europe.'
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
It was evident, they said, that the 'victors' ventured into Formosa only because the United States stood between them and the dreaded Japanese.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
George Kerr, a Taiwan specialist posted to Taipei by the US government from 1942 to 1947, describes the early contacts between the Taiwanese and their mainland compatriots:
Elements of the United States Seventh Fleet escorted troopships into Keelung and Kaohsiung on October 15.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The KMT's strongest ally, the United States, had with
drawn its support in disgust over the Nationalist regime's corruption and incompetence.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
This left the ROC's diplomatic partners in a quandary: because the ROC refused to relinquish its claim to legitimacy on the mainland, recognizing both states was impossible.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Nixon's visit to China in 1972 demonstrated the United States' determination to build a relationship with Beijing; the Shanghai Communique issued before the visit committed the US to a one-China policy.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
But on 16 December, President Jimmy Carter announced the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
The United States was Taiwan's biggest market, so maintaining the existing level of exports was important economically.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Given the presence of an opposition party, along with the newly liberalized election rules and democratic nominating proce
dures, standard political science hypotheses about democratizing states would predict significant changes in the conduct of the elections.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Instead, ROC leaders took the line that China was divided into two areas, under the jurisdiction of two states.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Under the new 'divided China' formula, Taipei no longer insisted that only one China could be represented in international organizations; instead, ROC leaders pointed to the examples of East and West Germany and North and South Korea to argue that dual recognition of divided states was acceptable both to Taiwan and to the world commu
nity.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Beijing's fury reached fever pitch in mid-March, when the United States sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait to calm the situation.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Still, as long as the president is chair of the majority party, he or she still will may enjoy de facto powers beyond what the constitution states.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In February, ten elected officials from the NP drew fire from party leaders when they endorsed a one China, two Chinese states formula.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Garver, John W, Face
off:
China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1997.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
June 1950 United States Seventh Fleet sails to the Taiwan Strait.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Dec 1978
National supplementary elections canceled due to the
announcement of normalized relations between the
United States and PRC.
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
In other words 'the supreme leader' could only choose among factions ...
Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
This amorphous and informal coalition of US officials, members of Congress, businessmen, publishers, journalists, scholars, church officials, and missionaries, as well as representatives from Taiwan, kept aid flowing, the PRC out of the UN, and diplomatic relations in place.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Frank Church (D-Idaho), and Robert Byrd (D-W Va.) prevented the most objectionable resolutions from being passed.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Perhaps the president resented desertion by fellow Democrats, especially Church, chairman of the SFRC, who planned to run against him in the i98o presidential primaries.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Church, Javits, and other authors of the TRA rejected his position, arguing that to protect sales from Chinese interference there had to be full disclosure.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Oksenberg la
mented its efforts to manipulate the US government, to court states and lo
calities, and to win over members of Congress.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
law doesn't govern China,' and it was undignified to go to court'
;
Looking back at the disarray, David Lee Ta-wei, subsequently foreign minister and representative to Washington, observed, 'Perhaps the only feeling shared by US and ROC officials was a distinct lack of trust.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Both the administration and Congress sought to protect Taiwan's prop
erty interests, right to appear in court, and participation in treaties, inter
national agreements, and international organizations.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Justice Department lawyers fought the case throughout the rest of
1979,
until the Supreme Court finally held it a nonjusticiable political question that coequal branches of the government had to decide themselves.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
They included Annette Lu Hsiu-lien (a future vice pres
ident), Lin Yi-hsiung (a future party chairman), and Shih Ming-te (a future legislator and party chairman), all of whom received substantial prison terms, and those who unsuccessfully defended them in court, particularly Chen Shui-bian (a future president), Frank Hsieh Chang-ring (a future pre
mier and potential president), and So Tseng-chang (a future Taipei county magistrate, party leader, and presidential aspirant).'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
During the trial of Oliver North, Singlaub testified to the US District Court that Elliott Abrams, then assistant secretary of state, called him off because 'someone at the highest level' had approached CCK directly with the request.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Few at the top of ', the party could reach out to Washington, knew much about the US, or wanted to court Americans.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Superficially, the disorder erupted when a US court-martial acquitted an American serviceman for killing a Chinese in Taipei.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The Court-Martial
of
the Kaohsiung Defendants.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Not only would this affirm facts on the ground, it would give Taipei legal standing in US courts to defend assets and agreements against PRC claims.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The State Department urged Beijing to file suit in US courts; Holbrooke, who felt Taipei had stolen the estate, con
templated securing a private attorney for the inexperienced Chinese diplo
mats?
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In particular, it appeared clear that Senator Barry Goldwater would use the Senate floor and the courts to contest the president's right to termi
nate the Mutual Defense Treaty.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
David Dean, the chairman of AIT, did meet with CCK to press for public trials in civilian courts without death sentences for dangwai leaders.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
As for what Taiwan would do after derecognition, US embassy person
nel expected more interest in separation from, than unification with, the mainland.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
David Dean arrived from Washing
ton, followed shortly by a second mission that insisted that Taipei shutter both its hot-cell complex and the island's largest research reactor, which would end plutonium production and preempt separation of plutonium from spent fuel.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Lee insisted that speaking of 'an independent sovereign state' did not neces
sarily imply permanent separation, but rather that Beijing must acknowl
edge the sovereignty of a historical ROC as well as a government chosen by a free and democratic electorate.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Jiang resisted, declaring that China would not abandon force to prevent separation.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The white paper asserted that 'if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reuni
fication,' then Beijing would be 'forced to adopt all drastic measures pos
sible, including the use of force.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Few advocated separation, but suspicion of Beijing's intentions animated real
ists and neoconservatives to worry about protecting strategic sea-lanes, high-tech industry, intelligence gathering, and voting rights.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Although in a truly free vote, the Taiwanese would choose separation, not unification, according to repeated opinion polls, Taiwan's pragmatic public dreams of independence, but accepts the status quo.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Beijing be
gan to talk about 'preventing separation' rather than advancing unifica
tion.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
During and after World War 11, dismay over the ineffectiveness and corruption of the Nationalist Chinese government soured the White House and State Department on Chiang Kai-shek.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Truman and his secretary of state believed diplomatic relations with Chiang's Chinese communist adversaries, who governed the vast majority of the Chinese, might be a necessary and wise solution.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, culti
vated a policy of strategic ambiguity to keep friend and foe, Taipei and Beijing, guessing about the circumstances under which the US might inter
cede in a military conflict in the Strait.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In the ensuing confrontation, Americans measured China against the Soviet Union-better or worse, a puppet or rogue state.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In the same way, anxious to find a solution to the Chinese civil war so that Japan's surrender would not spark renewed fighting, Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent General George Marshall to me
diate in
1945.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, however, concluded that the crisis left him no other choice but, grudgingly, to sign the treaty.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The State Department refused.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
9
Chiang prompted Kennedy's guarantee by threatening to veto Mongolia's UN admission because it remained part of China rather than being an independent state.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
33
Bundy, who had briefly served at the CIA with Cline, urged the president to listen to the station cheif's insights into the KMT's thinking and his warnings that its leaders felt ignored and mistreated by the State Depart
ment.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
3
^
Meanwhile, Kennedy's State Department sought to deal with the Chi
nese representation issue through a 'successor states formula.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
37
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, whom historians and diplomats have blamed for thwarting China initiatives under Kennedy, told his son that he was, in fact, 'leaning toward a two-China policy in x961.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Believing Taipei's veto on Mongolia to be 'political suicide,' he told Assistant Secretary of State Walter McConaughy, a KMT sympathizer, to make clear that the adminis
tration would see to it that the American people lost all compassion for Chiang Kai-shek.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Neither he nor his secre
tary of state educated the opposition, however, deferring to right-wing Re
publican pressures and giving higher priority to improving relations with Moscow.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
During the early 196os, although John F. Kennedy allowed evidence of Chinese fanaticism to dominate his administration's view of the PRC, travel restrictions eased and the State Department reorganized to begin in
dependent analysis of China.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Roger Hilsman, Kennedy's assistant secre
tary of state, told the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, shortly after JFK's death, that the US ought to encourage development of a more prag
matic China while continuing to protect Taiwan, but in the context of a 'two-Chinas' world.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
There was friction, of course, but despite Washington's anger at an unruly client state, its support continued, a support bolstered by anticommunism, do
mestic partisanship, and the cold war.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
To implement the early phases of his China policy, Nixon used the State Department, but he told its China specialists nothing about his broader in
tentions, allegedly believing they were wedded to a pro-Taipei perspective that would interfere with rapprochement.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In fact, opinion throughout the government was mixed, but the first initiatives taken by the White House
Taiwan Expendable? -
37
were based on State Department proposals, including the idea of exchang
ing high-level emissaries.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Nixon and Kissinger, nevertheless, preferred to divert State Department and CIA analysts with task forces and studies.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
38
When, after several postponements, CCK arrived in spring
1970,
the ad
ministration greeted him with a ceremonial welcome ordinarily reserved for heads of state.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Less dramatic but also important was a statement by the State Department spokesman C. W Bray early in the month that China and Taiwan ought to negotiate the status of Taiwan directly, since it re
mained undetermined.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Did Kissinger believe that Taiwan would survive rapprochement as ei
ther a separate state with which the US enjoyed diplomatic relations or as a political entity clinging to some form of autonomy? Although the PRC would lack the military capabilities to attack and occupy the island at least for some time to come, Zhou asserted to Kissinger without hesitation that 'the US must recognize that the PRC is the sole legitimate government in China and that Taiwan Province is an inalienable part of Chinese territory which must be restored to the motherland.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The two men therefore preferred to lie to the sec
retary of state and pretend that they had asked the Chinese to reschedule, rather than actually to do sob
9
Ultimately, Nixon would instruct Kissinger to delay his return to avoid a triumphal homecoming on the day of the vote, but that gesture in no way lessened the US contribution to the Tai
wan debacle.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
73
But of
ficials at the State Department and the National Security Council believed that if the US worked vigorously, a majority for dual representation could be mustered, along with a provision awarding the Security Council seat to Beijing while leaving a place for Taipei in the General Assembly.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Kissinger dismissed the effort as an 'essentially doomed rearguard action' mounted because it was 'the only piece of the action on China under State Department con
trol.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Discussions of what would become the Shanghai Communique had proceeded for months without direct participation by the Department of State.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
By exposing Marshall Green, assistant secretary for East Asia, and Secretary of State William Rogers to the full text for the first time only af
ter the CCP Politburo had approved it, Nixon created a crisis of sorts.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Five months later, administration critics had assailed the secretary of state for inviting North Korea to attack the South.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The leadership had been seriously undermined, the more so since Chiang learned of the trip from men he deemed low-level emissaries, a mere assistant secretary of state and a member of the NSC staff.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Indeed, many diplomats viewed Taiwan's governing authorities with a jaundiced eye, recalling that in the 194os and 1950s the China lobby, with support from the ROC, had tried to drag the US into war with Mao and had helped fuel anticommunist purges at the State De
partment.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
6
Accordingly, Konsin Shah, long a close aide to CKS, became ROC con
sul general to New York, poised to take over as an unofficial ambassador, the Office of ROC Affairs in the State Department (Taiwan desk) specu
lated.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
To ad
dress the risk that he might not be able to control the US office in Beijing, Kissinger set up a private communications channel to the White House and used a CIA agent to bypass State Department personnel.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Shen noted that in a meeting with the secretary of state, shortly before Kissinger's February trip to Beijing, the affable Rogers chided him: 'If we have to reiterate our assurance to your country every time we have had some contact with the Chinese Com
munists, it would give people the impression that your country does not have much faith in us.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Lord, by this time director of Policy Planning at the State Department, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Hummel argued that Beijing saw the US as a guarantor against unwelcome outcomes: a turn to the Soviets, to the Japa
nese, or toward independence, or collapse into chaos.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Before the end of the year, the State Department informally banned high-level meetings.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Instead, Taiwan officials had to deal almost exclusively with the head of the Taiwan desk at the State Department.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
State Department analysts concluded that the likelihood of an attack on Taiwan had significantly fallen, so providing weapons to Taiwan had become a political and economic gesture rather than a military necessity
50
The US military assistance program ended in fiscal year
1973,
and discus
sion began about terminating indirect support provided through foreign military sales credits (FMS).
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
For these reasons Kissingey who remained national security adviser and secretary of state, had no trouble convincing Ford to meet privately with China's Washington representative.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Although the new president greeted Huang and fifty-nine other foreign envoys, only the deputy secretary of state met with the ROC ambassador.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In September
1974
CCK placed Mei Ko
wang in charge of running ROC intelligence agents in the US, hoping his background in police administration and his Michigan State University doctorate would be more useful than intelligence experience.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Arthur Hummel, deputy assistant
Strait Talk - 78
Collapse and Reprieve - 79
secretary and assistant secretary for East Asian Affairs at the State Depart
ment in the mid-1970s, lamented failures of security.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
State Depart
ment and CIA officials, though often quarreling, nevertheless agreed Tai
pei would not risk provoking China and jeopardizing US and Japanese support.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
After Unger's deputy William Gleysteen assumed duties as deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia, he reached out to Tai
wan, providing better access to information when 'Kissinger refused all contact with Taiwan officials, and none of my other seniors, including [As
sistant Secretary Philip] Habib, wanted to hold Taiwan's hand.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
State Department officials recorded that 'Shen was more shaken than we have ever seen him'; they expected that 'although CCK may take the news with less signs of emotion, we recognize that he will be jolted.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The State Depart
ment generally prevailed: Taiwan obtained only modest increments to its capabilities.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
'40
State Department and White House concern for Chinese sensi
tivities, however, overrode Unger and undercut the Defense Department's desire to sell Harpoons.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
State Department lawyers complained that their diplomat col
leagues ignored the need for clear rights and obligations.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The rest argued over whether, if international law did not automatically terminate the treaty with a break in diplomatic relations, derecognition of Taiwan as a state would void the pact and the US ability to defend the island
42
At the NSC, where Brent Scowcroft had become national security adviser, analysts asserted that since the US had never 'explicitly recognized Taiwan as part of China,' it would not infringe on China's sovereignty in coming to Taiwan's rescue.°'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Carter and his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, believed in the desirability and possibility of a new detente.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
By comparison, planning for the diminished role of Taiwan-an ally that would soon cease to be an ally, a state that would no longer be recognized by many states, and an erstwhile international player that would become peripheral to world affairs-appeared unglamorous and burdensome.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Meanwhile, the NSC and State Department sorted out what Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger had promised to, and accomplished with, China.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
To sharpen the picture, Cyrus Vance, as secretary of state designate, assembled a group with Asia experi
ence in December
1976,
including Richard Holbrooke, soon to be assis
tant secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the State Department; Michel Oksenberg, who would become the key China specialist at the NSC; Anthony Lake, Vance's choice to head Policy Planning; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Gleysteen.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Holbrooke, an early member of Carter's foreign policy team, entered the State Department committed to rapid recognition of China.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
His enthusi
asm for normalization drew him to Oksenberg and the White House, whereas his strong personal and bureaucratic identification with Vance and the State Department caused him to defend their views.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
,
The conspicuous, clearly mutual bitterness between Holbrooke and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, complicated coop
eration between the NSC and State Department, but the degree to which it affected policy toward Taiwan and China remains unclear.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
moments of ri
valry and tension, but the main story I would stress is the pursuit of com
mon objectives,' which included 'regular State, DOD, NSC consulta
tions.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In China, 'Brzezinski's behav
ior was outrageous, particularly his delight in humiliating Holbrooke and the State Department both in private and public-behavior that would have been unimaginable for his Chinese hosts, who of course took care
ful note of this gratuitous advertisement of strains within the American camp,' recalled Gleysteen.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The State Department wanted to have the action on it.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The president felt, and I shared the view, that if we did it through the State De
partment we would never get it done.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
s Ironically, when writing the recog
nition communique, Oksenberg borrowed Roger Sullivan from the State Department to speed drafting, which meant that Sullivan had to call in sick so that Holbrooke would not know he was working at the White House.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Only the strong objection of the secretary of state, rooted as much in bureaucratic rivalry as in concern about Taipei, delayed this early and unexamined decision on Taiwan policy.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The choice least likely to an
ger China, and therefore most appealing to the State Department, was to increase Taiwan's force of relatively unsophisticated and short-range Northrop F-511s, planes that posed no threat to the mainland.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
John Chang Hsiao-yen had transmitted this message from Washington in
1977
after State Department officers Burton Levin and Chas Freeman warned him that 'the storm was gathering,' and Taipei must prepare.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
My goodness, even the assistant secretary of state for East Asian Affairs was pretty much kept out of it.'°
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Deng had been rehabilitated only the month before, and his commitment to support Hua Guofeng as party chairman and head of state seemed unlikely to endure.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
They proposed that a 'respected, knowledgeable, discreet lawyer' be brought in to 'critique and assist' the State Depart
ment Legal Bureau in studying arrangements for future relations with Tai
pei because 'it is essential that the legal work be invulnerable to Con
gressional probing.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The president insisted that developments be known only to a small circle, including Brzezinski, Vance, Brown, Mondale, Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, Oksenberg, and Hol
brooke, along with staff members Roger Sullivan (detailed to the White House from State), William Gleysteen at State, the CIA station chief, and J. Stapleton Roy, Woodcock's deputy in Beijing.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Carter warned Vance against leaks, observing, 'I don't trust (1) Congress, (z) White House, (3) State, or (4) Defense to keep a secret.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Vance, Hol
brooke, and Warren Christopher, deputy secretary of state, worried that Senate leadership, if excluded from the process, would balk.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Even the secretary of state had gone to Egypt.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
;
° Finally, at Brzezinski's behest, Carter directed that CCK be given just two hours' warning, though State Department interces
sion added a few more hours.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Commenting on the confrontation, the Wall Street journal complained, 'His real offense was being too eloquent a spokesman for the State Department bureaucracy to tolerate.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
He re
called, 'Many State Department officials suspected the ROC would try ev
ery measure to muster support to unravel or disrupt the new agreement with the PRC..
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
chairman of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee, quickly assembled a delegation and trav
eled to the island over State Department protests.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In fact, the Department of State press survey staff noted that, although sentiment overall favored recognition, both proponents and opponents focused on Taiwan's sudden vulnerability and the absence of security guarantees 4
7
Dole, encouraged by the ROC premier, extended an invitation to CCK on behalf of the Coalition for Peace through Strength to come to Washing
ton to confront Carter before relations ended.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Perhaps some of our subse
quent problems, such as the ambiguities and disagreements with China over the Taiwan Relations Act, can be attributed to the lack of planning, but it must be remembered that under very trying circumstances the State Department did extremely well.''
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In April, before Brzezinski's crucial trip to Beijing, but at a time when key people saw normalization as certain to occur during Carter's first term, State Department lawyers predicted legal hazards and looked for reme
dies.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Under the watchful eye of Herbert Hansell, the State Department's legal adviser, a three-month study
Strait Talk - 118
looked at options.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Therefore, while NSC and State Department China specialists became 'consumed' with preparations for Deng Xiaoping's January visit, they reluctantly found themselves forced to deal with unrest in Congress and in Taiwan.e
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
By
1978,
though the details remained secret, NSC and Department of State personnel focused exclusively on normalization.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
That wasn't where we were in the Department of State.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
A high-level Taiwan official noted privately that he had been urged by a low-ranking State Department officer to mobilize friends in Congress to fill a gaping hole in the omnibus bill.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Faced with objections to the administration's posture on the defense of Taiwan, the NSC and the State Department worked, although not always in unison, to contain the reaction.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
State Department officers also tried to forestall further complaints about lack of consultation by discussing the pending omnibus bill with both the SFRC and the House International Af
fairs Committee.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The Taiwan Relations Act - 121
The State Department generally appeared more realistic and concilia
tory than the White House, as it recognized that language regarding secu
rity had become inevitable.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Roger Sullivan found that as he negotiated the details of Taiwan's future, his embassy interlocutors
already had his official instructions, provided by a sympathizer from the State Department 2
2
Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k'un, Sullivan's counterpart, rendered 'an extraordinarily skilled performance,' according to one US partici
pant, 'on the level of rhetoric, tugging at the heartstrings; at the level of practicality, devising solutions; at the level of tactics, integrating intel
ligence with negotiation.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The NSC reduced the visi-
Strait Talk - 124
bility
,
of military assistance and supported State against Defense to curb training programs; it favored aid for specific weapons rather than compre
hensive assistance.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Beijing feared Cline would be named assistant sec
retary of state for East Asia, and, although it soon became apparent that Cline would not enter the administration, the Chinese continued to be alarmed about him and others like him.)°
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
John Holdridge, the assistant secretary for East Asian Affairs designate, collaborating with Lilley and pushed by Alexander Haig, the incoming secretary of state, acted immediately.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Op
ponents appeared primarily among China specialists in Washington and Beijing, strongly supported by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who had participated in the Nixon opening, and Vice President George Bush.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
More ideological and vociferously anticommunist were individuals such as Paul Wolfowitz, head of Policy Planning at State, and Reagan himself.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Meanwhile, the State Department argued that the president needed Beijing's cooperation in dealing with egregious Soviet expansionist behavior going on in Poland.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Haig urged Deng not to 'drive Taiwan into a state of despera
tion' that could lead authorities there to 'attempt development of a sepa
rate nuclear capability.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Foreign Minister Huang Hua forcefully articulated China's arms sales position to Haig at a heads-of-state meeting in Cancun, Mexico, in Octo
ber
198x,
and Beijing kept up the pressure relentlessly thereafter.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Further, ac
cording to Gelb, a well-placed Pentagon official, 'echoing military and State Department judgments' told him, '`If the FX is sold to Taiwan, it will be strictly for political reasons, not military ones.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Gelb had noted in the
Times,
'The State Department has been trying to calm Peking by holding up signing about $Soo million in new arms sales contracts to Taiwan, excluding the FX.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Early drafts from the State De
partment exasperated Reagan because, he wrote, of 'the note of almost apology to the P.R.C.' National Security Adviser William P. Clark and the NSC reworked them, but the letters still reflected Haig's sense of urgency more than Reagan's convictions.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
By June the acrimonious negotiations finally reached the point where State Department officers could prepare text for a joint communique.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
I'm not turning my back on Taiwan, and other than a few State Department types, no one is trying to push me that way.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In June tg8a, as State Department officers wrestled with language for the China communique, Mark Mohr, deputy director of the Taiwan desk, re
ceived orders to put together a statement that would be transmitted from Reagan to CCK.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Similarly unpersuasive is Special Assis-
Strait Talk - 150
tant to the Secretary of State Charles Hill's account that Reagan drafted them personally: Reagan had not followed the debates closely enough.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Lilley recalls, by contrast, 'the distinct feeling' that the contents were not new to Chiang and that someone at the State Department had probably leaked them.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Haig never expected vigorous adher
ence to the assurances and did not foresee that a new constellation of of
ficials at the State Department would use them to offset a communique they did not like and would not fully implement.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
According to Secretary of State George Shultz, its existence, once revealed to Taipei, made a big difference in the level of anxiety there.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
American Assurances - 1 S3
Shultz Arrives
When Alexander Haig left the State Department, Reagan named George Shultz as his secretary of state.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In Haig's State Depart
ment, he had been one of the few high-level figures who had dared directly to oppose the secretary's tilt toward China as well as his position on the August Communique.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Sigur's ability to exert influence was greater than most National Security Council staffers or assistant secretaries of state, given his assiduously culti
vated network of interagency and international contacts.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Given the fierce compe
tition between Shultz and Defense Secretary Weinberger as well as the clash over power and access to the president that developed between Shultz and National Security Adviser Clark, Wolfowitz, Armitage, and Sigur
American Assurances - 1 SS
played a crucial mediating function without which many issues could not have been resolved 2
1
It was not surprising under these circumstances that one of the first ma
jor studies to be done after Shultz moved into the State Department in July
198.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Although usu
ally sensitive to political and personal dynamics, Taipei sought to influence Shultz through Defense Secretary Weinberger and National Security Ad
viser Clark, both chronically at odds with the secretary of state.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Bill Brown, deputy to Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz, better served Tai
wan's interests.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
He and his counterparts, Jim Kelly at DOD and David Laux from the NSC, prompted Wolfowitz, Armitage, and Sigur to support the IDF at a critical meeting with Shultz, in opposition to China hands at the State Department, who argued that IDF development violated the Au
gust Communique, and that the aircraft would not be viable.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Various State Department officers, distrustful of Taiwan and convinced that China would not tolerate the transfer, strongly opposed the idea.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Both the NSC and State Department, however, insisted that Reagan not appear eager to visit Bei
jing, a posture that had given the Chinese too much leverage over his pre
decessors.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Strait Talk - 164
Central American Leverage
CCK understood that the role of a dependent state sometimes required support for the overseas adventures of its patron and that this could accrue to the dependent's international standing.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Evi
dence does exist that NSC, CIA, and State Department officials met and decided to stop Singlaub, but the reasons remain unclear.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Feeling acutely that his illness-which often confined him to bed and made it impossible to read state papers-left him little time to cement his legacy, Chiang lifted martial law, permitted an opposition political party to operate, and freed the press.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
(Of course, he could more easily make that assertion because he did not read their writings, just as he failed to exploit much of the State Department material provided before his departure.)'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagle
burger also had been with that cadre.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Nearly as important, Bush appointed James Baker secretary of state though, or maybe because, he remained a neophyte in the realm of foreign relations: the president cared more about his consummate political skills and their thirty-five years of friendship.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Baker did not push State Department inter
ests at the White House or make efforts to include the diplomats' perspec
tives on China, much less on Taiwan issues.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
And instead of familiar figures sympathetic to Taiwan (such as Richard Armitage and James Lilley), Bush chose Richard Solomon as State Depart
ment East Asian assistant secretary.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In any case, Baker had no interest and Bush saw no reason to consult anyone at State.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
3
Secre
tary of State Baker appeared to be hinting in the pages of
Foreign
Affairs
that if China did not act more responsibly on issues such as arms sales, the administration might have to resort to an 'ultimate sanction-a threat to the territorial integrity of the Middle Kingdom.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Capturing a majority in a key state like Texas suddenly took on overwhelming importance, particularly given Bush's identification with Texas as his adopted home and the embarrassing possibility that he might forfeit its thirty-five electoral college ballots.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
As Robert Suettinger, then National Intelligence officer for East Asia, recalled, 'Several interagency work groups were held in August at which the Defense Department presented its case to a rather skeptical audience of State Department, Commerce Department, and intelligence community representatives.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
State Department officers, recognizing that the exercise was pro forma, busied themselves looking for ways to implement the president's order while staving off the worst of China's fury.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Within the administration an informal interagency dis
cussion group, which had begun to meet in
199
r and encompassed people from the NSC, the vice president's office, DOD, the State Department, and the CIA, began to focus on the Chinese problem.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
6
The State Department, however, remained unmoved.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who had initially declared that the sale would be made over his dead body, argued to the press that transfer of the planes would do no more than restore Taipei's ability to protect the island at the same level as had existed at the time of derecognition, given how many aircraft Taiwan had lost.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Ding Mou-shih, head of CCNAA, met for the first time with the recently appointed assistant secretary of state for East Asian Affairs, William Clark Jr. (not related to judge William P. Clark), to discuss Bush's July
3o
remarks on an F-16 sale.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Within the Department of State reverberations of the F-16 decision pro
duced uncertainty about the direction of future relations with Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
A Japan specialist, Clark approached Taiwan more sympatheti
cally than many at State and sought to rectify cumbersome procedures complicating relations with Taipei.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Thus, Clinton's national secu-
Strait Talk - 196
rity adviser, his secretary of state, and the assistant secretary for East Asian Affairs argued that relations with China could not be seen solely through the lens of business interests, but, to be healthy and stable, must simulta
neously emphasize a values dimension.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Warren Christopher had said much the same thing during his confirma
tion hearing as secretary of state in January
1993.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
3
To Christopher, emphasizing human rights had been a lifelong pre
occupation, beginning with civil rights work in the Johnson years and as second in command at the State Department during the Carter administra
Change and Continuity -- 197
tion.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Lake had not yet wrested China policy from the State Department in the summer of 1993, and no one paid attention to Taiwan at the NSC.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
State, at the same time, could not or would not argue to dislodge the review.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Both NSC and State Department officials had more insistent problems to handle and preferred to sidestep the Tai
wan review.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The state would teach Taiwan history and geogra
phy in the schools and encourage the use of the Taiwan dialect rather than Mandarin.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
He played golf throughout Southeast Asia and met with heads of state during these 'informal' visits.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Lee's request to attend the November
1993
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Seattle, after Clinton had raised it to a head-of-state level, however, was predictably de
nied.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Accordingly, State Department analysts braced for the day that Lee would try to use a visit to his allies in Latin America to justify a layover on US soil.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Lake, however, still not convinced that the White House should engage China-Taiwan policy, preferred not to challenge State Department drafting.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In the end, the White House and State Department backed down and agreed to let Lee land in Honolulu.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In any case, not only did the State Department fail to squelch the Hawaii stories, but the incident allowed Lee to stimulate sentiment for a compensatory trip.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
US officials could enter govern
ment offices in Taiwan and Taiwan's representatives could do the same in Washington, except at the White House, the adjacent Old Executive Office Building, and the State Department.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Finally, to improve economic interaction, the review authorized a sub
cabinet economic dialogue and efforts by State Department officials, up to undersecretary level, to advance US business prospects with the US's sixth
largest trading partner.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The idea of an appearance at Cornell or at any other of several universities that had invited him predated the Hawaii debacle, and Cornell's president had approached the State Department about inviting Lee as early as the spring of 1993.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Some thirty state legislatures passed resolutions favoring Lee's trip.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
But how much did they need to know? If Clinton could welcome the controversial Gerry Adams, leader of the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, to the White House in the spring of 1995, over London's protests, why would they want to turn away an elected head of government because Beijing said no? State Department priorities
.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
They accepted assurances-in particular those from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on April
17,
1995
-
that
Clinton would not grant Lee a visa because that would be inconsistent with unofficial relations.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
As part of his gubernatorial duties as a promoter of commercial deals for his state, Clinton had taken the first Arkansas trade mission to the Far East.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The US ambas
sador to China, J. Stapleton Roy, thought that Washington was long over
due in telling Chinese leaders of the probable trip and should offer Jiang Zemin the state visit he coveted to soften the blow.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Berger and Suettinger at the NSC as well as Jim Steinberg and Alan Romberg at the State Depart
ment adamantly insisted that the visa be denied.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
r46o) prohibited the secretary of state from preventing any elected Taiwan official from entering the US on the grounds of 'adverse foreign policy consequences.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
THE CLINTON
administration had been manipulated by a weak client state that had, not for the first time, used the American system against it
self.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The State Department worked with TECRO to ensure that Lee would undertake a modest, private visit.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
First, he empha
sized that popular elections imbued the ROC with sovereignty, not just its status as the successor state to the Qing Dynasty.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Taiwan Strait Crisis - 215
After Lee's visit to Cornell, the assistant secretary refused to see Lu, and when Lu realized Lord's door had closed, he prevented his deputy at TECRO from dealing directly with Lord's deputy at State.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
State Department China special
ists had tried to alert senior officials that maneuvers of this sort might be undertaken in the wake of a Lee visit.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In negotiations that autumn for a US
China summit, the State Department refused to make Taiwan central to the agenda because the US position 'is not going to change.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Both the State Department and the intel
ligence community created special task forces to collect information, and the latter provided daily updates to leaders.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Perry angrily pointed this out to Liu Huaqiu, director of the Foreign Affairs Office of China's State Council, who arrived in Washington as those missiles crashed into the sea.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Sandy Berger and Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff called for cross-Strait talks and pledges of cooperation from Lee Teng-hui.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Steinberg, in con
junction with Thomas Pickering, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, sustained contact with Ding and others who had accompanied him from Taipei.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Wood's lack of qualifications outraged the AIT board of directors-two of whom resigned-and State
Strait Talk - 226
Department officers, who slowed his paperwork.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Thus, he urged, when the secretary of state trav
eled to China, an assistant secretary of state should go to Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Both the White House and State Department involved him in decision making from which AIT direc
tors were customarily excluded, further increasing his stature, credibility, and value in dealing with Taipei.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Certain this discus
sion would anger Beijing, however, the State Department and the NSC in
sisted the DOD postpone the first session until after the October Clinton
Jiang summit, judging the potential harm to Sino-American relations more important than any reassurance it might provide Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Before Jiang's trip to Washington in
1997,
Beijing pressed for a public written statement refining these ideas, but the adminis
tration agreed only to Clinton's oral reiteration of the pledges in private; the State Department's press spokesman, Jamie Rubin, would explicitly af
firm them after the Chinese had left Washington.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Lee had begun speaking of the ROC as 'an independent sovereign state' as early as
1988,
echoing a formulation that both Chiangs had also em
ployed.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Madeleine Albright at State and Sandy Berger at the NSC, for instance, largely ignored Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
As one senior official acknowledged later, the initial silence that had greeted reiteration of the Three Nos by Rubin,
Setting the Record Straight - 235
Albright, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk had misled them.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
State-to-State Relations
Taiwan's predicament remained chiefly political.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Startling members of his own government whom, as usual, he had not consulted, he used a ques
tion previously submitted by the reporter to assert that relations between China and Taiwan ought to be conducted on a 'special state-to-state' basis.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In the wake of his 'two-state' declaration, his popularity soared to 87 percent.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
22
In the
Deutsche Uelle
interview, however, Lee responded directly with his so-called two-state theory.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Instead, Taiwan had to assert its legitimacy as a state, along
side the PRC, within one future nation called China and carry on special state-to-state relations.z
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
On the morning of July
9,
Lee told Tsai and the project director Chang Jung-feng that he intended to announce the state-to-state formula.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Kenneth Lieberthal from the NSC and Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth flew to Beijing to calm the Chinese, deny US involvement, and avert retaliation.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
He argued that the state-to-state idea, like the Three Nos, was not new, only a different formulation.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Probably the most serious cost of Lee's two-state declaration was the disruption of secret high-level communications between Washington and Taipei.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
When Clinton told reporters, during a July
z1,
1999,
press confer
ence, that three pillars defined his China-Taiwan policy, most observers thought he was warning Taiwan against pursuing the two-state initiative further.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Carl Ford, a high-level Cassidy representative who served in both the Defense and State departments and on Capitol Hill, in
sisted that his lobbyists were crucial, arguing, 'My experience has been that the US will do things for Taiwan only when the pain becomes so great that they have no other option.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
On the day of his inauguration, May zo, Chen declared his '4 Nos and x shall not,' motivated at least as much by recognition that he must avoid war with China: '[As] long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not de
clare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called 'state-to-state' description in the Con
stitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Richard Armitage, the fu
ture deputy secretary of state, for instance, arranged a meeting between Taiwan officials and Bush before the election so that, should he win, each side would know what the other desired.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
He had served as assistant secretary for East Asia in the State Department in the Reagan ad
ministration, working closely there with Armitage, and later as a top aide to Cheney at the Pentagon during the administration of George H. W Bush when the
F-16
sale to Taipei materialized.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
His coauthors included Wolfowitz, James Kelly, future assistant secretary of state for East Asia, and Torkel Patterson, soon to join the NSC as senior Asia director.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In office as deputy secretary of state, he
i, did what he could, within the constraints of the unofficial relationship, to communicate with Taipei.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
He placed himself among administra
tion alliance advocates like Rumsfeld, Armitage, and Secretary of State Colin Powell and against great power continentalists, who, he felt, did not understand that Asia was not Europe.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Their collaboration linked a wider community concerned about US-Taiwan relations, including Jim Kelly, the assistant secretary of state, who had worked on Taiwan at the Reagan NSC and Defense Department, as well as Randall Schrivey an Armitage protege who moved from DOD to State to be a special assistant and later deputy assistant secretary for East Asia.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Taiwan as a one-party state with a limited future had seemed predictable, not requiring a robust contingent of AIT political observers.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The split generally pitted the NSC and State against
Strait Talk - 266
DOD, the vice president's office, and sometimes the president.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Thus, Chen warned against coercion, declaring, 'Taiwan is not a province of one country nor is it a state of another,' and asserting that the one
China principle is 'abnormal thinking.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
DOD's emphasis on defense mea
sures clashed with the NSC and State's focus on political solutions.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
ADST Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Service Oral History Project
AIDC Aero Industry Development Center
AIT American Institute in Taiwan
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARATS Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait
ASW antisubmarine warfare
BUSH George H. W. Bush Library, College Station, Texas
CARTER Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia
CCK Chiang Ching-kuo
CCNAA Coordination Council for North American Affairs CCP Chinese Communist Party
CFPF Central Foreign Policy Files
CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific Command CKS Chiang Kai-shek
CNA Central News Agency, Taipei
CWIHP Cold War International History Project
DOD Department of Defense
DPP Democratic Progressive Party
DNSA Digital National Security Archive
EA Bureau of East Asian Affairs, State Department
FAPA Formosan Association for Public Affairs
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FEER Far Eastern Economic Review
Abbreviations - 282
FMS foreign military sales
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FORD Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan
FRUS Foreign Relations o f the United States
HAKO Henry A. Kissinger Office Files
IAEA International Atomic Energy Commission
IDF indigenous fighter aircraft
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOHNSON Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas KENNEDY John E Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts KNIT Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) LAT Los Angeles Times
LSK Liu Shao K'ang
MAC Mainland Affairs Council MDT Mutual Defense Treaty MEMCON Memorandum of Conversation MFN most-favored-nation status
MND Ministry of National Defense
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFAA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Taipei
MUDD Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University
NARA National Archives, College Park, Maryland
NPC National People's Congress
NPMP Nixon Presidential Materials Project NSA National Security Archive
NSB National Security Bureau, Taiwan NSC National Security Council
NSAEBB National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book NUC National Unification Council
NYT New York Times
PLA People's Liberation Army
PRC People's Republic of China
REAGAN Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California
ROC Republic of China
SCMP South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)
SEF Straits Exchange Foundation
SFRC Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SIGINT signals intelligence
TECRO Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
TMD theater missile defense
TRA Taiwan Relations Act
TRI Taiwan Research Institute
TSEA Taiwan Security Enhancement Act TSI Taiwan Studies Institute
USLO US Liaison Office
USUN US Mission to the United Nations
Abbreviations - 283
WHCF White House Central Files
WP Washington Post
WSJ Wall Street Journal WT Washington Times WTO World Trade Organization
Notes
Introduction
z.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
NSC 37, 'The Strategic Importance of Formosa,' December
1,
1948, U.S. De
partment of State,
FRUS,
1949,
v0L
9 (Washington D.C., 1975), 262; Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary Johnson, August 17, 1949, ibid.,
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
FRUS
195
2-
54
,
14, Pt-
1
(1985), 307-30; 'Status of Aid Programs for the Republic
of China,' March 7, 1956, Box 31, folder: State Department, Karl Rankin Pa
pers, MUDD.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
FRUS
x961-63, 154-59; Bundy to U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Undersecre
tary of State for Political Affairs, memo, August 21-, x961, ibid.,
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Bundy told Kennedy the KMT believed the 'wicked State Department' op
posed the president's friendlier views.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Komer to Bundy and Rostow, June 15, 196x, NSF Countries, folder: China General 6/13/6x to 6/z7/6r, KENNEDY; Department of State Daily Opinion Summary, White House Central Files (WHCF), Box 387, folder: IT47/COx
CO 5o-z, KENNEDY.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Roger Hilsman to Michael V Forrestal, memo, July 9, 1963, Declassified Doc
uments Reference System (1988), Fiche 191, no. 2841; Roger Hilsman to Sec
retary of State, memo, October 24, 1963, drafted by Jim Thomson, ibid.,
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Airgram 1037, Taipei to State, June zo, 1966, 'Indications Government of the ROC Continues to Pursue Atomic Weaponry,' NSAEBB, no. zo; 'New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese `Nuclear Intentions,' 1966-1976,' www .gwu.edu/--nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBBzo/.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#
2
7529 State to Taipei, February z4, 1970, Paul Kreisberg, FOIA.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#134611 State to Taipei, July z4, 1971, folder: UN6 Chinat, July 23, 1971, Box 3211, UN (Chicom-Chinat), CFPF, 1970-73, RG 59, NARA; #3680 McConaughy, Taipei, July z8, 197x, NARA.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#067545 State, December 15, 1971, WHCF, Subject Files, CO 34 China [1969-70], Box 17, NPMP, RG 59, NARA.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Talking Points, Department of State, n.d.,
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Secto zlz For Eagleburger from Breme, November 17, 1974, folder: PRC
State Department Telegrams to Secretary of State-NODIS (3), Box 15, NSA-President Country Files, FORD; Memcon Kissinger with Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, February z6-27,1972,
10:zo
PM-1:40 AM, HAKO, Box 9z, Dr Kissinger's Meetings in the PRC during the Presidential Visit, Feb
ruary 1971, NPMP, NARA and NSA; Kissinger,
White House
Years, 2082-84; Bush, At Cross Purposes, z z9-30
18.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau expressed greater urgency in 'Peking Changes Taiwan Line,' Intelligence Note, April z, 1974, Box 331: China Ex
changes April 1-August 8, 1974, thru October-December 1975, folder: China Exchanges April r-August 8, 1974, SPC/SP Lord, NARA.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#io657o Rush, State, May zi, 1974, ibid.;
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#1871 Unger, Taipei, May z4, 1974, ibid,; #128587 Sisco, State Depart
ment, June 17, 1974, Box
1:
Embassy Taipei
1
959
-
1977, folder: DEF 15-9 Reductions-ROC 1974, RG 84, NARA.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
State could not stop Defense officials, particularly those overseas, from traveling to Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#5091 Unger, Taipei, August 14, 1974, NSA/PCF/EAP, Box 5, folder: China, Republic of-State Department Telegrams to SecState-EXDIS (z ), FORD.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#6814 Unger, Taipei, NSA/PCF/EAP, Box 5, folder: China, Republic of-State Department Telegrams to SecState-NODIS (3), FORD.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#5933 Unger, Taipei, September z4, 1974, NSA/PCF/EAP, Box 5, folder: China, Republic of-State Department Telegrams to SecState-NODIS (1), FORD.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#0668 Unger, Taipei, February 6, 1975, NSA/PCF/EAP, Box 5, folder: China, Republic of-State Department Telegrams to SecState-NODIS (z), FORD.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#019383 Kissinger, January 28, 1974, NSA/PCF/EAP, Box 5, folder: China, Republic of-State Department Telegrams from SecState-NODIS (1), FORD; #0513 Unger, Taipei, January 29,
1
974, ibid.;
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Box 4, folder: China, Republic of (z); unmarked paper left with CCK, February 6, 1975, Box 5, folder: China, Republic of-State Department Telegrams from SecState
NODIS (1); #04176o Kissinger, February 24, 1975, ibid.,
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Memcon Dr. E. Abel, West German Embassy, with H. Daniel Brewster (SCI/AE), State Department, November zz, 1972, Subject-Numeric Files, 1970-73, AE
111
Chinat, RG 59, NSAEBB zo; Moser to Green, December 14, 1971, ibid.,
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
FSE 13 Chinat #2051 State to Embassies, Bonn, Brussels, and Taipei, January 4, 1973, ibid.;
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#12137 State to McConaughy, January zo, 1973, ibid.;
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#51747 State to Taipei, March
zT,
1973, NSAEBB zo; #7051 Taipei to State, November z3, 1973, NSAEBB 2zz.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
'Prospects for Arms Production and Development in the Republic of China,' Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, NIO IIM 76-ozo, May 1976, NSA/ PCF/EAP, Box 5, folder: China, Republic of (to), FORD; #6172 Unger, Taipei, September 15, 1976, NSA/PCF/EAP, Box 5, folder: China, Republic of-State Department Telegrams to SecState-EXDIS (z), FORD; Memcon Unger with Ambassador James C. H. Shen, November 18, 1976, Box x: Embassy Taipei 1959-1977, folder: DEF 12 Nuclear Weapons 1976, RG 84, NARA; #91733 Robinson to Taipei, September 4, 1976, NSAEBB zzz.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#5091 Unger, Taipei, August 14, 1974, NSA/PCF/EAP, Box 5, folder: China, Republic of-State Department Telegrams to SecState-EXDIS (t), FORD.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
CIA Chron, 44; #153o Bruce, Peking, NSAIPCF/EAP, Box 15: Country File— PRC-State Department Telegrams, folder: PRC-State Department Tele
grams to SecState-EXDIS (i), FORD; Hummel to Kissinger, memo, Septem
ber 14, 1974, Box 376: China Sensitive Chron August 17-October 15, 1974 than China Sensitive Chron February-April 1974, folder: China-Sensitive Chron August 17-October 15, 1974, SPC/SP Lord, NARA; Tyler, Great Wall, 186-87.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The State Department's Intelligence and Re
search staff contradicted the CIA, dismissing the CIA's evidence as contin
gency planning.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
#332 Taipei to State, January 19, 1977, NSAEBB z2i.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Nonprolifer
ation and U.S. Foreign
Policy (Washington, D.C., z98o), 69n12, 70; #67316 State to Taipei, March z6, 1977, NSAEBB
zz1;
Brzezinski to Carter, April z9, 1977, ibid.;
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Vance to Carter, January
11,
1979, Plains Files, Subject Files, State Depart
ment Evening Reports, Box 39, folder: State Department Evening Reports, December 1978, CARTER; Loh I-cheng, 'Taiwan: `We'll Fight, We'll Die for Freedom,''
New York Daily News,
December z6, 1978, 34; 'Ugly American
ism,' WSJ, February 6, 1979, 18; Loh I-cheng interview, November 8, 2ooo, Taipei.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Vance to Carter, January z3, 1979, Plains Files, Subject Files, State Depart
ment Evening Reports, Box 39, folder: State Department Evening Reports, January 1979, CARTER.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Vance to Carter, January 9, 1979, Plains Files, Subject Files, State Department Evening Reports, Box 39, folder: State Department Evening Reports, Decem
ber 1978, CARTER; Vance to Carter, January
i 1,
1979, ibid.;
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Interview with Department of State official, not for attribution, z003.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Garver, Face
Off,
8z; Ross, 'The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation,' 96-98; Department of State daily press briefings, September 18, 1995, and
September it,
1995.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
They met on nine occa
sions between 1988 and 1992 with mainland counterparts, who were proba
bly Yang Side, a PLA career officer, the secretary general of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group, the director of the Central Committee's Taiwan Work Office, and a representative of Yang Shangkun, and Wang Zhaoguo, i99i-96 Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee and 19go-96 Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, as well as Wang Daohan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
On the Beijing side there were Tang Shubei, deputy director of the PRC State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office and vice chairman of ARATS, and Zhou Ning.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
(accessed December zooo); Micheal D. Slack, in a telephone interview, February 4, zoos, revealed a contemporary study from the State Department's political-military affairs office that also em
phasized skills over equipment.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Seth Faison, 'Taiwan President Implies His Island Is Sovereign State,' NYT, July
1
3, 1999,
www.lexis-nexis.com
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
National Archives, College Park, Maryland
RG 59: General Records of the Department of State; RG 84: Post Files; RG 218: Joint Chiefs of Staff Record Group; RG 381: Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
United States Department of State.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Testimony of Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, March z5, 1996.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Department
of
State Bulletin zz
(January z3, 1950): r 11-18.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
'Taiwan President Implies His Island Is Sovereign State.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni
versity Press, x986.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Tempe: Arizona State University Press, 1995.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
J.), 98, 247, 264 Chen Hsi-fan (Stephen), zz7, 134 Chen Li-an, 166, 183, 191
Chen Shui-bian, 125, 180, 238, 246, 261, 172, 276, 277, 178; and TSEA, 147; poli
cies toward China, 153, 254, 255, 265
266; election in zooo, 253-254, 175; Pol
icies toward independence, 254, 265
166,,167-x68, z6g, 275; '4 Nos and i
Index - 377
shall not' declaration, 154, 268, 275; ab titudes toward United States, 255, 26z
263; decision making process, 163, 265, 266, z6g; one state on each side of the Strait (yibian yiguo), 265; policies toward referenda, 266-267; policies toward US arms sales, 269-z7o
Cheney, Dick, 185, 256, 158, 261, 266, 168 Chennault, Anna, 131-132, 134
Chiang Ching-kuo, 16, 33, 34, 37, 201, 232; relationship with Cline, zi, z4, 133; relationship with Ch'ien, 38, 45, 49, 97, 98, 135, 149, 150, 151.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
53,55-56,58-6o,62,63-64,67,74, 75, 80, 83
-
84, 85, 86, 88, go, 93, xoz, 104,136,142-143,153,154,166, 168, 172-173, 175, 197, 2I8, 133; and secrecy, 28, 30, 37-38, 45, 48
-
49, 5z+ 68, 76, 82, 83-84, 116; first visit to Beijing (July 1971), 30, 31, 41
-
44, 45, 46, 48
-
49, 75, 8o; and Taiwan, 30, 36, 37-39,41
-
43,44,45,47,49,50,51
51, 55
-
56, 57, 58-60, 6z, 64, 67, 68, 80-81, 83, 86, 9i-9z, 141-143, 153, 166, 168, 198, zi8; attitudes toward Chiang Kai-shek, 30, 45; relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo, 38-39;
The
Wbite
House Years,
41; relationship with Zhou Enlai, 41-43, 44, 46, 50, 51, 61, 6z, 63-64, 84, 102, 142-143; second visit to Beijing (October 1971), 46, 49
50; relationship with James Shen, 48, 60, 6z, 65, 67; relationship with Rogers, 49
50, 51, 58, 196; relationship with George H. W. Bush, 50,172-173; relationship with Reagan, 54; relationship with Deng Xiaoping, 67, 84; relationship with Ford, 69, 71, 72, 75, 76; and Soviet Union, 69, 88
Knowlands, William, io
Koo Chen-fu, 174, 190, 215, 134, 136, 239 Korean War, 3-4, 9, 13-14, 15, 35, 41, 58, 132
Kosovo, 141
Kristoff, Nicholas, 236 Kristoff, Sandra, 198-igg Kung Ling-kan (David), iiz Kuomintang (KMT), 4, 11-14, 15, 17, r8, 19, 21, 32, 33, 35, 39, 43, 63, 76, rio, 113,-14,115,115,134,139,151,165,
180, 187, igo, igi, x99, zoo, z:6, zzz, 147, 153, 154, 261-165, 267, 274, 175
276
Lafayette-class frigates, :8z Lagon, Mark, 245
Laird, Melvin, 67
Lake, Anthony, 9o, 125, 133; values in for
eign relations, 196; and Taiwan, 196, 198-199,
111,
218, 119,
110;
view of NSC responsibilities, 196, igg, 2oi; and China, 196, x99, 211, 117, 118, 119, zzo,224
Lasater, Martin, 167 Laux, David, 159 Lear Astronics, 159 Lee Kuan Yew, 139 Lee Ta-wei (David), 113
Lee Teng-hui: visit to US in
1
995,
1,
213
117, 278; attitudes toward US, 3, 176, zo4, 211; relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo, 167; policies toward PRC, 168, zoo, zo8-209, 216, 2zz; attitudes toward democratization, 176, 179-181, z5o; and US arms sales, 185, 186, igi, 192, 170; Hawaiian stopover in 1994, 199-1035 policies toward UN, zoo; rela
tionship with Frederick Ch'ien, zoi, zo6; on Taiwan Policy Review, zo4-zo5; visa to enter US sought by, zo5-ziz; decision making process, zo6, 117, 123, 225, 139-140; Chinese view of, zo8, 216, zi9; during US-China confrontation of 1995
96, z13,zi8, 2Ig, 22I, zz1-zz3, 230; policy of 'resolute defense, effective de
terrence,' zzz; relationship with Ding Mou-shih, 114-125; on Taiwanese inde
pendence, 131, 136; and Three Nos pol
icy, 234, 135-136, zoo; and theater mis
sile defense (TMD), 237-238; on Clinton, 239-zoo; policy on state-to-state rela
tions with China, 239-244, 249, 161, 163;
The Road
to Democracy, 239-zoo;
Asia's
Wisdom and Strategy, 243; and TSEA, 147; policies regarding reunifica
tion, z5o; and Taiwan Solidarity Union, 164; vs. Chen Shui-bian, z69, 270, 275
Lee Yuan-tse, 2zz
Legislative Yuan, 18o, 188, 168 Lei Yang, 40
Lenin, V. I., on self-determination, 6 Levin, Burton, 97
Li Daoyu, zoo-zor
Index - 383
Libby,1.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Strait Talk
STRAIT TALK
United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England
Copyright 0 zoo9 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America
First Harvard University Press paperback edition, zox r
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Strait talk : United States-Taiwan relations and the crisis with China / Nancy Bernkopf
Tucker.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
United States-Foreign relations-Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Taiwan-Foreign relations-United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
United States-Foreign relations-China.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
China-Foreign relations-United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
David Lee Ta-wei, also a scholar-diplomat, recently Taiwan's representative in the United States, assisted as well.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
MACHIAVELLI
T
ODAY CONFRONTATION
In the Taiwan Strait represents the single most dangerous challenge for the United States in the world.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Should hostilities begin-whether through miscalculation, misunderstand
ing, accident, or intention-the United States might wish to stay out, but it would have difficulty remaining disengaged.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The security of the United States, Taiwan, and China is tightly intertwined.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Washington and Beijing missed the chance to reach out before Ma's inauguration: Beijing rejected a Taiwan-observer seat at the May zoo8 World Health As-
Strait Talk - 2
sembly, and Washington rebuffed Ma's desire to visit the United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
War, actual or potential, has always been at the core of the relationship
Introduction - 3
between the United States and Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States balanced global responsibilities.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Mistrust in conditions of great uncertainty invited Taiwan to struggle for influence over its destiny in the United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Given the jeopardy in which this puts the United States, this book seeks to help decision makers avoid adding to the mistrust they have inherited.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COLD WAR
D
URING THE
years from 1945 to 1969, the United States defined the world in terms of a cold war contest with the Soviet Union and its al
lies.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
CHAPTER ONE
The Origins of Strategic Ambiguity
HEN RICHARD
NiXON took the oath of office as the thirty-seventh president of the United States, Taiwan's leaders celebrated the tri
umph of a cold warrior and friend of the Republic of China (ROC) who would, they assumed, vigorously guard the cause of Free China.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Thus, American presidents sought al
lies everywhere, among the industrialized powers and the less developed states.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
9
° Further, a presiden
tial visit would promote deterrence of the PRC and highlight Taiwan's economic success as a model for other Asian states.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States similarly had few choices.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
DETENTE
DURING RICHARD NIXON'S tenure, the Soviet Union's challenge es
calated as Moscow achieved parity with the United States in nuclear weaponry and international involvement.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
For the United States this could be seen as a coming-of-age story: the Americans finally facing reality, accepting the PRC's existence after decades of denial, triggering choruses of relief worldwide.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The place of Taiwan in the calculus of the American China initiative il
lustrates the problem of relating to US client states, given the dynamic ways democracy may intervene in foreign policy making.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
These ambassadorial talks, convened in Geneva and War
saw, solved few problems but brought China into direct contact with the US more often than with most other states with which it enjoyed formal relations.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Instead, it grew more powerful and influential in the world community, especially among newly emerging postcolonial states.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Services from the two states 'began to watch each other as much as they cooperated.'z°
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In the 196os, out of office but planning his rehabilitation, Nixon traveled extensively to build his image as an international states
man.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Bush waged a ferocious campaign on what he believed to be Nixon's or
ders, not knowing that just days before the final vote Kissinger doctored a Rogers speech, dropping references to UN universality and to the fact that the population of Taiwan exceeded the populations of two-thirds of mem
ber states.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
17
The resulting Shanghai Communique did not tell the people of the United States, Taiwan, or China that Nixon had privately accepted Beijing's key demand.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
relations,' a clear benefit of his decision to deal with Nixon would be 'a gradual alienation in the relations between the United States and the Chiang gang....
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States heightened misunderstanding when, confronted by a looming peace agreement with Hanoi, it supplemented weak South Viet
namese air defenses with a loan of one hundred of Taipei's F-5A aircraft.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Seeming to draw a parallel between Taiwan and the Baltic states, Mao observed that the latter had been permitted to retain embassies in the US even after Moscow opened its embassy there.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
As a result, 'even senior and knowledgeable govt officials who, occasionally, have informally discussed `theoretical options' [such as `two states within one nation'] with us tend to slide along .
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Arms sales to Taiwan after derecognition also required a formal legiti
mizing structure, since US law demanded that only states or international organizations could be buyers.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Zhou Enlai, who had organized and carried forward the opening to the United States, died of cancer in January
1976.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
But Kissinger's frustration and the absence of recognition of China by the United States did not alleviate anxiety, gloom, or distrust in Taipei.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
CHAPTER FIVE
Derecognition
EITHER THE
United States nor Taiwan proved ready for the events of 1978-79, even though both had had ample time to prepare.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
He also felt keenly the fears of other states such as Israel, which would judge Carter's reliability in part by this policy.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
'In the absence of consistent presidential leadership,' Carter wrote later, 'Tai
wanese lobbyists seemed to prevail in shaping United States policy.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Since the
strait Talk - 96
United States would ultimately find it impossible to reach a settlement with Beijing, ROC officials had no reason to worry.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In part Chiang saw this as a practical decision to build the economy and initiate political reforms so that there would be as much progress as possible before the United States acted
on
normalization.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Former political prisoners charged Carter with re
sponsibility for a wave of brutal political repression 26
A backlash also developed in the early months of
1979
in the United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The ROC'S chief in
formation officer, Loh I-cheng, attacked the United States in the New York Daily News and its affiliates, which led Vance-with Carter's blessing-to demand his immediate recall.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
As disillusioned as some Americans might have become with the authoritarian and corrupt KMT government, many economic, cultural, and security ties bound Tai
wan to the United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Accordingly, the heart of the Taiwan Enabling Act became the decla
ration that wherever US laws referred to foreign states, nations, countries, or governments they would also pertain to Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
5
Federal legislation designed to cover routine business with foreign states would no longer pertain to Taiwan after derecognition, which would cre
ate banking, immigration, and other problems.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The crucial passages asserted that 'any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts and embar
goes,' would be of 'grave concern' to the US, that defensive weapons in appropriate quantities would be made available to Taipei, and that Wash
ington would 'maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any re
sort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
18
Congress ignored Carter's objections and said explicitly that Taiwan re
quired support from the United States to ensure its security, refusing to en
trust the island's future to the goodwill of Washington or Beijing.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Its name, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, or CCNAA, lacked referents to China, Taiwan, or the United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
It led to incoherence in our treatment of Taiwan and failed to take into full account the importance to the United States of the de facto independent island.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
As an experienced America specialist, 'he was expected by his colleagues to show hurt pride over how the United States was treating Taiwan'; at the same time, 'he needed to underline Taiwan's friendship with the United States and its hopes for the future without attacking any American politicians-or AIT-personally.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
He favored Taipei because it aligned itself with the free world, sup
ported the United States internationally, and refused to succumb to com
munist antagonists.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Chinese leaders had 'pointed out [to him] that a sub
stantial portion of the military threat against Taiwan has been removed during the last three years, that efforts are being continued to resolve the differences with Taiwan amicably and with patience, and that the United States should not interfere in this process.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Zbigniew Brzezinski concurred: 'While the United States explicitly reserved to itself the right to continue providing arms to Taiwan ...
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan;
z.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the Chinese on arms sales to Taiwan;
;.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States would not play any mediation role between Tai
wan and Beijing;
4.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act;
5.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and
6.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the Chinese.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Whatever weapons they need to defend them
selves against attacks or invasion by Red China, they will get from the United States.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
that the United States had been tasked to overcome in order to preserve the overall relationship.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Not only had there been violent repression of dissent at the end of the 197os, but in the early r98os evidence emerged of spying and intimidation against activists in the United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
For Taiwan the issue involved a se
rious diplomatic risk, since Nicaragua was one of only a few states with which it continued to have diplomatic relations.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
He wrote in his diary at the time that 'every
body in the United States wants to go to China,' and it seemed that he shared that enthusiasm for the exotic communist east.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
As he told an American official, he had been a graduate student at Cornell University in x968 and expected the United States to fragment amid the violence and turmoil of that year.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Foreign Minister Fred Ch'ien boasted to the media that 'the United States was looking to us to openly declare our position.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
This shows that the United States takes us seriously.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
9
For the United States, Taiwan's more volatile domestic politics and its newly assertive international posture challenged assumptions and estab
lished practices.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Surprisingly, the United States gave serious, if brief, consideration to a project in which an American company would perform the overall systems integration for a European consortium.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
45
Presi
dent Lee Teng-hui later contended that 'it was not until negotiations for the purchase of Mirage fighter aircraft from France made progress that the United States ceased its reluctance to discuss exporting F-16s to Tai
wan.'°
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
6
'
Shifting Ground - 191
Taiwan authorities saw the plane as enhancing security and deepening ties to the United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
He went on, whether out of conviction or poor NSC staff work, to lump China with authoritarian 'backlash' states like North Korea.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
This would be good for China, for the United States, and, had he thought about it, for Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Particularly, Christopher later wrote, 'I wanted to send an unambiguous message to states like China ...
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
9
Lee mounted a hopeless campaign to enter the United Nations after the DPP demonstrated the popularity of the proposal, asserting that the Republic of China should be able to rejoin under the divided states formula that had admitted two Germanies and two Koreas.'°
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Not only did he tempt the UN with a promise of
$t
billion if Taiwan was voted in, but Taipei also offered huge grants of developmental aid to small states that would switch diplomatic recog
nition from China back to Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Had the US government decided to welcome Lee graciously or had Lee concluded that he had achieved everything he wanted simply by coming to the United States, a precedent would have been set but only a minor change in policy made.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Where such organizations did not require members to be states, the US would 'more actively' seek to help Taiwan gain mem
bership.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Lee Teng-hui complained that Washington paid too much attention to Chinese communist demands, throwing into doubt 'the reputation of the United States as the vanguard of the world's democracies.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
China called repeatedly for Clinton to invite Jiang Zemin to the United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In his memoir he asserted that in 1986, as he prepared a speech challenging Taiwan to reduce trade barriers and increase investment in the United States, he refined his views on international economics, advancing a constellation of ideas that would make him a New Democrat by the end of the year.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Neither house saw 'legitimate grounds for excluding Presi
dent Lee Teng-hui from paying private visits' to the United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Lee's politi
cal goals in traveling to the United States could not have been satisfied with much less.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In the United States that summer of 1995, the Clinton administration sought ways to repair the damage caused by Lee's actions and Beijing's an
ger.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
`the United States has more than enough military capability to protect its vital national security interests in the region, and is prepared to demonstrate that.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Similarly, the United States committed to rebuilding an inadequate Tai
wan military establishment.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
As a result of China's belligerence in the Strait, Tokyo opted to sign a tough military agreement with the United States, one that was more explicit and compre
hensive than it had been prepared to adhere to several months earlier.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The administration invited Jiang Zemin to the United States in
1997,
and Clinton went to China in
1998,
hoping to alter mutual perceptions and erase the bitterness triggered by Tiananmen.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
After 1996 DOD's Campbell, working with Schriver and Stokes, saw software as a way to 'reduce the sense of isolation in Taiwan, giving its military leaders a greater confidence in their ties with the United States ...
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
THE EVENTS
of 1995
-
96 may have been an instance of foolhardy risk taking by Taiwan and the United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States, meanwhile, refused to be coerced into abandoning Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Joseph Nye, assistant sec-
Strait Talk - 232
retary of defense, for instance, told Chinese military officers in Beijing in November
1995
that 'nobody knows' what the United States might do in the event of a military clash in the Taiwan Strait.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
'24
US officials felt blindsided by the two-states concept.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
3
°
The administration meanwhile sent Richard Bush to Taiwan to find the proximate rationales for 'two states' and to emphasize Washington's irri
tation.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The price Lee paid for 'two states' proved limited, a fact that confirmed Lee's view that 'even when Washington indicates no support for Taiwan, it does not mean that it opposes the policies held by Taipei.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
When Clinton met Jiang Zemin at a summit of APEC leaders in mid-September, he re
marked that Lee 'had made things more difficult for both China and the United States.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
When Lee failed to use the channel to give advance notice of 'two states,' the di
rect contact ended.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Critics insisted that Lee Teng-hui wanted strong forces for promoting relations with the US rather than for fighting or deterring the PLA, since he did not believe that China would attack, but he did assume the United States would bail Taiwan out if it did.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Therefore, they agreed to increase internal production and foreign procurement for Tai
wan contingencies5^
During the Clinton administration, the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Taiwan expanded significantly.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Setting the Record Straight - 249
Assent of the People
Following Lee's two-states declaration, the Institute of Taiwan Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing drafted a white paper to expose his errors.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
59
DURING
the
19gos
Taiwan developed a link to the United States that it had lacked before, its democracy.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
No longer operating in a predictable cold war environment, moreover, US officials contemplated preemptive de
fense against threats from the 'axis-of-evil'-Iran, Iraq, and North Ko
rea-and rogue states such as Cuba, Syria, and Libya.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
become essential that the United States make every effort to de
ter any form of Chinese intimidation of [Taiwan],' they asserted, 'and de
clare unambiguously that it will come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack or a blockade.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In the earliest days of Bush's presidential run she wrote in Foreign Affairs that 'The United States ...
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
He believed Washington's refusal was intended to pun
ish him following his two-states declaration.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
And, finally, Tsai Ing-wen, a lawyer and trade specialist who had been the principal agent behind Lee Teng-hui's two-states theory, concentrated on cross-Strait relations and tried to clarify Taipei's positions for Bush officials.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The Kuomintang had reinforced the inward-looking nature of the DPP by excluding it from security discussions with the United States and China.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In October zooz Jiang Zemin sought to aggravate tensions between Washington and Taipei when, during an informal summit at Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas, he proposed that China move an unspecified number of mobile mis
siles from its coast-if the United States would reduce, and eventually end, arms sales to Taiwan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
'S
2
Worried about how Chen would interpret and use his second election
The Influence of Democracy - 271
victory in
2004,
the
administration emphasized preserving the status quo, but the status quo 'as we define it,' not the DPP vision of Taiwan as a sov
ereign, independent states' Bush also sent Moriarty's NSC successor, Mi
chael Green, to Taipei to remind Chen of his inauguration promises in zooo.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Lack of trust between the United States and Taiwan, vividly illustrated by these
1957
events, had accumulated because of actions and policies undertaken by both sides intentionally, carelessly, and mistakenly.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Since misjudgment, mistake, or mishap could, at any moment, plunge Taiwan, China, and the United States into a conflict all want to avoid, the abiding mistrust that prevents resolution must go.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Direct interaction among top officials of Taiwan and the United States is the only solution.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
to undermine the politics of war and peace between the United States and China.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
NSC 146/2, 'United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government,' November 6, 1953.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Garver,
Sino-American Alliance,
140-41; Chen Jian, 'Beijing's Changing Pol
icies toward Taiwan,' in
The United States and Cross-Straits Relations,
ed.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
x999), 118; and John K. Fairbank,
The United States and China,
4th ed.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Ronald W Pruessen, 'Over the Volcano: The United States and the Taiwan Strait Crisis, x954
-
1955,' in Ross and Jiang,
Re-examining the Cold
War, 81
82; David Mayers, Cracking
the Monolith
(Baton Rouge, 1986), 115-z5.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Nancy Bemkopf Tucker,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States,
1945
1992:
Uncertain Friendships
(New York, 1994), 53-62.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
See Dong, Zhong Mei guanxi ciliao xuanbian, 3-8; Joint Communique between the PRC and the USA, Shanghai, February z7, 1971, Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United
States: Richard
Nixon,
1972 (Washington, D.C., 1974), 376
-
79
z9.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
meeting between Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, Guest House Villa #3, Peking, November zz, 1973, 3:00-5:30
Pm,
China and the United States Collection #00279, DNSA.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Michael J. Glennon, 'Liaison and the Law: Foreign Intelligence Agencies' Ac
tivities in the United States,'
Harvard International Law journal
z5 (Winter 1984): z, znz, 3n5; U.S. Congress, House, Hearings,
Taiwan Agents in Amer
ica and the Death of Prof Wen-chen Chen,
97th Cong., 1st sess.,
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Jay Taylor in
Generalissimo's Son,
317, states categorically that Chiang 'ap
proved' the plan.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
folder: China-Twin Oaks (and other real property in the United States), December 1978-June 1979 [CF, O/A 710], ibid.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Lee Ta-wei,
Making of the Taiwan Relations Act,
39, 69,177; Tucker,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States,
135
-
36
49.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Tucker,
Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and
the United
States, 183.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
This two-states discussion is a result of many interviews with high-level of
ficials and former officials in Taiwan (zooo) and the US as well as; Bush, 'Lee Teng-hui and `Separatism,'' 87-89.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
(accessed January zo, 2005); coverage of So Chi press conference in United Daily News, July 13, 1999; So Chi, Weixian
bianlu: Cong lianguolun dao yibian yiguo [Brinkmanship: From the Two States Theory to One Country on Each Side] (Taipei, 1003), 77-114.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
(accessed De
cember 5, 2004); Richard Bush, 'The United States Role in the Taiwan Straits Issue,' speech presented at the University of Illinois at Carbondale, December 7, 1998; Bush, Untying the Knot, 262.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United
States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications (Santa Monica, Calif., 1999)
18.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Cold War International History Project
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Digital National Security Archive
China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, r96o-1998; Iran
Contra Affair, 1983-1988.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
'The United States' Role in the Taiwan Straits Issue.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September zooz.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Public Papers
of
the Presidents
of
the United States: Richard Nixon,
1972.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Foreign Relations
of
the United States.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
In The United States and Cross-Straits Relations, ed.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Washington, D.C.: United States Global Strategy Council, 1989.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Fairbank, John K. The United States and China.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Glennon, Michael J. 'Liaison and the Law: Foreign Intelligence Agencies' Activ
ities in the United States.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Notes from The National Committee on United States-China Relations z9 (Fall-Winter zooo): 8-11.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
The United States and Cross-Straits Relations.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
'Over the Volcano: The United States and the Taiwan Strait Crisis,
1
954
-
1955' In Re-examining the Cold War, ed.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
'The `Taiwan Lobby' in the United States.'
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Weixian bianlu: Cong lianguolun dao yibian yiguo [Brinksmanship: From the Two States Theory to One Country on Each Side].
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
'If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?' Wash
ington Quarterly 25 (Summer zooz): 15-z8.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Security Challenges for the United States, China and Taiwan at the Dawn
of
the New Millennium.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain friend
ships.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
See
also US arms sales to Taiwan
Asian Development Bank (ADB), 157-158 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, zoo, 241
Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), 190, 254
August Communique, 154, 158, 159, 192, zz6; and US arms sales to Taiwan, 142
147,148,149,150,15
1
,
1
5
2
,
1
53,
1
55
1
57, 183
Bachrack, Stanley D, 36 Bader, Jeff, 224
Baker, James, 136, 174, 179 Bandung Conference, 14 Barak, Ehud, 148
Barton, Joseph, 184 Baucus, Max, 179 Bechtel Corporation, 153 Belgrade, bombing of Chinese Embassy in, 194,241
Bellocchi, Natale, 183, 186-187, 202, z03 Bennett, Robert, 145
Bentsen, Lloyd, 184
Berger, Samuel B. 'Sandy,' ig8-x99, zio, 219, zz5, z3z-233,146
Blaauw, Coen, 146
Blair, Dennis C., 246, z5o-z6o Blue team, 244-248, 265 Boland amendments, 164 Bolton, John, 268
Bosnia, 193, 218 Bowles, Chester, 36 Bray, C. W., 39-40 Breaux, John, zii Bremer, L. Paul 'Jerry,' 143 Brookes, Peter, 245 Brown, Bill, 159
Brown, Hank, zoo Brown, Harold, 103, 104 Brown, Ron,i98 Brownell, Herbert, io5 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 88, 196; relationship with Holbrooke, 9o-92-, 9z, 105, rob; and China, 90-93, loo, 102,
10
3
-10
4,
io5,116-117,14o;and Taiwan, 9
1-
93, 97, 98, so8, tog, 116-117, 119,140; vs. Vance, 9z-93, 101-104; relationship with Shen,97
Buckley, William E, Jr., 54, 72 Bundy, McGeorge, 18, 2t
Burghardt, Ray, 243, 253-254 Burr, William, 6z
Bush, George H. W.: relationship with Kissinger, 50, 172-173; as UN ambassa
dor, 50-51, 171-172; relationship with Ford, 7z-73, 74; as head of US Liaison Office in Beijing, 7z-73, 131, 171-1733 on Carter's policies toward China, 114; and Reagan's policies toward Taiwan, 131-133, 136, 139, 141, 144, 145, 155, 167; and Reagan's policies toward China, 131
-
133, 144, 145+ 155, 167, 173
-
174, 181; and Persian Gulf War, 169, 171, 178, 183; policies toward China, 169
170,174,175-177,178,179,184,
1
89
19o, 1955 policies toward Soviet Union, 171; and Nixon's policies toward China, 172; relationship with Nixon, 171; and Ford's policies toward China, 171-173; relationship with Mao, 173; relationship with Deng Xiaoping, 173, 174, 189; rela
tionship with Scowcroft, 174; relation
ship with Baker, 174; policies toward Tai
wan, 174-175, 178-179, i8i-i8g, igo
19z, 195, 198, 2io, 256; relationship with Lilley, i8r; F-16 sales to Taiwan, 183, 184, 186-i89, 190, 191,
110,
214, 218, 256, 258, 259; election campaign of 1992, 183-x84, 185, i87, i88, i8g, ig1 Bush, George W.: and axis of evil, 251; POIi
cies toward Afghanistan, 151; policies to
ward Middle East, 251; policies toward North Korea, 151; policies toward rogue states, 251; policies toward China, 251, z52,255,257,258-z59,265,268-z69, 271-z72; and September
1
ith attacks, 151-252, 265; and war on terrorism, 251-152, 265, 266, 271, 276; invasion of Iraq, 151-z5z, 265, 266,176; attitudes toward democracy, 155, z6z, 170; poli
cies toward Taiwan, x55-z6z, x65-266, 267-z7z, 278; arms sales to Taiwan, 259-26o, 261; view of Chen Shui-bian, 266, 267, 268-x69, z7o, 17x, 278
Bush, Jeb,z68
Bush, Richard C., zo6, z4z; at AFT, zz7, 232,235
-
236,149
-1
50,z
6
4
Butz, Earl, 73 Byrd, Robert, izo
Cabot, John, zo Cairo declaration, 40 Cambodia, 62, 175 Cambone, Stephen, 268 Campbell, Kurt, 191-192, 225, 1x8-229, z3z, 245, 146
Canada, 78
Carter, Jimmy: policies toward China, Sz, 88,89-93,95-96,98-loo,IOT-107,
111,
116-117, 119, 123, 116, 130, 131, 134.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
I5I, 154, 158, 162-163, 166; and US technology transfer to Tai
wan, 155-156, 158, 16o; policies toward Central America, 16o, 164-:66; and Liu assassination, 162; policies toward con
tact with PRC, 166-167, 168; policies to
ward democratization, 166-167, 168, 25o; Three Nos policy, 167, 168; assassi
nation attempt on,
1oz;
and US Embassy attack of
1
957, 173
-
274
Chiang Kai-shek: and Chinese civil war, 3,
11,
12-13, 34; government corruption of, 3, 13; Policies toward nuclear weapons, 5, 34; during W WII, iz; US mistrust of,
12
,
14
-
I5, 16-17, ig; and return to mainland, 12, 15, 16-17, 18, 19-20,
z1,
2
4,35,3
8
,39,4
1
,73
-
74,85,176,273
274, 176; and Mutual Defense Treaty, 14; and 'Plan K,' 15; US nuclear weapons
Index - 378
Chiang Kai-shek
(continued)
requested by,
17, ig; policy
toward PRC admission to UN,
18, 19, 47
-
48, 49, 51
52, 54-553
and Vietnam War,
19, z5-26, 35, 38, 73-74;
relationship with Kirk,
2o;
and French recognition of PRC,
zi-2a;
and PRC nuclear weapons program,
13
14;
later years,
33-34;
mistrust of US,
38, 4o;
and Nixon's policies toward China,
45, 46, 47-48, 49, 51
-
5
2
, 59-6o, 66;
death of,
73
Chiang Kai-shek, Madame,
55, 97, 98,
1
r1
Chiang Wei-kuo,
164, 165
Ch'ien Fu (Frederick): relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo,
38, 45, 49, 97, 98, 135, 149, 150, 151, 154, 161;
as Vice Foreign Minister,
96, x09, i io, 134;
on US diplomatic relations with PRC,
99,
i io, iii; and Taiwan Relations Act,
1
zo; and CCNAA,
123, 156,158,174;
rela
tionship with Cross,
124,134,139;
rela
tionship with Lilley,
143, 144-145
+
149, 150, 161;
and Six Assurances,
149, 151, 161;
and August Communique,
x56, 158;
and Reagan's Central American policies,
T64, 165, 166;
relationship with George H. W. Bush,
167;
as Foreign Minister
178, 187, zoo,
101,
zo6, 210, 214
Chile,
27
China: US mistrusted by,
1,
z, 30, 44, 68,
73, iz6, 157, 178, 179;
nuclear weapons program,
1,
4, 14, 16, 20,
11,
22, 23-24, 18, 34;
normalization of relations with
US, z, 5, z8, x9-32, 36, 39, 40
-
5x, 53
68, 69, 71, 71, 74, 76, 77
-
78, 80-81, 81
86, 89-93, 95-96, 97, 98-ioo, 99, for 115, ii6-iSB, ii9, izz, iz6, x29, 131, 134, 161, 173, 198, 274;
trade with United States, z,
17, 40, 88, 170, 179, 189, 195
-
i96, 197, 199, 203, x05, 252;
human rights in, z,
z8, 169-x70, 175
177, 179, i95, 196-198, 203, 205, 207, 212; 214, 249, z5z;
Tiananmen Square demonstrations, z,
x60, 169-170, 171, 176-177, 178, :8i, i8z, x85, 190, 19x, 197, tot, zo6,
2
07, 211, 214, 133; Poli
cies toward use of force against Taiwan,
3.40,
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
See also Israel Middle East resolution of 1957,
10
Middleton, Mark E., 116
Mirage z000-5s, 186, 187, 188, 191 Mistrust: of United States by Taiwan,
1,
2, 3, 4, 5-8,
it,
z0 zz, z6, 30, 34, 38, 40, 54, 61, 63, 68, 89, 96, 113,
11z,
Iz6, 135, 158, 16o, 163, 187-188, 192,
z1z, 11x
7
26i, z6g, 171, 273
-
274, 175, 178, 179-z8o; of United States by China, i, z, 30, 44, 68, 73,x16, 157, 178, 1795 of China by United States,
1, 1,
73, zzz, 278, 179; of Taiwan by United States, i
z, 3, 4, 6
-
8,
11,
14
-
15, 16-17, 19, zz, 14, z6, 38, 67, 89, 96, 113,
Izz,
115,
1ZI,
2zz, 130, 231, 271, 273
-
174, 175, 179-z8o; of Taiwan by China, 1-2, 131, x77, 278; relationship to Taiwan's de
mocratization, 5-6, 271, 175, 178; of China by Taiwan, 166, x77, 278 Mitchell, George, 182
Mohr, Mark, 149 Mondale, Walter,
101,
104 Mongolia, 18, i9
Moriarty James, 267,168,171 Most-favored nation status, 170, 179, 189, 195-1965197,199,205
Index - 384
Mundt, Karl, 37 Murkowski, Frank, 247 Murphy, Robert, 40 Mutual Defense Treaty, 3, 74, 150, 256; purpose of, 4, 14; and Nixon's China pol
icies, 39, 40, 58-59, 6o, 66, 68, 81; US abrogation of, 43-44, 82, 83, 84, 92, 95, 101-ro2, 104-x05, io6, 107-108, 117,
Ill
Nan Huai-chin, 222 Nathan, Andrew, 235 National Defense Authorization Act, 237 National
Review,
151
National Security Agency, zz; signals intelli
gence (SIGINT), z6o-z6i
Netherlands, 137-138 New
York
Times, 218, 136 Nicaragua: Sandinista government, 87, 117, 165; Taiwan and the contras, 160, 164
166
Nixon, Richard: policies toward China, 4, 7,11,z7-z8,29-32,35-52,53,55-68, 71
-
72, 75, 88, 90, 93, 98,
10z,
104, iz6, 130-131, 136, 153, 158, 172, 174, 218, 274; policies toward Taiwan, 4, 7, 30, 37-39,41
-
43,45,46
-
52,53,55
-
68,71,
75, 78, 105, iz6, 130-13r, 153, r68, 218, 256; and Chile, 27; policies toward Soviet Union, 27; and Vietnam War, z7, 41, 4z, 6o; resignation of, z8; and se
crecy, 18, 30, 31, 37
-
38, 45, 52, 58, 59, 6o, 68, 82, 85, x08, 116; and Watergate, z8, 66-67, 69, 71; attitudes toward Chiang Kai-shek, 30, 35, 43; historical precursors of China policies, 31-33;
For
eign
Affairs
article of 1967, 36; relation
ship with Chiang Ching-kuo, 38-39; rela
tionship with Agnew, 39, 46, 71; visit to China in 1971, 45, 53, 55-59; relation
ship with Reagan, 46, 48, 54, 130-131, r61; policies toward UN, 46-5z; relation
ship with Ford, 7:; Five Points, g2, 103; relationship with Carte; 114-115
Noriega, Manuel, 165-166 North, Oliver, 164-165 Northern Ireland, 193-194, 118 North Korea: nuclear weapons program, 194, 199, 224, 151, 2525 Agreed Frame
work, 194, z5i; missile launching in 1998, 237; Six-Party Talks, 251.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
See
also Korean War
Northrup, 94, 95, 135, 136
-
137, 159
Nuclear weapons/power/programs,
1,
5,
10,
14, 17, 19, 20,
z1,
12, 23, 14, 17, 28, 34, 38, 64, 67, 78, 79, 8i, Sz, 96, 105, x17, 138, 161, 163, 185, 188, 189, 194, 199, zo5, 216, 218, 219, 224, z4r, z5z, z6o, z67,277
Nunn, Sam, zii
Nye, Joseph, 231-232
Offshore islands, 3, 17-18, zo, 38, 139, 218, 274; Jmmen (Quemoy), 14, 16, i9, 256; Mazu, 14, 16, 256; Penghu Islands, 14, 66,
111
Oksenberg, Michel, 9o; relationship with Holbrooke, 9i; and China, 9i, 91, 93, 95,
IOz,
103, 104, 105; and Taiwan, 95, 96, 97, 108,110
One China on each side of the Strait (yibian yiguo), 265
One-China polity (US), z, 6, 39, 144, 168, 198, 235, 241, 242, 243, 256, 258, 279 One-China principle (PRC), 85, 236, 249, 255, z6z, 263, 267
One country, two systems formula, 166, 175, z3z, 3zon66
OPLAN 5077-04, z6z Ortega, Daniel, 117 Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 121
Paal, Douglas, 185, 267, 268
Panama: Noriega government, 165-166; Panama Canal, 72,
101, 101,
129 Pascoe, Lynn,
'Or,
215
Patriot missiles, 236-237
Patterson, Torkel, 257-258, 259-z6o, z61, x67
Peace Pearl program, 160, 185 Peng Ming-min, 223
Percy, Charles H., 146 Perot, H. Ross, 183 Perry, William J., 211, 214, 117, 118; and 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, 219-zzo, 211 Pickering, Thomas, zz5
Ping-pong diplomacy, 39 Poland, 137, 141 Pompidou, Georges, 44 Potsdam declaration, 40 Powell, Colin, 146, 157, 265, 268 Powers, Francis Gary, 22-z3 Pragmatic (flexible) diplomacy, 180, zoo, 109
Pratt, Mark, 98, log
Index - 385
Presidential Review Memorandum 24, 93 Project for the New American Century, 256 Prueher,Joseph, z19-220,223
Public opinion, US: and Congress, to; and Nixon's policy towards China, 18, 30, 31, 46, 51, 56, 57, 6o, 89; and Taiwan, 30, 32, 46, 51, 6o, 61; and two-Chinas poli
cies, 33; and George H. W. Bush's policies toward China, 169-170
Qian Qichen, 178, 209, 114, 215, 217, 218, 255
Qiao Guanhua, 83-84 Quayle, J. Danforth, 174-175
Rather, Dan, 151
Reagan, Ronald: relationship with Nixon, 46, 48, 54, 130-131, 1617 relationship with Republican conservatives, 54, 72, 117, 130-131, 136, 146, 161; and Ford's policies toward Taiwan, 72, 74, 75, 130; and Ford's policies toward China, 74, 129; Strategic Defense Initiative/Star Wars, 127; policies toward Soviet Union, 127, 129, 278; policies toward Central America, 127, 135, 160, 164-166, 168; policies toward China, 117-118, 135
136, 137
-
138, 139
-
141, 142, 144, 145
1469150-151,151,154-155,157-158, 160-163, 164-165, 167-168, 192, 197, 211, 258, 274, 278; policies toward Tai
wan, 129, 130-x47, 148-152, 153-165, 167-168, 175, 181, 18z, 185, 186, 192, 197,
zio,
zz6, 235, 258, 266, 274; rela
tionship with Chiang Ching-kuo, 131, 135, 139, 149, 151, 158, 161; inaugura
tion of, 133-134; relationship with Haig, 136, 138, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 150, 1537 Six Assurances, 147, 148-151, 161, 166, 235, z4z, 266, 274; and secrecy, 148-1525 secret one-page memo, ISz, 186; and Taiwan-China military balance, 152, 186; relationship with Shultz, 153; relationship with George H. W Bush, 155; visit to China (April 1984), 160-163 Referendum, 180, 254, 266-268; US view of, x67, 268; China's view of, 267, x75 Regan, Donald, 157-158
Rice, Condoleeza, 258, 259, 268 Richards, Ann, r84
Richburg, Keith, 232 Robb, Charles, 104, 211 Rockefelle5 Nelson, 36, 73
Rogers, William, 45, 47, 637 relationship
with Kissinger, 49
-
50, 5z, 58, 196 Rognoni, Mario, x66
Rogue states, 251 Romberg, Alan, x06, zio Roosevelt, Franklin, 113 Roosevelt, Theodore, 87 Rope, William, 143, 150, 153, zz6
Roth, Stanley, 118, 207,
210,
211, 241-z4z Roy, J. Stapleton, 99, 104, io6, 107, 109, 189, 2io
Rubin, Jamie, 231, 231, 234-235 Rumsfeld, Donald, 257, 268 Rushe; William, 151
Rusk, Dean: relationship with Kennedy, 18
ig; and two-Chinas policy, x8-i9; rela
tionship with Chiang Kai-shek, 19, 24; relationship with Johnson, 14; and Viet
nam War, 15-26
Russia: arms sales to China, 185; economic conditions in, 193; political conditions in, 193
Rwanda, 193
Ryotaro Shiba,i99-too
Saudi Arabia, Khobar Towers attack, 193 Scaife, Richard Mellon, 245
Scalapino, Robert, 3z Schlesingeq James, 67, 74 Schrive; Randall, 228-229, x58, 259-z6o Scott, Hugh, 85
Scowcrofy Brent, 71, 81, 85-86, 174 Secrecy in US-China relations: during Nixon administration, z8, 30, 31, 37-38, 45, 51, 58, 59, 6o, 68, 82, 85, 108, 116; dur
ing Carter administration, 104, Io8-109, 116, 161; during Reagan administration, 148-152; during Clinton administration, 125
Self-determination, 6, 51, 56, 59, 131, 135, 275
September
it,
zooi, attacks, 251 Service, John S., 44, 6o
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 266
Shah, Konsin, 61
Shaheen, Therese, 267-268 Shalikashvili, John, zi9, zzo Shanghai Communique, 58-60,75, 76, 9o, 105, io6-Io7, 117
Shen Chang-huan, 97-98, 109,
110,
135 Shen, James, 133; and Nixon's policies to
ward China, 45, 48, 49, 62, 63; relation-
Index - 386
Shen, James (continued)
ship with Kissinger, 48, 6o, bz, 65, 67; on South Vietnam, 66; and Ford's policies to
ward Taiwan, So, 83; and Carter's poli
cies toward Taiwan, 96-97, 99
Shih Ming-te,
I
z5 Shiina Motoo, zz5 Shirk, Susan, 235 Shoesmith, Thomas, zz6 ShokanAsahi,
I
9g-zoo Shultz, George, 153-160; and Reagan's pol
icies toward Taiwan, ISz, 153-154, 157, 159-161, 166, 167; and Reagan's policies toward China, 153-154, 157, 166, 167; relationship with Huang Hua, 157
Sigur, Gaston, 147, 151-ISz; and Reagan's policies toward China, 154-155; and Reagan's policies toward Taiwan, 1595 and Reagan's policies toward Central America, 164-x65
Singapore, 139, 258 Singlaub, John K., 164, 165 Six Assurances, 147,148-151,161,166, 235, 242, 266, 274
Smyser, Richard, 73 Solarz, Stephen, 162, 264 Solomon, Richard, 63, 68, 73, 84, 175 Somalia, 193, 198
Soong Chu-yu (James), 98, tog,
111,
139,
103,
111,
127, 137, 140, 153, 154, 168, 274, 276, 278; relations with China, 9, 16, 17,
it,
z8, 30, 32, 36, 40, 41, 51, 66, 74, 88, 89, 91, 104, Iz7, 132, 133, 140,
137, 141; collapse of, 169, 176, r8o, 185, 193
Spratly Islands, 186 Steel, Ronald, 153 Steinberg, James, 210-1I
I,
zz5, 233-234, 243
Stoessel, Walter J., 40 Stokes, Mark, zz8
Stone, Richard, 1o8, 114, 123
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEE), 179, 190, 234
Strategic ambiguity, 4, 14, 19, 219, 231
232
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), 27, 99, 102
So Chi, 190, 240-z4I So Chih-cheng,
III
So Tseng-chang,
I
z5 Submarines, z5g-z6o Suettinge, Robert, 184, 190,
101,
209, Ire,
III,
224
Sullivan, Roger: and Nixon's policies to
ward China, 35-36, 46, 65, 98,
11
o; and Taiwan's nuclear weapons program, 79; and Carter's policies toward China, 91, 104; and Carter's policies toward Taiwan, 98, 99,
110,
Izz-Iz3
Sun Yun-suan, 114, 166 Sung Ch'ang-chih, 165 Syria, 251
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representa
tive Office (TECRO), 184, 203, 205, zo6, 213, 214-115, 124, 236, 264; and Benjamin Lu Chao-Chung, 214-115; Ja
son Hu Chih-chiang at, zz6-267; Stephen Chen Hsi-fan at, 227,134; and TSEA,
161, 187
South China Sea, 186
246,247
Taiwan: US mistrusted by, 1, z, 3, 4, 5-8,
South Korea, 3-4, SI, 125.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
See Taiwan Security Enhancement Act
Tsiang Yien-si, 114
Tuchman, Barbara, Stilwell and the Ameri
can Experience in China, 173
Twin Oaks mansion,
I I z-I
I3, 198 Tyler, Patrick, 71-72, ZI8
Unger, Leonard: and Nixon's policies to
ward Taiwan, 67, 68, 76-77, 81; and Ford's policies toward Taiwan, 79-80, 83; and Carter's policies toward Taiwan, 95, 99, 109,
1Io
United Nations, zoo, 104; dual deterrence, 4, 14
-
15, 219, z5o; and two-Chinas pol
icy, 17, 18; admission of PRC to, 17, 18, z1,25,33,34,35,39,40,41,46
-
52,54
55, 78; Security Council, 17, 38, 47
-
485 universality principle, 52; Japan relations, 16, z7, z8, 4z, 155, 193, 214, 230, 258, 179; Japanese formula (model), 75, 85, 93, 102, 113
United States: Taiwan mistrusted by, 1-2, 3, 4, 6-8,
11,
14
-
15, 16-17, 19, 12, 14, 26, 38, 67, 89, 96, 113,
1zz,
125, 2ZI, z12, 230, 231, 271, 273
-
274, 275, 279
-
280; normalization of relations with PRC,
1,
5, 7, 28, 19-31, 36, 39, 40-52, 53
-
68,
69, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77-78, 80-81, 8z-86, 89
-
93, 95-96, 97, 98
-
100,
99, 101-115, rr6-rr8, 119,
Izz,
126, v.9,
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Haig's stints as supreme commander of NATO and aide to Kissinger qualified him for the post but never offset his outsider status.
Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
Taiwan: A New History
These two towns, so close but so far away from each other, are also useful symbols of another facet of the island's past and present-the Christian Church's presence in Taiwanese life .
Taiwan: A New History
The other major Protestant church, the largest indigenous church on the island, the True Jesus Church (Chen Ye-su Chino-hui) is independent of formal Western connections and has its roots in Shantung in northeastern China.
Taiwan: A New History
Both the Presbyterian Church and the True Jesus Church focus their efforts on Han-Taiwanese and
yuan-chu
min and thus are united by their willingness to serve the needs of these two, often antagonistic, populations.
Taiwan: A New History
5
Wu-she's main street is home to a Catholic church, pastored by a Western
shen Ju
(holy father) and members of the Maryknoll order.
Taiwan: A New History
This presence has been explored in Murray A. Rubinstein, The Protestant Commu
nity on
Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991).
Taiwan: A New History
And as a Taiwan Presbyterian, Wu is at once heir to George Leslie Mackay and shares in the Taiwanese nationalist sentiments of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
1
s
Murray Rubinstein's research on the mission history of that period reveals that British and Canadian Presbyterian pioneers actively promoted an indigenous church, one that closely identified with local communities and delivered social services as well as the gospel.
Taiwan: A New History
Murray A. Rubinstein, 'Mission of Faith, Burden of Witness: The Presbyterian
Church in the Evolution of Modem Taiwan, 1865-1989,'
American Asian Review,
9, no. 2 (summer 1991): 70-73; see also Hollington K. Tong,
Christianity in Taiwan: A History
(Taipei:
China Post,
1961), pp. 21-51.
Taiwan: A New History
For post
1931 control of the Presbyterian missions, see Murray A. Rubinstein, 'Mission of Faith, Burden of Witness: The Presbyterian Church in the Evolution of Modem Taiwan, 1865
1989,' American Asian
Review,
9, no. 2 (summer 1991): 78-80.
Taiwan: A New History
Most Taiwanese religious practice takes place without regard to formal church organization, trained clergy, or sacred texts.
Taiwan: A New History
The Nationalists built upon the base that the Presbyterian Church and the Japan
ese had constructed and upon their decades of experience running an educational system in those parts of China that they controlled
.
Taiwan: A New History
It was a university begun with help from the Christian Board of Higher Education in Asia and academics with West
ern church connections had served as faculty and administration during its early years.
Taiwan: A New History
A second major private and church-related university is Fujen Catholic University.
Taiwan: A New History
9
r It has also devoted much space to Taiwanese religion and to the culture of the Han and non-Han ethnic groups; one issue was devoted to the Hakka and another to the indigenous peoples9z
TAIWAN'S SOCIOECONOMIC MODERNIZATION, 1971-1996 391
Cultural imperialism was also directed against the Presbyterian Church on Taiwan, a major voice for the cause of Taiwanese self-hood.
Taiwan: A New History
The church leaders made their own public indictment of the regime and its human rights and ethnic policies in a journal called
&4(-Determination,
which was published over the course of the 1970s and 1980s.
Taiwan: A New History
On Presbyterian efforts on Taiwan, see Murray A. Rubinstein,
The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan: Mission, Semi
nary, and Church
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), chap.
Taiwan: A New History
Self-Determination: The Case
for
Taiwan
(Tainan: Church Press, 1988), gathers together the issues of the journal and offers a detailed look at the process of
402 TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY
suppressing the Taiwanese-speaking Presbyterian Church of Taiwan as well as an attack on this policy and the government of the ROC.
Taiwan: A New History
Meanwhile, the Presbyterian aboriginal churches^ were pursu
ing a movement for title to aboriginal church land, which would become the 'Return Our Land' movement by the end of 1987.
Taiwan: A New History
In late 1986 I organized a visit of Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) aboriginal leaders to the Philippines, where, while visiting Igorot peoples in northern Luzon, they met with the Cordillera People's Alliance (CPA).
Taiwan: A New History
The consultation, held to honor the UN Year of Indigenous Peoples, is attended by more than 130 government official and invited participants, including all aboriginal legislators, National Assem
bly members, provincial assemblymen, aboriginal township mayors, officials from all levels responsible for aboriginal affairs, academics, and aboriginal church and civic organization leaders.
Taiwan: A New History
The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan has played a major role in the modem history of Taiwan aboriginal people.
Taiwan: A New History
Taiwan Chi-tu cheng-loo chiao-hui 1971
1992 tsung-hui she-hui kuan-hui wen-hsinn
[General Assembly social concern docu
ments of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1971-1992].
Taiwan: A New History
Taipei: Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, General Assembly Resource Centre.
Taiwan: A New History
He remained on the run for the next few months with the help of administrative leaders and personnel of the Presbyterian Church on Taiwan (PCT), including General Secretary Kau Chih-min and Joyce Chen, a member of Kau's staff.
Taiwan: A New History
In the seventies, the church attempted to publish works in Romanized Taiwanese, and when the government confiscated this material, church leaders appealed to the Carter administration then in the midst of its human rights offensive.
Taiwan: A New History
During the Mei-li-tao period a number of key
tang-wai
members were linked to the church, and church leaders such as John Tin of the Tainan Theological Seminary had been consistent vociferous opponents of the regime.
Taiwan: A New History
The trial of the church leader and the murder of the Lin family members
31
were evidence that the state would no longer tolerate the church's participation in the secular world of Taiwanese politics.
Taiwan: A New History
The small and highly radical New Testament Church had established a community on a mountain in Tainan county, about an hour's drive from the island's western coast.
Taiwan: A New History
In early 1980 the church, led by a man named Elijah Hong, was driven from the mountain and in the years that followed the government authorities continued to
PRAGMATIC DIPLOMACY 445
harass it.
Taiwan: A New History
The church leaders were often intemperate in their remarks and cult
like in their loyalty to their leader, but they posed no real danger to the state, which nevertheless decided to show that any voice of opposition, even one so marginal as this Pentecostal church, would be silenced
33
Oppression was not the only policy the state pursued during this period.
Taiwan: A New History
The key leaders of the
tang-wai
and Presbyterian Church had been put in prison but the social
forces unleashed by Taiwan's economic transformation had led to a new sense of
446 TAIWAN.
Taiwan: A New History
The PCT, the conscience of the opposition movement, responded to this horrifying attack on the Lin family by converting the Lin family apart
ment into the Gi Kong Church.
Taiwan: A New History
They also placed a bronze plaque outside the church to remind passersby of what had taken place there.
Taiwan: A New History
The church that was founded then emerged as the center of church-inspired social action and continued to play that role into the early 1990s.
Taiwan: A New History
On this church see Murray A. Rubinstein, 'The New Testament Church and the Taiwanese Protestant Community 1960-1988,' in Lin Chi-ping, ed.
Taiwan: A New History
His monographs include The Protestant Commu
nity on Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church (1991), and The Origins
of
the Anglo-American Protestant Missionary Enterprise in China (1996).
Taiwan: A New History
Michael Stainton worked with the Yuan-tzu-min while serving with the Presbyte
rian Church on Taiwan for over a decade.
Taiwan: A New History
political activism of, 438, 443-444 migration
from China, 9-11, 66-67, 112, 124-125, 127-129
to China, 75, 98, 135-136 illegal, 124-125 legalized, 118-119 restrictions on, 109, 112-113, 115-116 from Taiwan to China, 208
Milisch, James, 167 military
and aborigine revolts, 118
and Ch'ing dynasty, 109-110, 140-141 and February 28 uprising, 295
in Fukien, 67-68
under Japanese colonization, 221-222, 279-280
and landlord class, 148
under Nationalists reform, 323 People's Republic of China, 475, 478, 479,480-481,482
during wartime period, 235-236, 239, 240,243, 244
See also police force Min-che, 188 Ming-chu, 97
Ming dynasty, 13 Buddhism during, 56 collapse of, 94 Confucian education during, 62 cults during, 63
and Dutch settlement, 88-95 economy under, 58-59 77-78 farming under, 54, 55
and foreign silver, 77 forts built during, 61-62 Fukien population under, 63-64 local government under, 58-59 and overseas trade, 76, 86
and privatization of land, 57
role of family/women during, 64-66 and salt production, 5l
Ming dynasty (continued)
shipping trade under, 46, 69-70, 71-73 mixes under, 60-61
Ming Min Shu, 67 mining, 192 missile tests, 472 missionaries, 91-92, 169 Miyamoto Nobuto, 30-31 modernist literary movement, 404, 405, 408-411
vs. nativists, 414-415 Mu-tan massacre, 183 Murkowski, Frank, 472 Museum of History, 537 Mutsu Munemitsu, 203 Myers, Ramon, 170
N
name changing, 240 Nan-yin, 267
nanshin policy, 235, 236, 257
National Affairs Conference of 1990, 432, 451-453, 506
National Assembly, 476 changes in, 439 constitutional reform in, 454-455, 503 elections in, 481-482
party factions in, 450, 452, 453 reform by, 460-461
National Central University, 379 National Defense Council, 330 National Development Conference (NDC), 507-508,509
National Unification Council, 529 nationalism
Chen on, 510, 512-513, 514, 515, 525, 529
and Japanese colonization, 208
party positions on, 504, 505-506, 508-509 in PRC, 528
through
literature,
262, 264 threat from China, 497 Nationalist Party
and elections, 326-327 reform in, 321-325, 335-336 Nationalist rule, 281-284
and cultural reconstruction, 284-285 dissidence against, 331, 335
and February 28 uprising, 295-296 political activism during, 286-287, 301 and post-February 28 uprising, 296-300
Nationalist rule (continued)
Taiwanese dissatisfaction with, 276-277, 290-291
U.S. support for, 326 National Security Bureau, 330 National Taiwan University, i
s
, 379 nativist literary movement, 266-267, 404, 405, 412-416
New KM'r Alliance, 458, 459
New Party, 432, 459, 460, 461, 473, 507 coalition with OPP, 477, 502
and corruption, 505
electoral support for, 500, 501 and Legislative Yuan, 476
and National Assembly election, 482-483 and national identity, 508, 509, 512 New People's Society, 231, 233
New Poetry debate, 412
New Taiwan (NT) dollar, 324, 375 New Testament Church, 444-445 Nieh Hua-ling, 407
Niger, 463
Nixon, Richard, 334, 437 Nogi Maresuke, 207
Pacification strategies of, 215, 216 nongovernmental organizations (NGO,) 462 nuclear power plant, 460-461
Nuyts, Pieter, 90
O
oil crisis, 373-374 opium trade, 171-172 Osaka Exhibition of 1903, 230 Ou-yang Tzu, 409, 414
P
P'an Chin-wen, 154 P'an Chunwen, 154 P'an family, 148, 151-155, 159 Van Jen-mu, 407
Van Shih-hsing, 154 P'an Shih-wan, 154 Pa Chin, 406-407 Pa-yeh Ta-lu, 427 Pa-yen Ta-lu, 422 Pan Hsien-yung, 409 Palace Museum, 478, 537 ParBlue coalition, 501, 502, 511, 513-514, 528 PanGreen coalition, 501, 502, 511, 513, 514, 515
pao-chin system, 213
party system.
Taiwan: A New History
See political parties P'eng-fat islands, 101
Dutch occupation in, 86, 88, 90 Japanese occupation in, 202, 203 returned to China, 236-247 P'eng Ko, 407
P'eng Ming-min, 335, 473, 482 presidential agenda of, 479 on Taiwan independence, 481 Pearson, Richard, 35
People's Liberation Army (PLA), 469; see also People's Republic of China, military action by
People's Republic of China, 321, 326 competition with ROC, 334
military action by, 475, 478, 479, 480-4S I, 482
opening of, 376
relations with U.S., 437-438 People Youth Corps, 284
People's First Party (PFP), 502, 503, 511, 512, 515
People's Republic of China (PRC) Chen's policy toward, 515, 525-529 relations with ROC, 497, 515-529 sovereignty claims of, 497, 516, 517, 520 Taiwan Strait Crises, 497, 516, 518, 519 and unification issue, 509, 525
Pescadore islands, 202 Philippines, 31, 75, 464 Phillips, Stephen, 499 P'eng-p'u aborigines, 149, 150, 151 See also P'an family
pirates, 70-71 89
and illegal trade, 68, 69-70 take refuge in Taiwan, 87 Po Yang, 335
police force, 212, 215
Political Activities Committee, 323 Political institutionalization, 498-499 Political parties
coalitions of, 502, 511, 513-514, 515 electoral support for, 500-502
on national identity, 512-513 Polarization and gridlock in, 503-504, 509
Positions on issues, 503-505, 507-509 on Taiwan independence, 507, 512 two-party vs multi-party systems, 500 See also elections; specific parties pollution, 22
556 INDEX
population, 9-10, 126
Chinese, after Cheng regime, 108, 109, 110 in Fukien, 63-64
during Japanese colonization, 210 in late Ch'ing dynasty, 177-178 See also migration
Preparatory Committee to Welcome the National Government, 282 Presbyterian Church on Taiwan, 391, 422, 423, 444, 446, 472n.32
Taiwan: A New History
The village also is the home of two Protestant churches.
Taiwan: A New History
Christian churches were built in many coastal cities and towns at the end of the Ming period and attracted a following that grew to hundreds of thousands.
Taiwan: A New History
Foreign missionaries, together with their churches and schools, also re
mained under his scrutiny.
Taiwan: A New History
The Tainan Presbyterian Seminary, perhaps the oldest educational establishment on the island, continues to prepare ministers and teachers for their respective roles in this largest and strongest of the island's Protestant churches.
Taiwan: A New History
Bond-Head outraged the churches and uplifters of Indians by proposing a large reservation where the dying race could live as it chose.
Taiwan: A New History
Sermons in aboriginal village Presbyterian churches, elite participation in international indigenous conferences, and ex
change visits gave continuous input to the 'aboriginal movement' in Taiwan, which by 1993 came to focus on self-government.
Taiwan: A New History
Aboriginal Post, 424 aborigines, 9, 11 ancestors of, 86 Austronesian origin theories on, 37-41 under Cheng regime, 99
under Ch'ing dynasty, 110-112, 117-118, 119-120
and Chinese, 13, 14, 86, 87-88 and class structure, 386-387 dwellings of, 21
effects of economic growth on, 391-393 and Japanese assimilation, 228
land rights of, 120-124 and landlord class, 137 northern origin theories on, 32-37 population of, 9, 389
religion of, 347-348
revolts by, 113-115, 117-119 self government of, 420-422 phases of, 422-429
and self strengthening program, 186, 190-191 and social conflicts, 179-180
Southern origin theories on, 29-32 and Taiwanese identity, 41-42 See also half mountain people Academia Sinica, 384, 390, 445 Academy for Political Officers, 323 Ackerman, Gary, 472
adoption, 66 Africa, 463 Agency for International Development, 328 agriculture, 11
and Chinese settlement, 13-14
and economic development, 367-368
agriculture (continued) employment in, 378, 382
See also rice; sugar industry; tea trade Ah-Hai, 286, 287
Ahem, Emily Martin, x Akashi Motojim 220 AKATS/SEF talks, 468-470 Allee, Mark, 145, 179
Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (ATA), 38-39, 392,422
Amis myths, 30, 31, 32, 33 Amoy harbor, 73, 90, 95
and Cheng regime, 100-101 ancestor worship, 341-342, 359 Anderson, Benedict, 42
Ando Rikichi, 236
Ando Sadayoshi, 220, 239 Anhai harbor, 73
Ault tribe, 152-155 An-p'ing, 12 Anti-Secession Act, 528 aquaculture, 368-369 Arafat, Yassar, 463 Arima Harunobu, 87 Arnold, Matthew, 408 Arrigo, Linda Gail, x Arrow War, 85
Assembly of First Nations, 428 Australia, 465
Austronesians
relations with aborigines, 39-40
B
Bank of China, 332
Bank of Communications, 332
545
546 INDEX
Bank of Taiwan, 228 banks
reform in, 376 and tea trade, 174 Belarus, 463 Bellochi, Natale, 471 Bernardi, Roy, 472 Bellwood, Peter, 38, 43 blood pleading, 244, 259 Blust, Robert, 34
Bourdieu, Pierre, 420, 422, 430-431, 433 British East India Company, 99 brotherhoods, 346
Buddhism, 345-346, 356-358, 537 in Fukien, 62
during Ming Dynasty, 56 sects of, 352-353 Bulgaria, 463
Bush, George H.W., 465 Bush, George W., 526-527
buraku
system, 228, 239
C
Cairo Declaration, 245-246, 247 Campbell, William, 180
camphor trade, 167, 168, 172-173 Camphor War, 168, 172-173 Candidius, George, 11
Carter, Jimmy, 441 Casteel Provintia, 89 Casteel Zeelandia, 89, 92, 95, 98
Catholicism, xi-xii, 169; See
also
Christianity censorship, 456
Central African Republic, 463 Central America, 463 Central Bank of China, 332 Central Standing Committee, 447, 460 Ch'ang Han, 70
Chang Chun-hung, 442
Chang family, 149, 149-151, 158-159, 159-160
Chang Fang-kao,149, 150 Chang fang-shui, 474 Chang Fang-ta, 149 Chang Hsiu-ya, 406 Chang Ming-hsiung, 179 Chang, Parris, 449 Chang-pi-jung company, 149 Chang Ta-thing, 152, 153 Chang Wen-huan, 263, 270, 272, 274 Chang Wo-chun, 265, 265-266
Chang-wu-wen, 149 Chang Yuen-jen, 150 Chang Yung-fa, 524, 526 Ch'en Chao-ju, 35-36 Ch'en Ch'eng, 300, 324 Ch'en Chenn-nien, 424 Ch'en Ch'i-t'ien, 330 Ch'en Chu, 442
Ch'en family, 147-148 Ch'en Feng-ch'iu, 147 Ch'en Huo-ch'uan, 270, 272 Ch'en Jo-hsi, 409
Ch'en Nang, 144 Ch'en Sheng-shoo, 139 Ch'en Yi, 280, 282, 283, 297
and February 28 uprising, 294, 295 Ch'en Ying-then, 409, 414, 415, 416 Ch'en Yung-hua, 96, 101
Ch'en Ti, 87
Chen Chi-lu, 36-37
Chen Fang-ming, 476-477 Chen Hsu-ku, 262
Chen Li-an, 472, 474, 480, 482 Chen Shen-yi, 464
Chen Shui-bian (Shui-Pien), 445, 462 and constitutional reform, 514
and Hsieh, 503
as mayor of Tapei, 508, 510
on national identity, 510, 512-513, 514, 515, 525, 529
policy changes under, 211-212 PRC relations under, 515, 525-529 referendum proposal of, 513-514 and Taiwan Independence, 510, 514, 525 in 2000 election, 497, 501, 502, 505, 509, 510,525-526
in 2004 election, 502, 514-515, 527 U.S. relations under, 526-527 visits to U.S., 527
Cheng, Robert L., 390
Cheng Ch'eng-kung, xiii, 13, 344 and trade, 89-90,94
rule of Taiwan by, 95-96, 98 Cheng Chih-lung, 66, 88-89 and Dutch settlement, 89-90 Cheng Ching, 96, 100
defeat of, 101 and trade, 97, 99 Cheng-thing-pao, 290 Cheng Ho, 63
Cheng K'o-shuang, 101, 102 Cheng regime, 12, 95-102
Cheng T'ai, 96 Cheng-yen, 357 Ch'i Chi-kuang, 71 Ch'ien-lung, 119 Chi'i Chia-kuang, General, 68 Ch'ing dynasty, x, 13, 165-166 abuse of aborigines under, 117-118 corruption in, 136
defeats Cheng regime, 96-97, 100-102 economy under, 170-171
government role during, 140-142 and Japanese occupation, 206 land use under, 134, 137-140
policy on Taiwan, 102-103, 108-110 and relations with Japan, 183-184
self strengthening program under, 184-194 social change during, 177-181, 183 social disorder during, 143-145
taxation under, 110-112 trade under, 171-177 See
also
landlord class Ch'ing empire, x Ch'i-teng Sheng, 410, 414 Ch'iu Nien-t'ai, 291 Ch'u Hai-yuan, 445, 451 Ch'ann-chou, 71-72
Chiang Ching-kuo, 323, 330, 391, 448, 466 oppression under, 443-446
presidency, 437, 438-439 reform under, 373, 446-448 Chiang Kai-shek, 282, 302, 326, 515, 516 reform under, 321, 322, 323, 327
and UN membership, 519-520 Chiang Pin-kung, 515
Chiang Wei-shui, 231-232 Chino-min Hsieh, 11 Chieh-shan Huang, 177-178
Chin Shi-huang, 36 Chin Heng-wei, 515 China, 166
defeat Japan, 246-247
Japanese acquisition of Taiwan by, 203 migration from, 9-11, 94, 98, 135-136 political unrest in, 293
refugees from, 299
and settlement of Taiwan, 13-14, 17 and Taiwanese identity, 208
Taiwanese settlements in, 228-230, 244-245 See
also
Chinese, Fukien; Han Chinese; People's Republic of China; Republic of China China Aid Act, 325
China Democratic Party, 330-331
INDEX 547
China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, 192
China Steel Corporation, 465
China Tide,
414
China
Times, 416 China Youth Party, 301 Chinese
aborigines are not, 31-32 massacre of, 75
and overseas trade, 77 relation to aborigines, 34-37
See also
Han Chinese Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 22
Chinese Anticommunist National Salvation Youth Corps, 323
Chinese Ethnohistory,
34 Chinese massacre of 1603- 87 Chinese New Literature, 406 Chou Chin-po, 272, 273 Chou Chung-bsuen, 152 Chou lien-hua, 445
Chou Pi-erh, 385 Christianity, xi-xii, I I through Dutch occupation, 91-92 in Fukien, 62, 63
in late Ch'ing dynasty, 169-170 Chu Hsi-ning, 407
Chu Li-min, 411 Chu T'ien-wen, 417 Chu Tzu-ch'ing, 406 Chu Wan, 70-71
Chu Yi-kuei rebellion of 1721, 113-115, 143 Chu Yin-han, 476, 477
Ch'ann-chou, 538 Chic Lo-man-pao, 152 Chung Chao-cbeng, 274, 407 Chung Li-ho, 274
Chung Mei-yin, 406 Chung-yung Yin, 327 churches, 444-445, 472n.32
Taiwan: A New History
They disregarded the Ming court's restrictive maritime policy and recruited Chinese settlers from Fukien for their Taiwan colony.
Taiwan: A New History
They were responsible for the Court of Justice, the supplies' room, the treasury, the police, the secretariat, the executioner's office, the Prefectural Hall, the County Hall, the archives, three granaries, the salt bureau and transport office, the grain mill inspectorate, the prison, the examination hall, three school libraries, the army inn, fifteen postal inns, five military posts, and some minor services.
Taiwan: A New History
In sixteenth-century Fukien, which was considered a border region by the Ming court, the military presence was overwhelming and a dominating element in government, taxes and levies, and personnel.
Taiwan: A New History
However, the Ming court had many other concerns, particularly about defense against the Mongols and maintenance of unity and orthodoxy in the empire.
Taiwan: A New History
The court agreed that it was indeed necessary to take extraordinary measures and appointed Chu Wan as governor of Chekiang province and concur
rently commander of the garrisons of the coastal prefectures of Fukien.
Taiwan: A New History
Chu Wan's strict measures against local officials and merchants who dared to send out ships and continue to trade with the Japanese and others quickly made him most unpopular with the Fukienese gentry and merchants and with those high court officials who profited from this trade.
Taiwan: A New History
At first, the court consented to his policies
of
terror: Ships and warehouses were bumf, people were forced to inform on each other, and armies were sent to attack harbor towns and arrest merchants known to be trading with the foreigners.
Taiwan: A New History
According to the theory held by him and others at the court, the pirate troubles would end only
if
the Chinese merchants would stop trading and offer
ing shelter for their ships.
Taiwan: A New History
As it turned out, unlike its succes
sor in the Ch'ing dynasty, the Ming court was not prepared to go that far.
Taiwan: A New History
However, the discussions at the court between those for and those against compromise with the pirates and liberalization of trade lasted on.
Taiwan: A New History
These suc
cesses provided the necessary political and military room for the court to approve a relaxation of the ban on shipping in 1567.
Taiwan: A New History
If the court had had a greater understanding of the economic needs of the Fukienese and their predicament, it would have been readier to compromise at an earlier date, and pirate raids and military campaigns could have been avoided.
Taiwan: A New History
Now the result was much suffering and damage, and the court's policies left Fukien and other provinces in a position where, on the mainland, most Fukienese could profit only indirectly and through illegal channels from the blooming international trade.
Taiwan: A New History
66
Harbors: Yue-kang and Some Other Ports in the South
Ch'uan-court's decline in the mid-Ming has been attributed to siltation of its harbor after the Yuan (partly owing to destruction of the vegetation cover along
72 TAIWAN.
Taiwan: A New History
At the court, objections to a further relaxation of overseas trade remained strong, particularly after Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea in 1592.
Taiwan: A New History
The Ming state, in deep systemic crisis composed of bank
ruptcy, court factionalism and eunuch power, Manchu invasion, and widespread rebellion, paid little attention to the local version of that crisis on the South China coast.
Taiwan: A New History
Officials at court in Peking had originally intended, once the rebel Cheng regime was defeated, to abandon Taiwan and evacuate its Chinese population to the mainland.
Taiwan: A New History
In adopting these policies, the government hoped to foster an economic recovery along the south
eastern coast that would stabilize its social order and generate taxes and customs revenues (from foreign trade) that would ease the court's own fiscal problems.
Taiwan: A New History
In the case of Taiwan, however, the court imposed a partial quarantine, as it was determined to prevent the island from again becoming a staging ground for rebellion.
Taiwan: A New History
The court feared that Han immigration to Taiwan would create a potentially rebellious population in areas beyond its effective control; it also saw expanding Han settlement as an intrusion on aborigine villages that would upset the ethnic status quo on the island.
Taiwan: A New History
Quarantine and Restrictions On Immigration
The court, persuaded primarily by considerations of maritime security, decided in 1684 to keep Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
But instead of adopting a policy of actively opening the Taiwan frontier, the court imposed a partial quarantine on the island.
Taiwan: A New History
The court's primary motive remained its fear that pirates, Cheng remnants, and rebels might make Taiwan into an antigovernment base.
Taiwan: A New History
I I
In 1683 the Ch'ing court had been impressed more by the burdens than the benefits of the incorporation of Taiwan into the empire.
Taiwan: A New History
The court, afraid that Taiwan might again become a rebel base, imposed a partial quarantine on the island.
Taiwan: A New History
The court judged that indirect control, exercised by quarantining the island, would be a less expensive and more cost-effective means of preventing disturbance on the frontier.
Taiwan: A New History
Also in 1731 the court added several sub
magistrates to its civil administration.
Taiwan: A New History
That many of the procolonization policies had already been tried deflated the arguments counseling continuation of the procolonization course; so when policy reversals were proposed the new court was receptive.
Taiwan: A New History
Whatever its policy, the Ch'ing court had to work through officials who had private goals that were as often satisfied by subverting official policy by extorting bribes as by carrying that policy out.
Taiwan: A New History
Ac
cording to Ch'ing practice, before their naturalization, the shu fan donated land to the Ch'ing court and in return received land on which they could hunt and make a living.
Taiwan: A New History
In this case, aborigines were prepared to press their griev
ances in court against the official (a deceitful
likin fi-chinf
tax collector), rather than take up arms.
Taiwan: A New History
86
More importantly for Taiwan itself, Ch'ing administrators initiated a vigorous, multifaceted 'self-strengthening' program, which has since been termed 'the first constructive policy the Qing court ever really evidenced in regard to the internal affairs of the island.''
Taiwan: A New History
Liu Ming-ch'uan was roundly denounced at court for failing to dislodge the French from Keelung during the subsequent course of the war, but he apparently lacked sufficient troops and weaponry to do so.
Taiwan: A New History
The court authorized the change in 1885, but took until 1887 to
188 TAIWAN.
Taiwan: A New History
is
The financial needs of the new province were partially met by the temporary subvention from Fukien, and by the court's allowing Liu to utilize all the exten
sive maritime customs and
li-chin
revenues collected on Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
121
In reporting to the court, Liu often spoke confidently of the submission of the mountain tribes and the opening of vast tracts of untamed wilderness for tea and grain cultivation and camphor production.
Taiwan: A New History
In view of the more than forty military expeditions Liu felt compelled to launch against the aborigines from 1884 to 1891, the court came to discount his exaggerated claims of success.
Taiwan: A New History
Strenuously objecting to Western control of Taiwan's coal resources as too high a price to pay even for modernization, the court forced Liu to suspend his protracted negotiations.
Taiwan: A New History
At key junctures, as in his handling of mining policy and costly aboriginal campaigns, Liu even aroused the court itself against him.
Taiwan: A New History
3
Li Hung-chang, China's chief diplomat, was forced to accede to these conditions as well as to other Japanese demands, and the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17, then duly ratified by the Ch'ing court on May 8.
Taiwan: A New History
Amid the outcry that Taiwan had been abandoned by the Ch'ing court, frenzied mobs appeared in Taipei, the capital.
Taiwan: A New History
The Ch'ing court took pains not to become involved, fearing Japanese reprisals as well as setbacks in negotiations over the retroces
sion of the Liao-rung peninsula in North China.
Taiwan: A New History
Their group had already begun to experience an acute identity crisis as a result of their 'abandon
ment' by the Ch'ing court.
Taiwan: A New History
7
s Shortly after the paper had ceased publishing, the highest court on Taiwan announced that the case against him was being dropped for lack of evidence.
Taiwan: A New History
In early De
cember
1948,
the Taiwan High Court upheld an earlier ruling by a Taiwan court invalidating all transfers of Japanese property made after August
15, 1945.
Taiwan: A New History
Following the overthrow of the Tokugawa bakufu by court nobles and samurai, administration of Japan was returned to the emperor, who adopted the reign name of Meiji (Enlightened Rule) in 1869.
Taiwan: A New History
'Wang T'ien-teng wen-tzu huo-an kao-fa-yuan hsuan-p'an wu tsui' [High court determines that no crime was committed in the Wang T'ien-teng case], Kuo-shengpao, January 31, 1947, 3.
Taiwan: A New History
When Shih was captured and arrested these Presbyterian officials were also arrested and put on trial in court proceedings that followed the public trial of the
Mei-li-tao
leadership.
Taiwan: A New History
Finally a new fifteen member court was set up to review the actions of the political parties.
Taiwan: A New History
Another source close to the event is a book of newspaper articles, statements by participants, and court transcripts pub
lished in 1988.
Taiwan: A New History
With the help of her lawyer/brother Ms. Lu was able to refute the confession in court on the basis of the fact that it was a confession made while she was being psychologically tortured.
Taiwan: A New History
Chin said that the DPP suffered a major setback in last December's elections because it lost many of its 'core supporters' by trying to court middle-of-the-road voters.
Taiwan: A New History
Convinced that an influx of foreign capital and expertise was needed to develop new mines, Liu courted foreign business interests in 1889-90.
Taiwan: A New History
136
By attempting to do so much so soon, Liu courted frustration and failure within a late Ch'ing administrative order that was still relatively sluggish and financially weak.
Taiwan: A New History
The former republics of the Soviet Union, for example, have courted Taiwan, and Taiwan also has a close working relation
ship with Vietnam.
Taiwan: A New History
The regime worked to improve relations with the region, courting leaders and sending the president and other high ranking offi
cials to visit, and inviting their representatives, to visit Taipei.
Taiwan: A New History
Caroline Hong
and Debbie Wu, 'DPP-PFP
Coalition
Seems Inevitable,'
Taipei Times, January 10,
2005, p. 3;
Jewel Huang and Caroline Hong,
'DPP
Courting Soong to Take up
SEF
Helm,' Taipei Times, January
4, 2005, p. 3;
Tai-lin Huang, 'Then Claims Soong Will Back Arms Bill,' Taipei Times, January
18, 2005, p. 1.
Taiwan: A New History
There are located the government's executive offices, cabinet ministries, legislative assemblies, highest courts, and examination and 'control' branches.'
Taiwan: A New History
Moreover, the lineage had control and sanction mechanisms of its own and therefore had less need to appeal to the courts or other official intervention.
Taiwan: A New History
88
Nevertheless, the Ando regime endeavored to resolve conflicts between the security forces and law courts that had developed during the Sakuma reign, primarily through the efforts of Shimomma Hiroshi, the new chief of civil administration.
Taiwan: A New History
His use of executive ordinances and decrees (furei) also enabled him to regulate the colonial courts.
Taiwan: A New History
The committee members called for reforms including the election of mayors and district magistrates, greater Taiwanese rep
resentation in the provincial administration (including government bureaus, courts, and police), abolition of the trade and monopoly bureaus, and that Tai
wanese not be drafted to fight in the mainland's civil war.
Taiwan: A New History
There are some common points of discourse between the Japanese and the Westerners, which I call the politics of the southern origin theory:
4
Taiwan as an isolated island, at the margins, an end of the line Aboriginal myths of origin as important evidence
Successive waves of immigration, mainly from the south Aboriginal people as ancient remnants (even a doomed race) A discontinuity of present with ancient past
The Asian (Chinese) mainland as generally irrelevant
A conceptual and historical separation between China and Taiwan Aboriginal people as non-Chinese needing help from non-Chinese against the Chinese invaders
Taiwan as home.
Taiwan: A New History
They were made very strong by design by employing various techniques such as a double hull, separation of about 25 compartments, a low center of gravity, close-sealing, iron cords, use of high-qual
ity timber for the masts and rudder, and high side-boards against billows.
Taiwan: A New History
Some supporters of Taiwanese independence (Tai-tu) go to great lengths to show a long-temt drive for permanent and formal separation from the mainland.
Taiwan: A New History
The ironies, ambiguities, and contradic
tions in religious flows between Taiwan and the mainland, and within Taiwan itself, result in part from the fluid possibilities of Taiwanese religious practice itself: the relative weakness of the monastic tradition, the frontier conditions, the long separation from the mainland, the speed of social change, and the lack of any effective institutional authority over interpretation.
Taiwan: A New History
As a corollary to this, it stated that they opposed the DPP's 'one China, one Taiwan' concept or any other form of what they considered to be separation.
Taiwan: A New History
The irony of the decades of separation and verbal and sometimes physical combat is that Taiwan, with its cor
poratist state and its export-oriented economy, also became a model-a paradigm
and the PRC increasingly recognizes that it needs Western (and Little Dragon) capital and expertise.
Taiwan: A New History
The state's two largest memorials cum cultural centers, the per
formance halls of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial and the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall
are, respectively, in the city's governmental and financial districts.
Taiwan: A New History
Taipei thus can be seen as a city approaching the world
class status that befits the hub of a state that is a small, but still dynamic, East Asian economic and political power center.
Taiwan: A New History
It follows the course of development of the only province the KNIT was left with and examines the ROC, now more than ever a U.S. client state, by tracing the island's political evolution and rapid socioeconomic development during these critical years of regime consolidation, reform, and economic restructuring.
Taiwan: A New History
Chap
ter 12 looks at Chinese religion on Taiwan and assesses its impact on the mod
ernizing KMT-dominated nation-state.
Taiwan: A New History
On the southwestern plains--the present-day areas of Tainan and adjacent Kao-hsiung
hsien-compact
villages populated by Chinese settlers emerged from 'state'-sponsored colonization because of both Dutch and Cheng family efforts during their brief interludes.
Taiwan: A New History
The wharfs had received a state monopoly on the manufacture of the official messenger ships for the Ryukyu islands.
Taiwan: A New History
According to data for 1578, 536,000
shih
of the annual tax grain (or 63 percent of the Fukien total of 850,000
shih)
stayed within the province to feed the garrisons and pay for the local state apparatus.
Taiwan: A New History
,45
While there may have been some popular support for such measures in the beginning, the continuous government repression of the very activities that Fukien valued most-overseas trade and religion--and its inability to offer adequate protection against outside threats must have left many southern Min people with negative feelings toward the state.
Taiwan: A New History
The main sources of silver were the state mines in the provinces of Chekiang and Yunnan, in Lung-hsi and P'u-ch'eng counties in Fukien, and illegal private mines.
Taiwan: A New History
A work in English discussing this period is So Kwan-wai, Japanese P%racy in Ming China during
the /
6th Century (East Lansing:Michigan State University Press, 1975).
Taiwan: A New History
(Photo by M Rubinstein)
The Wild Coast
84
As we learn more about the energy and tenacity of Chinese frontiersmen and the occasional, serious efforts of local elites and bureaucracies to bring newly settled areas fully within state and civilization, we are likely to find the history, or
86 TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY
THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY TRANSFORMATION 87
prehistory, of Taiwan more and more puzzling.
Taiwan: A New History
Officers occasionally had been stationed there since about
1170,
bringing the islands under the control of the Chinese state for the first time, but there is no record of Chinese settlement or political authority on Taiwan at this time.
Taiwan: A New History
Adept at finding the right patron and maximizing his own power and freedom from the usual bureaucratic checks and balances, very much inter
ested in trade and ready to cut a deal with anyone, a sort of mirror image within the Ch'ing state of the Cheng outlaw traders-mediators-sealords,
3
s he is one of
THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY TRANSFORMATION 97
the key figures in the history of Taiwan in the seventeenth century.
Taiwan: A New History
Already in 1663 Cheng Ching had changed the name of his capital from Eastern Capital to Tung-ning (East Pacified), and seems to have been ready to discuss acknowledging Ch'ing suzerainty as a tributary state, on roughly the same terms as Korea.
Taiwan: A New History
It had never been part of the Chinese imperial state.
Taiwan: A New History
Farming taxes to private mer
chants was advantageous for the state because it guaranteed the payment of the tax quota at the same time it eliminated the expense of administering a tax collection system in the villages.
Taiwan: A New History
The monopoly merchant system, however, concentrated great power in the tax farmer and his subordinates, who mediated between the state and the weakly organized and unsophisticated aborigines.
Taiwan: A New History
Like tax farming, corvee reduced the state's administrative expenses, was subject to sim
ilar abuses, and was the source of frequent troubles.
Taiwan: A New History
Ch'ing fron
tier quarantine policies, however, were difficult to enforce and in the Taiwan case were opposed by many officials, who saw them as the source of much of the unsettled state of Taiwanese society.
Taiwan: A New History
Taiwan's local gazetteers simply state that a revolt broke out at this time in the plains aborigine village of Ta-chia-hsi, under the leadership of one Lin Wu-Ii.
Taiwan: A New History
A NEW HISTORY
The substantial reduction of aborigine taxes in 1737 was in one sense the ultimate solution to the state's inability to create a tax collection system that was not subject to official corruption and interpreter abuse.
Taiwan: A New History
The Ch'ing state used its authority to allocate rights and duties with respect to land to manage the relations between Han settlers and the plains aborigines while at the same time pursuing its own revenue and security goals.
Taiwan: A New History
In Taiwan state authorities recognized two broad categories of frontier land, tribal land and government-owned wasteland.
Taiwan: A New History
Accordingly, the Ch'ing state came to recognize tribal ownership over large amounts of uncultivated land that served as aborigine hunting grounds and pasture.
Taiwan: A New History
One early method of acquiring aborigine land that received explicit official sanction (it had the added advantage of guaranteeing state revenues) required a settler to assume the head tax burden of a tribe in return for rights in land.
Taiwan: A New History
His analysis of the state of Taiwan's society required encouraging Han settlement, reclamation, and the expansion of taxable acreage, and he gave little thought to either the cost to the aborigines or the dangers of aborigine revolt.
Taiwan: A New History
In sum, the thrust of the 1724 decree was to give Han settlers access to tribal land on condition that they pay rents to aborigine tribes and land taxes to the state.
Taiwan: A New History
Because it was militarily unable to evict large numbers of frontiersmen and financially unable to resettle them, the Ch'ing state was forced to acquiesce in most Han reclamation, even though it was technically illegal.
Taiwan: A New History
Thus plains aborigine utility as a military force loyal to the state (and fear of their potential for revolt), their status as taxpayers, ambivalence toward the im
migration of Chinese settlers who disrupted the status quo but contributed to land tax revenues, and a Confucian concern to preserve the livelihoods of subject peoples all motivated the Ch'ing state to arbitrate relations between Chinese immigrant farmers and civilized aborigines.
Taiwan: A New History
The goal of the Ch'ing state was to keep the competition between settlers and aborigines from disrupting its control of a strategic periphery of the empire and imposing additional costs that Taiwan's inadequate revenues did little to defray.
Taiwan: A New History
These people are referred to in official decrees as 'secret crossers'; the Ch'ing state simply could not bring their movement to a halt.
Taiwan: A New History
No enterprising Western soldiers of fortune successfully established a tropical kingdom or
FROM TREATY PORTS TO PROVINCIAL STATUS 167
founded an imperial city-state on Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
Above all, the figures point up the volatile state of the camphor industry and the astonishing growth of the tea trade in value terms from the 1860s to the 1890s.
Taiwan: A New History
The Liu-ch'ius were not Japanese territory but a Chinese tributary state, while Ch'ing policy in Taiwan precluded responsibility for aboriginal behavior beyond the effective reach of Chinese administration.e
Taiwan: A New History
Notwithstanding these initial colonization efforts, few mainland Chinese farmers volunteered to become state-subsidized pioneers on the southern Taiwan frontier.
Taiwan: A New History
As compensation for their new tax burdens, the state reduced
hsiao-tzu
payments to
to-tzu
households by 40 percent, another step closer to the latters' gradual elimination as a signifi
cant factor in landed property holding on Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
The most drastic of these reforms related to Kobayashi's efforts to force the Japanese state religion, Shintoism, upon the Taiwanese.
Taiwan: A New History
Marius B. Jansen, 'The Meiji State: 1868-1912,' in
Modern
East Asia: Essays
in
Interpretation,
ed.
Taiwan: A New History
The male voters had to be at least twenty-five years old and affluent enough to pay a direct state tax of fifteen Japanese yen or more.
Taiwan: A New History
A state comprising Han settlers since the seven
teenth century and a province of the Manchu-governed China since 1885, Tai
wan in the early part of the twentieth-century was incorporated by Japan into a different geopolitical and economic system and as a result experienced the initial stages of modernization because of its East Asian colonizer, which had itself recently modernized based on the Western model.
Taiwan: A New History
The two organizations published a journal called
Taiwan Youth
(T'ai-wan ch'ing-nien) to propagate progressive ideas and voice opinions about the current state of affairs in Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
Moreover, as Taiwan had already been politically separated from China for more than two decades, its people had many fewer channels for leaming the standard Chinese vernacular through pub
lic institutions such as education, publications, or a state bureaucracy.
Taiwan: A New History
They also invoked positive aspects of the colonial experience, such as economic develop
ment, in order to justify their criticism of the state.
Taiwan: A New History
Islanders wrestled with two interrelated problems: Where did they fit in the nation of China? What was their place in the Nationalist state? To many, China appeared chaotic and backward-a potential drain on the island's resources and a threat to
BETWEEN ASSIMILATION AND INDEPENDENCE 177
its stability.
Taiwan: A New History
The Nationalist state failed to meet many standards of acceptable governance that the Taiwanese had formed under the previous regime.
Taiwan: A New History
Taiwanese criticism of the state mirrored calls for expanded pro
vincial autonomy.'°
Taiwan: A New History
In early 1947, simmering tensions between state and society exploded in what became known as the February 28 incident.'
Taiwan: A New History
After the incident, the state dominated debate over Taiwan's place in China and the Nation
alist polity.
Taiwan: A New History
;
The Taiwanese paid a huge price for this progress: life in a brutal police state, second-class citizenship, economic exploitation, and constant uncertainty over their place in the world.
Taiwan: A New History
Voicing themes that became common in disputes between the Nationalist state and the Taiwanese after 1945, indigenous political leaders emphasized that they were best able to manage the internal affairs of the island-they should have a greater role-and that their economic development and education levels warranted such measures-they could take on this responsibility.
Taiwan: A New History
34
Many of them, however, were torn between loyalty to their native place and to the Nationalist state, which had provided them with status and careers.
Taiwan: A New History
They would be the ones who attempted to shape the relationship between state and society after the retrocession.
Taiwan: A New History
The Taiwanese realized that their collaboration with the Japanese colonial empire would be an extraordinarily sensitive issue in their relationship with the mainlander-dominated Nationalist state.
Taiwan: A New History
43
State policies involving important issues such as the disposition of Japanese assets and economic reconstruction, cultural reintegration and language, and participation in political activity all led to disputes with the island's people.
Taiwan: A New History
The state magnified these prob
lems by attempting to link Taiwan to the mainland even as the latter struggled, then failed, to recover from the war.
Taiwan: A New History
The Nationalists placed colonial-era enter
prises and monopolies under state control, confiscated Japanese private property, and established trade bureaus to manage commerce between the island and the mainland or the outside world.
Taiwan: A New History
49
Since the nation and government belonged to the people, he reasoned, state enterprises were inherently good.
Taiwan: A New History
The new regime's efforts to increase its control over all facets of the economy collided with the drive by wealthy Taiwanese to expand their enterprises into areas formerly controlled by Japanese firms or the colonial government' Businessmen large and small could neither compete with state firms nor trade freely with either old markets (Japan and its former colonies) or new (the mainland).
Taiwan: A New History
53
Taiwanese saw corruption as particularly troublesome, as they came to recall fondly that they had learned the importance of the rule of law under the stnc4--yet predictable police state run by the Japanese .s
Taiwan: A New History
State monopolies on goods such as tobacco, alcohol, salt, and matches proved unable to meet the needs of consumers.
Taiwan: A New History
64
Finally, the Taiwanese received mixed messages from the state.
Taiwan: A New History
The state vastly overestimated the speed at which Taiwanese could learn
kuoyu
well enough to discuss political issues (the fastest process) and read or write official materials (the slowest).
Taiwan: A New History
The media became the most visible avenue for the Taiwanese to attempt to influence the state.
Taiwan: A New History
The main
landers' near-monopoly over important positions in the provincial adminis
tration, including state enterprises and monopoly bureaus, antagonized the Taiwanese.
Taiwan: A New History
6
After 1945 the conflict between admiration of Japanese material progress and Chinese ancestry became a major point of contention between the Nationalist state, which presented itself as synonymous with China, and the Taiwanese.
Taiwan: A New History
Islanders connected the failures of the state, as represented by the provin
BETWEEN ASSIMILATION AND INDEPENDENCE 191
cial government, to a broader critique of the nation of China.
Taiwan: A New History
The Nationalists reacted brutally, crushing the island's elite as a political force capable of operating outside the mainlander-dominated state or the Kuomintang.
Taiwan: A New History
Although few of the elite participated in the initial uprising or anticipated that the Nationalists would so quickly lose control, they suddenly found themselves negotiating between the state and Taiwanese society.
Taiwan: A New History
The com
mittee became the focal point for negotiations with the state.
Taiwan: A New History
126
The state answered the challenge presented by the Taiwanese takeover and political demands with force.
Taiwan: A New History
Nevertheless the state targeted prominent Taiwanese for arrest or execution By March 13, even as the island returned to Nationalist control, the government embarked upon a movement to 'exterminate traitors' (su
chien)--rounding
up Taiwanese who may have of
fended anyone in the government.
Taiwan: A New History
27
Now, the state moved ahead with decolonization at gunpoint.
Taiwan: A New History
2
s As soldiers spread terror through the island, they crushed the Taiwanese as a political force that could advocate change outside the Nationalist state or Kuomintang party structure.
Taiwan: A New History
Many of those who criticized the state and promoted self-government after the retrocession died, fled, or were frightened into silence.'
Taiwan: A New History
36
Now, the state alone defined the Japanese legacy, which it placed at the core of evaluations of the February 28 incident.
Taiwan: A New History
Now, the state dominated debate over the colonial legacy and thus prevented its application as a justification for political reform.
Taiwan: A New History
The Nationalist state now managed political debate and change from the top down, with little
BETWEEN ASSIMILATION AND INDEPENDENCE 297
concern for the requests of the Taiwanese.
Taiwan: A New History
Criti
cism of the state in the press became muted, as outspoken Taiwanese had disappeared and the most independent publications were banned or forced out of business.
Taiwan: A New History
The state did carry out several minor reforms in response to the incident and resulting U.S. unease over Nationalist misrule.
Taiwan: A New History
141
The Taiwanese, minus the most vocal advocates of self-government, held slightly more posts in the provincial government and state-controlled enter
prises.'
Taiwan: A New History
43
This body, however, had little formal power or informal influence over the state.
Taiwan: A New History
'45
The state focused on economic development even as it quashed Taiwanese political aspirations.
Taiwan: A New History
4
s
On the other hand, the vice-chair of the Provincial Consultative Assembly, Li Wan-chu, one of the most prominent non-Kuomintang political
298 TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY
figures, pointed out that the Taiwanese lacked the capital to purchase these state enterprises.
Taiwan: A New History
151
This meant that much of the property sold by the Japanese to Taiwanese at the end of the war belonged to the state.
Taiwan: A New History
154 Reflecting the pressures of all-out civil war on the mainland, communism joined Japanization as the primary enemies of the state.
Taiwan: A New History
In the Provincial Consultative Assembly, the political elite avoided issues that could antagonize the state.
Taiwan: A New History
In the clearest sign of state confidence in its control--reflecting the decline of Japanese influence and success at government-controlled reintegration--the pro
vincial government began to move forward with its own program for local self
government in
1948.
Taiwan: A New History
The state set the agenda and limits on these discussions by rejecting provincial self-government (changing the relationship between Taiwan and the central government) while promoting its version of local self-government at the city, town, or district level.'
Taiwan: A New History
59
The state made clear that self-government outside its own program was synonymous with seeking independence from China.i
Taiwan: A New History
6
° The press, now more tightly controlled by the authorities, emphasized that the state
sponsored self-government in no way sought to weaken the island's links to the mainland government-completely the opposite of the vision held by Taiwan
ese.i
Taiwan: A New History
The state placed this activity in the context of a broader program of 'citizenship training' for the Taiwanese and the newly promulgated constitution for the Republic of China.i
Taiwan: A New History
Now the Taiwanese would have to earn the state's version of local self-government by assim
ilating into the Nationalist Chinese political order.
Taiwan: A New History
After the February 28 incident, the state controlled not only the pace and scope of reforms to the island's administration, it even dominated how those changes were discussed.
Taiwan: A New History
The eventual implementation of limited reform in the early 1950s reflected the Nationalists' confidence in their ability to prevent dissent and engage in state building from the top down.
Taiwan: A New History
Through the press and Provincial Consultative Assembly, he strongly criticized the state and advocated expanded self-government, often com
paring aspects of the new regime unfavorably with the old.
Taiwan: A New History
For example, Huang Ch'aoch'in was a success in the Nationalist state, party, and economy.
Taiwan: A New History
Huang also held important posts in several banks and state enterprises.
Taiwan: A New History
His views of Taiwan's relationship with the mainland and local self-government closely matched the state's.
Taiwan: A New History
However, he focused on the distribution of benefits from the state, not on issues involving systematic change such as self-government.
Taiwan: A New History
A few islanders, such as Li Wan-chu and Kuo Kuo-chi, managed to remain active in politics outside the Nationalist party and state structures.
Taiwan: A New History
175
The state had cleared a path for innovative policies to promote development that is today characterized as an 'economic miracle.'
Taiwan: A New History
176
In the political realm the Nationalists blocked any change in the relationship between the state and Taiwanese society.
Taiwan: A New History
Economic development and resulting social
BETWEEN ASSIMILATION AND INDEPENDENCE 303
change enlarged a middle class that increasingly pressured the state for demo
cratic reform.
Taiwan: A New History
many ways, the history of the Taiwanese relationship with the state during the immediate postwar period represents an examination of collective memory and how it shaped--both consciously and unconsciously-political activity.
Taiwan: A New History
Unlike other Taiwanese, how
ever, their influence depended less upon their role in society (a functional elite) than upon formal state posts (a positional elite).
Taiwan: A New History
Taiwan
ese Independence Movements, 1683-1956,' National Archives, Department of State Re
cords, RG 59, Office of Intelligence Research, August 8, 1956, IR 7203, 6.
Taiwan: A New History
His political ideology, known as the Three Principles of the People (San-min chu-i) stressed nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood (a program based primar
ily upon land reform and a large state role in the economy).
Taiwan: A New History
'Conditions in Formosa,' State Department Report, March 15, 1946, National Archives, State Department Records, Record Group 59, 894A.00/3-1546
Taiwan: A New History
The policies may have been ill-conceived and the state industries ill-managed; and certainly from that perspective, 'nationalization' seemed much more like 'expropriation.'
Taiwan: A New History
Review of press reports in State Department files, RG 59, 894A.00/5-2146.
Taiwan: A New History
After the February 28 incident, there was little discussion, much less state promotion, of Lu Hsun.
Taiwan: A New History
Wang was not the only promi
nent Taiwanese harassed by the state.
Taiwan: A New History
As a result, their criticism of the state's efforts at reintegration came earlier and
was stated more forcefully than that of other Taiwanese.
Taiwan: A New History
Tobacco was one of the products taxed and controlled by a state monopoly.
Taiwan: A New History
Leighton Smart to President Chiang Kai-shek, April 18, 1947, 'Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan,' reprinted in
United
States
Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949
(Washington, DC: Department of State, 1949), 928.
Taiwan: A New History
They state that the provincial government could only call upon five thousand soldiers and eight thousand police to restore control (Lai et al.,
Taiwan: A New History
U.S. State Department official George Kerr received a letter from an informant in Taichung mentioning the presence of Hsieh and her attempt to incite violence.
Taiwan: A New History
For details on the makeup of the committee, see 'Kenneth Krentz, American Consul in Taipei, to the Secretary of State, January 2, 1949,' RG 59, 894A.00/
Taiwan: A New History
The state made clear the connection between provincial self-government and independence.
Taiwan: A New History
For a description of the beginning of the Communists' military offensive in late 1948, see 'The Ambassador in China (Smart) to the Secretary of State, September 22, 1948,' in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948, vol.
Taiwan: A New History
'Memorandum from American Consul Kenneth Krentz to the Secretary of State, October 29,1948,' RG 59, 894A.00/
Taiwan: A New History
'The Consul General at Taipei (Krentz) to the Secretary of State, November 23, 1948,' in
FRUS,
1948, vol.
Taiwan: A New History
The State Department ordered officials in Taipei not to discuss this possibility with Wei.
Taiwan: A New History
'Memorandum from Ambassador Stuart to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1948,' RG 59, 894A.00/12-3048.
Taiwan: A New History
For an overview of the impact of rent reduction and land reform upon the Taiwanese rural elite and farmers, see Hou K'un-hung, 'Kuang-fu ch'u-ch'i T'ai-wan Vu-ti kai-ko yen-tung-cheng to cheng-fu, ti-chu, yu f men-rung' [The state, landlords, and farmers in Taiwan's postretrocession land reform],
Chung-kuo
hsien-tai-shih chuan-t'i yen-chiu pao-kao, 17 (1994): 273-329.
Taiwan: A New History
The U.S. State Department was even contemplating the right timing and occasion to recognize the newly founded People's Republic of China.
Taiwan: A New History
The provisional amendments made the Nationalist Party do
mestically unchallengeable as long as a state of civil war existed.
Taiwan: A New History
An important reason for the extraordinary success of Taiwan's economy was the recruitment of many highly trained professionals to take charge of economic planning and development of state-run industries.
Taiwan: A New History
Wu was forced to leave Taiwan in 1953 and formally broke relations with the Nationalist government in 1954, when he held a press conference in New York to criticize Chiang and his government as 'undemocratic,' for making Taiwan into a 'police state,' and for making the people submit to 'one-party rule.'
Taiwan: A New History
The party-state ruling system became entrenched and undermined the progress of democratization in Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
Furthermore, Chiang Kai
shek was forced to state publicly in 1958 that the ROC would not resort to force to reunify China.
Taiwan: A New History
See Richard E. Barett, 'Autonomy and Diversity in the American State on Tai
wan,' in Contending Approaches to
the
Political Economy
of
Taiwan, ed.
Taiwan: A New History
Edwin A. Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1988); Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in
the
Taiwan Miracle (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), pp. 68-69.
Taiwan: A New History
Chien-kuo Pang,
The State and Economic Transformation: The Taiwan Case
(New York: Garland, 1992), pp. 180-185.
Taiwan: A New History
Clearer state authority was finally established only by the Japanese occupiers, who had a very different culture of the family in spite of a shared Confucian heritage.
Taiwan: A New History
1 3
Both local elites and the state tried to clean gods up as they grew influential.
Taiwan: A New History
Many of these top clergy worked closely with the state, which helped them establish new Buddhist schools and temples.
Taiwan: A New History
1 will
not discuss imperial state religion here, although it certainly was practiced in the Ch'ing dynasty.
Taiwan: A New History
Factory
Women in
Malaysia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).
Taiwan: A New History
13
The newly arrived firms found a low-cost, dedicated, and readily trained work force at their disposal, a work force that-given the totalitarian nature of the Taiwan government and that state's control of labor unions-was not then able to organize itself and confront potential exploitation at the hands of the foreign owners.
Taiwan: A New History
To that degree, the typical public univer
sity reflected the centralized Leninist state of which it was a part.
Taiwan: A New History
The first she terms the 'new middle class,' which resembles the class of salarymen in Japan and the bureaucratic 'new class' in some state capitalist societies described by Milovan Djilas.
Taiwan: A New History
Many politicians in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) who had bitter memories of their conflicts with the state felt there was much to lose by forgiving and forgetting.
Taiwan: A New History
It called for state recognition of aborigine social organiza
tions, populations, and regions.
Taiwan: A New History
It called for aborigine ownership of land and resources and for a return of those lands that the ethnic Han and the state had obtained by illegal means.
Taiwan: A New History
On the flower industry and related new developments in the agricultural sector, as well as a telling overview of the state of agriculture on Taiwan, see Philip Liu, 'Agricul
tural Crossroads,' FCR, 42, no. 4 (April 1992): 28-33.
Taiwan: A New History
These emige writers were frequently mobilized in the state-sponsored cultural programs and produced a literature that has often been characterized as anti-Communist.
Taiwan: A New History
The crevice thus created in the Nationalist government's state control provided an opportunity for frustrated native intellec
tuals to vent the discontent that had been building for years: anxiety over the country's future, which had frequently been glossed over by the 'regain the mainland' slogan; indignation about political persecutions of dissidents; and many other grievances against the authoritarian regime.
Taiwan: A New History
If this is so, Taiwan's aboriginal people are past the point of debating its merits and demerits with the state as a possible policy-because it is now doxa, aboriginal
ABORIGINAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 411
identity, and an inherent right.
Taiwan: A New History
Linked to ideas of 'autonomy' and 'self
determination,' it presents a utopian vision of indigenous people in full control of their own lives and future, 'freely determining their political status and freely pursuing their economic, social, and cultural development,' 'maintaining and strengthening their distinct political, economic, social and cultural characteristics as well as their legal systems, while retaining their rights to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the state' (UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Articles three and four).
Taiwan: A New History
The state shall guar
antee to the aborigines the right to exercise autonomous
Stage 2: Orthodoxy, 1990-1993
By 1990 the desire for aboriginal self-government was no longer simply a dissident opinion of the extremely small and politically marginalized ATA.
Taiwan: A New History
Almost everyone who is anyone in the political universe of aboriginal Taiwan, in both government and opposition camps, is present The 'Statement'passed at the end of the consultation declares:
Our country is a multiethnic state
[tuo min-tzu kuo-chia] ...
Taiwan: A New History
Although he rejects the idea of self-government (still heterodox to the state), the fact of this meeting itself is a consacration of the self-government movement as representing the legitimate voice of TAP and confirms the idea of self-government as the core of aboriginal doxa.
Taiwan: A New History
This serious setback should not keep us from losing sight of the fact that, at the symbolic level of legal inscription, the establishment of these long-demanded national commissions represents a further confirmation of the legitimacy of the idea of aboriginal people holding a special place in the structure of the state--one of the ideas upon which the doxa of aboriginal self-government is established.
Taiwan: A New History
In their press release on return to Taiwan (September 12, 1996) they state:
In our visit we discovered that the right of self-government is not given by those who rule but is built upon aboriginal people's clear recognition of who they are....
Taiwan: A New History
However, and more important in the perspective of this argument, the Na
tional Assembly did pass an amendment to the constitution, affirming: 'The State shall, in accordance with the will of the ethnic groups, safeguard the status and political participation of the aborigines.'
Taiwan: A New History
Chapter XIII Fundamental National Policies Section 6
Frontier Regions
Article 168
The State shall accord to the various racial groups in the frontier regions legal protection of their status and give them special assistance in their local self
government undertakings.
Taiwan: A New History
One paragraph refers to aborigines:
The State shall accord to the aborigines in the free area legal protection of their status and right to political participation.
Taiwan: A New History
Ab
original self-government is not something that the KMT explicitly opposes, and when the chair of the party and president of the state meets with aboriginal movement leaders he also gives that movement legitimacy.
Taiwan: A New History
This is made salient in the social problems faced by aboriginal people, especially in conflicts over land, which constantly remind aboriginal claimants of their powerlessness in the face of the market, the state, and other Taiwanese
interested
in getting hold of their land.
Taiwan: A New History
Self-government proposals offer a way for the state to establish a new partnership with an aboriginal minority claiming universal and inherent aboriginal rights.
Taiwan: A New History
And in the diplomatic sphere, the question of identity
here meaning the formal name that the KMT-dominated state could take--became central and resonated with the issue of Taiwanese identity and Taiwanese power in the struggle between the ruling party and the
tang-wai
upstarts.
Taiwan: A New History
There were important questions: Who would control the state apparatus? Would it be the mainlander-dominated KMT or would it be the Taiwanese
tang-wai?
Taiwan: A New History
Most observers felt that ultimately the state would win because it had a history of using force when challenged.
Taiwan: A New History
Everyone knew the power of the state's military apparatus and the general effectiveness of its security mechanisms, but now it was shown that public demonstrations, if carefully planned, might be an effective tactic in the political struggle.
Taiwan: A New History
Scholars have also argued that he ongoing KMT-tang-wai conflict was in large measure made possible by a surge of demonstrations by the people against the state.
Taiwan: A New History
Farmers held demonstrations demanding that the government deal with the declining state
of agriculture and with the problems that the ever diminishing number of small farmers faced in an agrarian world increasingly dominated by large corporate farms
22
Other groups were similarly emboldened.
Taiwan: A New History
34
These were important steps, coming as they did at a time when the state was attempting to keep grass-roots political forces in check.
Taiwan: A New History
The state believed it posed a danger but a number of key figures including Chou Lien-hua and Chu Hai-yuan of the Institute of Ethnol
ogy/Academia Sinica lobbied on its behalf and wrote articles advocating that the organization be legalized, which the state did in the mid-1980s.
Taiwan: A New History
These intellectuals felt that working within the system and thus supporting the state by participating in the political process was wrong.
Taiwan: A New History
This, in turn emboldened the tang-wai which readied itself to again challenge the state in a dramatic fashion.
Taiwan: A New History
In the view of contemporary observers, the state could not go too far.
Taiwan: A New History
The long overdue revamping of the constitutional framework of the state's power could take place in the framework of this new and less restric
tive document.
Taiwan: A New History
The vote on the Sunshine Law was an important victory, but the DPP and other enemies of an all-powerful state, such as the New KMT Alliance, also suffered a major defeat during this same period.
Taiwan: A New History
In 1989, for example,
PRAGMATIC DIPLOMACY 463
the West African state of Liberia decided to follow a dual recognition policy by maintaining formal diplomatic relations with the ROC while continuing its rela
tionship with the PRC.
Taiwan: A New History
Germany, for example, sent a delegation of officials to the ROC in early 1993, in part to compensate for Germany's refusal to sell submarines to the ROC, but it only represented one state in the German Federated Republic, Saxony-Anhalt.
Taiwan: A New History
He was accompanied by officials of major Taiwanese state-run enterprises such as the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation, the China Steel Corporation, and the Taiwan Power Company.
Taiwan: A New History
At key times, such as before the opening of the annual UN General Assembly session, officials and academicians from the ROC would come to the United States to lobby for their cause, in this case readmission to the United Nations, among congressmen and State Department officials.''
Taiwan: A New History
Under considerable pressure from friends of the ROC in both houses of Congress, the U.S. State Department granted him a visa, as a private citizen and not as the head of a friendly state-the United States, of course, did not recognize Taiwan formally.
Taiwan: A New History
Lee then met a number of government figures from Califomia such as California State Treasurer Mah Fong and State Secretary of Trade and Commerce Julie Wright.
Taiwan: A New History
Also extremely useful as a starting point for any student of Taiwan's development is Thomas B. Gold,
State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle
(Armonk, NY M.E. Sharpe, 1986).
Taiwan: A New History
See also the account in Edwin A. Winkler, 'Roles Linking State and Society,' in Ahem and Gates, The Anthropology of Taiwan of Taiwanese Society, 83-84.
Taiwan: A New History
Opportunity and Challenge
(Tempe: Arizona State University, 1995); Bernard T.K. Joi, 'Pragmatic Diplomacy in the Republic of China: History and Prospects,' in Hu,
490 TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY
Quiet Revolutions on Taiwan, Republic of China,
297-330.
Taiwan: A New History
Some of Taiwan's central political institutions, such as the hybrid presidential-parliamen
tary system, had depended on the authoritarian dictatorship of the KNIT party
state.
Taiwan: A New History
DPP takes lead in
Fairly secondary at
welfare
environment and
pushing for expansion
present
policy
women's rights)
of welfare state; yet,
pushed by social
KMT also co-opts
movements
popular DPP policies
National
Growing DPP
Polarization between
Growing polarization
identity
challenge to KMTs
pro-Independence
over PanGreen's
and
'one China' policy
DPP and pro-Unification
appeals to Taiwanese
ethnic
and to considering
KMT evolves when first
nationalism and
justice
Taiwanese as
KNIT under Lee Teng-hui
PanBlue's rage after
Chinese
and then DPP take more
2004 vote
moderate and nuanced
stances
two central facets of the issue divisions or cleavages in Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
For example, during their final massive campaign rallies both
TAIWAN ENTERS TROUBLED WATERS 515
Lien Chan and James Soong kissed the ground in Taipei and Taichung, respec
tively, to demonstrate their devotion and loyalty to Taiwan; and Lien Chan was quoted as saying, 'There is one state on each side of the Taiwan Strait,' thereby echoing what was seen as a highly provocative argument by Chen Shui-bian just two years
before.so
Taiwan: A New History
This last period can be conceptualized as a growing tension not only for Taiwan, but for China as well, between the benefits of the stable but far from desirable status quo and the dangers that pursuing the desired state of sovereignty would almost inevitably unleash.
Taiwan: A New History
Lee's 'Special State-to
State Relations' 1999 2.
Taiwan: A New History
for instance, provides an illustra
tion of how a multilevel 'game' was involved in four key events that shaped the
Taiwan and China
KMT may have feared implications of the 'Two Chinas' compromise for domestic legitimacy
sovereignty claims restrain client states, by force of arms leading them to accept status quo of divided China
Both ROC and PRC The United States is seek to be sole UN willing to save a UN representative membership for ROC, but Chiang Kai-shek rejects this effort
Democratization Taiwan seeks more shows strong support protection for its
for upgrading sovereignty; PRC Taiwan's international fears precedent status being set for Taiwan Independence
Domestic Beijing welcomes Changing national
constituencies Taiwan being drawn roles in global
created in both into China's orbit, economy stimulate
countries who favor but also constrained large movement of
peaceful cross-Strait by its own industry from Taiwan
relations; in particular, dependence on to China
Islander business global markets;
people in Taiwan Taipei becomes
benefit from concerned about
economic ties growing dependence on China
Little, if any, involve
ment by the United States or other nations
TAIWAN ENTERS TROUBLED WATERS 519
current state of cross-Strait relations.
Taiwan: A New History
14
That the U. S. president would state a position so consistent with Beijing's claims about Taiwan's international status (or, more accurately, its lack of status) on Chi
nese soil raised consternation in Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, among Taiwan's supporters in America that a fundamental policy shift had occurred in the United States.
Taiwan: A New History
The PRC proclaimed its refusal to accept Lee's theory with exclamation points, while Taiwan's president
refused to back down, although he reiterated that 'special state-to-state relations' were not a declaration of Taiwan Independence
7
7
Cross-Strait Relations During Chen Shui-bian's Presidency: Pressures for Instability from All Three Levels
Chen Shui-bian's victory in the 2000 presidential election immediately made him the target of conflicting pressures on cross-Strait relations from all three levels of the foreign policy 'game.'
Taiwan: A New History
Cross-Strait tensions erupted again in July 1999 when Lee upset the seeming equilibrium of 'cold peace' by an
nouncing a theory that Taipei and Beijing were connected by 'special state-to
state relations.'
Taiwan: A New History
In his campaign for president, Chen initially appealed to Taiwanese national
ism with such statements as: 'That Taiwan is an independent country is not only a fact but also a shared wish and desire of more than 90 percent of the Taiwan people' and 'The Constitution does not quite do the job of spelling out Taiwan as an inde
pendent state.''
Taiwan: A New History
For example, he explicitly stated that he would not declare Taiwan Independence nor even include Lee Teng-huff's concept of 'special state-to-state relations' in the Constitution.
Taiwan: A New History
Based on his earlier campaign promises, these were things that he would not do: (1) declare independence, (2) change the ROC'S official name, (3) hold a referendum on Taiwan's national status, (4) add 'state-to-state relations' to the Constitution, (5) abolish the National Unification Council or the
Guidelines for National Unification
that Lee Teng-hui had created in the early 1990s.
Taiwan: A New History
Cal Clark, 'Democracy, Bureaucracy, and State Capacity in Taiwan,' International Journal ofPublicAdministration,
23,
no. 10 (October
2000): 1833-1853;
Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,
1986);
Samuel P.S. Ho, 'Economics, Economic Bureaucracy, and Taiwan's Development,' Pacific Affairs,
60,
no.
Taiwan: A New History
John F. Copper, Taiwan's 1004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Democracy's Consolidation or Devolution? (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law,
2004);
Wen-hui Tsai and George P. Chen, Building a Democratic State in Moderniz
ing Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
Joseph Bosco, 'Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage and the State in Local Politics,' in The Other Taiwan: 1945 to Present, ed.
Taiwan: A New History
2
(Sum
mer
1996): 71-96;
Cheng-tian Koo, 'Private Governance in Taiwan,' in Beyond the Devel
opmental State.'
Taiwan: A New History
Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, 'The Changing State-Society Relations in the ROC: Economic Change, the Transformation of Class Structure, and the Rise of Social Move
ments,' in Two Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China After Forty Years, ed.
Taiwan: A New History
Peter Hayes
Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Ber
keley: University of California Press,
2004); Zheng,
Discovering Chinese Nationalism; Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese National
ism (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2004).
Taiwan: A New History
At the same time scholars of religion in the major Taiwanese research institutes and universities have helped mainlanders to study their own past with confidence and without fear of reprisal by a state that regarded popular religion as superstition and looked with distrust on the leaders and the practitioners of the text-centered faith systems.
Taiwan: A New History
from the University of Illinois at Ur
bana-Champaign and has previously taught at New Mexico State University, Uni
versity of Wyoming, and Chung Yuan Christian University in Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
His recent books include the co-authored Comparative
Development Patterns
in Asia (1997) and the co-edited
Beyond the Developmental
State (1998) and Democracy and the Status
of
Women in East Asia (2000).
Taiwan: A New History
Ronald G Knapp is a member of the department of geography of The State Uni
versity of New York/New Paltz.
Taiwan: A New History
He has taught at Gettysburg College and is now on the staff of the Office of the Historian of the U.S. Department of State.
Taiwan: A New History
He has also edited, with Frank N. Pieke and Woei Lien Chang, Cooperative and Collective in China's Rural Development: Between State andPrivateInteresis (1998).
Taiwan: A New History
The Island Frontier of the Ch'ing,
1684-1780
John R. Shepherd
107
Printed in the United States of America
6.
Taiwan: A New History
6
As Taiwan was buffeted by the waves of invasion from Holland, from the Chinese mainland (some Taiwanese nationalists have suggested that China can be seen as an alien presence), from the Western mercantile imperialists, from Japan and, after 1945, from the mainlander
dominated regime of the Kuomintang and its savior, the United States, its people developed a society and culture that reflected the effects of or reactions to these varied outside sociocultural, political, and intellectual influences.
Taiwan: A New History
He states that 'the aboriginal tribes ...
Taiwan: A New History
2
The expression 'capitalist world system' refers to Immanuel Wallerstein's concentric ring con
ceptualization of modem world history centered on a modem European 'core,' which directly dominates the political economy of an inner belt of 'semiperiphe
ral' states and gradually subordinates a distant penumbra of less important 'pe
ripheral' states.
Taiwan: A New History
More specifically, the theory sets late nineteenth-century China on the periphery of a core of dynamic, expansive Western states.
Taiwan: A New History
While the United States neglected to establish consular representation on Taiwan, choosing instead to economize by maintaining its consulate in Amoy, Great Britain's weightier range of interests were consistently if not always intel
ligently represented on the island after 1861.
Taiwan: A New History
The British consular presence, in fact, was tantamount to all Western diplomatic representation on Taiwan be
tween 1861 and 1895, since resident British officials personified the interests of half-a-dozen other foreign powers, including the United States (after 1875).
Taiwan: A New History
He soon reconstructed and re-armed the fortifications guarding Taiwan's principal seaports, but in the aftermath of the crisis, Liu determined that self-strengthening required much more---a 'thorough reorganization of the entire island,' as Samuel Chu states.
Taiwan: A New History
64
Moreover, both services were now in agreement that war with the United States and Britain seemed inevitable.
Taiwan: A New History
Soon thereafter, on October 25, widespread public celebra
tions were held when Taiwan and P'eng-hu were formally retroceded to China in accordance with the terms of the Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Procla
mation that had been drawn up by the major Allied powers: the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.
Taiwan: A New History
As the Nationalists began to flee the mainland, Taiwanese complained that 'Taiwan was number three' (Tai-wan ti san)-the island became the third most desirable destination for mainlanders: They claimed that the wealthiest and most influential refugees moved to the United States, and others with money went to Hong Kong.
Taiwan: A New History
The Political Science Clique (also called the Political Study Clique) included many administrative or technical experts who had been educated in Japan or the United States.
Taiwan: A New History
Historian Lin Heng-tao states in his oral history: 'Upon his arrival on Taiwan, Ch'en Yi supported a certain level of freedom of expression and permitted newspapers to reflect some practical questions.'
Taiwan: A New History
Only Korea decided to transfer its embassy to Taiwan, while others either followed the Soviet Union in recognizing the People's Republic of China (PRC) or like the United States, waited until the dust settled before deciding which government to recognize.
Taiwan: A New History
Hence, no military aid was forthcoming, nor would the United States use its military power to defend Taiwan because its loss would not affect vital U.S. interests.
Taiwan: A New History
A year later, economic and military aid from the United States to the Nationalist government resumed and a U.S. Mili
tary Assistance and Advisory Group was established in Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
The United States resumed its military and economic aid to the Nationalist government when it established the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group in Taiwan in 1951.
Taiwan: A New History
From this time until 1964, the United States offered $1.5
Taiwan: A New History
It is generally believed that the appointment to import
ant positions of several liberals, such as Wu Kuo-then as governor of Taiwan province and Sun Li jen commander of the army, were intended as friendly gestures to attract the support of the United States.
Taiwan: A New History
Mutual Defense Treaty in December 1954, Taiwan's position was further secured and the United States at the same time was further dragged into the Chinese mire.
Taiwan: A New History
However, on the other hand, the United States did not want to start World War III over Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
Looking at it from another angle, these two crises in the Taiwan strait made the Nationalist govern
ment more dependent on the United States and strengthened the need for martial law in Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
The United States also rendered its support to the Nationalist government in the international arena.
Taiwan: A New History
*The
lobby
was an eclectic aggregation of politically conservative organizations and individuals who supported the interests of the ROC in the United States.
Taiwan: A New History
The gov
ernment provided textile manufacturers with funds to start production and with raw cotton provided by the United States.
Taiwan: A New History
The United States, with strategic and economic considerations in mind, began to promote self-financing and the improvement of the investment climate in Taiwan in the late 1950s.
Taiwan: A New History
The United States hoped to expand its aid to Taiwan in the next several years so that Taiwan could become independent and plan its economic development and thereby become an example for other recipients of U.S. aid.
Taiwan: A New History
This strategy achieved some returns in the form of abundant diplomatic support for the ROC ;
7
That same year, the United States and four other nations proposed and passed a resolution making the PRC's application to the United Nations an 'Important Question' requiring approval by two-thirds of the General Assembly.
Taiwan: A New History
On the other hand, the Vietnam War played a major role in leading U.S. policymakers to seek a compromise or understanding with the PRC in order to get the United States out of the war.
Taiwan: A New History
To maintain its 'legitimacy' as the sole representative of all of China, the Nationalist government diligently defended its international status and, with the help of the United States, was able to maintain its status in the United Nations.
Taiwan: A New History
However, the enlargement of the UN and the changing attitude of the United States toward the PRC inevitably put the ROC on the periphery of American concerns in Asia.
Taiwan: A New History
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States played a major role in the economic development and defense of Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
The ROC's agreement not to attack mainland China without prior consultation with its treaty partner, the United States, demonstrates that the Mutual Defense Treaty restricted Nationalist troops in their attack on mainland China.
Taiwan: A New History
The states maintaining diplomatic ties with the ROC and the PRC changed from 39 : 19 in 1953 to 53 : 36 in 1960.
Taiwan: A New History
This variation reflects in part the inability of the various states that have governed Taiwan to control interpretation of the ritual in spite of many attempts.
Taiwan: A New History
It has been docu
mented from areas just undergoing a market transformation, but is just as typical of societies like the United States with its regular complaints about the loss of family values.
Taiwan: A New History
It runs a hospital and a medical school in eastern Taiwan, has a larger welfare budget than the city of Taipei, and now has branches across the world, including at least five in the United States (with a free clinic in Los Angeles).
Taiwan: A New History
Tibetan Buddhism is similarly popular among intellectuals and professionals in the United States, and for very similar reasons.
Taiwan: A New History
One good reason for this shift to flowers was that in 1990 a hectare of rice produced U.S.$3,000, a hectare of flowers produced U.S.$24,000. As a result the island has become a major exporter of a wide variety of flowers and other decorative plants, finding major markets in nearby Japan, the United States, Singapore, Hong Kong, and that most famous of flower-producing nations, the Netherlands (which controlled Taiwan during the early seventeenth century).
Taiwan: A New History
Japan was the largest market for live flowers, while the United States bought dried flowers and potted plants.
Taiwan: A New History
As Wang and others have shown, major electronics companies in the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan were attracted to the incentives offered by ROC officials.
Taiwan: A New History
One change was spurred by the problem of Taiwan's trade surplus, a problem recognized by both the Nationalist government and nations like the United States that were Taiwan's largest trading partners.
Taiwan: A New History
Cheng, Wang, and other economists thought that the Republic of China was vulnerable because of its trade relationship with the United-States.
Taiwan: A New History
In the year 1985, for example, 48 percent of Taiwan's exports went to the'United States.
Taiwan: A New History
;1
The United States also decided to end Taiwan's most favored nation trade status.
Taiwan: A New History
3
z
This new policy has succeeded: by the 1990s the percentage of Taiwanese ex
ports to the United States dropped below 30 percent while exports to Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe sharply increased.
Taiwan: A New History
This is run by a number of Catholic orders from Europe and the United States and is a descendent of (or replacement for) the famous Fukien University that had existed on the mainland.
Taiwan: A New History
54
The Foundation for Scholarly Exchange, the Chinese-run agency that worked with the Fulbright Foundation, administered the Test of English as a Foreign Language and other exams that opened the way for these students and also provided services to help those applying for education in the United States find a program that matched their interests and abilities.
Taiwan: A New History
The most talented of these students were also able to apply for Fulbright scholarships to study in the United States or apply for other similar scholarships.
Taiwan: A New History
The U.S. training was of particular value, given the island's close ties to the United States and the size and power of the overseas Taiwanese communities that can now be found in such financial and commercial centers as Los Angeles and New York.
Taiwan: A New History
This extensive section contains an introduction and articles on Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asian states such as Thailand, Malay
sia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
Taiwan: A New History
An examination of the 1978 issue allows us to see what the system of education was like in Taiwan in the year before both the formal derecognition by the United States and the tangwailKMT conflict.
Taiwan: A New History
For those Taiwanese with family in the United States or occupations that took them and their children to the West, there was the Taipei American School.
Taiwan: A New History
Crystal
Boys
projects a more idealistic vision influenced by the countercultural movement of the 1960s in the United States, with its anarchic assertion of the emancipatory power of the Dionysian impulse, its celebration of youth and beauty in their ephemeral physical forms, and its romantic affirmation of the redeeming virtue of love.
Taiwan: A New History
Many liberal scholars, especially returnees from the United States, played important roles in igniting this new current, which at first revolved around several universities and intellectual magazines.
Taiwan: A New History
They launched fierce attacks on the government's eco
nomic dependence on Western countries (especially the United States), which al
lowed the 'decadent' capitalist culture to infiltrate the lives of Taiwan's people; feeling indignant on behalf of Taiwan's farmers and workers who paid a high price in the process of urban expansion, they also attempted to draw public attention to adverse effects of the country's economic development as a whole.
Taiwan: A New History
Lin Huai-min, a former modernist writer who had studied under Martha Graham while in the United States, founded the first Chinese modem dance troupe, produced the well-received 'Cloud Gate Dance Series' (yun-men wu-chi), and incorporated both classical Chinese and folk Taiwanese elements in his choreography.
Taiwan: A New History
Item 3 states:
TAP have the right to practice regional autonomy in the area where the aborig
ines have traditionally lived.
Taiwan: A New History
In foreign countries such as the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and even China minority nationali
ties have already had self-government for a long time, guaranteed by their constitutions.
Taiwan: A New History
The writer of this article argues that self-government is the only road to save TAP from extinction and asserts that in most democratic states, even totalitarian China, aboriginal peoples already have self-government.
Taiwan: A New History
And in the background, acting to underline the critical nature of each event or set of events was the evolving relationship between Taiwan's strongest ally, the United States, and the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan: A New History
As we now know from Henry Kissinger's memoirs and other sources, the roots of the problems for Taiwan began during the late 1960s when Richard Nixon became president of the United States.
Taiwan: A New History
In 1971 the United States supported the PRC and the ROC lost its position.
Taiwan: A New History
As the dispute escalated, Taiwan's once staunch ally, the United States, backed the Japanese.
Taiwan: A New History
There were carefully staged protests and media criticism of the United States; within a few months, however, a new quasi-formal relationship, generally modeled in some fashion after that with Japan, was in place.
Taiwan: A New History
Here he received a B.S. in agricultural economics in 1949, the year of the fateful Nationalist retreat to the island, and went on to teach at T'ai-ta and then to earn a masters in the United States.
Taiwan: A New History
During the 1960s he returned to the United States for further graduate studies.
Taiwan: A New History
from the United States.
Taiwan: A New History
95
One key issue that Lee, the premier, the new cabinet, and the Legislative Yuan all faced was the copyright conflict with the United States.
Taiwan: A New History
Taiwan had maintained working relationships with states in various areas of the world and continued to build on them as it strove to take advantage of evolving regional and world-wide diplomatic and political-economic trends-end crises
-4o
broaden its reach and increase its influence overseas.
Taiwan: A New History
The ROC also maintained ties with states it had long recognized.
Taiwan: A New History
132
ROC officials also tried to take advantage of the transformation of Eastern Europe and worked to develop relationships with the Baltic states, with other former Soviet client states, and with the nations that had broken away from the Russian-dominated Soviet Union.
Taiwan: A New History
In the late 1980s and the 1990s, formal or quasi-formal relationships were formed with states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore.
Taiwan: A New History
In 1994, the United States lifted its trade embargo of Vietnam, paving the way for joint U.S./ROC development of Vietnam and the Vietnamese market.
Taiwan: A New History
150
The Taiwan-United States relationship was complicated.
Taiwan: A New History
There were also informal relations between the ROC government and key figures in the United States Senate and House of Representatives.
Taiwan: A New History
This period started with a singular and most dramatic event President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States and to his alma mater, Comell University.
Taiwan: A New History
However, as soon as he landed it became clear that, whatever the details of his visa, local officials and members of the overseas Taiwanese community in the United States would not pretend to see him as just another Taiwan/ROC national in the United States on a private visit, nor did many members of Congress.
Taiwan: A New History
Natale Bellochi, the head of the Ameri
can Institute on Taiwan, greeted him as did Benjamin Lu, head of the ROC repre
sentative office in the United States.
Taiwan: A New History
This trip, and all that it entailed, was seen as significant by observers and offi
cials in the United States, the PRE, and Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
Lee and the officials of the Gov
ernment Information Office who were based in the United States took maximum advantage of the spotlight cast upon the U.S.-trained agrarian economist who had become the highest official in Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
This exhibit was scheduled to tour the United States from March 12,1996, to April 6, 1997.
Taiwan: A New History
These were the largest U.S. naval forces seen in the area since the end of the Vietnam war-a period when Taiwan and the United States enjoyed a close diplomatic and military relationship and American advisers representing the Military Advisory Group were in many parts of the island.
Taiwan: A New History
On the role of the United States during this critical period in the seventies and eighties see ibid.,
Taiwan: A New History
from the United States.
Taiwan: A New History
It was at this time that he also ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to seek dual recognition, i.e., asking friendly states and trading partners to extend diplomatic rec
ognition to the ROC and the PRC.
Taiwan: A New History
Did he feel freer to express his long-cherished beliefs as he gained a stronger grip on power? Or, did he become something of a prisoner to the 'base constituency' of the DPP, which saw national identity and ethnic justice as the overriding issues in Taiwan? In any event, politics in Taiwan moved toward the model of recent political dynamics in the United States, where the major parties focus their appeals on their most ideologically committed supporters rather than trying to compete for moderates in the middle of the political spectrum.
Taiwan: A New History
9
However, increasing Chinese frustration over Taiwan's 'creeping officiality' in international affairs finally exploded after the United States gave President Lee Teng-huff permission to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, in the summer of 1995, setting off another period of growing tensions labeled
the new
battle
over sovereignty,
which, as noted in Table 17.4,
Taiwan: A New History
Interactions of Different 'Levels' in Affecting Cross-Strait Relations
Pressures from
Domestic politics
National 'above' in inter
Event
from 'below'
governments national system
Taiwan Strait
Little, if any, in
Both ROC and Both the United States
crises of 1950s
authoritarian
PRC try to establish and USSR seek to
PRC replaces ROC at UN in 1971
Taiwan's pragmatic diplomacy and renunciation of sovereignty over Mainland China
Growing economic integration between Taiwan and China during the 1990s
used nationalism to gain popular support and legitimacy.'
Taiwan: A New History
Both, however, were constrained by the need to maintain the military support of their su
perpower patrons, the United States for Taiwan and the Soviet Union for China.
Taiwan: A New History
Both could only vanquish the other with the strong support and military resources of their respective patrons, while the two superpowers displayed considerable reluc
tance to let their client states pull them into a major conflict that could) have turned into World War III.
Taiwan: A New History
Initially, Taiwan with the support of the United States and most of the West held a substantial advantage.
Taiwan: A New History
The tipping point was probably the PRC's replacement of the ROC for the 'China seat' in the United Nations in 1971; during the 1970s even most of Taiwan's closest 'friends,' such as the United States and Japan, switched their formal diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing as well.
Taiwan: A New History
The United States was willing to save a membership for Taiwan in the United Nations, al
though China would have gained the coveted seat in the Security Council, and U.S. diplomats felt that such an effort would have been successful.
Taiwan: A New History
There was a growing 'new nationalism' between the public and the government who increasingly saw Taiwan as representing the last major symbol of national humiliation from nineteenth century Western and Japanese imperialism whose reunification was essential for China's 'face'; and the military was increasingly critical of Jiang Zemin for his soft policy toward Taiwan 69
Matters came to a head when the objectives of the two governments directly clashed in 1995 and pulled the United States into their dispute.
Taiwan: A New History
The central objective of Taiwan's pragmatic diplomacy then turned to arranging an 'unofficial visit' for Lee to the United States; and this became even more important to Lee in 1995 as he began to consider his presidential eam
paign.
Taiwan: A New History
In sharp contrast, the PRC strongly objected to any Lee visit to the United States, claiming that this could be construed as recognition of an independent Tai
wan by America.
Taiwan: A New History
Reportedly, Beijing was particularly worried that Lee would go to the United States after his direct election and claim a democratic mandate to govem a sovereign nation.
Taiwan: A New History
The PRC argued that this represented a major change in the U.S. policy that prohibited visits to the United
TAIWAN ENTERS TROUBLED WATERS 513
States by ROC officials.
Taiwan: A New History
For its part, the United States was surprised, if not stunned, by China's reaction and laid some of the blame at Lee's door, claiming that the Taiwan president had broken several promises about keeping his visit low key and unofficial.
Taiwan: A New History
Wang of Formosa Plastics
73
The United States then added to the pressure on Taiwan when President Clinton made a statement in Shanghai, which came to be known as the 'Three No's,' during his trip to China in June 1998 that many saw as constituting a major change in U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan:
We don't support independence for Taiwan; or two Chinas, or one Taiwan, one China; and we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.
Taiwan: A New History
For example, the United States subsequently continued arms sales and visits by U.S. officials to Taiwan; and no evidence has emerged that the United States expected any substantive change in cross-Strait relations
76
Still, perceptions are perhaps of the utmost importance in diplomacy, and both Beijing and Taipei perceived that Taiwan's efforts for improving its international status were under serious challenge.
Taiwan: A New History
The United States also reacted with considerable alarm.
Taiwan: A New History
First, the rules limiting visits of Taiwan officials to the United States were relaxed consider
ably.
Taiwan: A New History
Third, defense cooperation between the United States and Taiwan was upgraded (or at least made less covert).
Taiwan: A New History
Chen's more assertive policy at times also strained relations with the United States as the Bush administration evidently con
cluded that Chen really was moving toward Independence, thereby running the risk of creating a crisis in the Taiwan Strait.'
Taiwan: A New History
John F. Copper, China Diplomacy: The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle (Boul
der, CO: Westview Press,
1992);
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972
(Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press,
1992);
Martin
L.
Taiwan: A New History
Julian Baum, 'Strait Talking,' Far Eastern Economic Review
(November 6, 1997): 22-26;
Paul Bolt, 'Taiwan-China Economic Cooperation: Ties That Bind,' in The United States and Cross-Strait Relations: China, Taiwan, and the USEntering a New Century, ed.
Taiwan: A New History
Bolt, 'Ties That Bind?'; Brown, 'Cross-Strait Relations'; Philip Y.M. Yang, 'The US East Asian Security and Taiwan Security' in The United States and Cross-Strait Rela
tions: China, Taiwan, and the US Entering a New Century, ed.
Taiwan: A New History
This process reached its climax when the United States in December 1978 withdrew its formal diplomatic recognition.
Taiwan: A New History
Lee's visit to the United States in June 1995 can be seen as a demonstration of Taiwan's newly found confidence as an actor on the world stage.
Taiwan: A New History
The role played by the United States in the strait crisis of March 1996 demon
strated the success of Lee's policies, for it showed that the United States was not willing to abandon its long-time friend, even if it did not recognize the ROC in a traditional way, through the formal exchange of ambassadors.
Taiwan: A New History
Robert Gardells is a member of the Social Sciences Faculty of the United States Merchant Marine Academy.
Taiwan: A New History
He has done extensive work on the 2-28 period and has presented papers at conferences in the United States and on Taiwan.
Taiwan: A New History
class structure, 386-389 Clinton administration, 481, 522, 524 Cloud Gate Dance Series, 417
Co So Kong, 343, 344
colonization policy, 115-116, 120, 123 Common Customs Society, 227 communications, 192
Communism, 298
and U.S. foreign policy, 326
See
also
People's Republic of China Compassion Merit Society, 357-358, 359
548 INDEX
INDEX 549
computer industry, 374-375 Confucianism, 180-181 and education, 62-63 Control Yuan, 456 constitutional reform, 503, 508, 514 Cordillera People's Alliance (CPA), 423 Comell University, 448, 471 corruption, 504-505
corvee, 58-59, 110, 111 Costa Rica, 463
Council for United States Aid, 331 Council of Grand Justices, 461 Coyet, Fredrik, 94-95
Crescent Moon Society, 408 cults, 63, 91, 351, 537 cultural arbitrary, 420-421 Cultural Revolution, 334, 537-538 currency, 447
D
D'Amato, Alphonse, 471472 Davidson, James W., 193 debates, television, 461 DeKlerk, Willem, 463 DeLay, Tom, 527
De Lisle, Jacques, 212
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 391, 416,446-447,454,459-460,476 in 1989 elections, 449450
in 1992 elections, 456457, 500 in 2000 elections, 497, 510 and aborigines, 428, 431432 under Chen, 510-515
coalition with New Party, 477
and constitutional reform, 455456, 514 and corruption, 505
and election restrictions, 470 electoral support for, 501
and national identity, 506, 509 party platform of, 473, 475476 and PFP 515
presidential candidates of, 473 scandal of, 461462
and social welfare policy, 505
on Taiwanese independence, 452453, 507 on UN membership, 522
in Washington DC, 465
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 464 democratization, 499-5110, 504 demonstrations, 427, 438 effectiveness of, 440
demonstrations (continued) of tang wai, 441443, 446 Den Kenjrtb, 220, 221-222, 227, 233 Deng Xiaoping, 516
DeWar, Robert, 29
discrimination, 211, 215, 217, 218 Djilas, Milovan, 387
Dodd, John, 168-169, 173 Dupont, 443
Dutch East India Company, xi, 88, 92-93, 97 Dutch occupation, xii, 97-98
Chinese reclaim Taiwan from, 94-95 cultural changes under, 91-92
and settlement, 11-13, 17-18 shifts in population under, 9-10
and trade, 88-91, 92-94 dwellings, 19-21 Dyen, Isidore, 37-38, 43
E
economic development, 331-333, 367-370 and changes in education, 377-382
and changes in employment, 382-384 and changes in land use, 393-395 and changing gender roles, 384-385 and class structure, 387-389
and ethnic conflicts, 391
and family structure, 385-387 and foreign investments, 370-372 under Japanese colonization, 210 under Nationalist rule, 283-284, 310n.51,
Taiwan: A New History
445
To Chun-ying, 113-114
Tuan Ts'ai-hua, 407 Tun-tzu, 153, 154 Tung-hai University, 379, 394 Tung-p'u Graves incident, 422 Twenty-one Demands, 219-220
U
Uchida Kakichi, 211
UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 424 unemployment, 284, 328
United
Daily News, 416
United Nations (UN), 334, 438, 465, 507, 519, 522, 538
United States, 247, 465, 538-539
aid to Taiwan, 321, 325, 328, 335, 336 air strikes by, 236
Lee
Teng-hui's visit to, 471-472, 516, 522-523
on PRE military actions, 481
relations with ROC and PRC, 334, 437-438, 519,524,526-527,538-539
and role in Taiwan economic development, 331-332, 370-371
support for Nationalists
government,
326 Taiwanese students in, 380
trade by, 375-376, 464
Universal Salvation (Pho To), 353, 354 urban growth, 23, 393-394
U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), 370
U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group in Taiwan, 325
Vietnam War, 334
V
W
INDEX 559
Wai-Jim Yip, 411 Walis Yugan, 38 Wallerstem, Immanuel, 166 Wang Ch'ang-hsiung, 270, 272 Wang Chen, 113
Wang Chen-ho, 414
Wang Ching-feng, 474, 480 Wang Chun, 117, 118 Wang Chi-hsien, 376 Wang Dachau, 471
Wang Lan, 407
560 INDEX
Wang Pai-yuan, 290
Wang Shi-ch'ing, 139, 140 Wang Shih-ch'ing, 227 Wang Ta-yuan, 86
Wang T'ien-teng, 287, 290, 294, 296, 300-301
Wang T'o, 415, 415-416 Wang Wen-hsing, 409, 411 Wang, YC.,
Taiwan: A New History
9
This extraordinary measure granted almost supreme legislative power to the governor-general and made colonial rule in Taiwan seem more in keeping with the British system of separate governance.
Taiwan: A New History
Colonial rule in Taiwan was patriarchal in nature by virtue of the supreme power vested in the governor-general.
Taiwan: A New History
This duplication of supreme military
111 TAIWAN.
Taiwan: A New History
68
As governor-general, he retained command over the garrison and reigned as the supreme military authority in the colony, as had the earlier Taiwan governors-general before Den Kenjiro assumed office in 1919.
Taiwan: A New History
The Emergency Committee, a twelve-member council, was organized in July 1949 to take over the function of the Central Political Council as a supreme policymaking organ in the party in order to deal with the crises of the time.
Taiwan: A New History
A NEW HISTORY
traditional novel, is ruled by the supreme order of
ch'ing
(sentimentality) and
hsin
(the heart), which can be both salvational and damning.
Taiwan: A New History
Taiwan: A Political History
The KMT had influence, if not out
right control, over not only the state, but also the military, the media, edu
cation, trade unions, much of the economy, and every large civic organization except the Presbyterian church.
Taiwan: A Political History
A group of Presbyterian church members also went to trial for allegedly helping to hide Shih, whom police arrested twenty-two days after the incident.
Taiwan: A Political History
The Presbyterian church had previously sided with the opposition, publishing a 'Declaration on Human Rights by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan' in August 1977.
Taiwan: A Political History
The church members put on trial included the general sec
retary of the church in Taiwan, the Reverend Kao Chun-ming, who got a seven-year sentence.
Taiwan: A Political History
The Presbyterian church of Taiwan, of which aborigines made up 40 percent of the membership, was also heavily involved in aboriginal activism.
Taiwan: A Political History
Nuclear power plant at Kungliao, 203, 233-234
Okamura Yasuji, 111 Okinawans, 94
'One country, two systems,' 148 Opium, 29, 32, 44-45,127
Ota Masahiro, 51
Pai Chung-hsi, 72
Pai Hsiao-yen, 207-208 Pan Ping-ping, 207 Pai Ya-tsan, 161
Peng Hsiao-jing, 207
Peng Ming-min, 92,198, 203 Peng Wan-ju, 207
Penghu Islands, 12, 15, 19, 32 33 People First Party, 231, 234-235 People's Liberation Army, 111, 115, 117, 197,199-202
Pingtan Island, 149 Powell, Colin, 239 Presbyterian Church, 152, 152,169, 224 Progress, 164
Provincial Assembly, 85, 87, 165, 192
Qian Qichen, 236 Qianlong,13 Quirino, Elpidio, 107
Ramos, Fidel, 218 Reagan, Ronald, 142,144 Religion on Taiwan, 3 Reynolds, Robert, 13
5
-136 Rhee, Syngman,107 Richardson, Bill, 221
Roh Tae Woo, 181 Roosevelt, Franklin, 82 Rusk, Dean, 110, 128
252 Index
Sakuma Samara, 41,48-49, 50 Saudi Arabia and Taiwan, 216 'Self-Strengthening National Salvation Fund,' 166
Service, John, 109 Sha Zhukang,236 Shanghai, 73, 82, 220 Shen Ching-huan, 137-138 Shen Pao-chen, 28
Shih Ch'i-yang, 172 SMh Lang, 18,19
Shih Ming-teh, 167,169-170,185, 201 Shihlin, 35
Sichuan, 125
Sieve Wan-chang (Vincent Siew), 204, 209 Soong Chu-yu (James Soong), 164, 181, 203,231
as presidential candidate, 228-231 provincial government downsizing and, 209-212
South Africa and Taiwan, 208, 216 Southeast Asia and Taiwan, 32, 53,116, 216-218
Soviet Union and Taiwan, 107-108,115, 123,136-137
Spain and Taiwan, 15,16,18 Stalin, Josef,111
Stilwell, Joseph W., 106
Straits Exchange Foundation, 219, 222 Stuart, John Leighton, 82
So Tung-chi, 88 Suharto, 218 Sun Fo, 80
Sun Li-jen, 83, 105, 110, 144
Sun Y. S. (Sun Yuan-suan),148, 148,180
Sun Yat-sen, 46,55,66,78--79,82,84,96,152 Sung Mei-ling (Soong May-ling), 106, 180-181
Sung, TV.,
Taiwan: A Political History
The imperial court in Beijing would find it difficult to comprehend why any honorable Chinese citizen would want to leave China, the heart of civilization, for barbarian territory.
Taiwan: A Political History
Turmoil within the court notwithstanding, Cheng's kingdom was sufficiently stable that he sought to expand it.
Taiwan: A Political History
Townspeople succeeded in taking Shima to court, but the judges, while calling the incident 'regret
table,' ruled that Shima was not subject to prosecution because he was acting within his official duties when he tortured his prisoners.
Taiwan: A Political History
With the reinstitution of mainland government, however, a court case in Taiwan established that transfers of Japanese property made after August 15, 1945, were invalid.
Taiwan: A Political History
The Taiwan High Court reaffirmed this decision in December 1948.
Taiwan: A Political History
The government's case against Lei Chen, who was tried in a military court, rested primarily on the con
fession of his China Democratic Party codefendant Liu Tzu-ying.
Taiwan: A Political History
Their trial, by a military court, was not held until April 1965 and lasted only one day.
Taiwan: A Political History
He was tried before a military
92 Taiwan
court.
Taiwan: A Political History
He said the court never informed him what crime he had committed or what law he had violated.z°
Taiwan: A Political History
A Japanese court ruled in 1977 that with Tokyo's diplomatic recognition of Beijing, ownership of the dormitory had passed automatically to the PRC govern
132 Taiwan
ment.
Taiwan: A Political History
In 1987, with the Japanese pro-Taiwan lobby bring
ing its influence to bear, the court gave ownership of the dormitory back to Taipei.
Taiwan: A Political History
A group of politicians led by Senator Barry Goldwater sued Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in federal court (with the case eventually dismissed by the Supreme Court) for failing to consult with Congress before terminating a treaty.
Taiwan: A Political History
It would be accurate to assert that the United States used Taiwan when China was an enemy and then unilaterally downgraded Taiwan's status in the relationship to court Beijing's favor.
Taiwan: A Political History
A court sentenced him to life in prison for sedition because he had distributed literature that criticized the government and Chiang personally and called for negotiations with Beijing.
Taiwan: A Political History
Actually,
is John Kaplan, The Court-Martial of the
Kaohsiung Defendants
(Berkeley, Calif.: Univer
sity of California Press, 1981), 19-31; 'The Kaohsiung incident of 1979,'
http://www.
Taiwan: A Political History
In April and May, a civil court sentenced thirty-three more participants to prison terms of two to six years.
Taiwan: A Political History
In the court of international opinion, Taiwan scored a clear victory.
Taiwan: A Political History
His successor Kodama Gentaro courted the favor of Taiwanese elites by attending several ceremonies honoring their family members.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taipei courted the Amdo faction and encouraged them to take over leadership of the Tibetan resistance move
ment.
Taiwan: A Political History
In judo
like fashion, however, the KMT found a way to exploit ideological diver
gences within the DPP The KMT courted individual DPP members, offer
ing them positions in the government.
Taiwan: A Political History
Along with evading government controls, some Taiwanese elites pur
sued their interests by courting the government's favor, which could lead to a bureaucratic appointment for a family member.
Taiwan: A Political History
More im
iportant, he proved adept at courting popular approval and gamesman
ship against opposing politicians.
Taiwan: A Political History
Civilians were subject to arrest by military personnel and trial by military courts.
Taiwan: A Political History
By one estimate, military courts tried the cases of more than ten thousand civilians during the martial law period.
Taiwan: A Political History
Security regulations were modified in the early 1950s to make a few concessions, such as allowing a defendant's family member to be present during a trial, permitting defense lawyers in military courts, and requiring police warrants before the arrest of civil
ians.
Taiwan: A Political History
Courts subsequently convicted five policemen for mistreating Wang.
Taiwan: A Political History
Having obtained confessions from all eight defendants while ham
pering their defense attorneys, the state convicted them in a series of courts-martial in March and April 1980.
Taiwan: A Political History
Nevertheless, the National Security Law defined offenses more clearly, lessened the penalties, and moved the adjudication process from military courts to civilian courts.
Taiwan: A Political History
The weaknesses of KMT-style rule were especially keenly felt in Taiwan because the separation from China during the Japanese oc
cupation had allowed Taiwan to grow apart from the mainland economi
cally, politically, and socially.
Taiwan: A Political History
Thus in both of these documents Washington worked to weaken the KMT's claim of juris
diction over the mainland and to deepen Taiwan's separation from China.
Taiwan: A Political History
Zhou said that although it was a mistake for some Taiwanese to favor independence, this was understandable given the long separation and KNIT propaganda.
Taiwan: A Political History
Another important PRC overture followed in September 1981, when NPC Standing Committee chairman and PLA marshal Ye Jianying offered a nine-point proposal 'to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of the Chinese nation.'
Taiwan: A Political History
He discerned and countered U.S. designs for Taiwan's permanent separation from China even as he explained to the Americans how their support of an ROC inva
sion of the mainland would serve U.S. interests.
Taiwan: A Political History
Polls in which only voters on Taiwan participated would further erode the winner's basis for claiming to be the president of 'China,' while consolidating Taiwan's separation from China.
Taiwan: A Political History
At issue is not only the question of which Chinese government has rightful claim to Taiwan, but also the possibility that Taiwan will reject both and opt instead for political separation from China.
Taiwan: A Political History
For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.
Taiwan: A Political History
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
15th century First known Chinese contact with Taiwan, already inhabited by aborigines
1544 Portuguese explorers encounter Taiwan and call it
Ilha Formosa
17th century Heavy Chinese migration to Taiwan
1624 Dutch build Fort Zeelandia near Taiwan
1662 Ming loyalist Cheng Ch'eng-kung seizes Taiwan from the Dutch
1683 Qing forces from mainland China capture Taiwan
1885 Qing government makes Taiwan a province of China
1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki cedes Taiwan to Japan; organized, armed resistance to Japanese occupation persists until 1902
Japanese administrator Goto Shimpei begins modernization pro
gram
Taiwanese political activists repeatedly but unsuccessfully ask Tokyo to establish a Taiwan parliament
Japanese retribution follows aborigine uprising in Musha village Japanese armed forces accept Taiwanese recruits
With Japan's surrender, Taiwan reverts to control of Chinese gov
ernment under Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT); Chen Yi becomes governor of Taiwan
February 28 uprising leads to KNIT counterattack and massacres KNIT, defeated on the mainland by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces, moves its government and remaining military units to Taiwan; government places Taiwan under martial law
1949-53 Taiwan implements successful land reform program
1950 With outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. government decides to block impending Chinese invasion of Taiwan
1898
1921-34
1930 1937-45 1945
1947 1949
1951 1952 1954
1954-55 1955 1958 1960
1964
1966 1971 1972 1975
1977 1978 1979
1980 1981
1984
1986
1987 1988
1989 1990 1991
1992
1993
xii Chronology
KMT government creates Taiwan Provincial Assembly Republic of China signs a peace treaty with Japan United States and Taiwan establish Mutual Defense Treaty; Na
tional Assembly approves indefinite extension of Temporary Pro
visions of the Constitution
First Taiwan Strait Crisis
Chiang arrests General Sun Li-jen Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
Liberal activist Lei Chen and his colleagues arrested; Taiwan dis
sidents in Japan begin publishing
Taiwan Seinen
Peng Ming-min arrested for questioning KMT's reunification phi
losophy
First export processing zone opens in Kaohsiung
United Nations General Assembly expels the Republic of China Tokyo severs diplomatic relations with Taiwan
Chiang Kai-shek dies during fifth term as ROC president; Chiang Ching-kuo becomes chairman of KMT Central Committee Alleged KMT ballot tampering triggers riot in Chungli
Chiang Ching-kuo is elected ROC president
United States switches diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing and gives notice it intends to terminate Mutual_ Defense Treaty; Congress balances this move by passing Taiwan Relations Act; large anti-KMT riot in Kaohsiung
Dissident politician Lin Yi-hsiung's family members murdered Chen Wen-cheng, university professor and critic of the KMT, found dead under suspicious circumstances; Beijing offers Nine
Point Proposal for reunification
Assassins linked to the KMT murder writer Henry Liu in Califor
nia
Opposition politicians form Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in defiance of ban on new parties
KMT-controlled government lifts martial law
Chiang Ching-kuo dies; Lee Teng-hui assumes the presidency and becomes head of the KMT
DPP wins enough parliamentary seats to propose legislation National Assembly elects Lee president
Lee announces formal end to war with China; all National As
sembly members resign and election refills their seats Government relaxes sedition law and abolishes Taiwan Garrison Command; renewal elections held for Legislative Yuan Semiofficial representatives of China and Taiwan meet in Singa
pore; conservatives split from the KMT and form New Party
1995
1996
1997 1999
2000
2001
Chinese president Jiang Zemin offers Eight-Point proposal for re
unification; Lee travels to United States; China carries out missile tests near Taiwan
China holds military exercises, including missile launches off Tai
wan's coast; Lee wins first direct presidential election
National Assembly dismantles provincial level of government China suspends cross-strait dialogue over Lee's remark that Tai
wan and China have 'special state-to-state relations'
DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian is elected president; KMT politi
cians meet with CCP officials in China
KMT expels Lee after he begins organizing support for Chen; DPP replaces KMT as largest party in the legislature
Chronology ziii
TAIWAN
Introduction
Beautiful, Beleaguered Island
Taiwan's present circumstances are peculiar and' intriguing.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwan was equally fa
mous for evolving from an authoritarian police state to a multiparty de
mocracy with a popularly elected president.
Taiwan: A Political History
At fourteen thousand square miles, Taiwan is about one-third the size of the U.S. state of Ohio, or slightly smaller than the Netherlands.
Taiwan: A Political History
Dutch colonialism in Asia was geared toward enriching and strengthening the home state, creating opportunities for Dutch businesses, and sheltering the work of Dutch missionaries.
Taiwan: A Political History
The CCP thus took the position that the eventual incorporation of Tai
wan into the PRC was a vital state interest.
Taiwan: A Political History
Thus premodern China's conception of state and regime security called for distancing China from Taiwan, a departure from the mindset of the typical great power or of present-day China.
Taiwan: A Political History
3
W. G. Goddard,
Formosa: A Study in Chinese History
(West Lansing: Michigan State Uni
versity Press, 1966), 26.
Taiwan: A Political History
Although the regime killed his mother and father and desecrated the graves of his ancestors, Cheng himself had negotiated with the Qing and was evidently willing to accept the status of an autonomous tributary state.
Taiwan: A Political History
The argument that pre
vailed, however, was that unless the Chinese government took charge of it, Taiwan would remain a thorn in the mainland's side, a threat to state and regime security either as a base for a foreign power or a haven for Chinese undesirables.
Taiwan: A Political History
Instead of a small popula
tion and a minimal administrative presence, they argued, Taiwan would create fewer problems and eat up less funding if the state promoted fur
ther development and greater, more balanced colonization along with a stronger government.
Taiwan: A Political History
Particular impetus came from the aborigine rebellion of 1731-32 and a simultaneous, oppor
tunistic Chinese uprising in Feng Shan County to the south, which were interpreted as evidence that the state should promote rather than restrict colonization.
Taiwan: A Political History
The Chinese also restated their position that the Ryukyus were
a
Chinese tributary state, not a Japanese territory, and therefore Tokyo had no basis to become involved.
Taiwan: A Political History
2
W.G. Goddard,
Formosa: A Study in Chinese History
(West Lansing: Michigan State Uni
versity Press, 1966),143.
Taiwan: A Political History
The government relied on the
hoko
leaders to ensure the community met its obligations, including the payment of taxes and the supply of labor for state projects.
Taiwan: A Political History
Moreover, the missionary schools were constantly under investigation by the state be
cause of their foreign connections.
Taiwan: A Political History
The corol
lary to suppressing Chinese religion was the promotion of Japan's state re
ligion, Shinto.
Taiwan: A Political History
^ W G. Goddard, Formosa: A Study
in Chinese
History (West Lansing: Michigan State Uni
versity Press, 1966), 177.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chen Yi s gover
norship also saw him promote an economic policy termed 'Necessary State Socialism,' which involved the formation of extensive state-run mo
nopolies and strangled thousands of small businesses.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwanese understandably saw it as state-sponsored looting.
Taiwan: A Political History
He argued that government own
ership of industry was preferable to private ownership because the state would use its profits to increase overall quality of life for the public as a whole, instead of enriching a few upper-class families.
Taiwan: A Political History
The Chinese ad
ministration placed all major Taiwanese industries and enterprises under the supervision of state commissions, which were inevitably staffed by Mainlanders.
Taiwan: A Political History
Although ultimately state-owned, firms were run as pri
vate businesses, with the commissioners overseeing the formation of boards of directors and other management organs.
Taiwan: A Political History
News of robbery and theft is ever-present in the papers, and we even hear that some of the brothers from the mainland have organized looting parties
24
Arrests and harassment of journalists critical of the government began in mid-1946, and state control of the press stiffened permanently after the February 28 incident.
Taiwan: A Political History
'Cri
tiquing' government policy with a view toward correcting errors and serving the public interest was acceptable; 'opposing' the state's national agenda, associated with Communist-inspired subversion, was not accept
able.
Taiwan: A Political History
The interests of the state and of the ruling party overlapped almost completely.
Taiwan: A Political History
Aborted Reconciliation
The administration of Chen Yi s replacement as governor-general, Wei Tao-ming, made efforts to reconcile Taiwanese and the Mainlander-run state in the wake of the February 28 crackdown.
Taiwan: A Political History
Wei restructured the Trade and Monopoly bureaus, facilitating private enterprise, and allowed Tai
wanese to hold more high positions in state-owned industries.
Taiwan: A Political History
The military and public security forces did not subscribe to Wei s softer approach to state-society relations.
Taiwan: A Political History
According to KMT doctrine, one prerequisite of democracy was a degree of material prosper
ity The citizens of a democratizing state also needed an understanding of and respect for democratic institutions.
Taiwan: A Political History
In general, the state tolerated limited political dissent within the following ground rules: (1) the 1947 ROC constitution would be the basis of KMT power and legit
imacy in Taiwan, and the government had the right to adjust the provi
sions of the constitution to fit the unusual circumstances of Taiwan's standoff with the CCP-dominated mainland; (2) the KMT would be pre
dominant in a one-party system, with token opposition provided by the two other state-approved parties, but the government would not allow the organization of a strong opposition party; (3) the government would pro
mote limited democratization, beginning with elections for local provin
cial officials and later expanding to open elections for the offices of some national representatives; and (4) in public political discourse, promotion of Communist ideology and serious attempts to discredit the central gov
ernment were not permitted
.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chiang held the three most powerful positions on Taiwan: ROC head of state, commander of the ROC military, and chairman of the ruling party.
Taiwan: A Political History
On occasion the party relied on its control of the state apparatus to engineer the outcomes it wanted.
Taiwan: A Political History
State Control over Society under Martial Law
The government's publicly stated rationale for declaring and maintain
ing martial law was summarized in many public statements such as this one by Chiang Ching-kuo:
[W]e hope that the Taiwanese people can maintain their security, peace, happiness, and prosperity.
Taiwan: A Political History
in world his
tory there has not been a single free, democratic state like the ROC that has
86 Taiwan
for so long confronted an expanding communist totalitarianism.
Taiwan: A Political History
In practice, as we have seen, the state's broad powers of arrest and indefi
nite detention without trial could also be used against advocates of politi
cal reforms such as legalizing opposition parties or opening more power
ful positions to Taiwanese.
Taiwan: A Political History
Despite these concessions to society, however, the state continued to im
prison and execute large numbers of Taiwan's people for essentially polit
ical offenses.
Taiwan: A Political History
While the ROC had its own plan for expanded self-government in Taiwan, the state's objective was to strengthen rather than weaken Tai
wan's links to China and to the central government.
Taiwan: A Political History
The KMT viewed ac
tivism for Taiwanese self-government outside party auspices as a treason
ous effort to create an independent Taiwanese state.
Taiwan: A Political History
Formosa has become virtually a police state.
Taiwan: A Political History
In other cases the state's retribution was more subtle.
Taiwan: A Political History
After NTU professor Yin Hai-kuang published essays in Tzuyu
Chungkuo
advocating liberalization, in 1966 the state-sponsored university kept him in its employ but forced him to give up teaching.
Taiwan: A Political History
One of many journalists who ran afoul of the state was Kuo Yi-tung (his pen name was Bo Yang), who was ar
rested in March 1968 over a newspaper cartoon of Chiang Kai-shek he produced that offended the authorities.
Taiwan: A Political History
After the White Terror, such punishment of critics of the state was selec
tive.
Taiwan: A Political History
Mark Mancall terms the arrangement 'submerged totalitarianism': every dissident and opposition politician or activist knew what kind of powers the state possessed to detect and punish its domestic enemies, and that the authorities could be ruthless in employing those powers.
Taiwan: A Political History
The state also subsidized primary education.
Taiwan: A Political History
From 1950 onward, the state took steps to stimulate private enterprise.
Taiwan: A Political History
Certain state-owned industries were transferred to private ownership.
Taiwan: A Political History
The govern
ment increased wages for some state-owned firms and introduced a pro
gram providing accident insurance to industrial workers.
Taiwan: A Political History
Consistent with the Sunist no
lion of the need for heavy state influence during the critical early stage of national development, this also assured Mainlander domination of the
%' Shirley W. Y. Koo, Gustav Ranis, and John C. H. Fei, The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of China, 1952-1979 (Boulder, Colo.:
Taiwan: A Political History
7
In the early 1960s, the state shifted to an export-led develop
ment strategy, a decision partly spurred by the promise of increased U.S. aid.
Taiwan: A Political History
32
W.G. Goddard,
Formosa: A
Study in
Chinese
History (West Lansing: Michigan State Uni
versity Press, 1966),193.
Taiwan: A Political History
33
The 1953 Land to the Tiller Act permitted landlords to retain a limited amount of land for their own tillage,
34
but they had to sell their holdings beyond that limit to the state.
Taiwan: A Political History
The state then resold this land to the former tenants who had farmed it at a price of 2.5
Taiwan: A Political History
This generated handsome profits for the state sugar industry, but left the farmers with only about 20 percent of their crop to sell at the market price.
Taiwan: A Political History
In larger enterprises and state-owned industries and utilities, however, government control led to preferential hiring and promotion of Mainlanders and discrimination against Taiwanese.
Taiwan: A Political History
He elicited statements in support of the idea from South Korean president Syngman Rhee and Philippine president Elpidio Quirino in 1949 before Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly killed the planned alliance, saying it would antagonize India.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwan in
the Cold War 107
China was an aggressive, irresponsible state in league with Moscow hard
ened after China entered the Korean War.
Taiwan: A Political History
Despite the value of keeping a friendly government in Taiwan, U.S. president Harry Truman and Secretary of State Acheson concluded that continued military assistance to Chiang's regime would waste American money and erode American prestige.
Taiwan: A Political History
Truman's advisers recommended the U.S. government encourage polit
ical reform on Taiwan (to inoculate it against Communist subversion) and cultivate a relationship with 'potential native Formosan leaders with a view at some future date to being able to make use of a Formosan au
tonomous movement should it appear to be in the U.S. national interest to
s U.S. Department of State, United States
Relations
with China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Washington, D.C.: U:S.
Taiwan: A Political History
Since the administration wanted Taiwan but not Chiang, U.S. State department officials Dean Rusk and Paul Nitze dis
cussed the possibility of a U.S.-supported coup d'etat to replace Chiang with a leader Washington perceived as more competent and respectable.
Taiwan: A Political History
19
Eisenhower announced in his first State of the Union message in February 1953 a 'deneutralization' of the Taiwan Strait: while continuing to guard against a PRC invasion of Taiwan, the United States would no longer restrain ROC attacks against the mainland.
Taiwan: A Political History
In June 1949 the ROC declared a 'closure' of Chinese ports under the CCP's control (as opposed to a 'blockade,' which would have implied the PRC was an enemy state rather than a group of rebels).
Taiwan: A Political History
If Washington left Taiwan to fight this battle alone, ROC forces could suffer a devastating defeat that might, in the words of Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, prove a 'severe political and psychological blow' to the KMT.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taipei reacted by declaring a state of emergency that summer.
Taiwan: A Political History
After 1962, the ROC government focused its policy on en
couraging Tibetans to overthrow the Communist government but to re
main citizens of a new, benevolent Chinese state.
Taiwan: A Political History
During a visit to Washing
ton in 1965, then-defense minister Chiang Ching-kun urged President Lyndon Johnson, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk to 'root out the root of aggression-destroy the Chinese Communist regime.'
Taiwan: A Political History
128 Taiwan
sions, would the treaty state that Japan passed ownership of Taiwan to 'China'? Both the ROC and PRC governments favored this.
Taiwan: A Political History
A U.S. State Department spokesman said in April 1971, 'In our view, sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores is an unsettled question.'
Taiwan: A Political History
The CCP therefore merited recognition as the state holding the right to represent the Chinese people in the UN, which espoused the
Taiwan in
the
Cold War
133
principle of universality and had not excluded other Communist states from membership.
Taiwan: A Political History
Furthermore, the PRE had been condemned by the UN as an aggressor state and was therefore unworthy of membership.
Taiwan: A Political History
The Soviet press and Soviet diplomats gave indications of accepting the idea that the ROC on Taiwan was a state rather than a province of China.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chiang placed his armed forces on a heightened state of alert and post
poned the elections that had been planned for December 23, prompting opposition politicians to urge the government to 'resist the temptation to embrace military rule while showing its determination to promote consti
tutional government and unify the entire nation in an environment of peace and democracy.
Taiwan: A Political History
When a delegation led by Undersecretary of State Warren Christopher arrived in Taipei in December, angry protestors attacked their cars with sticks.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwan in the Cold War
141
munist and hawkish Ronald Reagan, who had a record of pro-ROC state
ments.
Taiwan: A Political History
Lee's comment drew immediate criticism from several quarters, and a few days later he said Taiwan would not try to develop the bomb 5
7
Having laid so much of the groundwork for a nu
clear capability, Taiwan remains a 'threshold' nuclear state, and opposi
tion to a Taiwan bomb is one of the issues on which the Chinese and U.S. governments consistently agree.
Taiwan: A Political History
Ultimately, of course, the political skills and determination of Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, and their lieutenants could not hold back the shifts that downgraded Taiwan from UN Security Council member and frontline state in the containment of communism to diplomatic and strategic backwater.
Taiwan: A Political History
In 1972 the state appointed Taiwanese Hsieh Tung-min as provincial governor, a post previously held by Mainlander generals.
Taiwan: A Political History
The KMT's close relationship with the state generated clear cases of the KMT's battle with the
Tangwai
influencing the state's administrative deci
sions.
Taiwan: A Political History
In reaction, Chi
ang Ching-kuo cancelled the elections and placed the ROC military on a heightened state of alert.
Taiwan: A Political History
In January the state arrested Yu, who was already on the KMT's bad side for his as
17
John F. Copper, 'Taiwan in 1981: In a Holding Pattern,' Asian Survey 22, no. 1 (January 1982):52.
Taiwan: A Political History
The thrust of the state's case was that the Kaohsiung Eight had advocated Taiwan independence.
Taiwan: A Political History
They re
ceived stiff sentences, ranging from twelve years to life imprisonment, which drew condemnation by the U.S. State Department in its annual
•' human rights report.
Taiwan: A Political History
The state held two more rounds of trials for those charged in connection with the Kaohsiung incident.
Taiwan: A Political History
The state closed down fifteen publications, including
Meilidao,
but per
mitted media coverage of the Kaohsiung Eight trial.
Taiwan: A Political History
In the long run, instead of discrediting the opposition, the state's show trial had the effect of increasing support among the public for dem
ocratic reforms.
Taiwan: A Political History
Mediated by a group of respected academics, the meeting was an important step in the KMT-dominated state's acceptance of a legitimate role for the opposition in Taiwan's political
system.laSubstantively
Taiwan: A Political History
In September, Minister of Justice Shih Ch'i-yang reiterated that forming a new party was an illegal act and that the state would not allow it.
Taiwan: A Political History
In the meantime the state kept working on a new civic organizations law that would make the DPP and other upstart parties Iegal.
Taiwan: A Political History
The Temporary Provi
sions of the constitution designed to strengthen the state against the 'Communist rebellion,' on which were based the extraordinary powers wielded by the president, remained in force.
Taiwan: A Political History
Some of the civil liberties specified in the constitution were restored, al
though the state reserved the power to suspend them in defense of the public interest.
Taiwan: A Political History
In November 1988, Kang e Ning-hsiang's opposition-oriented newspaper received a license despite ,' its title, Capital, which implied Taiwan was an independent state.
Taiwan: A Political History
The pro-KMT state operated Taiwan's first three television stations; a fourth station sympathetic to the political op
position, Formosa Television, did not begin broadcasting until 1997.
Taiwan: A Political History
Presidential versus Parliamentary System
The ROC constitution did not clearly define the relationship between the president and the premier and left room for either of them to emerge as the state's most powerful leader.
Taiwan: A Political History
Attempting to minimize the offense to Lee, a U.S. State Department official arranged a reception for Lee and his party in a meeting room at the airfield.
Taiwan: A Political History
'It was embarrassing,' admitted the State Department official on the scene.
Taiwan: A Political History
Both U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher and assistant secretary of state for Asia and the Pacific Winston Lord assured the Chinese govern
ment Lee would not get a visa to enter the United States for the proposed Cornell visit.
Taiwan: A Political History
Some con
gressmen pointed out the incongruity of the State Department allowing
13
'100 years since Treaty of Shimonoseki,' In.d.l,
Taiwan: A Political History
The State Department relented.
Taiwan: A Political History
Lee, however, urged his countrymen to re
sist China's efforts to influence the election through 'state terrorism.'
Taiwan: A Political History
Sim
ilarly, Beijing held fast to the argument that using force within its own territory is the right of a sovereign state.
Taiwan: A Political History
The Chinese soon became convinced that Lee was committed to moving Taiwan toward indepen
dence, based on their interpretation of his 'deeds rather than his words'-including his campaign to gain membership for Taiwan in inter
national organizations, his attempts to travel abroad and meet with for
214 Taiwan
eign officials, his 'state-to-state relations' comment in 1999, and his host
ing of a 1997 visit by the Dalai Lama, despised by Beijing (and by many conservatives in Taiwan) as head of the Tibetan independence movement.
Taiwan: A Political History
The two sides made some progress on the issues of Chinese hijackers, fishing disputes,
Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui
219
and rescues at sea, but the only product of the meeting was a joint state
ment.
Taiwan: A Political History
Although the U.S. State Department had already spelled out this policy, this was its first articula
tion by an American president, as Clinton's predecessors had resisted Chi
nese pressure to further constrain the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
Taiwan: A Political History
Persistent U.S. pressure on Taipei after the crisis to reach an interim agreement with the PRC might have been a motivating factor in Lee's con
troversial 'state-to-state' comment in July 1999.
Taiwan: A Political History
Lee said during an interview on a German news program that since 1991, the ROC had 're
defined its relationship with Mainland China as being state-to-state rela
tions
(guojia yu guojia guanxi)
or at least special state-to-state relations
(tesude guo yu guo guanxi).'
Taiwan: A Political History
The 'state' he referred to was the Republic of China, not an independent Tai
wan.
Taiwan: A Political History
His government's previous claims that the ROC was a sovereign state and a political equal to the Beijing government were well known.
Taiwan: A Political History
Lee's government planned to abolish the Unification Council and amend the ROC constitution and other legal doc
uments to implement the 'special state-to-state relationship' concept, but held off under heavy U.S. pressure.
Taiwan: A Political History
5
After the KMT's Sixteenth Party Congress decided to reaffirm the Guidelines for Unifica
tion instead of endorsing Lee's idea of a 'special state-to-state relation
ship,' Lee helped organize the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in August 2001 and vowed to help Chen resist the pressure to accommodate China.
Taiwan: A Political History
Cross-strait relations were already at a low point following the 1995-96 missile launches and Chinese reaction to Lee's 'state-to-state' comment.
Taiwan: A Political History
During his inauguration speech that month, Chen said that if China refrained from using force against Taiwan, his government would not declare independence, change the name of the Republic of China, alter the constitution to implement Lee's 'state-to-state relations' premise, hold a referendum on Taiwan's political status, or abolish the Guidelines for National Unification (which were based on the one-China principle) or the National Unification Council.
Taiwan: A Political History
Along with a stop in Houston, Chen became the first ROC president to travel to New York City, overcoming the U.S. government's unwritten ban on top-level ROC stopovers in either New York or Washington, D.C. In some ways Chen's U.S. trip was not as provocative as Lee's visit to New York State in 1995.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taipei still worried, nonetheless, that after September 11 the United States might trade Taiwan-related concessions for Chinese support in the
239 Taiwan
war against terrorism, prompting U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell to publicly assure Taiwan this would not happen9
On the broader diplomatic front, 2001 saw the failure of Taiwan's ninth attempt to join the United Nations.
Taiwan: A Political History
With Taipei already indignant that China would not permit Chen or even former vice president Li Yuan-zu to attend a gathering to which other countries sent their heads of state, the Taiwan delegation walked out in protest after PRC foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan snubbed ROC economic minister Lin Hsin-yi during a press conference.
Taiwan: A Political History
We have seen that each of the two Chinese Civil War rivals came to define ownership of Taiwan as vital to regime and state security.
Taiwan: A Political History
In Taiwan's case, economic development and minor political reforms by the state increased society's demands for greater liberalization and empower
ment, while attempts to suppress the opposition had no lasting effect.
Taiwan: A Political History
The state is barely able to contain the demands of various groups for re
form and redress.
Taiwan: A Political History
normalization, 166 reconquest of the mainland and, 113-116 trade unions and, 178
Labor Party, 176 Land reform, 99-102 Language politics, 95-96 Lanyu Island, 222-223 Lattimore, Owen,109
Lee Tong-hui, 6, 10, 144, 172, 225-226 199
5
-1996 crisis and, 196-202 1996 election and, 201-202 agenda, 183-185
ascension to presidency and KMT
chairmanship, 179-181 Correll University visit, 196-197
deterioration of power and popularity of, 202-205, 208-209
falling out with KMT, 234-235 farmers' protest of 1988 and, 178 February 28 incident and, 185-186 foreign relations under, 212-222 One-China principle and, 213-214, 221-222
Honolulu stopover (1994), 196 ouster from KMT chairmanship, 230-231
parliamentary reform and, 191-192 premiers, politics of, 187-188 presidential powers, attempts to ex
pand, 188-189
provincial government downsizing and, 209-212
'State-to-state relations' comment, 221-222
support for Chen Shui-bian, 235 Lee Yuan-tseh, 228,230
Legislative Yuan, 84-86, 90, 129, 137, 154, 157,160,164,174-175,177,189,195, 197-198,224,
2001 elections and, 235, 239
Chen administration and, 232-235 invitations to visit China, 237 nuclear power plant controversy and, 203,234
renewal of, 177-178,191 Lei Chen, 87-88
Li An, 230
Li Huan,154, 154,166,181,186 Li Hung-chang, 32
Li Mi, 126-127 Li Peng,190
Li Tsung-jen, 82 Li Yuan-zu, 239 Liao Bun-gei, 93 Liao Chang-hao,.208
Taiwan: A Political History
First published 2003 by Comell University Press First printing, Comell Paperbacks, 2003
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Roy, Denny
Taiwan: a political history / Denny Roy.
Taiwan: A Political History
The reigning hegemonic power in Asia, the United States of America, and the rising potential regional superpower,
China, recognize that Taiwan may drag them into a Sino-American war, which both deeply hope to avoid.
Taiwan: A Political History
Over a quarter of Taiwan's exports go to the United States, and another 20 percent go to China/Hong Kong.
Taiwan: A Political History
Japan is the leading source of Taiwan's imports, mostly agricultural goods and
2 Taiwan
industrial raw materials and secondarily manufactured goods, followed by the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
The list of important historical players includes not only individuals and nations but also states and regimes, beginning with the Dutch, under whose control Taiwan fell during part of the seventeenth century.
Taiwan: A Political History
Achieving their purposes on the island required the Japanese to undertake substan
13
Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa:
A Problem for United States Foreign Policy
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1952),28-29.
Taiwan: A Political History
Goto Shimpei, whom Governor-General Kodama Gentaro named direc
tor of the civil administration in 1898 and gave broad policy-making au
thority in nonmilitary matters, commissioned studies of the aborigines and asked for information from the United States about the American In
dians.
Taiwan: A Political History
The other Allied powers then at war with Japan, the United States and Britain, accepted the ROC position.
Taiwan: A Political History
A former mayor of Nan
jing, Wei had been China's ambassador to the United States during World War II and had a favorable reputation among many U.S. officials.
Taiwan: A Political History
Li sought American help, asking U.S. ambassador to China John Leighton Stuart to get Chiang in
vited to visit the United States to weaken Chiang's continued control of the ROC government.
Taiwan: A Political History
Li was visiting the United States and scheduled to meet with Truman in Washington in March 1950 when Chiang announced that he had accepted a request from the Executive Yuan to take back the presidency.
Taiwan: A Political History
The appointment of Wu, who was educated in the United States and relatively liberal, was apparently intended to favorably impress an American government disillusioned with Chiang's regime.
Taiwan: A Political History
Openly critical of the Chiangs' authoritarianism, Wu survived at least two assassination attempts and then resigned in 1953 while in the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
The regime succeeded admirably, bringing Taiwan into the ranks of the newly industrializing countries that would force China and other Asian Marxist states to reassess their aversion to engagement with the international economy.
Taiwan: A Political History
Although KNIT officials often resented med
dling in ROC internal matters by Americans who did not support all the party's goals, Taiwan could not afford to reject the aid the United States of
fered.
Taiwan: A Political History
United States advisers consistently urged Taiwan's leaders toward privatization and openness to foreign investment.
Taiwan: A Political History
The $100 million in nonmilitary aid Taiwan got annually from the United States provided about 40 percent of the ROC's capital formation and gave an important boost to the building of infrastructure and the training of technical specialists.z
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwan's postwar land reform program is widely considered one of the
za Nancy Bemkopf Tucker,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States,
1945-1992 (New York: Twayne, 1994), 59.
Taiwan: A Political History
Later, both land prices and the value of these stock shares ap
preciated, creating wealth among Taiwanese outside the traditional landed elite class and greatly reducing disparities of income throughout societym The disparity between the rich and the poor shrunk steadily until by the 1980s Taiwan's rate of income inequality was one of the low
est in the world, besting both the United States and Japan.
Taiwan: A Political History
Most signif
icantly for Taiwan, the United States government's policy changed from abandoning the ROC to defending it after the Korean War caused Washing
ton to reinterpret Taiwan as part of the Cold War battleground.
Taiwan: A Political History
This gave the KNIT access to America's vast resources, but also brought the challenges of persuading the United States to support Taipei's agenda and avoiding a dependence that would give Washington excessive control over Taiwan's destiny.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chiang's attitude toward the United States had always been ambivalent.
Taiwan: A Political History
He was suspicious, if not hostile, toward ROC po
litical figures he considered too friendly with the United States, as was evi
dent in the purges of Sun Li-jen and later former foreign minister and am
bassador to the United States Yeh Kung-ch'ao (George Yeh).
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States relinquished its privilege of extraterritoriality' in China and re
pealed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which had all but banned Chinese im
migration into the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
Wartime propaganda in the United States portrayed China as a protodemocratic and proto-Christian country putting up a gallant fight against a powerful and cruel fascist invader.
Taiwan: A Political History
The two states' deep common interest in defeating Japan sus
tained the relationship despite disagreements over the conduct of the war.
Taiwan: A Political History
He wanted to leave the fight against Japan to the United States and preserve his forces for a final campaign to eliminate the Chinese Communists.
Taiwan: A Political History
Republic of China leaders frequently expressed the hope that the United States would send 1 million ground troops to fight the Japanese troops in China.
Taiwan: A Political History
United States officials who worked closely with Chiang, such as his U.S. deputy commanders General Joseph W. 'Vinegar Joe' Stilwell and General Albert C. Wedemeyer, became disillusioned with the KMT regime.
Taiwan: A Political History
Past American support for the Chiang regime made it impossible for the CCP to believe that the United States was a neutral ar
biter.
Taiwan: A Political History
At the same time, the KMT believed that to some degree the United States had betrayed the Republic of China.
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States failed to provide the ROC as much support as the CCP got from the Soviet Union.
Taiwan: A Political History
Then the United States cut off military aid altogether when the ROC needed it most.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chiang hoped to rally the Asian states under threat of Communist takeover into a NATO-like al
liance.
Taiwan: A Political History
Many Americans agreed that the United States had let the ROC down.
Taiwan: A Political History
Supporting the ROC against the PRC was a popular position in the United States, where Chiang still enjoyed the benefits of a favorable image built up by wartime propaganda.
Taiwan: A Political History
With revulsion toward communism already deeply ingrained in the United States, the PRC quickly earned a negative image through its mis
treatment of Westerners in Chhnn
3
.
Taiwan: A Political History
Ambassador to the United States Wellington Koo and other ROC officials secretly paid American journal
ists who wrote disparaging reports about U.S. China experts considered unfriendly to the Chiang government
.
Taiwan: A Political History
This, they postulated, might restore the political consensus within the United States in favor of resuming the flow of military aid to Taiwan.
Taiwan: A Political History
One of the strongest arguments for withholding aid was that if the United States accommodated China, Beijing would break from the So
viets and reconcile with the U.S. bloc.
Taiwan: A Political History
10
United States and British intelligence ana
lysts predicted the invasion would take place sometime in the summer of 1950; the U.S. government ordered its nonessential personnel in Taiwan to evacuate on May 26.
Taiwan: A Political History
In short, the United States was now following a 'two Chinas' policy to justify denying Taiwan to the CCP
A successful anti-Chiang coup might have had the same effect, but the fighting in Korea caused an overnight reversal of U.S. policy toward Tai
wan: from abandoning the island to CCP takeover to guaranteeing Tai
wan's protection through U.S. military deployment.
Taiwan: A Political History
In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist Forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific
Area and to the United States.'
Taiwan: A Political History
Within this context, as the joint Chiefs had said, the United States perceived a much greater interest in denying the CCP a vic
tory on Taiwan.
Taiwan: A Political History
Since the war preempted the coup, the United States was now e stuck protecting Chiang.1z
Taiwan: A Political History
Beyond this common ground, however, Taiwan and the United States disagreed on grand strategy against the PRC.
Taiwan: A Political History
The leadership in Beijing would continue to torment the region, forcing costly countermeasures by the United States, until the Communists lost control of China.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chiang Kai-shek tirelessly asserted it was better for the United States to deal with China (by supporting an ROC invasion) immediately rather than waiting until China got stronger and fomented more political and military tensions.
Taiwan: A Political History
United States officials did not believe the KMT's plan to reconquer China was realistic.
Taiwan: A Political History
Resigned to the survival of the CCP regime, the United States wanted to weaken it and induce it to break away from the Soviet camp and seek accommodation with the democratic-capitalist world.
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States therefore favored small-scale ROC military ac
tivities on the mainland that would harass the CCP regime and make it appear incapable of policing its own territory, but opposed operations that might lead to a major war involving the United States or would divert too much ROC strength away from the defense of Taiwan.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chiang also agreed to place his troops under the command of an American general if the United States military participated.
Taiwan: A Political History
This alarmed both China and the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
The ROC saw yet another window of opportu
'
Chiang Kai-shek letter to President Eisenhower, Apr. 16, 1956, Foreign
Relations of the United
States, 1955-57, vol.
Taiwan: A Political History
In January 1967, Taipei's ambas
sador to the United States, Chow Shu-kai, said publicly that 1967 might be year the ROC recovered the mainland.
Taiwan: A Political History
While Truman had tried to distance the United States from Chiang's government, Eisenhower wel
comed Chiang as an ally.
Taiwan: A Political History
Eisenhower said he saw no 'logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists, thus permitting those communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies in Korea.'
Taiwan: A Political History
20
Britain, India, and some Southeast Asian states, however, criticized the change as an invitation to a wider conflict.
Taiwan: A Political History
22
Eisenhower's administration deter
mined that U.S. interests required retaining Taiwan as part of the structure designed to protect noncommunist states on the western rim of the Pa
cific.
Taiwan: A Political History
This wording committed the United States to help defend a hypo
thetical ROC beachhead on the mainland as well as any of the thirty smaller ROC-held islands beyond Taiwan and the Penghu group.
Taiwan: A Political History
Sympathetic to the KMT's need to uphold its legitimacy at home, the United States supported resolution of this issue through an un
publicized agreement not written into the treaty.
Taiwan: A Political History
4
Yeh asserted in a public statement Taipei's position that the treaty 'did not signify in any way that the ROC did not have the right to recover the Mainland,' but subsequent statements by U.S. officials made clear that the United States did not intend through the treaty to en
courage offensive ROC military action against the mainland and the treaty did not apply to the smaller islands.
Taiwan: A Political History
Defense of the offshore islands was a particularly difficult issue for the United States because Chiang insisted he would occupy and defend them even without American help.
Taiwan: A Political History
2
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, vol.
Taiwan: A Political History
But despite Dulles's claims, Eisen
hower did not commit the United States to defend the offshore islands, presenting an angry Chiang with another American sellout.
Taiwan: A Political History
Dulles subtly suggested that the United States might employ nuclear weapons, and after a visit to Taiwan he said that under some circumstances U.S. warships and aircraft might help the ROC defend the offshore islands.
Taiwan: A Political History
This may have been an effort to compel the United States to intervene in a China-Taiwan war.
Taiwan: A Political History
Zhou made remarkably conciliatory statements about the United States, including an offer to open discussions with Washington on 'the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area.'
Taiwan: A Political History
In a July 1955 report to the National People's Congress, Zhou explained that China could discuss Taiwan with the United States without compro
mising Chinese sovereignty.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taipei was unhappy with these talks, as it generally opposed high-level negotiations between the United States and China.
Taiwan: A Political History
A major reason was Dulles's insistence
m Tang Firm, 'The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the United States,' Western Political Quarterly 12 (1959):1088; Garver, Sino-American Alliance 134-135.
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States dispatched a shipment of modern weapons to Taiwan, including jet fighters and antiaircraft missiles.
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States supplied additional landing vessels and training in am
phibious operations.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chiang was again angry that Washington would not allow stronger and more direct military action against the PRC and pre
ferred to perpetuate a divided China, while U.S. officials were more bitter than ever about the ROC'S insistence on retaining the offshore islands and saw Chiang trying to maneuver the United States into a major war with China.
Taiwan: A Political History
Although the Soviet leadership gave verbal public support to the CCP during the crisis, Moscow was empha
sizing peaceful coexistence with the United States and did not welcome Chinese military action against Taiwan.
Taiwan: A Political History
This in turn helped persuade Mao that the Soviet Union cared more about stable relations with the United States than supporting China's quest to incorporate Taiwan.
Taiwan: A Political History
The PRC sought to steer nearly all negotia
tions with the United States toward the goal of reducing American sup
port for a noncommunist Taiwan.
Taiwan: A Political History
Zhou said publicly in 1960, 'So long as the United States continues to occupy Taiwan, there can be no basic im
provement in the relations between the United States and China.'31
Taiwan: A Political History
U.S. ROC Cooperation in Conflicts on the Asian Mainland
In attempts to weaken the PRC government and counter its influence, Taiwan and the United States saw opportunities for cooperation in several
zs Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992 (New York: Twayne,1994), 43.
Taiwan: A Political History
Small-scale, covert ROC activities on the mainland were acceptable to the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
The ROC shared with the United States some information gained from ROC spies on the mainland or from the interrogation of PRC officials captured in com
mando raids.
Taiwan: A Political History
Even
tually the United States decided to give Taiwan the highly capable U-2 spy plane.
Taiwan: A Political History
35
The ROC and the United States also cooperated in abetting anti-PRC ac
tivity in Tibet.
Taiwan: A Political History
Tibetan guerrillas received training in Taiwan and the United States beginning in the late 1950s3
6
The ROC supported the Ti
'
2
Tucker, Taiwan, Hong
Kong,
34.
Taiwan: A Political History
Knowing the United States was involved, the Burmese government appealed to the U.S. government to remove these troops from Burmese territory.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chiang's government argued, not surprisingly, that the best way for the United States to relieve Communist pressure on South Vietnam was to in
vade North Vietnam and to allow the ROC to launch a campaign to recap
ture China.
Taiwan: A Political History
Thus the United States refused South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's re
quest for ROC combat troops.
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States had nuclear weapons on Taiwan until 1974.
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States government opposed it, however, because it made the conflict over TTaiwan a domestic Chinese issue and was therefore inconsistent with U.S. intervention to defend Taiwan from the PLA.
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States would pressure Japan to sign with Taipei rather than Beijing, but only on the condition that this ROC-Japan peace treaty en
compassed Taiwan and the Pescadores, not the mainland.
Taiwan: A Political History
A third reason for the PRC's diplomatic ascension was the im
provement in relations between China and the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
In a more Concrete gesture of support, the United States for the first time sold two submarines to the ROC in 1971.
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States had made compromises that clearly weakened the diplomatic standing of the ROC despite its being an alliance partner with which America had formal diplomatic relations.
Taiwan: A Political History
In the American statement on Taiwan, 'the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States Government does not challenge that position.
Taiwan: A Political History
Still, this was enough to indicate the United States had officially dropped the two Chinas position dating from Truman's statement on June 27, 1950.
Taiwan: A Political History
By mid
1975, however, the number of countries recognizing Taipei had dropped to 26, while the PRC had normalized relations with 112 states.
Taiwan: A Political History
Despite a few such small victories, by 1979 the PRC had decisively won the diplomatic campaign, enjoying relations with 117 governments, in
cluding the world's major states, while only twenty-four states of rela
tively little consequence recognized the ROC.
Taiwan: A Political History
Sparring between the ROC and the Soviet bloc states began in the UN as early as 1949, when the General Assembly responded to an ROC com
plaint by passing a resolution that criticized the Soviet Union.
Taiwan: A Political History
It was the absence of a Soviet rep
resentative that allowed the United States to get the Security Council to condemn North Korea as an aggressor and to authorize UN military in
tervention to defend South Korea.
Taiwan: A Political History
Through the 1950s, the United States successfully rallied a majority of member states in support of a moratorium against considering the PRC for admission to the UN.
Taiwan: A Political History
Decolonization caused General As
sembly membership to swell with the admission of new Third World states, many of which were sympathetic to Beijing.
Taiwan: A Political History
In 1961 the United States bought more time by successfully proposing that the matter of the PRC replacing the ROC be considered an 'important question,' requiring a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly to pass.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chiang agreed on the condition the United States would use its influence to ensure Taipei kept the China seat in the Security
43
Chinese Institute for International Affairs, China and
the United
Nations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1959), 258.
Taiwan: A Political History
Prior to the key vote, however, the United States conceded it would accept giving the ROC'S Security Council seat to Beijing if UN members would vote to allow Taipei to remain in the General Assembly.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwan's people had few outlets for redressing the dissatisfaction they felt over their treatment by the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai believed the threat of improved ROC relations with the USSR would induce the United States and China to treat Taiwan with greater consideration.
Taiwan: A Political History
Re
public of China officials continued, nevertheless, to suggest that Taiwan might host Soviet military bases if the United States switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing.
Taiwan: A Political History
In 1989 Taipei established relations with three states that already recognized the PRC: Belize, Grenada, and Liberia.
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States Switches Recognition
United States officials repeatedly assured Taipei they would not scrap the Mutual Defense Treaty.
Taiwan: A Political History
In the United States, the Watergate scan
dal halted the movement toward normalization because a politically weakened Nixon, and similarly his successor Gerald Ford, could not af
ford to lose the support of conservative, pro-ROC Republican politicians.
Taiwan: A Political History
Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan warned the United States that recognizing the PRC was against U.S. interests because it would betray fundamental American ideals and because the United States would lose credibility with its noncommunist allies worldwide.
Taiwan: A Political History
138 Taiwan
tempted to engineer a fallout between China and the United States and re
portedly considered mailing letter bombs to U.S. academics perceived as pro-China 5
1
The eventual result of the negotiations was that China would not prom
ise not to use force against Taiwan, but would not let continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan stand in the way of normalization.
Taiwan: A Political History
relations contains a weak American affirmation of the one-China principle: 'The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.'
Taiwan: A Political History
The ROC had hoped for three concessions that would soften the blow of U.S.-PRC normalization: a strong statement of the United States' commit
ment to the security of Taiwan, an accompanying promise by the PRC not to use force against Taiwan, and continued U.S. arms sales.
Taiwan: A Political History
In Chiang's public comment, he said that the United States 'has broken its assurances' to the ROC and 'cannot expect to have the confidence of any free nation in the future.'
Taiwan: A Political History
United States recognition of the CCP government was also 'tantamount to dashing the hopes of the hundreds of millions of people enslaved on the Chinese mainland for an early restoration of freedom' and 'a great setback to human freedom and democratic institutions.'
Taiwan: A Political History
It was in Taipei's interest, then and thereafter, to make its contacts with the United States appear as 'official' as possible, both to arrest the deterioration of the relationship and to promote friction be
tween Washington and Beijing.
Taiwan: A Political History
A backlash by the pro-Taiwan faction in the United States was in
evitable.
Taiwan: A Political History
The act says threats to Taiwan would be 'of grave concern to the United States,' and
sn Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, 'A New Kind of Party: The Kuomintang of 1949-1952,' in
Proceedings of Centennial Symposium on Sun Yat-sen's Founding of the Kuomintang for Revolution, vol.
Taiwan: A Political History
Understandably, Taipei constantly complained that the United States was not transferring enough weaponry for Taiwan to counter the immense military resources of the PRC.
Taiwan: A Political History
In the 1960s the United States sup
plied Taiwan with F-100, F-104, and F-5 aircraft as well as tanks, artillery, warships, and antiaircraft missiles.
Taiwan: A Political History
United States arms sales to Taiwan after 1975 were comparatively pal
try.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwan particularly wanted the United States to agree to sell advanced fighter aircraft.
Taiwan: A Political History
since the es
tablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China.'
Taiwan: A Political History
Tai
wan acquired a research reactor from Canada and nuclear technology and material from several other countries (including low-grade plutonium from the United States), ostensibly to aid Taiwan's civilian nuclear energy program.
Taiwan: A Political History
In December
Taiwan in
the
Cold War
143
1987, Chang defected to the United States with a cache of incriminating documents and informed the U.S. government Taiwan was still trying to build nuclear weapons.
Taiwan: A Political History
United States satellite photographs of the activi
ties around the research reactor corroborated Chang's report.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwan shut down the reactor, dismantled its processing facilities, and re
turned most of the plutonium supplied by the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
144 Taiwan
nese-American journalist Henry Liu Yi-liang, however, was a disastrous setback to the KMT's image in the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
The most prominent of the three was Admiral Wang Hsi-ling, head of the National Intelligence Bureau, who had directed the activities of ROC agents in the United States while he was a military attache in Washington.
Taiwan: A Political History
Section 301 of the United States' 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act provided for retaliation against countries that consistently barred U.S. imports.
Taiwan: A Political History
The ROC maintained it wanted to keep out American cigarettes to protect the health of its people, not for economic reasons, and ran an advertising campaign in the United States intended to make this point.
Taiwan: A Political History
The threat of placing Taiwan on the 'super 301 list' and carrying out other forms of retaliation receded as the ROC's trade surplus with the United States began to shrink in the early 1990s.
Taiwan: A Political History
More seriously, Taiwan's trade surplus with the United States reached $19 billion in 1987.
Taiwan: A Political History
Xu Xianggian, the PRC minister of defense, an
nounced in January 1979 that the PLA would stop shelling Jinmen and Matzo as a friendly gesture to Taiwan and in recognition of China's nor
malization of relations with the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
Mainland China, Taiwan, and United States Policy
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Taiwan: A Political History
It is not surprising that the United States, a superpower, often forced its will on its small ally.
Taiwan: A Political History
For the assistance it received from the United States, including about
150 Taiwan
$100 million annually in nonmilitary aid from 1951 to 1964, Taiwan pro
vided America with significant benefits.
Taiwan: A Political History
But to balance out the story, the important benefits Taiwan (and especially the KMT) gained from its Cold War association with the United States should also be noted.
Taiwan: A Political History
Even after 'abandoning' Taiwan, the United States continued to provide weaponry and to help deter PRC military coercion.
Taiwan: A Political History
The opportu
nity to mop up the remnants of KMT resistance and speedily unify Tai
wan with the mainland disappeared, and the United States reentered the picture as Taiwan's self-appointed protector.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwanese political activists continued to campaign against the KMT from abroad, particularly Japan and the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
The next year authorities announced the culprit was a Taiwanese re
siding in the United States who mailed bombs to three ROC officials with the objective of overthrowing the government.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chen Wen-cheng was a well
known critic of the KMT and a permanent resident of the United States, where he was a professor at Carnegie Mellon University.
Taiwan: A Political History
(Hsu Hsin-liang, who escaped and fled to the United States, was sentenced in absentia.)
Taiwan: A Political History
Republic of China security agents ceased monitoring Taiwan students and dissidents in the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
Having fled to the United States after the Kaohsiung incident, Hsu became head of the U.S.-based Taiwan Revolutionary Party.
Taiwan: A Political History
Wang Sheng visited the United States in April 1983.
Taiwan: A Political History
from Comell University in the United States, and served with the joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction.
Taiwan: A Political History
Some National Assem
bly members wanted to increase the assembly's powers and stature, with the eventual goal of creating a two-house legislature such as those in Britain and the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
196 Taiwan
alleged terrorists such as the Irish Republican Army's Gerry Adams and the Palestine Liberation Organization's Yasir Arafat to visit the United States while denying entry to the leader of a democratic polity.
Taiwan: A Political History
In May 1995, the House of Representatives passed, by a vote of 396 to 0, a resolu
tion asking the executive branch to allow Lee to visit the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
Lee traveled to the United States while the Chinese press viciously de
rided him as 'traitor' and 'sinner' who sought to 'split the motherland.'
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States' reaction was low-key.
Taiwan: A Political History
A Chinese general nonetheless warned a U.S. envoy visiting China that the PLA might retaliate against American intervention in defense of Taiwan with a nuclear attack against the west coast of the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
Although Peng was the DPP's best-known politician, his opponents said he was too old, not familiar enough with the latest developments in Taiwan because of his long exile in the United States, and lacking in government experience.
Taiwan: A Political History
Although the United States was under no explicit, formal obligation to militarily defend Taiwan against a PLA missile attack or naval blockade, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act established the principle that America would view with 'grave concern' any PRE 'effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embar
goes.'
Taiwan: A Political History
On March 11 the United States an
nounced it was deploying a second aircraft carrier battle group led by the Nimitz to the area.
Taiwan: A Political History
From a Chinese perspective, the aversion of all major groups on Taiwan to declare independence was en
couraging, but the willingness of the United States to support Taiwan sep
aratism and the continued defiance of Taiwan's people decreased the pos
sibility that China could reclaim Taiwan by a means other than military force.
Taiwan: A Political History
Although Taiwan stood up relatively well against the financial crisis that devastated the economies of South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and other Asian states, the business community was unhappy with continued restrictions on trade with China.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taipei sought political and economic interaction with other states regardless of whether they had diplomatic relations with the PRC and tried to gain 'substantial relations' through quasi-official institutions where formal diplomatic relations were not possible.
Taiwan: A Political History
During the 1990s the ROC lost diplomatic relations with South Korea, South Africa, and Saudi Ara
bia while gaining recognition from states such as Nicaragua, Nauru, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Macedonia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwan finished the decade sharing normal relations with twenty-nine states.
Taiwan: A Political History
Few UN member states, however (only fifteen by 1998), were willing to endorse
216 Taiwan
Taiwan's application in the face of countervailing PRC pressure.
Taiwan: A Political History
Cross-strait talks resumed in 1998 after a three-year lapse following Lee's decision to visit the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
Such a breakthrough occurred in September 1992, when U.S. president George Bush announced that the United States would sell 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan for $6 billion.
Taiwan: A Political History
But Beijing did not sever its diplomatic or economic relations with the United States.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwan's office in the United States also changed its name from Coordination Council for North American Af
fairs to Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office.
Taiwan: A Political History
China's decision to attribute such great consequence to Lee's statement perhaps stemmed from the CCP's perception of increased threats both domestically (with serious economic,
Taiwan
under Lee Teng-hui
221
political, and social challenges to the Jiang government's leadership) and internationally (with a militarily preeminent United States seemingly hos
tile toward China).
Taiwan: A Political History
Lee's administration had previously described Taiwan and the PRC as 'two governments' or 'two equal political entities;' now they were two 'states.'
Taiwan: A Political History
China, nevertheless, chose to characterize Lee's statement as a disavowal of the one-China principle-that is, two states meant 'two Chi
nas.'
Taiwan: A Political History
He noted that states had granted national minorities substantial autonomy not only in the democ
racies, but even in the PRC 3
1
In July 1994 Lee met with aboriginal ac
tivists, symbolizing recognition of the legitimacy of their campaign.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chen took ad
vantage of the new climate in Washington to secure a visa to visit the United States in May 2001.
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwan nevertheless faces the continuing challenge of improving its sys
tem of governance (as do 'mature' democracies such as the United States).
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States and China face the prospect of a war over Taiwan that neither side wants.
Taiwan: A Political History
China is committed to attack Taiwan under certain cir
cumstances, while the United States is committed to defend Taiwan under certain circumstances.
Taiwan: A Political History
For its part, the United States has been deeply involved in the Republic of China's history since the Second World War.
Taiwan: A Political History
The United States assisted Taiwan's economic and political liberalization through ad
vice and education while protecting Taiwan from seizure by a menacing Communist power.
Taiwan: A Political History
United States sup
port for the ROC raises Chinese suspicions about overall American policy in Asia and thus makes Sino-U.S.
Taiwan: A Political History
80
Ta Chia Hsi, 27 Tahsuch,165 Tai Kuo-hui, 68 Taichung, 22, 36 Taiwan,15,21-22,34,36,125,131,228 Taipei, 35,67-68,81, 92,125,160-161,194, 196,204
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representa
tive Office, 220
Taiping Rebellion, 25 Taitung, 224
Taiwan Bunka Kyokai, 47 Taiwan Communist Party, 73
Taiwan Democratic Autonomy League, 93 Taiwan Democratic Independence Party, 93
Taiwan Garrison Command, 89, 157, 163, 168,175, 185
Taiwan Independence Party 203 Taiwan Political Review, 165 Taiwan Revolutionary Party, 176 Taiwan Seinen, 47, 94
Taiwan Solidarity Union, 235 Taiwan Youth Association, 93-94 Takasago,41
Tamsui, 34
T'ang Ching-sung, 33 Tang Fei, 228, 232-233 Tang Shubei, 219 Tang Ying-shen, 223 Tangwai agenda,158-160 Tangwai Campaign Assistance Corps, 159
Tangwai Research Association for Public Policy, 159,170-171
Taoyuan, 86,165, 207 'Tax farming,' 26-27 Temporary Provisions, 83-84,185, 190 Ten Major Projects, 153
Tenth Credit Cooperative, 171 'Three links,' 147,237-238 'Three no's,' 148,150
Three Principles of the People, 79, 84, 96, 144,148-149,154
sing Jih-ch'ang, 28
'human, Harry S, 82,108-110,112,116 Tsai Ing-wen, 237
Tsai Yu-chuan, 176 Tsiang Tmgfu, 133 To Chun-ying, 21 To Teh-chi, 207 'Tungpu graves incident,' 223 Tzuyu
Chungkuo
(Free China), 87, 92
Unger, Leonard, 139
United Nations, 93, 106, 124, 224 Taiwan's attempts to rejoin, 173, 204, 216-217
Taiwan's ouster from, 133-135,164-165 United States of America and Taiwan (be
fore 1945):
bombing of Taiwan during World War 11,53
massacre of shipwrecked Americans in 1867,30
World War II relations, 105-107
United States of America and Taiwan (postwar):
1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, 202 arms sales, 132,141-142, 220, 238 attitude toward DPI, 174
Bush, George W., Administration's sup
port for Taiwan, 238-239
Burma, operations in, 126-127 clashing Cold War strategies, 113-116 coup d'etat, discussion of, 110 decision to defend Taiwan in 1950, 112-113
economic advice and assistance, 99 mutual Defense Treaty, 118-119,132, 137,139
Taiwan Relations Act, 140-142, 202 Tibet, operations in, 125-126 Trade disputes, 145-146
U-2 flights over China, 125 U.S.-China relations and Taiwan, 1-2, 109,118-123
Joint Communique of 1978,139 possibility of war over Taiwan, 243-244 Shanghai Communique, 131-132 Sino-U.S.
Taiwan: A Political History
Chiang was named Supreme Com
mander of Allied forces in the China theater.
Taiwan: A Political History
He took on the title of KMT chairman
(Chuhsi)
a month later (the
156 Taiwan
elder Chiang's title of Tsung-tsai or 'supreme leader' was retired after his death).
Taiwan: A Political History
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Other practices, offenses, and punish
ments include the exile or imprisonment or execution of dissidents, with sentences to death for Bible smuggling; the sentence of death for 'using a cult (the South China Church) to undermine the en
forcement of the law'; the illegality of the Falun Gong practice of exercise and meditation; continued repression of the people of Ti
bet; the expulsion or execution of over 6,000 Tibetan Monks, and the continued moving of Chinese into Tibet to change the balance of ethnicity so Tibetans become a minority.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
On Hong Kong Ra
dio he said, 'Why would you appoint someone who doesn't sup
port communism as a cardinal? Is it like Poland? Didn't the church play a big role in Poland? ...
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Pope John Paul II had made many attempts to have relations with Beijing and a joining of the Beijing recognized Catholic Church with the underground Catholic Church, but the conditions of the People's Republic of China did not change, and the pope would not accept their conditions.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The underground Catholic Church, with an estimated eight to twelve million followers, expressed their grief over the death of the pope through word of mouth in 'Small Lane News.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
'It is a very sad moment and everyone's hearts are heavy' was a statement made by an officer of the underground Catholic Church.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Hours after the death of Pope John Paul II, Beijing announced that Chinese authorities had carried out a new series of arrests of officials from the underground church.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It was Sunday and President Bush went to the Gangwashi Church, one of the few state-approved and monitored Protestant churches, its congregation required to register with the government as part of its 'Three Self Patriotic Movement.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
and United Nations, 18,19 election of, 41
Bush, George W. Anti-Secession Law, 77-78 defense of Taiwan, 167-68 Kyoto speech on Taiwan, 139 meeting with Hu Jintao, 141 on Middle East status quo
dangers, 165 Rice's nomination, 8 second inaugural address, 1,171, 173
State Department disagreement with, 3
Taiwan question response of, 4 television appearance, 4,167-68 thanking Hu Jintao, 141
Wen Jiabo's visit to, 63 Carter Communiqu6, 29-31 and Shanghai Communiquh, 165 Chiang Kai-shek's reaction, 32 demonstrations reaction, 32 Goldwater's reaction, 32 Meany's reaction, 32
Reagan's support of, 42-43 Carter, Jimmy
Shanghai Communiqu6, 31, 165 discussions with Kim 11 Sung, 142 Nixon's letter to, 32-36
PRC diplomatic recognition by, 27 response to Nixon, 36
State Department influence on, 3 Carter, Jimmy:, 29
Catholic Church, underground, 114
INDEX
Catholic Patriotic Association, 56,114 CCP.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Liu Bainan, the vice president of China's State Catholic Patriotic Association, which does not recognize the pope (controlling China's 'state-sanctioned only' Catholic churches), said it was a 'hostile act' and the pope showed a lack of respect for China by choosing Bishop Zen without prior consultation with the Beijing's leadership.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Senator Barry Goldwater threatened that he would take Presi
dent Carter's decision to abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 to court 'and show the action to be both illegal and unconsti
tutional.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Senator Barry Goldwater went through with his earlier threat to bring the abrogation of the Mutual [between the United States and Taiwan] Defense Treaty of 1954 to court.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The U.S. District Court first dismissed the suit on June 6, stating the differences between the executive branch and the legislature should be resolved by those two branches of government.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Three more 1979 chapters of the courts followed before it was decided:
October 17: With the Senate making its opinion known, the U.S. District Court reappraised its earlier decision and determined President Carter needed the consent of the Congress to end the Mu
tual Defense Treaty.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
November 30: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled by a 4 to 1 vote that President Carter did have the authority to unilaterally terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
[This was a reference to the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1936, written by Justice George Sutherland in U.S. v.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Senator Goldwater then brought the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
A SURPRISE UNDER THE CHRISTMAS TREE
December 13: The U.S. Supreme Court by a vote of 7 to 2 re
fused to hear the case, its refusal allowing the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to stand.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Since four U.S. Supreme Court Justices are needed to hear a case, the abroga
tion of the treaty would take effect.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Chen Chuei, a spokesman for the prosecutor's office of Taiwan's High Court, said the government 'is investigating whether the KMT has violated the criminal code, which stipulates against reaching an agreement with any foreign government with
out authorization.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Beijing's National People's Congress overturned an immi
gration decision made by Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Hong Kong's Court of 'Final Appeal' was no longer final.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Court documents confirmed Yahoo Holdings
Ltd.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
See
Universal suffrage Suharto (President of Indonesia), 15 Sukamo (of Indonesia), 15
Sun Yafu, 77
Sun Yat-sen, leader of Chinese revolution, 10
Sun-tzu, on dealing with enemies, 53 Supreme Court (U.S.),
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The provisional body's validity 'cannot be challenged by Hong Kong's courts.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, Zhu Bangzao, said, 'We hereby warn Lee Teng-hui and the Taiwan authorities not to underestimate the firm resolve of the Chinese government to safeguard the sovereignty, dignity, and territorial integrity of the courage and strength of the Chinese people to fight against separation and Taiwan's independence.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
And neither did many U.S. foreign service offi
cers at the State Department, who winced at his words.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
They are meant to be an accurate reflection of the feelings of some major State Department foreign service officers on that day.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Foreign service officers at the U.S. State Department wouldri t put it in these words, at least not publicly, but through the years many of them believed Taiwan to be expendable.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The State Depart
ment, after all, had a philosophy far different than most presidents the department was meant to serve.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Like other giant bureaucracies in the District of Columbia, many of those who worked for the State Department believed they were part of the permanent executive branch of the United States while presidents were temporary annoy
THE QUEST AND THE ANTI-QUEST
ances.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
George W. Bush had come to the presidency in the 'holiday pe
riod' between the Cold War and 9/11, a nine-year interval in which the State Department was realigning itself.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
His answer created an emotional landslide among the majority of U.S. foreign service officers in the U.S. State Department.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
(The presi
dent obviously meant, 'Whatever it would take to help Taiwan defend
itself,' but it wasn't the syntax, it was the meaning of the words that struck the State Department as being 'totally counterproductive.')
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It took three years and nine months for the State Department to
'free
our policy' from President Bush's April 25, 2001, statement re
THE QUEST AND THE ANTI-QUEST
garding the defense of Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It was near the end of 2004 and someone had to do something before the imminent changes at the State Department under Condoleezza Rice, which were scheduled to take effect in little more than a month.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
On December 10, 2004, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage appeared with Char
lie Rose on the Public Broadcasting System.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
This was the opportunity on a silver platter for the deputy sec
retary of state to finally 'correct' President Bush's earlier statement that the United States would do whatever it took to help Taiwan
defend itself, although as an officer of the State Department he had to do it with at least some of the instinctive self-preservation that permeated the department through its habitual use of ambiguity.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The U.S. State Department helped China's President Hu Jintao by challenging statements made by President Chen of Taiwan 'as a change in the status quo' even when it came to President Chen's
THE QUEST AND THE ANTI-QUEST
call for democratic referenda of Taiwan's population.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Simultane
ously the State Department left unchallenged mammoth changes in the status quo committed by China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Enter President Bush's nomination of Condoleezza Rice as sec
retary of state in the president's second term to the discouragement of a bureaucracy that largely regarded liberty as a frequent im
pediment to their objective of hand-shaking and back-slapping and wine-sipping with any current government of the world.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The following morning she appeared at the U.S. State Department where she received a welcome of applause and cheers from the State Department employees waiting for her in the building's lobby.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
On August 4,1971, Secretary of State William Rogers issued a statement that said in part:
No question of Asian policy has so perplexed the world in the last twenty years as the China question-and the related ques
tion of representation in the United Nations.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
(You will notice that I did not make a state
ment regarding who governed China, the PRC or the ROC, which was the issue of the time.)
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
That communique became intentionally misinterpreted by the U.S. State Department and that intentional misinterpretation became the foundation of two future communiques, one to come in the Carter administration and the other in the Reagan administration.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Maybe not throughout the nation, but there was applause throughout the State Department.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
If because of the delicate state of our negotiations with the PRC you feel the administration could not go this far, I would not discourage the Congress from doing so.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
I
know that par-
TAIWAN: THE THREATENED DEMOCRACY
ticularly at this time you are overburdened with work with the final budget decisions to be made, the State of the Union address to be pre
pared, and a possible Summit visit with Brezhnev on the agenda.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
As disappointing as it was to so many that President Carter's policies were retained, the reasoning of President Reagan was not only based on the advice of the State Department but was steeped in an important U.S. tradition (and a similar tradition of most de
mocracies) that dictates a new president does not act to void inter
national agreements of previous presidents other than in the most extraordinary circumstances or extreme changing conditions.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
On August 17, 1982, President Reagan issued a (State Department authored) communique, which became the third communique when added to the Shanghai Communique of President Nixon and the Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China of President Carter.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Both sides emphatically state these principles continue to govern all as
pects of their relations.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
(The attempted clarification was given without the en
thusiasm of the State Department.)
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
During the demonstration that preceded the massacre, Secre
tary of State James Baker and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft called for 'restraint on both sides.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
But without telling the nation, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Se
curity Advisor Brent Scowcroft were sent to Beijing in July 1989 within weeks of the massacre.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
There was a second secret trip of Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft in December of 1989.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In June 1995, against the advice of the U.S. State Department, Taiwan's President Lee accepted an invitation from Cornell Univer
sity to receive its first Outstanding International Alumnus Citation.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Presi
dent Lee, who had called the actions of the People's Republic of China 'state terrorism,' won with 54 percent of the votes.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Al
though Deng held no official position at the time of his death and
Jiang Zemin had already taken over the government's formal lead
ership, Deng did not need an office to be admired and respected by the government of the People's Republic of China and the U.S. State Department.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
They should, however, give some thought to China having more than one billion human
beings,
as they so infrequently state.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Had it been accepted, the U.S. State Department wouldn't know what to do about it.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
No acceptance of Taiwan into any international organi
zation as a separate state.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In a radio interview with
Deutsche Welle
('Voice of Germany') President Lee said that any talks between China and Taiwan should be conducted on a 'state-to-state' relationship.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
'I will not push forth the inclusion of the 'state-to-state' description in the Constitution; and
TAIWAN: THE THREATENED DEMOCRACY
4.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Days before his visit, on December 3, Chinese State Media reported that military officials repeated that China would wage war against the 'renegade province'-Taiwan-if it declared independence.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
A senior State Department official put it differently than the senior administration official.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The senior State Department official said, 'We've been forced to react to steps taken by President Chen that seem to be pointing toward independence.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The political parties that leaned in varied degrees toward formal sovereignty as an independent state were called 'Pan-Green' in the Taiwanese vocabulary, while those that leaned toward opposition of
independence were called 'Pan-Blue.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
On October
25, 2004, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said in an interview with Hong Kong's Phoenix TV, 'Taiwan is not inde
pendent.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
President Chen has advocated changing the name of his government's foreign missions in host nations and changing the name of state enterprises such as 'China Airlines,' 'China Steel,' 'China Ship Building,' and 'China Petroleum,' and stating they should at least have the word 'Taiwan' as part of their names to avoid the very frequent confu
sion of those who think the names signify they are establishments of the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Although the U.S. State Department did not give any support or opposition to the change on the cover of Taiwan's passport as 'nothing to do with the United States,' the U.S. State Department's deputy spokesman, Adam Ereli, said, 'These changes of terminol
ogy for government-controlled enterprises or economic and cultural offices abroad, in our view, would appear to unilaterally change Taiwan's status, and for that reason we are not supportive of them.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Not asked of Adam Ereli or addressed by him was a larger, more positive element that would be achieved by a name change from the Republic of China to Taiwan: it would be a formal state
ment to the international community that Taiwan does not want 'two Chinas.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
There were ten articles to the bill, all of them regarding Taiwan, but its reason for being was summed up in Article 8: 'In the event that the 'Taiwan Independence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunifi
cation should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non
peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
'The State Council and the Central Military Commission shall decide on and execute the non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in the preceding paragraph and shall
promptly report to the Standing Committee of the National Peo
ple's Congress.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
White House press secretary Scott McClellan used the State De
partment's cherished word 'stability' but at least he didn t use Hu's and Putins term of 'territorial integrity': 'We view the adop
tion of the Anti-Secession Law as unfortunate.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In fairness, his statement was by far better than the one offered by State Department spokesman Richard Boucher just six days be
fore the law was passed with the certain knowledge that passage was scheduled for the coming Monday: 'Our policy, I think, is well
known.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Sun Yafu, deputy director of Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council said, 'In the coming three years, if war breaks out across the Taiwan Straits, there would be only one possibility; that is the Taiwan independence secessionist forces misjudge the situa
tion and thus rush recklessly into danger.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It was also not lost on European leaders that President Bush had made a statement against the EU's original plan in words the State Department had never used: he warned that the transfer of weapons and technology 'would change the balance of relations between China and Tai
wan.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Cheng An-kuo, Taiwan's chief representative in Hong Kong, announced on the radio that he agreed with President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan that any negotiations between Taiwan and the People's
Republic of China should be made on a state-to-state basis.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States Department of State and the United King
dom's Foreign Office expressed concern over erosion of freedom of the press in Hong Kong.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In response to democracy advocates' criti
cism of Qian Qichen s statement as one of intervention in the Hong Kong's system, Chief Executive Tung answered that Qian's state
ment was one of 'encouragement' only expressing 'care' rather than intervention.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The president of the People's Republic of China, Jiang Zemin, said that Hong Kong and Macau should 'function positively in mat
ters concerning the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and Macau, and the interests of the State and the Chinese Race.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
As was preordained, the premier of the People's Republic of China, Zhu Rongji, signed a State Council decree stating that Hong Kong's chief executive Tung Chee-hwa was to start his second five
year term on July 1, 2002.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The Beijing-appointed government of Hong Kong an
nounced that by July of the coming year, Article 23 of the Basic Law would be put into effect and it would outlaw treason, secession,
subversion, sedition, and theft of state secrets.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Hong Kong pro-democracy leader and legislator Martin Lee met with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington, D.C., and testified in a U.S. Senate hearing.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In March, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in Beijing, Sheng Hua-ren, reaffirmed that Beijing has the authority to declare a state of emergency in
Hong Kong and 'the Central Government can apply Chinese laws to Hong Kong.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Ching Cheong, a Hong Kong-based reporter for Singa
pore's Straits
Times
was detained in China for allegedly obtaining state secrets.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Without denials by officials of the Yahoo Internet firm, it was reported that Yahoo, which was registered in Hong Kong, pro
vided information regarding a journalist, Shi Tao, to Chinese offi
cials, who then accused Shi Tao of e-mailing 'state secrets' and sen
tenced him to ten years imprisonment.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
(Unlike democracies, state se
crets of the PRC go well beyond national security, including infor
mation on statistics, child labor laws, police behavior, strikes, riots, and other government data.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Lo King-wah, spokesman for the Hong Kong Journalists Association, condemned Shi Tao's sentenc
ing, stating that Shi Tao did not expose a state secret and that the help given to the PRC by Yahoo-Hong Kong was detrimental to press freedom.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Once again, democracy-advocate Martin Lee went to Wash
ington, D.C., where he met with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In response to the December demonstration of Hong Kong people, the deputy spokesman for the U.S. State Department, Adam Ereli, said, 'We believe it's important to achieve universal suffrage
in Hong Kong as soon as possible, that the people of Hong Kong are ready for democracy, and that the sooner that a timetable for achieving universal suffrage is established, the better.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The deputy head of China's State Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, Liu Bainian, repeated that the PRC would not send any representative and that 'the decision to let Chen Shui-bian attend has hurt the feelings of the Chinese people, including five million Catholics.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The funeral was blacked out of China's state-controlled media, its audience left with a two-sentence report stating that it had taken place.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin continued his statement by supporting the lifting of the European embargo of arms and technology to the People's Republic of China, calling the fifteen-year embargo that started in retaliation for the Tiananmen Square Massacre 'anachronistic, wrongfully discriminatory, and in complete contradiction of the current state of the strategic partner
ship between Europe and China.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Long before they ever get there, however, they become fluent in the language of the State Department or they would never get an overseas assignment.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
State Department foreign service officers describing such meetings to the press have learned to say, 'It was a useful and constructive meeting in which a wide range of subjects were discussed.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The U.S. State Department teaches creative use of ambiguity par
ticularly when discussing a conflict between two foreign nations if there is no question that one side is to blame and the other side is guilt
less.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Richard Boucher is a State Department professional having been in the foreign service for twenty-eight years, including posts as the U.S. ambassador to Cyprus and U.S. consul general in Hong Kong at the time of handover.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
He has been a spokesman for five secretar
ies of state of both political parties.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
On March 24, 2005, ten days after the passage of China's Anti
Secession Law and two days before the scheduled demonstration in Taiwan in opposition to the Anti-Secession Law, the following
took place at the State Department.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It was a news conference with the deputy spokesman of the State Department, Adam Ereli, a for
eign service officer of sixteen years who served mainly in Middle East countries and posts in D.C. He is highly regarded and re
ceived a Meritorious Honor Award and three Superior Honor Awards at the State Department:
QUESTION: Taiwan's President Chen announced that he would join the rally to protest against China's Anti-Secession Law and all his cabinet members, including the premier, as well as all their families are encouraged to join them.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In this case there was the accusation that President Chen bent to the pressure of the U.S. State Department.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In defense of Lien Chan's trip to China, State Department dep
uty spokesman Adam Ereli said, 'We believe that steps that in
crease dialogue, support dialogue, support a peaceful resolution of
cross-strait tension are to be supported, are to be welcomed, and that's the case with this latest visit and it's, you know, we support the expansion of those kind of contacts.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, seemed to sup
port at least part of the first sentence of the State Department statement by saying, 'We welcome dialogue between Beijing and
major figures in Taiwan because we believe diplomacy is the only way to resolve the cross-strait issue,' then he added, 'but we hope that this is the start of Beijing finding new ways to reach out to President Chen Shui-bian and his cabinet because any long-term solution can only be found if Beijing negotiates with the duly elected leadership in Taiwan.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The State Department was not the author of that added statement.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
By Friday, April 29, the White House, the State Department, as well as supporters and critics of Taiwan's President Chen were put into the background.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
If he finds turning the country into a normal and independent sovereign state a burden, he might want to consider withdrawing from the party.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
As city mayors and county magistrates of the Republic of China (ROC) we have gathered here to make a clear state
ment to the world and to register our discontent and protest on behalf of the grassroots citizens of Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
We maintain that
Mainland
China should clearly understand that the Republic of China has been a sovereign state since 1912, and that status remains unchanged.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The U.S State Department made no New Years resolution at all.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
At the news briefing in which the statement was read, Adam Ereli, the deputy spokesman for the State Department, added in explanation, 'We're issuing this in the wake of some comments by President Chen in Taiwan that we don't want to be inflammatory or send the wrong signal, so we thought it useful to reiterate U.S. policy on the subject.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Clifford Hart of the U.S. State Department and Dennis Wilder of the National Security Coun
cil came to Taipei and met with President Chen.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Soon thereafter, the State Department's Adam Ereli said that Taiwan should 'publicly correct the record and unambiguously affirm it did not abolish the National Unification Council, did not change the status quo, and that the assurances remain in effect.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
As U.S. State De
partment deputy spokesman Adam Ereli put it with a valid sense of triumph, 'The United States opposes any unilateral change from the status quo.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Imagine the panic that would have been caused in the State De
partment if an order had been made for the new year that the phrases 'unilateral change' and 'status quo' were to be struck
from further use within the department.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Maybe it would even call for the cancellation of the State De
partment.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Along
with the demonstrations, which were attended most heavily by the Kuomintang Party, came the allegation that President Chen was him
self corrupt and responsible for undocumented use of state funds.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Therefore, it delighted the Kuomintang, it delighted the U.S. State Department, and it delighted President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Why do we retain such a demand that ignores the facts? The State Department authored that continuing demand because of the
People's
Republic of China's insistence there should be no change.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Somewhere, sometime in the international arena it should be candidly admitted that there was a deliberate State Department misinterpretation given to the Shanghai Communique, and that
misinterpretation served as the basis for the forthcoming Carter and Reagan communiques.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wisely said, 'We are concerned about the military balance and have said to China that they should do nothing militarily to provoke Taiwan.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick picked up on the atti
tude coming from above and said we warned the EU not to end their embargo of technology and weapons to China: 'If there ever
were a point where there were some conflict or danger and Euro
THE POLICY OF POSTPONEMENT
pean equipment helped kill American men and women in conflict, that would not be good for the relationship.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In June 2005, State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack had said: 'Sixteen years after the brutal and tragic events of Tiananmen Square, we still remember the many Chinese citizens
killed, detained, or missing in connection with the protests.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Most important of all was a statement Secretary of State Rice made in Cairo on June 25, 2005: 'For 60 years my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region,
here in the Middle East, and we achieved neither.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
['We' undoubt
edly meant the State Department.]
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
[The first three words were the same as 2001 but four years after that 2001 interview, his answer expanded into State Department-trained ambiguity.]
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Neither stop was permitted by the U.S. State Department, rejecting any transit point within the conterminous area of the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
On June 28, 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a measure (through an amendment to a funding bill for the State De
partment and other government entities) that would prevent any
spending on banning Taiwan officials from the White House and the State Department, and prevent any prohibitions of U.S. officials attending Taiwan National Day celebrations, prevent any prohibi
tions of senior military officials from visiting Taiwan, and prohibit funding on other prohibitions between the United States and Tai
wan, including how to compose a 'thank-you' note to officials from Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The U.S. State Department agreed with Jiang Yu and not with the U.S. House of Representatives.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
A senior State Department offi
cial announced: 'The administration is opposed to this measure be
cause it interferes with the president's prerogative to conduct our foreign relations.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Why is Taiwan not entitled to a state of its own while the Palestinian Authority is entitled to a state of its own? Mak-
TAIWAN: THE THREATENED DEMOCRACY
ing the contradictory policies more incoherent is that while Taiwan has no ambition to take over China, much of the Palestinian Author
ity has the admitted ambition to take over Israel.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
One of the great incompatibilities of U.S. foreign policy, authored and consistently encouraged by the State Department to administra
tions of both major parties, is that while we insist on a 'one state'
('one China') solution to the conflict between Taiwan and China, we insist on a 'two state' solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In President George W. Bush's second inaugural address and in his 2005 State of the Union address he embarked upon the
grandest pursuit of mankind: for everyone in the world to be free from smothering governments who steal people's God-given birth
right-liberty.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
U.S.), 169
Chan, Anson (Civil Service Chief, Hong Kong), 92,105
Chang King-yuh (Chairman, Mainland Affairs Council), 83
Chang, Albert, 96,104
Chen Shui-bian (President, Taiwan), 61,132
demand for resignation, 161 dollar diplomacy of, 110 fear expressed by, 62 Freedom Award presented to, 116 Hart/Ereli meeting with, 159 humiliation by U.S., 168-69 meeting with Ma Ying-jeou, 149 National Unification Council
abolition disowned by, 159 New Year (2006) speech, 155-56 on death of John Paul II, 115-16 on Taiwan name-change issue, 72 ongoing scandal problems, 161 relinquishing of power, 161 scandal apology by, 156
second inaugural address, 65 State Department challenge, 6 unification statement by, 157 Cheri s Four No's, 61, 62-663
Cheng An-Kuo (Taiwan representative, Hong Kong), 89
Chi Haotian (PRC Minister of Defense), 60
Chian Pin-kung (Vice Chairman, KNIT Party), 131
Chiang Chmg-kuo (son of Chiang Kai
shek), 26
martial law ended by, 44
Six Assurances relief for, 43114 Chiang Kai-Shek
and KNIT, 12 death of, 26 Mao Tse-Tong overthrow of, 11
on PRC as common enemy, 20 ROC rulership of, 10
Taiwan position of, 24 U.S. support of, 26 Chiang Pin-kung, 80
Chien, Eugene (Foreign Affairs Minister, Taiwan), 70
Chinese Communist Party (CCP),12, 12,83 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 98
Ching Cheong,100,101 Chirac, Jacque, 66-67 Chou En-lai (Premier, PRC),13, 13,26 Chow Shu-kai (ROC Foreign Minister), 20
Civic Party, Hong Kong 104 Clinton, Bill
Beijing visit of, 52
human rights comments, 48 MFN trade status waffling, 47-48 nuclear agreement with Jiang Zemiri s, 52
PRC piracy threats by, 51 PRC's state terrorism attempts thwarted by, 49
reaction to Lee's interview, 60 Shanghai alarming statement, 53 State Department influence on, 3 Clinton, Bill:, 60
Committee to Protect journalists, 100 Common Aspirations for Peaceful Cross-strait Development Communique,133 Communiques.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
See
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Offices
Cox, Christopher, 55,94 Creative ambiguity Boucherinterview, 124-28 Ereli interview, 128-29 of State Department, 123 DAB.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
See Democratic Progressive Party Eagleburger, Lawrence, 45 Eisenhower, Dwight, 123 Emergency Decrees (of 1949), 44 Emperor of China, 9
agreement with Great Britain, 42 agreement with Japan, 42
Epoch
Times newspaper, 99,104 Ereli, Adam, 71,103,128-29 non-unification position, 159 support of Lien Chan's PRC trip, 132
European Union (EU)
and Anti-Secession Law, 77-78 and human rights, 163
arms embargo by, 66-67, 166 Falun Gong spiritual group, 56,90, 92, 94
Five Tasks agreement (Lien Chang lu Jintao),133
Ford, Gerald, 41 Foreign Service officers language training for, 123 stability belief of, 4 Freedom Award, to Chen Shui-bian, 116
Freedom of speech, in Hong Kong 86 General Assembly (UN) Resolution, on PRC membership/ROC expulsion, 18-19
Gibson, Charles, 4 Goldwater, Barry, 32,38-39 Good Morning America, 4 Goss, Porter, 7
Great Britain
Emperor of China agreement, 42 Hong Kong handover by, 59 reaction to Anti-Secession Law, 77-78
Great Leap Forward (Mao Ts,-tong), 13
INDEX
Hand to Hand to Protect Taiwan Alliance, 80
Handover, of Hong Kong Anniversary Celebration, 106 by Great Britain, 85 Handover Night, 106
Hart, Clifford (State Department), 159 Ho, Alex, 97
Hong Kong
Adaptation of Laws Act, 87 Bill of Rights, 86
DAB of, 95
demonstrations in, 89, 94, 97-98 entities comprising, 83-85
Epoch Times
break-in/closure, 99, 104
Falun Gong denied visas, 92, 94 freedom of press/speech policies, 86,90
Great Britain's handover of, 59 Handover Night, 85,106 John Paul Il barred from, 89 Legislature substitution, 87 radio show hosts resignation, 96 striking down labor laws in, 87 universal suffrage demonstration, 102
Hong Kong; 83,84,86-108
Hsiu-Ben Lu, Annette (Vice President, Taiwan), 61, 91,136
Hu Jintao (President, PRC)
Chen Shui-biari s invitation to, 134 detention of Tiananmen Square Massacre families, 66
helped by State Department, 6 Lien Chan's visit to, 131, 133 meeting with Bush in Beijing, 141 New Year's unification resolution, 158
panda gifts of, 133 PRC praised by, 97 presidential victory of PRC, 63 signing of Anti-Secession Bill, 76 speech aimed at Bush, 140-41 U.S. taken advantage of by, 6 warnings to Taiwan, 76
Hu, Jason, 173
Hua Kuo-feng (Premier, PRC), 26 Human rights violations Clinton's comments, 48 growth of, 55
McCormack on PRC's, 166 resolution withdrawal, 51 Wolf on PRC's, 169
Human Rights Watch 88
IAEA.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
26, 39,45
Liberty, as Bush (George W.) theme, 1 Lien Chan (Chairman, KMT Party), 80 Beijing University speech, 134 Hu Jintao meeting, 131, 133
trip to PRC, 131, 132 Lincoln, Abraham, 10
Little Red Book of Quotations
(Mao Tse
tung), 13
Liu Chieh (ROC UN Ambassador), 20 Liu Jianchao (Foreign Ministry Spokesman, PRC),114
Liu Xinhong (Bishop), 105 Ma Ying-jeou
appointment as justice Minister, 147
Chen's offer to meet with, 149 Defense Procurement Bill problems, 149
desire to do business with PRC, 149 election victory, 146, 147 previous action explanation, 131, 132
response to unification statement, 157
Ma Yinglin (Bishop), 105
Macau, Portugal's handover of, 59 Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan, 83 Manchu (Qing) Dynasty; 10
Mao Tse-tung anger at UN, 15 Great Leap Forward of, 13 overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek, 11 Soviet hegemony complaints, 23 threat of Taiwan takeover, 12, 13 Martial law, ended by Chiang Ching
kuo, 44
McClellan, Scott, 76,132 McCormack Sean (State Dept.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
imperialism, 20 Portugal's handover of Macau, 59
INDEX
pressuring of Benedict XVI, 117 pressuring WTO against Taiwan, 60
religious intolerance, 114,115 rocket motor testing, 52 ruling succession, 26
state terrorism efforts, 49 Suharto's break with, 15 superpower status, 53 Taiwan investment funding.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
as State Department annoyances, 2-3, 3
Public Broadcasting System, 5 Putin, Vladimir, support of PRC, 76 Qian Qichen (Vice-Premier, PRC, 90 Qian Xiaoyang.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
96
Raffarin, Pierre (Prime Minister, France), 117
Anti-Secession Bill support, 119
lifting arms embargo support, 119 Reagan Communique, 42 13,165 Reagan, Ronald
election of, 41
State Department lack of influence on, 3
Red Regina.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
See
Ip, Regina Refugees, flee China for Taiwan, 70 Reporters Without Borders, 100-101 Republic of China (ROC), 9
Bush on UN exclusion, 18 Chiang Kai-shek rulership, 10 Mayor's response to Anti
Secession Bill, 150-52 name change, 69 opposition to PRC support in UN, 18
UN role of, 18 Republic of Vietnam and Shanghai Communique, 23 name change, 69
Rice, Condoleeza
Lee's (Martin) meeting with, 102 on PRO's non-provocation of Taiwan, 166
Secretary of State nomination, 8 State Department changes by, 5 support for democracy, 167
ROC.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
U.S.), 169 Roosevelt, Theodore, 53
Rose, Charlie, 5 Russia
and Six-Power Talks, 6 reaction to Chen s unification statement, 157-58
Salim Ahmed Salim (Tanzanian Ambassador), 20
San Francisco Peace Treaty, 9 Scandal
Chen s apology for, 156
C hen's ongoing problem, 161 in DPP, 145-46 Schroeder,Gerhard,66-67 Scowcroft, Brent, 45
INDEX
second inaugural address (Chen Shui
bian), 65
second inaugural address (George W. Bush)
liberty theme, 1, 171
worldwide disagreement with, 1-2 September 11, 2001 attacks, 6
Sha Kukang (PRC UN Ambassador), 150
Shanghai Communique, 23-26 and Pakistan/India dispute, 23 and State Department, 25, 165 and Vietnam, 23
Carter's misuse of, 31 stance on Taiwan/PRC, 25 Shen, Louis, imprisonment of, 114 Sheng Hua-ren, 96
Shi Tao (journalist), 100-101
Shih Ming-teh (DPP, former chairman), 161
Shimonoseki Treaty, 9 Silkworm missiles, 55 Six Assurances (of Reagan), 4
3-44
Six-Power Talks, 6,141
Soong, James, 80,134
South China Morning Post
newspaper, 104
South Korea
and Six-Power Talks, 6
Bush APEC speech on Taiwan, 139 displeasure at Nixon's trip, 23 South Vietnam, displeasure at Nixon s trip, 23
Soviet Union
Mao's complaints against, 23 outward praise for Nixon's trip, 23 Suharto's break with, 15
Spain, and jurisdiction of Taiwan, 69 Speeches/statements.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
See
also
second inaugural address (Chen Shui-bran); second inaugural address (George W. Bush)
Chen Shui-bran, New Year, 155-56 Hu Jintao, aimed at Bush (George W.), 140-41
Lien Chan, Beijing University, 134
of Bush, 139,140-41,165,167-68 on freedom of speech policies, 86 Rice, on democracy, 167
State Department (U.S.)
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
First Edition
ISBN 13-Digit 978-0-9778984-2-8 ISBN 10-Digit 0-9778984-2-3 LCCN 2006933774
Printed in the United States of America
10987654321
CONTENTS
PREFACE ..................................................................................................
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Between those forty-one years were a host of trips to Taiwan as political events changed in the United States and in Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
During those forty-one years, there were also countless discus
sions and forums regarding Taiwan at home in the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
(Those two cities are often used just as Washington, D.C., is often used instead of saying 'the government of the United States of America.')
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It was to be the second-term inaugural of Presi
dent George W. Bush and the first presidential inauguration since the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States of America.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
'It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world ...
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Its prominence in both fields has been enhanced by investment and trade with those in free countries including the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
They had failed in their
four decades of attempting to bring about 'peaceful coexistence' between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The deputy secretary was asked, 'Where is the landmines-in terms of China's rise and the United States? What has to-.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
TAIWAN: THE THREATENED DEMOCRACY
The attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., and the sky
jacked airliner that was brought down by passengers over Pennsyl
vania's Somerset County before it could hit another target, were a declaration of war against the United States by Islamist revolution
aries.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In one morning 2,973 people were killed in those attacks on United States territory leaving thousands more with physical inju
ries, the grief of the countless, and other psychological casualties that will never be able to be calculated.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Defeat in this war would be the end of the United States and, in fact, the end of modern civilization.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
One of the many changes was in striving for a status quo to be maintained in all possible armed conflicts other than the war against Islamist terrorism, so that the energy of the United States
would be cohesive against the current threat.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Hu Jintao, president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) knew how to take advantage of the position of the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
He gave the public impression that he was on the side of the United
States in its war against Islamist terrorism while his nation was supplying military supplies and technology to governments sup
porting Islamist terrorists.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
His prime card was agreeing to 'take the lead' in what became known as the Six-Power Talks (the United States, Japan, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and China) 'to re
duce the nuclear threat of North Korea.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
General Xiong
TAIWAN: THE THREATENED DEMOCRACY
Guangkai of the People's Republic of China gave a clear warning that the People's Republic of China could launch ICBMs on the United States if the U.S. came to the defense of the people on Tai
wan during an attempt of China to take Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The Defense Intelligence Agency had earlier estimated that China had a total of 157 nuclear warheads that could be used on short-range, medium-range, and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It would make more sense for Great Britain's prime minister to claim the United States of America as a renegade province of the United Kingdom.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Sun Yat-sen was a great admirer of those things he knew about the United States of America, and particularly about Abraham Lincoln.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In the order itemized in the U.N. Charter those five nations were: 'The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America' (Chapter 5, Article 23 of the Charter).
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States correctly perceived the loss of Chiang's ability to retain his government over China as a catastrophic downfall of a friend and ally in World War II.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
There was no dispute in the United States among major candi
dates or political parties that Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary govern
ment should not be recognized by the United States as the legal gov
ernment of China, and that the U.S. recognition of the Republic of China should remain unchanged, as it was ousted by force.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Although there was no public dialogue between the United States and the People's Republic of China, there was a private and secret link for communications through U.S. Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The announcement I shall now read is being is
sued simultaneously in Peking and in the United States:
'Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations be
tween the two countries and also to exchange views on ques
tions of concern to the two sides.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
I have taken this action because of my profound conviction that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the United States and the Peo
ple's Republic of China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States accordingly will support action at the General Assembly this fall calling for seating the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
At the same time the United States will op
pose any action to expel the Republic of China or otherwise deprive it representation in the United Nations.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Our consul
tations have also shown that any action to deprive the Re
public of China of its representation would meet strong op
position in the General Assembly, Certainly, as I have said, the United States will oppose it.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Thus, the United States will cooperate with those who, what
ever their view on the status of the relationship of the two governments, wish to continue to have the Republic of China represented in the United Nations...
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
As expected, the Republic of China on Taiwan was strongly op
posed to United States support for seating the People's Republic of China in the U.N., but what was unexpected was the statement of the People's Republic of China saying the United States was con
tinuing 'to obstruct the restoration to the People's Republic of China of all her legitimate rights in the U.N. and insists on being the enemy of the Chinese people.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
On October 18,
1971,
four months prior to President Nixon s scheduled trip to Peking, the annual debate in the U.N. began, but po
sitions of most member states were already known.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It was apparent
that the majority of states would vote for Taiwan to be expelled from the organization.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
U.S. ambassador Bush called the vote a 'moment of infamy,' the first time the word 'infamy' was publicly used to describe an international incident by an official of the United States government since President Roosevelt said '...a
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The Soviet Union publicly praised President Nixon's trip but it was common knowledge that Soviet general secretary Leonid Brezhnev was wary of any handshakes between the United States and the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It was, as he called it, 'tri
angulation' between those two powers, using the United States as the third comer of the triangle while retaining U.S. diplomatic rela
tions with the ROC and not giving diplomatic relations to the PRC.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Within the United States there was considerable debate be
tween those who praised President Nixon's trip and those who opposed it.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Prior to the release of the Shanghai Communique, President Nixon told China's premier Chou En-lai that the United States did not support the independence movement of Taiwan, (which, at the
time, the government of Taiwan itself prohibited to the point of jail
ing such Taiwanese proponents of independence) but if the call for independence should come about, President Nixon said the United States did not have the authority to prevent it.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
As President Nixon later recalled (as close as possible to his words): 'The words expressed in our Shanghai Communique were not about U.S. policy but a statement of different views held by the
United States on one side and the Peoples Republic of China on the other side regarding a number of issues-not of agreements between our two sides, but statements of our sides position and statements of their side's position and they were labeled in the communique as such-as exactly that' He went on to read the communique.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The part of the communique pertaining to Taiwan was 'The U.S. side declared: the United States
acknowledges
(not our policy but an acknowledgment of the truth as it existed then) that all
Chinese
(meaning those Chinese who came to Taiwan, and the Chinese represented by the People's Republic of China-not the native Taiwanese or we would have used the
THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE
word 'people' instead of 'Chinese') on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Tai
wan is a part of China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States govern
ment does not challenge that position.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Out of that intentional misinterpretation that became more pro
nounced as the years went on, the United States government adopted the position that the People's Republic of China is the legal govern
ment of China and Taiwan is part of the People's Republic of China, a statement that had never been made in the U.S. position as given or intended or anticipated or written in the Shanghai Communique.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
I would like to read a joint communique which is being simultaneously issued in Peking at this very moment by the leaders of the People's Republic of China:
'A Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the Peo
ple's Republic of China, January
1, 1979.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
'The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January
1, 1979.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
'The United States recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
'Within this context the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
'The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique of
1972
and emphasize once again that both sides wish to reduce the danger of intema
tional military conflict.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
'Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any other third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
'The government of the United States of America acknowl
edges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
'The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange ambassadors and establish embassies on March 1,1979.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
As the United States asserted in the Shanghai Communique of 1972 issued on President Nixon's historic visit, we will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
To strengthen and to expedite the benefits of this new relationship between China and the United States, I am pleased to an
nounce that Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping [Deng Xiaoping]
A SURPRISE UNDER THE CHRISTMAS TREE
has accepted my invitation and will visit Washington at the end of January.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The normalization of relations between the United States and China has no other purpose than the advancement of peace.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Most noticeable in President Carter's communique was the way in which the Shanghai Communique of President Nixon was mis
used as the basis for his own communique: the Carter Communique read, 'The United States of America and the People's Republic of China affirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The Shanghai Communique was clear in not stating 'principles' nor was there a statement within the Shanghai Com
munique of the United States and the PRC agreement on this issue.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Worst of all were the assertions in President Carter's statement that 'The United States recognizes the government
of
the People's Republic
of
China as the sole legal government of China ...
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part
of
China.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
(Years after the Carter Communique, the third Joint Communique, agreed upon on August 17, 1982, during the Reagan administration, repeated the Carter Communique by recording: 'In the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Rela
tions on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, the United States of America recognized the Government of the People's Re
public of China as the sole legal Government of China, and it ac
knowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China....')
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Taiwan s President Chiang Ching-kuo
said: 'Now that it has broken the assurances and abrogated the [Mutual Defense] Treaty, the United States government cannot be expected to have the confidence of any free nation in the future.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
He said the initiative of President Carter was 'an unwise and horri
ble move' and that the United States had 'never severed its rela
tions with a friendly country.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
A SURPRISE UNDER THE CHRISTMAS TREE
On April 10, 1979, an angry majority of the 96th United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It stated that:
The President, having terminated governmental relations be
tween the United States and the governing authorities on Tai
wan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this
AM
is necessary to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific, and to promote the foreign pol
icy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan...
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States will make available to Taiwan such de
fense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self
defense capability.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The President and the Con
gress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in re
sponse to any such danger.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Within hours the Senate did take action, voting 59 to 35 in a Sense of the Senate Resolution (non-binding) that the U.S. Senate must approve the termination of any 'Mutual Defense Treaty be
tween the United States and another nation.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Judge Gasch ordered a prohibition of complet
ing the abrogation: 'At least under the circumstances of this case, involving a mutual defense treaty with a faithful ally who has not violated the terms of the agreement, and the validity of which has not otherwise been destroyed, any decision of the United States to terminate that treaty must be made with the advice and consent of the Senate or the approval of both Houses of the Congress.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
For most of those in the United States it was difficult to share that kind of admiration: he was vice premier of the People's Republic of China in 1952 while the Korean War was being waged with the PRC aiding (and even saving) North Korea.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The grandest gift Deng Xiaoping received was in the Christmas season of 1978 when President Carter traded away diplomatic rela
tions between the United States and Taiwan for diplomatic relations
between the United States and the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
ENDORSEMENTS
N 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected president of the United States, followed in 1988 by the election of George Herbert Walker Bush.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
His vice president and a future president of the United States, George Herbert Walker Bush, also had a strong history as the U.S. representative to the United Nations who fought for Taiwan's seat in the U.N.'s General Assembly.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
(He was later appointed by President Ford to be the first Chief United States Liaison Officer in Peking, which might have influenced his later more amicable feel
ings toward the PRC.)
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In addition to the previously mentioned part of the Reagan Communique, it also read in part:
Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's intemal affairs consti
tute the fundamental principles guiding United States-China
ENDORSEMENTS
relations.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States attaches a great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infring
ing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or inter
fering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States would not alter the terms of the Tai
wan Relations Act.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States would not consult with China in ad
vance before making decisions about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States would not mediate between Taiwan and China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan, which was that the question was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would not pressure Taiwan into negotiations with China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
After the massacre, President Bush announced sanctions against China with a suspension of military equipment, a suspen
sion of government-to-government trade, an extension of visas for Chinese students already in the United States, and a suspension of any high-level meetings between officials of the United States and the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
On November 3, 1992, candidate Clinton was elected president of the United States, and he was inaugurated on January 20, 1993.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
One year later, on May 3, 1994, during the annual review of MFN status, President Clinton said, 'I do not seek, nor would it be proper, for the United States or any other nation to tell a great na
tion like China how to conduct all its internal affairs or treat all its citizens, or what laws it should have.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In retaliation for that journey to the United States, the People's Re
public of China launched missile tests in waters near Taiwan and recalled its ambassador to the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The People's Republic of China warned the United States not to interfere in what was an 'internal affair,' but President Clinton did not follow the more common and weak procedure of ambiguity.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
That meant billions of dollars in new tariffs on a host of items imported to the United States from China, including textiles, synthetic fiber apparel, cosmetics, and auto parts.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Under such a threat, the government of the People's Republic of China stopped allowing such internal piracy (at least temporarily) and therefore the increased tariffs did not need to be imposed by
the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
On March 13, 1998, the United States announced it would no longer sponsor a resolution to condemn the human rights violations of the People's Republic of China before the United Nations Com
mission on Human Rights, as it had every year since the Tiananmen Square Massacre.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The resolution had not passed over the years, but the U.S. sponsorship of it was a powerful statement of concern by the people of the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Therefore it became an equally powerful statement when the United States discontinued sponsor
ing that annual attempt.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
That resolution was one of the only re
maining cornerstones of the human rights policy of the United States toward the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In 2006 this was revised to 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles 'capable of hitting the United States.')
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It was later learned that during President Clinton's visit, the People's Republic of China test-fired a DF-31 solid-fuel rocket motor that was part of their de
velopment of its newest road-mobile solid fueled intercontinental ballistic missile that could hit the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States and the Soviet Union were labeled as the two superpowers during the decades of the Cold War.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Shortly after President Clinton's trip to China, on July 22, 1998, the Most Favored Nation's name for trade status in the United States was changed to Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR).
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The author wrote, 'We
must get this straight once and for all: there is no such thing as hav
ing purely economic relations with the totalitarian states.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
While there has been expansion in the width of some wallets, those individual financial gains have not been expansive for the United States as a whole.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
MFN and Permanent Normal Trade Status
with the People's Republic of China has brought an average tariff of approximately 4 percent charged by the U.S. on goods from China entering the United States compared to 30-50 percent charged by the PRC for U.S. goods entering China.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
During the year of 2005 the PRC enjoyed a surplus in trade with the United States of over 200 billion U.S. dollars.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
According to 'The Na
tional Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the Peo
ple's Republic of China Select Committee of the United States House of Representatives', better known as the Christopher Cox Committee, the People's Republic of China sold Iran significant numbers of 90-mile range CSS-8 ballistic missiles, along with asso
ciated support and guidance and telemetry components, and also provided assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons program.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
China's government continues to defend its support of Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge of the 1970s, the Tiananmen Square Massacre of the 1980s, and missile sales to rogue states of the 1990s into the twenty-first century.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Once President Carter gave diplomatic rela
tions to the People's Republic of China, the United States had little left with which to give or hold back on a diplomatic level.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
President Clinton phoned China's president Jiang Zemin to as
sure him that the United States retained a 'one China' policy.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
He was now becoming dependent on pleasing President Jiang Zemin, who was targeting Taiwan with missiles, and pleasing President Clinton, who had given his version of the 'Three No's,' and called the PRC 'the stra
tegic partner of the United States.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States also opposed the referendum.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
How could the United States oppose a democratic government asking its people through a referendum if they would endorse a proposed policy of that government? Just weeks before the Bush
Wen meeting, President Bush had said, 'When India's democracy was imperiled in the 1970s, the Indian people showed their com
mitment to liberty in a national referendum that saved their form of government.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
On the day President Bush made his anti-referendum statement to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo, a senior administration official added that in private discussions, President Bush had told Premier
Wen that the United States would intervene on behalf of Taiwan should China use force against Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The requirements of an independent nation by the Convention and Rights and Duties of States (December 26, 1933) mandate that such a political entity must have a defined territory, a permanent
TAIWAN: THE THREATENED DEMOCRACY
population, a government, and the capability of entering into rela
tions with other states.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It was obvious but not admitted by most nations of the world, including the United States, that Taiwan now existed under 'The Three Realities':
1.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Since the international community, including the United States, stresses a 'one China' policy, such a name should be celebrated.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In truth, it is an honor to be kicked out of the U.N. (the United States should have that good luck) and Taiwan should never humiliate itself by trying to get back into an organiza
tion from which it was ejected.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The changes were obviously meant to pacify both the People's Republic of China and the United States, setting requirements unlikely to be achieved: changes could only come about if three
fourths of the legislature passes an amendment, and then in a na
tional referendum the amendment receives 50 percent (plus one) of the approval of all
eligible
voters rather than 50 percent (plus one) of all those
voting.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The acting secretary general of Japan's ruling party said that 'it would be wrong for us to send a signal to China that the United States and Japan will watch and tolerate China's military invasion of Taiwan.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Two days after the PRC's Anti-Secession Bill became law, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning it, stating the passage of that law changed 'the status quo in the re
gion and thus is of grave concern to the United States.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Even clearer was another warning by President Bush: if Europe ended its embargo of weapons and technology to the People's Re
public of China it could 'bring to Asia, the weapons of Europe be
ing opposite the weapons of the United States.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In front of President Chen was a sea of people waving flags of Taiwan along with flags of the United States and Japan in recognition of the new U.S.-Japan Joint Agree
ment that called for security in the Taiwan Strait as a common stra
tegic objective.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Similar to and more stringent than the Logan Act of the United States, Taiwan's Article 113 of their Criminal Code bans unauthorized political parties and private citizens from negotiating agreements with foreign governments under risk of being charged with treason.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
One was from the United States, one from Japan, and one from Macau.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In reaction, China warned the United States to stop meddling in its internal affairs.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
THE OFFER OF ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS
Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China, Qin Gang, responded to the United States by saying: 'Hong Kong affairs are China's domestic affairs, and do not allow for any foreign intervention.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
TAIWAN: THE THREATENED DEMOCRACY
In June of 2003 she resigned in the wake of massive demonstrations against Article 23 and went to the United States for three years.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Perhaps most surprising and worst of all was the January 2005 decision of Grenada, a nation that had been liberated from a com
munist coup in 1983 by the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Most nations of the world, including democracies-even includ
ing the United States-treat elected officials of Taiwan as pariahs who look through our windows, but can't come in.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
All of that happened long before the communist government took over, but the communist government states that the
TAIWAN: THE THREATENED DEMOCRACY
missionaries 'were executed for violation of Chinese laws during the invasion of China by imperialists and colonialists.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
That's been a very consistent position
of
the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The solved dilemma of diplomatic protocol in China and the in
creasing discord in Taiwan was matched by the predictable division in the government of the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Decades back, similar disunity in the United States brought about the defeat of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In the cur
rent decade the United States is suffering from political domestic disunity in fighting the war against Islamist terrorism.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In the conflict between the People's Republic of China and Tai
wan, disunity is running rampant: President Chen Shui-bian craves approval from everyone; Taiwan's major out-of-power politicians crave power; profiteers throughout the world crave business in China; and the United States craves a policy of ambiguity.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States will continue to stress the need for dialogue between China and Taiwan
that leads to a peaceful resolution
of their differences.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States will continue to stress the need for dialogue between China and Taiwan that leads to a peaceful resolution of their differences.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The United States will continue to stress the need for dialogue between China and Taiwan that leads to a ...
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
His most recent meeting with the Peo
ple's Republic of China's president Hu Jintao had been brief, just
two months earlier in New York at the Waldorf Astoria when both presidents were in New York for the sixtieth anniversary of the U.N. In that meeting, both presidents had appeared at what was meant to be a photo opportunity and a welcome to the United States by President Bush and a gracious thank-you by President Hu.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
I hope that the United States will join the
A SHORT TRIP
Chinese side in safeguarding peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, and opposing so-called Taiwan independence.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
President Bush did not respond to that but instead thanked President Hu for 'taking the lead' in the Six-Power (United States, Japan, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and China) Nuclear Dis
armament Talks regarding North Korea.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Having a successful resolution coming from the Six-Power Talks is, most likely, not why the United States wants China in
volved in the Six-Party Talks.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Prime among them was the 1994 Advanced Framework Agreement that called for North Korea to freeze its nuclear weapons program and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] safeguards if the United
TAIWAN: THE THREATENED DEMOCRACY
States, Japan, and South Korea would provide two light-water nu
clear plants that were 'proliferation-resistant' to replace its graphite
moderated nuclear plants.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
An agreement made with North Korea might well be more harm
ful to the United States than not having any agreement at all, since the North Korean government has no hesitancy to sign an interna
tional agreement with every intention of violating its own signature.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Back then, all sides agreed that the United States would pro
vide fuel oil pending the construction of the reactors (as well as other aid to North Korea).
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
In a 2003 discussion, this one with the United States and China in Beijing, North Korean officials said they possessed nuclear weapons.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The guest from the United States told Chairman Ma that many of the most ardent long-time supporters of Taiwan in Washington, D.C., were becoming less supportive because of the actions of his Kuomintang political party.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
The Defense Procurement Bill (already rejected forty-one times and re
jected fifteen more times by the end of June 2006) was to accept the United States' offer of six Patriot PAC-3 Missile Defense System bat
teries, eight diesel-powered submarines, and twelve P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
That must be remembered by citizens of Taiwan and the United States: the Kuomintang came to power without democracy and lost that power in the 2000 election after President Lee, the unique Kuomintang de
mocracy-advocate who won the first direct election for the presi
dency did not run again.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
If someone doesn't know, then that person should write a list of those policies Beijing wants the people of Taiwan to reject (such as putting to a vote whether or not to change the name from the Republic of China; changing the names of public enterprises; rewriting the constitution should the people of Taiwan vote for changes in the constitution; other referenda for the people's approval or disapproval; abolition of
TAIWAN: THE THREATENED DEMOCRACY
the National Unification [with China] Council; the purchase of de
fense items from the United States or elsewhere; Taiwanese appear
ing in demonstrations that protest Beijing's warnings of non-peaceful means to unify; or independence-or add anything else that is op
posed by Beijing).
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Recent reports on the military power of the People's Republic of China, published by the United States and Japan respec
tively, have made it very clear that China's military devel
opment evidently exceeds the reasonable scope of its defense needs.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It issued its usual statement emphasizing that the United States 'does
NEW YEAR'S RESOLUTIONS
not support Taiwan's independence and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either Taiwan or Beijing.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
As far as U.S. is concerned-United States is concerned, our policy towards this issue hasn't changed.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
We think
it's important that both sides engage in dialogue and that there be
and very importantly, I think it's-I want to underscore this-the United States opposes any unilateral change to the status quo by either side.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
CHAPTER TWENTY
THE POLICY OF POSTPONEMENT
T
HE UNITED STATES has long had a Policy of Postponement regarding China's threat to Taiwan, and even a Policy of Post
ponement regarding China's potential of becoming a superpower hostile to the United States while that potential has continued to enlarge.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Unfortunately, just as in the United States, many businesspeople of the EU have a greater interest in exporting products and importing banknotes than they have for the human rights of others.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
But the United States main
tains the same (or worse) policies we observed prior to those events.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
With the Anti-Secession Law passed by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China making a very loud and unambiguous warning of possible 'non-peaceful means' to take over Taiwan, the U.S. Policy of Postponement could enter a new and more dangerous phase if China and the rest of the world be
lieves the United States is willing to
continue
that postponement no matter the PRC's cross-strait warnings.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
There should be no argument that the United States must
win the war against Islamist terrorism.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
But to ignore such extreme changes in the status quo by the People's Republic of China that could endanger the United States at China's timing makes a travesty of our China
Taiwan policy.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Jiang Yu, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said, 'Approving this draft bill is a serious violation of the fundamental principles of bilateral relations' and that it was contrary to the 'one China' policy of the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
And while Taiwan is pro-United States, much of the Palestinian Authority is adamantly opposed to the United States.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
By the United States and other nations holding to the vo
cabulary of the past, the policy complicates what has been a very simple reality since at least 1991.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
It is no less than outrageous that the United States government opposes Taiwan removing from its constitution that it is the legal government of China (because it would change the status quo).
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Similarly, most Americans have descen
dants that were not Americans, but do they want the country of their grandparents, or even further back, to be the country with
THE POLICY OF POSTPONEMENT
whom they 'unite'-and have that foreign government as their own government, rather than the United States? Our policy does not indicate opposition to that kind of transfer of sovereignty for the people of Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Compare China with Great Britain: Throughout most of the first half of the twentieth century there was a British Empire of sixty-two colonies and forty-five other political entities, including dominions, protectorates, associated states, as well as mandated and trust terri
tories.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
During the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, President Kennedy thrust aside all measures of ambiguity, saying, 'If any nuclear missile is launched
from Cuba
against
any nation in the Western Hemisphere,
this nation will regard it as an attack
by the Soviet Union
on the
United States.'
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
While the United States so admirably worked toward and praised Iraq for holding a referendum for their democratically ori
ented constitution on October 15, 2005, the policy of the United States opposes a referendum for a democratically oriented constitu
tion in Taiwan.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Over two centuries ago, we in the United States had Founders who held to the same convictions.
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
96th), 37,48 Consensus of 1992, 133 Contemporary Business News, 100-101 Convention and Rights and Duties of States, 65
Coordinating Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA).
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
See
Taiwan Solidarity Union Tung Chee-hwa (Chief Executive, Hong Kong), 85, 88, 91, 93, 98 U.S. Japan Joint Agreement, 75, 121 United Nations
and Taiwan name-change issue, 72 establishment of, I1
General Assembly Resolution 2758, 18-19
important question resolution, 19 Liu Chieh/Chow Shu-kai's walkout, 20
Mao Tse-tung's anger at, 15 PRC on bankruptcy of, 20 ROC role in, 18
United States (U.S.)
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
6 possible risk of war with PRC, 152 PRC on imperialism of, 2, 20 PRC's trade surplus with, 54
Sun Yat-serf s admiration for, 10 War against Islamic terrorism, 164 United States (U.S.):,
Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
In early 2005, the PRC passed an 'antisecession' law that author
ized the use of force to stop moves toward the permanent separation of Taiwan from the mainland.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
But de facto separation (or, if you prefer, de facto independence) is the status quo; the decision to change that status quo by compelling unification is in Beijing's hands.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
In the West this status, which originally was assigned by the state based on the birthplace of one's father or paternal grandfather, is typically referred to as 'ethnici
ty'' Provincial origin/ethnicity, in turn, is correlated with the concept measured by the question 'Do you consider yourself Chinese, Taiwanese, or both?' which social scientists in Taiwan call ethnic consciousness.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
In the United States, calls for a Taiwanese state reflecting Taiwanese identity ar
e
especially strong.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
They hoped to create measures that would get at the real tension in Taiwanese society: the tension between identifying with the literal homeland of Taiwan or the official (but unrealized) nation
state, China.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Evidently a large majority of Taiwanese view themselves as citizens of a state that comprises only Taiwan, while half the respondents identify Taiwan and its people as Chinese.'
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
On the one hand, they reinforce the perception that Taiwanese are not interested in unification; they believe they are citizens of a state (the survey cleverly avoids the issue of what it should be called) that exists only on Taiwan.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
In a 2004 article, Chu Yun-han analyzed data asking respondents to agree or disagree with two conditional statements: 'If Taiwan can main
tain peace with mainland China after declaring independence, Taiwan should become a new nation (state)' and 'If the social, economic, and political conditions in the mainland become comparable to Taiwan, the two sides should become unified.'
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Second, 'the ratio of
principled believers in independence
among the E-generation [roughly correspondent to the fourth generation] is not very high, despite the fact that they have been exposed more extensively to the democratization process and the state-sponsored cultural [Taiwanization] program' (Chu 2004: 504).
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Television and radio stations broadcast mostly in Mandarin; like newspapers and magazines, they were subject to tight control by the KMT party-state.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
The children of party and government officials were groomed for service in the KMT party-state.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
The state encouraged mainlanders to hold onto their faith that they would soon return home, and many parents hoped their life on Taiwan would turn out to be a temporary sojourn.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
They called for an inclusive definition of Taiwanese identity: Taiwan's independence, the young activists argued,
belongs to everyone, including Mainlanders, even the KMT According to this group, Taiwan's independence is a matter of spirit, not symbol
ism; thus, changing the flag or the name of the state is not important.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Moreover, Chu thinks it is possible that in a few decades mainland China will evolve into a state with which Taiwanese will want to be unified, so foreclosing that option now would be a mis
take.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Craig Calhoun
New York University Yuen Foong Khong
Nuffteld College, Oxford University
T.J. Cheng
The College of William and Mary Damien Kingsbury Deakin University Chu Yun-ham
Academia Sinica R William Liddle
The Ohio State University
Ralph A. Cossa
Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu Kenneth G. Lieberthal University of Michigan Harold Crouch
Australian National University Gurpreet Mahajan Jawaharlal Nehru University Neil DcVoua
Hartwick College Eugene Martin
United States Institute of Peace
June Teufel Dreyer
University of Miami Duncus McCargo University of Leeds
Donald McFetridge
Former U.S. Defense Attach€, Jakarta
Thomas McKenna SRI Consulting
Andrew Nathan Columbia University
Andrew Dros Washington College
Steven Rood
The Asia Foundation, Philippines
Danilyn Rutherford University of Chicago
Leonard Schoppa
University of Virginia, Charlottesville
Kirsten E. Schulte
London School of Economics
Emile C.J. Sheng Soochow University
Sheldon Simon Ariwna State University
David Timberman USAID, Washington, D .C.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Policy Studies
Previous Publications
continued
Policy
Studies
to
Policy Studies 2
Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is The Free Arch Movement (GAM): Anatomy
Special Autonomy the Solution? of a Separatist Organization
Rodd McGibbon, USAID, Jakarta Kinren E. Schulze, London School of Economics
Policy
Studies 9
Policy
Studies 1
The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed
NGO Mediation and Implementation Edward Aspinall, University of Sydney
Konrad Huber Council on Foreign Relations Harold Crouch, Australian National University
Policy
Studies 8
The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies
Eric Gmierrez, WaterAid, U.K.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
East-West Center
The East-West Center is an internationally recognized education and research organization established by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to strengthen understanding and relations between the United States and the countries of the Asia Pacific.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Through its programs of cooperative study, training, seminars, and research, the Center works to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia Pacific community in which the United States is a leading and valued partner.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
List of Acronyms Executive Summary Introduction
The Myth of 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
A Demographic Challenge to 'Taiwanese Nationalism' Generations in Politics: A Review of the Literature Methodology
Taiwan's Generational Politics by the Numbers Provincial Origin
National Identity and Ethnic Consciousness Generational Studies
Generation and the Independence/Unification Issue Generation and Partisanship
Generation and Views of Mainland China A Note About Salience
v vii 1 4 7 11 15 17 18 20 23 24 26 28 31
iv Shelley Rigger
A Generational Model of Taiwan Politics 34
The First Generation 34
The Second Generation 37
The Third Generation 44
The Fourth Generation 50
Implications for Cross-Strait Relations 56
Endnotes 61
Bibliography 65
Policy Studies: List of Reviewers 2005-06 7
1
Policy Studies: Previous Publications
73
List of Acronyms
DPP Democratic Progressive Party
FA PA Formosan Association for Public Affairs KMT Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) NP New Party
PFP People First Party
PRC People's Republic of China
ROC Republic of China
TNSS Taiwan National Security Survey
TSU Taiwan Solidarity Union
U.S. United States
Executive Summary
A peaceful, amicable relationship between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) is essential to prosperity and security in and beyond the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism:
Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
The notion that the Taiwan Strait is one of the world's most dangerous places has great currency in the United States today, and for good reason.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Especially in the United States, there is concern that as mainland China's economic, political, and military power grows, Beijing will once again make unifi
cation a priority.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
reflect a profound shift in public opinion on this island of 23 million, one that poses a challenge for both China and the United States.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
[Pan 2004: A-13); emphasis added]
The
Post
article typifies the discourse on Taiwanese identity in the United States.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Not long after the DPP was founded, how
ever, political scientists began applying theories and methods developed to study partisanship in the United States to Taiwan's electorate.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Most Western governments-led by the United States-accepted the ROC'S claim to be the legitimate government of all China.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
In the 1950s and 1960s, dissidents living in exile in the United States and Japan organ
ized a movement to throw off the KMT by declaring Taiwan an independ
ent republic, thereby removing the ROC government's justification for keeping Taiwan under the thumb of its 'emergency' rule.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
A year later President Richard Nixon visited China and the United States began Preparations to derecognize the ROC.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Although he has lived in the United States and mainland China for most of his adult life, he fol
lows events in Taiwan closely.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
But many others are determined to maximize their competitiveness by study
ing, taking advanced degrees in Europe or the United States, and getting work experience, in the PRC if necessary, in foreign companies.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
56
Shelley Rigger
Implications for Cross-Strait Relations
Washington has scrutinized Chen's every move
Since the end of World War 11, relations between the United States and Taiwan have been close, but not always easy.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Under Lee Teng
hui, the United States found itself facing a new prob
lem-Taiwan's effort to assert itself more strongly on the international stage.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
'Generation Units and the Student Protest Movement in the United States: An Intra- and Intetgenetational Analysis.'
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
Pamela
Ann
Dieter Ernst
United States Institute of Peace East-West Center
Patriuo Nunes Abinal.
Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
To even the gentlest of questions, he adopted a reverential, whispering-in-church tone.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The city-state, which is the administrative centre of the Catholic Church and the home of the Pope, is the only other organization of comparable dimensions to the Chinese Communist Party, albeit on a global scale, and with a similar addiction to ritual and secrecy.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
on-and-off talks, the Vatican has not been able to reconcile its worldwide prerogative to appoint bishops with the Party's insistence that it alone has the right to approve their choice for the Catholic Church at home in China.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
One of the unofficial Chinese intermediaries with Rome joked about the uncanny similarities between the Party and the Catholic Church when he visited the Vatican in zoo8.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
43
Caijing
on bankers, 68-9
Gun Shuging's interview, 51 on Rio-Tinto bid, 6o
on Shanghai corruption cases, 161 car number-plates, of Party officials, 14 car sales, zoo9, xvi
Casino Royale
(film), 238 Catholic Church, 11-i2 CCTV, 185, 250 cell-phones, 39 censuses, 158-9
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 137-8 beneficiaries of, 147
failing of, 145-7
investigation procedure, 142-5, 168-9 on Shanghai corruption cases, 16o-61, 164-6,167-9
structure and staffing, 141-z Central Committee, rz
Central Committee Taiwan Work Leading Small Group, zi
Central Guards Unit, ii
Central Military Commission, 107 Central Organization Department, 17 appointment and promotion, 81, 8z-3 and ethnic minorities and other Parties, 79 internal tension, 74-6
invisibility, 71-2, 73.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
And the priests in the state
approved churches solemnly say Mass and administer the sacraments.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Wang Qishan and Barack Obama (Getty Images) Zhu Rongji (Reuters/Andrew Wong)
Goo Shuqing (Reuters/China Daily Information Corp) Edward Tian (Bloomberg/Getty Images)
Mao Yaqing (Reuters/Stephen Hird) Li Yuanchao (Reuters/Susana Vera) Chen Liangyu with Bernie Ecclestone (Reuters/China Photos) Tian Wenhua in court (Reuters/China Daily Information Corp) Nian Guangjiu (China Today)
Yang Jisheng (Jin Zhong)
Workers in the countryside during the Great Leap Forward Li Rui (AFP/Getty Images)
Zhou Zhengyi (Reuters/China Daily Information Corp) The Shanghai skyline (Bloomberg/Getty Images)
Prologue
It was the summer of zoo8, one year into the banking crisis in the west.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
A retired judge in Chongqing, a vast metropolis in western China, recounted the response he got when he objected to interference of party officials in his court rulings.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Judges must remain loyal - in order - to the Party, the state, the masses and, finally, the law, according to the report issued to the National People's Congress in
2009
by the Supreme People's Court.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
To use an American analogy, it would be like appointing a former bureaucrat in charge of policing in Chicago to be the US Supreme Court Chief justice on the basis of his success, first at fighting crime in the mid-west city and then managing a division of the justice Ministry as a partisan political appointee in Washington.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Chinese Supreme Court is not like its US counterpart.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Wang performs another important role at the court, by hosting foreign judges and lawyers visiting China, as their nominal counterpart in the legal system.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
A similar depart
ment in the US would oversee the appointment of the entire US cabinet, state governors and their deputies, the mayors of major cities, the heads of all federal regulatory agencies, the chief executives of GE, Exxon-Mobil, Wal-Mart and about fifty of the remaining largest US companies, the justices on the Supreme Court, the editors of the
New York Times,
the
Wall Street Journal
and the
Washington Post,
the bosses of the TV networks and cable stations, the presidents of Yale and Harvard and other big universities, and the heads of think-tanks like the Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
What is not in dispute is that Xu was court-martialled after 4 June, and sentenced to five years in prison for his actions in this period.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When, after the street march, Xu Haiming appeared before the local court in front of a gallery filled with supporters, he waved a sheaf of property titles at the three judges.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`The reason we are bold enough to come to court is because we still have faith in the integrity of our judges and the soundness of the legal system.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Being expelled from the Party for serious corruption is tantamount to a finding of guilt in a court of law, even though the trial itself and a formal verdict and sentencing may be months or longer away.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
By the time they reach the court, he admits, the argu
ment is solely about the length of their sentence, not their guilt or innocence.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
About eighteen months later, he was finally tried in court on charges of bribery and sentenced to fifteen years in jail.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
As a final gesture to simmering public anger, the Supreme People's Court in Shijiazhuang agreed to hear the lawsuits from five families, as a way of finally putting the issue to rest.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
By the time his case got to court two years later, the hyperbole about false account
ing and fraudulent bank loans had evaporated.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When Dai appeared in court in March zoo6, he defiantly pleaded not guilty.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
More startling was how the Changzhou
court,
which is under the control of the city's party commit
tee, joined Dai in thumbing its nose at Beijing.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
For four years, the court refused to issue a verdict in the trial.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`We have been push
ing and pushing the court for a decision, but now we have given up.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In mid-2009, with Dai already out on home detention, the court quietly entered a guilty verdict on a minor charge.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The court's decision underlined the futility of Beijing's campaign against the company.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Five engineers from the former Chinalco's institutes were convicted in a court in Guiyang of stealing commercial secrets.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Yuan focused on the textbook's handling of the Boxer rebellion in
1899-19oo,
an event that ended in humiliation for the Qing court when the siege of the old legation quarter in Beijing was eventually lifted by foreign armies.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In court, the accused official said he didn't realize that his actions violated any laws, as many other government officials did the same thing.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
:
The story of Zhang's golf clubs is contained in a court case filed in the US District Court, Middle District, Orlando Division, by Grace & Digital Information Technology against Fidelity National Financial; and received in the court on 6 March zoo6.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
No constituency has been courted with such care under Jiang's and Hu's leadership in the past two decades.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Wang had endured our courting with impeccable politeness and sat cheerfully through the two-hour interview before inviting us for dinner.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Like communism in its heyday elsewhere, the Party in China has
PROLOGUE
eradicated or emasculated political rivals; eliminated the autonomy of the courts and press; restricted religion and civil society; denigrated rival versions of nationhood; centralized political power; established extensive networks of security police; and dispatched dissidents to labour camps.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The courts deliver verdicts on the matters before them.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Even then, any punishment meted out by the courts is at the behest and direction of party organs, which ultimately control the judges directly, and the lawyers indirectly, through legal associations and licensing.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
China retains many of the formal institutional trappings that give it a superficial resemblance to a pluralist system, with executive govern
ment, a parliament and courts.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
As well as sitting above state-owned businesses and regulatory agencies, these party departments oversee key think-tanks, the courts, the media, all approved religions, and universities and other educational institutions, and maintain direct influence over NGOs and some private companies.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
He also chairs the Party's Central Politics and Law Committee, the country's supreme legal uthority which supervises the courts, the police, the justice ministry and the legislature, the National People's Congress.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In a speech published before his term finished, Luo conceded that Chinese courts had to keep pace with international trends but rejected the argument that judges and lawyers had to be independent as a result.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Political departments were reinforced or re-established inside government ministries, the courts and the military, as an early warning system about potential deviants.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Local courts exist within the local party system and are not independent of it.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
They were in charge of the judges in the local courts.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The same party committees of the city and district governments against whom Xu was fighting ran the courts, appointed the judges and paid their salaries.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
All along, any trouble he could stir up in the courts and the media was a device to capture the attention of the sole body within the system with the clout to bring Chen Liangyu and Shanghai to heel, the Party's anti-graft body, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in Beijing.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
At the same time, the local party's overwhelming powers within its own borders effectively make each district its own separate jurisdiction, with direct control over the courts and over local regulations governing business activities.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`It is the spider at the centre of a web,' said Li, of the committee, `connecting the police, the prosecutor's office, the courts and the judiciary.'
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Most discontinued their actions once the courts throughout the country refused to take the cases.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
While the process was expedited, to limit the opportunity for victims' families to protest, the courts' verdicts were harsh.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When the victims mobilized to take legal action, party bodies intimi
dated the lawyers, manipulated the courts and bought off the litigants, before finally letting a handful of cases proceed.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
They first tried to charge him with `embez
zlement and misuse of state funds', but this was thrown out on appeal to the provincial-level courts.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
There was a 5o-metre swimming pool, tennis and squash courts, and private trainers available for personal sessions in a well-fitted-out gym.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In one, Jia Qinglin warned that China needed to build a `line of defence to resist western two-party and multi-party systems, a bi-cameral legislature, the separation of powers and other kinds of erroneous ideological interferences'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Chinese leaders have long debated the merits of a Chinese-style separation of powers doctrine that would put greater distance between the Party and the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
If the Party had followed the pair's recommenda
tions for an independent anti-corruption body, the Taiwanese academic noted, then it `would have achieved the 'separation of powers' proposed by Montesquieu that has long been rejected by the CCP as an idea belonging to the decadent bourgeoisie'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Red Machine: The Party and the State
1
z.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Beijing wanted western skills to overhaul their bankrupt state banks.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The down payment was delivered in a frenzy of deals in late zoos and early zoo6, when foreign financial institutions invested tens of billions of dollars in Chinese state lenders.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The same mood of brittle triumphalism on display at Boao had begun to course through government pronouncements, official debates, the state media and bilateral meetings at home and abroad from early zoo9.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
How communism came to be airbrushed out of the rise of the world's greatest communist state is no mystery on one level.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In the words of Dai Bingguo, China's most senior foreign policy official, China's `number one core interest is to maintain its fundamen
tal system and state security'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
State sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic development, the priorities of any state, all are subordinate to the need to keep the Party in power.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
For all the reforms of the past three decades, the Party has made sure it keeps a lock-hold on the state and three pillars of its survival strategy: control of personnel, propaganda and the People's Liberation Army.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Since installing itself as the sole legitimate governing authority of a unified China in 1949, the Party and its leaders have placed its members in key positions in every arm, and at each level, of the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Few events symbolized the advance of China and the retreat of the west during the financial crisis more than the touchdown in Beijing of Hillary Clinton, the new US Secretary of State, in February zoo9.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
China's high-profile tours through Africa, South America and Australia in search of resources, the billion-dollar listings of its state companies on overseas stock markets, its rising profile in the United Nations and its sheer economic firepower had made China the new focus of global business and finance since the turn of the century.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In the space of a few months in early zoo9, unconstrained by any serious public debate at home, the Chinese state committed $5o billion in extra funding for the International Monetary Fund and $38 billion with Hong Kong for an Asian monetary fund; extended a $25 billion loan to cash
strapped Russian oil companies; set aside $3o billion for Australian resource companies; offered tens of billions more to various countries or companies in South America, central and Southeast Asia, to lock up commodities and lay down its marker for future purchases.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In the final fractious day of negotiations, the Chinese snubbed a heads
of-state session, sending along a relatively junior official to talk with President Obama and other world leaders.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Red Machine
The Party and the State
`The Party is like God.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
State security, local activists, government officials and the foreign and Chinese media alike have all learnt over time to internalize the seasonal rhythms of repression that turn with the political calendar.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`My freedom was restricted,' he said, echoing the deadpan phrase that state security uses when they haul people off the streets.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
He kept himself on the radar of state security through his unabashed friendships with dissidents.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
On the desks of the heads of China's fifty-odd biggest state companies, amid the clutter of computers, family photos and other fixtures of the modern CEO's office life, sits a red phone.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`When the 'red machine' rings,' a senior executive of a state bank told me, `you had better make sure you answer it'
The `red machine' is like no ordinary phone.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
For the chairmen and women of the top state companies, who have every modern communications device at their fingertips, the
THE RED MACHINE
`red machine' is a sign they have arrived, not just at the top of the company, but in the senior ranks of the Party and the government.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`They are very convenient and also very dangerous,' said an executive of a large state resources company.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The `red machine' gives the party apparatus a hotline into multiple arms of the state,
THE PARTY
including the government-owned companies that China promotes around the world these days as independent commercial entities.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In turn, to extend the analogy, what would they have made of the Exxon-Mobile CEO receiving a steady stream of party and government documents, available to the executives of Chinese state companies by virtue of their office and rank? The `red machine' and the trappings that go with it perform precisely these functions.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The names of the bodies through which the Party exercises power, the Politburo, the Central Committee, the Praesidium and the like, all betray one of the most overlooked facts about the modern Chinese state - that it still runs on Soviet hardware.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Vladimir Lenin, the leader of the Russian Revolution, designed a system according to which the ruling party shadows and stalks the state by penetrating it at all levels.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Some, but not all of the heads of China's big state-owned enterprises are Central Committee members.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
An array of other interests which make up the leviathan of the Chinese state, rang
ing from representatives of minority communities, like Tibetans, to the head of Hu Jintao's Central Guards Unit (popularly known as the Bodyguard Bureau), the Party's secret service, makes up the remaining members.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Politburo's overriding priorities lie elsewhere, in securing the Party's grip on the state, the economy, the civil service, the military, police, education, social organizations and the media, and controlling the very notion of China itself and the official narrative of its revival from an enfeebled power, broken apart and humiliated by foreigners, into a powerful state and resurgent civilization.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The number-plates are a banal illustration of the most important guiding principle of Chinese politics, of the Party's ascendancy over the state in all its forms.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Political language faithfully reflects the hierarchies, by referring to `party and state leaders' in all official announcements.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The front stage of Chinese politics, or Lenin's orchestra, are the government and other state organs, which ostensibly behave much like they do in many countries.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The tentacles of the state, and thus the Party, go well beyond the government.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Likewise, the Politburo, headed by Hu, sits above the State Council, China's equivalent of a cabinet, which is headed by the Premier, Wen
THE PARTY
Jiabao, who is also on the Politburo.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When Hu visits Washington and other western capitals, he is always billed as President, and head of state, at the insistence of the Chinese, and not as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, which is his most important position.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Hu Jintao is party secretary but he also carries the more junior title of state president.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Throughout the system, the Party has positioned itself like a politi
1 panopticon, allowing it to keep an eye on any state or non-state ency, while shielding itself from view at the same time.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The glum Maoist state that once greeted Iovestors and tourists, with its grim Soviet architecture, mirthless officials, surly service staff and chronic shortages of consumer goods, (neatly fitted preconceptions of traditional Cold War communism.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The State Department's official record of the trip, including the speeches, toasts and press conferences, did not mention the word `communist' once.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Foreigners in China in the twenty
first century can be forgiven for thinking they are not in a communist state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When the internet gained popularity in China, state security initially added `democracy' to the list of banned words for web searches.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The make-up of all these committees, and in many cases even their existence, is rarely referred to in the state-controlled media, let alone any discussion of
ow they arrive at decisions.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Party has been careful, too, to minimize its profile in international business, systematically playing down its presence in the large state enter
prises that have been listed offshore in New York, Hong Kong, London and elsewhere.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The bulging prospectuses used to sell Chinese state companies ahead of their offshore public listings are crammed with information from every conceivable angle about their commercial activ
ities and board roles, but the Party's myriad functions, especially control over top personnel, have been airbrushed out altogether.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The bankers and lawyers argue they have little to disclose in any case, because the Party has never provided them with any informa
tion or documents about its role in state companies, let alone in business generally.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
An anonymous reply posted soon after on the website of the China Academy of Social Sciences, one of the country's leading state think-tanks, said Professor He and the reform group that organized the conclave had conspired to set up `a shadow political party, unregistered, but existing in reality'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Wang has never studied law, and ascended to the post in
2oo8
through a career in provincial policing in central Anhui province and then the state security bureaucracy in Beijing.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
His appointment
as
head of the committee was announced cursorily in the state media after the
2007
congress, but otherwise his work and speeches are largely directed internally, to party organs, not the public at large.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
After years of largely fruitless discussion, they simply gave up, because a single-party state cannot countenance such a reform.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The idea of a genuine split has now become a little posse, because to pursue the notion to its logical conclusion would risk gutting the Party's control over the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In the process, the Party has pulled off a remark
able political feat, somehow managing to hitch the power and legitimacy of a communist state to the drive and productivity of an increasingly entrepreneurial economy.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Parry has been able to maintain its own secret political life, directing the state from behind the scenes, while capturing the benefits and the kudos delivered by a liberalized economy and a richer society at the same time.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
All the issues on the table in most developed countries, about the value of open markets, the cost of state ownership, the perils of protectionism and the impact of floating currencies, are up for discussion in China as well.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Liberal economists are still subject to occasional waves of intimidation, because of the sense that their ideas ultimately threaten the dominance of the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The visible hand of the state and the invisible hand of the market, far from being contradictory, are made to complement and reinforce each other.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The flipside of the single-party state are the multiple, and multiplying, realities of twenty-first-century China.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
China is awash with people and organizations with evolving profes
sional interests, codes and agendas which are antithetical to a repressive, busybody state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
All of them had had drummed into them by their parents and teachers, and seemed to accept without reservation, that the state would retain a powerful role in their lives.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Economic policy was fixated on a fight between hardliners, who saw the crackdown as a chance to reassert old-fashioned state controls, and the liberalizers, under Deng Xiaoping, who were plotting to grab back the initiative to entrench market reforms.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In other words, the title to the vast, sprawling assets of the Chinese state, every
thing from giant energy and industrial companies and land-holdings, should be held not in the name of the Chinese government but of the Party itself.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Rural households had been free to sell on the market anything they produced above the quota demanded by the state, a reform which generated a surge in new wealth in the countryside, where most Chinese live.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Top political leaders, like Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, encouraged discus
sion of political reform, including grassroots elections, a more open media and a scaling back of the role of party committees that directly managed government ministries and state businesses.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
At a lunch in Washington at the Cosmos Club in the mid-eighties, Tom Robinson, the late political scientist, and the host of the meal, had badgered Chen about the appar
ent contradictions between the state's official Marxist ideology and the free-market reforms then unfolding in China.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Instead of trying to protect the moribund state sector which was threatening to sink the economy and the political system along with it, the Party decided on a new, high
risk course of action.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Chen Sun eventually fell out with Deng over the pace of free-market
37
THE PARTY
reforms, which he worried would chip away at the powers of the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
back off from this fight, but to up the ante by having the Party take
'r
over the ownership of large state assets in its own name.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Stamping the Party's name on the title-deeds of state assets would '' have multiple benefits, they argued.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The multiple forms of state ownership, by ,ministries, enterprises, the military and government entities, plus the murky and entangled rights to different assets and revenue streams on top of that, made it all but impossible to trade and extract value from
;h
;any public goods.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
It would be politically beneficial as well, simultaneously aligning the Party directly with growing state businesses and heading off nascent political competition from entrepreneurs.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
As for experiments in privatization and diversifying the ownership of state companies, that was dismissed.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In other words, the dross of the state sector which was beyond salvation could be sold off, with the big companies in key sectors being kept for the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But the idea was killed by a more practical political objection - that direct ownership of state assets would send a fatal signal about the Party's weakness, not its strength.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In a tour of Sichuan in
1993,
economist Milton Friedman gave the then governor some characteristically straightforward advice about how to instantly instil market discipline in an economy dominated by the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
And the appointments system, through the Central Organization Department, was refined and tightened, to ensure the loyalty of cadres, not just in government, but throughout educational institutions, the media and multiple bodies under state control.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Equally, the Party might not own state assets directly, but it would maintain the right to hire and fire the executives who managed them.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
For the economy to prosper, the huge state firms that communist commissars had once directly managed would have to be turned upside down and the role of party operatives inside them reined in.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Instead of simply producing goods to plan and providing cradle-to-grave employment, knowing all along that the Finance Ministry would cover any losses, the state had to make money to survive.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But along with a surge in growth came a wave of entangled problems, of inflation and social unrest fuelled by mass lay-offs from state companies and anger at official carpet-bagging of the assets left behind.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Over the next ten years, the government would lay off about So million workers in state enterprises, equal to the combined work
forces of Italy and France, and redeploy another r
8
million into firms which no longer carried the benefits of their old jobs.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Workers at centrally controlled urban state enterprises dropped from a peak of
76
million to
z8
million in just ten years from
1993.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The state sector, which had always been the heart of the Party's control over the economy, seemed to have been decimated.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Overseas, many foreigners thought that the Party had embarked on fundamental change as well, mistakenly equating the state sector over
haul with western-style privatization.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Zhu protested that China was corporatizing its large state assets, which was just another way of
,
realizing state ownership'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Bush was not the only western leader to misread Zhu, widely seen in foreign circles as someone dismantling the very roots of the state economy.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Zhu faced legions of critics within the Party over his abrasive style and, according to his boss, Jiang Zemin, `his inexhaustible capacity to rub people up the wrong way', but no one was able to pin on him the crime of privatization of large state enterprises.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
For all their divisions, the top policy-makers in Beijing were largely united over the need to consolidate and strengthen the power of the Party and the state, not let it wither away.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The proposal from the Beijing Hotel meeting about direct party ownership had died, but the principle that the Party and the state should maintain control of the commanding heights of the economy lived on.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
43
THE PARTY
Zhu, in pithy Chinese fashion, boiled down the blueprint for state enterprise reform to a single phrase at the 1997 parry congress -`grasp the big, let go of the small'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Party and the state would retain control of the large companies in what were deemed strategic sectors, such as energy, steel, transport, power, telecommunications and the like.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In a formula that was rolled out for scores of state companies, a small number of their shares were listed overseas, while the government kept about 70 to 8o per cent of the equity in its own hands.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Zhu's policy largely still holds today, of strengthening the state sector by streamlining it, professionalizing its management and demanding that companies take responsibility for their own balance sheets.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
From now on, if Zhu got his way, the only state ATMs would be in Beijing itself.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The legacy of years of poor and often corrupt management of the state banks was now more than just a drain on the exchequer.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The party apparatus in Beijing, in tandem with the Central Organization Department, shunted aside local bigwigs by plac
ing the power to hire and fire senior executives in banks and other state enterprises with the centre, no matter where they were in the country.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But from the moment Beijing decided to restructure state enterprises and sell parts of them offshore, the Party had deliberately downplayed its role in their operations, hiding it from its own people, and the rest of the world as well.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
A self-contained economic eco-system, Shanghai Petrochemical was an old-style state enterprise down to its bootstraps.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The same qualities that made Shanghai Petrochemical seem an unlikely candidate to raise money on the New York and Hong Kong stock exchanges in
1993
made it a perfect choice for Chinese leaders intent on launching an overhaul of the state sector.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The risks associated for a company, as an entity owned by the state, and operating in an environment buffeted by both market forces and powerful, capricious bureaucrats with control over energy prices, were laid out in full view.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But the notion that the shadowy party bodies with a role overseeing state enterprises, all of which had secret lives at home, were going to advertise their powers overseas was never going to fly anyway.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But even here, in a country in which the Party controlled the government and all state businesses, the body's existence was banished altogether.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Instead, it artfully says that `pursuant to the Constitution, the National People's Congress is the highest organ of state authority'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The highest organ of political authority, according to the constitution, was, of course, the Party itself, which in turn dictated the policies and personnel of the government and enterprises to the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
By the time the big state banks came to raise funds on over
seas stock markets from
1005
onwards, however, the omertk surrounding the Party's role at home began to spring some leaks.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Party has an institutionalized, albeit undis
closed, presence in state companies that is not for sale.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
As the lawyer admitted: `In corporate law, the boards [of Chinese state companies] can choose to disregard the Party's advice.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
As a fact of life, they cannot:
Chinese state businesses have changed dramatically since the Shang
hai Petrochemical listing.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The state's investment in bank restructuring was immense.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Collectively, the big state banks cut the number of branches from
116o,ooo
in
11997
to 8o,ooo in
1003.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In interviews with state bank chief executives, I had always been surprised about their refusal to discuss the job cuts made to get their enterprises into shape for overseas listings, naively thinking it would be a selling point for foreign fund managers.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
It was only later I discov
ered that the authorities had classified information about the mass lay-offs as a state secret and restricted detailed reporting to internal publications.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`Ultimately, no one was under any illusions that the state controlled the companies,' said an adviser to the deal.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
There is little debate in China itself these days over whether the Party's backstage role in Chinese state enterprises should be disclosed outside of the communist club.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
It is within the system itself, between the traditionalists in the Party on the one side, who want to keep a tight grip on the enterprises, and the increasingly ambitious chief executives of state companies on the other.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The split personalities of the powerful, reconstituted state enterprises were not just difficult for the rest of the world to deal with.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Fu rose through the ranks to become one of China's most cosmopolitan state CEOs, but not so worldly that he understood how to handle the international board the company appointed when it sold shares overseas in one of its subsidiaries.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
No matter what Fu said, there was enough evidence to make a case in Washington that CNOOC represented the political priorities of the Chinese state, rather than a commercial enterprise in its own right.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Most foreigners dealing with large Chinese state companies in the early days of economic reform felt much like the Japanese executives from the giant Mitsubishi conglomerate negotiating to build a power plant for Baoshan Steel, a pioneering project near Shanghai in the early eighties.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Chen Jinhua, a titan of state industry who recounted this story in his biog
raphy, said the Japanese were right.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
By the time big state companies like CNOOC were heading offshore two decades later socialist co-operation, now re-branded as China Inc., had become as much an embarrassment as an advantage.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
To add to the confusion, there was no longer much socialist co-operation between state enterprises in any case.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In its place, the Party had instituted a form of socialist competition to get the best out of the state sector.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Much less understood is how the Parry has unleashed the state's animal spir
its at the same time, with a force few anticipated.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The pendulum swung so fast and so violently that the problem the Party faced with state enterprises was turned on its head.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In
2007,
the year which marked the historic high-point of fast economic growth in China, the combined profit
ability of centrally owned state enterprises reached about $140 billion, compar?d to close to zero a decade previously, and triple the earnings of five years before.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Once written off as dinosaurs of a crumbling communist system, the structure, solvency and profitability of scores of big state enter
prises were transformed in a decade.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The transformation of the state sector had far-reaching benefits for the Party, just as the convenors of the Beijing Hotel meeting years before had forecast they might.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The swelling profits eased the burden on the fiscal budget and strengthened the state banks' balance sheets.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But the preferential policies meted out to government companies, of cheap land, resources and energy, ensured that the profits of China's boom were captured and kept by the state, at the expense of the population at large.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The state's accumulated war
chest was not only about self-enrichment.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
With an eye to soaring raw material demands decades into the future and its declining stocks of oil at home, Beijing began to push the big, cashed-up state companies to head offshore in earnest around zooz to `go out and become bigger and stronger', in the parlance of top leaders.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The fundamental problem, though, of the Party's lurking backstage presence in large state enterprises remained untouched and unresolved.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The same veil of secrecy the Party threw over its own affairs at home obscured the government's role in state companies as they went abroad.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When it was formed in zoor, the Aluminium Company of China (Chinalco) had all the characteristics of the thoroughly modern, and comfortably bi-polar, Chinese state corporation.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
To ensure the new company didn't develop the sclerotic habits of the old state sector, the government added the market to the mix, directing Chinalco to hive off some of its most valuable assets into a separate entity (known as Chalco) to be listed on overseas stock markets later the same year.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The `red machine' sitting on the desk of the company's chairman, Xiao Yaqing, signified Chinalco's status as one of the fifty-odd core companies which the state regarded as essential for its national security and economic development.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Next to the hotline connecting Xiao to the party elite was the new symbol of the Chinese corporate state, a screen displaying the stock price of the company's overseas listed enter
prise.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
It wasn't long, however, before his country came calling with a task that dwarfed anything that Chinalco, or any Chinese state business, had ever successfully taken on.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Very much the new face of Chinese state business when he became CEO in
2001,
the then 4z-year-old Xiao was a decade younger than Fu Chengyu and most state enterprise bosses.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Like CNOOC's Fu, Xiao carried all the political baggage of a top-level state business executive.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
With CNOOC's mistakes in mind, Xiao went on the front foot immediately, giving interviews to the foreign media in a fashion unprecedented for the head of a Chinese state company, and flying down to Australia to reassure nervous polit
icians in person about Chinalco's intentions.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Chinalco was a state-owned company, but run without interference from the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
So many state companies in the energy and steel sectors had responded to the Polit
buro's patriotic call to take on BHP-Billiton that the government put the choice of the Chinese bidder to an internal tender.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The parent company was
11oo
per cent state-owned, which made for rapid decision-making, with
out the kind of interference from the pesky international directors that had tied up CNOOC's tilt for Unocal.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The political heft behind the Rio-Tinto bid was evident from the way the financing was approved, directly by the State Council, or cabinet, without CDB's board even discussing the loan.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
With the backing of the flush Chinese state, however, Chinalco still had the firepower to press ahead, offering $119.3
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The most blatant public display of Chinalco's cosiness with the state was yet to come.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Without the second agreement to increase Chinalco's stake in Rio-Tinto, Xiao would have lost billions of dollars in state funds and failed to secure a new resource base for both his company and his country at the same time.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Xiao's promotion to the cabinet position was the last straw, ensuring that any genuine commercial rationale for Chinalco's invest
ment in the Anglo-Australian miner was overshadowed by suspicion about the hidden hand of the Chinese state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
directly by the cabinet; its bid had come from the parent company to minimize outside scrutiny; and its CEO had left the company for a party-approved government position days after negotiating the final deal, to be replaced by another state business executive also chosen by the Party.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Not long after the deal collapsed, four of Rio's China-based executives were arrested in Shanghai by state security on allegations of bribery and commercial espionage.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
It was no wonder that political opponents of the deal in Australia were able to portray Chinalco as an agent of the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Not all state enterprises endeav
oured to make their case in public, however misleading it may have been.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Common sense dictated that the company and the state were fused together as a single entity.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The controversy, which reached a peak ahead of the zoo8 Beijing Olympics, masked a much more complex reality evolving inside China over the politics of state enterprises.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Much as the scholars had criticized PetroChina for putting profits ahead of the national interest, furious local commentators complained the oil giants wanted the benefits from being state-owned semi
monopolies without any countervailing responsibilities.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`As the head of a state company, you are expected to fight your corner,' said one industry executive.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The corruption inquiry into Chen left Sinopec, a key state company, in a mess.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In little over a decade, the Party had pulled off what few had predicted was possible, the construction of a profitable state sector, with inde
pendent commercial aspirations, but still ultimately under its control.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But Chen bounced back in his new job, as arty secretary and president of the China Development Bank, a `so-called policy lender established to finance favoured state projects, such as the Three Gorges Dam and local infrastructure works.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Unrestrained by the kinds of estructuring the state banks were undergoing, CDB's outstanding loans rose from
$73
billion in
1998
to
$544
billion a decade later.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Even as he emerged as a sophisticated standard-bearer of Chinese state capitalism on the global stage, Chen retained a canny sense of his party's proletarian roots.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When I was in the foyer of the five-star Peninsula Hotel in
1007
ahead of a meeting of the bank's international advisory board, I noticed a man in a cloth cap and a plain Mao-era jacket, resembling an old state factory manager, striding through the foyer, surrounded by smartly dressed, bustling secretaries and advisers.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Becoming a banker in
1979,
aged thirty-three, after the Cultural Revolution, Liu was quickly promoted through a range of state business and government positions.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When the state batiks were being restructured, Liu relentlessly drilled his subordinates on the importance of global regulatory norms, like capital ratios, risk returns and non-performing loan rates.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
67
THE PARTY
The financial restructuring of China's vast and sprawling state sector embodies such contradictions perfectly.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
And a conservative political class whose entire lives had been built around old-style state ownership had been swept aside.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
With the need to be profit
able and compete globally, top executives of state enterprises these days have a relative freedom to run their businesses inconceivable a decade ago.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Most went to state companies.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In China, by contrast, the banks were both state-owned and state
68
CHINA INC,
controlled.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`Top executives [at the big state banks] are also government officials with vice minister-level positions,' reported
Caijing
magazine.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Party's control over personnel was at the heart of its ability to overhaul state companies, without losing leverage over them at the same time.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Barely heard of outside China and little known inside the country itself, beyond official circles, its reach extends into every department of state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`As long as it is nothing to do with state secrets, it should be OK,' he eventually said.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The department is accurately, if blandly, described as the human resources arm of the Party, but this does not do justice to its extraor
dinary brief and the way it is empowered to penetrate every state body, and even some nominally private ones, throughout the country.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Politburo members, factional groupings, the centre and the provinces, and individuals aligned to different ministries and industries - all struggle to place their people into positions of power and influence in state institutions.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
China differs crucially from the Soviet Union in one respect: the system is far more pervasive, penetrating deeper into lower levels of government and other state-controlled insti
tutions.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Tibetans, Uighurs from Xinjiang, Muslim Hui people and the like, all pre-screened for their loyalty to the Party, are handed a small number of largely symbolic posts to give the vast sprawling state a more inclusive lustre.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Outwardly, the twenty-fast-century organization department is a very different animal from the arm of state security as conceived in Yan'an.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
More recently, Zeng Qinghong, together with Zhou Yongkang, from
zoo7
8x
THE PARTY
the Politburo member in charge of the law and state security, have been key players in the so-called petroleum mafia and influential in senior appointments in China's energy sector.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Equally, the department treated the heads of state companies in China as if they were apparatchiks as well, to be shifted around at will, whatever commercial conflicts might arise.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
At a time when the executives at state enterprises had been ordered to behave more like entrepreneurs than politicians, it was inevitable a new set of conflicts would rise to the surface.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The day before in China, the Central Organization Department had announced without warning a reshuffle of the top executives at China's three big state-owned telecoms companies, China Mobile, China Unicorn and China Telecom.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Tian, a returnee from the US lured to head China Netcom, a fourth, fledgling state telco, was in the midst of a global roadshow to promote his company's upcoming share sale.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The anger was even more palpable among the many Chinese who had spent years trying to build a genuine commercial corporate culture in the refurbished state enterprises.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The problem was not so much the disregard the organization
Ad
THE KEEPER OF THE FILES
department displayed for the edifice of company law and governance painstakingly constructed in large state companies and sold to foreign investors over the previous decade.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`At all the major state companies, the party meetings are held regularly before the board meetings.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The reshuffle sent a simple message to executives of the state companies.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The fiction that the Party is not involved in such decisions is care
fully nurtured, by ensuring that public announcements of new appointments are made by formal government bodies, such as the State Council, the government body which regulates state enterprises, known as SASAC, the ministries themselves or the parent company.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Even the head of the country's only nominally private bank, Minsheng Bank, the subject of many fawning media articles for being an entrepre
neurial upstart in a state financial monopoly, is cleared through the party process.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Tian was already a wealthy and successful private businessman when he was approached in the late nineties to run Netcom, then a fledgling telco state start-up.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
By Chinese government standards, Netcom was an enlightened project, an attempt by four state investors to deregulate the local telco
86
THE KEEPER OF THE FILES
sector, then dominated by the giant China Telecom and its ministerial patron.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Real recognition did not come until about two to three years later, though, when the once small state start-up company took over the operations of ten provinces from China Telecom.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
For Thornton, who already had experience of taking Chinese state companies to international stock markets, Zhang's introductory lecture on the role of the party committee was an `eye-opening' moment.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In zoo8, China Netcom disappeared altogether, subsumed by another state company in the latest industry reshuffle.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The organization department hasn't stopped disciplining errant state business executives in the meantime.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In early zoo9, the heads of the three state airlines were all rotated overnight into rival firms to keep competition in check.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The organization department's responsibility for choosing the bosses of about fifty of the largest state enterprises makes it relatively easy for it to play stern parent with these companies.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
One of the first senior appointments under his watch was the elevation of his provincial propaganda chief from Jiangsu into the Central Propaganda Department, as a vice-minister, giving Li a power
ful ally at the heart of the state media.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The most striking moment of a dismal trip, however, had come beforehand, en route to the Xiang, in the office of the provincial head of the State Environment Protection Administration, in Changsha.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Hunan provincial head of the State Environment Protection Administration, a government entity, far outranked the local environ
ment officer but that was not where the real power lay.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Thousands of students could not afford to go to school in the area; tens of thou
sands of unemployed workers, laid off from bankrupt state enterprises, were milling around the streets, in search of jobs; and about
3,500
98
THE KEEPER OF THE FILES
households needed welfare funds to stay afloat.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In China's single-party state, it is the equivalent, in the west, of a budding politician finally winning elective office after years of working the electorate.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
For officials rising through the ranks of state enterprises, a different calculus emerged in the early years of this century.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When the state
owned companies sold shares overseas, their executives received stock options.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
A few years previously, the question would not have arisen, as until the late nineties leading executives at state enterprises would never have had options to exercise.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Beijing changed tack when it began to push its large state enterprises on to overseas stock markets.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Rather than a tool to create executive incentives, the Chinese options were a calculated ruse to ensure that the state got the highest price poss
ible from selling the shares offshore.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The options were held in the name of the executives, but were supposed to stay the property of the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The executive quickly realized his mistake and backpedalled, saying he had donated the money to the state, so as not to cause divisions with his colleagues.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Top executives in large state firms, many of them sitting on potential windfalls of millions of dollars through options granted to them after offshore listings, had little choice but to publicly observe the directive not to cash them in.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
ror
THE PARTY
The controversy over options was fused with another touchy inter
nal debate, about the paltry formal pay structure for the executives of senior state enterprises.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
'It is common knowledge that the CEOs of state enterprises in Hong Kong didn't make as much as their secretaries at the time,' said a Chinese banker.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Executives of Chinese state companies posted abroad were keen to emulate the China Mobile example.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Ji Haisheng, president of the Singapore operations of COSCO, China's state-owned overseas ship
ping line, found himself sitting on millions of dollars' worth of options.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Formal pay of state executives was lifted, and then
roe
THE KEEPER OF THE FILES
capped during the subsequent economic downturn.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In state enterprises, officials had been able to make their fortunes by cashing out of the system altogether.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Deng only passed formal leadership of the military to him five months later, once the Party's ascendancy over the state and the capital had been restored.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In Chinese staff colleges, up-and-coming military officers have it drummed into them that the failure of Soviet communists to keep control of the military rendered the state defenceless against ideologi
cal subversion from the west.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
More secretive than even the Party itself, the military developed into a state-within-a-state, distinguished as much by the underground commercial interests of its officer corps as the discharge of its duty to defend the Party and the country.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
billion oil concession in tandem with Norinco, the state weap
ons manufacturer.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Likewise, Chinese investment in oilfields in Sudan was done in parallel with arms sales by a state-owned weapons firm to the Khartoum regime.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Party insiders striving to create a more rules-based state in China boast that the military's powers and duties have been codified much like the rest of the bureaucracy.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But much as the Party has stepped back from micro-managing large state enterprises, the PLA enjoys greater freedom in managing its day-to-day duties.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
It had its own organiza
tion department for, doling out jobs in the state sector.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Its big businesses had largely been sold off, or reverted to state control.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Far from taking pleas
ure in his revised prediction of peace, however, the renowned professor was plunged into a state of despair at the lack of a resolution of the Taiwan issue.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`A rich state does not mean a rich people.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`The cost of the disintegration of the state that Russia paid amounted to a large-scale total war.'
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Here in Shanghai, state enterprises produce nearly
So
per cent of
GDP.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Corruption thrives in sectors with heavy state involvement and considerable room for administrative discretion: customs, taxation, the sale of land, infrastructure development, procurement and any other sector dependent on government regulation.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Much like the organization and propaganda departments, anti-corruption work is decentralized, with small branches at each level of government and in each organ of the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Every prov
ince, city and county government, and any state organization under them, all have their own anti-graft commissions or representatives to keep an eye on party members.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Large state companies have an in-house commission delegate as well.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Normally, when I take their case, it is the lowest point in their mental state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
chronicled the removal from office of the then Beijing mayor, Chen Xitong, in 1995, providing the kind of lurid detail absent from the dry accounts of his downfall in the state media.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
145
THE PARTY
Like all large state bodies, China Construction Bank has an execu
tive on its supervisory board who acts as the delegate of the anti-graft commission within the institution.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Niu Yuqing, a scholar at the Central Party School in Beijing, said the individuals who headed party committees, be they in provincial or city governments or state com
panies, seldom seemed to be held accountable for wrongdoing.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
149
THE PARTY
A newly chastened Shanghai was retooled by the Party into a bastion of state industry and forced to remit any profits generated by its enter
prises to the central government in Beijing, much as had happened in the fifties, leaving nothing for reinvestment at home.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Far
1150
THE SHANGHAI GANG
from being the free-wheeling market place that many visitors believed, Shanghai represented the Party's ideal, a kind of Singapore-on-steroids, a combination of commercial prosperity and state control.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`The government certainly cannot lose its control on the state-owned sector; we are not for the shock therapy that they had in Russia.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Here in Shanghai, state enterprises produce nearly So per cent of GDP.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The evidence suggests that Shanghai's strong-state policy worked to plan in the fifteen years after the city's opening.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The city's governing philosophy had gained national influence as well, stressing the importance of a strong, wealthy state on permanent stand-by as a counterbalance to the fast-growing private sector.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Shanghai's success as a bastion of state power, combined with its political muscle in the capital, gave it the status to become a test-bed for key reforms, in private housing, capital markets, state enterprises and social security.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The son of a poor factory worker, Zhou Zhengyi began his rapid ascent into high society in
11
995, using funds from a successful noodle stand business to buy shares in state enterprises issued to employees just before they were partially privatized in stock-market offerings.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
A Chinese journalist at Xinhua in the city who had been sending reports to Beijing about the real-estate scandals, as part of the covert news service the state agency provided to party authorities, was hauled in by the local propaganda bureau and ordered to stop.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Foreign report
ers based in the city who ventilated the disputes were also put under heightened surveillance and their contacts ordered to report all conver
sations with them to state security.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
A few weeks later, the Shanghai authorities took further retaliatory action by arresting Zheng Enchong, the activist lawyer, for leaking state secrets, a charge often wheeled out when the authorities want to make a political example of critics, and sentenced him to three years in jail.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Hu Jintao now occupied all three of the most senior positions in the country - as Communist Party secretary, state president and chairman of the Central Military Commis
sion.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
First, they would go to the State Petition Bureau, then to the Central Politics and Law Commission and on to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
And one by one, these `so-called good friends' of Chen, as the state media later tartly remarked, `handed in all the materials' investigators were looking for.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
It was the announcement by a state publishing house of the release of Jiang Zemin's selected works, to coincide with the former party secretary's eightieth birthday in August zoo6.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`The publication and issue of the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin is a major event in the political life of the Party and state,' he said.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Study groups were organized by party cells across the nations to imbibe Jiang's theories in an orgy of state-orchestrated tributes in the state media, lasting a week.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Once the decision was made, the government removed photos of the state-sanctioned protest marches from the internet, to ensure the phenomenon of rival demonstrations did not spread.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In May zoog, Gongan county in Hubei province ordered state employees collectively to smoke at least
23,000
packs of cigarettes a year, to protect, it said,
,
tax revenues and consumers' rights'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In
2005,
with its compet
itors closing in, Ms Tian forged an alliance with Fonterra, the world's number one dairy exporter, from New Zealand, which offered state
of-the-art technical expertise, to cement its place as an industry leader.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Late in
2007,
the government sent as clear a signal as the state could muster on the issue.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
It executed the head of the State Food and Drug Administration, Zheng Xiaoyu, after he was convicted of taking bribes from pharmaceutical companies seeking government approval to market their products.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Government buildings in cities and towns throughout China are built on a grand scale on prime real estate, in-your-face symbols of the power of the state, with grand vestibules and ornate meeting rooms,
188
THE EMPEROR IS FAR AWAY
all designed to awe invited visitors.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The people who take the state on, like lawyer Li Fangping, have to exist on more modest resources.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Such party bodies prefer to exercise their control at one remove, through government organs or state-controlled professional associations.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Soon after the Sanlu verdicts, a businessman in the US state of Geor
gia was arrested for knowingly selling contaminated peanut products, leaving hundreds ill and a number of people dead.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Chinese state media, stung by blanket foreign coverage of the Sanlu scandal, reported the Georgia case with glee.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`Faced with such a grim natural disaster, the Party and the government are the powerful social mobilizing force of the socialist state,' the
People's Daily
said.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
According to an official media dispatch from the scene of a mining accident in Henan province in 2007, the moment
r9z
THE EMPEROR IS FAR AWAY
one rescued miner emerged out of the blackness into daylight, his first words were: `I thank the Central Party! I thank the State Council! I thank the Henan provincial government! I thank the people of the nation!' Apart from the fact that the rescued miner made no reference to his family or loved ones, what is notable about this quote is that it captures perfectly the ruling hierarchy, with the Party at the top, followed by the central government, the provincial leadership, and finally, the people.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When it came to the private sector in China, which has blossomed in tandem with the state in the past three decades, the Party was more than happy to take its share of the credit.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
So I can't have any conflicts with myself, can I?' (Zhang Ruimin, the chief executive of Haiey China's largest whitegoods manufacturer)
`Government support for private enterprises is less than that given to the state sector.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
After the suppression of the
1989
protests, hardliners in the Party lumped entrepreneurs in with the student demonstrators as subversive threats to the state and sent Nian back inside for the third time.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
By the time I met him, in late
zoo8,
Nian had morphed from subver
sive capitalist into a state-sponsored business celebrity.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Even by the standards of a capitalist economy, the Party could be unusually pro-business, as long as the state got a cut along the way.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
It may have taken decades, but a broad consensus has now developed at the top of the Party, that far from harming socialism,
197
THE PARTY
entrepreneurs, properly managed and leashed to the state, are the key to saving it.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Luckily for China, Deng learnt early on a lesson that nearly every other failed socialist state neglected to heed, that only a boister
ous private economy could keep communist rule afloat.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The report said: `In China, the following big sectors are either Loo per cent or majority controlled by the state: oil, petro
chemicals, mining, banks, insurance, telcos, steel, aluminium, electricity, aviation, airports, railways, ports, highways, autos, health care, educa
tion and the civil service:
Yasheng Huang, at MIT, who has spent years poring through official Chinese data and documents on this issue, said when asked for his estimate of the size of the private sector: `The honest answer is that I do not know and I think many people do not know.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Most economists now skirt the issue, by dividing companies into two categories, state and non-state, and leave it at that.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Under Deng's new deal, farmers could sell on to the market whatever they produced above the quota demanded by the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The partial,
201
THE PARTY
strategic retreat of the state in China in the nineties gave insiders pole position in the mass sell-off of companies in sectors not considered strategic by the government, such as textiles, food and consumer elec
tronics.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Emulating Margaret Thatcher in Britain, when she privatized council homes by offering to sell them cheaply to their occupants,
city
after
city
in the nineties in China created private property markets by selling off state housing.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But just as the x989 crackdown transformed the Party's stewardship of the state economy, its management of the private economy was overhauled as well.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The big state industries which had survived the massive restructuring of the nineties retreated into the well-financed fortresses the Party had built for them.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Whole sectors, mainly heavy industry, telecommunications and transport, were reserved for the state and shielded from full-blown competition.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
To all intents and purposes, Haier had been privately, and successfully, managed with little interfer
ence from the state for many years.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Around the same time, the pendulum of public debate was swinging against the privatization of state assets.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
An odd alliance of old-style leftists and populist commentators launched a highly charged public campaign on the issue, comparing management buy-outs of state firms to the scandalous privatizations of Yeltsin's Russia.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
With no prior warning, the Qingdao agency in charge of government enterprises announced in April
2004
that Haier was owned by the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Haier case was a signal reminder that a company could be privately run one day and find itself claimed as a state asset the next.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Haier's senior managers refused point-blank to attend meetings for state enterprises convened by the Qingdao agency supervising the city's companies.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In April
2007,
with a click of the mouse, the city quietly removed Haier from the list posted on the government website of state-owned enterprises in Qingdao.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Some private companies are registered as state entities or collectives, giving them what the Chinese call a `red
z0;
THE PARTY
hat' and an extra degree of political protection from harassment by officials.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Chinese banks, which are all owned by the state, still prefer to lend to the state, because the government will usually stand behind the debt in one form or another.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
They can be fully state-owned, collectively owned or co-operatives; or limited liability companies, with diversified share registers split between both public and private owners.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The largest, and founding, shareholder of Lenovo, the computer firm which bought IBM's PC business, is a state science think-tank, but the company is registered and listed overseas and largely privately managed.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Huawei, the telecommunications equipment manufacturer and perhaps China's most globally successful company, is careful to say it is a collective rather than a private company, a definitional distinction that has been essential to the company's receipt of state support at crucial points in its development.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In
1996,
Zhu Rongji, then vice-premier, visited Huawei with the heads of four large state banks in tow.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
They would not have afforded the same courtesy to a local journalist, because they understood that
205
THE PARTY
the Chinese media were firmly in the hands of the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Once his dispute with the state became public, Yang was finished.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Goo Shuqing, a smooth, globally minded official who worked as a commercial banker and in the central bank, managed to rise through the ranks
of the Party, even while demanding it curtail its interference in state businesses.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
As head of Chinalco, Man Yaqing faced the same dilemma with which many state business executives struggled: how to run a profitable enterprise and meet the Party's political objectives at the same time.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Pictured here with Bernie Ecclestone, the head of Formula One motor racing, Chen oversaw the building of a state-of
the-art race track in record time.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Yang Jisheng, a journalist for his entire career with the state news agency, Xinhua,turned against the Party after x989 to write a series of exposes, including an epic work about the famine of the `Great Leap Forward'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
a model of state-led develooment.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Entrepreneurs had been starved of bank capital, fenced out of some of the most profitable sectors of the economy, often forced into unholy alliances with state partners and sometimes sent to jail.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`You take too much, the state is unhappy, and you take too little, you get upset with yourself,' he said.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When this first state shareholder was replaced a few years later, he made sure his new partner was state-owned as well.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The first rule, he said, was that you will not develop quickly without a `red hat', or a state partner.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Accustomed to keeping its role in government and state businesses backstage, the Party nevertheless saw political benefit in advertising its penetration of the most dynamic part of the economy.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
They simply do not want the competition:
The controversy over the direct sales industry in China is the most florid example of this largely overlooked aspect of the growth of the private sector in a communist state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In April x998, the State Council, China's cabinet, issued a decree, read out on the evening news bulletin of the state broadcaster, ordering all direct sales operations to cease business immediately.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But these ministries were not powerful enough to stand up to state security and the police.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In words that could easily have been applied to the Party itself, the State Coun
cil criticized direct sales because `its organization was closed to outsiders, its mode of transaction was secretive and its distributors had spread throughout the country'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The condi
tions laid down were aimed squarely at preventing them from becoming political Trojan horses outside of state control.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Rather than representing workers inside state companies, the union worked for the
zr3
THE PARTY
Party.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In the words of two legal experts on China's labour laws: `The fundamental objective [of the union campaign] is to reassert a lost control mechanism over the large number of employ
ees that are now working in foreign firms, as opposed to state enterprises.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
With the state investing little in the city, small, mainly household, firms stepped into the breach.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Party's preferred model for the penetration of foreign joint ventures, which is taught in party schools, is the tie-up between Japan's Nissan and China's Dongfeng, a state-owned car and truck maker.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The organization department's internal report in zoos on its work inside non-state companies is full of down-in-the-mouth dispatches from the grassroots about the Party's declining profile in private and joint venture workplaces.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
According to surveys conducted by Bruce Dickson, Chinese officials who believed the primary responsibility of state-sanctioned business associations was to provide party leadership over private companies had fallen from
48
per cent
218
DENG PERFECTS SOCIALISM
In 1999 to
32
per cent in zoos.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The contrasting fortunes of two entrepreneurs who tried to crack open state-dominated industrial sectors in the early years of this century provide textbook examples of how to manage government relations to develop one's business, and the steep price to be paid for failure.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Nearly a decade after he launched a push into the aluminium sector, Liu Yongxing mused in an interview about the lessons he had learnt in trying to do business in an industry long monopolized by the state.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
With the domestic supply of alumina in China under the control of a single state company, Liu saw a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for his East Hope group to enter the market as a streamlined, low-cost player.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Liu aimed to control the entire production process, from mining bauxite to refining alumina to smelting aluminium, so he would not be held hostage by his state competitors at any point along the way.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
As a low-cost producer, he thought he could easily grab a profitable market share away from the relatively pampered state-owned giants like Baosteel,
150
kilometres away down the Yangtze, near Shanghai.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Liu's business survived, only just, multiple attacks on it by the state sector.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Whereas Liu astutely managed the politics of battling a state monopoly, Dai was out of his depth when the political winds in Beijing reversed course, and started blowing against him.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Most of the new capacity was being added by China's state-owned steelmakers, which were expanding frenetically.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The full force of the state soon descended on the project.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The State Council convened a meeting specifically to discuss Dai's steel mill.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`Big state companies can get involved in huge projects.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But when private com
panies do so, especially in competition with the state, then trouble comes from every corners.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`Government support for private enterprises is less than that given to state companies.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
before he split with his brothers, his businesses had never relied on borrowing from the state banks.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Up against him was a state monop
oly, the Aluminium Company of China, or Chinalco, one of the elite fifty or so large firms controlled directly by the Party in Beijing.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Not only was Chinalco one of the most powerful, sophisticated and aggres
sive state firms in the country, it also controlled the raw materials and technology needed by any competitor wishing to enter the industry.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Frustrated, a number of the top engineers quit the two state institutes in
2003
and set up a new research centre in a university in Shenyang, taking the blueprints for refinery designs with them.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The most astounding thing about this body-blow to one of the most powerful state companies in China was that it resulted directly from industrial espionage by local private companies.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
But Liu's most important relationships were with the state outside Beijing, with the various provincial govern
ments which wanted to promote economic development close to home.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Almost as remarkable as the book itself was how Yang, a journalist with Xinhua, the official state news agency, had managed to compile and write it.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Using the privileges afforded to a senior Xinhua journalist, Yang was able to penetrate state archives around the country and uncover the most complete picture of the great famine that any researcher, foreign or local, had ever managed.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The lies were re
inforced, if necessary, with state terror orchestrated by slavish officials who feared political death if they deviated from Mao's diktats.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The state statistical bureau had poor
quality data and was shut down during subsequent political campaigns.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
When around the same time the author and economics columnist for the
Financial Times
Martin Wolf was negotiating to have his book on globalization released in China, the changes insisted on by Citic Publishing, a major state organ, all centred on his characterization of the Soviet Union and communist dictators.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
According to Xia Chuntao of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a state
think-tank
with the status of a ministry, Mao is not an issue of political sensitiv
ities but a `matter of principle'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
He pointed out that CCTV, the state broad
caster at the heart of the media establishment, had just run a forty-episode series based on a wholesale reinterpretation of the late Qing dynasty.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`State officials can set fires but civilians are not allowed to light a lantern!' they wrote.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Compared to the oppressive political atmosphere after
x989,
the response of the state was positively enlightened.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Yang spent his entire professional life at Xinhua, the official state news agency, starting in
1967
and retiring in zooz.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Even then, the propaganda department directed it be taken off the shelves, shut the state publishing house for three months and told its director to write a self-criticism.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Wang struggled for years to get his hands on a full set of state statis
tics from within his own workplace.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Wang Weizhi, the demographer, occupies the flat in west Beijing allocated to him by the state think-tank where he completed his career.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
After it was released, state security detained the individuals blamed for writing the document and collecting signatures, and attempted to visit and interrogate every one of the i,ooo or so signatories to the document.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
He insisted, when state security turned up on his doorstep seeking an explanation, that he hadn't signed it, although he had been approached to do so.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
One of the initiators of the petition, Liui Xiaobo, was kept in detention for
z6r
THE PARTY
six months before being formally charged in June
2oo9
with `inciting state subversion'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Party made its displeasure known by sentencing Liu to eleven years in jail, the longest term ever given to someone convicted for state subversion since the offence was created in the late nineties.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
With the sixtieth anniversary on the horizon, the emerging lawyers' network was also a hot target for state security.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
While the US, Europe and Japan stagnated in the wake of the financial crisis, the Party had by mid-zoo9 engineered a stunning bounce-back by flooding state businesses with credit.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The way the state targets even lawyers like Li and his clients is evidence that behind the Party's boisterous, boasting exterior lies a regime with a profound appreciation of its limited legitimacy and fragile mandate.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The middle class en masse hasn't dared rise up against the state, because they have so much to lose.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The extreme poverty that exists in China alongside great and often ill-gotten wealth is more than just embarrassing for a state that professes to be built on the principles of socialism.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The state-owned industrial and financial sectors are unrecognizable from a decade ago.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Instead of allowing the foreign media and local internet activists to scoop the state media when reporting on disasters and protests, the authorities now encourage local media to report some negative news, to ensure the official version dominates public debate.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
How do you
169
THE PARTY
unpick the powerful financial interests within the Party that benefit from the state's privileged position in the economy? Does unravelling the state's economic interests irreparably damage the Party's political clout? There is no easy way to chart a course through this thicket but the Party's adaptive abilities should not be underestimated.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
On the day of the largest demonstrations, the reach of the all-power
ful state was on full display.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
In Beijing and elsewhere, the police commandeered the state-owned telecommunications network to flood the city's mobile system with messages, to ensure the situation did not get out of control.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The state press immediately changed its tone, to focus on the `positive' aspects of the relationship.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
:
Among the western banks which had invested in China's big state lenders, the Royal Bank of Scotland was effectively nation
alized; a near-bankrupt Merrill Lynch was swallowed by Bank of America, which needed a federal bailout to absorb the losses; Goldman Sachs was forced to convert into a mere bank to access federal aid and UBS in Zurich was rescued from insolvency by a capital injection from the Swiss government.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Standing Committee's individual members'
278
NOTES
responsibilities are, in order, party affairs and the military (Hu Jintao); oversight of China's managed parliament (Wu Bangguo); the economy (Wen Jiabao); relations with non-party members, Taiwan and civil organizations (Jia Qinglin); media and propaganda, which in China are one and the same thing (Li Chang
chun); the day-to-day running of party affairs and some diplomatic responsibilities (Xi Jinping): a back-up on the economy and budget, environ
ment, health and central-regional issues (Li Kegiang); anti-corruption (He Guoqiang); and the police and state security (Zhou Yongkang.)
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
zo The State Department's ...
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
A good example is the prospectus for Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Ltd, one of the first Chinese state-owned enterprises to list overseas, dealt with in a later chapter.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
This was calculated in zoo6, before the cost for fixing the balance sheets of ABC and a number of other state banks could be taken into account.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
: State Secrets: China's Legal Labyrinth, published by Human Rights Watch in China, 2007, p. 171.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The blog said:
Government officials often state in public that their criteria for selecting officials are 'appointing people on their merit'.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
:
These quotes come from Szu-chien Hsu,
Reforming the Party and the State under Hu Jintao,
Institute of Political Science, Academica Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
: This comes from conversations with Yasheng Huang and also early drafts of his book, Capitalism with
Chinese Characteris
tics: Entrepreneurship and the State,
Cambridge University Press, zoo8.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
:
Yasheng Huang's
Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State,
Cambridge University Press, zoo8, is a tour-de-force on this topic.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
223
Big
state
companies
can ...
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
(Charles Louis Kincannon and Judith Banister, `Perspectives on China's 1982 Census', in
A Census of One Billion People,
Beijing, Population Census Office under the State Council and Depart
ment of Population Statistics of the State Statistical Bureau, 1986, pp. 288-31x.)
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
74, 28on
against local authority, 90-93 members' files, 77-8
nature of, 69
origin and historical background, 76-7 on Parry's disaster relief, 192-3 refined and tightened, 41
and state enterprises, 46, 72-4, 84-9
see also nomenklatura
system Central Party School, zz6-8
Central Politics and Law Committee, 25, 189,190
Central Propaganda Department, 17, 229 media control, 184, 186, 237, 248-9;
see also
media, censorship
military propaganda, rzi-z reinforced, 41
roles of, 235-7, 248-52, 253 in Santo case, 189
Taiwan mission, izz
centrally planned economy, metaphor for, 37
CEOs, 89 reshuffled, 84-5 status symbol, 8-9, to stock options of, loo-103 Chai junyong, 164 Chan, Hon, So, 81 Changchun
Chen's trial in, 166 corruption cases, 139 Changzhou,zzo-zz Charter 08, 261-1 Chen Ailian, 5 Chen Deming, 83-4 Chen Jinhua, 55
Chen Liangyu, 135, 136, 161 background, 155
-
6 confronts Wen Jiabao, 163-4 defends Shanghai, 151 investigation on, 138, 164-6 trial and prison life, 166
Chen Shui-bian, 124 Chen Tonghai, 64 Chen Mandan, 65-6 Chen Xitong, 144, 168 Chen Yuan, 40, 64-5, 66 .
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
see
state enterprises China Investment Corporation, x-xi China Mobile, 84, 85, Tor
China National Petroleum Corp.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
47-9 Shanghainese, 152-3
land disputes, 135-7, x58-6o, 164, 167 Shao Daosheng,98
Shao Depeng, 217
Shen Ting, 159, 164, 167-8 Shen Wenrong, zo7 Shenzhen
corruption cases, 181 Deng's tour to, 41 Shijiazhuang, 174 Shirk, Susan, izg
shuanggui
(double regulation), 142-3 Sichuan
corruption cases, 139 earthquake, 192 Singapore
COSCO in, io2
Suzhou industrial park, 83 Sinified Marxism, 67 Sinology, 18-i9
Sinopec, 63-4
society, infiltrates Party, 30 Song Ping, 36
Song Xiaojun, iig-zo, 125, 131 southern tour, 41
Southern Weekend,
185
-
6 Soviet Union
disintegration of, 35, 131
nomenklatura
system, 78, 79 Orgburo, 76
Party's verdict on collapse of, 237-8 Succession, 154
Stalin, Joseph, 76
Standing Committee, 13, x78-9n above corruption investigation, 147 Shanghai gang in, 154
state assets debates over, 40 Deng's model on, 42
new conservatives on, 35, 39 state enterprises
competition and profitability, 53-6 Deng's model on, 4z
new conservatives on, 39 Party's low profile in, z1-2, 49 pay structure for CEOs, 'Oz-3
personnel control of, 46, 68-9, 73
-
4, 84
-
9
reform, 44,67-8
split personalities of, 53, 64 stock options, Ioo-xoi tax from, 267
workers lay-offs, 4z-3, 50
see also
individual enterprises steel industry, zzo, 2zi, 222 Stewart, Jackie, i6z
Storming the Barricades (Zhou
Tianyong), 69
students loans, 173
money worship, 133 view of Party, 31-1 So Shulin, 64
So Zhiliang, 245, 246 Sudan,6z
Suihua, 97-9, 116 Sun Jingkan, 16o Suzhou,83 corruption cases, 139-40
Tai lake (Taihu), 89, 9o, 9i-z Taiwan issue
Jiang and Hu's policies, Io6-7, 127-30, 134
nationalist stand on, 131-2 nature of, 122-3 one-China policy, iz7-8 Taiwanese opinions, Iz5-8
see also
Kuomintang
Tang Dynasty
(AD
618-907), official vetting, 77
tax policy, 178, 179 telecommunication, 133-4 telecoms companies, 84-9 terror, x65
textbook censorship, z49-50 Thatcher, Margaret, zoz 38th Army, io9-io Thornton,John, 88
Tian, Edward, 84, 86-9 Tian Fengshan, 98 Tian Wenhua
charged, t7z downfall, 188 dual responsibility dilemma, 186 leads emergency meeting, 171 titles of, 182-3
trial and charge, igo-gi
Tiananmen Square massacre, 105, 253, z62 discussion suppressed, 3 5
impact of, 34
-
5, 36, 201, 202 Party's verdict, 239 post-event investigation, 36 splits Party and PLA, iog-io
Tibet,
I I I
Tieben
see
Jiangsu Tieben Iron & Steel
The Times of Deng Xiaoping
(Yang Jisheng), 153-4
Todai
elite,
9
Tombstone
(Yang Jisheng), x19, 130-3
1,
132
sourcing of, 254-5 trade union, 213-I4 Tsai, George, iz6-7, 130 Tsang Yok-sing,
i1
21st-Century World Herald,
147 'Twenty-Seven Perfections', 77
UBS, 199
Unhappy China
(Wang and Song),
I I
z, 132
United Front Department, 17 United Front department, 235 United Kingsom, elite networks, 9 United States
aircraft carrier patrols seas around Taiwan, x28
elite networks, 9
official appointment, 74 Patriotism, zzo
pet food scandals, 183, 184-5 universities, 79-8o
Unocal, 54
urban citizens, 17 Urumqi,
111,
139
Vatican, and China, 11-12
vertushka,
13
voting,
1i-iz
wages, 56 Wal-Matt, 213-14 Wan Yanhai, 3 Wang Jianzhou, 85 Wang Juntao, 23-4 Wang Minggao, 140,144 on corruption cases, 148 interview with, 71, 72 lack of name card, 70-71 Wang Qishan, ix, xvi Wang Shengjun, z4 Wang Shenyi, 99 Wang Shi, zo7-8
Wang Weizhi, 231, 258-6o Wang Xiaodong, iii Wang Xiaofang, 95, 96 Wang Xuebing, 158 Wang Yang, 134 Watergate scandal, 164 Wen Jiabao, xvi, 7, 179n confronted by Chen Liangyu, 163 on democracy, 2o
development policies, 178-8o
Wen Jiabao (cont.)
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
solves Sinopec oil dispute, 63 on Tieben case,
III
titles
of,
15-16
visits earthquake zone, 191 wife and son
of,
147-8
on Zhang Enzhao's case, 145
Wen
Wei Bao,
z1
Wenzhou,z15,zI7-18
'west mountain meeting', z1-3 Wolf, Martin, 237, 169
World Trade Organization, zo2, 166
Wrath of Heaven,
144, 168, 169 writers/artists, 96
Wu, Joseph, 113, 114 Wu Bangguo, 7, z79n Wu Lihong, go-91 Wu Si, 74
Wu Macho, zog
Xi Jinping, 8, 118, 179n Xia Chuntao, 247, 251-1 Xia Jianming, 30
Xiamen, corruption cases, 139, 159 Xiang river, 9z-3
Xiao Chaoxuan (fictional), 95-6 Man Yaqing, 57, 58, 6o-6z Xinhua news agency
interview with Zhang Ruimin, 198 on peanut product scandal, 191 secret internal reports, 230, 153 on Tian's downfall, 188
Xinjiang,
111,
139 Xinjiang Soldier Corps, 114 Xintiandi, Shanghai, z9 Xinyang, 155-8
Xu Guanhua, 140
Xu Haiming, 13 5-6, 137, 153, 157, 160, 164, r67
Xu Kuangdi, 151, 156
Xu Qinxian, Lieutenant-General, 109-xo
Yan Xuetong, 104
on diplomatic policy, 13 z on Hu's policies, 107
on military,
1zz
on money worship, 132-4 on Taiwan issue, 131-z Yan'an rectification, 77-8 Yang, Andrew,
I
2o
on Taiwan issue, 112,
I
z6, r29 Yang Bin, zo6
Yang Jiechi, z77n
INDEX
Yang Jisheng, 119-31, 23
2
, 139
-
40, z5z-6,z58,259-61,165 Yang Mianntian, 103
Yang Ping, 39,40 Yang Rong, zo6 Yang Shangkun,139 Yang Yuanging, 104 Yingkou, 175
You Ji,
III
Youngoy 116 Yu Debong, 131,155-7, z6o Yu Jianrong, 179
Yu Jie, 246-7
Yu Minbong, 117 Yu Qiuli, 113
Yuan Weishi, 70,78-9, 149-50, 151 Yuanhua case, 7-8
Yung Chunchang, 119 Yunnan,181
Zeng Qinghong, 74, 81-z Zhang Baoqing, 170,173 Zhang Chunjiang, 88 Zhang Dahong, 216 Zhang Dejiang, zo8-9 Zhang Enzhao,145-6 Zhang Peili, 147-8 Zhang Quanjing, 75
Zhang Ruimin, 194, 198, 103 Zhang Yimou,
I
z:-z
Zhao Ziyang, go, 154,154 encourages political reform, 36 image blackout, 35
rural reform, zoo Zhejiang, 109 Zheng Bijian, 106 Zheng Enchong,135,137,159,161,167 Zheng Xiaoyu, 183
Zhengtai Group, 118 Zhou Enlai, 113, 113, 253 Zhou Qiren, xzo, 113 Zhou Ruijin, 31, 154 Zhou Tianyong, 69
Zhou Yongkang, 14-5, 81-z, z79n Zhou Zhengyi, 157-8, 159, 161-z, 167 Zhu Feng, 6z-3
Zhu Peikun, 31 Zhu Rongji, 148 careers, 81 financial system reform, 44-6 misread by Western leaders, 43 state enterprise reform, 44 visits Huawei, 104
ant
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Printed in the United States of America.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Party itself suffered an existential crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the three years to [99z, an event that resonates to this day in the corridors of power in Beijing.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
It is no coincidence that the Vatican is one of the few states with which China has been unable to establish diplomatic ties since the founding of the People's Republic in E949.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Hu only flaunts his party title on trips overseas to the handful of surviv
ing fraternal communist states, like Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
They could point to the long western engagement with decidedly undemocratic Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich states.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
Look what happened when the Soviet Union lost the three Baltic States.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`Some foreign media, especially those based in the United States, have wantonly reported on so-called unsafe Chinese products,' said Li Changjiang, the head of the agency responsible for monitoring food imports and exports.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
THE PARTY
In times of national crisis, the Party can choose to flaunt its leadership and its ability to mobilize resources on a scale few states in the world can match.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
(Yang Jisheng, the author of
Tombstone)
'In China, the head of the Central Propaganda Department is like the Secretary of Defense in the United States and the Minis
ter of Agriculture in the former Soviet Union.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
`In China, the head of the Central Propaganda Department is like the Secretary of Defense in the United States and the Minister of Agriculture in the former Soviet Union,' said Liu Zhongde, a deputy-director of the department for eight years from
1990.
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
No individual or group had sufficient capital to purchase the township's industrial assets, so cadres began courting outside investors.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In the concluding chapter I revisit the central themes of the book
environmental values, civil society, and the challenges of achieving sustain
able development-and reflect upon their implications for thinking about some of post-reform Chinas difficult environmental problems.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Curiously, this tendency toward a rigid separation between humans and nature in Western philosophical thought, when combined with modern ecological science and management practices, has resulted in a biocentrism akin to the American naturalist Aldo Leopold's widely cited land ethic: 'A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
It is wrong when it tends otherwise' (Leopold 1949:224)' This dualistic worldview is now evident in much of the First World environmentalism that drives global conservation efforts, which
POLLUTION, PERCEPTIONS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES
87
take the separation-and sometimes forced exclusion-of humans from nature as a precondition to conserving natural resources, threatened spe
cies, and biodiversity (West and Brockington 2oo6).
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
I employed a combination of methodological approaches, including approximately loo semistructured interviews and
150
survey questionnaires with government officials, indus
trial workers, farmers, and scientists and bureaucrats in the State Environ
mental Protection Administration.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In
1998,
the agency was upgraded to the State Environmental Pro
tection Administration.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
I have also been buoyed along over the past few years by a generous research grant from the College of Liberal Arts at Oregon
XVI PREFACE
State University, and by David McMurray, the chair of the Anthropology Department, who allowed me to keep this project at the top of my priority list, sometimes at the expense of other duties.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
During
2007
and
2008,
1 held a fellowship at the Center for the Humanities at Oregon State University, which supported further research and writing and facilitated stimulating interactions with colleagues from various disciplines.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In using the term 'civil society,' I am referring to an intermediate realm between the family and the state characterized by col
lective action around shared values, interests, and goals (Hefner
1998;
Selig
man
1992).
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Registered envi
ronmental NGOs are subject to a dizzying set of controls and regulations from China's State Council and Central Committee, but informal citizens' groups in fact often find creative ways to accomplish their goals within this complex, authoritarian system.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
The political scientists Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li
(20o6:2)
describe rightful resistance as:
A form of popular contention that operates near the boundary of authorized channels, employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinges on locating and exploiting divisions within the state, and relies on mobilizing support from the wider public.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
For example, the discourse of environmental pro
tection within the central government is gaining momentum; in
2oo5
Chi
na's State Environmental Protection Administration, with the support of Premier Wen Jiabao, halted thirty major industrial projects for failure to properly conduct environmental-impact analyses.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Futian provides an apt setting for examining the processes and conse
quences of industrial development because it allows us to follow China's arc from the state- and collectively owned enterprises of the socialist period to the market-oriented, private enterprises of today.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Many contemporary conservation projects
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND SUSTAINABILITY 17
stem from decidedly Western epistemologies-such as a vision of wilder
ness as a place unsullied by human activity-and are enacted by a combina
tion of multilateral agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and state authorities.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
I first examine the discourses and practices related to industrial development during the Maoist era and the subsequent years of economic reform, sketching in detail how Futian's factories grew to provide industrial inputs for Panzhihua Iron and Steel Company, a massive state-owned en
terprise.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Futian's facto
ries were established primarily to support the massive state-owned Panzhi
hua Iron and Steel Corporation.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
By the mid
19sos
Futian, along with most of rural China, had undergone a full-scale communization of agriculture in which peasants were organized into a three-tiered system of state farming based on people's communes, produc
tion brigades, and production teams.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
The farming family as an economic unit ceased to exist, and those peasants who worked on communalized land grew crops in accordance with output targets set by higher adminis
trative levels and earned work points that entitled them to a share in the harvest after state procurement requirements had been met.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In dismantling the system of social bene
fits that existed during the collective period, the liberal economic reforms of the past three decades have also fundamentally transformed the state
society relationship in rural China.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
China considers itself a 'unified, multiethnic state [tongyi
duo
minzu guojial' In addition to the dominant Han majority, which constitutes about
92
percent of the nation's population, there are fifty-five 'minority nationalities
[shaoshu
minzu]' that received formal rec
ognition by the central government following an ethnic-identification proj
ect conducted between
195o
and
19s6.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
After Mao's death and Deng Xiaoping's ascendance to power in the late
1970s,
the nation was set on a path toward what top political leaders called 'socialism with Chinese characteristics;' a euphemism that in fact meant a retreat from socialist ideals and an espousal of market-driven capitalist de
velopment that would gradually wrest the economy from state control.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Rural-urban migration has been the common response to such structural changes in many devel
oping countries, but in China the central government bureaucracy had ef
fectively been subsidizing urban workers for more than thirty years, provid
ing state-guaranteed health care, education, and pensions for them and their families.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
To offer these services to a surfeit of new migrants would place an untenable strain on state resources.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
As a result, these small-scale factories were much more nimble and competitive than the lumbering state-owned enterprises that hailed from the period of high socialism.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
-FUTIAN FARMER
A
FTER IMO
Zedong's death and Deng Xiaoping's ascendance to power in the late
1970s,
the People's Republic of China was set on a path toward what top political leaders called 'socialism with Chi
nese characteristics [zhongguo reside shehui zhuyi]; a euphemism that in fact meant a retreat from socialist ideals and an espousal of market-driven capitalist development that would gradually wrest the economy from state control.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
One of the hallmarks of economic liberalization in China today is the transfer of state-held assets into private hands, a trend that would have been unthinkable in Mao's time.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In response, the central government has ironically facilitated the con
centration of wealth and the privatization of collective assets by espousing policies that allowed for greater private ownership of industry, moving cau
tiously but steadily away from the Maoist ethic of the means of production being owned by the people (quanmin sucyou zhi) and toward a restructur
ing of industry called 'grasp the large and let go of the small [zhua da fang xiao]:' In practice, this meant nurturing the large and important state
owned enterprises while allowing smaller factories to fail or to privatize.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Four or five furnaces typically operated simultaneously while the others were either in a state of preparation or clean-up.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Consequently, Pangang's consumption of coke has plummeted, and industrial entrepre
neurs in Futian have been forced to seek other markets for their product, chief among these being the state-owned fertilizer factory in Huaping.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In reality, most sectors of the Chinese economy are con
trolled by market forces, but the market is in turn guided by the heavy hand of the party-state, at both the national and local levels.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
These included wasteful, inefficient production practices, and sometimes overt corruption; a lack of sufficient capital to expand indus
trial capacity; and problems securing loans from the state-run banking system, which ironically began favoring privately owned firms in its lend
ing practices (Oi
2oos).
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In one recent case study I worked on in Yunnan province, for example, my col
league, a Western-trained Chinese anthropologist, observed as a state
owned sugar-processing mill was bought by a group of investors that in
cluded the mill's former manager, three deputy managers, the Communist Party secretary of the county, and the chairman of the state-sponsored labor union (Li and Tilt
2007).
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
The alternative to equality was said to be
xiaokang,
a state in which individuals sought their own pecuniary benefit.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Large-scale factories, some owned by private or foreign investors and some still under state con
trol, emit millions of tons of pollutants into the atmosphere.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In a hefty tome dealing with the overall state of China's environment entitled Case Studies in Environmental Protection, the environmental scientist Meng Lang cites five major problems threatening the long-term survival of rural industry in China, four of which are directly related to the environment:
L. The rate of natural resource consumption in the rural industrial sector is unsustainably high
2.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Because of its abundance and its state-regulated pricing structure, coal is almost univer
sally the fuel of choice for rural industry.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
The State Environmental Protection Ad
ministration, the agency charged with setting national pollution standards and enforcing compliance, has recognized the seriousness of rural pollu
tion since at least the mid-L99os.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Class I areas, which have the most stringent emissions regulations, are tourist, historic, and conservation areas; Class II are residential urban and rural areas, including agricultural areas such as Futian; and Class III are industrial areas and heavy traffic areas (Wan
1999;
Chinese State Environmental Protection Ad
ministration
1996)
Each class corresponds to a standard
(biaozhun)
for various key pollutants.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In the wake of liberal reforms, farm
ers are exposed to considerable economic risks; no longer subject to the communal land system, they must meet their own economic needs as the state provides less security and fewer services than during the socialist period.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
This problem is exacerbated somewhat by China's complex land-tenure system, which is highly variable from region to region but is commonly seen to contain four fundamental dimensions: the right to residual income from agricultural activity; the right to use land in relative freedom from state regulation and other encumbrances; security of tenure rights into the future; and land-transfer rights (Liu, Carter, and Yao
1998).
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In this figure, the white portion of each bar reflects the per
centage of informants in each group who strongly agreed with the state
ment, the lightly shaded portion the proportion of informants who agreed with the statement, and so on.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Moreover, the factory's role in the regional political economy was in
creasingly marginal; state-owned enterprises like Pangang remained at once vital parts of the regional economy and symbols of national pride and
development.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Although the recent fate of many state-owned enterprises throughout China has involved privatization or closure, Pangang has in
creased its output in recent years and shows little signs of weakening.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
With Pangang, the nation's third-largest state-owned smelter, located just fifty kilometers away, air quality in Futian was undoubtedly affected by the regional dispersion of pollutants from an operation of that magnitude.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
As the key agency representing the Chinese state in matters of environmental quality, what role does SEPA play in es
tablishing and enforcing pollution standards? From where do agency offi
cials derive their mandate to act? Such questions relate to the growing insti
tutional capacity of regulatory agencies such as SEPA, but they also have to do with the burgeoning of civil-society organizations and their intersection with environmental issues in contemporary China.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
For example, during the Ninth National People's Congress in 1998, amidst massive cuts in the national bureaucracy, the State Environmental Protection Administration not only survived, but was granted more admin
istrative authority (Jahie11998).
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Although its power within the central administration remains limited in comparison with other state agencies whose mandate rests firmly in the arena of economic development, such as the State Development Planning Commission and the Ministry of Construction, SEPA is unarguably gaining capacity and momentum.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Several of these projects were massive hydroelec
tric facilities that had been in the works for years and were collectively
110 CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLLUTION ENFORCEMENT
National People's Congress (NPC)
NPC Standing Committee
State Council
State Envionmental Protection Administration (SEPA)
Related Social
SEPA Departments
Affiliated Inagtutions
Organizations
(e.g.,
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Article
18
of the Environmental Protection Law states that 'in cases where the discharge of pollutants exceeds the limit set by the state, a compensation fee shall be charged according to the quantities and concentration of the pollution
112 CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLLUTION ENFORCEMENT
released .°
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In 1996, the State Council, Chinas primary legislative body, issued
Deci
sions Concerning Certain Environmental Protection Issues
(Chinese State Council 1996) One section of this legislation was devoted to addressing the growing problem of rural industrial pollution, singling out for closure fif
teen types of township and village enterprises that were considered partic
ularly deleterious to the environment.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
The World Bank also published
China's Environment in the New Century: Clear Water, Blue Skies,
a damning report on the state of China's environment, which closely examined the rural industrial sector as a primary culprit (World Bank 1997) Early in 2ooo, Xie Zhenhua, then serving as minister of SEPA, spoke at a national conference on environmental protection, where he em
phasized that the government would continue to pursue and prosecute small-scale factories that failed to meet emissions standards.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In September
2002
the State Council issued a new directive to 'strictly implement acid rain control in the two control areas;' one of which includes Sichuan, where coal reserves are known to be particularly high in sulfur content.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Mayor Zhang and Party Secretary Wang also appeared on the program, discussing the state of the township's industrial development and its impact on the local environment and the health of the township's citizens.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLLUTION ENFORCEMENT 119
Policy Factors
Environmental Protection Bureau
Enforcement Tools
Institutional Constraints
Inspections and monitoring Funding
Pollution levy Equipment
Negotiation Expertise
Forced closure Manpower
Economic/Fiscal
Factors
District fiscal situation Township fiscal situation Financial solvency of firm
State Council directives SEPA policy Emissions standards
Civil Society Factors
Media exposure Citizen complaints
FIGURE
6.3.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Even during the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976),
the height of the socialist experiment and the point at which the power of the Chinese state was nearly absolute, this tradition of public engagement in civic affairs remained viable.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
As public consciousness grows regarding the rule of law and the contrac
tual obligations that bind citizens to the state, a greater discursive space is beginning to open up, within which the processes of civil society may oper
ate.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
The political scientists Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li have aptly de
scribed this growing phenomenon as 'rightful resistance, which they de
fine as follows:
A form of popular contention that operates near the boundary of authorized channels, employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinges on locating and exploiting divisions within the state, and relies on mobilizing support from the wider public.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
(2006:x)
It is important to distinguish rightful resistance from open rebellion against existing power structures, which in contemporary China can prove politically ineffectual and downright dangerous to those who are seen as challenging the state.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Such groups share many characteristics, including strong financial and scientific ties to international NGOs and a reliance on leaders with cultural prestige or political power that serves to buffer the organization somewhat from state
124
CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLLUTION ENFORCEMENT
interference.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
While such groups currently number in the hundreds, they are subject to a dizzying set of controls and regulations from the State Council and Cen
tral Committee.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
EPB enforcement priorities and actions are guided by State Council directives and SEPA
CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLLUTION ENFORCEMENT 125
policy, but citizen complaints and media exposure, what I have broadly called 'civil-society factors;' played a key role in determining the regulatory course of action for officials in the Renhe District EPB.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Factories were formerly held by the township government as collective assets, which meant that any criticism of the factory was ultimately criticism of the state, albeit the local state.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
When the factories were privatized as part of Reform and Opening, however, industry and state were effectively decoupled, which allowed citizens to complain about industrial pollution without pos
ing any direct affront to state power.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
While everyday forms of resistance consist of covert acts such as 'foot-dragging' designed to cumulatively and subtly under
mine state power, rightful resistance works in a more straightforward fash
ion by demanding adherence to the values, laws, and policies of the state itself.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
During the Maoist era, the interests of the indi
vidual were completely subsumed by those of the state.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Given the state's explicit commitment in law and policy to strict environmental standards, environmental issues are increasingly considered nonsensitive by government officials, which means that covering industrial accidents or infractions has become more routine in recent years (Mol and Carter
20o6).
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
For factories facing special financial difficulties, pollution-discharge fees may even be 'reduced, exempted, or postponed' (Chinese State Coun
cil
2003).
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Farmers throughout China must continually cope with shifting condi
tions within an economy that is in transition from state-controlled to market-oriented.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In state-sponsored publications, sustainable development, most often translated as
'kechixu fazhan;'
or 'development that can be sustained;' is defined in accordance with the commission
(1987:43)
as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs
[ji manzu dangdai rende xuyao, you bu dui houdai rende nengli goucheng weihaide fazhan]'
(China Industrial Development Report
2001:96-108)'
China was a high-profile participant in the
1992
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Develop
ment in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, adopting Agenda
21,
a broad policy docu
ment outlining environmentally sound development strategies in which the goal of sustainable development was defined as ensuring 'socially respon
sible economic development while protecting the resources base and the environment for future generations' (see Beckerman
1998).
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In his speech, Jiang laid out what he called 'four main goals in establishing a
xiaokang
society
[jian
she
xiaokang shehui si da mubiao];
the last of which, despite its obtuse language, unmistakably underscores the national government's shift to
ward a discourse of sustainability:
Similarly, Premier Wen Jiabao, in a
2oo6
speech at the Sixth National Congress on Environmental Protection sponsored by the State Council, stressed what he called the 'three transformations':
3.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
(CHINA TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISES 2002: 4)
From an economy-centered model of development to equal attention on both environmental protection and economic development From a mindset of cleaning up after economic development to a simultaneous emphasis on environmental protection
and
economic development
From a sole emphasis on administrative measures to control the envi
ronment (top-down, hierarchical, institutional) to a more comprehen
sive system involving the state, the business sector, and civil society
(XUE.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
SIMONIS, AND DUDEK 2007; CHINESE STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ADMINISTRATION 2006)
Supported by official policy and rhetoric, Chinese scholars of environ
mental science and policy are also actively exploring the implications of sustainable development for contemporary China.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Township government officials viewed in
dustry as the most important path to local economic development,
144 STRUGGLING FOR SUSTAINABILITY
STRUGGLING FOR SUSTAINABILITY 14$
State level
Central government Idealized sustainable Primary objective is to promote environmentally sustainable development practices through State Council directives,
SEPA
policy, and pollution-emissions standards
(e.g.,
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
At a more pragmatic level, the discourse of sustainability, and its exten
sion through the enforcement of pollution standards, provides an avenue for the central government to exercise power over peripheral areas such as Futian at a time in which the state is retreating from administrative over
sight in other ways.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Policies designed to protect the environment can often become a way for central states to gain control over other state and
STRUGGLING FOR SUSTAINABILITY 149
nonstate actors (Agrawal zoos) Of course, the central government also has a stake in quelling the popular uprisings over pollution that are occurring throughout China with greater frequency.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
For example, despite the fact that emissions from large state-owned enterprises like the nearby Panzhihua Iron and Steel Company surpassed Futian's emissions by an order of magnitude, such state-owned behemoths remained to pollute an
other day because they were vital sources of employment and revenue, be
cause they carried symbolic and political value for the state, and because they were effectively beyond the regulatory reach of the municipal and dis
trict EPBs.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Furthermore, officials in midlevel agencies such as the Renhe District Environmental Protection Bureau lacked the institutional power and jurisdiction to tackle massive, state-owned enterprises like Panzhihua Iron and Steel.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Rather, it became more important for me to ex
amine the divergent positions and interests of various state agencies in re
gard to the question of sustainable development.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Within the realm o£ en
vironmental politics, even a tightly controlled single-party state like the People's Republic of China contains contentious positions within dif
ferent levels of the government, and these positions have important con
sequences for determining exactly how sustainability is defined and implemented.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
ENVIRONMENTAL CIVIL SOCIETY WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
One of the key areas of inquiry for social scientists studying China today is the role of civil society-which I have defined as an intermediate realm between the family and the state characterized by collective action around shared values, interests, and goals-in public life (Chan 2005; Welter zoos).
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Economic liberalization has also played a role in the growth of environ
mental civil society The decoupling of industry from state, which has been a hallmark of Reform and Opening, has undoubtedly helped open the door for civil society mobilization in opposition to industrial pollution.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In the early reform era, when the vast majority of rural factories were owned and managed collectively by township and village governments, criticism of the factory was ultimately criticism of the state, albeit the local state.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In some ways, I came to view the factory owners and workers as victims of an ambiguous and unpredictable political economy in China, where the state gives every impression of 'retreating' from many of its duties but retains the authority to selectively enforce laws and policies when it deems necessary.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
If we are to fully understand the processes behind pollution enforcement and the consequences of these processes for economic and environmental sustainability, then we need to appreciate the complexity of governance in contemporary China and the divergent positions and interests of various state agencies in regards to the question of sustainable development.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
The current global financial crisis, which commenced as I finished the final revisions for this book, poses yet another challenge to the relationship between state and civil society in China.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In Civil
Life,
Globalization, and Political Change in Asia: Organizing Between Family and State, ed.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Chinese
State Council.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Guowuyuan Guanyu Huanjing Baohu Rogan Wentide larding [State Council Decisions Concerning Certain Environmental Protection Issues].
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Chinese
State Council.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Chinese
State Environmental Protection Administration.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
2006, Zhongguo Huanjing
Zhuangkuang
Gongbao [Report on the State of the Environment in China].
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Chinese
State Environmental Protection Administration.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
2oo5
Fields
of Power, Forests of Discontent: Culture, Conservation, and the State in Mexico.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
'House, Cooperative, and State in the Remaking of China's Country
side.'
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In Cooperative and Collective in China§ Rural Development: Between State and Private Interests, ed.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Weller, Robert R 2005 'Introduction: Civil Institutions and the State.'
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In Civil Life, Glo
balization, and Political Change in
Asia:
Organizing
Between Family and State, ed.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
See also reforestation campaign
Deng Xiaoping,
1;
ascendance
to power of, 38; on development, 21-22, 60; experimenting with decollectiviza
tion, 2-3; 'liberate your thinking,' 62; 'Reform and opening' announced by, 2; on rural reform, 37; on xiaokang, 62
development, sustainable, 10-12,127; central government model of, 143,144; competing models of, 143-45,144-; defining, 141; defining, state-sponsored publications, 138; defining, Tian Lizhong, 142-43; definition of, conflict of values regarding, 136; definition of, wenbaovs.huanbao,142-43,
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
See State Environmental Protection Administration
Shapiro, Judith, 3; on migration history of
Panzhihua, 24
Shuitian, 33; cultural quality of, 34; literacy of, 34; resentful of official government classification of
r,
36; wedding, 33, 34 Sichuanhua, xiii
Sichuan Nationalities Research Institute, xiii
Sichuan Province, 32; map Of, 14; particu
late matter emitted from, 70
Sichuan Television Station, 114 Smil, Vaclav, 84
smokestacks: at coking plant, so, 76; at zinc smelter, 76, 113
'socialism with Chinese characteristics, 38, 44, 158; joke, 57-58; success of, 169n2 socialist revolution, 2
social order, 87, 121
Social organizations.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
See nongovernmental organizations
social stability, 126
Special Economic Zones, 13
State Council and Central Committee, 9 State Environmental Protection Adminis
tration (SEPA), xii, 9,12, 69; administra
tive structure of, r1o; air quality stan
dards, 72, 72, 75; granted more authority, 1o9; prioritizing enforcement duties, 118; systematic monitoring by, 70
Steward, Julian, 16
strategic risk repression, 103, 155 sulfur dioxide, 69, 70
sustainable development.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Printed in the United States of America
2009017783
CONTENTS
List of Figures vi List of Tables ix Preface xi
1.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
China's gross domestic product has grown nearly to percent per year over that time period, and its economy is expected to be the largest in the world, surpassing the United States, within the next two decades.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
The rural-urban disparity can be truly shocking to the foreign
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND SUSTAINABILITY 13
visitor; I have often reflected that I experience less culture shock when I get off the airplane from the west coast of the United States to Beijing than I do when I board a train or a bus and travel from the city into the Chinese coun
tryside.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Much of this work shares the common goal of understanding what Arun Agrawal (zoos) has termed 'environmentality,' the linkages between states and spe
cific localities-mediated through power, knowledge, and discourse-and the resultant relationships between people and the natural world.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
The scale and pace of China's environmental crisis have undoubtedly been exacerbated by the past several decades of market-driven development; even conservative estimates suggest that pollution cuts
4
to 5 percent from China's GDP each year (Liu and Zhou
2oo1)'
Both a blessing and a curse, coal has fueled the spectacular rise of China's economy, which is currently the world's third largest (behind the United States and Japan) and is expected to become the largest within the next two decades.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Using organic chemical analyses, scientists in the United States are now able to determine with some certainty that pollutants from China (including carci
nogenic compounds known as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, or PAHs) are carried into the upper atmosphere, where they travel across the Pacific as far as the west coast of North America, contributing to the ambient pol
lution burden in Oregon, where I live (Primbs et al.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In 2007, China surpassed the United States to officially become the world's largest pro
ducer of carbon dioxide, emitting 6.2
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Modern coal-fired industrial facilities in the United States and Europe are typically equipped with 'coal-scrubbing' technologies such as electrostatic precipi
tators, which remove much of the particulate matter from the gaseous emissions.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
1993)
5
One pioneering study conducted in six cities across the United States provides a good esti
mation of the health effects of PM...
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Chinese pollu
tion standards are similar to, if slightly more lax than, those of developed countries such as the United States.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
percent of GDP in
2005
(Zhang
2005)
While this is slightly less than the amount the United States spends on environmental compliance, which is estimated to be about
2.6
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In the context of environmental protec
tion and sustainable development, the Chinese government can in fact be viewed as multiple states, each promoting its own model of sustainable de
velopment.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In the United States and other developed countries of the West, for example, environmental movements began with pragmatic con
cerns over the occupational health and safety hazards posed by the dual processes of urbanization and industrialization during the early twentieth century (Gottlieb 1993) Only later did the movement proceed to more ab
stract concepts such as biodiversity conservation, holes in the ozone layer, or global climate change.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Moreover, while China's total CO' emissions have surpassed the United States, its per capita emissions are still signifi
cantly below U.S. levels.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
In this regard, villagers' experiences in Futian mirror those of citizens in other coun
tries, including the United States, where public concern clashes with ambiguity, uncertainty, or denial on the part of environmental-health scientists and officials.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Much of the work on environmental justice in the United States, for example, has focused on how racial minorities and people of low socioeconomic status bear a disproportionate share of the health risks associated with environmentally polluting industries and activities.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Second, much of the recent work on environmental justice in the United States has been conducted under a growing legal framework supported by Executive Order 12898, which makes clear legal mandates on federal agencies to pre
vent unequal environmental burdens from falling on communities of color or poor communities.
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
See also Our Com
mon Future
United Nations World Summit 2oo5, 16o United States Executive Order 12898, 171n2
United States National Environmental Policy Act, 79
wage labor opportunity, 41
waidiren, 90, 1o6; animosity towards, 94 Wang Chunyang, 115; on development, 60-63; on factory closures, 130; on migrant workers, 52-53; on xiaokang, 62
Warring States Period, 62
water: Laozi on, 87; metallic tasting, 82; pollution from coal-washing plant, 88-89,114; quality, 3-4, 65; shortages, 93-94
192 INDEX
Weller, Robert,
106;
on environmental consciousness,
8
wenbao, 30, 91, 161; huanbao v.,142-43,
The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Fear
ing a 'fatal accident' if he were captured, Shih Ming-teh slipped through the police dragnet and sought refuge with Reverend Kao Chun-ming, head of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The most politically active religious group during Taiwan's democratization movement was the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Missionaries of the church had been in Taiwan for decades under the Japa
nese colonial regime; the most famous of these was the Canadian medi
cal missionary George Mackay.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
108
Mackay's church played a critical role in popularizing a written form of the Hokkien language.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
After the KMT imposed martial law, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan became a zone of relative safety for Taiwanese hoping to preserve and cul
tivate a unique Hokkien identity.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
While some missionaries remained in the country, Hokkien-speaking Taiwanese dominated the church's leadership and governance structures.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Those changes created a new challenge for the Presbyterian Church, which remained steadfastly committed to romanized Hokkien.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
At a church conference in the early 2000s, young pastors stirred strong feelings when they asked the church's blessing to use Chinese-character Bibles-and even some spoken Mandarin-in their services.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
They claimed young parishioners were more comfortable reading characters than romanized Hokkien, but for many church leaders such a compromise threatened to weaken the church's Tai
wanese identity.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The fight in the Presbyterian Church was largely generational.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The crisis over language and culture that has roiled the Presbyterian Church plays itself out in myriad ways in Taiwan society.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
See
referendum Portugual, 14, 35, 42 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, 73, 107-109
presidential office, 3, 9, 35, 81, 85, 88-89,158
Provincial Assembly, 66, 68, 71, 74 Pulau,177
Putonghua.See
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Inhabited by Austronesians and rough
and-ready Chinese of questionable loyalty and limited economic value, Taiwan received little attention from the Manchu court-except when there was trouble.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
When the Qing court rejected their requests to trade, the British forced their way in, bartering opium grown in their South Asian colonies for Chinese tea and porcelain.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
As in the rest of China, the British first paid themselves their reparations then forwarded what was left to the Qing court.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
To defend the empire against these threats, the Qing court was forced to give local military leaders unprecedented power and autonomy-including the right to collect taxes.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The court's hold on power grew ever more tenu
ous, even as it upgraded Taiwan's status to a province in
1885
in the hope of promoting modernization and a more effective defense.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Taiwan's supreme court, the Council of Grand justices, ruled the senior representatives must step down.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Shi Lang was the admiral who persuaded the Qing court to seize Taiwan from Zheng Chenggong's Ming loyalists back in the 1600s.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Shi Lang told the court that despite the ex
pense, Taiwan needed to be incorporated into the empire to prevent it from becoming a haven for troublemakers, putting him firmly in the camp that advocates holding Taiwan to keep it out of enemy hands-that is, for strategic denial.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Hu learned a painful lesson about the limits of executive power when he was courting
Chapter 4
I'm constantly thinking about what we can produce, what industries we can have in the future.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
She and seven other members of the
Formosa
staff were tried in military courts on charges of subversion.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
President Chen Shui-bian (and thousands of others) were arrested by ROC police, judged in ROC courts, and confined in ROC prisons.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The president elected in 2008, Ma Ying
jeou, believes Taiwan's best hope for maintaining the status quo-de facto separation, albeit short of full independence-is to cultivate friendly ties with the mainland.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Also, Taiwan and mainland China had grown very far apart dur
ing those five decades of separation.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Raymond R. Wu wrote in the
Straits Times
in early 2003, 'With China becoming Taiwan's [Number] 1 export market at the
'An Opportunity Full of Threats' 129
end of last year, economic interdependence will make Taiwan's permanent separation from China increasingly improbable, thus reducing the risk of direct military conflict.'
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
However, the proposals for 'Taiwan independence,' 'two Chinas' and 'two states,' aiming for separation instead of reunification, violate the One-China Principle, and are naturally unacceptable to the Chinese Government.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Once a divorce is final, reconciliation is unlikely, so even though remaining separated is hardly Beijing's preference, it prefers separation to divorce.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
For Taiwan, the trick is to maintain as much freedom of action as it can without finalizing the divorce; the PRC's goal is to end the separation.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
After every separation, the country was invariably reunified, only to be followed in its wake by rapid political, economic, cultural, scientific and technological de
velopment.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The only future for Taiwan is reunification with the China mainland, and certainly not separation.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
This line of argument holds that Taiwan's separation from the mainland is a legacy of China's weakest age, the period in the late nineteenth and
The International Birdcage
171
early twentieth centuries when parts of China were invaded and colonized.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Restoring those traits requires eliminating the last, aberrant vestige of China's late-Qing weakness: Taiwan's separation from the mainland.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
In this context, Taiwan's continued separation from the mainland stands as the last remnant of China's self-proclaimed 'century of humiliation,' a defi
ciency that must be overcome if China is to see its rightful glory restored.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
It asserts it will pay any price to avoid the outcome it deems unacceptable: the permanent separation of Taiwan from China.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Of course it would prefer Tai
wan not strengthen its internal rhetoric of separation, but as long as Beijing controls Taiwan's international status it can nullify any pro-independence moves.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
It is unique in the world in having all the attributes of a state-territory, population, government-except recogni
tion by others.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The People's Republic of China insists that history makes Taiwan part of China, and because the government in Beijing is the rec
ognized Chinese state, it should rule the island.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Chapter 1
The World's Tallest Building 5
In the 1930s, Japanese expansionism deepened the crisis facing the strug
gling ROC state, forcing Chinese of all political stripes to concentrate their energies on resisting Japan's occupation of eastern China.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Four years later, in 1949, the Communists proclaimed a new Chinese state, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the defeated ROC government fled to Taiwan.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
For the next forty years they devoted themselves to the task of keeping the Republic of China alive in the hope that it might someday return to the mainland in triumph, drive the Communists from power, and restore itself as the reigning Chinese state.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Under the protection of the United States,
which
regarded Taiwan as a crucial bulwark against Communist expansion, the KMT adopted a state-led economic development plan that soon put Taiwan on the road to prosperity.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Beijing does not recognize the ROC'S legitimacy; in its view, the Communists' victory in 1949 extinguished the Republic, leaving the PRC as the only state representing the Chinese nation.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
They still op
pose folding Taiwan into the PRC, but they now see little benefit in giving up what they have to become part of
any
Chinese state headquartered on the mainland-even a non-Communist one.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
billion mainland people and their leaders in
evitably would dominate a unified Chinese state.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
It rebranded numerous state-owned cor
porations, replacing 'China' in their names with 'Taiwan,' and it tried, with little success, to stem the flow of Taiwanese business to the mainland.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
It cannot call itself the Republic of Taiwan, but it can and does assert the statehood of the Republic of China, a state once universally recognized, now reduced in territory but still robust within its own jurisdiction.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Japan was desperate to prove to the West that it was a modern state-a colonizer, not a territory eligible for colonization by others.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
It was to be a model colony, a massive demonstration project where the Meiji state would show off its military, economic, and administrative prowess.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
As Japan and China were preparing to sign the Treaty of Shi
monoseki, a handful of Taiwanese tried to fend off Japanese colonial rule by setting up a 'Republic of Formosa'-a Taiwanese state independent of both China and Japan.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
When the Chinese political activist Sun Yat-sen, who was on a fund-raising trip in the United States, heard the news he rushed back to China to help set up a new Chinese state based on democratic principles.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Nonetheless, the ROC state gradually consolidated its authority and extended its reach.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The following year, Japan set up a puppet state in the region and installed the deposed Qing emperor as its nominal head.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
On February
27, 1947,
a police officer in Taipei City struck a woman he was arresting for selling cigarettes illegally (tobacco was a state monopoly).
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
As soldiers spread terror through the island, they crushed the Taiwanese as a political force able to advocate change outside the Nationalist state or [KMT] party structure.'
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
As far as the PRC was concerned, the Republic of China ceased to exist; the PRC had superseded it, and all of its territories-including Taiwan-now belonged to the new state.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Suddenly, the mar
ginal territory had become the last refuge of a state that had lost its nation.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
In the early decades after Retrocession, the KMT operated a single
party authoritarian state with few individual or civil rights, but over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, the system was transformed into a fully democratic state.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The state
owned companies that dominated major industries were led by Mandarin
speaking executives, while Taiwanese military conscripts were commanded by an overwhelmingly Mainlander officer corps.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The state defined the cultural practices of ordinary Taiwanese as inferior to those of the Mandarin-speaking, Confucian-spouting elite.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Their homes were owned by the state, and they were never renovated, not least because renovations might betray a lack of faith in Chiang's promise that they would soon 'return home.'
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Where Lee Teng-hui s concept of Taiwanese identity was essentially po
litical-he argued for a separate, independent Taiwanese state-Chen Shui
bian's concept was cultural-it posited Taiwan as a nation.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Japanese entrepreneurs and state agencies took the lead in Taiwan's industrialization, but over time, some Taiwanese accumulated the skills and capital to compete in business.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Under the auspices of the state-owned Taiwan De
velopment Company, Japanese firms introduced a wide range of industries, from chemicals to machine tools to textiles.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
At the time, the Allied powers recognized the Republic of China led by Chiang Kai-shek's Nation
alist (KMT) Party as the Chinese state, and it was to the ROC that Japanese colonial administrators handed over the island.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
During the devastating
Chapter 3
From Farmers to Manufacturers 45
eight-year Japanese occupation of China's coastal cities, corruption and inflation in the areas under ROC control sapped the state's legitimacy.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Rather than turning those enterprises over to the private sector, the ROC state took ownership of most of them, while the Kuomintang acquired others.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The first round of measures aimed at rescuing Taiwan's economy included setting up the Taiwan Production Board to oversee state-owned firms, es
tablishing a new currency (the New Taiwan Dollar, or NT), and undertak
ing an ambitious land reform.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
In the first phase of land reform, undertaken in
1949,
the state ordered farm rents reduced from a standard
50
percent of the harvest to
37.5
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
That same year, the state sold off publicly owned land to the farmers who worked it, setting the price at two and a half years' harvest, payable in kind over ten years.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The state then sold family-sized parcels to the landlords' tenants.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Not surprisingly, most Taiwanese viewed the land reform as a positive develop
ment, and they gave much of the credit to the ROC state, especially its local representatives.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Where private capital was reluctant to
48
enter, the state used publicly owned enterprises.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
At first, only the state could provide heavy industry on a scale that would support consumer-oriented manufacturing, but Taiwan's economic policy gurus left room in the economy for private firms to grow into that niche.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The state-owned China Petroleum Corporation dominated Taiwan's oil and gas market from the beginning of ROC rule in Taiwan.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Despite its initial advantage-and strong state support-CPC is not Tai
wan's major plastics producer.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Under the plan, the state expanded access to capital by reactivating banks, liberalizing access to foreign currency, and creating a stock exchange.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Within two years, it had met its targets for in
vestment, export value, and employment, prompting the state to construct EPZs in several other cities.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Large corporations, many of them state owned, provided a steady supply of industrial raw materials-energy, plastic, steel, cement-to Taiwan's ex
port manufacturers.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Both the education system and the structures for civil service promotion were biased in favor of Mainlanders, who were overrepresented in the mili
tary, government, and state-owned firms.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The government policies that favored state-owned firms in large-scale and heavy industry limited the growth of private firms and ensured a steady supply of industrial inputs.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The state's relaxed ap
proach to new business creation reinforced the cultural preference for be
ing one's own boss.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Taiwan's ambitious, hands
on entrepreneurs seized opportunities created by the development-oriented state to expand the private sector.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
And by the 1980s, some of the largest pri
vate firms were overtaking their state-owned competitors.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
In 2000, Wang's Formosa Petrochemical Company opened a refinery to compete with the China Petroleum Corporation; in 2001, the Taiwan legislature passed a bill to privatize the state-owned oil giant.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Just as Wang Yung-ching's private venture caught up with its state-owned competitor, the service sector eventually overtook manufacturing.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Some of the most important studies-all of which I rely on heavily in this chapter-include Thomas Gold's classic book State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle; Li-min Hsueh, Chen-kuo Hsu, and Dwight H. Perkins' Industri
alization and the State: The Changing Role
of
the Taiwan Government in the Economy, 1945-1998; Ezra Vogel's The Four Little Dragons; Robert Wade's Governing the Market; and The Key to the Asian Miracle: Making Shared Growth Credible by Jose Edgardo Campos and Hilton L. Root.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Megan Greene's book, The Origins
of
the Developmental State in Taiwan, is an excellent source of information on Tai
wan's science and technology policy.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
In August 1947, a few months after the bloody 2-28 Incident, General Al
bert C. Wedemeyer submitted a sobering report to U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
It was only in the 1970s that Taiwanese began to resist the state in significant numbers, to demand their freedom.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Although it didn't look that way in the 1950s and 1960s, the ROC state was not built on an authoritarian foundation.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Chapter 4
From 'Free China' to Democratic Taiwan
61
Although the ROC state incorporated many compromises aimed at ac
commodating the political realities of early twentieth-century China, it took the three principles as the basis of its legitimacy.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
But democracy was not its only value-or even its primary one-for the ROC also was a na
tionalist state.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Despite these limitations, the constitution remained the source of the ROC state's legitimacy.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
It might be cut off from most of its territory, but the state itself was intact: the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan were meeting in Taipei, the ROC's bureau
cratic agencies had set up shop in offices built for Japan's colonial officials, the armed forces were fortifying their defenses-and President Chiang Kai
shek oversaw it all from the grand Presidential Office at the west end of Hsinyi Road.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
They regarded themselves as the representatives of a past and future Chinese nation; they felt obligated to their compatriots in the mainland to preserve the diversity of China's population within the ROC state.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The expectation that Mainlander youth would take government positions meant Taiwanese were expected not to take them, while a quota system guaranteeing all provinces a share of state jobs limited the number of Taiwanese who could serve.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Nor did the state limit its nationalistic indoctrination to Mainlanders.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
As years-then decades-passed and the prospects of mainland recovery dimmed, freezing the legislature increasingly seemed like a stratagem for denying democratic representation to the people who actually lived under the ROC state: the people of Taiwan.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
A far more promis
ing approach would be to identify authentic local leaders and co-opt them into the KMT-led state.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
In making the Kaohsiung defendants pay a terrible price for challenging the regime, the state planned to silence them and cow their would-be supporters.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Taiwan was now officially a multiparty state.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
A decade later, he was in the United States, studying at Iowa State University.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
While Chen argued that Taiwan needed a new constitution to address inefficiencies in existing political institutions, he also said the new document would make Taiwan 'a normal, complete, great state.'
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
During the 2008 presidential race, DPP candidate Frank Hsieh so despaired over the state of affairs that he cancelled his public appearances and went into seclusion for two weeks.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The wed
ding date is set according to complex astrological calculations that take into account the couple's birthdays as well as the state of the cosmos around the time they hope to wed.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Their determination to use the language in their written documents put them at odds with the KNIT, which was insisting on Mandarin, but their dose ties with Christian groups in the West partially protected them from the state's repressive urges.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
When the KNIT arrived in Taiwan in 1945, its plan was to reinte
grate the island into the Chinese nation-state, so it adopted cultural policies aimed at inculcating a particular version of Chinese culture.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
The pressure to create art that would speak to an audience in search of its identity without provoking the state or compromising artistic quality took a toll on Lin.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
As before, the state initiated public-private collaborations that helped transform Taiwan into a global center for IT production.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
What economic integration has done is to take
both
end-state options off the table, in favor of a broad social preference for what Taiwanese call 'the status quo
-
-a situation in which Taiwan enjoys de facto independence while not ruling out unification in the future.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
By the late 1960s, this state of affairs was becoming insupportable.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
If recovering the mainland was the
raison d'etre
for single-party authoritarianism, a global rejection of that project meant the ROC state would need to find a new basis for its legitimacy.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
As the 1970s progressed, voices from across the political spectrum offered different views of how the state should reconstruct itself.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Some devoted them
selves to democratizing the ROC, while others believed Taiwan could never be free so long as it was under a state calling itself 'Republic of China.'
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
They took inspiration from early gestures toward a Taiwanese state, including a brief episode in 1895 and talk of Taiwan independence during the colonial period.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
But even here there is a catch:
140 Chapter 7
normally, international recognition is necessary for a state to exist, so if no other governments recognized the newly independent Taiwanese state, it still might not be independent under international law.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Shih observed that Taiwan, doing business as the ROC, had no need to declare independence, since the Republic of China was an independent state already-and had been since 1912.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
Pro-independence hardliners developed the notion of Taiwanese na
tionalism-the idea that Taiwan constituted a nation worthy of its own, fully sovereign state-to support their case.
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
During a 1999 interview with the Ger
man radio network Deutsche Welle, Lee described the relationship between the ROC and the PRC as 'a special state-to-state relationship.'
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse
In fact, Lee's statement said nothing about Taiwan indepen
dence, but it did assert the existence of an ROC state.
Why Taiwan Matters